

Do attempts to formalise the *syād-vāda* make sense?

Piotr Balcerowicz

1. Ontology and epistemology of the *syād-vāda*

A contribution of Jainism to Indian philosophy which seems most stimulating, inspiring, debated and controversial, one which provoked most opposition from other systems of India is beyond doubt the doctrine of multiplexity of reality (*anekānta-vāda*). Indisputably it is also the most interesting Jaina contribution to Indian philosophy. The doctrine involved both a very particular realist ontology as well as a corresponding epistemology that was structured in such a way as to most aptly handle certain ontological presuppositions.

The Jaina ontology entailed by the doctrine of multiplexity of reality (*anekānta-vāda*) viewed the world structure as consisting of four interrelated aspects: substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), mode (*pariyāya*) and ineffable, transient occurrence (*vivarta, vartanā*), often overlooked in both Jaina expositions of the theory and in analyses carried out by modern researchers. However, the point to emphasise was that things, especially when conceived as substances, were believed to preserve their identity and in this aspect they were immutable and permanent; at the same time however, when conceived as modes, they appeared to change and transform continuously. This seemed to have led to contradictions in ontology. Besides, in order to explain the process of change, Jaina ontology also distinguished three modes of existence, that actually coexisted: origination (*utpāda, udaya*), continued existence (*sthiti, dhrauvya*) and cessation, or disintegration (*bhaṅga, vyaya, apavarga*). These four closely corresponded to the Buddhist Sarvāstī-vāda's and Abhidharma's four (or three) conditioned factors, known as 'markers' (*saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa*) – origination (*utpāda*), continuity (*sthiti*), deterioration (*jarā, vyaya*) and extinction (*bhaṅga, nirodha*) – or second-order elementary constituents of reality (*dharma*) that were believed to attach themselves to every other first-order elementary constituent of reality 'marked' (*lakṣya*) by them and thereby determined in its momentary existence (*kṣaṇika*).

The emphasis (which gradually became more pronounced after 2nd / 3rd centuries CE) of Jaina ontology on both permanence and imperishability of substances, worked out against the Buddhist theories of momentariness (*kṣaṇika-vāda*) and insubstantiality (*nairātmya, niḥsvabhāvatā*), as well as constant mutability and change of substances in form and occurrence, developed in contrast to the theory of the immutable substance of the Vaiśeṣika, seemed to lead to a contradiction: how to reconcile the idea of a permanent substance with its incessant mutability? Both the dual nature of things and a solution of the paradox was expressed by Umāsvāmin (c. 350–400) in the *Tattvārtha-sūtra*:

[29] The existent is furnished with origination, annihilation and permanence.
[30] It is indestructible in its essentiality, i.e. permanent. [31] [The existent is both], because [it is] established as having emphasised [property] and not-emphasised [property].¹

It seems that this juxtaposition of two seemingly incompatible natures of the real were the starting point for the doctrine of multiplexity of reality (*anekānta-vāda*).

The complexity of the nature of everything that exist was further emphasised by the fact that the existent was thought, under the influence of the Vaiśeṣika, to be qualified by the universality, or universal character (*sāmānya*), and particularity, or particular character (*viśeṣa*). The idea is expressed as early as by Siddhasena Divākara in the *Saṃmati-tarka-prakaraṇa*.²

¹ TS₁ 5.29–31 / TS₂ 5.30–32: [29] *utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya-yuktaṃ sat*. [30] *tad bhāvāvayayaṃ nityam*. [31] *arpitānarpita-siddheḥ*.

² STP 3.1:

The dual nature of the existent is reflected in the language, which is expressed by Samantabhadra in the *Yukty-anuśāsana*:

‘Manifold particulars are grounded in universality. Word [by its nature] is furnished with an access into (*sc.* pertains to) the particular. Another [variety of word (speech element)] leads to (*sc.* conveys) a particular, that is of the universal nature, because [such a word] functions with regard to intermediate particulars;’³

as well as in the *Āpta-mīmāṃsā*:

‘The manifest thing neither originates nor disintegrates as something that has universal character, because of its continuity. It does disintegrate and originate because it is particular. these two [universal and particular character occur] jointly in one [thing]. The existent consists in origination and [continued existence as well as disintegration].’⁴

The idea was also repeatedly mentioned by Akalaṅka (8th c.), for instance in the *Laghīyas-traya*:

‘The defining feature of time and other [categories], which should be reflected upon, has been examined elsewhere in its entirety [with the conclusion that] this [defining feature] is grounded in an object that consists in substance, modes, the universal character and the particular character.’⁵

The conviction that world substances, and their qualities, modes and transient occurrences cannot even be conceived to exist entirely independently, as if separated from other elements and that they all simultaneously originate, are endowed with continued existence and disintegrate in every moment again and again, while at the same time preserve their integrity and self-identity, led further to a belief that the world is a complex network within which all the existents are related with all the remaining ones and that their essential character and nature is not only determined by what is in things themselves but also by all the relations in which they enter vis-à-vis all other existents.

These ontological concepts, as usually is the case (e.g. two cognitive criteria (*pramāṇa*) to cognise two aspects of the world (*sva-lakṣaṇa* and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* in Dignāga’s system), necessitated a particular epistemology to most efficiently and competently handle accepted ontological constitution of the world.

Originally ontological or metaphysical considerations eventually led to exuberant development of corresponding epistemology, which ultimately involved what came to be known as the theory of multiplexity of reality (*anekānta-vāda*), that comprised three analytical methods: the method (historically the oldest) of the four standpoints (*nikṣepa-vāda*, *nyāsa-vāda*), the (usually) sevenfold method of conditionally valid predications, known as the doctrine of viewpoints (*naya-vāda*),⁶ and the method of the seven-fold modal description (*sapta-bhaṅgī*, *syād-vāda*).

A clear reflection of the awareness that the Jaina theory serves to handle a very particular ontology, based on the idea of coexistence of seemingly incompatible features in one and the same locus, can be found in the *Nyāya-viniścaya* on a few occasions:

*sāmañnammi viśeso viśesa-pakkhe ya vayaṇa-viñiveso /
davva-pariṇāmam aṇṇaṃ dāei tayaṃ ca ṇiyamei //*

³ YA 40, p. 94:

*sāmānya-niṣṭhā vividhā viśeṣāḥ padaṃ viśeṣāntara-pakṣa-pāti /
antar-viśeṣāntara-vṛttito ’nyat samāna-bhāvaṃ nayate viśeṣam //*

⁴ ĀMī 57:

*na sāmānyātmanôdeti na vyeti vyaktam anvayāt /
vyety uedti viśeṣāt te sahâkatrôdayâdi sat //*

⁵ LT 47:

*kālâdi-lakṣaṇaṃ nyakṣeṇâyatṛêkyam parikṣitam /
dravya-paryāya-sāmānya-viśeṣâtmârtha-niṣṭhitam //*

⁶ See BALCEROWICZ (2001) and (2003).

‘They have correctly explained that the defining feature of perception is lucid percipience of definite contents consisting in an object which is both substance and modes as well as is of universal character and of particular character;’⁷

and

‘The seven-fold modal description operates by way of affirmation and negation [expressed with the functor] “in a certain sense” in keeping with the complex structure (lit. divisions) consisting in substance and modes as well as in the universal character and the particular character.’⁸

Since the term ‘*bhaṅga*’ (‘angle’), or figure, may denote either an ‘expressed option’ or a ‘sentence’ (*vākya*),⁹ esp. an attributive or qualitative one, that predicates a certain attribute or its absence to an object, and this understanding applies both to *naya-vāda* and *syād-vāda*, and since both the theories coincided as regards the number of their elements, these two came to be called *naya-sapta-bhaṅgī* (‘seven-fold description through viewpoints’) and *pramāṇa-sapta-bhaṅgī* (‘seven-fold description through cognitive criteria’), respectively, in the mediaeval period. Further, since—in opposition to both *naya-vāda* and *syād-vāda* which were considered true and reliable—one could also distinguish a third analytical description of the world, a flawed one called ‘erroneous viewpoint’ (*durnaya*) or ‘erroneous presentation’ (*durnīti*),¹⁰ a third *sapta-bhaṅgī* method was invented called *durnīti-° / durnaya-sapta-bhaṅgī* (‘seven-fold description through erroneous viewpoints’).¹¹ It didactically and rhetorically and served to demonstrate how it is possible that other philosophical and religious systems can err, what analytical methods they unknowingly apply so that they achieve wrong results, and what doctrinal errors they commit.

The present article will deal only with one component of the doctrine of multiplexity of reality (*anekānta-vāda*), i.e. with the method of the seven-fold modal description (*sapta-bhaṅgī*, *syād-vāda*).

Its most important component, most hotly criticised by other schools of thought, were the conjunctions of three basic figures (*bhaṅga*), or ways of analysing an object within a consistent conceptual framework, usually—at an earlier stage—expressed *roughly* as follows:

- (1) *syād asti* (‘*x* is, in a certain sense, *P*’),
- (2) *syān nāsti* (‘*x* is, in a certain sense, not-*P*’),

⁷ NVi 1.3₁:

*pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇam prāhuḥ spaṣṭam sākāram añjasā /
dravya-paryāya-sāmānya-viśeṣārthātma-vedanam //*

⁸ NVi₁ 3.66₂ = NVi₁ 451cd–452ab:

*dravya-paryāya-sāmānya-viśeṣa-pravibhāgataḥ /
syād-vidhi-pratiśedhābhyaṁ sapta-bhaṅgī pravartate //*

⁹ E.g. SBhT. p. 16.10: ...*bhaṅgānām vākyaṇām*....

¹⁰ See. e.g. Hemacandra-sūri (1088–1172) in AYVD 28ab:

*sad eva sat syāt sad iti tridhārtho mīyate durnīti-naya-pramāṇaiḥ /
‘A thing *x* can be determined in threefold manner as “*x* only is...”, “in a certain sense, *x* is...”, “*x* is...” by means of, respectively, erroneous presentations (viewpoints), viewpoints and cognitive criteria.’*

¹¹ See e.g. Māilla-dhavalā-[deva] (c. 1200) in ṆC 254ab, p. 128: *sattēva huṁti bhaṅgā pamāṇa-ṇaya-duṇaya-bheda-juttāvi /* (‘There are as many as seven conditional perspectives with divisions as regards cognitive criteria, viewpoints and defective viewpoints.’); Prabhācandra (11th c.) in PKM 6.74, p. 482 ff.; Vimaladāsa (15th c.) in SBhT 1.7, p. 16.1: *īyam eva pramāṇa-sapta-bhaṅgī naya-sapta-bhaṅgī ca kathyate*. See BALCEROWICZ (2003: 37).

Comp. also JTBh₁ 1.22 § 64, p. 20.7-10: *sēyam sapta-bhaṅgī pratibhaṅga(m) sakalādeśa-svabhāvā vikalādeśa-svabhāvā ca. tatra pramāṇa-pratipannānanta-dharmātmaka-vastunaḥ kālādibhir abheda-vṛtti-prādhānyād abhedōpacārād vā yaugapadyena pratipādakam vacaḥ sakalādeśaḥ. naya-viśayī-kṛtasya vastu-dharmasya bheda-vṛtti-prādhānyād bhedōpacārād vā krameṇābhidhāyakam vākyaṁ vikalādeśaḥ*. Yasovijaya prefers a term *nayābhāsa* (‘fallacy of a viewpoint’) for *durnaya*, see JTBh₁ 2.2 § 11 (p. 24.15 ff.) = JTBh₂, p. 24.15 ff.

(3 or 4) *syād avaktavyam* ('*x* is, in a certain sense, inexpressible').

The remaining four figures were, as it is widely known, permutations of the three basic ones.

In the first part, the paper asks the question whether attempts, and there are quite numerous, to formalise *syād-vāda* really make sense, or if they were to make any sense what requirements they would have to fulfil in the first place in order to approach any degree of being an accurate (and correct from formal logical point of view) description of what the Jainas attempted to say through their theory. By implication, the paper will show what approaches to the formalisation issue are flawed at the very outset. In the second part, the paper presents an attempt to... formalise the *syād-vāda* which, in my opinion, fulfils the formal requirements or an accurate representation of the doctrine.

2. Formalisation attempts and requirements of the *syād-vāda*

Generally speaking, I would distinguish two kinds of modern approach to the method of the seven-fold modal description (*syād-vāda*): constructivist method (interpretation) and reductionist method (interpretation), decisively most of modern interpretations belonging to the former category.

What is call 'constructivist method' is such a strategy of examination that, while trying to meaningfully analyse the theory, makes use of modern tools of logic and epistemology which were not explicitly known in ancient or mediaeval India, although one can see no objection to their application and one thinks their use helps one illuminate the issue by 'dismembering' its muddled structure or by disambiguating expressions which seem to us either indeterminate, obscure or equivocal precisely because no such disambiguation tools were available at that time. It is the lack of original clarity or ambiguity on part of ancient or mediaeval Jaina thinkers that supposedly calls for the application of modern logical terms and apparatus to clearly see logical relations and logical structures that lie behind the *syād-vāda* theory. The outcome of this approach is generally richer in logical terms, philosophical concepts and theoretical apparatus than what seemed to be the original concepts expressed by Indian thinkers centuries ago. As a matter of fact, this methodological approach dominates in research and many have felt inspired by the apparent ambiguity of the *syād-vāda*, viewing it as an expression of current fashions and tendencies in Western philosophy and logic. Since the relativity seemingly embedded in the theory easily yields to various interpretations and trends in vogue as well as to various levels of individual understanding and formal (often inadequate) schooling and appears to be applicable to various fields of human activity, ranging from formal logic, philosophy of language, logical pragmatics to theories of conflict solution, intercultural relations, multiculturalism, ethics and tolerance, a plenitude of papers and articles of various quality have been produced by serious scholars, perhaps less serious amateurs and inspired Jaina lay persons. Even stimulating and philosophically valuable works are far too many to be listed here, I have to confine myself just to mentioning a handful of selected papers written in last quarter of a century or so: S.S. BARLINGAY (1965), R.N. MUKERJI (1977), Bimal Krishna MATILAL (1981), BHARUCHA-KAMAT (1984), Bimal Krishna MATILAL (1985: 301–319)¹², Sangam Lal PANDEY (1984), Bimal Krishna MATILAL (1991), to some extent (as regards the interpretation of *syāt ... eva*) Atsushi UNO (2000), Pradeep P. GOKHALE (2000), D.S. KOTHARI (2000), Pragati JAIN (2000), V.M. KULKARNI (2000), John CORT (2000), Jonardon GANERI (2001: 137–144), Jonardon GANERI (2002), Fabien SCHANG (2008a: 78–80), Fabien SCHANG (2008b). Especially GANERI's presentation, lucid in its form, is a serious attempt to offer a truly consistent logical model of the *syād-vāda*, an attempt in which the author hopes to take into account most ramifications of Jaina system. Heretofore researchers had largely been satisfied with offering a more or less plausible exposition for the first three or four figures of the doctrine, without exploring the implications of their models for the fifth, sixth and seventh compounded propositions. Had they done it, they would have immediately discovered inconsistencies in *their own* proposals, which were

¹² This is shortened version of MATILAL (1981).

subsequently projected onto the original Jaina model. Not only expositions of BHARUCHA–KAMAT’s and MATILAL’s interpretations, mentioned by GANERI (2002), suffered from this flaw, but a range of other attempts, such as that of MUKERJI (1977), or quite recent ones of KOTHARI (2000), UNO (2000) and GOKHALE (2000), the latter being perhaps most faithful of them.

What is perhaps a little surprising, most of the above-mentioned authors hardly acknowledge what has been said on the *syād-vāda* prior to *their* times and they expound their interpretation of the *syād-vāda* without entering into discussion of earlier interpretations. A good exemplification of this approach is that almost none of eleven authors of a monograph on *anekānta* edited by J. Nagin SHAH (2000) ever refers to his predecessors or argues in favour of his own interpretation as better representing the *syād-vāda* than any other.

To recapitulate, the constructivist method explores what respective authors believe are hidden, unexpressed logical structures and logical and philosophical implications of the *syād-vāda*, such as multiple values or paraconsistency of the *syād-vāda*. A real danger of this approach is that it may read modern concepts into an ancient theory, albeit the theory allowed no room for them.

What I call ‘reductionist method’ is an approach that tries to do without modern tools as much as possible by not postulating more than ancient or mediaeval authors express themselves explicitly. There are very few of those who have followed this track and one could call them more traditionally oriented, just to mention a few names: NAHAR–GHOSH (1917: 103–135), BHARADWAJA (1984), PADMARAJIAH (1986: 333-378), to some extent (as regards the interpretation of the seven *bhaṅgas*) Atsushi UNO (2000) and V.M. KULKARNI (2000). The involvement of modern tools of logic basically is reduced merely to a limited set of symbols which do not involve more than the texts say themselves explicitly. The reason for that is often what the authors, e.g. NAHAR–GHOSH (1917: 110), feel is ‘inadequacy of Formal Logic’ to handle the complexities of the *syād-vāda* and the intricate and highly complex structure of the world as well as the conviction, expressed for instance by NAHAR–GHOSH (1917: 115), that ‘*Saptabhaṅgi* supersedes formal logic as the latter is inadequate to explain unity in difference.’ Another possible reason may also be inadequate knowledge of modern logic and its tools on the part of some scholars romancing with the *syād-vāda*. The outcome of such an approach should, in principle, not entail more than ancient or mediaeval thought contained and expressly reflected upon. The result may not be as stimulating as that of the former method, and indeed very few authors refrain from venturing an exciting ‘constructivist’ journey into the realms of modern logic. No wonder, this methodological approach may thus seem a bit disappointing to a philosophically oriented mind.

Let us have a closer look at the approach adopted by some of the representatives of what I call constructivist method. Due to lack of space I cannot discuss every single interpretation, and I will restrict myself to singling out some most conspicuous points of selected few.

R.N. MUKERJI (1977: 230-233) directly establishes a link between ‘*Syādvāda* and Modern Many-Valued Logic’, frames the seven figures (*bhaṅga*) and assigns (almost) each of them as separate truth value ranging from 1/6 up to 6/6, or 1, in a six-valued probability logic, ‘rather like the throw of six-faced dice in games of chance’, as follows:

| | | | |
|---|----------------|--------------------------|------------|
| | a ₁ | A | 1/6 |
| a | a ₂ | ~(~A) | 1/6 |
| b | (=2a) | A • ~(~A) | 2/6 or 1/3 |
| c | | ~[A ⊙ ~(~A)] | 3/6 or 1/2 |
| | d ₁ | A • ~[A ⊙ ~(~A)] | 4/6 or 2/3 |
| d | (= c • a) | | |
| | d ₂ | ~(~A) • ~[A ⊙ ~(~A)] | 4/6 or 2/3 |
| e | (= c+b) | A • ~(~A) • ~[A ⊙ ~(~A)] | 5/6 |
| f | (=2c) | A ⊙ ~(~A) | 6/6 or 1 |

The symbols ⊙ and • stand for ‘*sahārpaṇa*’ and ‘*kramārpaṇa*’ respectively, which R.N. MUKERJI (1977: 227) explains as follows: ‘in words the partially grasped aspects are stated serially (*kramārpaṇa*), and cannot be stated together in their integral unity (*sahārpaṇa*)’, whatever that ‘integrality’ could mean and irrespective of how ‘the games of chance’ and dice

could relate to chances of hitting truth by expressing a particular statement out of seven options, or figures (*bhaṅga*). R.N. MUKERJI makes use of two separate conjunction symbols \odot and \bullet in order combine sentences based on one predicate (either asserted or negated). What is problematic with this representation, as we shall see later, is among other things the fact that what is denied in negative sentences of the *syād-vāda* is never one and the same predicate, but always a different predicate than the one which has been previously asserted, viz. it is never the case that A and $\sim A$,¹³ but always the case that A and $\sim B$.

Bimal Krishna MATILAL (1981: 54–56)¹⁴ and (1991: 12–16) follows suit, with some modifications though. He specifically distinguishes ‘three primary and non-compound predicates, positive, negative and the neutral (+, -, 0)’, and represents how ‘a simple mathematical computation will generate only seven varieties, if we use these three units in three ways, one at a time, two at a time and three at a time. In addition he introduces ‘three predication-units ... represented by $x, y,$ and z ’ as follows:

$$\begin{array}{cccccc} x, & y, & z, & xy, & yz, & zx, & xyz \\ +, & -, & 0, & \pm, & -0, & +0, & \pm 0 \end{array}$$

What is completely misleading and wrong in his presentation of 1981 is that he takes the three symbols +, -, 0 to stand for ‘three primary and non-compound predicates’, and treats them as three separate basic truth value symbols! This mistake is somehow corrected in his exposition of 1991, when he speaks of ‘the three basic evaluative predicates (truth-values?)’ (1991: 13), although he simultaneously speaks of ‘a separate and non-composite value called “*avaktavyā*” (“inexpressible”), side by side with “true” and “false”.’ He further replaces R.N. MUKERJI’s two separate conjunction symbols \odot and \bullet that combine sentences based on one predicate (asserted or negated) with three separate sentential symbols, and not really predicate symbols, ‘ $x, y,$ and z ’ (despite the fact that he ambiguously calls them ‘predicate-units’) that stand for three different options / figures (*bhaṅga*): *syād asti*, *syān nāsti* and *syād avaktavyam*. Although to use three separate symbolic expressions (+, -, 0) for three different basic options (*asti*, *nāsti*, *avaktavyam*) is a welcome move, at the same time it—as much as we use three sentential symbols instead of three predicate symbols—actually conceals or evades the real problem which the *syād-vāda* posits, which basically is a case of a predicate calculus, namely how to assert and deny a property of a thing at the same time and not to bypass the law of non-contradiction.

This lack of clarity as regard the treatment of what really the symbols +, -, 0 and \pm represent (‘truth values’, also referred to as ‘evaluative predicates’ or ‘predication-units’ whatever the latter two could really mean) and how they then differ from symbols x, y and z , if both are series of predicates, what Bimal Krishna MATILAL (1981) does not do, and what R.N. MUKERJI (1977) does, is to explain how the three primary truth values add up from the lowest truth value up to truth value 1 (MUKERJI: 6/6). What is certain, he does use the symbols +, - and 0 in order to demonstrate ‘combinability of values’ (1991: 13), which clearly goes in the direction of many-valued logic. Further, while referring to non-bivalence logic and paraconsistent logic that applies to the *syād-vāda* (1991: 14, 15), he is aware (1991: 15) that what the Jainas developed was not a typical system of ‘multiple-valued logics or the para-consistent logics’. He also claims that ‘the Jainas, in fact, set the limit to our usual understanding of the law of non-contradiction’ (1991: 15). This claim is, as we shall see, based on a wrong reading and analysis of sources.

In fact, both R.N. MUKERJI and MATILAL find their predecessor in BARLINGAY (1965: 6, 65), who takes the *syād-vāda* as a case of modal logic apparently with three values, with *syāt* being expressive of ‘perhaps’, ‘possibly’ or ‘probably’. Especially recent decades abound in interpretations that cast the *syād-vāda* in the mould of many-valued logic, albeit with various modifications that try to explain how different truth values are applicable and in what sense. For instance, Pradeep P. GOKHALE (1991: 83-84) takes *syāt* as an existential qualifier qualifying possible viewpoints. To him, “*syāt*” ... does not appear as an antecedent of a conditional but it

¹³ For another case of this common mistake see e.g. GANERI (2001: 138): ‘(1) asserting that the object is F ; (2) denying that it is F ; or (3) both asserting and denying that it is F (with different values of the hidden parameters),’ etc.

¹⁴ John CORT (2000: 326–327) copies the analysis of MATILAL (1981) without acknowledging it.

looks more like an existential quantifier of the following sort: There is a standpoint such that ... , There is a way in which ... , There is a respect in which ...' In his interpretation a sentence, say, *syāt jīvaḥ nityaḥ*, 'would rather mean: (a) There is a standpoint such that "that Self is permanent" is the case', or in more general terms: '(b) There exist some x such that x makes p true,' i.e.: '(c) $(\exists x) (xTp)$.'

Not everyone would agree that the *syād-vāda* represents a six-valued logic, as R.N. MUKERJI (1977) claims, or is a case of a three-valued logic, as the interpretations MATILAL (1981), (1991) and BARLINGAY (1965) contend. Some scholars, e.g. BHARUCHA-KAMAT (1984), GANERI (2002) and Fabien SCHANG, speak in favour of a seven-valued logic, each of them for different reasons though. GANERI (2002: 274, 276) speaks of Jaina seven-valued logic **J7**, with three primitive values, t, f and u, and explains that 'The Jainas have a seven-valued logic because, if we allow for the existence of non-optimal standpoints, standpoints which are just neutral with respect to some propositions, then, for each proposition, *p* say, the total discourse has exactly seven possible states' (2002: 274). GANERI's (2002) model finds its continuation in a recent interpretation by Fabien SCHANG (2008b), who constructs a **J7** model, trying to compromise two interpretations, GANERI's (2002) and MATILAL's (1991), which assume that *avaktavya*, i.e. "non-assertability" refers to incompleteness (*à la Ganeri*) or inconsistency (*à la Matilal*), and 'both result in a unique quasi-truthfunctional logic with either many-valued or classical, two-valued entailment relations.' Ultimately, SCHANG develops 'a syncretist approach of Jaina logic ... constructed in order to do justice to both interpretations of non-assertability; the subsequent many-valued logic is a $24-1 = 15$ -valued logic that is shown to be reducible to Priest's paraconsistent logic **P3**.'

Further, many scholars maintain that the *syād-vāda* violates the law of non-contradiction. An example is Sangam Lal PANDEY (1984: 163), who is of the opinion that '... only that logic is indicated by *syādvāda* which challenges the law of contradiction and gives some truth value to contradictory statements.' According to him, the *syād-vāda* represents many-valued logic, or three-valued logic resembling that of Łukasiewicz, to be exact. Also GANERI (2002: 273–274) is of the opinion that the Jainas reject the law of non-contradiction in the sense that although they are committed to '(a) the thesis that " $\neg (p \ \& \ \neg p)$ " is a theorem in the system', they 'reject (b) the thesis that it is not the case that both "*p*" and " $\neg p$ " are theorems'.

Others, e.g. BHARUCHA-KAMAT (1984), argue to the contrary, viz. that the *syād-vāda* does challenge the law of non-contradiction, albeit it is a case of paraconsistent logic. Further contemporary models that are applied to the *syād-vāda* are those of modal logic (e.g. BARLINGAY (1965) and GANERI (2002)), of probability logic (R.N. MUKERJI (1977)) or modal logic that is not truth-functional (GANERI (2002: 274-278)).

The problem with all the above instances of the constructivist approach is that, in order to make an appearance to faithfully and consistently represent the *syād-vāda*, they presuppose far more theoretical logical tools than ever existed in India.

Formalised interpretations that see a breach of bivalence assume that ancient or mediaeval Jainas for all practical purposes developed a notion of logic that does not respect the law of contradiction, and that when the Jainas speak that the *syād-vāda* relies on 'notions of affirmation and negation applied to numerically one real thing in all cases without any contradiction'¹⁵ they mean something completely different than what they expressly state.

And what the Jainas communicate on various occasions is a rather straightforward expression of their conviction that their theory involves no logical contradiction (*avirodhena*), no conflict with empirical observation and no inconsistency with their system of beliefs (*pratyakṣādi-bādhā-parihāreṇa*):¹⁶

'What is called the seven-fold modal description is an arrangement of statements that are expressed in seven forms, which is marked with the term "in a certain

¹⁵ PKM 6.74, p. 681.22–23: *pratiparyāyam vastuny ekatrāvirodhena vidhi-pratiṣedha-kalpanāyāḥ*.

¹⁶ Even for this reason alone the interpretation of the *syād-vāda* as a non-adjunctive system (see e.g. GANERI (2002: 278), echoed by SCHANG (2008b: 5)), which tries to bring meaningfulness into a discourse held by various parties, does not apply because we have here one and the same party and not really a multi-party discussion.

sense”, which considers numerically one real thing, such as the living element (soul) etc., by way of affirmation and negation, either taken separately or compounded, in accordance with queries whose contents are properties such “existence” (sc. ‘ x being P ’) etc. taken one by one, while avoiding contravention with perception and other [cognitive criteria] without any contradiction.’¹⁷

Interpretations which want to see a case of many-valued logic in the *syād-vāda* overlook that there was neither a term nor concept for additional truth values other than ‘true’ and ‘false’. The proponents of this approach also overlook the most important fact that the crucial expression *avaktavya*, which to them seems to provide a justification for their many-valued logical theories, is not about four¹⁸ out of seven propositions of the *syād-vāda* but is about the object, or rather about its properties that are predicated of.

An approach to see probability logic in the *syād-vāda* relies on the assumption that the Jains had a *logical* notion of probability, a notion which is a relatively recent concept and it is rather problematic whether ancient Indians had it or whether it could be formulated in terminology and conceptual framework of ancient Indian philosophers.

A close reading of the paraconsistent interpretations will reveal a lot of logical apparatus that is a modern invention, and it is not possible to have paraconsistent logic without having a clear notion of certain basic conceptual components of it. Most importantly, we should in the first place distinguish actual cases of reasoning or statements that at least seem to be inconsistent (as is the case with the *syād-vāda*), although the authors are either not aware of such inconsistencies or do not consciously make any formal attempt to explain away these inconsistencies from the cases when authors consciously express something which they know is inconsistent under classical or common-sensical interpretation but they make a conscious attempt to reformulate basic logical relations and they expressly state new logical rules. The latter attempt is not really observed in the case of the *syād-vāda* on the part of ancient and mediaeval Jaina philosophers. As we know paraconsistent logic was developed mostly in order to bypass the logical principle that anything follows from contradictory premises, and it entails a number or explicitly accepted semantics and redefinition of traditional terms as well as introduces of new logical rules. Again, we do not see anything in the history of the *syād-vāda* that would match this kind of development. In order to ascribe paraconsistency to the *syād-vāda* as a logical theory we would have to first demonstrate that its creators had, for instance, a clear notion of a principle of non-adjunction or an idea of a non-truth-functional logic (as GANERI argues in favour of the *syād-vāda* as an example of both). But do we really see that Jaina thinkers accepted that in a discourse various participants formulate their own beliefs in a consistent way, albeit these may not be consistent with those propounded by others, and the sum of these beliefs makes a paraconsistent system, and, in addition, have a clear idea of the principle of non-adjunction? I seriously doubt it.

Similarly, any attempt to present an axiomatisation of the Jaina system, e.g. those proposed by GANERI (2002: 278–279) or by SCHANG (2008b) as ingenuine as they may be, presupposes that the Jains had a clear concept of ‘axiom’ and ‘derivation of theorems’, and that they consciously applied it to the *syād-vāda*. However, I find no evidence to that. That is why such attempts will fail to accurately reflect the real structure of the *syād-vāda*, albeit they may be interesting pieces of modern logical exercise inspired by the *syād-vāda*.

¹⁷ SVM₁ 23.100-104, p. 142.23–143.3: *ekatra jīvādau vastuny ekāka-sattvādi-dharma-viṣaya-praśna-vaśād avirodhena pratyakṣādi-bādhā-parihāreṇa pṛthag-bhūtayoh samuditayoś ca vidhi-niṣedhayoh paryālocanayā kṛtvā syac-chabda-lāñchito vakṣyamānaih saptabhiḥ prakārair vacana-vinyāsaḥ saptabhaṅgī gīyate*. Cf. also SBhT, p. 3.1–2: *eka-vastu-viśeṣyakāvīruddha-vidhi-pratiśedhātmake-dharma-prakāra-ka-bodha-janaka-sapta-vākya-paryāpta-samudāyatvam*. This goes back to Prabhācandra’s PKM 6.74, 684.12-13: “*avirodhena*” *ity-abhidhānāt pratyakṣādi-vīruddha-vidhi-pratiśedha-kalpanāyāḥ saptabhaṅgī-rūpatā pratyuktā*.—‘With the term “without contradiction” we deny that the character of the seven-fold modal description consist of combinations of assertion and denial that stand in contradiction to perception etc.’

¹⁸ Namely *syād avaktavyam*, *syād asty avaktavyam*, *syān nāsty avaktavyam* and *syād asti nāsty avaktavyam*.

To clarify my objections to the constructivist approach, let me avail myself of the following analogy (although analogies are never a logically sound argument but can serve as a useful didactic device). Would it make sense to interpret Anaximenes' idea of τό πνεῦμα ('the breath [of life]', cf. *prāṇa*), identified with ἡ ψυχή ('soul'),¹⁹ as an indication of ontological dualism of mind and matter which he accepted? After all Anaximenes does speak of various forms of existence, including what we would call 'matter' as a result of condensation (DK 13A5). However, we know that a prerequisite of such a dualism is the acceptance of the idea of intelligibility, or a similar one, as a criterion that distinguishes the mind from insentient matter, something that originates first with Plato's *Phaedo*, and the idea of intelligibility does not play any role in Anaximenes' understanding of ἡ ψυχή. To project later concepts on Anaximenes' theory would be methodologically as mistaken as reading modern logical concepts into the ancient *syād-vāda*, because theoretical requirements that would make constructivist interpretations meaningful were still absent at the time when Jaina thinkers developed their ideas. The indispensability of the theoretical apparatus of modern logic lies in its making a reflection on certain logical concepts at all possible: without this apparatus any formulation of logical ideas formulated in terms of, say, paraconsistent logic or many-valued logic is simply not possible. If one claims that, say, the Jainas do not understand bivalence in a classical way, one should first produce a piece of textual evidence attesting to the fact that indeed there was at least one Jaina philosopher who expressly stated that contradiction (*virodha*) should be reinterpreted or understood a little different than we usually do. If we wish to maintain that there are other truth values at work in the *syād-vāda*, we are expected to pinpoint at least one passage which explicitly argues in favour of the stance that there are other notions apart from truth (*satya*) and falsehood (*asatya*), which are as real as these two. If we merely rely on how we understand the *syād-vāda* theory, we merely project our modern concepts. That is why I have serious reservations as regards this method and its results as a genuine description of the *syād-vāda*. Their usefulness may lay only in approximation or metaphor (*upacāra*), the usefulness of which is rather limited in extra-poetical context.

Furthermore, one can see that as a matter of fact some scholars, e.g. GANERI (2002), to some extent, and Fabien SCHANG en masse, no longer offer a genuine interpretation of the *syād-vāda* but use some ideas of the theory in order to develop independent systems of many-valued logic which may be of considerable interest in their own right but of little interest as formalisation attempts of the *syād-vāda*. Many interpretations either neglect original textual sources and rely on a very superfluous popular understanding of the *syād-vāda*, or they misconstrue the sources.

A good example is GANERI (2002) who manipulates with Sanskrit sources in the sense that he reads ideas and notions into textual layers that are simply not there, and mistranslates crucial terms, for instance in a passage of PKM 6.74, p. 683.7 ff.:

(Opponent:) Just as the values "true" and "false", taken successively, form a new truth-value "true-false", so do the values "true" and "true-false". Therefore, the claim that there are seven truth-values is wrong.

(Reply:) No: the successive combination of "true" and "true-false" does not form a new truth-value, because it is impossible to have "true" twice. ... In the same way, the successive combination of "false" and "true-false" does not form a new truth-value.

(Opponent:) How then does the combination of the first and the fourth, or the second and the fourth, or the third and the fourth, form a new value?

(Reply:) It is because, in the fourth value «non-assertible», there is no grasp of truth or falsity. In fact, the word «non-assertible» does not denote the simultaneous combination of truth and falsity. What then? What is meant by the truth-value «non-assertible» is that it is impossible to say which of "true" and "false" it is.' (2002: 273).

¹⁹ DK 13B2: οἶον ἡ ψυχή ... ἡ ἡμετέρα ἀηε οὔσα συγκρατεῖ ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὄλον τὸν κόσμον πνεῦμα καὶ ἀήρ περιέχει.—'Like our soul, being the air, which holds us together and controls us, so does air and breath embrace the world around.'

A number of philological mistakes in GANERI's rendering of this brief passage seems to me enormous: his 'values' are merely properties (*dharmā*) predicated of a real thing (*vastu*) being examined through the *syād-vāda*, his 'true' and 'false' are the existence (*sattva*) and non-existence (*asattva*) of particular properties in the real thing; 'the claim that there are seven truth-values' is in fact 'the limitation to properties of seven kinds' (*sapta-vidha-dharma-niyamaḥ*), viz. a conviction that there cannot be more than seven properties; instead of his 'combination of' truth values we have properties that either coexist or not (*sahita*); 'the successive combination of "true" and "true-false"' as truth values is simply '[two properties] emphasised consecutively' (*kramārpitayoḥ*); 'it is impossible to have "true" twice' is in fact 'it is not possible to have existence twice' (*sattva-dvayasyāsambhavād*), viz. when we express existence of a property twice, it does not add up to 'two existences'.

The methodological flaw here lies also in the following fact: GANERI ascribes what he takes to be truth values, but what is called in Sanskrit texts 'properties' (*dharmā*), to sentences, and rightly so in the sense that truth and falsehood can indeed be properties of propositions *only*. However, what Prabhācandra speaks of are *properties* of a real thing (*vastu-viṣaya*), i.e. he—as *all* Jaina authors known to me—speaks of 'syāt sentences' as predicating of particular properties of an object under examination. But doing so, GANERI is in a good company: most interpreters commit the same mistake. The properties (*dharmā*) are, therefore, not of propositions (and only in such a case there might be some justification to interpret them as truth values) but of objectively existing things that are being talked about.

The most serious problem with GANERI's interpretation is that he uses the passage as an attestation to an explicit reference to many-valued logic. However, in the *real* text there is no mention of logical truth values at all! We have here a case of pouring new theory into old 'theoryskins'. Interesting and highly appealing as it really is, his project of **J7** (Jaina seven truth values) remains his **J7** (Jonardon's seven values); it is not, in my opinion, a rendering of a theory that was developed centuries ago in India and should not be treated as such. Here is exactly the same passage translated anew, without, I hope, projecting any external ideas onto the original text (the braces {} mark a portion omitted by GANERI):

[Objection:] Just as it is the case with the property [predicated of in] the first and second [figures], it is established (sc. clear) that the properties [predicated of in] the first and third etc. [figures] when emphasised either consecutively or reversely (i.e. simultaneously) become still another property, therefore the limitation to properties of seven kinds will not be established (sc. there will be more properties than seven).

[Reply:] This is not proper, because one never cognises two [predicated properties] which are emphasised consecutively as still another (sc. third) property, because it is not possible to have existence twice, {and because the existence [of a property in an object] is one with its intrinsic nature etc. which one intends to express.²⁰} ...

[Objection:] How would it then be possible that the first and the fourth, or the second and the fourth, or the third and the fourth combined are still another [property]?

[Reply:] Because in the fourth [statement], in which the [expressed] property is "inexpressibility", there is no comprehension of existence and non-existence. As one should realise, it is not the case that one can express these two [existence and non-existence], when emphasised simultaneously, with a word 'inexpressible'. Rather, because it is completely impossible to express these two when emphasised in such a way (sc. simultaneously), one wants to demonstrate with this [fourth sentence] still another property 'inexpressibility'.²¹

²⁰ In other words, to say that 'x has a property P' and to say that 'x exists as having a property P' is one and the same thing.

²¹ PKM 6.74, p. 683.7–19: *nanu ca prathama-dvitiya-dharma-vat prathama-tṛtīyādi-dharmāṅām kramētarāpitānām dharmāntaratva-siddher na sapta-vidha-dharma-niyamaḥ siddhyet; ity apy asundaram. kramārpitayoḥ dharmāntaratvenāpratīteḥ, sattva-dvayasyāsambhavād {vivakṣita-svarūpādīnā sattvasyākatvāt}. ... katham evam prathama-caturthayor dvitiya-caturthayor tṛtīya-*

The background for Prabhācandra's above discussion and the passage misunderstood by GANERI is the question which Prabhācandra asks in the *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa*:

‘So why either in the verbal method of viewpoints or in the verbal method of cognitive criteria (i.e. *syād-vāda*) there are exactly seven options? Because only as many (sc. seven only) questions on the part of the debater are possible. For such a limitation to seven options [only] is [the case] precisely because of [the number of possible] queries. Why can the query be only sevenfold? Because inquisitiveness [in this case] can only be sevenfold. How come it is sevenfold? Because the doubt arises in seven ways. Why is then doubt sevenfold? Because a property of a real thing that becomes an object of doubt can be sevenfold. For it is as follows: the existence [of the thing as P], to begin with, is a property of a real thing, because if one does not accept this [existence of the thing as P], it is not consistent to assume that the real thing is a real thing, like a horn of a donkey. Similarly, non-existence [of the thing as Q] is somehow a property of the very same [real thing]; [otherwise] there would be a contradiction as regards the exact determination of the real thing, because the own form (sc. intrinsic nature) [of a real thing] cannot be determined if its non-existence [as Q] is not taken into account on the basis of a different form [belonging to other things] too, like [*mutatis mutandis* its existence as P is determined] on the basis of [the real thing's] own form (sc. intrinsic nature). Through such [a method], one can demonstrate the fact, which has [just now] been demonstrated, that both properties (sc. existence as P and non-existence as Q) etc. when emphasised consecutively²² are properties of the real thing, because if it were not the case, it would contradict the everyday practice based on words [that] consecutively [express] notions of existence or non-existence [as P or Q], and because there would be an undesired consequence that there could be no everyday practice based on words [expressive] of the notion of the additional three properties distinguished with [the term] “simultaneous inexpressibility”. And those types of everyday practice [based on the additional three properties or inexpressibility] are certainly not without their objects, because [they do lead to] certainty [derived] from the actual cognition of the real thing and from successful execution of activity [aimed at the real thing]²³, just as everyday practice [based on the real thing's] form of such a kind (i.e. the object's existence [as P]) etc.’²⁴

caturthayoś ca sahitayor dharmāntaratva syād iti cet? caturthe 'vaktavyatva-dharme sattvāsattvayor aparāmarśāt. na khalu saḥārpitayor tayor avaktavya-śabdenābhidhānam. kiṃ tarhi, tathārpitayor tayoh sarvathā vaktum aśakter avaktavyatvasya dharmāntarasya tena pratipādanam iṣyate.

²² The background for above use of the expression *arpita* is the passage of TS₁ 5.29–31 / TS₂ 5.30–32 quoted above (p. 1, n. 1). See also relevant portion of SSI 5.32 referred to below (p. 31, n. 90).

²³ These two notions clearly correspond to the Naiyāyika and Buddhist criteria of the truth of our cognitions respectively: the cognition of the object (*vastu-pratipatti*) as correspondence of the cognition to facts and *pravṛtti-prāpti* and causal efficacy (*artha-kriyā-sāmarthya*).

²⁴ PKM 6.74, p. 682.18 ff.: *kasmāt punar naya-vākye pramāṇa-vākye vā saptāiva bhaṅgāḥ sambhavantīti cet? pratipādyā-praśnānām tāvatām eva sambhavāt. praśna-vaśād eva hi sapta-bhaṅgī-niyamaḥ. sapta-vidhā eva praśno 'pi kuta iti cet? sapta-vidhā-jijñāsā-sambhavāt. sāpi sapta-dhā kuta iti cet? sapta-dhā saṃśayōtpatteḥ. so 'pi sapta-dhā katham iti cet? tad-viṣaya-vastu-dharmasya sapta-vidhatvāt. tathā hi—sattvaṃ tāvad vastu-dharmaḥ, tad-anabhyupagame vastuno vastutvāyogāt khara-śṛṅgavat. tathā kathaṃcid asattvaṃ tad-dharma eva, sva-rūpādibhir iva para-rūpādibhir apy asyāsattvāniṣṭau pratīniyata-svarūpāsambhavād vastu-pratīniyama-virodhaḥ syāt. etena kramārpitōbhayativādinām vastu-dharmatvaṃ pratipāditāṃ pratipattatvyam. tad-abhāve kramaṇa sad-asattva-vikalpa-śabda-vyavahāra-virodhāt, saḥāvaktavyatvōpalakṣitōttara-dharma-traya-vikalpasya śabda-vyavahārasya cāsattva-prasaṅgāt. na cāmī vyavahārā nirviṣayā eva; vastu-pratipatti-pravṛtti-prāpti-niṣcayāt tathā-vidhā-rūpādi-vyavahāravat. This idea of doubt, crucial to understand this passage, is much earlier and is present already in NS 1.1.23: *samānāneka-dharmōpapatter vipratipatter upalabdhy-anupalabdhy-avyavasthātāś ca viśeṣāpekṣo vimarsāḥ saṃśayaḥ.*—‘Doubt is an inquisitive reflection that depends on a particular characteristic [about which one is not certain and it is] due to perceived possibility of a property common [to different loci], due to perceived possibility of numerous properties, contradictory apprehension, incongruity of apprehension or incongruity of non-apprehension.’*

As we can see, Prabhācandra sets off with the idea of doubt (*saṁśaya*), well known from its classical exposition in the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*:

‘First one sees a property common to a pillar and a person a [particular] height or a [particular] circumference [which could be a feature of both], and becomes curious as regards that particular characteristic [which can be applicable] to both [a pillar and a person] which he has seen before. Then he cannot determine any of the two [possibilities and decide] what it is. Doubt is such a cognition that fails to determine what it is. “I apprehend a property which is common to both [but] I do not apprehend a particular characteristic which belongs only to one of these two”—such a reflection is the basis [of doubt]. This [reflection] emerges as [a cause] that prompts doubt. Such an inquisitive reflection that depends on [this] particular characteristic [which one needs to determine what object one actually sees] is doubt.’²⁵

The nature of doubt, both as it is described by Vātsyāyana Pakṣilasvāmin and by Prabhācandra, is a particular property one is in search of in order to distinguish one thing from another, similar one. Since one may entertain a range of doubts, one can also ask questions (*praśna*) to clear the doubt.²⁶ One can, as Prabhācandra maintains, approach one and the same thing (*vastu*) in order to determine its particular character (*sva-rūpa*) and distinguish it from other things (*para-rūpa*) by examining all possible figures, which are said to be not more and not less than seven. But there can be no doubt that the properties are of the real thing (*vastu*) and not of the sentences that predicate a property of a thing. Therefore, the properties in question cannot be truth values.

In contradistinction to the constructivist method, the reductionist approach, as we have seen above, simply restates, in modern languages, which are natural languages, what was said centuries ago in Sanskrit or Prakrits, in many cases hardly adding anything that would enrich our understanding of the structure of the *syād-vāda* and its implications. In addition, the use of natural languages may conceal hidden implications, inconsistencies and structures or may expose apparent inconsistencies, paradoxes and contradictions which perhaps are not there.

Attempts to formalise the *syād-vāda*, which promise to reveal the structure of the *syād-vāda* and to deconstruct apparent contradictions, generally presuppose concepts that were originally, historically not there and therefore present a theory called ‘*syād-vāda*’ that has never existed in such a form. Do such attempts make sense at all? Are we justified in any way in our endeavours to formalise it? I think we are under a condition that we do not presuppose more that existed already in India in ancient times. And this approach entails a close philological reading of the sources.

We should certainly not attempt to formalise the *syād-vāda* as it existed in a way that hopefully yields a logically sound system of logic, which can preferably even be axiomatised, but rather to use formalisation, if we at all think we should, only in order to *reproduce* the real structure of the *syād-vāda*, even if it ultimately turns out to be incoherent! Nonetheless, the researcher’s task should here be restricted merely to a possibly faithful representation through which one may, perhaps, easier discover its logical flaws or appreciate its logical rigidity, whatever the case may be. Otherwise we shall be devising our own system of logic that is a distant echo of the historically attested *syād-vāda*.

The relevance of the foregoing remarks is not restricted to the treatment of the *syād-vāda*, but it concerns the methodological approach of modern scholars, especially philosophers, who try to make sense of ancient theories by applying modern tools. Such an approach is not entirely

²⁵ NBh 1.1.23: *sthānu-puruṣayoḥ samānam dharmam āroha-pariṇāhau paśyan pūrva-dṛṣṭam ca tayor viśeṣam bubhutsumānaḥ kiṁsvid ity anyataram nāvadhārayati, tad-anavādharāṇam jñānam saṁśayaḥ. samānam anayor dharmam upalabhe viśeṣam anyatarasya nōpalabha ity eṣā buddhir apekṣā. sā saṁśayasya pravarttikā vartate. tena viśeṣāpekṣo vimarśaḥ saṁśayaḥ.* For NS 1.1.23, see n. 24.

²⁶ The idea of posing questions (*praśna*) with respect to one and the same thing goes back to Akalaṅka, RVār 1.6, p. 33.15: *praśna-vaśād ekasmin vastuny avirodhena vidhi-pratiśedha-vikalpanā sapta-bhaṅgī. ekasmin vastuni praśna-vaśād dṛṣṭenēṣṭena ca pramāṇenāviriddhā vidhi-pratiśedha-vikalpanā sapta-bhaṅgī vijñeyā.*

innocuous and one should always proceed with utmost care not to impose modern conceptual frameworks onto old theories and derive from them implications which are not necessarily entailed by them, but it is their combination with modern tools that yields such implications. One should always ask what questions were at all possible given a particular conceptual framework and presuppositions in a particular historical context, and what questions result from the theories and their underlying presuppositions that were current in ancient times only.

To mitigate the apparent impression that all the above is criticism directed against the constructivist approach, I should add that there is undeniable value in this approach's opening new possibilities of expressing ingenious intuitions ancient Indian philosophers had by applying modern tools. But as researchers and philosophers we should always, at each stage of our investigation, remind ourselves that modern tools can make such intuitions more transparent and visible, but at the same time they create new intuitions, which would otherwise not have been possible. And we should not confuse these two kinds of intuitions.

3. Description of the *syād-vāda*

Perhaps the most conspicuous feature of the *syād-vāda* figures is that they *all are true*, and it is not possible to formulate a range of truth values either as **J3**, **J6** or **J7**. All constructivist interpretations in terms of many-valued logic seem to tacitly assume that at least some *bhaṅga* can be hierarchically ordered with respect to their truth value, ranging from false and indeterminate to true. The matter of fact is, however, that all seven statements are true:

| <i>bhaṅga</i> | truth value |
|--------------------------------------|-------------|
| 1. <i>syād asti</i> | 1 |
| 2. <i>syān nāsti</i> | 1 |
| 3. <i>syād avaktavyam</i> | 1 |
| 4. <i>syād asti nāsti</i> | 1 |
| 5. <i>syād asty avaktavyam</i> | 1 |
| 6. <i>syān nāsty avaktavyam</i> | 1 |
| 7. <i>syād asti nāsty avaktavyam</i> | 1 |

It is not the case that each member of this septuplet has a different truth value; what each of these figures actually expresses is a different property! No text ever says that, as for instance MUKERJI (1977) proposes, that the *syāt* sentences can be ordered according to their truth values from the least true to the most true as follows: 1/6, 1/6, 1/3, 1/2, 2/3, 5/6 and 1.

There is no single author, to my knowledge, which would claim, as MUKERJI (1977: 227) does (*vide supra*, p. 5), that the *syād-vāda* is 'a game of chance' and the sentences *syād asti*, *syān nāsti* etc. hit the truth with different probabilities, therefore we can speak of different 'grades of truth'. No Jaina text ever says that at least one of the seven *syāt* sentences is false or is not really true, or it is not possible to say that a sentence is neither true nor false, i.e. the sentence cannot be assigned any truth value. All the Jaina sources are quite unequivocal that *all* these statements are true.

Suppose, however, as basically most interpreters do, that the figures have different truth values. What would it mean then, as e.g. MATILAL (1981: 54–56) and (1991: 12–16) wants, and in the same spirit GANERI (2002) as well as most other scholars, that (1) the truth value of '*syād asti*' is true, (2) the truth value of '*syān nāsti*' is false, whereas (3) the truth value of '*syād avaktavyam*' is 'neutral'? What it would yield is the following:

- (1) If '*syād asti*' is true, then it is the case that *syād asti*.
- (2) If '*syān nāsti*' is false than it is not the case that *syād asti*, hence *syād asti*!
- (3) If '*syād avaktavyam*' is 'neutral', or neither true nor false, or true-false (depending on interpretation), than it is not really the case that *syād avaktavyam*, although we are unable to say what the case is!

This is certainly not what the *syād-vāda* entails.

As it has been noticed before, the term *syāt* is a sentential functor which means ‘somehow’, ‘in a certain sense’, a particle ‘expressive of multiplexity of reality’²⁷. The seven sentences, as all textual sources show, are in fact incomplete sentences for which we search for a meaningful context, but they all concern one and the same object (*ekatra vastuni, eka-vastu, ekatra jīvādau vastuni*)²⁸:

‘Difference and identity, which are the domain of cognitive criteria, are not empirical deceptions. For you, [Jina,] these two [coexist] without contradiction in one and the same [thing] consistent with the secondary or primary expressive intent [respectively].’²⁹

These seven sentences predicate a particular property (*dharmā*) of the object in logically possible ways.

3.1. The meaning of ‘existence’ in the *syād-vāda*

Although it seems rather obvious, the three primary terms used in the *syād-vāda*, i.e. (1) *asti* (‘*x* is’) and *astitva / sattva* (‘existence of *x*’), (2) *nāsti* (‘*x* is not’) and *nāstitva / asattva* (‘non-existence of *x*’) and (3) *avaktavya / avācya* (‘*x* is inexpressible’) and *avaktavyatva / avācyatā* (‘inexpressibility of *x*’) do not represent any truth values, as suggested e.g. by MATILAL (*vide supra*, p. 6) and GANERI (*vide supra*, p. 9). These are clearly used in a copulative meaning of ‘is’, viz. (1) ‘*x* is *P*’, (2) ‘*x* is $\neg Q$ ’, and (3) ‘*x* is inexpressible as being *P* and $\neg Q$ at the same time’. In this sense, all the *syāt* sentences are incomplete sentences in which predicates should be supplied. All the examples supplied by Jaina authors unanimously point in the same direction. Samantabhadra in the *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* (*vide infra*, p. 15) and Malliṣeṇa in the *Syād-vāda-mañjarī*³⁰, give some examples.

3.2. Contradiction in the *syād-vāda*

Any model genuinely faithful to original intentions of the Jainas should take into account their insistence on the lack of contradiction in any of the seven propositions, which has been explicitly articulated on numerous occasions, e.g. by Hemacandra-sūri in the *Anya-yoga-vyavaccheda-dvātriṃśikā*:

‘Non-existence, existence and inexpressibility with regard to things are not contradictory [when taken as] conditioned by differentiation through conditioning factors. Only when they do not realise the above, idiots who fear contradiction, who are led to destruction by their simplistic interpretation (absolutism) of these [three], stumble.’³¹

It is reiterated by Malliṣeṇa (c. 1229) in the *Syād-vāda-mañjarī*:

‘Existence [combined] with non-existence does not present any contradiction. Neither does inexpressibility, composed of assertion and denial, present any internal contradiction, nor does inexpressibility combined with expressibility yield any contradiction. And that is why the whole theory of the seven-fold modal

²⁷ SVM₁ 5.7, p. 13.11: *syād ity avyayam anekānta-dyotakam*.

²⁸ PKM 6.74, p. 681.22–23, SVM₁ 23.100–104, p. 142.23–143.3, SBhT, p. 3.1–2, see p. 8.

²⁹ ĀMī 36:

*pramāṇa-gocarau santau bhedābhedaḥ na saṃvṛtī /
tāv ekatrāvīrudhau te guṇa-mukhya-vivakṣayā //*

³⁰ See SVM₁ 24.58 ff., p. 150.14 ff. = SVM₂, p. 225.4 ff.

³¹ AYVD 24:

*upādhi-bhedōpahitaṃ viruddhaṃ nārtheṣv āsattvaṃ sad-avācyaḥ ca /
ity aprabuddhāva virodha-bhūtā jaḍās tad-ekānta-hatāḥ patanti //*

description, which is based on the three figures whose defining features are non-existence, existence and inexpressibility, respects non-contradictoriness.³²

Accordingly, the Jainas, it seems, consistently defined contradiction as based on negation in its classical sense, viz.

x, y are contradictory iff $x = \neg y$.

Such understanding transpires from various passages, e.g. from Hemacandra's *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*:

'If, in the presence of x , y is not comprehended, x stands in contradiction to y .'³³

Malliṣeṇa repeats the same idea:

'If x and y appear by way of their mutual exclusion, this is contradiction, defined as mutual non-occurrence, just like cold and heat. But here [with the *syād-vāda*] it is not the case, because existence and non-existence occur as being non-reciprocal with respect to each other.'³⁴

Much earlier the impossibility of co-occurrence of two contradictory properties in the same substratum was expressed by Samantabhadra in the *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* nine (!) times, which highlights Jaina emphasis on non-contradictoriness of their theory:

'Because of the contradiction, there cannot be selfsameness of nature of both [phenomena that are opposed in nature, which is incriminated] by the enemies of the method of the seven-fold modal description. Also when [a charge is expressly formulated by the opponents] that if [a thing is] indescribable³⁵ it [must be indescribable] in the absolute sense, then [such a charge] is not logically tenable because, [that being the case, the charge itself] is [seen to be] expressible.³⁶

Each of the instances of the above verse are meant to illustrate the impossibility of a conjunction of a set of contradictory properties: presence and absence (13: *abhāva-bhāva*), universality and particularity (32: *sāmānya-viśeṣa*), permanence and impermanence (55: *nitya-anitya*), being an effect and being a cause (70: *kārya-kāraṇa*), dependent and independent (74: *apekṣika-anapekṣika*), perception and tradition (77: *pratyakṣa-āgama*), mental cognoscible thing and objective cognoscible thing (82: *antar-jñeya-bahir-jñeya*), fate and opposite of fate (90: *daiva-adaiva*), merit and demerit (94: *puṇya-pāpa*), nescience and cognition (97: *ajñāna-jñāna*). These are just examples of properties (*dharma*) that might appear to stand in contradiction.

In the same spirit, the question how the notions of universality and particularity (*sāmānya-viśeṣa*) are possible with respect to one and the same real thing (*vastu*) is discussed by Malliṣeṇa³⁷ as a case of *seeming* contradiction. On another occasion, he maintains:

'For, just as there is [seven-fold modal description] of the existence and non-existence, similarly there is also the seven-fold modal description, and only seven (*eva*), of [the thing's] universal character and particular character. For it is as follows: in a certain sense, x is universal; in a certain sense, x is particular; in a

³² SVM₁ 24.10-11, p. 148.14-16: *astitvaṃ nāstitvena saha na virudhyate. avaktavyatvam api vidhi- niṣedhātmakam anyonyam na virudhyate. athavā avaktavyatvaṃ vaktavyatvena sākaṃ na virodham udvahati. anena ca nāstitvāstitvāvaktavyatva-lakṣaṇa-bhaṅgaka-trayeṇa sakala-sapta-bhaṅgyā nirvirodhatōpalakṣitā.*

³³ PM₁ 1.1.32 § 130, p. 32.18; PM₂, p. 28.10: *yat-sannidhāne yo nōpalabhyate sa tasya virodhīti niściyate.*

³⁴ SVM₁ 24.22-23, p. 149.3-6: *paraspara-parihāreṇa ye vartete tayoḥ śītōṣṇavat sahānavasthāna-lakṣaṇo virodhaḥ. na cātrāivam. sattvāsattvayor itarētaram aviṣvag-bhāvena vartanāt.*

³⁵ Here: *avācya=avaktavya*, in the sense of the third (or fourth) figure (*syād avaktavyam*).

³⁶ ĀM₁ 13, 32, 55, 70, 74, 77, 90, 94, 97:

*virodhān nōbhayātkātmyaṃ syād-vāda-nyāya-vidviṣām /
avācyatātkānte 'py uktir nāvācyam iti yujyate //*

³⁷ SVM₁ 24.58-78, p. 150.14-151.9 = SVM₂, p. 225.4 ff.

certain sense, x is both; in a certain sense, x is inexpressible; in a certain sense, x is universal and inexpressible; in a certain sense, x is particular and inexpressible; in a certain sense, x is universal, particular and inexpressible. And one should not claim that in these [statements], there is no form of affirmation and negation, because the universal character has the form of affirmation, whereas the particular character consists in negation as having the form of exclusion.’³⁸

Such a clearly defined idea of non-contradiction is especially important in propositions (3) ‘inexpressible’ or (4) ‘both existence and non-existence’, and all their derivative propositions (5)-(7). This certainly leaves no room for a non-classical or paraconsistent interpretation of contradiction.³⁹

Accordingly, the Jainas’ understanding does not appear to be very much different from the classical definition of contradiction formulated by Aristotle:

‘It is impossible that the same thing at the same time both belongs and does not belong to the same object and in the same respect (and all other conditions which one can specify, let them be specified, so that dialectal objections be met).’⁴⁰

3.3. Disambiguation of incomplete sentences

An important question is what the semantic background of the *syād-vāda* actually is? In general, textual sources are quite unanimous that the idea behind ‘doctrine of the seven-fold modal description’ (*sapta-bhaṅgī*) is to disambiguate statements, which after a closer inspection are a sort of shorthand for more complex assertions, e.g. ‘in a certain sense, it (some object) indeed exists’ is a truncated statement, which should be read as ‘in a certain sense, it (some object) indeed exists *as ...*’, or ‘in a certain sense, some object x indeed has a property P ’. In a natural language, all statements stand in need of additional analysis which has to take into account the context. The idea that every sentence is incomplete and its intent should be delimited by or derived from a particular context to which it applies is occasionally expressed by the Jainas with a maxim (*nyāya*): ‘Every sentence functions with a restriction.’⁴¹ This is, perhaps, the most crucial aspect when it comes to the proper understanding of the *syād-vāda*.

The mechanism how statements expressed in natural languages, by nature ambiguous, could be converted into propositions whose meaning is unequivocal as well as the practical need for such a mechanism is well exemplified in what Malliṣeṇa demonstrates, availing himself of a verse of the *Manu-smṛti*:

‘There is nothing wrong with consumption of meat, with alcohol and with having sex—this is a natural activity of living beings. However, abstention [from such activities] brings a great reward.’⁴²

³⁸ SVM₁ 23.158–162, p. 145.7–12: *yathā hi sad-asattvābhyām evaṁ sāmānya-viśeṣābhyām api sapta-bhaṅgy eva syāt. tathā hi. syāt sāmānyam syād viśeṣaḥ syād ubhayaṁ syād avaktavyam syāt sāmānyāvaktavyam syād-viśeṣāvaktavyam syāt sāmānya-viśeṣāvaktavyam iti. na cātra vidhi-niṣedha-prakārau na sta iti vācyam. sāmānyasya vidhi-rūpatvād viśeṣasya ca vyāvṛtti-rūpatayā niṣedhātmakatvāt.*

³⁹ Clearly, as GANERI (2002: 271–272) rightly notices, models proposed by BHARUCHA–KAMAT and MATILAL place the contradiction where it is not there, viz. $|p| = 1$ iff $\nabla (p \& \neg p)$ (BHARUCHA–KAMAT (1984: 183)) or $|p| = 0$ iff $\nabla (p, \neg p)$ (MATILAL (1991: 10–11)).

⁴⁰ *Met* 1005b19-22: τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό (καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιορισάμεθ’ ἂν, ἔστω προσδιορισμένα πρὸς τὰς λογικὰς δυσχερείας).

⁴¹ *sarvaṁ vākyam sāvadhāraṇam, sarvaṁ vacanaṁ sāvadhāraṇam*, quoted e.g. by Siddharṣi-gaṇin in NAV 1.9, p. 341, NAV 29.28, p. 472; Guṇaratna-sūri in TRD 9, p. 35.1–2. The maxim is also used by non-Jaina authors, e.g. Jayanta-bhaṭṭa in NMa vol. 2, p. 555.10; NĀ 372, p. 96; Bhāsarvajña in NBhū, p. 282; Karṇakagomin in PVSVT, p. 248; Bhāskara in BĪPVV 1.5.15, vol. 1, p. 269.19; 2.3.1, vol. 2, p. 70.9; BĪPVV 2.4.16, vol. 2, p. 192.17. See also NUK, p. 95.

⁴² MDhŚ 5.56:

na māmsa-bhakṣaṇe doṣo na madye na ca maithune /

Malliṣeṇa argues that

‘If this [verse] is interpreted to have the meaning as it stands, it is incoherent twaddle. If there is nothing wrong in [activity] which is practised, how is it possible that abstention from it could bring a great reward? That would lead to an undesired consequence that abstention from sacrifice, studying the Veda, donations etc. [would also bring a great reward]. Therefore this verse must have a different intent. For it is as follows: it is not the case that there is nothing wrong when one eats meat, on the contrary: it is really wrong. Similarly, it is the case also with alcohol and sex. Why does he then say that there is nothing wrong [with these] because this is a natural activity of living beings? That with respect to which they act, i.e. which they encounter, is activity, i.e. a situation of encounter. That means that—[if we take] “living beings” [to mean] ordinary creatures—this is a cause of acquaintance of ordinary creatures with such [an activity, although they do not follow it]. It is well known from tradition that consumption of meat, alcohol and sex are main causes of the acquaintance of creatures [with such a custom]. ... Alternatively, this is activity of “living beings” taken to stand for monsters. The sense is that only these [monsters] act in the sense that they consume meat, drink alcohol and have sex, but not reasonable creatures.’⁴³

Clearly, no verse and no sentence can be read out of context and every proposition and sentence requires a closer analysis of its meaning. With the above analysis and examination of similar traditional maxims, Malliṣeṇa opens his exposition of the *syād-vāda*. The way he proceeds is highly significant: by quoting a well-known passage he demonstrates how semantics is at play: this is something all of us do in our ordinary lives; we never take propositions as they stand but we always supply additional information from the context in order to reach accurate understanding of it.

Quoting a verse of the *Viśeṣādvāyā-bhāṣā* (VĀBh 115), Malliṣeṇa explains that sometimes humans commit a mistake of a false interpretation even of an authoritative text (*āgamā*), which is by definition true:

“From incapacity to distinguish true and false, from apprehension conditioned by causes of existence (sc. *karman*), from absence of results of cognition [comes] nescience of the wrong believer (*mithyā-dṛṣṭi*)⁴⁴.”

Precisely from such causes [the heretics], when overpowered by these [causes of nescience], interpret even the Twelve Canonical Books as false testimony.⁴⁵

By implication, as Malliṣeṇa wants to convince us, a remedy that safeguards one from committing such a mistake is, of course, a proper methodology, i.e. the *syād-vāda*, which disambiguates enigmatic and equivocal natural language.

The process of disambiguation not only allows one to determine a proper application of a proposition and its accurate meaning but also proves indispensable to eliminate other possible

pravṛttir eṣā bhūtānām nivṛttis tu mahā-phalā //

Quoted in SVM₁ 23.58–59, p. 141.5–6.

⁴³ SVM₁ 23.60–86, p. 141.7–142.11: *asya ca yathā-srūtārtha-vyākhyāne ’sambaddha-pralāpa eva. yasmin hy anuṣṭhīyamāne doṣo nāsty eva tasmān nivṛttiḥ katham iva mahā-phalā bhaviṣyati? ijjādhyayana-dānāder api nivṛtti-prasaṅgāt. tasmād anyad aidamparyam asya ślokasya. tathā hi na māṃsa-bhakṣaṇe kṛte adoṣaḥ api tu doṣa eva. evaṃ madya-maithunayor api. katham nādoṣa ity āha yataḥ pravṛttir eṣā bhūtānām. pravartante utpadyante ’syām iti pravṛttiḥ utpatti-sthānam. bhūtānām jīvānām tat-taj-jīva-saṃsakti-hetur ity arthaḥ. prasiddham ca māṃsa-madya-maithunānām jīva-saṃsakti-mūla-kāraṇatvam āgame. ... athavā bhūtānām piśāca-prāyaṇām eṣā pravṛttiḥ. ta evātra māṃsa-bhakṣaṇāḍau pravartante na punar vivekina iti bhāvaḥ.*

⁴⁴ This is the first *guṇa-sthāna* and should not be confused with *mithyā-darśana*; *mithyā-dṛṣṭi* is a possessor of *mithyā-darśana*. See SSI .18, 9,1, and H. von GLASENAPP (1942: 75–92).

⁴⁵ SVM₁ 23.42–45, p. 140.14–17:

*sad-asad-avisesenāu bhava-heu-jahicchiōvalambhāu /
ṇāṇa-phalābhāvāu micchyā-diṭṭhissa aṇṇāṇam //*

ata eva tat-parigṛhītam dvādaśāṅgam api mithyā-srutam āmananti.

meanings the proposition can in theory convey, as Vidyānanda Pātrakesarisvāmin (c. 850) explains:

‘One should in the first place carry out the process of [semantic] determination of a proposition in order to eliminate [its] undesirable meanings. Otherwise, because the [meaning of the proposition] would be equivalent to anything unsaid, it [could be taken] in any possible meaning.’⁴⁶

Thus, the primary task of a philosopher, as Jaina thinkers understood it, is to develop adequate tools that should make our language precise and unequivocal. They try to achieve this goal by formulating an appropriate semantic model that would provide reliable instruments to read any statement within its intended context. As Akalaṅka in the *Pravacana-praveśa* puts it, such a disambiguating strategy is indispensable in any successful communication:

‘Even if it is not explicitly pronounced, the functor “in a certain sense” is understood from the context in all cases, both with respect to an affirmation and negation as well as with respect to any other case (sc. these two combined), if one should successfully convey [the intended meaning].’⁴⁷

As the verse indicates, any successful and, therefore context-sensitive communication procedure should consistently read the functor *syāt* into any sentence, which by nature is incomplete and cannot convey its meaning while taken alone: the crucial semantic elements necessary for its proper understanding have to be supplied from the context. And that is what, as Akalaṅka claims, we regularly do in our daily life.

3.4. The *syāt* particle and the basic figures (*bhaṅga*)

One of the most conspicuous early components of the Jaina seven-fold modal description is the three basic figures (*bhaṅga*), or ways of analysing an object within a consistent conceptual framework:

- (1) *syād asti* (‘*x* is, in a certain sense, *P*’), i.e. $\sigma(x \text{ is } P)$.
- (2) *syān nāsti* (‘*x* is, in a certain sense, not-*Q*’), i.e. $\sigma(x \text{ is } \neg Q)$,
- (3) or (4) *syād avaktavyam* (‘*x* is, in a certain sense, inexpressible’), $\sigma(x \text{ is } (P \ \& \ \neg Q))$.

where the symbol σ represents the sentential functor *syāt*. As we shall see the above formalisation, which is here treated only as an approximation, is not the most accurate one.

The idea of the three basic figures (*bhaṅga*), viz. *syād asti*, *syān nāsti*, *syād avaktavyam*, was not a Jaina invention. It seems to have been a common intellectual property shared by various

⁴⁶ TŚVA₁ 1.6.53, vol. 2, p. 431:

*vākye ’vadhāraṇam tāvad aniṣṭārtha-nivṛttaye /
kartavyam anyathānukta-samatvāt tasya kutracit //*

The verse is quoted also by Malliṣeṇa in SVM₁ 23.121–122, p. 143.20–21, and by Vimaladāsa in SBhT, p. 21.3–4.

⁴⁷ LT 63:

*aprayukto ’pi sarvatra syāt-kāro ’arthāt pratīyate /
vidhau niṣedhe ’py anyatra kuśalaś cet prayojakah //*

Comp. also Prabhācandra’s explication in NKC, p. 692.6–7: *aprayukto ’pi na kevalam prayuktaḥ sarvatra vākye syāt-kāraḥ, upalakṣaṇam etat tena eva-kāro ’pi pratīyate*.—‘the functor “in a certain sense”, even when it is not explicitly pronounced, i.e. when it is not pronounced at all [is understood] in any sentence. This is an implication. By force of this [implication] also [the delimiting particle] “only” is understood [too].’

philosophically oriented groups of early Indian thinkers, including the Ājīvikas, e.g. Makkhali Gosāla (Pāli) / Gosāla Mañkhaliputta (Buddh. Skt.) = Gośala Maskariputra (Jaina).⁴⁸

It is not impossible that the true inventors of a crude form of this manner of describing the world were Makkhali Gosāla and his followers, with whom Mahāvīra Vardhamāna and early Jains had a lot in common. As the *Namādī-sutta* informs us much later:

‘So these Ājīvikas are called “Three-tiers”. Why? It is explained: because they accept the whole world as consisting in three natures, namely: the soul, the non-soul and both the soul–non-soul; the world, the non-world and the world–non-world; the existent, the non-existent and the existent–non-existent, etc. Because of reflection based on viewpoints, they accept three viewpoints, namely: substance-expressive, mode-expressive and both-expressive. It is for this reason that it has been said: the heretics of the three-tiers conceive of kinds of reflection [in the form] of viewpoints in sevenfold manner as seven computations—such is the meaning.’⁴⁹

What the Jains did they developed the three primary statements into a more complex system by permutating them and giving them a more specific meaning, and applied them to their ontology.

It should be noted, however, that a crude form of the three basic figures—‘*x* is P’, ‘*x* is ¬Q’ and ‘*x* is both P and ¬Q’—is present in some canonical works, e.g. in the *Viyāha-pannatti*.⁵⁰ However, the basic figures (*bhaṅga*) augmented with the particle *syāt* are absent from early portions of the Jaina Canon. They emerge gradually both in much later Canonical strata and, especially, in non-Canonical literature.⁵¹ I just list a couple of examples where the *bhaṅgas* are used as well as some occurrences of the sentential functor *siya* / *siyā* / *syāt*:

(a) *Viy* 12.10 (p. 608–614): ...*siya atthi siya natthi...*, esp.: 610.15 ff.: *rayana-ppabhā puṭhavī siya āyā, siya no āyā, siya avattavyam – āyā ti ya, no ātā ti ya*; and 611.20 ff.: *du-paesie khamdhe siya āyā, siya no āyā, siya avattavvam—āyā ti ya no āyā ti ya, siya āyā ya no āyā ya, siya āyā ya avattavvam—āyā ti ya no āyā ti ya, siya no āyā ya avattavvam—āyā ti ya no āyā ti ya*.

(b) *Viy* 5.7.1 (p. 210.20–21 ff.): *paramāṇu-poggale ṇam bhaṁte! eyati veyati jāva taṁ taṁ bhāvam pariṇamati? goyamā! siyā eyati veyati jāva pariṇamati, siya ṇo eyati jāva ṇo pariṇamati*.

⁴⁸ But see also the Buddhist approach of the *vibhāṅga-vāda* and the ‘unanswered questions’ (*avyākata pañha* / *avyākṛta-praśna*), described in MATILAL (1981: 7–18); See also relevant remarks in MATILAL (1981: 47–51).

⁴⁹ *NamSCū* 105, p. 73.26: *te cēva ājīvikā terāsiyā bhaṁtī. kamhā? ucyate—jamhā te sarvaṁ jagam trayātmakam icchamti, jahā—jīvo ajīvo jīvājīvaś ca, loe aloe loyāloe, samte asante samtāsamte evam-ādi. naya-cimṭāe vi te tiviham ṇayam icchamti, taṁ jahā—davvaṭṭhito payyavaṭṭhito ubhayaṭṭhito, ato bhaṇiyam—“satta terāsiyāim” tti satta parikammāim terāsiya-pāsamḍatthā tividhae naya-cimṭāe cimtayamṭīy-ārthaḥ*. The passage, in mixed Prakrit and Sanskrit, is basically identical with *NamVṛ* 107, p. 87.5–8; *te cēva ājīviyā terāsiyā bhaṇiyā. kamhā? ucyate, jamhā te sarvaṁ jagat trayātmakam icchanti, yathā jīvo ’jīvo jīvājīvo, loe aloe loyāloye, samte asante samtāsamte evam-ādi. naya-cimṭāe te tiviham ṇayam icchamti, taṁ jahā—davvaṭṭhito pajjavatṭhito ubhayaṭṭhito, ao bhaṇiyam—“satta terāsiyā” tti, satta parikammāim terāsiya-pāsamḍatthā tivihāe naya-cimṭāe cintayamṭīy-ārthaḥ*.

Cf. also BASHAM (1951: 274–275, n. 5): ‘*Nandi comm.: tathā ta eva gosāla-pravaritṭā ājīvikāḥ pāṣaṇḍinas trairāsikā ucyante, yatas te sarvaṁ vastu try-ātmakam icchanti, tad yathā: jīvo ’jīvo jīvājīvaś ca, loko ’loko lokālokaś ca, sad asat sad-asat. naya-cintāyām dravyāstikam paryāyāvastikam ca. tatas tribhī rāsibhīś carantīti trairāsikāḥ.*’

⁵⁰ E.g. *Viy* 10.2.4, p. 488.21–489.1: *kati-vidhā ṇam bhaṁte! joṇī paṇṇatā? goyamā! tivihā joṇī paṇṇatā, taṁ jahā—siyā usiṇā sītōsiṇā. evam joṇīpayam nikhasesam bhāṇiyavvam*. And similarly it is applied to *vedaṇā* in *Viy* 10.2.4, p. 489.3–5: *kati-vidhā ṇam bhaṁte! vedaṇā paṇṇatā? goyamā! tivihā vedaṇā paṇṇatā, taṁ jahā—siyā usiṇā sītōsiṇā. evam vedaṇā-padam bhāṇiyavvam java neraiyā ṇam bhaṁte*.

⁵¹ Some Canonical instances are enumerated, e.g., by KĀPADĪĀ (1940–1947: cxi ff.), UPADHYE (1935: 81–84); they are also discussed by SCHUBRING (1962: 1163–1165) and occasionally in SHAH (2000); stray occurrences are listed also in JSK (entry ‘*syād-vāda*’, Vol. 4, pp. 496–502).

(c) Paṇṇ 784 (p. 195.21 ff.): *cau-paesie ṇaṃ khaṃdhe siya carime no acarime siya avattavvae no carimāiṃ no acarimāiṃ no avattavvayāiṃ, ... siya carimāiṃ ca acarime ya siya carimāiṃ ca acarimāiṃ ca siya carime ya avattavvae ya siya carime ya avattavvayāiṃ ca ...*, etc.

(d) Aṇḍ 415 (p. 166.22 ff.): *tathā ṇaṃ je te baddhellaṃ te ṇaṃ siyā atthi siyā natthi, jai atthi jahañṇeṇaṃ ego vā do vā tiṇṇi vā...*

(e) Aṇḍ 473 (p. 182): *siyā dhamma-padeso siyā adhamma-padeso siyā āgāsa-padeso siyā jīva-padeso siyā khaṃdha-padeso.*

It is not always the case that the three basic figures (*bhaṅga*) invariably co-occur with the *syāt* particle. There are numerous cases when the sentential functor *syāt* (*siya*, *siyā*) is missing, which most probably reflects an earlier historical layer and attests to a slow gradual development of the concept of the *syād-vāda* in Jainism:

(a) Paṇṇ 781–788 (p. 194 ff.), e.g. p. 194.25 ff.: *paramāṇu-poggale ṇaṃ bhaṃte! kim carime acarime avattavaye carimāiṃ acarimāiṃ avattavvayāiṃ, udāhu carime ya acarime ya udāhu carime ya acarimāiṃ ca udāhu carimāiṃ ca acarime ya udāju carimāi ca acarimāiṃ ca...*, etc.

(b) Viy 8.2.29 (p. 337.20 ff.): *jīvā ṇaṃ bhaṃte! kim nāṇi annāṇi? goyamā jīvā nāṇi vi, annāṇi vi.*

Perhaps the earliest non-Canonical Jaina thinker who mentions the basic figures (*bhaṅga*) and occasionally appends the sentential functor *syāt* to them (but not always!) is the collective author called Kundakunda, to whom a number of works composed between 3rd–6th centuries are traditionally ascribed. The *Paṃcatthiya-saṃgaha* already offers what is later known as *pramāṇa-sapta-bhaṅgī* and contains an expression *ādesa-vaseṇa* (*ādeśa-vaśāt*) which clearly foreshadows later tradition that speaks of a ‘complete account’ (*sakalādeśa*), in contradistinction to ‘incomplete account’ (*vikalādeśa*)⁵²:

‘Substance is possible, as one should realise, as “seven-figured” (sc. can be predicated of with the help of seven figures) by force of the account (sc. way of predication): in a certain sense it is, it is not, it is both, it is inexpressible and it is a combination of the three.’⁵³

Kundakunda’s *Pavayaṇa-sāra* offers another instance:

‘[22] From the substance-expressive viewpoint everything is a substance. From the mode-expressive viewpoint, [any thing] becomes different. It is [nevertheless] non-different, because it consists in that [substance] at the time of its [existence].’⁵⁴

[23] The substance is said—on account of any particular mode—to be..., and not to be..., and again [the substance] becomes inexpressible; but further [the substance] is both, [viz. is... and is not... at the same time] or is otherwise, [viz. any other permutation of the three basic figures (*bhaṅga*)].’⁵⁵

⁵² See p. 40 ff.

⁵³ PSSā 14:

*siya atthi ṇatthi uhayam avattavvam puṇo ya tat-tidayam /
davvam khu satta-bhaṅgam ādesa-vaseṇa sambhavadi //*

⁵⁴ The verse is rather obscure. Another possibility to translate it as follows: ‘From the substance-expressive viewpoint and from the mode-expressive viewpoint, any substance is [both] different and non-different, because [the particular] consists in that [universal] at the time of its [existence],’ where *aṇṇam* corresponds to *viśeṣam* and *aṇṇam* to *sāmānyam*. The difficulty with such a translation is that the idea it renders is that ‘everything is different from the substance-expressive viewpoint, and everything is the same from the mode-expressive viewpoint.’ On the other hand *dravyārthika* relates to *sāmānyā*, whereas *paryāyārthika* to *viśeṣa* (comp. STP 3.57), which finally yields a contradiction. That is why the commentators Amṛtasena and Jayasena (p. 144–145) are at pains to relate *dravyārthika-sāmānyā-ananya* and *paryāyārthika-anyā-viśeṣa*.

⁵⁵ PSā 2.22–23, p. 146 ff.:

davvaṭṭhiṇa savvam davvam taṃ pajjayaṭṭhiṇa puṇo /

Not much later than the *Pavayaṇa-sāra*, perhaps even contemporaneous with it in view of the simplicity of the exposition of idea of ‘path of verbal characterisation which has seven possibilities,’⁵⁶ i.e. the *syād-vāda*, Siddhasena Divākara in the *Saṁmati-tarka-prakarāṇa* (ca. 450–500) describes all the seven figures (*bhaṅga*), albeit he does without the functor *syāt*:

[36] A substance which is simultaneously beyond verbal characterisation through [either of] the first two [modes (*pariyāya*)] that are either of another thing (sc. “x is not-Q”) or that are determined [as one’s own] (sc. “x is P”) turns out to be inexpressible. [37] If one aspect is determined with respect to its occurrence and another aspect [is determined] with respect to its mode of absence, such a substance both is [with respect to one aspect] and is not [with respect to the other aspect] (sc. “x is P and is not-Q”), because it is characterised by some account⁵⁷ (sc. through some predication). [38] Such a substance whose [one] aspect is mentioned with respect to its occurrence and whose [another] aspect is [mentioned] in both ways (sc. simultaneously is and is not), it is something that both is and is inexpressible according to [the fifth] possibility. [39] Such a substance whose [one] aspect is mentioned with respect to its non-occurrence and whose [another] aspect is [mentioned] in both ways (sc. simultaneously is and is not), it is something that both is not and is inexpressible according to [the sixth] possibility. [40] Such a substance whose [one] aspect is mentioned with respect to its occurrence and non-occurrence and whose [another] aspect is [mentioned] in both ways (sc. simultaneously is and is not), it is something that is, is not and is inexpressible according to [the seventh] possibility.’⁵⁸

Although the functor ‘in a certain sense’ is missing, the picture presented here is not an altogether undeveloped concept. Besides, Siddhasena Divākara, who does not use the sentential functor *siya* / *siyā* (*syāt*) at any section of his work, supplies additional parameters (*vide infra*, p. 30 f.) which he calls ‘aspects’ (*deso*) from which the substance can be predicated of in each of the seven possibilities: it can be said to exist with respect to a certain aspect, and not to exist with respect to another.

Certain discrepancies in Kundakunda’s and Siddhasena Divākara’s presentations, most probably either contemporaneous or not much distant in time from each other, which are conspicuous in the above juxtaposition may be taken as an indication that the period of fifth century, to which I would assign both the expositions, was a time when the method of the seven-fold modal description (*syād-vāda*) was not a definite concept but, instead, was at stage of development, and the sentential functor *syāt* was still not obligatory.

Typical examples in genuine sentences of the *syād-vāda* are generally restricted to the terms: *jīva*, *paṭa*, *ghaṭa* and *kumbha*, and it seems that the earliest point of reference, when the subject

havadi ya aṅṅam aṅṅam tak-kāle tam-mayattādo // 22 //
atthi tti ya ṅatthi ya havadi avattavvam idi puṇo davvam /
pajjāyena du keṇa vi tad ubhayam ādiṭṭham aṅṅam vā // 23 //

⁵⁶ STP 1.41a: *satta-viyappo vayaṇa-paho*

⁵⁷ Comp. the expression *ādesa-vaseṇa* (*ādeśa-vaśāt*) in PSSā 14 above, p. 20.

⁵⁸ STP 1.36–40:

atthamāra-bhūehi ya ṅiyaehi ya dohi समयam āthim /
vayaṇa-viseṣāyam davvam avattavvam padai // 36 //
aha deso sabbāve deso abbhāva-pajjave ṅiyao /
taṁ daviyam atthi ṅatthi ya āyesa-viseṣiyam jamhā // 37 //
sabbhāve āiṭṭho deso deso ya ubhayahā jassa /
taṁ atthi avattavvam ca hoi daviyam viyappa-vasā // 38 //
āiṭṭho ’sabbhāve deso deso ya ubhayahā jassa /
taṁ ṅatthi avattavvam ca hoi daviyam viyappa-vasā // 39 //
sabbhāvāsabbhāve deso deso ya ubhayahā jassa /
taṁ atthi ṅatthi avattavvam ca daviyam viyappa-vasā // 40 //

Compare a completely misconstrued and erroneous translation of the passage in SAṄGHAṀI–DOŚI (2000: 29).

of the proposition is at all mentioned is *jīva*, which reflects a general soteriological concern of Jaina thinkers. Other standard subject terms (*paṭa*, *ghaṭa* and *kumbha*), which I would take as secondary examples, were taken from a general tradition of Indian inference (*anumāna*). An interesting reference is found in Jinabhadra-gaṇin's *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya* (6th/7th century) who does not use the standard set of expressions: *atthi / asti, nāsti / naṭthi, avattavyam / avaktavyam*, typical of the method of the seven-fold modal description, but instead he uses the expressions *kumbha* ('pitcher'), *akumbha* ('not pitcher'), *avattavyam* ('inexpressible'):

'Being something the existence, non-existence and both [the existence and non-existence] of [a particular property of it] is emphasised through [the pitcher's] own mode and through the mode of something else, this [pitcher] is differentiated as "a pitcher", as "something else than a pitcher", as "something inexpressible" and as "both [a pitcher and something else than a pitcher]".'⁵⁹

This seemingly innocuous mode of expression may attest to an older strand of Jaina tradition, preserved in the Āvaśyaka tradition that preserves terminology that has much affinity to the way Ājīvikas employed the three figures: P, non-P, P & non-P, for instance *jīva*, *ajīva*, *jīvājīva* (*vide supra*, p. 19, n. 49).⁶⁰ This 'syāt-free' tradition apparently was continued as a marginal phenomenon until early mediaeval times, because Hemacandra Maladhārin, who aptly elaborates on the verse, does not use the functor in his explanations at all:

'The idea is that [the author of the verse] demonstrates the seven-fold modal description, namely: a [particular] pitcher is called 'pitcher' when, being predicated of, it is emphasised, through its own modes such as an upward neck, a hull, a spherical shape, a base etc., as something existent (sc. as something which is a member of a class *A*). That is what is meant by the first figure: "the vessel is existent [as $a \in A$]". Similarly, [a particular pitcher] is [taken to be] something else than a pitcher when, being predicated of, it is emphasised, through the modes of another [thing] such as the protection of the skin, as something non-existent (sc. as something which is a member of a class $\neg A$). When the expressive intent is [to emphasise] the non-existence (sc. its being something else) [in the case] of any pot whatever through the modes [typical] of another [thing], that is what is meant by the second figure: "the vessel is non-existent [as $a \in A$]". By the same token, when one wishes to speak of any pot with no exception when, being predicated of, it is simultaneously emphasised—through its own modes, through the modes of another [thing] and through both [in the same breath]—as something [both] existent and non-existent, then it becomes inexpressible. [It becomes inexpressible], because it is not possible to speak, by means of any conceivable, numerically singular speech element which is not convention-bound, of any thing at all simultaneously as both existent and non-existent. These [figures] present a complete account [of a thing]. Now, the [remaining] four are explained in its turn explained as incomplete account [of a thing]...'⁶¹

The second essential element of the theory in its developed form is, as it is well-known, beside the idea of the 'figures' (*bhaṅga*), the sentential functor *syāt* ('in a certain sense'), usually

⁵⁹ VĀBh 2232 (p. 910):

*sabbhāvāsabbhāvōbhayappio sa-para-pajjāōbhayao /
kumbhākumbhāvattavyōbhaya-rūvāibheo so //*

⁶⁰ See also VĀBh, p. 911.9 ff.: *kumbhaḥ akumbhaḥ avaktavyaḥ ...* and p. 912 (on *paṭa*).

⁶¹ VĀVṛ, p. 910.12 ff.: *sapta-bhaṅgīm pratipadyata ity arthaḥ, tad yatha—ūrdhva-grīvā-kapāla-kukṣi-budhnādibhiḥ sva-paryāyair sadbhāvenārpito viśeṣitaḥ kumbhaḥ kumbho bhanyate—"san ghaṭaḥ" iti prathamō bhaṅgo bhavatiṭy arthaḥ. tathā paṭādi-gatais tvak-trāṇādibhiḥ para-paryāyair asadbhāvenārpito viśeṣito 'kumbho bhavati—sarvasyāpi ghaṭasya para-paryāyair asattva-vivakṣāyām "asan ghaṭaḥ" iti dvitīyo bhaṅgo bhavatiṭy arthaḥ. tathā sarvo 'pi ghaṭaḥ sva-parōbhaya-paryāyair sadbhāvāsadbhāvābhyām sattvāsattvābhyām arpito viśeṣito yugapad vaktum iṣṭo 'vaktavyo bhavati, sva-para-paryāya-sattvāsattvābhyām ekena kenāpy asāṃketikena śabdena sarvasyāpi tasya yugapad vaktum aśakyatvād iti. ete trayāḥ sakalādeśāḥ. atha catvāro 'pi vikalādeśāḥ procyante...*

explained as *kathañcit* (‘somehow’). It is well attested in most Jaina sources, including the latest strata of the Jaina Canon, but entirely absent in earlier canonical phases. The particle is the most pronounced element of each of the seven basic figures (*bhaṅga*). It is said to operate by means of affirmation (*vidhi*) and negation (*niṣedha*, *pratiṣedha*, *niyama*). The various combinations of affirmation and negation are extensively detailed and elaborated, for instance, by Mallavādin Kṣamāśramaṇa in the *Dvādaśāra-naya-cakra*⁶². Also Samantabhadra refers to them in his *Svayambhū-stotra*:

‘Affirmation and negation are accepted [in the sense of] “somehow”. [Thereby] the distinction between primary and secondary [figure] is established. Such is the guideline of the wise (or: of the fifth Tīrthaṃ-kara Sumati). That is your most excellent creed. Let the worshipper praise you.’⁶³

In the *Āpta-mīmāṃsā*, he states:

‘The application domain of the speech element should be qualified, inasmuch as it consists in aspects that should be affirmed and in aspects that should be negated, just as a [positive] logical reason is a property [related] to the inferable property, and likewise a negative logical reason [is not related to it], respectively.’⁶⁴

Closer examination of the development of the *syāt* particles and the figures (*bhaṅga*) leads us to a conclusion that a mature theory of the seven-fold modal description took final shape by approximately the turn of the fifth and sixth centuries at the earliest.

To recapitulate, what were historically only three basic figures (*bhaṅga*) later came to be permuted so that the total of seven basic figures was reached, making up a complete version of the doctrine of the modal description (*syād-vāda*):

1. ‘In a certain sense, *x* [indeed] is P’ – *syād asty [eva]*.
2. ‘In a certain sense, *x* [indeed] is not-Q’ – *syān nāsty [eva]*.
3. ‘In a certain sense, *x* [indeed] is P and [indeed] is not-Q’ – *syān asty [eva] nāsty [eva]*.
4. ‘In a certain sense, *x* [indeed] is inexpressible’ – *syād avaktavyam [eva]*.
5. ‘In a certain sense, *x* [indeed] is P and [indeed] is inexpressible’ – *syād asty [eva] avaktavyam [eva]*.
6. ‘In a certain sense, *x* [indeed] is not-Q and [indeed] is inexpressible’ – *syān nāsty [eva] avaktavyam [eva]*.
7. ‘In a certain sense, *x* [indeed] is P, [indeed] is not-Q and [indeed] is inexpressible’ – *syān asty [eva] nāsty [eva] avaktavyam [eva]*.

A significant step was an introduction of the particle *eva*—altogether absent in all earlier formulations—by Samantabhadra (c. 580–640?), who was apparently influenced by Dharmakīrti’s use of *eva* as a delimiting particle (*vyavaccheda*).⁶⁵ The particle *eva* was a highly useful semantic tool to restrict the applicability of the property (*dharma*) predicated of the real thing (*vastu*), or a semantic method to restrict the range of the term that denotes the property.

I find it rather difficult to determine when and by whom the term *sapta-bhaṅgī* as such was used for the first time. Although the expression is, to my knowledge, absent from the Cannon, it

⁶² E.g. DNC, p. 6.2 ff. (*vidhi-bheda*), and DNC, p. 9.7: *vidhi-niyama-bhaṅga-vṛtti-vyatiriktatvād...* All the permutations of *vidhi* and *niyama* are enumerated also in DNC, p. 10.1–11.2.

⁶³ SvSt₁ 5.5 = SvSt₂ 25:

*vidhir niṣedhaś ca kathañcid iṣṭau vivakṣayā mukhya-guṇa-vyavasthā /
iti prañītiḥ sumates tavēyaṃ mati-pravekaḥ stuvato ’stu nātha //*

For later descriptions see e.g. RVār 2.8, p. 122.15 ff., esp. RVār 1.6, p. 33.15 ff.

⁶⁴ ĀMī 19:

*vidheya-pratiṣedhyātmā viśeṣyaḥ śabda-gocaraḥ /
sādhyā-dharmo yathā hetur ahetuś cāpy apekṣayā //*

⁶⁵ See BALCEROWICZ (2009: ix–x) and (forthcoming). The use of the particle *eva* is one of a few points that, in opinion, force us to re-examine traditional (i.e. pre-Dharmakīrtian) dating of Samantabhadra.

is, however, already used by a pre-Dinnāga author Kundakunda in PSSā 14 (*vide supra*, n. 53, p. 20), albeit in the form *satta-bhaṅgam* ('seven-figured'), which is a *bahu-vrīhi* adjective compound relative to *davvam* ('substance'), which indicates that any substance can be *predicated of with the help of seven figures*.

Further, the same author refers to the *sapta-bhaṅgī* method applicable to (or as a capacity of) the soul:

'[71] The great soul is one (viz. either 'self-same', or 'one perceiving organ' (*akṣa*) or 'it is possessed of cognitive application (*upayoga*')). It is [also] two (viz. 'it is possessed of two-fold cognitive application: cognition and perception'). It becomes of threefold characteristics, it is said to roam in four [types of existence]. And it is grounded in five primary qualities (viz. karmic states (*bhāva*)). [72] It is endowed with the capability to move in six [directions]. It is cognitively apt as *having the existence to which the seven figures apply*. It has eight substrata (viz. qualities). It has nine objects (sc. the nine categories (*tattva*)) [to cognise]. It has ten states. It is called the living element.'⁶⁶

Interestingly, also in this passage Kundakunda makes reference to the method not directly through the expression *sapta-bhaṅgī*, so well-established later on, but again through a *bahu-vrīhi* adjective compound which describes the ultimate soul: *mahātmā ... sapta-bhaṅga-sadbhāvaḥ*—'the great soul ... has the existence to which the seven figures apply'.⁶⁷

Although Siddhasena Divākara does not use the term *sapta-bhaṅgī* in STP, he speaks of 'a verbal procedure that consists of seven options' (*sapta-vikalpaḥ vacana-panthaḥ*) instead, with which he concludes the description of the seven figures in STP 1.36–40 (*vide supra*, n. 58, p. 21):

'In this way, there emerges a verbal procedure that consists of seven options, taking into account the substantial modes. However, while taking into account the modes [in the form] of momentary manifestations, [the method of analysis] either has options [of description, viz. the object can be predicated of from various figures,] or it has no options'.^{68, 69}

This may be an indication that the term *sapta-bhaṅgī* was not so well established or not universally widespread among Jaina theoreticians even still around 500 CE as it is popularly thought.

3.5. The parameters and aspects

Most Jaina descriptions of the *syād-vāda* make a clear mention of what is called by them variously as aspects (*deśa / deso*) or facets (*aṃśa*), and what I propose to call parameters. Most Jaina thinkers distinguish four such basic parameters that qualify the way we predicate of a thing: substance (*dravya*), place (*kṣetra*), time (*kāla*), condition (*bhāva*).⁷⁰

⁶⁶ PSSā 71–72, p. 123:

*eko cēva mahappā so duviyappo tti-lakkhaṇo hodi /
cadu-samkamaṇo bhaṇido paṃcagga-guṇa-ppadhāṇo ya // 71 //
chakkāpakkama-jutto uvautto satta-bhaṅga-sabbhāvo /
atthāsao ṇavattho jīvo dasa-ṭṭhāṇago bhaṇido // 72 //*

⁶⁷ Or less likely: 'the great soul ... has the existence which applies the seven figures'.

⁶⁸ I.e. it is not possible to predicate of an object because momentary manifestations, being transient and infinite, are beyond the scope of the language (sc. there are not enough words, numerically speaking, to describe each of them). The verse offers another possibility of interpretation, see TBV.

⁶⁹ STP 1.41:

*evam satta-viyappo vayaṇa-paho hoi attha-pajjāe /
vaṃjāna-pajjāe uṇa saviyappo ṇivviyappo ya //*

⁷⁰ E.g. RVār 4.42 (p. 254.14 ff.), SVM₁ 23.113 (p. 143.12), JTBh₁ 1.22 § 63 (p. 19) / JTBh₂ 1.22 (p. 19).

The four classical parameters have a longer history. They gradually developed during the so-called ‘Canonical Period’, that ranges from 4th/3rd century BCE till 450–480 CE and are reflected in the Jaina Canon eventually codified in the second half of 6th century. They assumed their more or less classical form before 4th/5th century within a complex strategy of ‘dialectical ways of analysis’ (*amuyoga-dvāra*). Initially these tools of analysis were crucial theoretical determinants known as the four standpoints (*nikṣepa*, *nyāsa*)⁷¹: substance (*dravya*), place (*kṣetra*), time (*kāla*) and actual condition (*bhāva*) of an entity analysed. Occasionally, other parameters were added in canonical literature, such as a particular quality (*guṇa*), a mode (*paryaya*), spatial extension (*pradeśa*), name (*nāma*), form (*rūpa*), material representation (*sthāpanā*), transformation (*pariṇāma*) etc.⁷² Also the post-canonical literature enumerated similar parameters that served the same purpose. Some authors distinguished more than the classical four. A good example is Siddhasena Divākara (c. 450-500 CE) in the *Saṃmati-tarka-prakaraṇa*, who regularly speaks of aspects (*deso*) from which the substance can be predicated of. He mentions eight such parameters which qualify our statements about a thing, although he is rather unique:

‘The proper method of exposition of entities [in accordance with *syād-vāda*] is based on substance (*dravya*), place (*kṣetra*), time (*kāla*), condition (*bhāva*) as well as mode (*paryāya*), aspect (or part, *deśa*) and relation (or combination of elements, *saṃyoga*), and also distinction (*bheda*).’⁷³

Later on, with the development of the Nyāya school and emergence of the concept of *upādhi*, variously translated as ‘subsidiary condition’, ‘extraneous condition’, ‘limiting adjunct’, ‘conditioning factor’, i.e. additional factors which should be taken into account in inference (*anumāna*) and in establishing the relation of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*), the idea of the parameters came to be identified with *upādhi*. Hemacandra-sūri, in the *Anya-yoga-vyavaccheda-dvātrimśikā* 24 (vide supra, p. 14), uses this new term and applies it in the sense of ‘an additional semantic factor’ one should take into account while analysing the meaning of a sentence. In his opinion, the meaning of every statement is ‘conditioned by differentiation through conditioning factors’, i.e. it should be disambiguated through additional semantic criteria. Commenting on Hemacandra-sūri’s phrase *upādhi-bhedōpahitam*, Malliṣeṇa develops the idea and establishes an explicit link between the ‘conditioning factors’ and an earlier idea of aspects or facets (*deso / deśa / aṃśa*; vide supra, p. 24):

‘[Non-existence, existence and inexpressibility] are conditioned by, i.e. are emphasised by way of, differentiation, i.e. diversity, of conditioning factors, i.e. delimiters which are the modes which express an aspect. This [differentiation] is a qualifier of non-existence. When conditioned by differentiation through conditioning factors, non-existence does not stand in contradiction with existent objects. One should correlate it to existence and inexpressibility having introduced such differentiation in utterances.’⁷⁴

⁷¹ See ALSDORF (1973) and BHATT (1978), esp. the ‘General Catalogue’ of the *nikṣepas* (1978: 15–32), in which the combination of *davvao khettao kālao bhāvao* is a recurring theme, next to other parameters such as *guṇao* or *ṭhavaṇao*. In a subsequent development, the paths of the standpoints (*nikṣepa*) and the parameters of the *syād-vāda* bifurcated in two different directions, with the *nikṣepas* ‘canonised’ as the quadruplet of the name, material representation, substance and condition in TS 1.5: *nāma-sthāpanā-dravya-bhāvatas tan-nyāsaḥ*.

⁷² Cf. the general catalogue of such parameters in BHATT (1974: 15–32).

⁷³ STP 3.60:

*davvyam khittam kālam bhavam pajjāya-desā-samjoge /
bhedaṃ ca paḍucca samā bhāvānam paṇṇavaṇa-pajjā //*

⁷⁴ SVM₁ 24.17–20, p. 148.21–149.1 = SVM₂, p. 223.4 ff.: *upādhayo ’vacchedakā aṃśa-prakārāḥ teṣāṃ bhedo nānātvam, tenōpahitam arpitam. asattvasya viśeṣaṇam etat. upādhi-bhedōpahitam sad-artheṣv asattvaṃ na viruddham. sad-avacyatayoś ca vacana-bhedaṃ kṛtvā yojaniyam.*

As for the number of such basic parameters, Siddhasena Divākara was not unique in devising his own set of parameters. At a certain point also Malliṣeṇa⁷⁵, following Akalaṅka⁷⁶, offers his own set of eight parameters with regard to which the thing is being predicated of: time factor (*kāla*), the thing's own essence (*ātma-rūpa*), the thing in its substantial aspect, i.e. its material substratum (*artha*), its relation (*sambandha*), the thing's its serviceability, i.e. its role as assisting factor or auxiliary condition (*upakāra*), the location of the thing as the property-possessor (*guṇi-deśa*), the thing as a combination of related attributes, or its concurrence with other properties (*samsarga*), and verbal designation (*śabda*). However, these additional parameters are usually treated as second-order parameters (*vide infra*, p. 34) that help determine the exact context of the four first-order parameters (*vide infra*, p. 30).

The relevance of the four basic parameters, and the same holds valid for more parameters than the classical four, is explained by Malliṣeṇa:

‘For there would be contradiction only if both existence and non-existence had one and the same conditioning factor. But it is not the case [in the *syād-vāda*], because the existence [of the object as *P*] is not [predicated of] with respect to the same fact with respect to which non-existence [as *Q* is predicated of]. Rather, existence [of the object as *P*] has a different conditioning factor and non-existence [of the object as *Q*] has a different conditioning factor. For existence is with respect to the own form [of a real thing], whereas non-existence is with respect to a different form [belonging to another thing].’⁷⁷

Such an account clearly avoids an apparent contradiction that ‘*x* is both *P* and $\neg P$ ’; what we have instead is a statement to the effect that ‘*x* is both *P* and $\neg Q$ ’. It is never the case under the *syād-vāda* scheme, that one and the same property is affirmed and denied from one and the same viewpoint or under one and the same set of circumstances.

But how should we read and apply this scheme in practice? Malliṣeṇa provides a lengthy example of how one should interpret modal sentences by applying the parameters for all the seven figures, and what semantic implications the figures carry:

‘[1] As for these [modal sentences, the first figure is:] “in a certain sense”, or “somehow”, [i.e.] through its own substance, place, time and condition, everything, for instance a pot etc., indeed exists; [it does] not [exist] through another thing’s substance, place, time and condition. For it is as follows: With respect to substance, a pot exists as being made of clay and does not exist as something made of water etc. With respect to place, a pot exists as related to [the city of] Pāṭaliputra, it does not exist as related to [the city of] Kanyakubja etc. With respect to time, it exists as related to autumn, not does not exist as related to spring etc. With respect to condition, it exists as something black, not as something red etc. Otherwise, an undesired consequence would follow that [the thing] would abandon its own form by assuming the other form. And in this method the process of [semantic] determination the aim of which is to exclude unintended meanings is employed, because otherwise it would absurdly follow that the same proposition would equally have the meaning which has not been expressed, because its own meaning would not be clearly defined in every case.’⁷⁸

⁷⁵ SVM₁ 23.189–206, p. 177.13–178.5 = SVM₂, p. 214.8–215.7.

⁷⁶ RVār 4.42, p. 257.17: *kāla ātma-rūpam arthaḥ sambhandhaḥ upakāro guṇi-deśaḥ samsargaḥ śabda* *iti*.

⁷⁷ SVM₁ 24.28–31, p. 149.9–12 = SVM₂, p. 224.1 ff.: *tadā hi virodhaḥ syād yady ekōpādhikam sattvam asattvam ca syāt. na cāvam. yato na hi yenāvāmsena sattvam tenāvāsattvam api. kim tv anyōpādhikam sattvam, anyōpādhikam^a punar asattvam. sva-rūpeṇa hi sattvam para-rūpeṇa cāsattvam* [^a SVM₁ misprints: *sattvanyōpādhikam*].

⁷⁸ SVM₁ 23.113–119, p. 143.12–18 = SVM₂, p. 210.7–12: *tatra syāt kathaṁcit sva-dravya-kṣetra-kāla-bhāva-rūpeṇāsty eva sarvaṁ kumbhādi na punaḥ para-dravya-kṣetra-kāla-bhāva-rūpeṇa. tathā hi kumbho dravyataḥ pārthivatvenāsti nāpa-ādi-rūpatvena^a. kṣetrataḥ pāṭaliputratvena na kānyakubjādītvena. kālataḥ śaiṣiratvena na vāsantikādītvena. bhāvataḥ śyāmatvena na raktādītvena.*

As it seems, every affirmative sentence predicates certain properties of a real thing with respect to its particular, individually specific substance, place, time and condition. At the same time it carries a hidden meaning which excludes a range of alternative properties predicable of the thing with regard to the same parameters: substance, place, time and condition. However, what can be, for all practical reasons, explicitly conveyed by an affirmative sentence is merely the former range of meanings.

Accordingly, ordinary sentences should always be interpreted through the parameters, and what the particle *syāt* actually expresses are various perspectives one can take while predicating a particular property of a particular object. Accordingly, if we wish to formally symbolise the *syād-vāda*, we should first distinguish (positive and negative) sentences that consist of a subject and a range of predicates R {A, C, E, G, ...} of the form: Px, and its hidden implied counterpart is: ¬Qx, with a range of predicates Q {B, D, F, H, ...}. For instance, the example given by Malliṣeṇa can be said to represent, at its face value, the following situation:

| | | |
|---------|---|--|
| x is A | = | 'x is made of clay', |
| x is ¬B | = | 'x is not made of water etc.'; |
| x is C | = | 'x is related to the city of Pāṭaliputra', |
| x is ¬D | = | 'x is not related to the city of Kanyakubja etc.', |
| x is E | = | 'x is existing in autumn', |
| x is ¬F | = | 'x is not existing in spring etc.', |
| x is G | = | 'x is something black', |
| x is ¬H | = | 'x is not something red etc.' |

It should be noted that all negative predicates ¬Q {¬B, ¬D, ¬F, ¬H, ...} are merely implied by the affirmative predicates R {A, C, E, G, ...}, but they are not expressly stated in sentences of the first figure: *syād asti*. It is only in the second sort of sentences, negative ones, that the exclusion comes to the fore:

[2] "In a certain sense", or "somehow", the pot etc. indeed does not exist; for in a certain sense there cannot be a thorough determination of the real thing, because its own form is not determined thoroughly when the real thing's non-existence [as Q] is not accepted also on the basis of a different substance etc. [belonging to other things], like [*mutatis mutandis* its existence as P is determined] on the basis of [the real thing's] own substance. And someone who maintains that [the pot] exists in an absolute sense cannot claim that the non-existence [as Q] with respect to the [pot] is not established, because it is somehow established to be congruous with the real thing, just as a proof [requires both positive and negative concomitance]^{79,80}.

The idea of a description of the thing's essence in a negative manner is related to a considerably common conviction among Indian philosophers that any definition determines the nature of a thing by indicating 'a property which excludes all that is not the thing's nature'⁸¹. Accordingly, the negative aspect of exclusion, so much emphasised by semantic theory of *anyāpoha* ('exclusion of the other') developed by the Buddhist tradition of Diñnāga, plays an important role in the Jaina theory of the *syād-vāda*. The same conviction led, for instance, Dharmakīrti, following Diñnāga, to formulate his theory that inference—comprising also all

anyathētara-rūpāpattyā sva-rūpa-hāni-prasaṅga iti. avadhāraṇam^b cātra bhaṅge 'nabhimatārthavyāvṛtṭy-artham upāttam. itarathānabhīhita-tulyatāvāsyā vakyasya prasajyeta. pratiniyata-svārthānabhīdhānāt. [^a SVM₁ / SVM₂ read *nāpy ādi-rūpatvena*, but this reading does not make sense. An almost identical passage found in JTBh 1.22 § 63.23: reads: *na jalādītvena*, therefore I suggest to emend the text taking *āpas*, a synonym of *jala*, as the first member of the compound. ^b SVM₁ reads *avadhāraṇam*].

⁷⁹ See p. 35 f.

⁸⁰ SVM₁ 23.132–140, p. 144.6–14 = SVM₂, p. 211.7–9: *syāt kathamcin nāsty eva kumbhādīḥ svadravyādibhir iva^a para-dravyādibhir api vastuno 'sattvāniṣṭau hi pratiniyata-sva-rūpābhāvād vastupratiniyatir na syāt. na cāstivākānta-vādibhir atra nāstivam asiddham iti vaktavyam. kathamcit tasya vastuny yukti-siddhatvāt sādhanavat.* [^a SVM₁ reads *eva*].

⁸¹ NBh₂ 1.1.2, p. 8. 6: *tatrōddiṣṭasyātattva-vyavacchedako dharmo lakṣaṇam.*

verbal communication based on linguistic signs—⁸²is a process which proceeds by the exclusion of false superimposition (*samāropa*), i.e. properties wrongly superimposed on the thing, or by removing cognitive error (*bhrānti*), that stems from the doubt as to what characteristics a thing possesses. Accordingly, what inference, including verbal communication, leads to is the determination of the thing by excluding the properties which do not belong to it.⁸³ As Dharmakīrti observes, the determination of the thing’s nature is directly related to the exclusion of all properties that do not constitute its nature, although the cognitive process that leads to the correct knowledge of the thing takes the negative path through elimination:

‘Since determinate cognition and false superimposition stand in a relation of [a cognitive act] that sublates [false superimposition] and [a cognitive act] that is sublated [by determinate cognition], it is understood that the former operates when the determination (sc. exclusion) of the false superimposition takes place.’⁸⁴

Similarly, when the Jainas speak of thing’s non-existence (*vastuno ’sattva*) they mean precisely such an exclusion of the properties that do not constitute the thing’s essence. Although logically equivalent to ‘*x* is P’, to say ‘*x* is not non-P’ reveals an additional intensional, semantically relevant information, which is precisely the line of thought that motivated Dinnāga to develop his theory of exclusion (*apoha*).

In Malliṣeṇa’s laconic exposition, the combination of the first and second figure should not present any difficulty:

‘[3] The third one, [i.e. the combination of the two: *syād asti nāsti*,] is absolutely clear.’⁸⁵

Since the first and the second figures are logically equivalent, although they do carry different semantic contents, their conjunction involves no contradiction. In addition, it is within our verbal means to express their conjunction. Similarly, the fourth figure which involves the conjunction of the positive and negative statements cannot yield any contradiction, although it is practically inexpressible in the sense that there are no verbal means to express the conjunction with one word:

‘[4] If there is a desire to express both properties of existence and non-existence, which are simultaneously emphasised as primary, with respect to one and the same real thing, then a real thing such as the soul etc. [understood in this way] is inexpressible, because a word of such kind [to denote both properties] is impossible. For it is as follows, a pair of qualities, i.e. of existence [as P] and non-

⁸² See *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* 5.1:

*na pramāṇāntaram śābdam anumānāt tathā hi tat^a /
kṛtakatvādivat svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣate // —*

—‘Verbally acquired cognition is not an additional cognitive criterion, different from inference, because it names its object through [the procedure known as] “exclusion of the other” in the same way as [the inference: “*x* is impermanent, because it is produced”, determines its object to have the quality of “impermanence” on the basis of the already known quality of] “being produced” etc.’

The verse is quoted by Kamalaśīla in *TSaP* 1515, p. 441.6–7 (^a*saḥ {tat?}*), partly quoted by Simha-sūri in *DNCV*, p. 612.13–14; quoted in *DNC* ed., vol. 2, p. 607.7–8. Cf. the translations in: HAYES (1988: 300) and HERZBERGER (1986: 145–146). See also HAYES (1988: 188–193) and DUNNE (2004: 145 f.) on Dharmakīrti.

⁸³ See, e.g., *PVSV*, p. 27.13: *anumānena samāropa-vyavacchedaḥ kriyate*.—‘Through inference, one accomplishes the exclusion of false superimposition’; *PVSV*, p. 27.14 f.: *samāropa-vyavacchedād anyavyavacchedaḥ kṛto bhavatīti tad-artham anyat pravartate*.—‘The exclusion of the other (i.e. all that is not the particular thing) is accomplished through the exclusion of false superimposition...’

⁸⁴ *PV*₁ 3.49 = *PV*₂ 3.49:

*niścayāropo-manasor bādhyā-bādhaka-bhāvataḥ /
samāropa-viveke śya pravṛttir iti gamyate //*

⁸⁵ *SVM*₁ 23.142, p. 144.16 = *SVM*₂, p. 212.3: *ṭṭīyaḥ spaṣṭa eva*.

existence [as Q], cannot be simultaneously articulated with respect to one [and the same real thing] with the [expression]: “x is [P]”, because this [expression] is not capable of conveying the non-existence [of x as Q]. Similarly, [a pair of qualities cannot be simultaneously articulated with respect to one and the same real thing] with the [expression]: “x is not [Q]”, because it is not capable of conveying existence [of x as P]. Further, no numerically one conventionally accepted word, like “flower-toothed” (Puṣpadanta),⁸⁶ is capable of expressing such a [complex] meaning, because even this [compound] name [Puṣpadanta] is seen to have the capacity to demonstrate the pair of meaning [“flower” and “teeth”] consecutively, like for instance the conventional (sc. artificial) term SaT [which is used to denote] both ŚatṚ and ŚānaC affixes.⁸⁷ And for this very reason, no copulative compound and no descriptive determinative (appositional) compound as well as no sentence can denote this [compounded meaning]. That is why the real thing [in question], which remains inexpressible, because there is no [verbal means] to denote the compounded whole, is [here] established as determined by simultaneous existence and non-existence, [both] emphasised as the primary meaning. But it is not inexpressible completely, because that would lead to an undesired consequence that it would not be communicable even with the term “inexpressible”!⁸⁸

The outcome of this kind of approach may seem rather trivial and disappointing because all that is meant by the statement *syād avaktavyam* is linguistic incapacity, or human incapability, to express an affirmation of certain properties and negation of some others in one breath, and not some kind of logical third value. It is simply not possible to expressly communicate two ideas simultaneously, even though they can be logically closely related. Both the singular name ‘Puṣpadanta’, belonging to the natural language, for one and the same individual which conveys

⁸⁶ This passage is translated in GANERI (2001: 143), who—instead of ‘one conventionally accepted word, like “flower-toothed” (Puṣpadanta)’—speaks of ‘a single conventional term such as *puṣpavant* [meaning “sun or moon”].’ GANERI does not justify his reading (emendation?), which apparently is: *puṣpavant-ādivat*, although both editions read: *puṣpadantādivat*. Indeed, his suggestion does seem very attractive at first, because the term *puṣpavant* in dual (*puṣpavantau*) means ‘both the sun and the moon’, and the term *puṣpavant* serve the purpose better than Puṣpadanta, inasmuch as *puṣpavant* (‘one which has the flower’) seems to be a uniform word and as a homogenous term indicates two objects in one take, whereas the name Puṣpadanta is clearly a copulative compound (*puṣpa-danta*) and appears to also convey two ideas. However, what is at stake in the passage is the question whether one linguistic unit (word) can convey two different properties that can pertain to one and the same referent. Clearly, it is only Puṣpadanta that meets this condition, whereas *puṣpavant* has two referents, so it is not what Malliṣeṇa originally could have had in mind.

⁸⁷ For the ŚatṚ and ŚānaC *kṛt*-affixes see e.g. A 3.2.124: *laṭaḥ ŚatṚ-ŚānaCāv aprathamā-samānādihikaraṇe*.—‘The [*kṛt*-affixes] ŚatṚ and ŚānaC [are used to replace] laṭ affix when it has the same reference except the first case-affix.’ The ŚatṚ and ŚānaC affixes of the *kṛt* category express the activity that occurs simultaneously with the activity expressed by the main verb, provided they are used in all other cases than the nominative case. ŚatṚ affix, as participial ending, forms active participles with °ant ending: *pacantaṃ devadattaṃ paśya* (‘Watch Devadatta who is cooking’); similarly ŚānaC affix forms medium participles: *pacamānaṃ devadattaṃ paśya* (‘Watch Devadatta who is cooking’). Malliṣeṇa’s idea is that even the artificially created term SaT does not have the capacity to denote both ŚatṚ and ŚānaC *kṛt*-affixes, but it projects both the ideas to the mind one after the other.

This example is taken over by Yaśovijaya in JTBh₁ 1.22 § 63, p. 20.1.

⁸⁸ SVM₁ 23.143–147, p. 144.17–145.2 = SVM₂, p. 212.3–10: *dvābhyām astitva-nāstitva-dharmābhyām yugapat-pradhānatayārpitābhyām ekasya vastuṃ bhidhītsāyām tādrśasya śabdasyāsambhāvād avaktavyam jīvādi-vastu. tathā hi sad-asattva-guṇa-dvayaṃ yugapat ekatra sad ity-ana vaktum aśakyam, tasyāsattva-pratipādanāsamarthatvāt. tathāsad ity-anenāpi, tasya sattva-pratyāyana-sāmarthyābhāvāt. na ca puṣpadantādivat sāṅketikam ekam padaṃ tad vaktum samartham, tasyāpi kramenārtha-dvaya-pratyāyane sāmarthyōpapatteḥ, śatṚ-śānaC sāṅketita-sac-chabdavat. ata eva dvandva-karma-dhāraya-vṛtṭyor vākyaśya ca na tad-vācakatvam iti sakala-vācaka-rahitatvād avaktavyam vastu yugapat-sattvāsattvābhyām pradhāna-bhāvārpitābhyām ākrāntam vyavatiṣṭhate. na ca sarvathāvaktavyam, avaktavya-śabdenāpy anabhidheyatva-prasaṅgāt.*

Cf. the translation in GANERI (2001: 143).

two distinct ideas, i.e. ‘flower’ (*puṣpa*) and ‘teeth’ (*danta*), and the term SaT, artificially created within the technical language of the grammarians, to denote two different affixes ŚatR and ŚānaC, symbolise the idea that whatever the linguistic means, either evolved naturally or devised in order to suit practical needs of a linguistic convention, any compounded idea is always expressed or brought to mind in a sequence, never simultaneously. Under such circumstances, the theory seems to lose its stimulating flavour for a logician and becomes of interest rather for a linguist.

In conclusion, Malliṣeṇa expresses what is already well known, namely that the fifth to seventh figures are mere permutations of the first four options:

‘[5–7] The intent of the remaining three can be easily deduced.’⁸⁹

As it transpires from the foregoing, the sentential functor *syāt* is itself a kind of variable the actual values of which are various parameters. We can distinguish two types of such parameters (for the second-order parameters see below p. 34), whose actual values happen to be, as in the above example: ‘made of clay’, ‘made of water etc.’, ‘related to the city of Pāṭaliputra’, ‘related to the city of Kanyakubja etc.’, ‘existing in autumn’, ‘existing in spring etc.’, ‘something black’, ‘something red’, etc. What I call first-order parameters are the traditionally accepted following four:

substance (*dravya*) = *S* ,
 place or occurrence (*kṣetra*) = *O* ,
 time (*kāla*) = *T* ,
 condition (*bhāva*) = *C* .

Their number can be extended (*vide supra*, p. 25 f.) and can include other parameters, such as mode, aspect, relation, distinction, material substratum, relation, serviceability, verbal designation etc., depending on the requirements of the analysis.

In other words, if we want to be more accurate, the ranges of predicates $R \{A, C, E, G, \dots\}$ and $\neg Q \{\neg B, \neg D, \neg F, \neg H, \dots\}$ turn out to be a predicate *P* indexed with the set of the four basic parameters $\{P^Sx, P^Ox, P^Tx, P^Cx, \dots\}$, for instance as follows:

‘With respect to substance, *x* is ...’: P^Sx ,
 ‘With respect to place, *x* is ...’: P^Ox ,
 ‘With respect to time, *x* is ...’: P^Tx ,
 ‘With respect to condition, *x* is ...’: P^Cx , etc.

However, a closer reading of textual sources shows that this is still a simplification, insofar as what we really have is a case of double indexicality or double parameterisation, i.e. the four basic, first-order parameters are also indexed in at least twofold fashion as follow: $R^S{}_1x, \neg Q^S{}_2x, P^O{}_1x, \neg Q^O{}_2x, P^T{}_1x, \neg Q^T{}_2x, P^C{}_1x, \neg Q^C{}_2x, \dots$, for instance:

‘with respect to substance S_1 , *x* is ...’ : $R^S{}_1x$,
 ‘with respect to substance S_2 , *x* is not ...’ : $\neg Q^S{}_2x$,
 ‘with respect to place O_1 , *x* is ...’ : $R^O{}_1x$,
 ‘with respect to place O_2 , *x* is not ...’ : $\neg Q^O{}_2x$,
 ‘with respect to time T_1 , *x* is ...’ : $R^T{}_1x$,
 ‘with respect to time T_2 , *x* is not ...’ : $\neg Q^T{}_2x$,
 ‘with respect to condition C_1 , *x* is ...’ : $R^C{}_1x$, etc.
 ‘with respect to condition C_2 , *x* is not ...’ : $\neg Q^C{}_2x$, etc.

We can restate the above set of propositions as a general rule as follows:

$\forall x . \exists \sigma : P^\pi x$,

‘For every real thing (*vastu*) *x*, there is a particular perspective σ such that it can be interpreted as parameter π with respect to which *x* is *P*’,

⁸⁹ SVM₁ 23.154, p. 145.3: *śeṣās trayah sugamābhiprāyāḥ*.

where $\pi = \{S, O, T, C\}$ is the set of the first-order parameters of substance = S , place (occurrence) = O , time = T , and condition = C .

Thus, every sentence should be taken as embedding a set of hidden parameters that delineate the context, and a predicate, say, P of any statement x : Px is in fact a compound predicate that should be analysed by way of additional parameters.

3.5. Emphasis

There is still one more important element to take account of, namely emphasis (*arpaṇa* / *arpaṇā*). The idea comes to the surface from relatively early works onwards, perhaps the earliest being Umāsvāmin's *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, where we find the expression 'arpitānarpita' ('emphasised [property] and not-emphasised [property]', vide supra, p. 1). The idea of an emphasised property (*arpita*) is subsequently elaborated by Pūjyapāda Devanandin in the *Sarvārtha-siddhi* and explained as 'a property to which prominence is extended' (*prādhānyam ... upanītam*):

'On account of the purpose [which] a real thing, being of multiplex nature, [is to serve or is to be referred to], prominence is extended to, or is emphasised, i.e. [prominence] is given to a certain property in accordance with the expressive intent [of the speaker]. [The property] which is contrary to that [emphasised property] is not-emphasised [property]. Since [such a not-emphasised property serves] no purpose [at a particular time], even though it exists, there is no expressive intent [to assert it]; hence it is called subordinate [property]. Since these two [kinds of properties] are established, viz. "because emphasised [property] and not-emphasised [property] are established", there is no contradiction.'⁹⁰

The opposite of the emphasised property in a not-emphasised property (*anarpita*), taken as subordinate property (*upasarjanīta*). These two are sometimes also called 'primary' (*mukhya*) and 'secondary' (*gauṇa*).

The emphasis has been variously understood by various authors and an exact analysis of its historical development and its different interpretations would serve no direct purpose here. In most cases, however, it is understood that two properties can be emphasised, this way or another, either simultaneously (*yugapad*, *yaugapadyena*) or consecutively (*krama*, *krameṇa*). What emphasis (*arpaṇa*) actually means is a verbal pronouncement of a property, whereas 'non-emphasis' (*anarpaṇa*) means that a property is not explicitly mentioned in a sentence although it is logically implied or entailed. What is important, the emphasis applies only when we want to express two properties, but it is never mentioned when one expresses just one property.

Other relatively early examples of the idea of emphasis are found in Siddhasena Divākara's *Sammati-tarka-prakaraṇa* 1.36–40 (vide supra, p. 21) and in Samantabhadra's *Āpta-mīmāṃsā*:

'The pair [of existence and non-existence is possible] because both are emphasised consecutively. [Their pair] is inexpressible because it is impossible [to express them] together. The last three figures consist of the inexpressible and the remaining [figures], according to their own reasons.'⁹¹

Samantabhadra makes a reference to the idea of emphasis also in the *Yukty-anuśāsana*:

'To establish [absolute] distinction of substance and modes is not [possible]. Double nature is contradictory when emphasised singly. Both property and

⁹⁰ SSi 5.32 ad loc., § 588, p. 231.9. ff.: *anekāntātmakasya vastunaḥ prayojana-vaśād yasya kasyacid dharmasya vivakṣayā prāpitam prādhānyam arpitam upanītam iti yāvat. tad-viparītam anarpitam. prayojanābhāvāt sato 'py avivakṣā bhavaty upasarjanītam iti ucyate. tābhyām siddher "arpitānarpita-siddher"* [TS 5.32] *nāsti virodhaḥ*.

⁹¹ ĀMī 16:

*kramārpita-dvayād dvaitam sahāvācyam aśaktitaḥ /
avaktavyōttarāḥ śeṣās trayo bhaṅgāḥ sva-hetutaḥ //*

property-possessor are mutually related in threefold manner. These two are not accepted by you (sc. by the Jina) to be contradictory in an absolute sense.’⁹²

A fairly early date of first occurrences of the idea of emphasis attests to its being a vital component of the theory of the *syād-vāda* from its outset. The idea becomes a standard element in all expositions of the theory. It is usually used to explain the difference between the figures *syād asti nāsti* and *syād avaktavyam*. Referring to the idea of emphasis and its consecutive or simultaneous application in the *Tattvārtha-rāja-vārttika*, Akalaṅka clarifies the difference between the third and fourth statements precisely as a difference in a consecutive and simultaneous emphasis:

‘The third alternative holds good, insofar as one wants to predicate two [distinct] qualities simultaneously of a numerically one undifferentiated [thing] without any differentiation [between the two]. In this case, when one thing as a whole is consecutively denoted by way of [accentuating] one property of a whole [composite] thing as such with [just] one speech element at one time for each of the first and the second alternatives (figures), [this is consecutiveness]. Similarly, when one wishes to ascribe two opposing qualities, each restricted (sc. expressible by separate words of different denotation), to numerically one thing as an indivisible whole with numerically one speech element at one time simultaneously, without any differentiation [between the two], then it is inexpressible (sc. inexpressible), because there is no such speech element [to convey] this [complex meaning]. In this case, simultaneity (sc. the fourth figure “inexpressible”) operates with regard to implied properties without differentiation with respect to time and other [factors], and their differentiation in the case of [the inexpressible proposition] is not possible.’⁹³

Clearly, for all practical reasons the third statement (*syād asti nāsti*) *consecutively* expresses two distinct properties, that are not contradictory, because they refer to two different contexts, or they have two different sets of parameters. On the other hand, in the fourth statement (*syād avaktavyam*), we have a case of, again, two distinct parameterised properties, which do not stand in contradiction, but there is no linguistic tools at our disposal to express them *simultaneously*. It seems that the ‘inexpressible’ figure is not a case of indeterminateness or undecidedness either understood as a third logical truth value or in the sense that we are unable to determine which of possible sets of parameters apply.

On the other hand, the claim that the figure ‘inexpressible’ refers to a situation when the truth value of a proposition is undecided or undetermined, or when neither of two alternatives can be affirmed or denied, finds some corroboration in what Malliṣeṇa incidentally, in a slightly different context, says in the *Syād-vāda-mañjarī*:

‘As regards [the predication expressing] “existence”, because it is inexpressible, [we speak of] the third sex (viz. neither male nor female), [when we reply to the question]: “what is conceived in her womb”’.⁹⁴

Apparently, on his reading, inexpressibility (*avaktavyatva*) fills in the lacuna in our knowledge, when we are unable to determine either of two values, i.e. ‘male’ or ‘female’, and

⁹² YA 48:

*na dravya-paryāya-prthag-vyavasthā dvaityātmyam ekārpaṇayā viruddham /
dharmas ca dharmī ca mithas tridhēmau na sarvathā te ’bhimatau viruddhau //*

⁹³ RVār 4.42, p. 257.10–15: *tr̥tīyo vikalpaḥ ucyate—dvābhyām guṇābhyām ekasyāiva abhinnasyābheda-rūpeṇa yugapad vaktum iṣṭatvāt. tatra yathā prathama-dvitiyayor vikalpayor ekasmin kāle ekena śabdena ekasyārthasya samastasyāiva ekena guṇa-rūpeṇābhidhānam kramāt, evam yadā dvābhyām pratiyogibhyām guṇābhyām avadhāraṇāt abhyām^a yugapad ekasmin kāle ekena śabdena ekasyārthasya kṛtsnasyāvābheda-rūpeṇābhidhāna tadā avācyāḥ tad-vidhārthasya śabdasya cābhāvāt. tatra yugapad-bhāvo guṇānām kālādibhir abhedena vivikṣitānām vṛttiḥ, na ca tair abhedo ’tra sambhavati.*

^a RVār ed. proposes to read: *avadhāraṇāt kābhyām*; varia lectio in n. 10: *avadhāraṇāt makābhyām*.

⁹⁴ SVM 28.12–13, p. 159.16–17: *sad iti avaktavyatvān napuṃsakatvaṃ yathā kiṃ tasyā garbhe jātam iti.*

instead we use a third term. The practical application of the three terms (existence, non-existence and inexpressibility) to the linguistic usage shows that apparently ‘inexpressibility’ might be used, one could argue, as a third logical value. However, this is probably not what Malliṣeṇa wants to say: although the term *napuṃsaka* does normally refer to a third sex (‘neither male [nor female]’), in this case such an interpretation can easily be dismissed on the ground that, under ordinary conditions, what is born of the womb can either be a girl or a boy, not a hermaphrodite (‘a third value’). The inability to determine whether ‘a girl will be born of the womb’ or ‘a boy will be born of the womb’ resembles the problem of a future sea battle discussed by Aristotle in Chapter 9 of Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας (*De Interpretatione*), esp. 18a29–39. Out of two contradictory statements about a future sea battle, either ‘it is the case that a sea battle will take place tomorrow’ is true, and the latter false, or ‘it is not the case that a sea battle will take place tomorrow’ is true, and the former false. However, ‘since propositions are true as they correspond with facts’ (18a33), so, as long as there is no tomorrow yet, both affirmation and denial have the same character: they remain undecided. There is one important difference, though, between Malliṣeṇa’s ‘either boy or girl’ case and Aristotle’s ‘sea battle’ dilemma: as long as a new day has not dawned yet, there is no corresponding fact, as an objective criterion of truth of propositions, against which we could determine which of two contradictory propositions is true, whereas in the former case the objective fact, in the form of a foetus in the womb, is there, but we are merely incapable of determining which of the two propositions corresponds to it. One could argue that, apparently, what this practical usage of the *syād-vāda* reveals is that a proposition ‘in a certain sense, the foetus *x* conceived in the womb is inexpressible’ simply means that it is impossible to express jointly that ‘*x* is a boy’ and ‘*x* is a girl’, but this only evades the real problem of how to relate this practical example to the theoretical structure devised by the Jainas. Clearly what it demonstrates is that inexpressible propositions are also such the truth value of which we are unable to determine, although the facts to which the propositions correspond are there but remain beyond our knowledge.

The idea of simultaneity can, as Akalaṅka points out, easily be replaced with the idea of ‘equal expressive force’ applied to both properties one wishes to predicate of the thing:

‘Alternatively, [the figure] is inexpressible because two properties of equal force, inasmuch as both function as primary, cannot be expressly predicated of a real thing as qualities both of which one intends to express, due to the fact that, when verbal designation of one impedes verbal designation of the other, that would entail either that [the object] would be contrary to what one accepts or it would have no qualities.’⁹⁵

As he indicates⁹⁶, various other parameters, not necessarily the time factor alone, can be used as criteria of emphasis, the main idea of which is to facilitate a reference point that determines what particular feature can either be affirmed or denied of an object, viz. in what sense a particular thing ‘is P’ and in what sense it ‘is not-Q’. Due to purely practical or verbal limitations, but certainly not logical constraints, the affirmation or denial cannot be asserted of one and the same object simultaneously.

That the problem of inexpressibility of the third (or fourth) figure does not concern logic but is a matter of limited verbal means at our disposal is quite a popular stand, and Akalaṅka is not an exception. The idea is echoed, e.g., by Abhayadeva-sūri (early 11th century) in the *Tattva-bodha-vidhāyini*:

‘The first figure is used in the sense of demonstrating existence [of *x* as P], in which the subordinate element is non-existence [of *x* as Q]. The second [figure] is used in the sense of demonstrating the [non-existence of *x* as Q] by the transposition of the [first figure]. However, there is no single term capable of demonstrating these two properties either as [simultaneously] primary or as [simultaneously] secondary, because in the first place there is no compounded

⁹⁵ RVār 4.42, p. 258.13–14: *athavā vastuni mukhya-pravṛtṭyā tulya-balayoḥ parasparābhidhāna-pratibandhe sati iṣṭa-viparīta-nirguṇatvāpatteḥ vivakṣitōbhaya-guṇatvenānābhidhānād avaktavyam.*

⁹⁶ RVār 4.42, p. 257.17 ff.

expression that can demonstrate these [two] nor a [singular] sentence [expressive of both] is possible.’⁹⁷

His analysis of all verbal means that could potentially be handy in expressing first two figures in one breath,⁹⁸ Abhayadeva-sūri concludes with the claim that

‘Simultaneous [application] of these two figures (*sc.* assertion and denial) is inexpressible, because such [a statement that could express the two jointly] is void of the form [conforming to that] which could be predicated of in such a way, [i.e. affirmatively or negatively].’⁹⁹

The above quotations, as well as a number of other passages, including those of the *Tattvārtha-rāja-vārttika* 4.42 (vide infra, p. 37), attest to the fact that, within in the framework of the seven figures, the elements of seemingly contradictory attributes (‘existence’ and ‘non-existence’), taken either alone or in combinations, are not given equal treatment but are treated in a qualified manner, i.e. as primary or secondary.

The idea of consecutiveness and simultaneity, especially embedded in the ‘inexpressible’ proposition, does not refer only to the time factor, but there are certain other parameters that should not to be confused with the first-order parameters of substance, place, time and condition, mentioned above (p. 30 f.), which determine the context of the predicate P. The traditional enumeration of second-order parameters¹⁰⁰ comprises additional reference points, which may be instrumental in determining from what perspective we can speak of ‘simultaneous’ application or ‘equal expressive force’ (*tulya-bala*), to use Akalaṅka’s expression, of the predicates. To be exact, they provide the context for the idea of emphasis applicable in each and every case.¹⁰¹

What is called ‘simultaneity’ (*yaugapadya*) involves the application of one and the same parameter taken as the point of reference which one wishes to apply to various properties affirmed or denied of one and the same thing. In other words, ‘simultaneous’ predications are those which predicate two incompatible sets of properties of a numerically one object from exactly the same reference point, which is elucidated by Akalaṅka:

‘As regards these [second-order parameters], [when some] properties happen to be contradictory with respect to one factor α , and the relevance of these [factors] α s is not observed with regard to one and the same thing at one and the same point of time β ; hence there is no speech element to express both of them, because [speech] does not function in this way.’¹⁰²

⁹⁷ TBV ad STP 1.36, p. 443.2-4: *asattvôpasarjana-sattva-pratipādane prathamō bhaṅgaḥ. tad-viparyayeṇa tat-pratipādane dvitīyaḥ. dvayō tu dharmayoḥ prādhānyena guṇa-bhāveṇa vā pratipādane na kiṁcid vacaḥ samartham yato na tāvat samāsa-vacanāṁ tat-pratipādakam nāpi vākyaṁ sambhavati.* In what follows Abhayadeva-sūri analyses various kinds of compounds etc. and their inefficacy to express both assertion and denial at the same time.

⁹⁸ TBV ad STP 1.36, p. 443.2-12.

⁹⁹ TBV ad STP 1.36, p. 443.23: *tat-prakārābhyāṁ yugapad avācyaṁ tathābhidheya-pariṇāma-rahitatvāt tasya.*

¹⁰⁰ E.g. time factor, the thing’s own essence, the thing in its substantial aspect, i.e. its material substratum, its relation, the thing’s its serviceability, the location of the thing, its status as the property-possessor, the thing as a combination of related attributes, the thing’s concurrence with other properties, the thing’s verbal designation etc.; vide supra, p. 26.

¹⁰¹ Akalaṅka does not use the word *arpaṇā* explicitly in his exposition, nor does he use the term *arpita* (‘emphasised’) in the afore-quoted passages, which might lead one to a mistaken impression that he does not know of the idea of emphasis or he understood it somehow differently. On the contrary, both the idea of emphasis and the term *arpita* are actually present in his works, the latter occurs several times in his exposition of the *syād vāda* in RVār 4.42, p. 253.9–262.13, esp. while dealing with the third (*syād avaktavyam*) and fourth (*syād asti nāsti*) figures, for instance: p. 258.21 = 259.1 (*ayam api syād ity evārpitavyaḥ*), 252.31 (*ābhyāṁ eva krameṇārpitābhyāṁ ubhaya-rūpaṁ vastūcyate*), etc.

¹⁰² RVār 4.42, p. 257.16 ff.: *tatra yena kāraṇena viruddhā bhavanti guṇās teṣāṁ ekasmin kāle kvacid eka-vastuni vṛttir na dṛṣṭā, atas tayor nāsti vācakaḥ śabdaḥ tathā-vṛty-abhāvāt.*

In a longer section Malliṣeṇa¹⁰³ replicates more or less the contents of respective sections of the *Tattvārtha-rāja-vārttika*, and explains in more detail how the second-order parameters operate. We have seen that the list of second-order parameters includes also second-order time-parameters, i.e. exact temporal reference points that index a basic parameter of time as distinguished from basic parameters of substance, place and condition. For instance we can both assert and deny particular properties of a given object with reference to time (as distinguished from predication with reference to, e.g., place, substance and condition), but we can apply different time points:

‘As regards these [second-order parameters], in the figure: “in a certain sense, a real thing such as the soul etc. is indeed [P]”, existence [is predicated of] at a given time *t*, but all the remaining innumerable properties existing at the same time *t* also occur in the same numerically one object [which are not expressed]—this is the procedure of non-differentiation with respect to time.’¹⁰⁴

As we have seen, the idea of emphasised property means that the property not emphasised is implied but not expressed, and the relationship between the emphasised and not-emphasised properties is often likened to the case of the inference (*anumāna*) based on the negative concomitance (*vyatireka*), which is necessarily implied by a positive proof formula that is based on positive concomitance (*anvaya*), albeit it is not expressed. Just as positive and negative kinds of concomitance are logically equivalent, but one still sees the need to state them both consecutively out of practical, rhetorical or didactic considerations, likewise it is not completely meaningless to formulate a separate negative proposition of the *syān nāsti* type that explicitly denies certain not-emphasised properties, although such denial is already implied by the positive proposition of the *syād asti* type, as Malliṣeṇa explains:

‘For the existence of a proving property such as existent character etc. with respect to a particular inferable property such as impermanence etc. is not explicable without [implying its] non-existence in dissimilar instances, because [otherwise] that would lead to an undesired consequence that this [proving property] could not have the status of a proving property. Therefore, the existence of a real thing is inseparably connected with its non-existence, and its non-existence is [inseparably connected] with its [existence]. And their main and subordinate characters depend on the intention [of the speaker].’¹⁰⁵

As we know, the occurrence of a proving property (*sādhana*) in all loci of an inferable property (*sādhya*), i.e. in similar instances (*sapakṣa*), which is the scope of positive concomitance (*anvaya*), is logically related to the non-occurrence of the inferable property (*sādhya*) in all loci that are not loci of the proving property (*sādhana*), i.e. in all dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*), which is a case of negative concomitance (*vyatireka*). That is precisely the link which Malliṣeṇa wishes to establish also in the case of a *syāt* figure that affirms a certain property and a *syāt* figure that denies other properties.

How closely the concepts of two kinds of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) and the idea of properties affirmed and denied in the *syād-vāda* correspond to each other is highlighted in another passage of the *Syād-vāda-mañjarī*, devoted mainly to the idea of the particular (*viśeṣa*) and negative concomitance (*vyatireka*) and in which no direct reference is made to the doctrine of multiplexity of reality (*anekānta-vāda*):

‘And it is this [negative concomitance] that excludes itself from other [entities] belonging to the same class (sc. similar) and from [entities] belonging to a different

¹⁰³ SVM₁ 23.189–225, p. 146.13–147–24.

¹⁰⁴ SVM₁ 23.191–193, p. 146.14–16: *tatra syāj jīvādi vastv asty evēty atra yat-kālam astitvam tat-kālāḥ śeṣānanta-dharmā vastuny ekatrēti teṣām kālenābheda-vṛttiḥ.*

¹⁰⁵ SVM₁ 23.136–139, p. 144.10–14 = SVM₂, p. 211.9–212.2: *na hi kvacid anityatvātau sādhye sattvādi-sādhanasyāstitvam vipakṣe nāstitvam antareṇōpapannam, tasya sādhanatvābhāva-prasaṅgāt. tasmād vastuno ’stitvam nāstitvenāvinābhūtam, nāstitvam ca tenēti. vivakṣā-vaśac cānayoḥ pradhānōpasarjana-bhāvaḥ.*

class (sc. dissimilar) by means of substance, place, time and condition, and acquires the designation “the particular”. For this reason one should not come to the conclusion that the universal and the particular are two different as two separate ontological categories.¹⁰⁶

The passage attempts to establish a link between the particular and the universal as two opposites that are based on the negative idea of exclusion the basis of which is the logical rule of negative concomitance. What is conspicuous in the passage is an explicit reference to ‘substance, place, time and condition’ as criteria that make the exclusion possible; and these are precisely the same four parameters that are at play in the *syād-vāda*, called here first-order parameters.

We can therefore introduce a new symbol ϵ for ‘emphasis’ to a model sentence in our formalisation attempt as follows:

$\forall x . \exists \sigma \sigma: P^{\pi\epsilon}x$

‘For every real thing (*vastu*) x , there is always a particular perspective σ such that it can be interpreted as parameter π with respect to which x is P and the property P is emphasised under condition ϵ ’.

I will use the symbol ϵ_1 ‘property under emphasis’, or ‘emphasised property’, and ϵ_0 for ‘property under no emphasis’, or ‘property not emphasised’.

Let us see, at least provisionally, before a final attempt of formalisation (p. 37 ff.), how the idea of emphasis can accordingly be applied formally. Closely following Malliṣeṇa’s interpretation of SVM₁ 23.113–119, p. 143.12–18 (*vide supra*, p. 26 f.), in a manner which is a recurrent theme in many other earlier works, Yaśovijaya (c. 1600) describes, in his *Jaina-tarka-bhāṣā*¹⁰⁷, the first figure *syād asty eva ghaṭaḥ* under four parameters:

[1] ‘In a certain sense, i.e. with respect to substance S , a given pot x exists as being made of clay’ (A^S_{1x}) and ‘with respect to substance S , a given pot x does not exist as something made of water’ ($\neg B^S_{2x}$): $A^S_{1\epsilon_1x} \& \neg B^S_{2\epsilon_0x}$;

[2] ‘In a certain sense, i.e. with respect to place O , a given pot x exists in the city of Pāṭaliputra’ (C^O_{1x}) and ‘with respect to place O , a given pot x does not exist in the city of Kānyakubja’ ($\neg D^O_{2x}$): $C^O_{1\epsilon_1x} \& \neg D^O_{1\epsilon_0x}$;

[3] ‘In a certain sense, i.e. with respect to time T , a given pot x exists in the autumn’ (E^T_{1x}) and ‘with respect to time T , a given pot x does not exist in the spring’ ($\neg F^T_{2x}$): $E^T_{1\epsilon_1x} \& \neg F^T_{2\epsilon_0x}$;

[4] ‘In a certain sense, i.e. with respect to condition C , a given pot x exists as something black’ (G^C_{1x}) and ‘with respect to condition C , a given pot x does not exist as something red’ ($\neg H^C_{2x}$): $G^C_{1\epsilon_1x} \& \neg H^C_{2\epsilon_0x}$.

How exactly the process of disambiguation takes place through the application of the idea of emphasis is further explained by Akalaṅka in the *Tattvārtha-rāja-vārttika*:

¹⁰⁶ SVM₁ 4.20–22, p.11.14–16 = SVM₂ p.13.14–16: *sa [vyatirekaḥ] eva cētarebhyaḥ sajjātiya-vijātiyebhyo dravya-kṣetra-kāla-bhāvair ātmānam vyāvartayan viśeṣa-vyapadeśam aśnute. iti na sāmānya-viśeṣayoḥ pṛthak-padārthāntaratva-kalpanam nyāyayam.*

¹⁰⁷ JTBh₁ 1.22 § 63, 19.21 ff.: *tatra syād asty eva sarvam iti prādhānyena vidhi-kalpanayā prathamō bhaṅgaḥ. syāt kathamecit sva-dravya-kṣetra-kāla-bhāvāpekṣayēty arthaḥ. asti hi ghaṭādikaṁ dravyataḥ pārthivādītvena, na jalādītvena. kṣetrataḥ pāṭaliputrakādītvena, na kānyakubjādītvena. kālataḥ śaiśirādītvena, na vāsantikādītvena. bhāvataḥ śyāmādītvena, na raktādītvenēti. evaṁ syān nāsty eva sarvam iti prādhānyena niṣedha-kalpanayā dvitīyaḥ. na cāsattvaṁ kālpanikam, sattvavat tasya svātantryeṇānubhavāt, anyathā vipakṣāsattvasya tāttvikasyābhāvena hetos trairūpya-vyāghāta-prasaṅgāt. syād asty eva syān nāsty evēti prādhānyena kramika-vidhi-niṣedha-kalpanayā tṛtīyaḥ. syād avaktavyam evēti yugapat prādhānyena vidhi-niṣedha-kalpanayā caturthaḥ, ekena padena yugapat ubhayor vaktum aśakyatvāt, etc.*

‘All figures are useful and meaningful because they aim at demonstrating particular distinction between secondary and primary character. Namely, (1) when substance-expressive [perspective] is considered as primary and modes (qualities) are taken to be secondary, this is the first [figure: Px]. (2) When mode-expressive [perspective] is considered as primary and substance is taken to be secondary, this is the second [figure: $\neg Qx$]. In this case, the primary character depends on verbal means, because it is expressly intended (sc. conveyed) by the speech element; whereas that which is not expressed by the speech element and what can be understood from the context has non-primary (sc. secondary) character. (3) In the third [figure “inexpressible”] on the other hand, which is of simultaneous character, both have non-primary (sc. secondary) character, because neither of them is expressed by the speech element as the subject-matter (sc. content) [of the statement]. (4) The fourth [figure], in its turn, has both [aspects] as primary, because both are expressed consecutively by the speech element “exists” etc. In this manner, the remaining figures will be explained.’¹⁰⁸

For Akalaṅka, the figure ‘inexpressible’ is equivalent to the situation when neither of the two properties is expressed, i.e. both of them are subordinate, or ‘non-primary’ (*aprādhānya*). This stand will have important implications for my attempt at formalisation.

3.6. Formalisation

Having taken all the above, I propose the following way to formalise the seven propositions of the *syād-vāda*:

***bhaṅga* formalisation 1:**

1. *syād asti* $P\pi_1\epsilon_{1x}$
2. *syān nāsti* $\neg P\pi_2\epsilon_{1x}$
3. *syād avaktavyam* $P\pi_1\epsilon_{0x} \& \neg P\pi_2\epsilon_{0x}$
4. *syād asti nāsti* $P\pi_1\epsilon_{1x} \& \neg P\pi_2\epsilon_{1x}$
5. *syād asty avaktavyam* $P\pi_1\epsilon_{1x} \& P\pi_1\epsilon_{0x} \& \neg P\pi_2\epsilon_{0x}$
6. *syān nāsty avaktavyam* $\neg P\pi_2\epsilon_{1x} \& P\pi_1\epsilon_{0x} \& \neg P\pi_2\epsilon_{0x}$
7. *syād asti nāsty avaktavyam* $P\pi_1\epsilon_{1x} \& \neg P\pi_2\epsilon_{1x} \& P\pi_1\epsilon_{0x} \& \neg P\pi_2\epsilon_{0x}$

where P is a predicate variable, and comprises a range of positive predicates R {A, C, E, G, ...} and a range of negative predicates Q {B, D, F, H, ...} (*vide supra*, p. 27); π is a set of the first-order parameters {S, O, T, C} of substance, place (occurrence), time and condition (*vide supra*, p. 31), which determine in what sense predicate P is to be understood; ϵ is emphasis, which indicates that a given property is either expressed (ϵ_1) or suppressed (ϵ_0).

How to read this? For instance, $P\pi_1\epsilon_{1x}$ states that an assertion that an object x is P should be understood through a certain first-order parameter π (π_1), e.g. ‘in view of its substance, a jar is made of clay’, and it is verbally emphasised (ϵ_1), i.e. the predicate is expressly stated in language. The second figure $\neg P\pi_2\epsilon_{1x}$ means a proposition stating that the same object x is not P should be understood through some other first-order parameter π (π_2), e.g. ‘in view of its substance, a jar is not made of water’, and likewise it is verbally emphasised (ϵ_1). The third figure $P\pi_1\epsilon_{0x} \& \neg P\pi_2\epsilon_{0x}$ expresses an idea that the object x is both $P\pi_1$ and is not $P\pi_2$, but no

¹⁰⁸ RVār 4.42, p. 253.21-26: *guṇa-prādhānya-vyavasthā-viśeṣa-pratipādanārthavāt sarveṣāṃ bhaṅgānāṃ prayogo rthavān. tad yathā—dravyārthikasya prādhānye paryāya-guṇa-bhāve ca prathamah. paryāyārthikasya prādhānye dravya-guṇa-bhāve ca dvitīyah. tatra prādhānyam śabdena vivakṣitatvāc chābdādhīnam, śabdenānupāttasyārthato gamyamānasyāprādhānyam. tṛtīye tu yugapad-bhāve ubhayasyāprādhānyam śabdenābhīdheyatayānupāttatvāt. caturthas tūbhaya-pradhānaḥ krameṇa ubhaysāsty-ādi-śabdena upāttatvāt. tathōttare ca bhaṅgā vakṣyante.*

single term or expression can convey this complex meaning, hence the properties in question are verbally suppressed (ϵ_0).

On this reading, we can see that all the seven figures do not overlap and in each of them the component predicates are not repeated, for instance in figure 7 ($P^{\pi_1\epsilon_{1x}} \& \neg P^{\pi_2\epsilon_{1x}} \& P^{\pi_1\epsilon_{0x}} \& \neg P^{\pi_2\epsilon_{0x}}$) no element occurs twice. It is because the ‘inexpressible’ proposition holds only when both properties are not emphasised at the same time. This corresponds to Akalaṅka’s reading of the figure ‘inexpressible’, in which both properties are not emphasised, or ‘non-primary’ (*vide supra*, p. 37), viz. both are conveyed with equally suppressed ‘expressive force’.

The compound predicates P^{π_1} (affirmed) and P^{π_2} (denied) can be easily replaced with simpler predicate variables, say, A and $\neg B$, respectively, however first-order parameter π that indexes predicate P, or rather a predicate variable P, shows that we move in the same range of properties or with the same ‘ontological context’, e.g. we refer either to a certain substantial aspect of the thing only (predicate: substance), or to its certain situational aspect only (predicate: place / occurrence) etc., and these levels are not confused or intermixed.¹⁰⁹ For instance, if we take substance S as the value of first-order parameter π , then we have the following table:

1. *syād asti* $P^{S_1\epsilon_{1x}}$
2. *syān nāsti* $\neg P^{S_2\epsilon_{1x}}$
3. *syād avaktavyam* $P^{S_1\epsilon_{0x}} \& \neg P^{S_2\epsilon_{0x}}$
4. *syād asti nāsti* $P^{S_1\epsilon_{1x}} \& \neg P^{S_2\epsilon_{1x}}$
5. *syād asty avaktavyam* $P^{S_1\epsilon_{1x}} \& P^{S_1\epsilon_{0x}} \& \neg P^{S_2\epsilon_{0x}}$
6. *syān nāsty avaktavyam* $\neg P^{S_2\epsilon_{1x}} \& P^{S_1\epsilon_{0x}} \& \neg P^{S_2\epsilon_{0x}}$
7. *syād asti nāsty avaktavyam* $P^{S_1\epsilon_{1x}} \& \neg P^{S_2\epsilon_{1x}} \& P^{S_1\epsilon_{0x}} \& \neg P^{S_2\epsilon_{0x}}$

Similarly, one can take place, time and condition as reference points, and in each of such sets of predications one remains within the range delimited by one and the same parameter, albeit it can assume various values. Akalaṅka’s suggestion to take the properties in figure 3 ‘inexpressible’ as not emphasised produces a relatively simple model that involves no further problems.

In contradistinction to Akalaṅka’s solution, however, for whom inexpressibility concerns verbal communication in which no positive and no negative aspect is expressed and what follows is silence, most authors take *avaktavya* to be the case when both properties are emphasised at the same time, viz. when one intends to expressly convey both of them but lacks the appropriate verbal means. In their opinion, inexpressibility is the case when one intends to verbally highlight two aspects, one positive and one negative, but simply lacks verbal means to accomplish this. That being the case, our table should be changed to the following:

bhaṅga formalisation 2:

1. *syād asti* $P^{\pi_1\epsilon_{1x}}$
2. *syān nāsti* $\neg P^{\pi_2\epsilon_{1x}}$
3. *syād avaktavyam* $P^{\pi_1\epsilon_{1x}} \& \neg P^{\pi_2\epsilon_{1x}}$
4. *syād asti nāsti* $P^{\pi_1\epsilon_{1x}} \& \neg P^{\pi_2\epsilon_{1x}}$
5. *syād asty avaktavyam* $P^{\pi_1\epsilon_{1x}} \& P^{\pi_1\epsilon_{1x}} \& \neg P^{\pi_2\epsilon_{1x}}$
6. *syān nāsty avaktavyam* $\neg P^{\pi_2\epsilon_{1x}} \& P^{\pi_1\epsilon_{1x}} \& \neg P^{\pi_2\epsilon_{1x}}$
7. *syād asti nāsty avaktavyam* $P^{\pi_1\epsilon_{1x}} \& \neg P^{\pi_2\epsilon_{1x}} \& P^{\pi_1\epsilon_{1x}} \& \neg P^{\pi_2\epsilon_{1x}}$

¹⁰⁹ This prevents, for instance, the conjunction: ‘in a certain sense, x is made of clay and x is not present in Kanyakubja’, because ‘made of clay’ and ‘present / not present in Kanyakubja’ belong to different levels, and to parameter π does not allow for it.

This reading, with the two properties emphasised in figure 3 ‘inexpressible’, reveals that figure 3 is basically identical to figure 4 ‘affirmation and denial’. We should, therefore, introduce a third kind of emphasis ε_2 , beside lack of emphasis ε_0 , to account for the distinction between simultaneity (both properties are equally emphasised: ε_1) and consecutiveness (one property is emphasised as ε_1 , whereas the other property is subsequently emphasised as ε_2):

| <i>bhaṅga</i> formalisation 3: | |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| 1. | <i>syād asti</i> $\underline{p\pi_1\varepsilon_{1x}}$ |
| 2. | <i>syān nāsti</i> $\underline{\neg p\pi_2\varepsilon_{1x}}$ |
| 3. | <i>syād avaktavyam</i> $\underline{p\pi_1\varepsilon_{1x}} \ \& \ \underline{\neg p\pi_2\varepsilon_{1x}}$ |
| 4. | <i>syād asti nāsti</i> $\underline{p\pi_1\varepsilon_{1x}} \ \& \ \underline{\neg p\pi_2\varepsilon_{2x}}$ |
| 5. | <i>syād asty avaktavyam</i> $\underline{p\pi_1\varepsilon_{1x}} \ \& \ \underline{p\pi_1\varepsilon_{1x}} \ \& \ \underline{\neg p\pi_2\varepsilon_{1x}}$ |
| 6. | <i>syān nāsty avaktavyam</i> $\underline{\neg p\pi_2\varepsilon_{1x}} \ \& \ \underline{p\pi_1\varepsilon_{1x}} \ \& \ \underline{\neg p\pi_2\varepsilon_{1x}}$ |
| 7a. | <i>syād asti nāsty avaktavyam</i> [conjunction of fig. 1, 2, 3] $\underline{p\pi_1\varepsilon_{1x}} \ \& \ \underline{\neg p\pi_2\varepsilon_{1x}} \ \& \ \underline{p\pi_1\varepsilon_{1x}} \ \& \ \underline{\neg p\pi_2\varepsilon_{1x}}$ |
| 7b. | <i>syād asti nāsty avaktavyam</i> [conjunction of fig. 4, 3] $\underline{p\pi_1\varepsilon_{1x}} \ \& \ \underline{\neg p\pi_2\varepsilon_{2x}} \ \& \ \underline{p\pi_1\varepsilon_{1x}} \ \& \ \underline{\neg p\pi_2\varepsilon_{1x}}$ |

This interpretation reveals serious redundancy: the elements which are repeated are underlined.

Furthermore, the problem with the above formalisation is that it does not take into account all what Malliṣeṇa and Yaśovijaya say (p. 26 and 36). For instance, this approach overlooks the idea that affirmation of P^{π_1} entails negation of $\neg P^{\pi_2}$, albeit it is implied (‘not emphasised’) and not explicit. That being the case, we would have to redraft the table as follows:

| <i>bhaṅga</i> formalisation 4: | |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| 1. | <i>syād asti</i> $\underline{p\pi_1\varepsilon_{1x}} \ \& \ \underline{\neg p\pi_2\varepsilon_{0x}}$ |
| 2. | <i>syān nāsti</i> $\underline{\neg p\pi_2\varepsilon_{1x}} \ \& \ \underline{p\pi_1\varepsilon_{0x}}$ |
| 3. | <i>syād avaktavyam</i> $\underline{p\pi_1\varepsilon_{1x}} \ \& \ \underline{\neg p\pi_2\varepsilon_{1x}}$ |
| 4. | <i>syād asti nāsti</i> $\underline{p\pi_1\varepsilon_{1x}} \ \& \ \underline{\neg p\pi_2\varepsilon_{2x}}$ |
| 5. | <i>syād asty avaktavyam</i> $\underline{p\pi_1\varepsilon_{1x}} \ \& \ \underline{\neg p\pi_2\varepsilon_{0x}} \ \& \ \underline{p\pi_1\varepsilon_{1x}} \ \& \ \underline{\neg p\pi_2\varepsilon_{1x}}$ |
| 6. | <i>syān nāsty avaktavyam</i> $\underline{\neg p\pi_2\varepsilon_{1x}} \ \& \ \underline{p\pi_1\varepsilon_{0x}} \ \& \ \underline{p\pi_1\varepsilon_{1x}} \ \& \ \underline{\neg p\pi_2\varepsilon_{1x}}$ |
| 7a. | <i>syād asti nāsty avaktavyam</i> [conjunction of fig. 1, 2, 3] $\underline{p\pi_1\varepsilon_{1x}} \ \& \ \underline{\neg p\pi_2\varepsilon_{0x}} \ \& \ \underline{\neg p\pi_2\varepsilon_{1x}} \ \& \ \underline{p\pi_1\varepsilon_{0x}} \ \& \ \underline{p\pi_1\varepsilon_{1x}} \ \& \ \underline{\neg p\pi_2\varepsilon_{1x}}$ |
| 7b. | <i>syād asti nāsty avaktavyam</i> [conjunction of fig. 4, 3] $\underline{p\pi_1\varepsilon_{1x}} \ \& \ \underline{\neg p\pi_2\varepsilon_{2x}} \ \& \ \underline{p\pi_1\varepsilon_{1x}} \ \& \ \underline{\neg p\pi_2\varepsilon_{1x}}$ |

However, also in the fourth attempt we discover that again some components (underlined) turn out to be redundant! The case is that whatever variants we can conceive of, granted both are properties emphasised in the ‘inexpressible’ figure, we will always find some elements in the final analysis redundant, especially in figures 5, 6 and 7. Therefore, for the sake of relative elegance, consistency and, perhaps, optimality, one should follow Akalaṅka in his interpretation of figure 3, in which both properties are not emphasised (formalisation 1).

Worth noting here is a compromising position taken by Abhayadeva-sūri who maintains that the figure ‘inexpressible’ may be due to the fact that either both properties are emphasised or that both properties are not emphasised, i.e. it is the case whenever the properties share the same

kind of emphasis¹¹⁰. As a matter of fact, his position is foreshadowed by Akalaṅka's mention of 'equal expressive force' (*tulya-bala*)¹¹¹.

Such reformulations, conspicuous in formalisations 2–4, reveal certain inconsistencies which are, in my opinion, not of logical nature but concern redundancy. My claim is that with Malliṣeṇa's and Yaśovijaya's interpretations, and these are most representative of Jaina tradition, according to which both properties are equally emphasised in figure 3 'inexpressible', we will never bypass redundancies in figures 5, 6 and 7, and that is why I would rather take formalisation 1 (Akalaṅka) as the most consistent representation of the *syād-vāda*.

3.7. Final remarks

A major concern of all interpretations of the *syād-vāda* is whether the Jaina model indeed yields any type of inconsistency or paraconsistency, and if it does, on which level. These inconsistencies, of still new nature, that surfaced in the above exposition of two different takes at the *syād-vāda*—Akalaṅka's, on the one hand, and Malliṣeṇa's and Yaśovijaya's, on the other—reveal an important feature of the theory of the seven-fold modal description: we should no longer speak of a uniform Jaina tradition or a homogenous interpretation of the theory, whereas the modern formalisation attempts discussed in § 2 tend to conceal this important historical fact, inasmuch as the tendency has usually been to present the theory as a consistent project. Rather, researchers should compare and separately analyse different expositions of the *syād-vāda* theory produced by various Jaina thinkers instead of imposing their preconceived believes in the homogeneity of Jaina intellectual tradition.

Further, it seems that a solution to the redundancy problem of the *syād-vāda* that surfaces if one takes the 'inexpressible' to mean that two properties are simultaneously emphasised (Malliṣeṇa's and Yaśovijaya's interpretation) lies in accepting the fact that what the theory is about is not really logical relations but rather semantics and our usage of natural languages: it's main practical import is to demonstrate to what degree every proposition is context-dependent. The 'logical' approach will probably never solve the problem of redundancy in the sense that it is unlikely that one will once present the theory as an absolutely consistent, redundancy-proof and error-free model. Rather, the purpose of formalisation attempts and formal models should be a lucid presentation through which one could more clearly see the limitations of a particular interpretation of all the seven figures adopted by presented by a particular Jaina thinker. As we have seen, the problematic predication 'inexpressible' (*avaktavya*) is a result neither of logically indeterminate character of a variable nor of undecided nature or status of an entity, either logically or ontologically or otherwise. That is lucidly demonstrated through the instances of the name 'Puṣpadanta' and the term 'SaT' (*vide supra*, p. 29).

There arises a very important question in the general context of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (*anekānta-vāda*), which is known to comprises three theories: *nikṣepa-vāda*, *naya-vāda* and *syād-vāda*, which complement each other. Especially the latter two make an impression that somehow their application overlaps and, indeed, most researchers seem to have treated them jointly, without making a conscious effort to distinguish them or to keep their respective applications distinct. What is then a practical difference of the doctrine of viewpoints (*naya-vāda*) and the method of the seven-fold modal description (*sapta-bhaṅgī, syād-vāda*)?

The former takes any potentially meaningful sentence as context-dependent and assigns to it a context within which the sentence is true. The *naya-vāda* states that, as far as a real thing (*vastu*) is considered, only one aspect of it can be taken into account, albeit the whole range of possible applications and references of the sentence can be conceived of, but these would become meaningful only within a correspondingly delimited range of context. That is why the *naya-vāda* is called an 'incomplete account' (*vikalādeśa*), because only one context, out of many, can be verbally expressed by a sentence and is applicable to a particular object under a particular

¹¹⁰ 'There is no single term capable of demonstrating these two properties either as [simultaneously] primary or as [simultaneously] secondary' (*dvayos tu dharmayoḥ prādhānyena guṇa-bhāveṇa vā pratipādane na kimcid vacaḥ samartham*), *vide supra*, p. 34, n. 97.

¹¹¹ *Vide supra*, pp. 32, 34 and n. 95.

viewpoint. In other words, the *naya-vāda* takes a sentence as an object of its analysis and selects a particular context as its proper reference, out of many possible applications. According to this theory, all utterances are in fact incomplete sentences, and the task of the theory is to determine a proper context for a particular sentence by assigning to it its proper point of reference, which is a particular viewpoint. In other words, one sets off with a particular utterance, which is by nature ambiguous, and searches for such a viewpoint, or for an ‘indexed level of description’¹¹², under which the sentence is true and relevant. Thus, the primary object of the *naya-vāda* are statements and their application.

The idea of the ‘incomplete account’ (*vikalādeśa*), or partial description of an object, which is merely a ‘side-effect’ of the strategy to assign proper reference to a proposition, is crucial in the way viewpoints operate, whereas cognitive criteria are characterised by the ‘complete account’ (*sakalādeśa*). The idea is often repeated in Jaina philosophical works and finds its succinct form in an unidentified, often quoted passage:

Complete account rests on cognitive criteria, [whereas] incomplete account rests on viewpoints.¹¹³

In contradistinction to the *naya-vāda*, the seven-fold modal description takes a real thing (*vastu*) as the object of its analysis and searches for all possible statements that can be made about it. That is why it is called a ‘complete account’ (*sakalādeśa*),¹¹⁴ insofar as all possible perspectives relevant in the verbal description of a thing are thereby taken into account. This idea was rather to accommodate all propositions that are conceivable with regard to one and the same object: each of the figures as a distinct locutionary act presents a new context or reveals its new aspect (*deśa*), but does not necessarily have its own distinct truth-value different from truth or falsity.¹¹⁵ Also, the theory of the seven-fold modal description acts on the presumption that all utterances are incomplete sentences, but the difference as compared to a similar assumption of the *naya-vāda* concerns the fact that a sentence undergoes the process of disambiguation through the process of establishing a referential link with its object, which is merely one of innumerable aspects of a real thing. To put it more precisely, one tries to offer a complete account of a real thing and formulates a whole spectrum of assertions and denials about the thing, and the meaning of each and every particular sentence in the seven-fold scheme of such assertions and denials is thereby determined, as if incidentally: it is, so to say, a side effect of the description of a particular real thing in its various aspects. These aspects are proper denotata of a particular sentence, not the real thing as such.

¹¹² BALCEROWICZ (2001: 392).

¹¹³ RVār 1.6, p. 33.9–10 = YAṬ 47, p. 106.7: *sakalādeśaḥ pramāṇādhiṇo vikalādeśo nayādhiṇaḥ*. For the idea see also LT 62 and LTV ad loc. (*Pravacana-praveśa*), pp. 686.2–688.2:

*upayogau śrutasya dvau syād-vāda-naya-saṃjñitau |
syād-vādaḥ sakalādeśo nayo vikala-saṃkathā ||*

Comp. NAV 29.28: *ataḥ sampūrṇa-vastu-pratipādanābhāvād vikalādeśo 'bhidhīyate, naya-matena sambhavad-dharmāṇām darśana-mātram ity arthaḥ*.—‘Hence, [such a statement]—inasmuch as it does not demonstrate the whole real thing—is called the incomplete account, which means that it merely shows [selected] properties that are possibly there in consonance with the opinion of (*sc.* according to) a [respective] viewpoint.’

Again, also when it comes to the distinction into ‘complete account’ (*sakalādeśa*) and ‘incomplete account’ (*vikalādeśa*), Jaina tradition was not unanimous. For instance, Hemacandra Maladhārin designates the role of both accounts to the *syād-vāda* only: the complete account are the first three figures (assertion, denial and inexpressibility), whereas the incomplete account are the remaining three combinations, see VĀVṛ, p. 910.12 ff.

¹¹⁴ The concept of the ‘complete account’ (*sakalādeśa*), or the idea of completeness of the system, is reflected in GANERI’s (2002: 278) idea of ‘optimality’, axiomatised by GANERI as axiom A4 $\neg(\exists\sigma)(\neg\sigma : p \ \& \ \neg\sigma : \neg p)$. In this interpretation, ‘optimality’ is not about the fact that there are no other truth values than seven, but that there is no other way to predicate of a property than through the seven figures.

¹¹⁵ See RVār 4.42, p. 253 ff.

Last but not least, Bimal Krishna MATILAL is reported to once have expressed his conviction that ‘The Jainas contend that one should try to understand the particular point of view of each disputing party if one wishes to grasp completely the truth of the situation. The total truth ... may be derived from the *integration* of all different viewpoints.’¹¹⁶ This and similar opinions expressed by MATILAL¹¹⁷, repeatedly circulated, were reiterated by GANERI (2002: 279) who maintained ‘that every standpoint reveals a facet of reality, and that, to get a full description of the world, what we need to do is to *synthesise* the various standpoints.’ This opinion seems to be dominant among modern researchers and, in my opinion, should be revised.

Interestingly enough, in order to incorporate various theories or worldviews into a consistent whole, the Jainas in their textual expositions never apply the *syād-vāda*; instead they use a different model, which is the sevenfold method of ‘conditionally valid predications’ (*naya-vāda*). As a rule, we find their attempt to give a meaning to each of various philosophical schools and standpoints in a consistent holistic framework in the context of the *naya-vāda*, contrary to what some researchers would expect. On the other hand, ‘the doctrine of the seven-fold modal description’ (*sapta-bhaṅgī*) is primarily discussed in three contexts: that of the triple nature of reality, which is believed to consist of ‘origination, continuation and decay’, that of the relation between the universal and the particular,¹¹⁸ and that of the relationship between the substance and its properties/modes. In short, all these questions could be reduced to that of ‘the identity problem’: how it is possible that a complex entity, composite and extended in space and time, is one and preserves its identity despite its transformations and similarities to other entities. This finds corroboration in Hemacandra’s *Anya-yoga-vyavaccheda-dvātrīṃśikā* 25:

‘In a certain sense, any thing (lit. “this very [thing]”) is [both] perishing and permanent. In a certain sense, any thing is [both] similar (sc. universal) and unique (particular). In a certain sense, any thing is communicable and incommunicable. In a certain sense, any thing is existent and non-existent. O Lord, this [seven-fold modal description] is the tradition the stream¹¹⁹ of which proceeds forth as nectar of truth enjoyed by the wise.’¹²⁰

In this poetically rather awkward verse, Hemacandra aptly sketches the four main thematic groups to which usually the *syād-vāda* is most commonly applied. And indeed, most examples of the application of ‘the doctrine of the seven-fold modal description’ we come across in

¹¹⁶ I quote this opinion after GANERI: this opinion, in exactly the same form and omission (indicated by ‘...’) as reproduced above, is quoted by Jonardon GANERI (2001: 149) who refers to MATILAL (1981) as its source, without mentioning any page number, and by GANERI (2002: 279), who mentions a 1977 publication of Matilal, which is later, in the bibliography, identified as: ‘Matilal, B. K. 1977. *The Central Philosophy of Jainism*. Calcutta: Calcutta University Press’, i.e. a publication which does not exist. I have closely examined MATILAL (1981), (1985) and (1991), and have failed, perhaps due to my oversight, to find such a quotation. However, what is quoted by GANERI is not different in spirit from what MATILAL stated on numerous occasions in his publications just mentioned, e.g. MATILAL (1981: 2) ‘Jaina philosophers claim that no philosophic or metaphysical proposition can be true if it is simply asserted without any condition or limitation. ... [T]he philosophic propositions of rival schools could be integrated together under the *Anekānta* system. In other words, these rival propositions can be said to capture the truth when and only when they are asserted with proper qualifications or conditions’; (1981: 30): ‘Other philosophers suffer from partiality of their outlook while the Jainas try to overcome partiality and one-sidedness and search for the totality of outlook[s], for omniscience’; (1981: 61): ‘The *anekānta-vāda* is thus a philosophy of synthesis and reconciliation since it tries to establish a rapprochement between seemingly disagreeing philosophical schools’; etc.

¹¹⁷ For some opinions see n. 116 and see below, p. 44.

¹¹⁸ E.g. RVār 4.42, p. 258-259.

¹¹⁹ Lit. ‘spittle’, ‘vomit’, or ‘discharge’! Malliṣeṇa (SVM₁ 25.27–36, pp. 152.20–153.4) is not quite comfortable with the simile and proposes another, alternative interpretation which he eventually called ‘poetical meaning’ (*kāvyaṛtha*).

¹²⁰ AYVD 25:

*syān nāṣi nityaṃ sadṛśaṃ virūpaṃ vācyam na vācyam sad asat tad eva /
vipaścītāṃ nātha nipīta-tattva-sudhōdgatōdgāra-paramparēyam //*

See also SVM₁ 25.31-36, pp. 152.34–153.4.

various works essentially pertain to one and the same issue: how to preserve the integrity of a composite thing, a problem which is entailed by the question of the relation between permanence and change, also phrased in terms of the question of how to relate the whole and its parts. However, the *syād-vāda* is never applied to doxographic analysis or as an instrument to construct typologies of various doctrines or to pigeonhole the opponents.

Hemacandra, followed by his commentator Malliṣeṇa,¹²¹ as well as all other Jaina authors¹²² I have come across correlate particular theories and views represented by particular thinkers and philosophical schools only under the scheme of the viewpoints (*naya-vāda*). Malliṣeṇa is not unique in the way he maps doxography onto respective erroneous viewpoints (*durnaya*):

The Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika are the followers of the view of the comprehensive viewpoint. All monistic doctrines with no exception and the Sāṃkhya school are prompted by the intention [expressed] through the collective viewpoint. The materialist school predominantly falls into [the category] the empirical viewpoint. The Buddhists¹²³ are those whose minds are prompted by the perspective of the direct viewpoint. The grammarians etc. stick to verbal and other viewpoints, [i.e. the etymological viewpoint and the factual viewpoint].¹²⁴

Clearly, an attempt to classify the whole spectrum of philosophical doctrines is undertaken in a separate section of Malliṣeṇa's work, after he has concluded the examination of the *syād-vāda*, and it is only in this context of the viewpoints (*naya*) that one can meaningfully talk of integrating various doctrinal positions and opinions. In the same spirit, Siddhasena Divākara establishes a correlation between the number of viewpoints which can be accommodated within the scheme of the *naya-vāda* and the multitude of doctrines and opinions:

‘There are as many accounts via viewpoints as there are possibilities of expressing [views]. Likewise, there are as many heretic doctrines as there are accounts through viewpoints.’¹²⁵

This verse demonstrates that, from relatively early times, it was the doctrine of viewpoints, not the method of the seven-fold modal description, that was exclusively used by the Jainas to handle doctrinal divisions and allocate them within particular compartments of the *naya-vāda*. Following this reasoning, the Jainas could indeed say that one reaches truth if one integrates all partial positions which are false when taken uncompromisingly as only true, as it was put by MATILAL (vide supra, p. 41). That conviction is expressed in a concluding verse of the *Saṃmati-tarka-prakaraṇa*:

‘[Let there be] prosperity to Jina's words that are made of an amassment of false views, that are conducive to immortality, that are venerable, and lead to the salvific happiness.’¹²⁶

In every viewpoint, as Siddhasena claims, there is some grain of truth because every opinion, even erroneous, has been formulated as relying on some kind of justification or empirical data. Just as, for an epistemic realist, no false mental image can be absolutely mistaken, and its falsity

¹²¹ See e.g. AYVD 28 and SVM thereon.

¹²² See for instance Vādidēva-sūri in PNTĀA / SVR, chapter 7, JTBh₁ 2.2 § 11 (p. 24.15 ff.) = JTBh₂, p. 24.15 ff.

¹²³ Note the pun on the Buddhists / the Buddha: °-*buddhayas tathāgatāḥ*.

¹²⁴ SVM₁ 28.155 ff., pp. 170.11 ff.: *naigama-naya-darśanānusāriṇau naiyāyika-vaiśeṣikau. saṃgrahābhīprāya-pravṛttāḥ sarve 'py advaita-vādāḥ sāmkhya-darśanam ca. vyāvahāra-nayānupāti-prāyaś cārvāka-darśanam. ṛju-sūtrākūta-pravṛtta-buddhayas tathāgatāḥ. śabdādi-nayāvalambino vaiyākaraṇādayaḥ.*

¹²⁵ STP 3.47:

*jāvaiyā vayanā-vahā tāvaiyā cēva hoṃti naya-vāyā /
jāvaiyā naya-vāyā tāvaiyā cēva para-samayā //*

¹²⁶ STP 3.69:

*baddam micchā-damsaṇa-samūha-maiyassa amaya-sārassa /
jīṇa-vayanassa bhagavao saṃvigga-suhāhigammaṃ //*

may be due to some kind of misapprehended correlation of real components that are true reflections of reality this way or another, in the same way even false beliefs are somehow grounded in facts, at least to a minimum degree. One can, therefore, make a claim that, metaphorically, the whole truth encompasses all such partial false views that result from a restricted vision or limited understanding of the world. But even the above opinion of Siddhasena shows that spheres of application of the *syād-vāda* and of the *naya-vāda* should not be conflated or confused: all Siddhasena says concerns only the latter. Such a conflation of the two separate realms must have been responsible for Bimal Krishna MATILAL's (1991: 15) opinion, and that mistake is occasionally committed, that 'The Jainas ... believe that each proposition, at least each metaphysical proposition, has the value "Inexpressible" (in addition to having other values, true, false etc.). That is, there is some interpretation or some point of view, under which the given proposition would be undecidable so far as its truth or falsity is concerned, and hence could be evaluated as "Inexpressible". Likewise the same proposition, under another interpretation, could be evaluated "true" and under still another interpretation, "false".' A situation when one seeks an accurate point of view under which a given proposition can be interpreted as true, false etc., viz. when one attempts to determine a proper context for the proposition, is not, as we have just seen, a domain of application of the *syād-vāda*, but that of the *naya-vāda*. It is also never the case, under the *naya-vāda*, that the truth value of a proposition is indeterminate, because the interpretative scheme is optimal and allows to always allocate a proper context to a meaningful proposition.

There is still one more remark to make and it concerns what I would call the 'tolerance myth' of Jainism, repeated in large circles of scholars and Jaina laity. In its popular form the tolerance myth states that the doctrine of multiplexity of reality was developed by the Jainas, or even by Mahāvīra himself, both as an expression of their intellectual non-violence and tolerance as well as in order to accommodate all conflicting worldviews with the aim of achieving reconciliation or promoting tolerance. In his relatively widely circulated book MATILAL (1981) expresses this conviction on numerous occasions, just to mention a few citations:

'It is possible that the well-known moral doctrine of Jainism, i.e. *ahimsā* "non-violence" was partly responsible for the development of the *anekānta* attitude in Jaina philosophy' (p. 4);

'Mahāvīra thus developed a philosophy of synthesis and toleration, which later came to be designated as the *anekānta-vāda*. ... Mahāvīra's method was one of commitment, for he attempted to understand the points of view of the fighting parties (in a philosophical dispute) so that their dispute could be resolved and reconciled' (p. 23);

'I think the Jainas carried the principle of non-violence to the intellectual level, and thus propounded their *anekānta* doctrine. Thus the hallmark of the *anekānta* was toleration. The principal embodied in the respect for the life of others was transformed by the Jaina philosophers at the intellectual level into respect for the view of others' (p. 61).

Such an approach has penetrated the minds of researchers and students of Jainism to a degree that it has actually become a silent presupposition underlying a number of papers and books. One of plausible sources of such an opinion, or at least of a corresponding term, is A.B. Dhruva's 'Introduction' to SVM (p. lxxiv) of 1933 where the seminal expression 'intellectual *ahimsā*' appears for the first time. Dhruva's phrasing had an impact on similar opinions which H.R. Kāpadīā expressed in his 'Introduction' (1947) to AJP (p. cxiv) in 1947.¹²⁷

In his well researched review of the dissemination and propagation of the myth, John CORT (2000: 324-5) argues, and I could not agree more, that the modern understanding of Jaina tradition as intellectually pluralistic and tolerant

'is at odds with the one gained from investigating a wider range of sources than just the logic texts themselves. ... If one looks at other aspects of the Jain religious worldview, in particular the Jain position on the proper path to liberation (*mokṣa-*

¹²⁷ See CORT (2000: 327 ff.).

mārga), one finds that the Jains accept other points of view as being at best only partially correct and therefore, inevitably, for the most part incorrect. In return, the Jains assert that only the Jain perspective is based on correct perception (*samyag-darśana*) and correct knowledge (*samyak-jñāna*), which are correct because they are rooted in the omniscience of the enlightened and liberated Jinas. Further, if one looks at narrative texts and other sources in which one finds expressions of Jain intellectual and social interaction with non-Jains, one finds that the Jains are frequently intolerant and disputatious in their interactions with non-Jains. ... nowhere in traditional Jain sources is this spirit of toleration and coexistence characterized as “intellectual *ahimsā*”.’

Not only stories and narratives, legendary accounts or historical records belie a belief that Jaina spirit of *ahimsā* pervades the *anekānta-vāda*,¹²⁸ a belief that has in the meantime assumed a status of a prevalent article of faith of most modern Jainas, but we find absolutely nothing in Jaina philosophical texts, in which Jaina philosophers reflect either on the nature of non-violence or on the multiplexity of reality but never establish any link between these two themes, until the twentieth century which could lend even symbolic degree of justification for such a belief. On the contrary, the *anekānta-vāda* could be more accurately viewed both as an effective ideological weapon wielded against other religious traditions and philosophical schools,¹²⁹ which are thereby demonstrated to be merely one-sided and true in a very limited sense, and as an expression of the conviction on the part of the Jainas that, since they have such a powerful tool that comprises all partially true worldviews, it is them who enjoy intellectual superiority over other traditions and the supremacy of their salvific doctrine is thereby well grounded.

Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality pretends to provide a meta-philosophical vantage point, or present a supra-doxastic scheme that enables one to evaluate the truth and falsity, always said to be partial, of all particular philosophical claims and beliefs in a wider model of truth, available only to the Jainas. However, this claim, instead of promulgating tolerance and equal respect for other convictions, introduces a doctrine of two truths, in a way similar to what we know from, e.g., Mādhyamika or Yogācāra schools. The difference is that the ultimate truth (*paramārtha-satya*) is in Jaina hands. And it is in this sense that the *anekānta-vāda* can be treated, contrary to modern claims, as a kind of concealed intellectual violence (*himsā*). Of course, this aspect of Jaina theory is in no way different from similar cases of intellectual violence exercised by other religious and philosophical traditions in a context of debate and rivalry in the sense that the latter, too, would waste no opportunity to take advantage of the strength of their own merits and arguments to secure their own privileged position in philosophical or public discourse. This should not obscure, however, obvious philosophical merits of the *syād-vāda*, and other components of the *anekānta-vāda*, which can justifiably be reckoned among most important contributions of Indian philosophy and continue to be a source of inspiration for logicians and philosophers. And the progression from earlier position to modern stance that takes the *anekānta-vāda* as an expression of *ahimsā* is socially noteworthy.

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¹²⁸ For a review of some sources see CORT (2000: esp. 331–336).

¹²⁹ Comp. DUNDAS (2002: 231): ‘In Jain hands, this method of analysis became a fearsome weapon of philosophical polemic with which the doctrines of Hinduism and Buddhism could be pared down to their ideological basics of simple permanence and impermanence respectively and thus be shown to be one-pointed and inadequate as the overall interpretation of reality which they purported to be. ... On the other hand, the many-pointed approach was claimed by the Jains to be immune from criticism...’

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