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‘8.16 PRABHĀCANDRA, *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* on Māṇikyanandin’s *Parīkṣāmukha*’ by Piotr Balcerowicz, in: **Piotr Balcerowicz and Karl Potter (eds.): *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. XII: *Jaina Philosophy, Part II*, 2 Vols., Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi [to appear in] 2011.**

This original version of the synopsis and translation is more philological in character and, in a number of places, it is much more detailed than the printed (abridged) version. It may however contain some mistakes which were eliminated in the printed version. Nevertheless, I hope the reader may still find it useful.

8.16 PRABHĀCANDRA, *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* on Māṇikyanandin’s *Parīkṣāmukha*

The work (‘The Lotus-like Sun [revealing] Cognisable Objects’), being a commentary on ‘An Introduction to Analysis’, has been edited by Mahendra Kumar Shastri in 1941 (Nirṇaya-sāgara Pres, Muṃbaī), and reprinted in 1990 (Sri Garib Dass Oriental Series, Sri Satguru Publications, Delhi). "E" refers to the pages of that edition.

Summary by Piotr Balcerowicz

First chapter (on the definition of cognitive criterion)

E 1-7. Eulogy in praise of Mahāvīra etc. All objects are well-established due to cognitive criteria (*pramāṇa*), whereas misconception arises due to fallacy (*ābhāsa*) of the cognitive criterion. That is one of possible ways to ward off a hypothetical criticism voiced at the outset of the work that PKM is incoherent, illogical and self-contradictory, its subject matter has no real referent; serves no purpose, like a madman’s statement; has not meaningful contents of real subject matter, like an investigation of the crow’s teeth; has no reasonable or realistic purpose, like the discussion of the mother’s remarriage; or it is not possible to accomplish its goal, like a talk of a miraculous gem that cures all afflictions. Since the definition cognitive criterion is a matter of dispute, explains Prabhācandra, it is necessary to define it adequately, because as long as we do not rely on proper cognitive procedures, our cognition of the world and all cognoscibles is not only liable to doubt but even fallacious.

E 7-13. A definition of cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*) follows. It is a cognition whose nature is the determination of both itself and a previously uncognised object (clearly a Mīmāṃsaka influence), because the nature of cognitive criterion is otherwise not explicable (*anyathānupapatti*), whereby Prabhācandra denies that the cognitive criterion is just anything that accompanies the rise of cognition or that it is a complete

causal complex that contributes to comprehension of an object in a non-deviant, reliable manner. Cognitive criterion has the nature of awareness, which excludes all accompanying factors such as light, sense organs, contact between a sense organ and the object etc. from being included in the definition. Every cognitive act is necessarily accompanied by some kind of self-awareness of cognition, for entities can be causes of their effects by virtue of their own nature only, not due to accompanying factors such as place, time etc. A detailed discussion, and subsequent rejection from the definition, of a number of such factors follows.

E 14-19. The Nyāya definition of cognitive criterion, and its corollaries (e.g. the connection of the sense organ and the object as an integral element), is refuted.

If one wants to characterise the most efficient means (*sādhakatama*) contributing to true cognition, it is not really the case, as the Naiyāyika holds, that being a cognitive criterion pervades being the most efficient means contributing to true cognition (i.e. every most efficient means contributing to true cognition is a cognitive criterion), just as being a cognitive criterion does not pervade either cognition *per se* (*jñāna*), such as doubt, or false cognition (*ajñāna*), even when its object is real. The Naiyāyika's following argument to prove that also such factors as the contact of a sense organ with the object etc. is faulty: whenever it is the case that when *x* occurs the resulting cognition occurs, and when *x* does not occur the resulting cognition does not occur either, such *x* is the most efficient means contributing to true cognition.

Discussion of cognitive capability (*yogyatā*) of the most efficient means contributing to true cognition: is it some kind of special capacity, either extrasensory or characterised by the presence of auxiliary factors, or an auxiliary factor as such, be it a substance, quality or movement (one of the three Vaiśeṣika categories), or merely a removal of impediments to cognition of the cogniser, etc.?

Rejection of the claim that since the soul is the cogniser (*pramātr*) and a macroscopic object is the cognoscible (*prameya*) none of these can be a cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*), inasmuch as one accepts something else, other than these two, as a cognitive criterion. In reality the soul as the ultimate cogniser is the cognitive criterion. That is why it is not the case that the truth is arrived at when all the four elements as something separate are there: the cogniser, the cognitive criterion, the cognoscible and the resulting cognition (*pramiti*).

Rejection of the Naiyāyika's theory that the characteristic of the atomic mind is that two (or more) cognitive acts cannot occur at the same time (*Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.16). The implication would be the impossibility of omniscience, e.g. in the case of Maheśvara.

E 19-20. Refutation of the Sāṃkhya definition: the operation of sense organs cannot be a cognitive criterion. The Sāṃkhya argument that otherwise it would not be the case that the operation of the senses would be restricted to a particular place does not hold.

E 20-25. Criticism of Mīmāṃsā definitions. First comes the refutation of Prabhākara's definition of cognitive criterion as "the activity of the cogniser, which can also be of non-cognitive nature, that illuminates the true nature (*tathātva*) of an object", because this cannot be proved either by perception nor by inference, or in any other way. Further, this definition is not compatible with inference defined as "the judgement with respect to a remote object on account of seeing one aspect of something the (invariable) relation is already known" (*Śābarabhāṣya* 1.1.5). This relation cannot be known either by positive concomitance (*anvaya*) or by negative concomitance (*vyatireka*), or by perception, non-perception (*anupalambha*) etc.

Acceptance of the sixth type of cognitive criterion, namely the non-perception or absence (*abhāva*), i.e. negative proof, leads to contradictions and other problems, such as: how could non-perception be “the activity of the cogniser”?! Further, with the Mīmāṃsā definition, neither cognitive criterion or cognition as such could be a substratum of a quality or a quality. Another undesired consequence would be that the cogniser would be unconscious.

Also the definition of cognitive criterion as the activity of the cogniser the nature of which is cognition, formulated by Kumārīla Bhaṭṭa, is flawed.

E 25-27. Cognitive criterion helps one attain happiness and the means to achieve it, and helps avoid unhappiness and what leads to unhappiness. Human being in principle strives to undertake causally efficient action (*arthakriyārthin*), and cognitive criterion can be instrumental in undertaking causally efficient actions, inasmuch as it indicates the object. However, it is not the case that there is no attainment of the goal if the goal is not indicated by cognitive criterion: one can incidentally be successful even without resorting to cognitive criteria. The attainment of an object which one would like to achieve (*upādeyārtha*) rests on activity, not on cognitive criterion as such, because it has its source in such an activity which is triggered by human wish. However, it is not the case that there is no operation (*vyāpāra*) characterised by cognitive criterion indicating the object when there is no activity (*pravṛtti*). The experiences contradicts this, e.g. it is not the case that the perception the contents of which is the moon does not indicate the moon, although it does not make one undertake any activity. This fact easily perceptible by everyone would be incompatible with the Buddhist understanding of what the cognitive criterion is, i.e. something that triggers activity, for clearly the cognition of the true nature of something that should be appropriated or of something that which should be avoided does not activate the person to appropriate it or avoid it. This additionally invalidates the Buddhist definition of the cognitive criterion.

Query: is the object of activity future or present? It cannot be a future object, because it, being something that exists in the future, could not activate perception that prompts one to undertake activity in order to attain the object. But it cannot be a present object either, because there cannot be any activity with respect to it of a person desiring to achieve it, for someone who has not yet experienced (e.g. perceived) that object cannot undertake any action. And it is well known that only a concrete thing prompts a causally efficient action with respect to an intended object, not just any thing, for only animals immediately undertake action on comprehending an object, without reflecting upon it.

Therefore the concept of undertaking causally efficient action is irrelevant to the definition of cognitive criterion; it is been rightly said that the distinctive feature of cognitive criterion is cognition (cognitive state) in order to disprove any non-cognitive element to it, such as activity.

E 27-36. Cognitive criterion consists in determinate cognition, or certainty (*niścaya*), and is contrary to any kind of false superimposition, of which there are three main types: doubt, cognitive error and non-apprehension. The quality of “being contrary to these” means that cognitive criterion grasps, or indicates, the true nature (*tathā-bhāva*) of a real thing (*vastu*) and is pervaded by the quality of “consisting in determinate cognition, or certainty”; this also includes inference. And it is not non-conceptual.

There is no awareness of clarity (characteristic of perception and self-perception, or introspective, of cognition) of a construction-filled state, for one apprehends the identity of the construction-free and construction-filled moments of awareness, which apprehension is in its turn due to the simultaneous grasp or indiscernible consecutive

occurrence of the two states. They usually occur together. It is not the case that construction-filled awareness is indistinct (*aspaṣṭa*) and construction-free awareness is distinct (*spaṣṭa*) and known through perception. How can one attempt to analyse these states if one dismisses clarity as something directly experienced perceptually and instead postulates clarity as something which cannot be directly experienced? As long as one does not clearly understand both these states, there could not be awareness of a difference, since it is never experienced, between awareness (*buddhi*) and consciousness (*caitanya*) as (there is said to be, for example,) in the Sāṃkhya system? Further, the construction-filled character of awareness invalidates what Dharmakīrti (in the *Nyāyabindu*) says about there being a kind of perception which is "introspective (*ātmasaṃvedana*) of all kinds of consciousness (*citta*) and all mental concomitants (*caitta*)".

However, what is actually the seeming apprehension of identity of conceptual and non-conceptual cognitive states? Does it mean that these two have one and the same contents, or one becomes the contents of the other, or the apprehension of one mirrored in the other? An analysis follows. Further, would their seeming identity be apprehended in non-conceptual form, or conceptual form, or in some other form of cognition?

Criticism of Dharmakīrti's idea that non-conceptual cognitive state, such as the perception of some colour, is experienced perceptually in its pure form when all conceptual cognitive states have been pacified. Prabhācandra quotes two verses from the *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV 2/3.124-123) in inverted sequence: "After one has withdrawn one's own thought from everything, even though one abides tranquil inside oneself, the mind incited by the senses sees non-conceptually some form with the eye. Perception is proved to be free from conceptuality by the very perception itself. Every conceptual cognition of all beings is cognised by itself individually and is correlated with the words." As Dharmakīrti is reported to say, in such a non-conceptual state of pacified conceptualisations it is not possible for conceptualisations experienced as associated with speech etc. to occur. That is obviously wrong because, as Prabhācandra explains, because such perception which is indeterminate (i.e. lacks certainty) is simply impossible in the case of someone who is directly perceiving an object the nature of which is stationary, gross etc. and who finds himself in a non-conceptual state, being someone who has first been conceptualising a horse, in which all conceptualisations have now been pacified and which is characterised by a perception of a cow. Then one cognitive image will be replaced by the other, but both will be of determinate character. Something which does not bring any certainty with it cannot aspire to possess cognitively valid status (*prāmāṇya*), i.e. be a cognitive criterion. There are other problems which the Buddhist idea of purely non-conceptual cognitions yields, one of them being the impossibility of purely non-conceptual perception giving rise to any conceptual cognitive state. After a lengthy discussion Prabhācandra concludes that conceptual cognition - being both reliable and an efficient means to a determinate cognition of an object, but also because it makes certain things which were so far uncertain - can be a genuine cognitive criterion. And the cognising subject desiring to know the world has to take recourse to it. Inference is a good example of such a conceptual cognition. In contradistinction to such kinds of conceptual cognitions, a purely non-conceptual cognition cannot be reckoned as a cognitive criterion because it differs in all these aspects, including that it does not bring in any certainty and the cognising subject cannot really have a chance to take recourse to it.

E 36-38. One could reason as follows. On the other hand, a purely conceptual cognition aspire to possess cognitively valid status (*prāmānya*), i.e. be a cognitive criterion, either, for a number or reasons: it lacks lucid, clear form, it can grasp what is normally never grasp (e.g. in the realm of fantasy), it prompts one to undertake action with respect to something which does not exist, it is not capable of making one achieve something that is to be achieved or making one avoid something that is to be avoided, it is not useful in everyday practice, its domain is not the unique particular, i.e. something which ultimately exists, it is sometimes fallible, it does not preclude false superimposition, it is triggered by verbal symbols, not by real existents, it brings in an image of something even though it does not exist, etc. Prabhācandra subsequently rejects all this criticism, by analysing all the charges one by one, and explaining that even though some of these points may be relevant (e.g. indeed conceptualisation lacks lucid, clear form), but they do not rule out the cognitive validity of conceptual cognitions for various reasons.

E 39-44. Discussion of the view, ascribed to Śabdādvaitins, i.e. followers of Bharṭṛhari, that all ideas and cognitive states are imbued with, or intrinsically related to speech and verbal domain, without which they cannot exist, and that is why they have to be conceptual by nature; without speech, no cognition would possess the capacity to manifest an object. A few verses from the *Vākyapadīya* cited. The ultimate verbal underlying reality, called Śabdabrahman, has no beginning and no end, because it does not undergo any origination or destruction; it is indestructible (*akṣara*) because it is occasioned by phonemes (*akṣara*) such 'a' etc.

Prabhācandra rejects this view for a number of reasons. First of all, the fact of all entities and ideas being imbued with speech is in no way reflected or represented in our actual cognitions. For how could we prove this? Either by perception sensory or introspective, or by inference or any sort, but none of these can corroborate such a claim of verbal reality and purely verbal nature of our cognitions. One cannot even prove on the basis of a recollection of an object as closely connected with verbal expression that we had a perception of the object as having such a nature – that would be a circular argument.

Further, what does it mean that an object is closely connected with verbal expression? Is it that when there occurs a cognition of an object, there also occurs a representation of its verbal designation? Is it that when there is perception of an object, one immediately cognises its verbal designation? Or is it that when the object itself occurs, there also occurs its verbal designation? None of these possibilities hold. How could then one explain the perception in the case of a very young child, who has not yet learnt a language, or of a mute person who knows no verbal designations? The doctrine of Śabdādvaita would imply that anyone who doesn't possess any linguistic skills and doesn't know verbal expressions cannot have or experience perceptions, i.e. would virtually be blind etc.

Can one prove that the world is made of speech on the basis of it consisting in the transformation of speech or because it originates from speech? But how can the speech evolve, just the world does, if it is indestructible, hence unchanging? And how can speech produce anything, being eternal and unchanging? One is faced with the dilemmas of how an eternal, unchanging entity produce effects: does it produce the its effects continuously (if its eternal nature is to produce) or all at once, or simultaneously (but then the cause cannot be eternal).

E 44-46. Next Prabhācandra discusses the monistic position: the absolute, ultimate verbal underlying reality, called Śabdabrahman, is homogeneous and unified, undivided and complete in its nature, without beginning and end, unchanging;

nevertheless, ordinary people who are impaired in their thought and vision due to nescience, comprehend it as manifold and intrinsically differentiated, the way they grasp the manifested world. In support some verses of the Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣyavārttika are quoted. Prabhācandra retorts that there is no valid way to prove such a theory; the monistic ‘verbal absolute’ cannot be demonstrated or proved by means of perception, inference or even by such statements “All this is indeed Brahman” (*Maitryupaniṣad*).

E 47-59. Another problem indicated by an opponent is this: if one cognition of determinate nature (*vyavasāya*) possessed cognitive validity, then all cognition of such nature would automatically become cognitive criteria, including cognitive errors, them likewise being of determinate nature.

A problem raised by an opponent (sceptic) is this: Since such cognitions as doubt are not established as valid by nature what exactly is actually rejected or criticised by the reference to cognitions of determinate nature? The analysis of the nature of doubt in terms of substratum or quality leads to conclusion that doubt as such would not be possible, nor would cognitive error. Prabhācandra responds that what doubt is every living being can experience directly and introspectively as something the nature of which is uncertain, faltering comprehension. His reply is also applicable to similar difficulties regarding cognitive error, or false cognition (*viparyaya*).

Prabhācandra further analyses, step by step, the nature of various types of invalid cognitive acts such as doubt, illusions, cognitive errors etc. and attempts to show that their nature is not of determinate character (*vyavasāya*), for being conceptual does not entail being determinate. Doubt is first subjected to the analysis. It is clearly distinguished from false cognition (*viparyaya*), cognitive error. Its various types are distinguished: the pseudo-presentation (*akhyāti*), the presentation of something non-existent (*asatkhyāti*), the presentation of an already well-known object (*prasiddhārthakhyāti*), the self-presentation of consciousness (*ātmakhyāti*), the (monistic) presentation of the inexpressible object as existence, non-existence etc. (*sadasattvādy-anirvacanīyārtha-khyāti*), the presentation of something in a distorted form (*viparītakhyāti*) or obscuration of memory (*smṛtipramoṣa*). In the sequel, all these are discussed in detail. The recurring theme is the correspondence theory of truth (as something that provides, with external reality, and objective criterion of truth) to refute all these theories of error.

There is no problem with the overlapping of cognitive criteria: that fact that two or more cognitive criteria grasp one and the same object does not constitute an invalid cognition, because each cognitive criterion may contribute some new piece of information to the knowledge which we have already had of the object. No ordinary cognition is capable of providing exhaustive information about a real thing and that is way a subsequent cognition may indeed bring in new data about its other aspects.

E 59-64. The so-called object previously uncognised (reference to *sūtra* 1.1) is such which has not been ascertained either directly in its own form or in one of its distinctive features. Further, also an object which has been previously seen and apprehended but due to a mistake or false superimposition (*samāropa*), sometimes accompanied by doubt etc., can also be reckoned as an object previously uncognised. That is why to comprehend a not yet comprehended object is not really a defining characteristic of a cognitive criterion. And it is not always the case that the first cognition which apprehends an object becomes a cognitive criterion. A problem is addressed whether the second cognition can establish the truth of the previous cognition. Discussion of recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*). It cannot be proved, on the

basis that it apprehends an object already cognised either by perception or memory (*smṛti*), that recognition grasps an object which has already been experienced, because the truth is that it does not act with respect to the exactly same object which is being perceived or remembered. Prabhācandra points out that otherwise one would have to accept that, since any cognition which grasps a previously uncognised object is a cognitive criterion, the cognition of a double moon would turn out to be a cognitive criterion, because one has not grasped such a double moon before. And one could not argue, for a number of reasons, that such a cognition of a double moon is not a cognitive criterion because it can be sublated, inasmuch as only such a cognition that is free from sublation can be accepted as a cognitive criterion. A discussion follows what exactly that state of being free from sublation is and under what conditions we can know can take place. Is the state of being free from sublation something that takes place at the same time of the cognition, or something that takes place at some later point of time or is the cause which makes a cognition a cognitive criterion? And is it a quality which is known as such or unknown? A number of possibilities are discussed. The conclusion is that the state of being free from sublation with respect to all cases and always is not something that can be known to a person who is not omniscient. A related problem is how to know whether our cognition has been caused by factors which are not defective, and is this quality something that is known, if so at what time and by what means, or it remains unknown.

E 64-67. Prabhācandra considers the idealist's criticism (Bhāskara?) levelled against the contention that the cognition of determinate nature (*vyavasāya*) which grasps a previously uncognised object defined in the above manner, the reason being that a determinate cognition which comprehends an empirically available object of our ordinary experience does not correspond to truth, whereas only the cognition which makes one grasp the ultimate reality is true. A few lines from the *R̥gveda*, *Maitryupaniṣad*, *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* etc. are quote in support of such a criticism and elaborate arguments to prove that diversified world is an illusion, e.g.: how can one prove the difference of objects? Through the difference of place, time or form? None of these holds, however, for how could the awareness of diversified form be logically possible? One uniform Absolute (Brahman) is by nature pure consciousness and all systems that speak of manifold things are false, for they contradict the statement of the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* "The Absolute is truth and consciousness and is infinite". Since the conceptual cognition which is both differentiated and undifferentiated (*bhedābheda*) has as its contents the real thing; whereas nescience (*avidyā*), the object of which is unreal, is illusion (*māyā*) which represents itself falsely. It is not the case within the monistic system of Advaita it is not possible to speak of the difference between happiness and suffering, between bondage and liberation. The conclusion of this lengthy passage is that the Absolute as undifferentiated (*advaita*) and the ultimate reality is proved by virtue of the fact that the unity of the world can be known through perception, inference and scriptures.

E 67-77. A refutation of the monistic standpoint follows. It begins with a dilemma: Is the monistic unity (*abheda*) proved because the phenomenal differentiation is disproved through a cognitive criterion, or because there is a cognitive criterion to prove the monistic unity? Well, none of these options work.

As Prabhācandra demonstrates, it is certainly not the case that the monistic unity can be ascertained through non-conceptual perception (and the monists argument rests on the assumption that the illusion of differentiated phenomenal world occurs at mental level in the process of conceptualisation). Would its contents be one individual, or many individuals or the individual essence? These and other possibilities will

inevitably lead to the conclusion that the unity cannot be perceived or conceived without admitting manifoldness, hence a contradiction.

Prabhācandra sarcastically points out that the Advaitin's explanation that differentiated phenomenal world becomes the contents of conceptual cognition due to some external factor begs a counterargument: the monistic unity becomes the contents of conceptual cognition due to some external factor, i.e. the objectively existent diversity. More elaborate arguments follow.

What actually is this conceptuality, or conceptual state of mind? A number of possible explanations are examined: is it cognition's condition which immediately follows recollection, the fact of cognition being imbued with speech, the manifestation of the class etc. in cognition, cognition's having a non-existent thing as its contents, cognition's determination of the essential nature of a thing by way of dependence on some other factor or metaphorical transference?

Rejection of the claim that the unity of consciousness, or the self (*ātman*) could be proved through inference or scripture if one wants to retain their purposefulness.

It is not true that the self (*ātman*) is the cause of the creation, continuity and dissolution of the whole world in any sense, because the cause-effect relation would contradict the notion of monistic unity. In such a way, also the ability to produce any effects by an eternal entity is refuted.

What purpose would the creator Brahmā have to create the diversity of the world (which apparently contradicts the monistic unity)? It couldn't be a purposeless act of rapture. It couldn't be an act of compassion to help other beings either, because one shouldn't have created the world with living beings afflicted with pain and tormented in hells etc., and because prior to the act of creation there would have been any entity or living being with respect to which the creator Brahmā could experience compassion, hence compassion itself would be groundless and purposeless. Another possibility is that Brahmā creates the world with happiness and suffering in dependence on the invisible principle of merits (righteousness) and demerits (unrighteousness) of living beings (*adr̥ṣṭa*), but then he is impeded in his independence and freedom of choice and his actions are determined by factors external to him. If one assumes that the diverse complexity of the world is due to merits and demerits of living beings, what's the use of additional useless factors which cause suffering? In no way is it possible to argue that the creator acts prompted by compassion.

The creator Brahmā cannot create out of its free will. The comparison of the creation of the world to a spider which makes its net out of its free will does not work because the spider is driven by its desire to consume its victims. An explanation that the world is just a perceptual vision of the creator is extremely paradoxical.

It is not possible to explain the apparent difference of objects in the ultimately monistic world due to difference of place, time or form, because these differences would involve real distinctions and the monistic world turns out to be a fiction. One has to accept the intrinsic oneness of the universal or the intrinsic difference of the particulars as ultimate. One cannot claim that nescience does not really exist as something different from the Absolute and it is the Absolute which is ultimately active. Prabhācandra rejects the Advaitin's definition of nescience as something can be defined as pre-origination absence (*prāgabhāva*) of the cognition of truth.

The argument based on the assumption that the conceptual cognition which is both differentiated and undifferentiated (*bhedābheda*) has as its contents the real thing, is faulty because the implication is: there is ultimately no contents of a conceptual cognition if we accept the idea of nescience.

Prabhācandra criticises the following argument: if the representation of differentiated world occurs in the state of dreams, it does not have to mean that the differentiated world or its representation is the ultimate reality.

Another problem raised by an opponent is this: what is actually negated by a sublating factor (e.g. cognition): is it a cognition or its contents, or its result? A related problem is how we can know that our cognition is true and whether we can know it by means of a sublating cognition? It is really that case that the cognition which can be taken as sublating is the subsequent one which present an object contrary to the original one, and what becomes sublated is the presentation by a previous cognition of an object which turns out to be non-existent? What is the sublating factor: is it cognition per se or is it an object? Further, for someone who maintains that the sublating factor may invalidate either a previous cognition or a previously cognised object the following problem arises: what actually is the relation between what sublates and what is sublated?

E 77-83. The next butt of criticism is the and his theory of the sole existence of consciousness (*viññānamātratā*) which is claimed to be established as the ultimate reality because an external object does supposedly not exist independently inasmuch as it is not cognised as different from the essence of a partless, unified consciousness (*buddhi*); further the theory that the cognition which grasps this consciousness is a cognitive criterion. Is one supposed to accept the sole existence of consciousness as the ultimate reality simply because of the existence of a cognitive criterion which apprehends the essence of a partless, unified consciousness or on account of a cognitive criterion which sublates the existence of an external object? Whichever path we take it is not possible to prove that what ultimately exists is undivided consciousness. The non-existence of an external object cannot be proved by perception or inference, and subsequently one has to reject the Viññānavādin's theory. Another attempt to prove the sole existence of consciousness is not by rejecting any object of cognition but by demonstrating that both the object and its awareness are one and the same because their apprehension is invariably concurrent. In passing the problem of the cognition of the omniscient in Buddhism is discussed. The fact that invariable concurrence of the omniscient's cognition and objects of its cognition does not prove that these are one and the same thing. If the Buddha weren't accepted a ultimately omniscient, why should one say that he "is someone who is the cognitive criterion" (*Pramāṇasamuccaya*).

But what actually does the concurrent apprehension mean? Does it mean that two things are apprehended simultaneously or that there is no consecutive apprehension, or that two things are comprehended as one? Further, what sort of unity can be proved in this way: is it the oneness of the object and its awareness or the absence of difference? Prabhācandra demonstrates how both these alternatives lead to one and the same conclusion: their undesired consequence is either the relation of something-to-be-grasped and something-which-grasps (*grāhya-grāhaka-bhāva*) and a proof of the existence of an external object.

E 83-86. The Buddhist position is examined. First, cognition is said to be whatever is manifested. What would be a correct logical reason for it: the fact that it manifests itself by itself or by something else, or just the very fact of it manifesting itself? All three are rejected. Further, is the "I" notion grasped or not grasped, does consciousness involve any cognitive operation or not, does it have definite contents or is it contentless, does it occur at the same time as a cognition grasping e.g. something blue or at a different time? All these possibilities are analysed, and in support some verses of the *Pramāṇavārttika* are quoted. The conclusion would be that it is illusory.

That also leads the opponent to establish a link with an insentient, material object: its notion in consciousness cannot come from outside of it. Also the contention “I know an object with my eye” brings the Buddhist to conclusion that the cognition which has this material object as its contents occurs due to past impressions and beginningless nescience in the very same way as an image of a double moon can appear in awareness without the existence of an external object that could correspond to the image.

E 86-94. Prabhācandra responds to Buddhist arguments. The nature of consciousness, and he deliberately chooses the Buddhist term *viññāna*, is such that it correctly manifests both the cognising subject (reflected in the “I” notion which the Buddhist contests) and the cognised object, external to itself. Similarly, the dilemmas whether consciousness involves cognitive operations or not, has definite contents or is it contentless etc. are not really applicable for a number of reasons.

The possibilities enlisted by the Buddhist whether cognition occurs at the same time as a cognition grasping e.g. something blue or at a different time, etc. would hold provided one accepted the theory of absolute momentariness (*kṣaṇīkavāda*).

Prabhācandra refers to the Buddhist argument that at the time when an object is actually perceived, it does not really exist, due to its momentary existence, and the undesired implication of it is that all beings would be omniscient, because they could grasp what does not stand in front of their eyes. He also indicates that absolute momentariness is not compatible with, actually would undermine, inference. Inference is defined as cognition of inferential sign-possessor (*liṅgin*) on the basis of inferential sign (*liṅga*), which fulfils three conditions of validity (*trirūpa*). These conditions cannot be fulfilled with absolutely momentary reality, because of the dilemma whether the cognition of inferential sign concurs with the inferential sign or not.

Prabhācandra demonstrates why, with Sautrāntika-Yogācāra ontological assumptions, it would not be possible to grasp the contents of consciousness, either through itself or through something else. He further abolishes the Buddhist claim that an insentient, material object could not be manifested in cognition. He begins with a dilemma whether what could not be manifested is the insentient, material object as something comprehended or not comprehended? Whichever way he Buddhist try to disprove that an external, material could be manifested in consciousness, he will always argue within a vicious circle (*anyonyāśraya*).

A discussion, with reference to an example earlier used by the Buddhist, whether happiness and suffering essentially consist in consciousness or are external to or different from it, e.g. being qualities etc. If pleasure and pain were not essentially consciousness, there would be not use of pain, because it would never be sensed. More options are examined.

The Buddhist argument is examined: just like for a person suffering from an ophthalmological disorder there occurs an image of a double moon, even though it does not exist, in a similar way the agent, external objects and all the ontological correlates of the subject-object relation may manifest themselves, even though they are non-existent. One may entertain such a belief but it is not possible to find a reliable argument of epistemic procedure to disprove the existence of the agent etc., whereas one can easily find such arguments to disprove the existence of a double moon.

To conclude, if there were a proof to establish reality (*advaita*) as undifferentiated, non-dual, that would entail duality of the proof (cognition) and the cognised undifferentiated, non-dual world, and one could not escape the subject-object division, if one tried to establish the monistic ontology. Further, if there were no proof, the

thesis of a undifferentiated reality could not be proved, because the proof of the existence of the cognised object and its nature depends on the existence of the proof. The conclusion is followed by a discussion whether the negation in the 'non-dual' reality (*advaita*) is weak negation (*prasajyapratishedha*) or strong negation (*paryudāsapratishedha*).

E 95-98. The Buddhist (Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti, who are also quoted) could try to defend the non-dual reality as follows: Even though it appears as having a representation of a complex, differentiated form, the cognition is numerically and essentially one and homogenous, inasmuch as it is ultimately devoid of any external and heterogeneous object; it is so because the external objects, being heterogeneous, might appear as distinguishable, whereas the images which occur in consciousness are indistinguishable, hence consciousness has to be one and ultimate. Prabhācandra rejects this line of argument by showing a range of undesired implications. He also points out that the unity of the world would imply that the Buddha would still be engrossed in the mundane world (*samsāra*) and the ordinary being engrossed in the mundane world would be liberated Buddhas. If the Buddhist tries to defend himself by saying: well, suppose that at the time when the Buddha attains liberation also someone else does, what would be the problem? Prabhācandra ironically retorts: suppose it is the case, but then who would praise the Buddha as "someone who is the cognitive criterion etc." (*Pramāṇasamuccaya*)? Or who would be the one who is completely benevolent and dedicated (*parādhīna*) by virtue of whom Dharmakīrti says in the *Pramāṇavārttika*: "There exist, i.e. remain in the mundane world, those who are completely benevolent and dedicated (the Buddhas) whose compassion for other beings is enormous"? Further, one would consequently "bid farewell to the dead cogniser", i.e. there would be no room to admit anything that could cognise.

Another problem is this: how could one prove absolute emptiness (*śūnyatā*): through a cognitive criterion or without a cognitive criterion? In the first case, how could absolute emptiness be possible, if the cognitive criterion which demonstrates the existence of absolute emptiness were genuinely real, i.e. not empty? In the second case, how could absolute emptiness be proved, if the proof of the existence of the cognised object depends on the existence of a cognitive criterion?

E 98-103. In the definition of cognitive criterion (*Parīkṣāmukha* 1.1), the determination of itself means the representation in cognition as referring to, or illuminating the nature of cognition itself. And similarly, the determination of the object means the representation in cognition as referring to, or illuminating the nature of an object external to cognition.

Prabhācandra launches an attack against the Sāṃkhya. First he examines the thesis that cognition cannot consist in the determination of itself, because it is unconscious, like a pot; and cognition is unconscious, because it is an evolute of the primordial active factor (*prakṛti*), which is unconscious by nature; whatever is conscious is not an evolute of the primordial active factor, like the self (*ātman*). Prabhācandra examines various possibilities within the Sāṃkhya system where consciousness could be derived from, but none of them is cogent, e.g. whatever is conscious cannot be an evolute of the primordial active factor, like the self. He also demonstrates that the permanence and immutability of the self is not compatible with the idea that it is a cogniser and therefore its nature is cognition. In fact, the idea of a conscious and cognising entity is not compatible with Sāṃkhya ontology because there is no principle in the system from which the idea of cognition could be derived.

It is not possible to maintain that due to a special conjunction of the self and the primordial active factor (*prakṛti*), a person in a state of mundane deception does not

perceive any difference, which does exist, between the cognitive-volitional centre, i.e. subjective quasi-conscious evolute (*buddhi*) and consciousness (*caitanya*), which is the essence of the self (*ātman*).

If the cognitive-volitional centre (*buddhi*) were not conscious by itself, it would not be capable of comprehending any object. Similarly, the discerning organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) is not capable of illuminating or perceiving anything. Therefore, there is nothing to support the thesis that the self cannot cognise without the discerning organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*), whereas there is much that speaks against it.

Further, it is not possible how the cognitive-volitional centre (*buddhi*) could contain an image or form of any object.

E 106-110. The arguments used against the Sāṃkhya are now applied to refute the Buddhist (Yogācāra-Sautrāntika?) who maintains that cognitively valid status (*prāmāṇya*) applies to cognition by virtue of it possessing or acquiring the form of an object. This can be refuted also through perception and introspection. One of the arguments is that just as a cognition produced by an object imitates, say, its colour, e.g. blue, in the same way if it were to imitate the object's insentience, it would also be insentient. But we it is claimed that cognition does not imitate the object's insentience, what comprehends the object's insentience, i.e. how is the insentience reflected in cognition? If the insentience is not grasped by cognition, which cannot imitated the insentience, then also the object's being blue cannot be comprehended. Or else, how could one explain that the object's blueness is reflected in cognition but not its insentience? Should then the cognition grasping an object require another special cognition to grasp the object's insentience? But then the cognition would also require another cognition to grasp the object's blueness. The conclusion is that the idea that the cognition reflects, or imitates, the form of its objects entails that it would have to imitate its insentience, ergo it would be insentient. Suppose then that the cognition does not imitate its object and occurs as having no specific form, but then the Buddhist concedes the opponent's victory.

Prabhācandra also provides positive proofs why cognition is not capable of imitating, or appropriating the object's form. He proposes the following: if cognition possessed the form of its object, it would assume the form of cognisable things and thereby it would forgo its status of a cognitive criterion. But that is not the case because cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*) and cognisable things (*prameya*) are represented in cognition due to the difference between them as occasioned externally and internally.

Further examination of the Buddhist position: Except for the fact that cognitive awareness has the form of its object it is not possible to relate the cognition to its object, e.g. "this is cognitive awareness of something blue", that is why one should accept that the cognitive awareness has the form of its object, as Dharmakīrti explained in the *Pramāṇavārttika*: "For nothing relates cognition to an object except for the fact that the cognition has the form of an object. This is why the cognitive criterion for the comprehension of a cognisable thing is the fact of the comprehension (cognition) having the form of the cognisable thing." To see to what extent the Buddhist enjoys his immense ignorance, Prabhācandra gibes, let us first see whether the cognition in question relates itself, or connects, to its object, or whether it being related to its object or it having the form of the object is validated by something? Obviously, the relation of the cognition to its object cannot be made by virtue of the cognition assuming the form of its object, because the cognition of an object is produced as being related to the object by virtue of its causes, such as sense organs, light etc. Further, does the fact of a cognition having the form of its object is made known by a

cognition which as the form of its object or by a cognition that is without such a form? The dilemma demonstrates that the initial (Buddhist) thesis is wrong.

Another problem which is examined is this: for the Buddhist the cognitive criterion is the relation of awareness to the object inasmuch as it is otherwise not explicable, and similarly the arising comprehension is the result, because the comprehension is possible only as related to the well-determined object.

Further, is the object's form such as its momentariness is different from the object's form such as its blueness etc. which becomes the contents of cognition or is it not different? Both alternatives yield undesired results.

E 110-121. Prabhācandra turns his criticism against the materialists now. Let's suppose in turn, as the materialists do, that cognition (consciousness) has no form; for cognition cannot be known by itself, in as much as it is a transformation of material elements, like a mirror. Prabhācandra points out that the logical reason used in the argument, viz. that the cognition (consciousness) is a transformation of material elements, cannot be proved in any way. Such consciousness could either be of the same type or of different type. In the first case, if cognition (consciousness) were a result of a particular transformation of material elements, that would imply that it should be visible to external sense organs, just like a mirror, and the theory cannot be saved even if the materialist assumed that consciousness would be made up of subtle matter, for subtle matter is still a kind of material elements, being both essentially disconnected from the conscious stuff and void of its materially observable form, would permanently remain invisible to external sense organs and imperceptible to introspective perception, and it would turn out to be of the same class of inferable subtle entities such as the afterlife, karmic merit, karmic demerit etc.

If consciousness, being a product of material elements, were of a different type than matter, it could not acquire its status of some conscious stuff, because if that were possible, fire could easily acquire the status of (i.e. become) water etc., and one would have to give up its belief in the four material elements.

Suppose now, as the materialist suggests, that there would still be something else, e.g. the self, different from particular cognitive applications (faculties, *upayoga*) of cognition and perception, and different from matter; but this could not be proved either. It would consequently remain unknown even introspectively, and could not be established through perception or inference etc. So this could not be claimed to be a site of consciousness, anyway. Prabhācandra rejects this argument by claiming that the self is cognised through perception, and that is well known from such statements as "I am happy", "I am unhappy", "I want this". No one can claim that such feelings and statements that report such feeling are false because there is nothing to sublimate them and they do not have their locus or origin in the body. These statements belong to a different category than the following, which do refer to the body: "I am fat", "I am slim". Further, one cannot claim that the true nature of the self as conscious cannot be established because it is like material form etc. When we say "I", its nature represented as consciousness.

In addition, the self can be proved as consciousness also through inference. This is how Prabhācandra believes can be done: the ear and other sense organs, being instruments, fulfil their purpose by serving the agent, because they are instruments, like an axe. More proofs are provided. Senses do not possess consciousness as their property (i.e. consciousness is not located in sense organs), because they are instruments, because they are products of material elements, like an axe. The mind does not possess consciousness as its quality, because it is an instrument, like an axe. Similarly, consciousness is not a quality of perceived objects. Some passages from

Lokāyata lost works are quoted. Some of the materialist's arguments are rejected, such as this: Consciousness is manifested by virtue of material elements such as the earth etc. which are called the body, sense organs, perceived objects, like the power of alcohol is produced by virtue of flour, water, sugar, *Woodfordia fruticosa* flowers etc. One of the problems with the materialist's arguments: would consciousness manifest itself being something existent or non-existent, or something which has a double form of something existent and non-existent? Or, would living beings possess consciousness right from birth as something which has been caused by the process of the appropriation of some earlier consciousness, because of some alteration of the previous consciousness, like intermediary consciousness, being between one moment and another moment? That is, of course, rejected, like an argument base on observation of the birth of conscious worms etc. from unconscious cow-dung.

Expressions in which the idea of the self is embedded, such as "I know a pot etc. with my mind (lit. cognition)", are taken to prove the reality of the self. Prabhācandra reveals his favourite proof of the soul (the self): The self is both beginningless and endless (i.e. eternal) because it is a substance, like earth and other substances. And the logical reason applied here is not baseless or faulty (in which the substratum, here the self, is unproved; *āśrayāsiddha*), because the self is well-known through the notion of "I". Neither it is unestablished in its form as beginningless and endless, because it is characterised by its nature of substance, to demonstrate: the self is a substance, because it is endowed with qualities (*guṇa*) and modes (*pariyāya*), like earth etc. Neither here is the logical reason unestablished, etc. But suppose that since the self is manifested as devoid of body, it is different from the body; hence it must be both without beginning and end, just like fire is always manifested as devoid of water. However, Prabhācandra finds fault with this argument. Then he examines another argument, subsequently rejected: it is not the case that the self is different from the body, because the self is its nature, or because the self is its quality, or because the self is its effect.

Suppose the following: since cognition (consciousness; *vijñāna*) is directly perceptible, it turns out to be a patient of an action, like a material thing, *ergo* another cognition acting as an instrument perceiving it has to be postulated. That is also rejected.

E.121-126. Suppose cognition cannot be known by itself, it can only be known as an object. But consider the proposition: "I know the pot by myself", in which case one cognises the action (*kriyā*), the instrument (*kaṛaṇa*) and the agent (*karṭṛ*) which all can be cognised like the patient of the action. In other words, here the self is the agent, the cognitive criterion is the instrument, the cognition is the action, all with respect to the patient, and all can be cognised. But the fact of them being known as the patient does not mean that they can be known as directly perceivable; otherwise it would absurdly imply that the self would be imperceptible, like the cognition of the instrument, inasmuch as it would not be cognised as the patient of the action (which is cognition). Cognition which is cognised as instrument is an instrument, but not perception.

Query: Are the self and the cognition (as the instrument) not established as the patient in all cases or only sometimes? Both lead to contradiction. Therefore, it is established that the self and the cognition can be patients of an action (which is cognition itself).

Query: is perceptibility a property of an object or a property of cognition? That may eventually lead to a conclusion that no direct cognition is possible, but only indirect. But how someone who maintains that cognition is indirect could establish the presence of cognition: through perception or through inference? Certainly not through perception because he accepts perception as such kind of cognition which cannot have

itself as its object, viz. he claims that it is not self-referential. He cannot avail himself of inference either, because there is no inferential sign (*liṅga*) which could be demonstrated as inseparably connected with this cognition. What could be the basis for the inference: the resulting cognition of an object, or a sense organ and its object taken jointly, or the mind (*manas*) which accompanies them? None of these options works.

E 126-128. But how can one prove the nature of the mind which assists a sense organ and its object and is capable of relaying one sensory datum at a time? As the Naiyāyika explains, the existence of the mind can be proved through the fact that cognitions do not arise simultaneously; for it is as follows: when there is a contact of the soul with the mind and of the object with the senses, cognition arises. Prabhācandra rejects this on the ground that one does experience it that all the five types of data can be received simultaneously and that while entertaining an image of a horse in one's mind one can see a cow and determine it with his mind. So the existence of such a mind cannot be proved by perception. Besides, to prove it by inference is a circular fallacious argument (*cakrakaprasaṅga*): the prove of the existence of the mind is based on the proof of the impossibility of simultaneous occurrence of cognitions, and the prove of the impossibility of simultaneous occurrence of cognitions is based on the proof of the existence of the mind. Further, the prove of the impossibility of simultaneous occurrence of cognitions is based on the prove of consciousness, and it in turn is based on the mind. Therefore, as Prabhācandra stipulates, one has to reject the mind which assists a sense organ and its object and is capable of relaying one sensory datum at a time as an inferential sign (*liṅga*) which could be demonstrated as inseparably connected with this cognition.

But, let us suppose there is some kind of inferential sign, but even then the problem is that such relation which inseparably relates the inferential sign cannot be established as long as one holds to the claim that cognition cannot be perceived or known directly. Consequently, one has to reject the argument, ascribed to Prabhākara: the self is not directly perceivable, because it is not cognised as a patient of the action of cognising, like the cognition of the instrument.

E 128-149. The truth is that cognition (consciousness) can be an object of itself, i.e. it is aware of itself, even without the use of language, just as it can be aware of an external object. Just as the nature of a pot is represented in cognition even without a verbal statement "a pot" and this representation is not of verbal character, because it is illuminated in awareness in such a nonverbal manner, similarly the nature of the cognising agent (*pramātr*), of the cognising instrument etc. is also represented and illuminated in awareness even though no words are spoken. Otherwise we would require external verbal symbols to know that: "I am happy". An opponent claims that indeed happiness and other feelings are not cognised directly, so also one cannot become aware of the cognition of an external object directly. Granting that, a problem arises. Suppose that a cognition needs another cognition to be cognised, because it is a cognisable object itself; but then is the other, second cognition perception or indirect cognition? This leads to infinite regress. Ultimately one would have to take recourse to god to account for the difference between the two cognitions. Even the logical reason used in the argument "because cognition is a cognisable object itself" is faulty and it entails circularity in reasoning or it turns out to be baseless (in which the substratum, here the self, is unproved; *āśrayāsiddha*).

The opponent should also satisfactorily explain whether the contradiction, which should ultimately be demonstrated or represented in cognition, in which the action of

cognising supposedly stands with respect to its being a patient of the action depends on still another cognition or on its own essence?

Further, Prabhācandra criticises a view which he ascribes to the Mīmāṃsaka: The cognition of an object is made known by another cognition which follows it immediately and is inherently connected with it; this entails a distinction of two kinds: the cognition of qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇajñāna*) as the instrument and cognitive criterion and the cognition of the qualified object (*viśeṣyajñāna*) as the result. Now, the Mīmāṃsaka maintains that there is difference between these two, because the cognition of qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇajñāna*) is the instrument, or cognitive criterion, and the cognition of the qualified object (*viśeṣyajñāna*) is the action being the result. But this is merely a matter of belief, not of a proof, Prabhācandra responds, because no one cognises as follows: “Being the cognition of qualifiers myself, I know through the cognition of the qualified object”! Further, the object of these two cognitions would be different or not different? Would they occur simultaneously or not?

The theory is criticised: The mind is material like the point of a needle, whereas the senses “subsist by excluding one another” (viz. when one is active, the others are not), being like lotus petals which are pierced one by one by the mind, but only one at a time, and are not able to cognise simultaneously.

Another undesired problem for the Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika would be that if one would not accept that cognition can become aware of itself also in the case of god (*īśvara*), then the range of existents (such as the substances, properties, movements, universals, individuators and inherence) and non-existents would not be reflected in any cognition.

Further, would the second cognition to know the contents of the first one arise when the first one still exists or no more exists? Would it be perceptual (direct) or indirect? That’s how *circulus vitiosus* progresses.

Besides, how could one know that “I want to know something” – by the same mental act or by some subsequent cognition? The opponent’s reply would lead to a paradox: “My cognition, even though it is not known, knows an object” – how could one know even this piece of knowledge? Or, consider the following: “Even though I am not aware of it, it gives me pleasure”. Such mental states cannot be known through perception, if one does not accept that cognitions are self-revealing, for there is no way to know of such mental, cognitive or emotional states through inference. The idea is elaborated.

E 149. Who possibly, be it an ordinary person or an expert, desiring such a directly perceptible contents which presents itself to awareness, would not desire a cognitive criterion that reveals it? It is not possible that an object revealing itself to cognition can be visible without a lamp which reveals itself, or is itself visible. Similarly, without self-revealing character of a cognitive criterion, it is not possible for an object manifesting itself to awareness to become visible.

E 149-151. Cognition derives its validity both intrinsically and extrinsically. In this way both intrinsic validity (*svataḥprāmāṇya*) and extrinsic validity (*parataḥprāmāṇya*) apply to cognition. when cognitive criterion defined through such characteristics as the determination of both itself and a previously uncognised object obtains its cognitive validity, that is extrinsic, whereas in the case cognitive activity and its resulting cognition the validity is intrinsic and extrinsic depending on rehearsed exertion (*abhyāsa*) of cognitive activity and its lack (*anabhyāsa*).

Since the maintain that all cognitive criteria possess intrinsic validity, the followers of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa should explain, with reference to what the cognitive validity applies to them: with reference to origin, with reference to cognitive activity or with reference

to its result? Further, what does it mean to say that cognitive validity arises? Does it mean that it arises without a cause, it arises due to its own peculiar causal complex (*svasāmagrī*), or due to the causal complex of pure consciousness?

Just to accept the idea of intrinsic validity alone is problematic, because for all practical purposes these two may be indistinguishable: just as a particular cognitive result characterised by cognitive invalidity is produced by sense organs suffering from particular defects, e.g. from an ocular disease (*kācakāmala*), similarly cognitive validity can be produced by sense organs qualified by particular qualities.

E 151-159. An exposition of the Mīmāṃsaka position on cognitive validity. Suppose cognitive criterion acquires its validity from some other source. But could such factors responsible for cognitive validity be established by perception or by inference, and if by the latter, would it be by inference based on the logical reason as essential nature (*svabhāvahetu*), the logical reason as effect (*kāryahetu*), or the logical reason as non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*)? None of these possibilities work. Further, it is not even possible to indicate a proper inferential sign (*liṅga*).

What is cognitive validity? It consists in true illumination of an object, and its conscious nature is revealed when cognitive awareness arises due to causal complex incorporating sense organs etc. To put it differently, cognitive validity is the power consisting in the true determination of an object. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's views expressed in the *Mīmāṃsāsāślokavārttika* are expounded and a number of his verses are quoted in support: "It should be accepted that cognitive validity of all cognitive criteria is intrinsic. For a power which does not come from itself (i.e. is not intrinsic), cannot accomplish anything by taking recourse to something else (i.e. to what is extrinsic)"; "When entities (here: cognitions) come into existence, they depend on their own causes, whereas the operation, with respect to their tasks, of the entities which have already established their existence is intrinsic"; "Just as a pot, with respect to its production, depends on a lump of clay, stick, potter's wheel etc., but when it comes to fetching water there is no more dependence on these causal factors".

Validity (the conviction of one's cognition being true) is intrinsic because it cannot be proved any living beings under the sway of doubt or misconception with regards to the validity of his cognition the moment it arises. For when a cognition arises there is certainty with regard to it: "this is indeed a real thing", not doubt or sensation of it being a misconception.

Another problem is discussed: how can we verify the veracity of our cognitions if the are not valid intrinsically? Through a subsequent practical verification or cognition? But, for instance, does the cognition resulting from causally efficient action (*arthakriyājñāna*) which establishes the validity of the previous cognition take place at the same time or at a different time? Suppose it arises at the same time; but then would these two cognitions have the same contents or different? Etc. And how can we practically distinguish between valid (*pramāṇa*) and invalid (*apramāṇa*) cognitions? Would they not turn out to be non-different, accepting Mīmāṃsaka assumptions? The Mīmāṃsaka rejects the theory of extrinsic validity in a lengthy passage.

E 159-176. Rejection of the Mīmāṃsaka views. The Mīmāṃsaka is wrong to claim that the cognitive validity cannot be derived from perception and it is not possible to assess the reliability of perceptual apparatus, i.e. the sense organs etc., through perception itself. It is not the case that perception is not capable of cognising relevant particular qualities of sense organs which attest to the veracity of cognition ('qualities of veracity') derived from them. For he should answer whether this alleged incapacity of senses, their defects and the lack of particular qualities which attest to the veracity

of cognition can be proved if we consider sense organs as consisting in sensory power or as consisting in actual physical apparatus? Etc.

The Mīmāṃsaka is wrong to maintain that it is not possible to indicate a proper inferential sign (*liṅga*) which could be related to the qualities of sense organs that would attest to their being non-defective. Indeed, this could not be done with the help of perception or inference, but there is one more cognitive criterion which can accomplish the task, namely presumptive knowledge (*ūha*). One can also find a method to know that a particular cognition does not fulfil the standards of cognitive validity and make sure that sense organs are not defective.

Since the situation is that defects and ‘qualities of veracity’ are mutually exclusive, then if there are no defect, it means that there are sufficient ‘qualities of veracity’, like in the case when in the absence of fire there is the presence of cold, viz. when there is absence of negation, there is presence of confirmation. Otherwise, how could there be a defect in the form of the absence of a fixed relation in the presence of a logical reason, because absence in the form defects would not be possible either.

If the Mīmāṃsaka maintains that the absence of defects is established through ‘qualities of veracity’, he actually expresses the idea that particular qualities (‘qualities of veracity’ are established through particular qualities; when its presence is established through particular qualities, why couldn’t cognitive validity be established extrinsically? Further, a true cognition which arises does not depend in its truth exclusively on stainlessness, i.e. on ‘qualities of veracity’.

A longer discussion how cognitive validity can be established through perception and inference. Rejection of the Mīmāṃsaka arguments that the validity could not be proved externally, through perception or inference, e.g. that the inferential sign for that could not be established, etc. Rejection of the argument that senses do not provide equivocal data, because in some cases, even though that are intact, they can be a cause of false cognition, whereas in other cases they cause true cognition, therefore they cannot provide validity to our cognition.

It is wrong to maintain that “when entities (here: cognitions) come into existence, they depend on their own causes, whereas the operation, with respect to their tasks, of the entities which have already established their existence is intrinsic”, because it is not compatible with the understanding of the cognitive criterion as a mental state in the form of the determination of the object as it is, for the problem is the following: when cognition comes into existence and in this it depends on particular causes, what would be this particular operation, with respect to its tasks, which could be intrinsic? Further, what would the task of cognitive criterion with respect to which its operation could proceed intrinsically? Would it be a determination of a thing as it is or an ascertainment of the form: “this is a cognitive criterion”?

Scriptural testimony, if it is to provide any reliable cognition, has to be imparted by a human agent who is endowed with proper qualities (‘qualities of veracity’), but scriptural testimony, if it were of divine, non-human origin (*apauruṣeya*), could not generate any kind of cognition of an object by itself.

Cognition resulting from causally efficient action (*arthakriyājñāna*), in as much as it depends on causally efficient action which is directly infallible (*avisamvādin*), does not bring certainty expected of a cognitive criterion in virtue of its dependence on its own infallibility. It requires additional factors.

It is not the case that any doubt with respect to cognition resulting from some causally efficient action can be exercised in the waking state simply because it can be seen that cognition resulting from some action can be exercised in a state of dreaming even when there is no real object of this action, because these two differ.

It is because cognition resulting from some action exercised in a state of dreaming is subsequently sublated by another cognition of the same agent at another point of time, after one wakes up, whereas it is not the case with cognition resulting from causally efficient action exercised in the waking state.

It is not true that it cannot be proved that no living being entertain doubt or mistrust the validity of his cognition the moment it arises, hence validity (the conviction of one's cognition being true) is intrinsic. A person who acts with deliberation first reflects whether a particular awareness of an object is a true or false cognition, and does not act hastily.

The Mīmāṃsaka is wrong to hold that the ascertainment of the cognitive validity arises in the absence of a cognition of defects which are sublating factors. Their absence would be ascertained when one doesn't grasp sublating factors or when one determines the absence of sublating factors? A number of other alternatives follow to demonstrate the failure the Mīmāṃsaka theory.

Refutation of the idea that the power of scriptural injunction can bring cognitive validity with itself. Prabhācandra concludes that it has been established beyond doubt that cognitive awareness produced by scriptural injunction cannot be accepted as cognitive criterion, because it lacks cognitive validity, inasmuch as it is produced by causes the defects of which cannot be successfully eliminated, and in this such cognitive awareness produced by scriptural injunction resembles a vision of a double moon.

A kind of succinct catechism (*āśis*) follows to wind up the “determination of facts”, which begins with a question who is revered Vardhamāna (the reply is: a Tīrthamāra, the highest divine being (*deva*)), and ends with a conclusion that his the cognitive criterion.

Second chapter on perception

E 177-180. Having demonstrated the general common defining characteristics of cognitive criteria in the previous chapter, the author proceeds to their particular characteristics. Cognitive criterion is said to be twofold. Well, there are some who maintain that cognitive criterion is one. These are the Cārvākas who say that all this discussion has no purpose.

Exposition of Cārvāka theory: perception is the only cognitive criterion, because it is “non-secondary”, i.e. primary or the main source of data. Cognitive criterion is defined by them as cognition which determines its object. This cannot be accomplished through inference, which cannot provide us with certainty about cognised objects, because inference relies on universals, and these do not exist. As a quoted Cārvāka source says: “There is no way to prove particulars [through inference], and to prove universals [through inference] is a fallacy of proving what is already [taken by the opponent to be] proved [in order to prove anything through inference] (*siddhasādhana*)”. Further inference proceeds when invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) is grasped and when the presence of the proving property in the logical subject (*pakṣadharmatā*) is known. But none of these conditions can be fulfilled, because these cannot be established through perception. And they cannot be established through inference as long as inference itself is not established as a valid instrument of cognition we cannot use it prove them, but inference relies on them. And there is no other cognitive criterion to help us out.

Prabhācandra rejects these arguments. First, he claims, inference and other cognitive criteria can be proved to be as valid as perception, for in all of them cognitive validity

can be demonstrated by taking recourse to the logical reason that they all, including perception, are infallible (*avisamvādaka*).

It is wrong to maintain, that since cognitive criterion is “non-secondary”, i.e. primary, inference cannot be considered a cognitive criterion, because what does “being non-secondary” mean? Does it mean that the contents of inference is secondary or that it is preceded by perception? The first alternative is false, because inference, like perception, cognises an object which is characterised by the universal as well as the particular, both being real. The second alternative is equally false, because it is sometimes observed that perception is preceded by inference (a reference to the *Nyāyavatāra* 10-11). The Cārvāka is also mistaken to maintain that that is not possible to grasp the relation of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) through perception, because it is well known that there is still another cognitive criterion called presumptive knowledge (*ūha*) which arises by force of perception and non-apprehension and it grasps invariable concomitance.

The Cārvāka should explicate what he means by rejecting inference as a cognitive criterion. Does he reject inference in its totality or inference with regard to extra-sensory objects? If the first alternative is the case that his position results in total destruction of all practical activities (*vyavahāra*), because it is applied by everyone. In the case of the second alternative, the problem is how to decide about cognitive validity or its opposite in the case of non-sensory perception and other cognitive criteria (such as inference etc.) with regard to their being primary or not? And without it, one could not even argue against heaven, novel metaphysical potency (*apūrva*), divine beings etc. A verse from Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇaviniścaya* is quoted in support: “Since the general form (idea) of cognitive criterion and its opposite is established, since one knows the ideas of another person and since one can negate some things (heaven etc.), the presence of another cognitive criterion (is established)”. Hence, it is not the case that inference is not a cognitive criterion.

E 180-197. The twofold division of cognitive criteria based on the dichotomy of perception and the rest, which includes inference.

Exposition and criticism of the Buddhist position. The Buddhist maintains: Since there are two kinds of cognisable objects, there must be two kinds of cognitive criteria: perception and inference. That position is wrong because there is just one kind of cognisable objects for cognitive criteria and it consists in the universal as well as in the particular. If inference were operative only with respect to the universal, no inference would be possible with respect to particulars, for it is not possible that a cognition has *x* for its object but is operative with respect to *y*. Further, how can one prove that there are two kinds of cognosibles? Does this dyad come as something known, unknown or making itself known to two kinds of cognitive criteria? Can it be known by perception or by inference? The Buddhist theory cannot escape a number of aporias it yields, including the overlap of perception and inference.

Exposition and criticism of the Mīmāṃsā position. Consider the following: even though there is not strict division of cognosibles, cognitive criteria other than perception are not necessarily included in inference. For instance, verbal cognition cannot be classified as a subtype of inference, and it cannot be subsumed under one category of indirect cognition (*parokṣa*). Likewise, each of cognitive criteria has its specific causes, e.g. verbal cognition is produced by speech. A verse (also partly cited in the *Tarkarāhasya*) is quoted in support: “The proponents of more cognitive criteria regard the cognition which arises from language (lit. words), also with respect to imperceptible things, as verbal cognition”; this kind of cognition produced by speech cannot be classified as perception or inference, therefore it has to be granted a

separate category. A number of verses from the *Mīmāṃsāślokaṅkārikā* are quoted. Further, what renders a cognitive criterion a status of validity is that it cognises an object previously not cognised (*anadhigatārthādhigantṛtā*). Also this defining characteristic justifies the acceptance of more cognitive criteria than just two. The Mīmāṃsaka (with numerous Kumāriḥ's verses) adduces reasons why reasoning based on analogy (*upamāna*), presumption (*arthāpatti*), absence as negative proof (*abhāva*) has to be accepted as separate cognitive criteria. The Mīmāṃsaka proceeds to attack the Buddhist dichotomy of cognitive criteria directly, and also considers a number of counterarguments against certain cognitive criteria admitted almost exclusively by his system, e.g. presumption does not meet the condition of the proving property being present in the logical subject (*pakṣadharmatā*) or it rests on no inferential sign (*liṅga*). A discussion of extra-sensory special causal power (*śakti*) and subsequent rejection thereof.

E 197-216. Criticism of the Mīmāṃsā position. It begins with the Mīmāṃsaka's criticism of extra-sensory special power (*śakti*). Can this absence of the special power be accepted because there is no cognitive criterion to grasp it or because the power is extra-sensory? Prabhācandra's analysis of the Mīmāṃsaka's arguments show that numerous points could not be explained without admitting the existence of some extra-sensory special power. Prabhācandra emphasises that the Jainas do not reject that a causal complex has the causal power of producing effect, but they maintain that in particular cases the causal power of producing effect of the causal complex is not possible without accepting the existence of some extra-sensory power (*śakti*) which not amenable to senses. Why should fire not cause an effect, e.g. burning an opening etc., even in the presence of counter-agents (*pratibandhaka*) such a (fire-proof) gem or (fire preventing) charm (*mantra*) in the presence of causal complex (*sāmagrī*)? Such counter-agents could nullify the causal complex, hence one has to admit the special power. Eventually, one has to accept that the hindrance in the origination of an effect caused by counter-agents is in fact due to the special power. What kind of absence of counter-agents would be the auxiliary cause accompanying the production of the effect? Would it be mutual absence (*itaretarābhāva*), pre-origination absence (*prāgabhāva*), post-destruction absence (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*) or absolute absence (*abhāvamātra*)?

But it is wrong to maintain that the special power inherent in earth and other elements is nothing but the universal earth-ness etc., because that would lead to an undesired consequence that a piece of cloth (made of the element of earth) would originate also thanks to a lump of clay (similarly, made of the element of earth) etc.

Anyone undermining the existence of the special power by attacking the idea with the alternative: "Is this power eternal or not", should first reflect whether the question refers to the special power in the substance or in the mode, etc., because the true nature of all existents is endowed with special substantial and modal power. Then the paradoxes disappear. Another related problem is this: how is it possible that god could produce any effect at all? To attack the idea of the special power with a dilemma whether the special power is different from its possessor or not is off the mark, because the point of fact is that it both: different and not different.

It is wrong to hold that special power is one in all things, for the contrary is easy to prove: there are numerous such special powers which inhere in causal factors, because there are numerous effects. Also there are numerous effect which are occasioned by numerous special powers resting in causes, because things are effects which are diversified through their natures.

Criticism of examples of presumption (*arthāpatti*) adduced by the Mīmāṃsaka: (1) one knows of the permanence of speech due to the efficacy of denoting terms; (2) living Caitra is somewhere else, because he is not at home.

Extensive critical discussion of absence as negative proof (*abhāva*), particularly of the relation of an entity (e.g. the surface of the ground) which is the locus of a to-be-negated object (e.g. a pot), or the negatum, i.e. the locus of the negative property (*pratiyogin*), which is not there. Further, the Mīmāṃsaka is mistaken to maintain that it is not possible to apprehend the absence of something through perception (which calls for still a sixth cognitive criterion, the negative proof) allegedly due to the fact that absence cannot be allegedly comprehended through perception.

It is problematic to apply the dilemma “Does the absence of five cognitive criteria which is the cause of the knowledge of the absence of cognisable thing (e.g. a pot on the ground) comes as something already known or unknown” to prove that one requires still another, sixth cognitive criterion to comprehend the absence.

There is complete disagreement as regards the Mīmāṃsaka’s claim that there is a special cognisable object, i.e. absence of the negatum, for the negative proof (*abhāva*), and his thesis: “perception, which can only grasp what exists, cannot apprehend absence of something” has to be rejected for the simple reason that perception can at the same time grasp other, diverse objects in the place when something is missing.

The division of absence into four categories which serve as objects for the negative proof, i.e. mutual absence (*itaretarābhāva*), pre-origination absence (*prāgabhāva*), post-destruction absence (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*) and absolute absence (*abhāvamātra*), is artificial and not required. Follows a lengthy refutation of the typology and demonstration of paradoxes it yields. The section ends with a direct rejection of Kumāriḷa’s verses quoted from the *Abhāvapariccheda* chapter of the *Ślokavārttika*: “Pre-origination absence is when there is no curd in milk yet; the defining characteristic of the post-destruction absence is the non-existence of milk in the curd; the absence of horse etc. in the cow is called mutual absence; the lower sections of the hare’s head devoid of stiff outgrowth in relation to the hare’s horns is called absolute absence”. The conclusion is that there is no reason to uphold negative proof as a separate cognitive criterion and it couldn’t have its distinct object. This can be known through perception, which is one of two cognitive criteria.

E 216-219. The first kind of cognitive criterion is perception, which is clear (*viśada*), i.e. lucid or distinct (*spaṣṭa*); whatever is not a clear cognition is not perception, like inference. There is a problem to consider:

when cognition arises that there is fire there on account of seeing smoke incidentally (without recalling an example), does it have a universal character or particular? If it were universal, it couldn’t be perception. If its contents were particular, there would be no place for doubt whether this fire is produced by burning grass or burning leaves, because when under ordinary circumstances one sees fire in proximity, one immediately knows its source. The conclusion is that this kind of cognition is inference triggered by apprehension of an inferential sign (*liṅga*), because inference is possible even if one doesn’t know example, which includes knowledge of invariable concomitance. Knowledge of invariable concomitance is not directly perceptible and is not clear, or lucid, and this cannot be cognised perceptually.

But is this non-lucidity a property of cognition or a property of its object? Or is it a property of the contents of cognition or a property of sense organs? And is it a property of physical sense organs or of psychic sense organs? Or, perhaps, it is a

property of light etc.? The conclusion is that it is the intrinsic nature of particular type of cognition known as perception.

E 219-220. But what actually is this clarity (*vaiśadya*) of perception? It is the representing (of an object) without mediation of any intermediate cognition or the representing (of an object) as something possessed of its distinctive character. An objection: This would indicate that subsequent stages of perception, i.e. cogitation (*īhā*), perceptual judgement (*avāya*) and retention (*dhāraṇā*), which follow the first moment of sensation (*avagraha*), should not be reckoned as clear, or lucid. The reply is that actually these are all just stages in one process, so the objection does not hold.

Another objection: Also in the case of indirect cognition (*parokṣa*), such as memory, recognition etc., this defining characteristic is possible, because the rise of memory or recollection is possible without any intervening cognition. Prabhācandra rejects this objection by showing that memory, recognition etc. are not immediate.

E 220-229. Criticism of the Naiyāyika. Prabhācandra proceeds to demonstrate that, since it has been established that clarity is a genuine defining characteristic and the definition contains no defects, the defining characteristic of perception as cognition “arisen from the sense-object contact”, formulated in the *Nyāyasūtra*, cannot be correct for a number of reasons: invariable concomitance between sense-object contact and perception is not established; perception does not pervade (*vyāpaka*) sense-object contact; sense-object contact is not possible in the case of extrasensory perception and in the case of perception of an omniscient being; it is also not possible in introspection (e.g. perception of one’s own pleasure) in as much as a contact between a sense organ and pleasure is not possible; contact between the eye and its object is not possible.

Suppose that the contact between the eye and its object is possible just like the contact between the sense of touch etc. with the object, for the eye possesses to capacity to reveal an apprehended external object, because it is an external sense organ, just like the skin (in contradistinction to the mind, which is internal). But what is meant by the external sense organ here: directed outside towards external object or placed outside in an external place? Then, also the mind would meet the first condition, whereas the second alternative is based on an unproved logical reason, because the existence of external eye-rays which are extension of the eye is not established.

And what is the eye, which comes into direct contact with its object? Is it the eyeball etc. or the eye-rays which meet the Nyāya definition? Prabhācandra demonstrates that neither does.

But suppose that the real sense of vision is the eye-rays emitted through the eyeball. But the eye-rays come in contact only with the glass or crystal, not with an object behind. The Naiyāyika would first have to prove that the rays would go through little holes in crystal or other translucent substances etc. Further, if the rays were to exit from the eyeball and to illuminate an object by coming into direct contact with it, they would apprehend the heat of the object, the heat being the corollary of light. But suppose that we can see the eye-lights which are emitted through the eyeball of a cat at night, and we don’t see them in them in the daylight; besides they do not need external light to see at night – this is a proof that eye-rays exist. Well, the cats do need external light to see just like us. And why then couldn’t we see human eye-rays at night too?

Consider the following proof: The eye reveals an object connected to its eye-rays, because it is luminous. But then are the eye-rays proved by this or they enter the contact with object as something already proven? The result is that there is no proof

for the eye-rays. Prabhācandra shows why eyeballs could not emit eye-rays. And there is nothing else in ocular sense organs which could emit the eye-rays.

Further, the property of the revealing the colour is tantamount to the property of generating cognition. This requirement could not be explained with the idea of direct sense-object contact. For instance, it would imply that the substance would have to reveal its colour, and this in turn would mean that the revealing colour is either luminous or not luminous, etc.

The Naiyāyika asks: If the eye could enter into direct contact with its object, how could one explain the production of cognition? But such sense-object contact would be irrelevant in as much as the cognition is produced independently in the self.

Further, the Naiyāyika should explain why the apprehension of an object which has fallen into dirty water is not possible if it is possible to see the same object in clean water?

E 229-231. In fact, there are two kinds of perception: primary (*mukhya*), or genuine, and conventional (*saṃvyavahārika*). Conventional perception is occasioned by sense organs and quasi-sense organ and its clarity is partial.

Sense organs are two-fold: physical (*dravya*) and psychic (*bhāva*). The former are made of matter endowed with the qualities of colour, taste, smell and touch (but not sound) which has been transformed into physical forms such as the eyeball etc. The latter consist in predispositions (*labdhi*) and cognitive applications (*upayoga*), or actual faculties.

Some theories are rejected: First, the essence of the senses of smell, taste, vision and touch is made of earth, water, fire and air jointly. Second, the sense of smell is made of earth only because even though other sensory data are present only the smell is revealed; similarly other senses are made of one element only. Third, earth, water, fire etc. manifest their respective sensory data.

Sound belongs to ether, because even when other sensory data, such as colour, are present, only the sound is manifested. This Vaiśeṣika theory is rejected on the ground that Prabhācandra has already demonstrated that the sound cannot the property of ether.

It cannot be proved that sense organs are the results of particular elements, because there is no evidence for that. However, it is indeed the case that physical senses are produced by matter which is amenable to respective senses, and they are not explicable without admitting that they are the instruments for respective psychic senses.

E 231-232. Neither the object nor the light can be the genuine cause of cognition because they can be discerned, just like darkness is not the genuine cause. It is well-known that also darkness, even though it is not the genuine cause of cognition, being rather and impediment to cognition, can be discerned, but certainly it is not a cause of cognition.

Suppose cognition were an effect of an object, would it be known through perception or through some other cognitive criterion? Suppose it would be known through perception, but it be known through the same perception which knows the object or through some other perception? Etc. It couldn't be known through some other cognitive criterion either.

E 233-239. It can be proved that anything which can be discerned is not a cause of cognition on account of any lack of conformity by way of positive and negative concomitance, like in the case of a cognition of a hair-net and like in the case of a cognition of nocturnal animals. On the contrary, the rule is that if *x* follows both concomitant presence (*anvaya*) and concomitant absence (*vyatireka*) of *y*, *x* is the

effect of y , like the smoke is the effect of fire. And it is not the case that both concomitant presence (*anvaya*) and concomitant absence (*vyatireka*) relate either the object or the light to cognition. It is explained in detail why a good illustration of this principle is the cognition of a hair-net and the cognition in the case of nocturnal animals. An object which becomes the contents of the cognition of a hair-net is acted upon by an eye afflicted by an eye-disease such as *kāmala* etc. and the cause of such cognition is the operation: of the hair-net, of the pupils, eyelids etc., of eyelashes or of the eye-disease? None of these options is satisfactory. Further, will the object of such a cognition of hair-net manifest itself only in one place or in some other places too? Clearly, it is not the case that the cognition occurs only when there is the object known as the hair-net – that would lead to the undesired consequence that such cognition would turn out to be non-erroneous. Or one would entertain doubt, for it is said in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* that “doubt arises due to perception of common features (*sāmānya*), due to non-perception of a particular feature (*viśeṣa*) and due to remembrance of unique features of both things”.

Further, if one accepts that what is to be discerned is nothing but the cause, extrasensory cognition of a yogin would cognise only past objects, because only past objects could be the cause of such cognition, but not present or future objects. But this is not acceptable. Clearly, the cause of such a cognition of a yogin, i.e. the object, could only precede the cognition, because being a cause of something is tantamount to making that something coming into existence, hence preceding it temporarily, not otherwise. Suppose it were otherwise, if the yogin’s cognition could discern a co-existent of a future object, that discernment of such an object as a cause of a cognition x would be accomplished by another cognition y – a contraction. If one cognition could discern objects which cause other cognitions, it would result in everyone being omniscient.

Further, suppose the object were momentary, what would the cognition of a yogin actually grasp, because the object as a cause preceding the cognition would not exist any more at the time of the cognition. And it has already been explained in the first chapter that a momentary object cannot be cause of anything. Moreover, on the level of the ultimate truth nothing could be cognised because a momentary object would never coexist with its cognition, it could never cause it and it could never be discerned by it, so nobody could be omniscient either. If one sees a person called Maitra, who looks like Caitra, ultimately one in no way sees Caitra, except in a metaphorical sense. The same thing is with momentary objects. That being the case, it is indeed correct to say that the idea of omniscience of the Buddha is only acceptable metaphorically. Alternatively, granted that by seeing one thing one also cognises other things similar to it (e.g. momentary entities belonging to the same series), in the case of a sensation of something one would also cognise all other things similar to it, and everyone would turn out to be omniscient.

And how would it be at all possible to cognise such a momentary thing if it were supposed to be the cause of cognition? The Buddhist or anyone who maintains that the actual cause of cognition is the object has not way to explain it satisfactorily. Would the fact of the object occurring be cognised by a cognition coexistent with this fact, by an earlier cognition or by a subsequent cognition? None of these options work.

An objection is raised: if cognition could arise in the absence of its object, why should it not arise in places devoid of such an object, e.g. something blue etc.? Suppose that it arises due to the eye-mind contact. Why should such an object, e.g. something blue, then not be grasped in other places too, because whether the object is actually there or

not is irrelevant? Prabhācandra uses the objection to demonstrate that the very presumption, i.e. that the actual object is the ultimate cause of cognition, is wrong.

Another objection is voiced: if the object were absent and the cognition of it were present, then there would be cognition of past, future and distant objects, just like the cognition of proximate things. Prabhācandra asks to specify what the phrase “there would be cognition” actually means? The cognition of the thing would arise, or there would be the cognition which grasps the object? None of these holds.

The only logically possible conclusion is that the rise of cognition of its object does not conform to concomitant presence (*anvaya*) and concomitant absence (*vyatireka*) of the object. So how could the Naiyāyika maintain in the *Nyāyabhāṣya* that “cognitive criterion has an object”? Consequently, cognition is not the effect of its object.

Neither is the cognition the effect of the light, because one does see that cognition arises in the case of beings with eyes embellished with collyrium etc. (who do not see clearly) and in the case of nocturnal animals even though there is no light entering the eye. An objection is raised: If the light were not the cause of cognition, we could have the cognition (sc. we could see) even in the darkness, and the observable rule is: if the light is there the cognition is there, if light is not there the cognition is not there, so the light must be the cause of cognition; otherwise the smoke could not be regarded as produced by fire. Prabhācandra questions: how would then darkness be cognised, if we assume that the light is the cause of cognition? If cognition of darkness were possible even without the light, the also in other cases, e.g. in the case of pots etc., such cognition would also be possible. So the light cannot be the cause.

Suppose one says that the object known as darkness and which is discerned by cognition actually does not exist, and the verbal practice among people to call “darkness” refers to the fact that no cognition occurs. That too is rejected by Prabhācandra by taking the recourse to the idea of clarity (*vaiśadya*) of cognition.

The verbal practice of saying that in this place there is more light and in that place there is less light does not prove that the light is the cause of cognition. An opponent who takes recourse to such a verbal practice forgets that there is also another verbal practice to say the following: in this cave etc. there is more darkness, and in that cave there is less darkness. Prabhācandra demonstrates that even in the absence of the light, a cognition arises, so the former can in no way be the cause of the latter.

E 239. The case is, however, that the cognition, although is not produced by the object or the light, manifests them as its contents. In this sense the situation is like in the case of the lamp: a pot etc. to be manifested does not produce the lamp which manifests it, because the lamp comes into existence due to its own specific causes.

Suppose one maintains the following: “If it is not possible to speak of the illuminating power of the illuminating cognition if there is no thing to be illuminated, one has to accept that the thing to be illuminated is the ultimate producer of the illuminating cognition”. But then the following argument also holds equally well: “If it is not possible to speak of ‘illuminatedness’ of the thing to be illuminated if there is no illuminating cognition, so let it be admitted that the illuminating cognition is the ultimate producer of the thing to be illuminated”.

E 240-241. In each and every case cognition, like a lamp, establishes (illuminates) its object within itself being incapacitated in its nature characterised by destruction-cum-subsidence (*kṣayopāśama*, one of five karmic states) of (karmic) veils (*āvaraṇa*) that obstruct it (cognition). This incapacitated nature of cognition is, in fact, the cognitive power (*śakti*). And it is this cognitive power which is the actual expedient for establishing the object in awareness as something determined in each and every case,

not the occurrence of the object etc. Obviously it is not the lamp which is produced by illuminated objects, although it does illuminate them.

If the cause of cognition were something to be discerned through cognition, that would yield deviance (*vyabhicāra*) with respect to sense organs etc. (which would also have to be considered causes, but which are not discerned). Sense organs or imperceptible things are also causes of cognition and should be discerned by it.

The Buddhist would counter: what we actually say is not that “the cause is always discerned” but that “nothing but the cause is discerned”. That is clearly wrong because otherwise the undesired consequence would be that the extrasensory cognition of a yogin or the cognition of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) which grasp objects in their all entirety would not be possible, because it has already been explained that objects either destroyed or not yet produced or object which coexist at the same time as the cognition are not the cause of cognition.

E 241-247. Now it is the time to explain the subdivision of perception.

Perception is primary when it is completely clear (*viśada*), extrasensory and when its all obstructing veils (*āvaraṇa*) are dissolved by a particular causal complex (*sāmagrī*), and this can include correct conation (*samyagdarśana*) etc. The destruction of obstructing veils may be due to destruction-cum-subsidence (*kṣayopaśama*) or destruction (*kṣaya*), and depending on the type of extent of the destruction of the obstructing veils, the result can be clairvoyance (*avadhi*), mind-reading (*manahparyaya*) or absolute knowledge (*kevala*).

The proof formulation (*prayoga*) is as follows: such a cognition *x* of an object *y* which is true when it occurs in a lucid form is such the obstructing veils of which have been removed with respect to the object *y*, like a cognition with respect to a tree etc. enveloped in a cloud of dust etc., which when the veiling dust is removed can perceive the tree; and such a cognition defined as above, when it is indeed lucid, is true with respect to anything which becomes illuminated. It cannot be dependent on senses or the mind, and being such it becomes free of any impurity, and so being clear it can grasp its object completely.

The Buddhist may object: If the obstructing veils of cognition were known to exist it would be correct to maintain the cognition arises due to their elimination, but the problem is that no one knows of such obstructing veils. What could they be or where could they be located? Would they consist in the body or in passions (*rāga*) etc., or in particular place, time etc.? It can easily be demonstrated that none of these options can function as obstructing veils, hence the Jainas are wrong to claim that some kind of perception may arise when its all obstructing veils are dissolved by a particular causal complex (*sāmagrī*).

Prabhācandra counters: of course this can neither be the body or anything else which the Buddhist has mentioned, but it is the karman, different from the body. And this can also be demonstrated through two kinds of proofs based on inference. But how can one prove that cognition has as its contents an object in its entirety? If one argues that when the obstructing veils are removed, cognition can illuminate its object, one commits the fallacy of vicious circle, or mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*). The reply to this query leads Prabhācandra to the conclusion that obstructing veils are material (*paudgalika*) karman, or the karmic matter as such.

The Advaitin switches in: But it is well known that the only kind of obstruction is nescience (*avidyā*), not material karman, because it is not possible that karman having physical form (*mūrta*) could obstruct cognition which does not have any physical form (*amūrta*); otherwise also the body etc. would easily obstruct cognition. Another

related problem is discussed by the propounder of the Yoga system: Since karman is the quality (*guṇa*) of the self (*ātman*), how could it be material at all? Both these objections are subsequently rejected.

It is proved that that on which the self is dependent (stimulated in its inner states) that is karman. And karman is material because the self is conditioned by its dependence on it. This does not yield any deviance (*vyabhicāra*) with respect to anger and other passions, considered the qualities of the soul, because they - being transformations of the soul - are by nature dependent on the soul.

The follower of the Sāṃkhya systems interjects: It is true, but something imperceptible cannot be the quality of the soul, because the point of fact is that karman is an evolute (*pariṇāma*) of the primordial supportive principle (*pradhāna*), in accordance with a quote from a Sāṃkhya source: “karman is an evolute of the primordial supportive principle, and it is white and black”.

Well, that objection is just a fanciful creative imagination, for if the primordial supportive principle (*pradhāna*) does not exist, as it is well known, so it is not possible that there could really exist any evolute of it.

There comes another objection: It is well known that material karman, the way it was explained, which operates in a casual way, itself being caused by deeds and effecting further causes, exists from beginningless time so a specific causal complex which could theoretically effect its destruction simply does not exist; so how it is possible that all obstructing veils could be dissolved by a particular causal complex? That is simply not possible. Prabhācandra replies: It is very well known that this particular causal complex consists in the triad of correct conation, correct cognition and correct conduct and it can accomplish the dissolution of the karmic matter enveloping the soul. Amassed karmic matter is dissolved through the process of eradication (*nirjarā*), which is twofold. How could it then be proved that a complete eradication of karmic matter can be accomplished? Through inference: In a particular soul karmic matter undergoes the process of its complete eradication because there is the end of its fruition (functioning); such entities which are not eradicated do not have an end of its fruition (functioning), like the time etc.; and we can see that karmic matter does have an end of its fruition, therefore can be completely eradicated in a particular soul.

Further, the existing karmic matter can be successfully obstructed through restraint (*saṃvara*), as it has been said in the *Tattvārthasūtra*: “Restraint is the obstruction of the inflow of new karmic matter (into the soul)”. This inflow is fivefold, and can be obstructed through triple restraint (*gupti*), fivefold circumspection (*samiti*), meditation on righteousness (*dharmānupreṣā*), control over afflictions (*parīśahajaya*) and proper conduct (*caritra*).

It can also be proved that that a complete eradication of karmic matter enveloping the soul is possible, not just partial eradication: Whatever exhibits gradual progression of its higher and higher stages it also reaches the apex of the gradation at some point, like the heat or the cold; and such gradual progression is possible in the case of correct conation (*samyagdarśana*), correct cognition (*samyajjñāna*) etc. of those who are at the first stage of inner development, i.e. the correct believers (*samyagdr̥ṣṭi*). Gradual progression of suffering etc. does not pose any problem of deviance (*vyabhicāra*) from the rule, i.e. it is never the case that suffering can attain its apex and become absolute, because it is well known to everybody that suffering reaches its empirical limit (although it is not absolute suffering) in the seventh hell. It happens in some people that removal of obstructing veils entails highest gradation of cognitive

faculties, because they gradually undergo the process of gradual progression till the apex.

But it is wrong to maintain that cognition has as its domain all object thanks to scriptures (*āgama*). Such cognition is never clear, so it does not fulfil the criteria of direct perception.

The Buddhist raised objection: But we can see that perfect extrasensory cognition of a yogin (*yogivijñāna*) is produced by attaining the culmination of the gradual progression of the depth of meditation, which is twofold: based on scripture and based on thought. This objection is wrong because both meditation based on scripture and meditation based on thought, both of which concern momentary and insubstantial (*nairātmya*) character of the world, have to be false. So it is proved that genuine perception is clear, extrasensory and its contents are all objects and it occurs when its obstructing veils are dissolved entirely.

E 247-254. Now it is the turn of the Mīmāṃsaka: It is known that in the case of some people it is not possible for cognition to know all objects, so how can you claim that such cognition of all things is possible, viz. how can you maintain the thesis of omniscience? Moreover, there exists nobody who is omniscient, because it cannot even become the domain of any of the five cognitive criteria which cognise existent things, i.e. which can verify the existence of something, hence there can be no proof of such a person, like in the case of a baby or a barren woman. The Mīmāṃsaka claims that it cannot be seen through perception that there can be an individual person who can see know all categories and entities.

Neither can it be accomplished through inference. He tentatively attempts to falsify the proof and tests whether the logical reason used in the argument indeed is faulty: can it be abolished through perception or inference or other cognitive criteria? The result of the test is that the proof denying the existence of an omniscient person is correct.

If it could be proved that a Jaina Arhant is omniscient, the same proof can be used to demonstrate that the Buddha too is omniscient, because there is no difference.

The following proof is also faulty according to the Mīmāṃsaka: objects which are subtle, separated from the sight and in far distance are perceptible for someone, because they are cognisable things, therefore an omniscient must exist.

Besides, what does “cognisable” mean? Does it mean that being cognisable is accepted as for the Jainas as something that is characterised by an individual property which are cognisable for cognitive criteria which comprehend all knowable things or consists in a particular property of being cognisable for cognitive criteria accepted by us and others, or is it a property which combines both? None of these is tenable.

An omniscient person cannot be known through scriptural testimony either. Would the scriptural way to prove the existence of such an individual be eternal or not eternal? It cannot be eternal, because no eternal scripture establishing an omniscient being exists. It cannot be non-eternal either, because the problem is: who expressed such a scripture: that very omniscient being or some other human being? The first case yields a fallacy of mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*). The second case allows for words of a madman be taken as authoritative.

Neither can it be demonstrated through a reasoning based on analogy or through presumption (*arthāpatti*). Several verses from an unidentified Mīmāṃsā source are quoted against the idea of omniscience. And there is no other cognitive criterion available which could demonstrate that an omniscient being is possible, so the idea has to be rejected. It can also be observed that perception produced by the senses and in accordance with real entities cannot demonstrate that things become objects for an

omniscient being etc. The Mīmāṃsaka considers a defence by proponents of omniscience, which is rejected, because it leads to a number of undesired consequences (*prasaṅga*). A number of verses quoted from an unidentified Mīmāṃsaka source in support.

Is the cognition of an omniscient person produced by the eye and other sense organs, or does it grasp moral law (*dharma*) and that's how it is acquired, or is it produced by rehearsed exertion (*abhyāsa*), or is it born through (authoritative) speech, or is it manifested through inference? All these should be rejected, so there would be no other way for the alleged omniscient to acquire cognition.

Does the fact that the omniscient grasps all things imply that everything is known to him, or that it comprehends a particular number of most important things? In the first case, would he comprehend everything gradually or all at once? Gradual comprehension is not possible because the set of all past, present and future things cannot be completed at any point of time so it can never cause such cognition of all things. To comprehend all at once is also not possible because that would lead to a lot of contradictions such as simultaneous sensation of heat and cold etc., which exclude each other. Further every next moment brings new things to cognise so it is not possible to know all. Or, if one knew everything in one moment, he wouldn't know anything in the next moment in a valid way (i.e. as something new) and there would be nothing left to be determined by cognition.

How could an omniscient person be known to exist by non-omniscient beings even at the time when his cognition actually comprehends all things graspable by omniscient cognition? Clearly, someone who is not omniscient cannot know that someone is omniscient. A few verses from the *Mīmāṃsāslokavārttika* quoted in support.

E 255-266. Rejection of the Mīmāṃsaka criticism of the idea of omniscience step by step. The starting point is the following counterproof: There is such a soul who directly perceives all categories, because since the soul has such a nature that can grasp these categories, causal factors of cognitive impediments have been destroyed in the soul; when, if something has a nature which can grasp *x* or *y*, causal factors of cognitive impediments have been destroyed in it, it directly perceives *x* or *y*, like such ocular cognition the cognitive impediments of which in the form of jaundice or some other disease have been removed directly perceives colour etc., therefore there is indeed some soul in which causal factors of cognitive impediments have been destroyed, since it has such a nature that can grasp colour etc. In fact, the proof is believed to be counterproof-tight: it does not suffer from any fallacy, e.g. the absence of the proving property in the logical subject (*pakṣadharmatā*), or lack of relation between the inferable property (*sādhyā*) and the proving property (*sādhana*), etc.

It is wrong to argue against omniscience as follows: What is accepted as the inferable property is either that objects which are subtle (*sūkṣma*), distant etc. are directly perceptible to cognition of one person or that that objects which are subtle (*sūkṣma*) etc. are directly perceptible to cognition of many persons etc. The fact is, on the other hand, is the following: Extrasensory perception of a yogin is independent of sense organs because its contents is objects which are subtle etc. what is however dependent on senses and the mind is not a cognition the contents of which is objects which are subtle etc., like perception of ours and of ordinary people like us; therefore, extrasensory perception of a yogin must exist.

Likewise, it is wrong to argue against omniscience as follows: The property of being cognisable in a valid way (*prameyatva*), i.e. valid cognoscibility, can either mean some particular valid cognoscibility for cognitive criteria comprehending all cognisable things or some particular valid cognoscibility for our cognitive criteria.

The Mīmāṃsaka must not understand the idea of valid cognoscibility (*prameyatva*) to posit such a dilemma.

Neither arguments of the *reductio ad absurdum* (*prasaṅga*) type or of the false cognition (*viparyaya*) type cannot apply to, or disprove the idea of an omniscient being, the existence of which can easily be proved by resorting to arguments based on analogy: It is well known from the *Rāmāyaṇa* etc. that perception of Garuḍa (Vainateya) can grasp things in the distance of hundreds of miles away; perception of vultures, boars etc. can grasp things which are very far away; perception produced by recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) triggered by sense organs combined with recollection (*smaraṇa*) can grasp things as distant in time, things as connected to the past time, things as connected to past perception etc. Since we can see such perceptions, we can safely assume that also perfect perception of these kinds is possible.

But the Mīmāṃsaka should explain the following: Why moral law (*dharma*) cannot be comprehended directly with the help of the eye etc.: is it because it is extrasensory, or because it is not present, or because it has no distinctive features? Since these and similar options are not possible, how could moral law be known without taking recourse to the existence of an omniscient being who can see it directly? Without assuming such a person one cannot explain how moral law can be known, and this is an argument based on presumption (*arthāpatti*). General cognition the contents of which are all objects and which is infallible is possible and it also comprehends what was expressed in the *Tattvārthasūtra*: “The existent is furnished with origination, cessation and permanence”.

The existence of an omniscient being can be known also through speech and testimony which can also lead to omniscient perception. And it is irrelevant that inference and verbal testimony are not lucid cognitions, because it is not always the case that the result is similar in nature to its cause, because it commonly seen that the sprout etc., which is very different from its cause, is produced from the seed. That is why it is possible that cognitions which are not lucid lead to lucid cognition (perception).

The omniscient can grasp different things, e.g. heat and cold, simultaneously without any contradiction, because such things can coexist in reality. Even ordinary people can project in their mind darkness and illumination by strong light simultaneously which does not involve any contradiction, although these two exclude each other in reality.

It is wrong to argue that if an omniscient person grasped all things in one moment, he would not know anything in a valid way in the second moment. The argument would be correct if the things cognised in the first moment did not exist in the second moment, but that is not the case, and that would lead to complete absence of any valid cognition. Some things should always be held in mind, e.g. we do not assert that the cognition of the omniscient cannot be produced by sense organs, so the omniscient can know tastes and colours too; the cognition of an omniscient person does not comprehend all things one by one in time, because that would involve infinite time needed to determine all infinite things, and it has been proved, instead, that he comprehends all things simultaneously.

Consider another argument against omniscience: How could possibly people who are not omniscient know that someone is omniscient? The reply is: how could Jaimini and others maintain that people who do not know all the things mentioned by the Veda know that all things are comprised in the Veda, viz. that the knowledge contained in the Veda concerns everything? They could not prove that everything is comprised in

the Vedas by any of the cognitive criteria; what they require is the existence of an omniscient being to tell them that the Veda speaks of all entities.

Similarly, it is not possible to prove that there is no omniscient being by taking recourse to any of the cognitive criteria. Ultimately the opponent would himself have to be omniscient in order to know that there is no omniscient being or he would have to know it from an omniscient being: a clear contradiction.

Hence it is well established that cognition of everything is a cognitive criterion against which no counterargument is possible and which cannot be sublated by anything.

E 266-270. Vindication of the idea of god, done esp. from the positions of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. The section begins with the rejection of the Jaina position and assertion of a being who is eternally omniscient: It is wrong to claim the cognition of all-comprehending being occurs due to dissolution of obstructing veils, because it is not possible for such a being, eternally liberated without any beginning, to be impeded by any obstructing veils at all. The Jainas might respond by saying “This is not possible, because there is no evidence. God cannot be eternally liberated without any beginning, because he is a liberated being, just like any other liberated being, who attained liberation at a certain point of time. Everyone knows that liberation is possible only with reference to the idea of bondage; without bondage there would be no liberation (the idea of liberation would lose any meaning), like there is no ether”. This reasoning should be rejected because the opposite can be proved as follows: God is eternally liberated because he is the agent creating a beginningless and infinite series of effects such as earth etc. Earth etc. are seen to be composite wholes created by a conscious agent, because they are effects; whatever is an effect is known to be created by a conscious agent, like a pot etc.; and earth etc. are known to be effects; therefore they must have been created by a conscious agent.

It is not sound for the Jaina to maintain that it is not proved that the property being an effect is inseparably connected with the property being preceded by a cause in the form of a conscious agent. Reasons given.

God is invisible not because he does not exist, but because he does not have a body. But even having no body, he can act and create, because having no body does not logically entail incapability of being an agent.

Further, his omniscience is proved by the fact that he is an agent actuating all effects, because anyone who accomplishes anything must necessarily know the aim and purpose which is the totality made up of material and other causes etc.; otherwise none of his actions would be possible. This is also mentioned in the *Bhāgavadgītā*: “There are two kinds of the soul in the world: the perishable and the imperishable. The perishable is all living beings; the highest is known as the imperishable. Still another highest soul is called the paramount self, who is the one who presides over the three worlds, pervading them, and is god”.

It is not the case that he does not possess cognitive validity (*aprāmāṇya*) because he does not propagate the truth in his own form, because it is attested that he does have the property of producing knowledge in the hearers, for cognitive validity (*prāmāṇya*) of cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*) depends on one’s ability to produce knowledge in the hearers, not on the ability to initiate activity.

God who is known to be a cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*) performs his tasks with respect to living beings at the time of creation of bodies etc. out of compassion, but it does not mean that he becomes an instrument of their happiness, because he as the agent is accompanied by auxiliary cause in the form of the invisible principle of merits and demerits of living beings (*adr̥ṣṭa*), whereby the invisible principle (*adr̥ṣṭa*) is superintended by consciousness, when effects are produced, because it itself is not

conscious. This has been explained in the *Nyāyavārttika* by Uddyotakara Bhāradvāja: “Manifest elements, superintended by consciousness, are causal factors of living beings’ happiness and suffering, etc.” Also Aviddhakarṇa said in the same spirit: “Material causes of the world etc., superintended by consciousness, initiate the creation of their own effects, because they have a material form, like threads of a cloth etc.”, etc. Inanimate entities cannot initiate anything, unless they are superintended by a conscious agent, and – at the time of recreation of the world - that must be god. More quotations from Aviddhakarṇa, Praśastamati (but nothing derivable from the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*) and Uddyotakara follow in support.

E 270-285. Prabhācandra replies in detail. If one tries to prove that earth etc. must be effects, because they are composite wholes, he should first explain what he means by composite wholes (*sāvayava*, lit. “having parts”): the fact that being present along with its parts, the fact of being produced by the parts, or just the whole as such? Then he should also prove that composite wholes have to be effects of the activity of a conscious agent. But that cannot be done in a logical and consistent manner. How would it follow that being the contents of consciousness of the agent means that it has to be a composite whole? There is not coherent and regular relation between these two.

Further how could the opponent explain the idea of creation which involves the idea that something previously inexistent is called into being as a composite whole by being connected with existence (the highest universal)? How could existence be related to something inexistent, before it comes into being? Relation can only relate two existent entities. And does this existence, prior to being connected to the composite whole, is itself existent or nonexistent?

Would, in the process of the creation, earth and other elements become effects in a limited way (*kathamcī*) or in every respect (*sarvathā*)? The latter is not possible, because not all things which exist substantially are effects, the former involves contradiction. All this leads to the rejection of the idea that composite things are effect and require a conscious agent.

Also the idea of a cause in the form of a conscious agent (*buddhimatkāraṇa*) stands in the need of clarification and there is no evidence for the qualifier of the inferable property, i.e. possessing consciousness (*buddhimat*). The concept involves a number of undesired consequences (*prasaṅga*) and has to be rejected.

The idea of consciousness the conscious agent is endowed with also stands in need of explanation: does it have a momentary or permanent nature? In any case, there could either be no creation or no liberation.

One needs body to create, otherwise no creation of action in the physical world is possible. A demon (*piśāca*) cannot break a branch of a tree, despite a common belief, because he has no body. Also the argument that a conscious agent is not grasped not because he does not exist but because he does not fulfil the criteria or perceptibility is not conclusive.

It is not possible that inanimate matter, even when superintended by a conscious agent, could effectuate anything, but if it could it could contribute mostly purposeless actions and effects.

It is wrong to claim that a conscious agent acting under compassion could cause happiness of living beings, because god creating the world would also create suffering, so there could be no place for his compassion.

The concept of god is incompatible with the idea of liberation. Likewise the idea of karmic retribution and its dependence on the invisible principle of merits and demerits

of living beings (*adr̥ṣṭa*) cannot be explained with the idea of a conscious agent controlling it.

An interesting argument from the ladder of perfection is cited in support of the existence of god: Every being from Brahma to demons (*piśāca*) is superintended by one conscious agent, i.e. god, because there is a progression pre-eminence of one above the other, which leads to a being which is pre-eminent with respect to all other beings subordinate to it. The argument is rejected on the basis of the fallacy of the inconclusive (*anaikāntika*) logical reason and other flaws.

Since the reasoning (*pramāṇa*) proving that god is the creator of the whole world turns out to be objectionable, also the proof that there is a soul eternally liberated cannot be defended.

E 285-289. Vindication of the idea of the primordial active factor (*prakṛti*) as the cause of the world, done from the position of the Sāṃkhya school, whose proponent says: It is correct to say that omniscience obtains, when all obstructing veils (*āvaraṇa*) are dissolved, however these veils are the result of the primordial active factor. It is not true that the veils are absent in the soul because actually the soul is veiled by “karman (which) is an evolute of the primordial supportive principle, and it is white and black”, as a Sāṃkhya source testifies. But how is the world created? Is it through mere power of the primordial active factor (*prakṛti*)? This is explained in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*: from the primordial active factor issues the great one (*mahat*), i.e. the objective consciousness, from it the subjective consciousness (*ahaṃkāra*), from it a group of sixteen elements, from this and from these sixteen elements issue five elements”. This evolutionary sequence is elaborated in detail. Thus, the whole creation preserves the nature of the primordial active factor. For in the world whatever nature has the cause precisely the same nature possess its effect, like a piece of cloth woven from black threads cannot have any other colour but black.

Further, in the world if there is a creator of *x*, we see precisely the transformation of *x* in the process of creation, like when the potter who is making a pot, which evolves from a lump of clay, assumes a upward form, then assumes a hollowed and rounded form etc. This explains how from the primordial supportive principle (*pradhāna*) proceed all differentiated individual things.

There can be no doubt that the primordial supportive principle (*pradhāna*) exists, because we can see its operation by virtue of its creative power. In this world, if *x* operates with respect to an object *y*, *x* is empowered with respect to (capable of effecting) *y*, like a weaver is empowered with respect to (capable of manufacturing) a piece of cloth.

E 289-297. This position of the Sāṃkhya school is rejected. If the all evolutes comprising entities from the great one (*mahat*), i.e. the objective consciousness, down to differentiated individual things that issue from the primordial active factor (*prakṛti*) have are of the same nature as the primordial active factor, then there is a contradiction. As everyone knows, if *x* is not completely different from *y*, then *x* is neither the effect nor the cause of *y* because the cause and effect have different characteristics, otherwise the distinction between the cause and effect would be blurred.

Besides, a permanent eternal entity, such as the primordial active factor, cannot be a cause of anything. Would it produce all its effects all at once or gradually? Would its produce its cause through its transformation by it renouncing its nature or without renouncing it? How would the effect differ from its cause? And if the cause were

eternal, would all its effects, inheriting the nature of their cause, also be eternal? Would they be the effects that always exist or that exist occasionally?

Also the creative power allegedly inherent in the primordial active factor cannot be explained.

E 297-299. Exposition of the position of the theistic (*śeśvara*) Sāṃkhya: All these differentiated entities are impelled not by the primordial supportive principle (*pradhāna*) alone, because they are not conscious. Clearly, something inanimate, unconscious cannot impel anything or produce some effect without an overseer. It could not produce anything at the time of creation either for the same reason. Therefore, god alone, but dependent on the primordial supportive principle, is the genuine agent and creator of differentiated entities.

This position is refuted by Prabhācandra. If neither god nor the primordial supportive principle cannot effectuate anything, how come can they produce something together, if none of them possesses the creative potential? The question of their permanent eternal natures also raises serious aporias. Liberation cannot be conceived in such a system either.

Therefore it should be recognised by anyone who is intellectually fit that only the self himself can accomplish the dissolution of obstructing veils. It is proved then that the soul attains liberation which is characterised by quadruple perfection: of infinite cognition, infinite conation, infinite happiness and infinite energy. However, the idea of a liberated living person (*jīvanmukta*) is not possible.

E 299-307. Criticism of the Śvetāmbaras. They accept that that the liberated person consumes food. For them apparently a the liberated person does not possess these four perfections, because he must be devoid of infinite happiness, and it is so because he suffers from hunger and thirst, otherwise he would have no need to partake of food.

If he partakes of morsels of food, he must be then afflicted by passions etc. Clearly, anyone who eats food, he is not someone who has got rid of all his passions, just like anyone in the street; and indeed in the opinion of the Śvetāmbaras the perfected being (*kevalin*) partakes of food.

They defend their position that he eats food not because of hunger and passions but in order to preserve and maintain his body, for otherwise he would die, and they argue: the preservation of one's body is preceded by consumption of food, because this is what we know as preservation of one's body, in the same way as we preserve our bodies. But then the Śvetāmbaras should explain what they mean by 'consumption' and what is proved by their argument: consumption as such or consumption of food? Etc. Their argument that the omniscient person must preserve his own body through eating, because that is what preservation of one's body means, like preservation of the body of ordinary people, is wrong, because then they should equally accept the following: The perception of the omniscient person is produced by senses (it is not extrasensory) because that is what perception means, like perception of ordinary people like us. But the fact is that the omniscient being requires no food to preserve his body. It is wrong to argue, as the Mīmāṃsakas do, that there is no one whose physical body would be structurally different from other people's: there are unique bodies or unique people. Follows discussion of various types of karman and their influence on the omniscient person's body and its structure. Prabhācandra demonstrates that hunger is not independent of karman, e.g. of karman causing confusion (*mohanīyakarman*). He also points out undesired consequences which follow when one accepts that the omniscient being consumes food: Would he eat alone or accompanied by his disciples? Would he perform the ritual of repentance (*pratikramaṇa*) after he has eaten? Why would he actually eat: to preserve the growth

of the body, or to sustain meditation and ascetic practices for which the body is necessary, to quell the sensation of hunger, to uphold the circulation of three vital forces (*prāṇa*)? Let us consider what Śvetāmbaras say: the omniscient person consumes food but he is not seen by people directly. But why should the omniscient do it? Out of false conceit or shame?

E 307-328. A section on liberation (*mokṣa*). It is wrong to define liberation as the attainment of four perfections: infinite cognition, infinite conation, infinite happiness and infinite energy, because in fact it is the destruction of nine specific properties of the soul (understanding, happiness, suffering, will, hatred, effort, righteousness, unrighteousness, subliminal impression). Even other systems (e.g. Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika) recognise that cognition of truth, tantamount to the destruction of false cognition, is the cause of liberation (*niḥśreyasa*).

There is also no proof for the claim that “The karman which has not been consumed (i.e. without retribution) does not disappear even after millions of millions of eons”. But there are proofs that such karman can be destroyed through various ascetic practices.

Similarly, there is no proof for the theory that the annihilation of all accumulated karman can only be accomplished through the cognition of truth and what the *Bhāgavadgītā* says is wrong: “Like a blazing fire turns fuel to ashes O Arjuna, in the same way the fire of cognition turns to ashes all karmans”.

Other theories of liberation are also discussed, including that of the Mīmāṃsakas. It is wrong to maintain: When subliminal impression, which is born out of false cognition and which is the accompanying cause, disappear, karman, even though it still exists, does not produce any more body and does not lead to a new birth. The concept of the one desirous of heaven (*svargakāma*) is not compatible with the idea of liberation.

The Vedāntin follower of Bhāskara maintains: Since in the liberated state consciousness also disappears, reasonable people do not strive after any kind of perfected knowledge, and liberation is accepted as a state of eternal bliss; the proof is the following: the self consists in happiness, because the contents of the self’s consciousness in the liberated state is unlimited joy, in accordance with a hemistich: “Bliss is the real nature of the Absolute (*brahman*), and it is manifested in the liberated state”. This position raises a number of problems, including the relation of the attribute and its substratum and the question whether these are eternal or not, is eventually rejected.

A Buddhist thesis “liberation arises due to clear cognition” is referred to and likewise rejected, because it is not possible that liberation which is free from passions etc. can be attained through cognition of a person under the influence of passions etc. Such an idea also involves a contradiction between the idea of one momentary personal continuum (*santāna*) and the idea of the last moment of personal consciousness. A recourse to the idea of the waking state and the state of deep sleep to prove the Buddhist thesis is also in vain.

A number of other opinions are described and subsequently criticised at length.

Buddhist position (Dharmakīrti’s school): The destruction of passions etc. comes about by force of rehearsed exertion of a particular type of meditation (*bhāvanā*).

Another Buddhist position: liberation, i.e. the ultimate good (*niḥśreyasa*), is the cessation of momentary personal continuum.

Advaitin’s and Śabdādvaitin’s positions: The dissolution of the mundane world and liberation occurs when the highest self is attained due to the cognition of the oneness of the self; The ultimate good (*niḥśreyasa*), i.e. liberation, is achieved due to the cognition of the oneness of the word (*śabдавдvaita*).

The Sāṃkhya position: The realisation of the discriminative knowledge of the primordial active factor (*prakṛti*) and the conscious principle (*puruṣa*) gives rise to liberation which is the state of being absorbed in pure consciousness.

E 328-334. A separate section is devoted to the refutation of the Śvetāmbara's belief in the idea of the liberation of women (*strīmukti*). Liberation, which is defined as the acquisition of infinite cognition etc., is possible only in the case of men, not women. The following Śvetāmbara proof is baseless: "Liberation of women is possible because all causes for it are available to them, just like for men", because these causes which normally do lead to liberation cannot be fully operative in the case of women. For the same reason, hermaphrodites (*napuṃsaka*) cannot attain liberation either. There are many additional reasons why women cannot attain liberation: they live in the highest state of illusion and deceit (*māyā*); they are not capable of genuine restraint; they must wear clothes which prevents them from real restraint, asceticism and of material and other possessions; they cannot prevent the destruction of many living beings and they do it by wearing clothes etc.; they cannot practice outer and inner restraint which is defined as the rejection of external and internal possessions, including the abandonment of negative feeling such as shame etc.; they pay more attention to clothes, which limit them, than to the protection of living beings; they are not capable of realising all the three gems (*ratnatraya*), i.e. correct connotation, correct cognition and correct conduct, completely. Liberation of women is not possible also because otherwise hermaphrodites would attain it too, but that is not possible.

Third chapter on indirect cognition

E 335-338. The other kind of cognitive criterion, next to perception, is indirect cognition (*parokṣa*), because it is not qualified by clear (*viśada*) nature, and the proof is: indirect cognition is cognition the nature of which is not clear, because it indirect cognition. It is occasioned by perception etc. It is divided into memory (*smṛti*), recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*), suppositional knowledge (*tarka*), inference and scriptural testimony (*āgama*).

The first of these is memory (*smṛti*) which is such kind of cognition which is based on the awakening of subliminal impression and has the form "It is that"; and the subliminal impression is nothing but the fourth stage of conventional perception known as retention (*dhāraṇā*). An example of memory is the experience which brings the reflection associated with a speech element: "He is Devadatta".

A Buddhist, who accepts only perception and inference as cognitive criteria, questions the cognitive validity of memory. Is it pure cognition, or is it cognitive act the contents of which is a previously experienced object? The first alternative leads to the recognition that memory should be regarded as perception, whereas the second reveals that the memory of Devadatta has the same structure and nature as the memory of Yajñadatta, and cannot be valid, because it is fallible (*visaṃvādaka*). This and other reservations are rejected. Further, Prabhācandra adds that since memory dispels false superimposition (*samāropa*) it has to be reckoned as a cognitive criterion in the same way as inference.

E 338-348. Recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) is the correlation of perception and recollection (*smaraṇa*) and it has the form either "this is that" or "this is like that". Objections of the Mīmāṃsā and Buddhist schools are discussed.

One may object that recognition should be classified as perception because it consists in perception. Like the Mīmāṃsaka says: recognition follows both concomitant

presence (*anvaya*) and concomitant absence (*vyatireka*) of the eye, i.e. it occurs only when perceptual data is there and when perceptual data is not there, it does not occur, and it this way is functions like ordinary perception. A number of verses from the *Mīmāṃsāslokavārttika* quoted in support.

These arguments are rejected it is not the case that recognition consistently follows both concomitant presence (*anvaya*) and concomitant absence (*vyatireka*) of perceptual data. Recognition does not stick to the time and place of the object of the original perception (when the object was perceived for the first time).

Examples of recognition are the following: “He is like Devadatta”, “Wild ox (*gavaya*) is like cow”, “buffalo is different from cow”, “That thing in the distance looks like a tree”.

Recognition is essential to prove some basic tenets of Buddhism, for instance “whatever is existent is momentary”, because only recognition allows us to compare similar entities in the temporal series, or “Rehearsed exertion (*abhyāsa*) of meditation (*bhāvanā*) on insubstantiality (*nairātmya*) of everything makes sense”.

Recognition is an important device to compare previous and subsequent similar occurrences or phenomena. One could not even ascertain cut and re-grown nails or hairs without it, especially when one accepts momentary nature of being.

How could one infer anything without recognition? One infers the presence of fire on a mountain, which resembles past fires, on the basis of smoke, which resembles past fires, by recollecting the relation between them, which also requires recognition.

The criticism that recognition is not a cognitive criterion is not justified. All reasons to justify the criticism are rejected: because it grasps a previously grasped object, because it immediately follows memory, because it assumes verbal form, because it subject to sublation.

The Mīmāṃsaka identifies recognition with reasoning based on analogy (*upamāna*) as follows: “When one remembers the subliminal impression left by perception of a cow when one sees a wild ox, and knows that ‘this is like that’, it is nothing but analogy”, some verses from the *Mīmāṃsāslokavārttika* quoted. This interpretation is rejected as an unsatisfactory account of the nature of recollection.

E 348-355. Presumptive knowledge (*ūha*), also known as suppositional knowledge (*tarka*), is the cognition of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) between inferable property (*sādhyā*) and the proving property (*sādhana*) on the basis of their apprehension and non-apprehension; it is not based on merely on frequent observation or infrequent observation, and it brings certainty; it is also contingent upon destruction-cum-subsidence (*kṣayopaśama*, one of five karmic states) of one’s karman. It is also capable of determining the relation of invariable concomitance between imperceptible, extrasensory inferable properties and the proving properties. Its substance is the following observation: “*x* occurs only when *y* is there” and “when *y* is not there, *x* does not occur”, like for instance: “only when there is fire, there is smoke; when fire is not there, there is no smoke”.

One may object: presumptive knowledge is not known to be a cognitive criterion, so how can anything be determined by it. But why should it not be a cognitive criterion? Because it grasped something already grasped? Because it is fallible (*visaṃvādin*)? Because it merely confirms the object of inference? None of these objections holds.

It is not the case that presumptive knowledge does not guarantee certainly just because it follows perception.

A number of objections (from the Buddhist): But how can it determine that smoke is universally the effect, one may object? One can determine the causal relation only in a

particular place and time, but not with respect to all times and places. Dharmakīrti says in the *Pramāṇavārttika* that “Smoke is the effect of fire in compliance with the property of an effect. Some thing *x* which is present when *y* is absent violates its status (of effect) having *y* a cause (i.e. cannot be regarded as the effect of *y*). If inseparable connection concerns the presence of something which is just related to mere presence, if it were absent, the absence of it would follow because there is no difference”. Accordingly, invariable connection can be determined without the recourse to presumptive knowledge. Or, presumptive knowledge is nothing but inference. Presumptive knowledge retains its cognitive validity because it removes false superimposition (*samāropa*). In addition, it is a cognitive criterion because it supports other cognitive criteria.

E 356-368. Inference is the cognition of the inferable property (*sādhya*) from the proving property (*sādhana*), which consists in certainty based on fixed rule that *x* is not possible in the absence of *y*. In inference, logical reason is ascertained as being inseparably connected with the inferable property. Its nature is specific, whereas the threefold condition of validity (*trairūpya*) is specific and inference cannot be based on it, because even if logical reason is fallacious, the threefold condition of validity can still be satisfied. An extended criticism of the Buddhist idea of the threefold condition of validity follows.

Would the defining characteristic of the logical reason be the threefold condition of validity in general or is it particular threefold condition of validity? Besides, there are many cases when the condition is met, but the inference based on it seems wrong to the Buddhist, e.g. “The Buddha is not omniscient, because he is a speaker, like an ordinary person in the street”, and vice versa, the reasoning is valid although the triple condition is not met, e.g. “When Kṛttika constellation rises, because Śakaṭa (Rohiṇi) constellation rises”.

Discussion of the role of the subjectlike class (*sapakṣa*), or the homologue, and unsubjectlike class (*vipakṣa*), or the heterologue, in inference, with respect to the threefold condition of validity (*trairūpya*). The following fallacious inferences reveal problems with the threefold condition: “These fruits are ripe because they grown on the same branch as the ripe fruit which has just been eaten” and “This Devadatta is stupid, because he is the son of that man, like his another son (who is stupid)”.

Discussion of the fallacy of unresolved initial question (*prakaraṇasama*), i.e. inconclusive reason which raises the very problem which it is meant to solve, and other fallacies, which may supposedly undermine the very process of inference. It is not true that all logical reasons are formally fallacious. For instance, it is not true that all logical reasons are inconclusive (*anaikāntika*). In fact, it has been demonstrated that logical reason is invariably concomitant with the property-possessor (*dharmin*) of the inferable property (*sādhya*).

A number of other critical questions are posed, e.g.: Does logical reason adopt a universal form or a particular form, or both, or neither?

Rejection of the Nyāya definition of inference as “which preceded by perception and is threefold: inference a priori (*pūrvavat*), inference a posteriori (*śeṣavat*) and commonly seen (*sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa*).

Discussion of the problem of universally present properties (*kevalānvayin*) and their role in inferences, and of the problem of genuinely individual cases (*kevalavyatirekin*), which are not instantiated except for the subject of inference itself.

Positive invariable concomitance (*anvaya*) is discussed. It is said to be threefold: external invariable concomitance (*bahirvyāpti*), universal invariable concomitance (*sākalyavyāpti*) and internal invariable concomitance (*antarvyāpti*).

Thus, various definitions of logical reason have been rejected.

E 369-371. The proper definition of logical reason is the following: the main characteristic of logical reason is its inseparable connection (*avinābhāva*), which is defined as consistent regularity (*niyama*) of simultaneous occurrence (*sahabhāva*) and consecutive occurrence (*kramabhāva*). The former variety comprises two sub-varieties: co-occurring phenomena, e.g. colour and taste of a fruit, and pervaded property (*vyāpya*) and pervader (*vyāpaka*), e.g. the rosewood tree (*śiṃṣapā*) and the tree (a particular species pervaded by the kind). The latter variety comprises two sub-varieties, too: successive phenomena, e.g. Kṛttika constellation and Śakaṭa (Rohiṇi) constellation, and the effect and the cause, e.g. the fire and the smoke.

This relation of inseparable connection (*avinābhāva*) can only be known through suppositional knowledge (*tarka*), not through perception and other cognitive criteria.

The inferable property (*sādhya*) is defined as something which is accepted, unsublated and yet unproved. This excludes properties which are doubtful, contrary and unrecognised. Doubtful is, for instance: “Is this a pillar or a man”? Contrary is, for instance the apprehension of silver instead of a piece of nacre (*śuktikā*). Unrecognised is uncertain whether grasped or not grasped.

The inferable property cannot be something sublated by what is not accepted (for the Jainas, e.g., the permanence of speech for the Jainas) or something sublated by perception (non-audibility of speech). The inferable property cannot be sublated by the scriptural testimony either.

Something which is accepted (by the proponent), like something unproved, is not such for the opponent. What the proponent accepts as inferable property does not have to be a legitimate qualifier for the opponent, because nothing is accepted as proved by everybody. The desire of the proponent is to demonstrate the property accepted by him. The inferable property may either be a particular property located somewhere or a property-possessor (*dharmī*) of that particular property. This is also called the logical subject (*pakṣa*). The property-possessor is something already known.

Two kinds of inferable properties are there with respect to something established through conceptual (determinate) cognition (*vikalpa*): existence and non-existence, for instance: an omniscient person exists and a donkey’s horn does not exist.

E 372-373. When property-possessor is established through cognitive criteria (*pramāṇa*) and conceptual (determinate) cognition (*vikalpa*), it is qualified by the inferable property. The examples: “This place is fire-possessor” and “Speech is transformation-possessor (*pariṇāmin*)”, i.e. undergoes transformation.

Objection: If the inferable property is fire-possessorship of a particular place, how could this be established through perception or other cognitive criteria? Such things could only be known through extrasensory perception.

In the case of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*), the inferable property (*sādhya*) is the property of the possessor, not the property-possessor qualified by the property, because in such a case the invariable concomitance could also be possible otherwise, and positive concomitance (*anvaya*) of logical reason cannot be proved in this way.

E 373-377. The statement of the logical subject (*pakṣa*)¹, which is being understood in a concrete proof formula, serves to remove the doubt as regards the actual substratum of a property which is the inferable property, e.g. “Does the inferable property of existence pertain to an omniscient being or to the feeling of pleasure?”. It is like the application of the property of the logical subject (*pakṣa*) which serves to bring to awareness a property which is the proving property and relate it to the property-possessor (*dharmin*) of the inferable property (*sādhya*).

Who on earth, having first mentioned the threefold logical reason, i.e. the logical reason as effect (*kāryahetu*), the logical reason as essential nature (*svabhāvahetu*) and non-apprehension, who wants to successfully prove anything would not specify the logical subject? That is why the logical subject (*pakṣa*) has to be always specified, and its the statement is necessary.

In this way these two are mandatory members of the proof formula: the logical subject and the logical reason, but not the example. Thereby the fivefold proof formula of the Nyāya school. Instead, Prabhācandra postulates the following functionality (but not necessity) of the five members of the traditional proof formula: The thesis (*pratijñā*) is the tenet (*āgama*); the logical reason is the inference per se, because the object which is the contents of the thesis can be inferred only through it; the example is perception (*pratyakṣa*), or empirical observation and attestation; application (*upanayana*) is reasoning based on analogy (*upamāna*) and the conclusion (*nigamana*) is the result of the demonstration that all these four are applicable to one and the same thing.

The example is not a member of the proof formula which makes the inferable property known, because it is only the logical reason, already defined as consistent regularity (*niyama*) in the form of the inseparable connection (*avinābhāva*) with the inferable property, which is operative with respect to the inferable property. Its incorporation in a proof formula can merely serve to corroborate the inseparable connection with the inferable property, because actually the inferable property can be proved through a counterproof in the unsubjectlike class (*vipakṣa*) alone.

¹ It may seem at first that in the passages below Prabhācandra uses the term *pakṣa* in two meanings ‘logical subject’ (or ‘subject term’) and ‘thesis’. I consistently take *pakṣa* to mean logical subject and preserve ‘thesis’ for *pratijñā*. There may be, in my opinion, a serious doubts whether *pakṣa* may really mean “thesis” and be equivalent to *pratijñā* in some passages below: there may apparently be a difficulty whether Prabhācandra really equates *pakṣa* with *pratijñā* (as it often happens with Indian thinkers), and whether it is indeed the case that *pakṣa* occurs here in two meanings (“subject term” and “thesis”). After the *Nyāyāvātāra* there was a tradition in Jaina logic (though not the mainstream) to maintain that, in a proper context, just to mention the *pakṣa* (as subject term / logical subject) and the *hetu* is enough: the rest (including the *sādhya*) can be inferred from the context (in this case: from the formulation of the *hetu*). In other words, it seems that some Jainas held that the complete thesis (*pratijñā*) may be reconstructed by the experts. For non-experts, one should mention more members of the *prayoga*. Now, the question is what Prabhācandra really means here. I’d say he follows the idea that the absolute necessity is the subject term (*pakṣa*), not the full thesis (*pratijñā*), and the logical reason. For instance, he says (p.374.8-9): “Anyone who desires the cognition of *sādhya* must also accept the formal expression (*prayoga*) of *pakṣa* (subject term) accompanied by (‘lit. ‘possessed of’) the formal expression (*prayoga*) of the *hetu*”. I’d understand it to implicate that the formal expression (*prayoga*) of thesis (*pratijñā*) is not required in particular contexts when one is capable of reconstruction the full *pratijñā* consisting of the subject term and the *sādhya*. On the other hand, Prabhācandra also says that the *sādhya* is a property of the logical subject (subject term) and can be inferred only through it, which may imply that the formal statement of the logical subject (subject term) is not just an indication of the logical subject (subject term) but it indicates the logical subject (subject term) as qualified by the *sādhya* (hence we would have the complete thesis, *pratijñā*).

Invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) cannot be proved merely by indicating the presence of the inferable property in the subjectlike class (*sapakṣa*). Further, the example has the form of invariable concomitance in a general manner applied with reference to an individual case, e.g. “like in the kitchen – said with reference to fire as the inferable property”, because invariable concomitance is normally formulated in a general manner, i.e. with reference to unspecified place, time, form and substratum. But a situation can occur when there is no certainty as regards a particular example and one has to look for still another example to settle the difference of opinions between the proponent and the opponent. The example cannot serve to remind the relation of invariable concomitance, because it is immediately remembered upon the formulation of the logical reason in the proof formula.

The example, mentioned after the formal statement of the logical reason, raises doubt as regards whether the property-possessor (*dharmin*) of the inferable property (*sādhya*) is indeed the proving property (*sādhana*) of the inferable property (*sādhya*). What would otherwise be the need for the application (*upanayana*) and the conclusion (*nigamana*) in the proof formula?

These two are not the members of the proof formula, because the doubt with regard to the property-possessor (*dharmin*) of the inferable property (*sādhya*) can be removed exclusively through the specification of the logical reason and the inferable property. However, the best and most effective member of the proof formula is in the form of the logical reason alone and it is the genuine shape of the proof formula, because it is really pertinent to the inferable property.

These three, i.e. the example, the application and the conclusion, can be included in a proof formula in order to rouse the proper understanding of the matter in the ignorant, but only in the context of instruction and for didactic purposes. However, in the context of debate, these are not to be used, because they serve no purpose and do not effectuate anything.

Further, there are two kinds of example, depending on whether they instantiate the positive or negative concomitance.

What is used in a proof formula where the proving property (*sādhana*) is pervaded by the inferable property (*sādhya*) is known as the example for the positive concomitance, e.g. “like in the kitchen – said with reference to fire as the inferable property”.

What instantiates a proof formula which demonstrates concomitant absence (*vyatireka*) of the proving property (*sādhana*) when the inferable property (*sādhya*) is absent is known as the example for the negative concomitance, e.g. “like in a pool of water – said with reference to fire as the inferable property”.

Application (*upanayana*) is formal use of the logical reason, whereas the conclusion is the formal use of the thesis.

E 378-383. Inference is twofold: inference for oneself (*svārthānumāna*) and inference for others (*parārthānumāna*).

Inference for oneself has already been described. It is cognitive process of comprehension of the inferable property (*sādhya*) on the basis of the proving property (*sādhana*).

Inference for others is a cognitive process of comprehension of the inferable property (*sādhya*) produced by a formal statement that refers to and makes known an object, which is the object of inference for oneself. Its object is precisely the same because the logical reason employed in it is also the same as in inference for oneself.

However, the logical reason can be of two types: positive, based on apprehension (*upalabdhi*) and negative, based on non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*). In any case, it is characterised by inseparable connection (*avinābhāva*), i.e. the relation between the inferable property (*sādhyā*) and the proving property (*sādhana*) as well as the relation between something-to-be-comprehended (*gamya*) and something that leads to the comprehension (*gamaka*). Apprehension concerns affirmation (*vidhi*) and negation (*pratiṣedha*); similarly, non-apprehension concerns both. Thus, apprehension has two varieties: apprehension of the non-contrary and apprehension of the contrary.

A apprehension (*upalabdhi*) of the non-contrary with respect to affirmation has six sub-varieties: the pervaded property, the effect, the cause, the antecedent, the consequent, the temporal correlate.

Discussion of various problems and inconsistencies which other accounts, especially Buddhist one, of logical reason involve.

When one accepts inference of colour on the basis of inference of one causal complex (*sāmagrī*) from taste, one also accepts a particular cause as a logical reason in case when there is no deficiency of other causes (e.g. soil, water) which could prevent the efficacy of that particular cause. In other words, from particular taste (of a particular fruit) which one relishes one infers a particular kind of causal complex (which comprises a number of cognate qualities). In the next step, from that particular kind of causal complex one infers a particular colour (associated with the taste).

The relation of causality (*tadutpatti*) or the relation of essential identity (*tādātmya*) do not apply to (the relation between) two things, i.e. the antecedent (past) and the subsequent (future), related in time as the inferable property (*sādhyā*) and the proving property (*sādhana*), because these two relations are not apprehended when things are separated by (distant in) time, e.g. absence of demon Rāvaṇa at the time of the future Cakravartin Saṅkha or the rise Kṛttika constellation rises and the rise of Śakaṭa (Rohiṇi) constellation are related by neither relation, whereas one can infer fire from smoke only when there is no lapse of time (i.e. when one immediately follows the other).

Objection of Prajñākaragupta: Since one knows from the rise of Kṛttika constellation that its effect is the subsequent rise of Rohiṇi constellation, why should the logical reason not be the effect (i.e. why should this inference not be based on the relation of causality)?

Two things, future and past, e.g. death and awareness of the waking state, cannot serve as logical reasons for things which have originated long before or for omens, such as lines in the palm of the hand, because when these themselves occur, they do not require such correlates (i.e. death in the future occurs independently of any omens on the palm of the hand and awareness of the waking state in the past does not require that one will wake up again some time later). It is so because when *x* requires the action of *y* it means that *x* exists when *y* exists. But omens and death are not causally related nor is the waking state and waking-up.

One may object: If there were no cause-effect relation, how could one possibly infer anything on the basis of one act of observation (without repeated, prolonged observation)? The answer is easy: through the inseparable connection (*avinābhāva*), because it is often seen that even when the relation of causality (*tadutpatti*) and the relation of essential identity (*tādātmya*) are not operative, one does know through the inseparable connection (*avinābhāva*). But when this is absent, one cannot correctly infer that a particular person is not omniscient and that a particular person is dark-complexioned on the basis of the property of being a speaker or on the basis of the

property of being that man's son, even though any of the two relations, i.e. either the relation of causality (*tadutpatti*) or the relation of essential identity (*tādātmya*), obtains.

Two temporal correlates (i.e. two co-existent things) cannot serve as logical reasons in inferences based on either the relation of causality (*tadutpatti*) or on the relation of essential identity (*tādātmya*), in case when they are either mutually exclusive or when they occur simultaneously.

E 383-390. Detailed description of the six sub-varieties of logical reason related to apprehension of the non-contrary with respect to affirmation.

First variety of logical reason as the pervaded property; two examples: Speech is transformation-possessor (*pariṇāmin*; i.e. undergoes transformation), because it is produced; (1) whatever is of such type (i.e. produced), is of such type (i.e. transformation-possessor), like a pot; and indeed it is produced, therefore it is transformation-possessor; (2) whatever is not transformation-possessor, is not produced, like a baby of a barren woman; and indeed it is produced, therefore it is transformation-possessor. These two proof formulas at the same time exemplify two main kinds of example: positive (*anvaya*) and negative (*vyatireka*).

Logical reason as the effect, example: In this body there is sentience, because there is verbal activity and practical actions.

Logical reason as the cause, example: Here there is shadow, because there is an umbrella.

Logical reason as the antecedent, example: Śakaṭa (Rohiṇi) constellation will rise, because Kṛttika constellation has risen.

Logical reason as the consequent, example: Bharāṇi constellation has risen, because Kṛttika constellation has risen.

Logical reason as the temporal correlate, example: Here in this citron there is colour, because there is taste.

Just like there is apprehension of the non-contrary, there is also apprehension of the contrary. Here is the example of a logical reason related to it:

Apprehension of the contrary is with respect to negation; and similarly, like apprehension of non-contrary, it has the same six sub-varieties.

Detailed description of the six sub-varieties of logical reason related to apprehension of the contrary with respect to negation.

Contrary logical reason, example: Here there is no sensation of cold, because there is heat.

Logical reason as the contrary effect, example: Here there is no sensation of cold, because there is smoke.

Logical reason as the contrary cause, example: in this embodied living being there is no happiness, because there is thorn in the heart.

Logical reason as the contrary antecedent, example: Śakaṭa (Rohiṇi) constellation will not rise within a moment, because Revatī constellation has risen.

Logical reason as the contrary consequent, example: Bharāṇi constellation has not risen before a while, because Puṣya constellation has risen.

Logical reason as the contrary temporal correlate, example: Here in this wall there is no absence of the other side of the wall, because there is the front side of the wall.

Description of non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*) follows. Like apprehension, it is also of two varieties: non-contrary non-apprehension and contrary non-apprehension. The first variety is described:

Non-contrary non-apprehension with respect to negation is sevenfold, divided into:

non-apprehension of the essential nature (*svabhāva*), non-apprehension of the pervader (*vyāpaka*), non-apprehension of the effect, non-apprehension of the cause, non-apprehension of the antecedent, non-apprehension of the consequent, non-apprehension of the temporal correlate.

Apprehension of non-contrary with respect to affirmation has six sub-varieties: the pervaded property, the effect, the cause, the antecedent, the consequent, the temporal correlate. Detailed description of the six sub-varieties of logical reason related to a non-contrary

Non-apprehension of the essential nature (*svabhāva*), example: Here on this ground surface there is no pot, because there is no apprehension of the pot as something in the case of which the conditions that make it amenable to apprehension have been reached (*upalabdihlakṣaṇaprāpta*), i.e. even though all the conditions of apprehensibility of something perceptible are met, the pot is not perceived. This logical reason is not invalidated by the case of non-apprehension of demons (*piśāca*), because they do not meet the conditions of their apprehensibility.

Non-apprehension of the pervader (*vyāpaka*), example: Here there is no the rosewood tree (*śiṃṣapā*), because there is no apprehension of a tree.

Non-apprehension of the effect, example: Here there is no smoke, because there is no apprehension of fire.

Non-apprehension of the cause, example: Here there is no fire as the actually efficient cause (*apratibaddhasāmarthya*, the one whose efficacy is not impeded) producing smoke, because there is no apprehension of smoke.

Non-apprehension of the antecedent, example: There will be no rise of Śakaṭa (Rohiṇi) constellation in a moment, because there is no apprehension of the rise of Kṛttika constellation.

Non-apprehension of the consequent, example: Bharāṇi constellation has not risen before a while, because there is no apprehension of the rise of Kṛttika constellation.

Non-apprehension of the temporal correlate, example:

Here (on the scale) there is no upward movement (of the lighter thing), because there is no apprehension of the downward movement (of the heavier thing).

Apprehension of non-contrary with respect to negation is described: it is threefold: non-apprehension of contrary effect, non-apprehension of contrary cause, non-apprehension of contrary essential nature.

Non-apprehension of contrary effect, example:

In this living being there is a particular disease, because there is no apprehension of healthy movement.

Non-apprehension of contrary cause, example: Here in this embodied living being there is suffering, because there is no union (of this being) with a desired object. Clearly, suffering is contrary to happiness, and lack of union with what one desires does not bring happiness but suffering.

Non-apprehension of contrary essential nature, example: Real thing is multiplex, because there is no apprehension of its simplistic nature; here clearly the simplistic nature is either being something absolutely permanent or absolutely momentary, and it is contrary to multiplex nature.

A proving property (*sādhana*) which occurs in succession (in a series of causes) should be included in logical reason of one of the primary types. Accordingly, in the case of affirmation, an effect of an effect should be included in non-contrary apprehension of the effect, for instance:

On this potter's wheel there was a *liṅga*-shaped lump of clay (*śivaka*), because now there is a bubble-shaped lump of clay (*sthāsaka*); the direct effect of a *liṅga*-shaped

lump of clay (*śivaka*) is a parasol-shaped lump of clay (*chattraka*), which in its turn is a cause of a bubble-shaped lump of clay (*sthāsaka*). Thus, a bubble-shaped lump of clay (*sthāsaka*) is the indirect result (effect of an effect) of a *liṅga*-shaped lump of clay. Thus, the effect of an effect should be included in non-contrary apprehension of the effect, not be reckoned a separate subvariety of the logical reason.

Similarly, in the case of negation, with respect to affirmation, an effect contrary to the cause should be included in apprehension of the contrary effect, for instance: In this cave, there is no playing of gazelles because, because there is a roar of a tiger. The effect contrary to the cause should be here included in apprehension of contrary effect. The cause of the playing of gazelles is gazelles, and tiger stands in contradiction with this.

E 390-391. Formal pronouncement in proof formula (*prayoga*) of the logical reason, along with the remaining members such as the example etc., with respect to something which has already been understood by the proponent is made in order to give rise to the understanding in the opponent and it can be made either by way of the relation of explicability in such a way only (*tathopapatti*) or by way of the relation of inexplicability otherwise (*anyathānupapatti*). The examples follow: “This place is possessed of fire because it is explicable only with the presence of smoke” and “This place is possessed of fire because it is inexplicable without the presence of smoke”, respectively.

Formal pronouncement in proof formula (*prayoga*) of the logical reason is validated through a proper grasp of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*), and this invariable concomitance can be determined accurately by the competent only thanks to the pronouncement of the logical reason. Moreover, the eventual proof of the inferable property (*sādhya*) can be accomplished only through this, too. That is why it is important to mention the logical subject (*pakṣa*) too in order to indicate the substratum (*ādhāra*), i.e. the actual point of reference for the inference.

E 391-399. Scriptural testimony (*āgama*) is cognition of a thing based on utterances of an authoritative person or his gestures or other signs given by him.

The Mīmāṃsaka’s objection: Since there is no authoritative person who can see imperceptible things, therefore one has to admit that scriptural testimony with respect to such things must be of non-human origin (*apauruṣeya*), and only such testimony is a cognitive criterion; so how could scriptural testimony ever be based on utterances of an authoritative person? This objection is misguided because it has already been demonstrated, first, that the Tīrthaṅkaras are those who see extra-sensory objects and second, that scriptural testimony of non-human origin (*apauruṣeya*) is not possible. What would this non-human origin of the Veda concern? Would it be about words or sentences or phonemes? How could the Veda be of non-human origin if there is no cognitive criterion to prove its non-human origin? And what could serve as a proof of it? Could this be perception being a cognitive criterion which demonstrates non-human origin of the Veda, or is it inference, or presumption (*arthāpatti*), or some other cognitive criterion? Perception cannot prove it because it merely grasps the sonic layer of speech and nothing more. It cannot be inference for a number of reasons, including formal ones, e.g. there is no example which should be formally pronounced either in support of positive concomitance (*anvaya*) or of negative concomitance (*vyatireka*). It is wrong to claim that since the power to remember the author of a work is generally there but the author of the Veda cannot be remembered, the Veda is of non-human origin. Further, would the author not be remembered by the

proponent or by the opponent or by everybody? Etc. The thesis of non-human origin leads to a number of undesired consequences, too.

E 399-427. Non-human origin of the Veda cannot be proved through scriptural testimony (*āgama*): It is proved that scriptural testimony does not possess cognitive validity (i.e. is not a cognitive criterion) to prove the thesis of the non-human origin of scriptural testimony.

Nor presumption can prove it.

But let us assume that the Veda is of non-human origin. Would it make the cognition of itself being already explained and known or itself being otherwise? Follows a longer discussion of what non-human origin of the scripture could be and why that is not possible.

Another problem is the following: Jaimini says that speech is permanent because the object of its grasp is the ultimate reality, which is permanent, and what corresponds to the permanent must also itself be such. Such an argument is faulty for a number of reasons, including the fact that one does not observe its object as corresponding to any kind of similarity to speech. And if one could observe any similarity between speech and its object, then verbal cognition would have to be fallacious. The Mīmāṃsaka may argue that speech is permanent because it is inexplicable without the fact that the speech's denoting power demonstrates the object, and such power must always be there; a number of verses from the *Mīmāṃsāslokaṅkāra* are quoted in support, along with more arguments to prove the thesis of non-human origin of the Veda. All these arguments of the Mīmāṃsaka are subsequently rejected.

E 427-431. Words etc. are the causes of cognition of things due to linguistic convention (*saṅketa*) in presence of inherent semantic power which concerns the relation of the signified thing and the signifying instrument (word) that obtains between objects and the speech. The example is: "Like the sentence: Mount Meru etc. exist".

But someone may object by raising the question: Is this inherent semantic power, which is in fact the relation of the signified thing and the signifying instrument (word), permanent or impermanent? It is neither (a verse from the *Vākyapādīya* quoted in support), therefore the concept should be rejected. Prabhācandra explains that the inherent semantic power is neither absolutely permanent (e.g. the relation between momentary symbols and gestures and their referents cannot be permanent) nor absolutely impermanent. The relation which obtains is actually between a speech element with an object as such mediated through a beginningless succession, and it is the basis to establish linguistic convention (*saṅketa*) that rules the use of words. This linguistic convention rests on human agents; it does not involve any kind of extrasensory perception.

But is this relation between the signified thing and the signifying instrument of sensory nature, or extrasensory, or can it be known inferentially?

It is not true what the Buddhist says (a quote from the *Pramāṇavārttika*) that the relation signifies its object by referring to its intrinsic nature.

Therefore words which are either common (pertaining to the empirical world) or cultivated (pertaining to the extra-empirical world) signify their objects due to linguistic convention (*saṅketa*) in presence of inherent semantic power.

E 431-444. The exposition and exposition of the Buddhist theory of semantic exclusion (*apoha*).

The Buddhist may object that the word's capability of signifying its object is not possible, because the existing objects with respect to which the words are used are either past or future and they do not coexist with words when the words are used.

Therefore the words do not signify what the users intend to signify; instead one should adopt the theory of semantic exclusion (*apoha*). Words do not signify directly; they signify through exclusion (negation).

This theory is shown to be a matter of pure belief for a number of reasons. First, we would not be able to communicate any meaning, whereas the practice shows that we do. Further, it is contradicted not only by practice but also by cognition: a cognition of, say, cow does arise due to the ascertainment based on affirmation (direct reference to the signified object) on hearing the word ‘cow’.

If through the word “cow” primarily obtains the suspension (exclusion) of the word “non-cow”, then on hearing the word “cow” one would understand “non-cow”. But the Buddhist defends his position, quotes from *Tattvasaṃgraha* and from Bhamaha’s *Kāvyaḷaṃkāra* follow.

Further, would the universal characterised by semantic exclusion (*apoha*), described as that which is to be denoted, refer to things through weak negation (*prasajyapraṭiṣedha*) or strong negation (*paryudāsapraṭiṣedha*)? None of these is satisfactory.

What kind of entity is meant by the Buddhist which consists in the suspension (exclusion) of, say, “horse”? It can neither be something singular, e.g. a unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) cow, nor a physical individual (*vyakti*) dappled cow named Śābaleya. More criticism follows, this time formulated by the Mīmāṃsaka along with quotes from the *Mīmāṃsāślokaṷārttika*. For instance, such a cow which is consistently signified through a word “non-cow” is in fact something which is signified by the word through affirmation, i.e. directly, because it serves to exclude the preclusion of “non-cow”.

Dignāga’s idea that the statement that “speech elements such as ‘blue’ and ‘water-lily’ refer to things qualified by the preclusion of other things than themselves” serves to corroborate the relation between the qualificand (*viśeṣya*) and the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) is also wrong.

But let us suppose that the theory of semantic exclusion is correct. Then with respect to a unique individual there is no qualifier to qualify it because there cannot be any discernment the contents of which is such an object; for we can see that all qualifiers produce discernment of the qualificand which mirrors the object’s form. More verses from from the *Mīmāṃsāślokaṷārttika* quoted against the Buddhist position. The conclusion would be that all the words which exclude the other would be void of their distinct character and they would all merge as far as their reference is concerned; they could not denote anything either.

Last but not least, semantic exclusion (*apoha*) is itself denotable or not denotable? Moreover, it would not be possible to establish any linguistic convention governing the usage of words.

E 444-453. The exposition of the theory of unanalysable meaning-unit (*sphoṭa*). The theory of *sphoṭa* serves to repudiate the Buddhist theory of semantic exclusion. According to this theory, linguistic convention is humanly produced only with respect to the usage of actual, empirical linguistic units; in other words, actual, empirical linguistic units (*dhvani*) directly refer to objects and are based on a convention which is artificial. The convention concerns objects consisting in the general and particular features but does not concern the class (*jāti*). Detailed description of the theory of *sphoṭa* follows, also supported by references to the *Vākyapadīya*. The actual rule is: if *x* leads to a particular linguistic practice with respect to *y*, then *y* is the object of *x*, and that is how the convention is established.

Discussion of what the intention (*vivakṣā*) of the speaker is and what role it plays in communication process. Is it merely the desire to pronounce words or is it the intention of the sort: “I will communicate this object with this word”? Does the sentence communicate its intent independent of linguistic convention or depending on it? Etc.

E 453-458. Criticism of the theory of unanalysable meaning-unit (*sphoṭa*). The following explanation of the process of verbal decoding of meaning is correct: one grasps the meaning by force of the last syllable characterised by the disappearance of previous syllables which are being cognised one by one. In other words, subliminal impression (*saṃskāra*) produced by a cognition of previous syllables reaches the final syllable in a continuous succession as follows: First, the apprehension of the first syllable of a word or sentence occurs, and a corresponding subliminal impression (*saṃskāra*) is generated by it; then, by dint of it, the apprehension of the second syllable occurs, then another corresponding subliminal impression is produced which is characterised by the subliminal impression impressed by the previous apprehension. In the same way, also the third syllable and subsequent ones are absorbed in the continuous series until the last subliminal impression, assisted by the last syllable, leads to the understanding of the meaning of the word or sentence.

But there is also an alternative and equally correct way to explain the process of understanding the meaning: Individual instances of the awareness of previous syllables in the series, not yet destroyed due to a fixed principle of destruction-cum-subsidence (*kṣayopaśama*, one of five karmic states) occasioned by the comprehension of the meaning of the speech element (a word or a sentence), as well as subliminal impressions produced by them establish the subliminal impression of the final syllable; the final syllable, dependent on the memory produced by such subliminal impressions becomes the cause of the understanding of the meaning of the word.

It is not possible for unanalysable meaning-unit (*sphoṭa*) to be manifested through syllables, because neither can all syllables taken jointly manifest it nor syllables individually.

Moreover, is the final subliminal impression which is implanted by the final syllable of the nature of unanalysable meaning-unit (*sphoṭa*) or its property? Neither is possible, so the idea of unanalysable meaning-unit (*sphoṭa*) should be rejected.

What would be the substratum of unanalysable meaning-unit or what would be the factor or element which would manifest it? Would it be the element of wind which is the substratum of sound?

Further, let us admit the reality of the unanalysable meaning-unit, but then precisely the way it is manifested through audible substratum and data, other similarly unanalysable units of smell, taste etc. would have to be admitted. And similarly, one would have to admit unanalysable meaning-units corresponding to motions and gestures of hands, feet etc. or to gesticulation indicating symbols at a matrix etc.

E 458-460. A discussion of the relation of words and sentences follows along the lines of the previous discussion of the relation of words and unanalysable meaning-units.

What would be the ultimate meaning conveyor: words or sentences? Word is a combination of syllables but is independent of mutually dependent syllables. Sentence is a combination of words but is independent of mutually dependent words. It is not possible to claim that sentence is a speech unit which is one and unanalysable, either. What kind of unit would it be: spatial, temporal or verbal/acoustic?

Sentence as a meaning-conveyor cannot be of generic nature, existing as an unanalysable unit and it cannot be eternal.

E 461-465. Exposition of the Mīmāṃsā (Prābhākara) theory of the expression of sentence meaning only through connected words (*anvitābhidhāna*). According to the Mīmāṃsaka only words, which lead to the understanding of the meaning of a sentence, preceded by the understanding of respective meanings of words, can convey the intent of the sentence; thus the primary meaning-conveyors are interconnected words; fragments of the *Mīmāṃsāślokaṅkāra* quoted in support.

A critique follows. If the understanding of sentence meaning depends on the understanding of the meaning of words which depends on the expression through words of the meanings which are interconnected with the meanings of other words in the sentence, then – in a sentence “Devadatta, bring a white cow” – the expression of only the word ‘Devadatta’, connected with the meaning of the sentence and with other words such as ‘bring’, ‘white’ and ‘cow’, could convey the meaning and the expression of all the remaining words in the sentence would be purposeless.

Words exercise two functions: the function of conveying its own meaning and the function of interpreting (making understood) the meaning of other words. But that is not compatible with the Mīmāṃsā position.

If a cognition of an referent of a word which has arisen on account of a word could lead to apprehension of the meaning of a sentence, then why should the cognition of a colour etc. produced on account of the eye etc. not lead to apprehension of smell etc.?

Critique of another Mīmāṃsā (Bhāṭṭa) theory: connection of separately expressed meanings (*abhihitānvaya*), according to which words do have isolated meanings independent of sentence. One of the problem is: how are the isolated meanings meaningfully combined: Are the meanings expressed through words connected into a semantic whole through still other word or through consciousness? It is not the case that words are the ultimate meaning conveyors.

Fourth chapter (on the cognisable object, *prameya*)

E 466-473. The scope (*viśaya*), or the datum, of cognitive criteria, including speech, as they have been described so far, is the object consisting in the universal and the particular. It is so, because such object makes up the domain of cognitions of repeatable (recurrent) and unrepeatable (discrete) things. Such is the object of cognitive criteria which consists in the universal and the particular because it is the cognoscible assuming external and internal form, but also because of its transformation characterised by continued existence as well as by acquisition and by the exclusion of preceding and successive aspects, and because it is capable of causally efficient action (*arthakriyā*).

That is why the universal (*sāmānya*) is twofold, divided into synchronic homogeneity (*tiryaksāmānya*) and diachronic homogeneity (*ūrdhvatāsāmānya*).

Synchronic homogeneity (*tiryaksāmānya*) is the permutation of the same property, like cowness in calves with half-grown horns, in young hornless cows etc.

One may object, that the universal is as nonexistent as a sky-lotus (growing in the sky), but such objection is baseless because the universal has as its object true (not sublated) cognitions of the sort: “a cow”, “a cow” etc., i.e. cognitions of a series of similar individuals. If the universal defined in this way did not exist, there would be no particular things (*viśeṣa*) either.

Cognitive awareness (*buddhi*) manifests within itself something which is of imitable, repetitive form, which has not entered the experience as unrepeatable (discrete) form; such cognition is true, i.e. not sublated, and it is this cognition which establishes the universal as something really existent.

There is another objection against the universal: There is no universal other than the particular because there is no such division in cognitive awareness; and without such division in cognitive awareness it is not possible to establish any difference in the world of existing entities.

This objection is baseless because the division of the universal and the particular in cognitive awareness is comprehended: the representation of the universal in cognition is experienced as a repeatable (recurrent) form, whereas the representation of the particular in cognition is experienced as an unrepeatable (discrete) form.

What is represented from a distance is only the universal, not particulars such as either pillar or a human, because there is serious doubt as to what that object really is (in the case of a particular no such doubt is possible). Detailed criticism of the Buddhist (Dharmakīrti's) account of the universal and the particular follows.

The universal is neither permanent nor omnipresent. Were it permanent, no change would be possible. It were omnipresent, would it be present in absolutely everything or present only where particulars are present, etc.?

E 473-481. It is wrong to maintain that the universal is of the nature of the individual (*vyakti*), a view which is expressed in the *Mīmāṃsāśloka-vārttika*: "Why should there be any essential identity (*tādātmya*) of the universal with the particular? Because (the particular) is its (the universal's) nature". Detailed criticism of the Mīmāṃsaka's view of the universal and the particular; copious citations from Kumārila's work, and their thesis of actual identity of the universal and the particular should be rejected.

In fact, the property of a real thing is twofold: dependent on the other (*parāpekṣa*) and independent of the other (*parānapekṣa*). The particular, being dependent on the other, executes its own causally efficient action which characterised (accompanied) by cognition of exclusion (i.e. by awareness which distinguishes this particular thing executing causally efficient action from everything else). Similarly, the universal executes causally efficient action which characterised (accompanied) by cognition of all repeatable (recurrent) entities (groupable in one genus). Thus, one is different from the other but are complementary and not separable.

In fact, the universal approaches similarity. One may claim the following: "If the universal were tantamount to similarity, then how could possibly the cognition 'precisely this is such a cow (exemplifying universal cowness)' be applicable – after one has seen a dappled cow (and understood that it is a cow) – to a white cow, too?" This is possible because of the notion of oneness, which is of two kinds: primary and metaphorical.

E 482-487. The idea, upheld by the Nyāya school, that the universal is a class of all its members, e.g. that the universal 'Brahmin-ness' pervades all individual instances (*vyakti*) of Brahmins, is mistaken. It is not possible to assemble all such particulars into one class by perception, e.g. by iterated observation: "This is a Brahmin; this is a Brahmin; this is a Brahmin, etc." This cannot be accomplished by inference or by any other cognitive criterion. Etc.

E 488-504. Diachronic homogeneity, which is the second type of the universal, is the substance pervading all its previous and subsequent manifestations, like clay in different stages, say, a lump of potter's clay etc.

The exposition of this idea offers an opportunity to primarily attack Buddhist nominalism and momentariness. The Buddhist may object: Since one in no way perceives any substance which pervades all its previous and subsequent manifestations as something different separately from its previous and subsequent manifestations, one has to conclude that it does not exist; what really exists is momentary particulars.

Prabhācandra retorts that one does cognise through perception itself progressive cohesion (*anvayirūpa*) of things which stands in clear opposition to their alleged momentariness and uniqueness.

The Buddhist: Let's grant that the progressive cohesion is what the Jaina's call the continued existence (*sthiti*); when this continued existence is cognised not in succession, i.e. all its stages at once, then one simultaneously grasps it along with its end or termination; alternatively, when continued existence is cognised in succession (along its temporal span), then cognitive awareness could not cognise such continuity, because both are momentary. This objection is rejected too.

Discussion what role plays memory (*smṛti*) and recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) in establishing the continuity of one substance over time instants. Further, if absolute knowledge (*kevala*) is capable of cognising all things past and present, it is purposeless to try to establish the continuity of a thing through memory etc.

A Buddhist objects: since previous and subsequent moments of a thing are not grasped, how else could the permanency of the thing? The reply is: You can see it yourself! If you didn't see it yourself, how could you claim to cognise the impermanence of its middle (present) moment, in other words, how would it be possible for you to relate this present moment of the thing to its previous and subsequent instants if you didn't cognise the substance over time in its continuity?

Another objection: Impermanence means the absence of previous and subsequent instants in the present moment and the absence of the present moment in these instants; and only this present moment is grasped through nothing but the perception of the absence of the previous and subsequent instants. This is rejected: if these previous and subsequent instants were not cognised as related to the present moment, and if this present moment were not cognised as related to the previous and subsequent instants, it would not be possible to make any negation of (to differentiate) the previous and subsequent instants with respect to the present moment.

Other problems are raised by the Buddhist: The continuity of things is called by you permanence (*nityatā*), and this depends on the three times: past, present and future; but how is it possible to perceive this continuity which depends on the three times if neither past nor future instants are perceived? Further, permanence of things actually means that they have past and future instants because they are related to past and future time; but the past and the future of time cannot be proved. The things' property of permanency is supposed to be proved through direct perception of repeatable (recurrent) forms; but such perception is known to be false because it can be sublated. All these objections are rejected.

Cognitive criterion which establishes a thing contrary to a cognitive contents is known as the sublator. But perception cannot play any role to establish any entity as something which disappears within a moment, neither can it be done through inference; the Buddhist accept no other cognitive criterion, so with what cognitive means can he sublimate the permanence of things? Inference cannot sublimate permanence of things because it depends on perception; moreover, what kind of logical reason could be employed to disprove it? It can neither be logical reason as essential nature (*svabhāvahetu*) nor the logical reason as effect (*kāryahetu*); it cannot be inference based on non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*) either; and impermanence cannot be claimed to be without any reason (*ahetuka*).

Another problem which impermanence involves is this: Let us grant the impermanence of things and the thesis that things originate, continue and disintegrate in the same moment; then if only an existent entity (non-existent entity cannot effectuate anything) is the cause of destruction of something existent, does it produce

the destruction before the origination of the existent thing, or at a subsequent point of time or at the same time? This yields a number of contradictions. If one does not accept non-existent entity as some other kind of thing, then what is called the substratum of momentary destruction: the thing itself, e.g. the pot, the shards or still something else?

It is impossible to explain why things would disintegrate moment after moment, but the claim that they do without a cause is not reasonable either.

Momentary real thing produces its cause while already being destroyed itself, or not yet destroyed, or being both destroyed and not destroyed or neither? (This is clearly a reference the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 1.1 etc). All these options lead to undesired consequences.

E 504-520. The exposition of the relation between things from the Buddhist perspective and its refutation.

Let us analyse the idea of causally efficient action (*arthakriyā*) in the context of momentariness. The Buddhist maintains that whatever exists has the defining feature of executing causally efficient action; in this definition of the existent thing, does the word 'defining feature' refer to a cause, or to intrinsic nature, or to the element which makes one know (*jñāpaka*)?

Another problem with momentariness is that it is not possible to establish not only any causal (effect-cause) relation but any relation of any kind of things.

As Dharmakīrti himself points out in his *Sambandhaparīkṣā*, the relation between things has to be characterised by one of two possible relations, either some kind of their dependence on other factors, or rather interdependence (*pāratantrya*) of things, or amalgamation of their forms (*rūpaśleṣa*). None of these is possible with momentary entities. A number of verses from the *Sambandhaparīkṣā* are cited.

This leads to conclusion that no causal theory, or no appeal to effect-cause relation (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*), can explain the origination and destruction of things from Buddhist perspective.

E 520-524. Just as the universal is two-fold, also the particular is two-fold: modal particular (*paryāya*), or modes, and differential particular (*vyatireka*), or differentiation.

Modes are transformations which take place in succession in numerically one substance, e.g. joy or despair on the soul.

Buddhist objection: This example does not make sense because the self (soul, *ātman*) is not different from particulars (modes) such as joy, despair etc., because it simply does not exist. This objection can be easily rejected because the self can be directly perceived through self-illuminating cognition (*svasaṃvedana*) as an agent which pervades manifold numerous mental states, like the cognition of something of mixed colour. The rule here is: if something manifests itself in one way, it should be practically treated in such a way.

The Buddhist position would contradict the following: If the modes such as happiness and unhappiness etc. were mutually absolutely different, then the following introspective observation would not be possible: "Before I was happy, now I have become unhappy".

If one does not accept the self (soul), then the undesired conclusion is that committed deeds (*karman*) are destroyed (i.e. there is no karmic retribution for what one has done) and deeds not committed befall someone who has not committed them.

Further, without accepting the self (soul) the process of memory, remembering and recognition would not be possible, for instance the following constation could never occur: "It is me who has known that; and now I know it". A longer discussion of

various accounts of recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) follows, including the Mīmāṃsā and Buddhist positions, with emphasis on the nature of the relation (*sambandha*) between what was experienced and what is being experienced, between the experience itself and its substratum (locus).

The argument that “affirmation and negation, which are mutually contradictory, can never occur at the same time” is rejected. It is wrong to reject something that occurs in a real thing cognised through cognitive criteria: a mad elephant does not kill indiscriminately either someone who is in the vicinity (on its path) or someone who is in a distance, because that would lead to an undesired consequence that when someone who is near gets killed by the elephant also the mahout gets killed, because he is also near, or if anyone in a distance can get killed, the consequences are far-reaching. Such is the Buddhist argument, and their theory of momentariness has to be rejected.

E 524-527. Differentiation, i.e. differential particular (*vyatireka*), is the transformation of dissimilar aspects in a different thing, e.g. a cow and the buffalo. A different thing is something which is different both from things of the same class (*sajātīya*) and of a different class (*vijātīya*). For instance, among cows it is a transformation of dissimilar aspects concerning calves with half-grown horns, young hornless cows etc.; among buffaloes it is characterised by prominence or ranginess. What is meant is the unique characteristic of each of them which is not common to other similar or dissimilar things.

A debate with the Vaiśeṣika. First comes a range of objections from the Vaiśeṣika side. It is wrong to maintain that the real thing consists of both the universal and the particular, because there is no cognitive criterion to grasp an object as having such a double nature, and because the universal and the particular are completely different from each other because they are also represented as completely different from each other, like a pot and a piece of cloth.

Further, one can experience two seemingly contradictory properties imposed one on the other, i.e. coexisting one with the other in the same locus, e.g. there is a piece of cloth stands in relation to the universal ‘piece-of-cloth-ness’, is capable of executing causally efficient action directed at things different from it and has a particular large size, whereas there are also the threads of which the piece of cloth has been made and these are related to the universal ‘thread-ness’, they produce different effect and have very small size; but these two, the piece of cloth and the threads, co-exist. In addition, the piece of cloth is different from the threads because it has a different maker than the threads, like a pot is made by potter, i.e. has a different maker. But the pot and the threads do not exclude each other, whereas the universal and the particular do.

If one takes the Jaina thesis seriously and admits the identity of two contradictory things such as the universal and the particular, then the piece of cloth and the threads would be identical and one could say that the threads are the piece of cloth.

But it is not possible to say that the piece of cloth and the threads are both identical and dissimilar, because that would involve doubt. The nature of the doubt is: from what and in what sense are they different and from what and in what sense are they not different? And there might also be a contradiction: x is different from y , and x is not different from y . To say, that a thing has two contradictory properties makes it automatically amenable to doubt and the doubt (whether x has P or non- P) cannot be resolved, because it is believed by the Jainas to have both!

Let us now analyse the structure of the world. A detailed description of the Vaiśeṣika ontology follows. First there are some things which are absolutely different from each other, and these are the six ontological categories, such as substances, qualities,

movements, the universals, the individuators (*viśeṣa*) and inherence. Then, there are nine substances, out of which four are divided into permanent and impermanent. The atoms are permanent, because they are existent on their own and do not have any cause. Atomic dyads (*dvyāṇuka*) and larger molecules are made of atoms and are impermanent, because they are effects. Etc. All substances from earth to the mind are different from each other. Similarly, there are 24 qualities (*guṇa*), and similarly some of these are different from each other, and some are not. So, indeed mutual difference of things is a part of the structure of the world, and likewise the part of the structure of the world is the fact that some things are not different from each other. But this does not imply that each thing can be a locus of two properties which stand in contradiction.

E 528-547. This account of Vaiśeṣika is rejected. It is not true that there is no cognitive criterion to grasp a numerically one thing as something consisting in numerous properties. In fact, any thing consists in numerous properties, because any thing is capable of executing causally efficient actions which are different from each other, e.g. the same Devadatta can be the father, son, grandson, brother, sister's son etc. The logical reason is not unproved (*asiddha*). Other logical reasons used by the Vaiśeṣika against the main thesis (one thing is multiplex, i.e. has many properties) are also cases of logical fallacies. The multiplex character of things can be perceived. That fact that different properties of one thing are grasped by different cognitive criteria, i.e. by perception, inference etc., does not show that their substratum is contradictory.

To claim that the whole and its parts are grasped by different cognitive criteria is also faulty.

The examples to which the Vaiśeṣika refers, e.g. a piece of cloth and a pot which are mutually different, cannot be used as parts of the logical formula, because they have no proving power, and they are inadequate.

The imposition, i.e. coexistence, of two seemingly contradictory properties does not prove absolute and incompatibility of the whole and its parts.

Things are internally different, i.e. complex, also because they have different causal powers and capabilities, but such a difference is not absolute.

The Vaiśeṣika maintains that all six ontological categories possess existentiality (*astitva*) and that there is a group of six categories which have something in common, but at the same time does not admit that existentiality is something over and above the six categories. Further, how this existentiality could be related to its substrata: through direct connection or through inherence. Neither is feasible. Discussion of the ontological status of existentiality (*astitva*).

Discussion whether and in what sense the threads are different from the piece of cloth.

The following objection is rejected: If the real thing is endowed with difference and non-difference, i.e. with two contradictory properties, then the undesired consequence should follow that it would automatically be amenable to doubt. This objection is off the mark, because doubt is justified when one does not see either difference or non-difference, e.g. there is doubt only when one has not seen whether the thing in the distance is a person or a pillar. But if one does see two mutually different properties, where is the problem, where is the place for doubt?

Further, there cannot be any contradiction between things different from each other.

The absence as other form is not tantamount to presence in one's form. The nature of a thing is not its presence in all aspects, because of an undesired consequence such that the object would be present only in its form, not otherwise.

What is the nature of contradiction? Is it characterised by the impossibility of joint concurrence (*sahānavasthāna*), or does it actuality of mutual exclusion (i.e. the establishment of one excludes the establishment of the other; *paraspara-parihāra-sthiti-svabhāva*) or does it consist in the relation of the sublated idea and the sublating factor (*bādhyā-bādhaka-rūpa*)? Two first types are rejected outright as applicable to the present case. The third type is rejected later.

Further, is the alleged contradiction of one thing being endowed with difference and non-difference a contradiction of two properties or a contradiction of a property and its substratum? Prabhācandra demonstrates that it is neither.

Let us suppose that there is some kind of contradiction, but is it contradiction in every respect (*sarvathā*) or in a particular respect (*kathamcit*)? Further, is the contradiction something non-different or different form existing entities? In neither case can such contradiction contradict anything. Suppose the contradiction concerns the object (*karman*) and the agent in dependence on the relation between the contradicted and the contradicting factor, but this does not help reject the thesis that entities have multiplex nature either.

Suppose that the contradiction is another particular kind of a category, because it is different from the six Vaiśeṣika categories. But that leads to paradoxes, and another problem is: how would it relate to the six categories: through direct contact (*saṃyoga*), through inherence (*samavāya*) or through the relation of a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇabhāva*)? None of these is applicable.

Two objections are voiced: First, since a substance (i.e. the soul / self) the nature of which is different the body, senses and cognitive awareness, which is also the substratum of such qualities as will etc., is permanent and has numerically one form, how can one possibly claim that everything is of multiplex nature? It is not the case that if it is permanent and one, one cannot ascribe such properties as being the agent, being the experiencing subject, birth, death, state of living, doing harm (*himsā*) etc. to it, and that it could not be the ultimate agent of karmic retribution etc. It is said in the *Nyāyasūtra* that harm is done to an agent (the self) the locus of which is the result of the combination of body, senses and cognitive awareness, i.e. the body. Second, since there is contradiction between repeatable (recurrent) and unrepeatable (discrete) essential natures (i.e. the universal and the particular) co-occurring in one thing, how could possibly the soul (self) have the nature of both? Both arguments are rejected by Prabhācandra.

It is also wrong to maintain that only the six categories, such as substances etc., are the objects cognisable through cognitive criteria, because this classification and the number cannot stand the test of critical enquiry. For instance the first four substances, i.e. elements such as the earth etc., which are said to be both permanent (as atoms) and impermanent (as molecules). Even atoms which are said to be permanent in the absolute sense would be contradicted by the paradox of a causally efficient action exercised by them either subsequently or all at once. If their nature is to produce atomic dyads (*dvyaṇuka*) and larger molecules, being permanent, they would be doing it all the time permanently (and there could be no whole lasting for more than an instant, so everything would be momentary) or they would do it all at once and no other combination of atoms would be possible.

Analysis of the three types of causes: inherent cause (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*) non-inherent cause (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*) and instrumental cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*). None of these three causes is consistent with direct contact (*saṃyoga*), etc. and they cannot explain how an atomic dyad etc. could be produced.

It is wrong to maintain that atoms are permanent on the basis that they are existent on their own and do not have any cause. There is no dispute between the Vaiśeṣikas and the Jainas as regards the existence of atoms; both agree that atoms have no cause, but that should be understood in such a way that atoms have the minutest dimension possible of which there is no cause. However, it is well known that atomic dyads can disintegrate and the result is atoms. Threads which exist after a piece of cloth has been torn into pieces can also have as its cause the piece of cloth.

Discussion of the relation of the whole and its parts follows. If the substance whole, e.g. a piece of cloth, whose conditions that make it amenable to apprehension have been reached (*upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāpta*), i.e. it is perceptible, were absolutely different from its parts, e.g. the threads, then one could not see it and have to conclude that it does not exist, or that the threads do not exist. Would the whole and the parts exist in the same place or not? Would that place be defined in scholarly terms or in commonsensical terms?

Query: How do we know that the whole exists? After we have seen some of its parts or after we have seen all its parts? That approach is not correct for a number of reasons; first, because suppose there is a huge elephant immersed in water and one just see its upper part: one would have to conclude that the elephant does not exist! Second, one always can see only outer parts of a whole and under normal conditions never can see the inner parts, but that does not lead us to reject the existence of the whole. Etc. A similar problem arises in the case of an object seen from the front whereas one cannot see its back side; how can one put these two sides together into one whole, after one has seen the back side too? How does it happen? With the help of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*)? Etc.

It is not possible that one existent partless thing (the whole) pervades numerous parts, either all at one or one by one, for instance the atom cannot pervade its parts and therefore it is partless and further indivisible.

But let's assume that the partless whole can occur in several loci (parts) all at once. But would it occur in everyone of all its loci (parts) through its whole essential nature or in partial nature? Being partless, either it would occur in its whole in just one locus but could not occur in any other loci, or it could not occur partially in every one of its loci because it is partless. The same paradox occurs when we analyse the whole with respect to its occurrence in numerous spatial points. The idea that the whole is partless leads to many other paradoxes, e.g. by covering just one part of it one would cover the whole of it, similarly by painting one of its parts (e.g. one thread,) red, the whole of it (e.g. a piece of cloth) would be red, etc.

The relation of the whole and its parts is based on the relation of pervaded property (*vyāpya*) and pervader (*vyāpaka*), which are at the same time the inferable property (*sādhya*) and the proving properties (*sādhana*); if there is no pervader, there is no pervaded property.

Suppose the whole exists as absolutely different from its colour, taste, smell, touch etc., to what would the idea of the whole refer? How would we know it?

E 547-564. The problem of the whole and the parts is discussed now in the context of the universal and its instantiations, i.e. the particulars.

Vaiśeṣika account of the elements, i.e. the earth etc., as absolutely different, i.e. as having exclusively unique intrinsic natures (*svabhāva*), and as being permanent in their nature, is also faulty. The same is true of the ether (*ākāśa*, or space).

A discussion of the nature of the ether follows. What is important, the term '*ākāśa*' will be used in two different meanings: 'the ether' (the Vaiśeṣika meaning) and 'space' (the Jaina meaning) in the following pages.

First comes the Vaiśeṣika account of the substance of the ether. The Vaiśeṣika says that it is permanent, partless etc. This is how the Vaiśeṣika formulates a proof of its existence. We can infer the existence of the ether (or space), as something endowed with the properties of permanence, partlessness etc., on the basis of the sound (*śabda*) only, even though the sound does not possess such properties, because it is impermanent etc. In what relation does the sound stand to the ether? It is a substance, a quality (*guṇa*), a movement (*karman*)? Etc. The analysis shows that sounds can neither be a substance or a movement, and they must be a quality, and as quality, they must have their substratum, which is the ether. Moreover, they are the unique quality of the ether, because the touch, colour etc. do not subsist in the ether. Thus, the sound is the only inferential sign (*liṅga*) on the basis of which one can infer the existence of the ether. The ether is omnipresent because its qualities, i.e. sounds, can be perceived everywhere, and it is permanent because people like us can always perceive its qualities, i.e. sounds. It is a permanent substance and a locus of all sounds.

All these arguments are rejected one by one. However, the term '*ākāśa*' changes its meaning from 'the ether' to 'space'. Is the existence of the ether (*ākāśa*, or space) proved because sounds generally rest in or because sound rest in a substance which is permanent, numerically one, incorporeal and omnipresent? The first alternative is something which is already accepted, so there is no need to prove it, but from it it does not logically follow that the locus is permanent, numerically one, incorporeal and omnipresent. The second alternative suffers from a number of logical defects, e.g. the logical reason is inconclusive as being doubtful and lacking counter-example (i.e. there is no unsubjectlike class, *vipakṣa*), and therefore has to be rejected. Further, it is not true that touch does not reside in the locus of the sound: the fact is that the ether is endowed with touch, because it is a cause of the stroke (vibration) of other objects with which it comes into direct contact.

It is not true that the ether is the substratum of both the minutest and the largest transformation, ether. This is neither perceived nor can be proved.

It is not the case that only the ether is a substance which cannot be directly perceived, because also the air is not apprehended perceptually. So why should one say that sounds are the qualities of the ether if they can be the qualities of the air as well?

There is no way to prove that the ether is numerically one, because there are many sounds. Discussion of other possible qualities of the ether follows.

Some other possible ways of explaining the nature of the ether and sound follow. Sound is momentary, because inasmuch as it is perceptible to people like us it is a quality of a particular omnipresent substance, like the feeling of happiness etc. Or, the sound is produced by another sound, because a property can be produced by a property.

There is no basis for the claim that the sound could be the unique inferential sign to prove the existence of the ether: the usefulness of sound to prove the existence of the ether equals its usefulness to prove the beauty of the son of a barren woman, inasmuch as it is not possible to find any property which would point to the ether as a substance producing effects in the form of sounds.

If sounds are the qualities of the ether, how can one explain the fact that a sound ceases? Is it because its substratum disintegrates? No, because the destruction of permanent ether is not accepted by the Vaiśeṣika. Is it because of its co-existence with another quality which stands with it in contradiction? No, because the ether does not possess other qualities. It is because of a contrary quality with which it comes into direct contact? Etc. The conclusion is that the sound cannot be the quality of the ether and therefore it cannot serve to prove the existence of the ether (*ākāśa*, or space).

How can its existence be proved? Prabhācandra says: the existence of the ether (*ākāśa*, or space) is proved because the space (*ākāśa*, or the ether) its result is a simultaneous absorption (having place) of all substances in it. The prove is the following: simultaneous absorption of all substances depends on a common cause, because otherwise their simultaneous absorption is not explicable. This disproves any assumption that the ether (*ākāśa*, or space) is not a locus of anything because it is not corporeal.

E 564-568. The Vaiśeṣika account of the substance of time (*kāla*) is likewise faulty. The Vaiśeṣika says that the substance of time is proved because of the inferential sign (*liṅga*), which is that the time is the only casual condition (cause) of the previous, the subsequent, the simultaneous etc. The substance of time is normally known as ‘time’. Discussion of the nature of time. Time is understood as something which separates one from the other, etc. But it is different from space (*diś*) and place (*deśa*) which also differentiate particular things.

The Vaiśeṣika position is criticised. Is time, said to be inferable on the basis of the cognition of ‘previous’, ‘subsequent’ etc., one substance or numerous substances? It cannot be one, because it is admitted by the Vaiśeṣika that it has two divisions: the time *per se* and the time of human experience. It is wrong to say it is one because it is a general cause of the cognition of simultaneity. Further, if one admits that it is partless and numerically one, how can one explain the experience of the past, present and future? Such a person would have to accept that there cannot be any simultaneity either.

The idea of the syntactico-semantic categories (*kāraka*) is applied to analyse the nature of time. Time cannot be a cause of natural phenomena, e.g. of the sunrise etc., because otherwise it would be activity (*kriyā*) *per se*. It cannot be an agent (*karṭṛ*) or the object (*karman*) of an action. Time has divisions of time units (*samaya*), moments (*muhūrta*), night-watches, days and nights, fortnights, months, seasons etc. Therefore time is not an indivisible and absolutely permanent substance.

E 568-570. The Vaiśeṣika account of the substance of space (*diś*, or direction) is inaccurate, too, because there is not cognitive criterion to prove its existence. The account of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* is discussed: “The inferential sign (*liṅga*) of space (or direction) is that on the basis of which one says ‘it is [on the left, right, west, east etc.] of that’”, and likewise the definition of the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* is given: “Space (direction) is that on the basis of which the ten notions (of cardinal directions) arise, such as the east, south, west, north, south-east, south-west, north-west, north-east, the zenith and the nadir, which are applied to one corporeal substance as a reference point (the limit or focal point) with respect to (other) corporeal substances”. Both are rejected, because *diś* (space or direction) cannot be proved as something different from *ākāśa* (space or ether) which is responsible for the notions of the east etc.

E 570-586. The Vaiśeṣika account of the substance of the self (*ātman*, or the soul) is likewise wrong. Clearly, the self cannot be omnipresent, because it is contrary to perception, introspection and such accounts as: “I am happy, I am unhappy, I know a pot etc.”. It is also contrary to inference. The self cannot have the maximum size (i.e. infinite dimension), because it would not be numerically one since it shares some general characteristics with other substances like a pot; also because it is a substance of a different kind than the space (*diś*), the ether (*ākāśa*) and time (*kāla*), like a pot; and also because it is endowed with action (it can move), like an arrow. Further, the self is not a substratum of a transformation of the atomic or maximum size, because it is conscious.

In what sense is the self permanent? Is it permanent in a limited way (*kathamcit*) or in every respect (*sarvathā*)? In the first case, it is permanent in the same way a pot is; in the second case, that cannot be proved.

The properties of righteousness (*dharma*) and unrighteousness (*adharmā*) are not the qualities of the self. Further, the self is not the locus of the invisible principle of merits and demerits of living beings (*adr̥ṣṭa*). What the Vaiśeṣika says: “The invisible principle (*adr̥ṣṭa*), being directly connected to its substratum (the self), impels movement with respect to other substrata, because it – having just one substance (the self) as its locus – is the quality which is the cause of action”, is wrong for a number of reasons. First of all, the invisible principle (*adr̥ṣṭa*) is not a quality. Further, it is not possible that it could be a cause of action.

Volitional impulse (*prayatna*) cannot be a quality of the self either. A number of Vaiśeṣika arguments to prove the existence of volitional impulse are rejected. One of them is the following situation: “The cattle come close to Devadatta, being drawn by a quality of Devadatta, because they are under the influence of a drawing force, like under the influence of a flavour (of some tasty fodder)”. That argument is not acceptable, because what is actually meant by the word “Devadatta”: the body, the self, their connection, the body qualified by the connection with the self, the self qualified by the connection with the body or a place of the self related to the body?

The Vaiśeṣika argues: “The self is omnipresent, because its qualities can be apprehended everywhere, like in the case of the ether (*ākāśa*)”. But how is it possible? Does it mean that all the qualities can be apprehended only in the self’s own body or also in another body? Neither alternative is possible.

Query: Is the self endowed with activity (*kriyā*) or not? If it were, it would be connected to corporeal things such as a lump of earth. But what does ‘corporeal’ mean? Etc. Whatever the meaning, if it were endowed with activity, it could not be permanent, like a pot. On the other hand, if it were free from activity, it would never transmigrate in the mundane world (*saṃsāra*). Or, if it could, how would it accomplish it? Through its body, mind or by itself?

Detailed discussion of the qualities of the self (soul) follows.

E 586-587. The Vaiśeṣika account of the substance of the mind (*manas*) is criticised. Prabhācandra refers to his previous account of self-illuminating cognition (*svasaṃvedana*). The mind, as the Vaiśeṣika characterises it, cannot be proved by any cognitive criterion, and it cannot be admitted as a separate substance either.

E 587-600. Rejection of Vaiśeṣika account of the ontological category of properties (*guṇa*). It is not possible to accept all the twenty-four categories as properties, because they cannot be established with the help of cognitive criteria.

First comes the exposition of all the categories, the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* cited as mentioning seventeen, and seven additional are added on the basis of the ‘and’ (*ca*) in the *sūtra* (following the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* explanation). All the categories are explained and described in more detail. Relatively sizeable space (just as in the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*) is devoted to the idea the quality of number (*saṃkhyā*) and the cognition of recurrent continuity (*apekṣābuddhi*) responsible for the recognition of numbers.

Prabhācandra criticises the Vaiśeṣika account of 24 qualities one by one.

First, the colour (*rūpa*) and other material qualities etc., the way they have been described, are not possible. It is not true that colour occurs only in earth, water and fire (being particularly manifested in fire), because it occurs also in air. Here is the

proof: Colour etc. occurs also in air because it is material and air is possessed of touch too, like earth etc. Similarly, water and fire possess smell, taste etc.

The number cannot be a separate quality, because the number is never cognised without things that are numbered, so it cannot be postulated as a separate entity over and above such things. Further, there is no need to postulate any special kind of cognitive faculty, known as the cognition of recurrent continuity, to cognise numbers. A longer and detailed critique of the number and the cognition of recurrent continuity (the assumption of which leads to infinite regress) follows.

The admission of atomic size in the case atomic dyads (*dvyaṇuka*) is not acceptable, because no example can be provided for an effect which is of the same size as its causes. We can observe everywhere that an addition of elements, e.g. of two stones, as an effect is larger. Similarly, if we add two atoms together, the result must be of larger size than atomic. And if the combination of two atoms is of atomic size, then the combination of even a large number of atoms would still be of atomic size.

The argument adduced by the Vaiśeṣika for the maximum size is faulty: “The maximum size is something different from colour etc. (sc. different from anything experienced directly), because it can be grasped through cognitive awareness different from a cognition of it, like happiness”. Etc.

Equally faulty are all arguments adduced to prove the existence of singleness (*prthaktva*). Further, qualities such as colour etc. are equally single, so how could the Vaiśeṣika explain such notion (qualities being possessed of a quality of singleness), if he also admits that a quality cannot possess another quality?

The quality of contact (*saṃyoga*) has to be rejected, and additional details will be discussed later on when one criticises the notion of inherence. However, a number of inconsistencies is pointed out. Suppose that contact exists as a separate quality. But then separation (*vibhāga*) should not be admitted because it is in fact a mere absence of connection. The Vaiśeṣika may argue: “If there were no separation, how could one explain the cessation of connection?” The answer is: through movement only. For instance the connection of a hand and an arrow is seen to be produced by a moment, not by separation.

That leads Prabhācandra to consider an idea of a separation which is produced by separation (*vibhāga-*vibhāga**). It also can easily be demonstrated to arise only due to activity, and it in fact consists in absence of connection, so such an idea does not necessitate the notion of connection.

The Vaiśeṣika may argue: “If there were no separation which is produced by separation, then – in the case when one touches a wall with a hand – even when the connection of the hand and the wall would cease, the termination of the connection of the body and the wall could not take place.” Such an argument is absurd because the connection of the body and the wall is not possible without the connection of the hand and the wall. Therefore both connection and separation have to be rejected as separate qualities.

Similarly remoteness (*paratva*) and proximity (*aparatva*), in space and time, cannot have the status of qualities. It can easily be demonstrated that the occurrence of a notion: “That one is blue, and so is the next one” with respect to qualities such as blue etc., which have occurred in a sequence, could also be explained even without admitting these two qualities of remoteness and proximity, because qualities cannot have other qualities. And if this (the idea of remoteness and proximity) can be demonstrated with respect to qualities, so it can be demonstrated with respect to substances as well, which can be remote or proximate without any need for such qualities.

The alleged qualities of pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*), desire (*icchā*), being just different states of consciousness (*buddhi*), cannot be claimed to be qualities.

Gravity (*gurutva*), liquidity (*dravatva*), viscosity (*sneha*) etc. can only be understood as qualities of matter. The Vaiśeṣika may retort: “Gravity is extra-sensory because it can only be inferred through the perception of a downfall”. That is not true because when a particular object is placed on a palm of a hand, its gravity is directly felt even without it falling down. Why does one not perceive the gravity of dust etc. in the same way? Because it is not amenable to direct grasp, inasmuch as it is too small. Otherwise one would have to admit that also smell, taste etc. are extra-sensory for the same reason.

It is not correct to say that liquidity (*dravatva*) is also a quality of earth and fire. But it cannot be a quality of water either, because also ghee and similar substances, which are not water, are both well known from everyday experience and frequently said in Vedic texts to be liquid (*snigdha*). But even if one admits that liquidity is a quality, then solidity (*kāṭhinya*), softness (*mārdava*) etc. should also be admitted as separate qualities, because they cannot be explained as a transformation or termination of liquidity.

Disposition (*saṃskāra*) known as velocity (*vega*) should not be a mere quality of earth and other matter, but also a quality of the soul, because the latter is also known to be endowed with activity (*kriyā*), which stands behind velocity. But in fact, velocity is nothing different from activity. That is even reflected in verbal usage; one can say: “he is moving with velocity” or “he is moving slowly”. There is no need to assume a separate kind of disposition to explain a downward movement of an arrow. There is also nothing like a disposition called *karman* (morally retributable deed). Similarly no disposition known as latent psychic disposition (*bhāvanā*), unless one understands it as retention (*dhāraṇā*, the fourth stage of perception and the basis of memory). Etc. To recapitulate, there is no quality of disposition.

The qualities of righteousness (*dharma*) and unrighteousness (*adharma*) have already been criticised and rejected on the occasion of the discussion of the self, its nature and qualities.

In such a way one has to reject the notion of qualities (*guṇa*) propounded by the Vaiśeṣika.

E 600-601. Rejection of Vaiśeṣika account of the ontological category of movement (*karman*), which is said to be of five kinds. There is no reason to maintain that there are just five kinds of movement. And there is no ground for it being different from activity (*kriyā*). If there is anything like movement, it is only possible in the case of an object which is undergoing some transformation.

E 601. Rejection of Vaiśeṣika account of the universal (*sāmānya*) – it has been criticised before.

E 601-604. The category of individuator (*viśeṣa*), or particular, the way it is described, is not possible either.

This is what the Vaiśeṣika says: Individuators (particulars) are said to occur in permanent substances, such as atoms, ether, time, space, self (soul) and mind and are responsible for the notion of absolute unrepeatability (discreteness) of things. Individuators are said to be ultimate and refer to atoms in the period between the dissolution of the world and its recreation, to liberated souls, to the minds (*manas*) of the liberated, and other entities which do not have their own distinct features which would distinguish one from the other. The fact that we have the notion of absolute unrepeatability (discreteness) of things in our mind serves as a cognitive criterion

(proof) of the existence of individuators. They are also proved by the fact that the yogins can differentiate among such permanent entities which do not have any individual features of their own.

These arguments are criticised for a number of reasons. Individuators do not exist because their defining features (*lakṣaṇa*) are impossible. Something which is said to inhere in permanent entities cannot exist because absolutely permanent entities cannot exist, as it has already been demonstrated. Also the argument which takes recourse of the cognition of yogins who can perceive ultimate entities is faulty: their cognition can be demonstrated to be erroneous (*bhrānta*). More arguments mentioned.

E 604-624. The category of inherence (*samavāya*) is likewise not possible.

A definition of the *Prasastapādabhāṣya* is cited: “Inherence is the relation which is the cause of the notion ‘x is here’ concerning the entities which cannot exist separately (*ayutasiddha*, ‘established as disconnected’) which are related as superstratum (*ādhārya*, ‘to be grounded’) and substratum (*ādhāra*, ‘ground’)”. Follows a closer description of the relation of inherence. That relation also helps establish the relation between the ether and sound: “The word ‘ether’ as a referring term (*vācaka*) is (denotes) here in the air, which is the referent (*vācya*)”. Inherence can be observed perceptually: a piece of cloth manifests itself as nothing but a connection of threads, and the connected wholes in the form of a piece of cloth etc. have the form of threads etc.; if there were no connection, there would be a representation of disjunction of components, like the mountain ranges of Sahya (the Western Ghats) and Vindhya. Inherence can also be proved inferentially: The notion “here in the threads there is a piece of cloth” is a result of a relation, because of the notion of ‘here’ which cannot be sublated, like the notion of sour milk etc. in this vessel. Counter-arguments are refuted.

This account is rejected by Prabhācandra. What is the actual meaning of “the entities which cannot exist separately” (*ayutasiddha*, ‘established as disconnected’)? Is it defined in scholarly terms or in commonsensical terms? The first alternative is wrong because scholars would not say that a piece of cloth and threads cannot exist separately. Also ordinary people know it with their common sense. A lengthy critique of the relation of inherence follows. The Vaiśeṣika confuses the relation of contact with that of inherence in many cases. He also makes a mistake to distinguish just two kinds of relation: contact and inherence. Often we just have a relation *per se*. Inherence cannot be perceived and it cannot be inferred. The arguments to prove the existence of inherence suffer from a number of formal defects. And there is no other way to establish its existence. Further, the assumption of inherence leads to a number of aporia, e.g. the difficulty to explain how would inherence relate existence (*sattā*) with existent entities (*sat*). Would inherence relate existence to something already existent or something not yet existent? Etc.

There is another problem with inherence: is it one or manifold / numerous? It could not be one, because we could not explain how one inherence relates many qualities with many substrata. But it could not be plural either. In addition, if any property or relation relates to its substratum, or property-possessor, then also inherence being a property or relation somehow must be located within its substrata, but that necessitates an admission of another (meta)inherence through which primary inherence would be located.

In such a way all the six ontological categories of the Vaiśeṣika system have been rejected.

Now, there is an additional problem of who to relate the six Vaiśeṣika categories with the sixteen epistemological categories of the Nyāya system: cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*), the cognoscibles (*prameya*), doubt (*saṃśaya*), etc. They partially overlap, one type cannot be mapped on the other, but they also are not exhaustive, which is the main goal of the Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas behind their typologies.

Neither classification finds room for two important categories: the principle of movement (*dharma*) and the principle of rest (*adharmā*). How could they be proved? Through inference: every sudden and simultaneous movement which involves the change of place of souls or material objects requires a common external factor, because this is a movement of coexisting entities (so that one cannot be the source of movement of the other), like waters moving in the same direction in one stream or the movement of many fish found in the same expanse of water. Similarly all souls and material things which are found at rest (do not move), must depend on some other common external factor, because they found themselves at rest simultaneously. And these external factors common to all souls and material things are the principle of movement and the principle of rest. It is not the case that things exercise influence on each other prompting others to move or to come to halt, because such an argument involves the defect of vicious circle (*anyonyāśraya*): some things move because they are moved by others, which in turn move because they are moved by the former.

In this way one should also reject any assumption of the invisible principle (*adr̥ṣṭa*) which is believed to be the source of movement etc. Material things are not moved or put to rest by something which is invisible, i.e. imperceptible and immaterial.

E 624-628. The differentiated result of cognitive criteria is the elimination of nescience (*ajñāna*) as well as avoidance (*hāna*), appropriation (*upādāna*) and indifference (*upekṣā*). This result is both different and not different from cognitive criterion. Out of these, the elimination of nescience is a result which is not different. But there is objection: suppose it is not different; but it is not logically consistent to say that the thing *x* is the result of thing *x* because of contradiction. This is rejected, because it is not the case that the property and the property-possessor are either absolutely different from each other or absolutely not different from each other. And the cause-effect relation between them is not contradicted if these two are not different from each other.

However, avoidance, appropriation and indifference are a result which is different from cognitive criterion, but even then there the difference is only qualified, not absolute.

Whoever cognises in a valid way (*pramimūte*) is someone whose nescience has been eliminated, and he avoids things which do not lead to the acquisition of desired goals, he appropriates things which lead to the acquisition of desired goals and is indifferent to things which are neutral with respect to the acquisition of desired goals, because of proper cognition concerning the results.

Rejection of a (Buddhist) objection: since there is no difference of the cogniser, cognitive criterion and the result, it is not possible to establish any difference.

One may object: cognitive criterion prompts an action which is different from its own essence, because it is a causal factor, like an axe. But then, if what you want to prove is that the difference is only qualified, then you commit a fallacy of proving what is already proved (*siddhasādhyatā*). If what you want to prove is that the difference is absolute, then you are not able to provide any relevant example because any possible example will be void of the inferable property (*sādhyā*).

The adopted rule that the action is always absolutely different from its cause is incorrect, which can easily be demonstrated by the example of a lamp which

illuminates things and manifests itself through its nature: its light is not different from its cause, the lamp.

Thus, from the point of view of ultimate reality both the result of cognitive criterion and cognitive criterion are established to consist in cognition, but should also be accepted as somehow different one from the other.

Fifth chapter (on fallacies, *ābhāsa*)

E 629-640. In his comments on a number of *sūtras* of this chapter of the *Parīkṣāmukha* (6.1-72), Prabhācandra has hardly anything to add on his own.

Anything which is different from all what has been explained above, i.e. from cognitive criterion, from their number, from cognisable object and from its result, constitutes a fallacy.

Fallacy of cognitive criterion (*pramāṇābhāsa*) of cognitive criterion includes: (1) cognising without self-awareness, (2) cognising an object already grasped, (3) mere vision of something (without any conceptual component), (4) doubt etc. These are fallacies because there is nothing to represent the relevant application (object) of such cognitive activity, the examples being, respectively: (1) like awareness of another person, (2) like an object previously cognised, (3) like a touch of moving grass, (4) like doubt concerning something which could be a pillar or a man; and like (according to Nyāya) inherence in a substance of what is (i.e. of qualities, movements and universals which are) connected in such a way with the eye and taste.

Fallacy of perception (*pratyakṣābhāsa*) is perception in the case when there is no clarity (*avaiśadya*), for instance Buddhist idea of the perceptual cognition of fire upon an accidental, sudden vision of smoke.

Fallacy of indirect cognition (*parokṣābhāsa*) also in the case when there is clarity (*avaiśadya*), for instance, the Mīmāṃsaka idea of (subsequent) instrumental cognition (*karaṇajñāna*) to know the first perceptible cognition.

Fallacy of recollection (*smaraṇābhāsa*) is a cognition of the sort “that was *x*” with respect to non-*x*, for instance with respect to Jinadatta a recollection “That was Devadatta”.

Fallacy of recognition (*pratyabhijñānābhāsa*) is a cognition of the sort: “this is *x*” in the case of someone of similar appearance who is not *x*, or of the sort: “he looks like that one” in the case when this is one and the same person, like in the case of twins.

Fallacy of suppositional knowledge (*tarkābhāsa*), through which one can know invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*), is a cognition of the sort: “This is the relation of invariable concomitance” in the case when things are not related, for instance the reasoning: “since he is the son of *x*, he is dark-complexioned (because all children of *x* are dark-complexioned)”.

The following cases are the fallacies of inference (*anumānābhāsa*).

The first variety among these is fallacy of the logical subject (*pakṣābhāsa*), the first kind of which is when it is not accepted (*aniṣṭa*) by the sides of the dispute, for instance: “speech is not permanent” for the Mīmāṃsaka.

The second kind of the fallacy of the logical subject is when it is already proved (*siddha*), for instance: “speech is audible”.

Third kind of the fallacy of the logical subject is sublated (*bādhita*), which has further sub-kinds: (1) sublated by perception (*pratyakṣa-bādhita*), (2) sublated by inference (*anumāna-bādhita*), (3) sublated by scriptural testimony (*āgama-bādhita*), (4) sublated by opinion prevalent among people (*loka-bādhita*) and (5) sublated by one’s

own words (*svavacana-bādhita*). The examples are, respectively: (1) “Fire is not hot, because it is a substance, like water”; (2) “Speech is not a transformation-possessor (*apariṇāmin*, i.e. is permanent), because it is produced and it is capable of causally efficient action (*arthakriyārthin*), like a pot”; (3) “Righteousness (*dharma*) brings about unhappiness to the deceased, because it depends on humans, like unrighteousness (*adharma*)”; (4) “Human skull is pure because it is a part of a living being, like mother of pearl”, because it is known that some parts of animal bodies can be pure and others impure, for instance a number of products of cow are pure, e.g. milk, but not cow’s meat; (5) “My mother is barren, because even though sexual contact with a man takes place, there is no foetus, like in the case of other women who are known to be barren”.

Fallacy of logical reason (*hetvābhāsa*), which has many varieties: logical reason which is unproved (*asiddha*), contrary (*viruddha*), inconclusive (*anaikāntika*) and irrelevant (*akimcitkara*).

Unproved is logical reason which lacks either certainty or existence (*asatsattāniścaya*). The first variety of the unproved type is logical reason whose existence is not existent (*avidyamānasattāka*), for instance: “Speech is a transformation-possessor (*pariṇāmin*, i.e. is impermanent), because it is perceptible to the eye”; such reason is unproved because its substance is not established to be such (here: it is not established that speech is perceptible to the eye).

Prabhācandra additionally distinguishes a number of fallacies of logical reason of the unproved type, of the variety whose existence is not existent (*avidyamānasattāka*): unproved in its qualificand (*viśeṣyāsiddha*), unproved in its qualifier (*viśeṣaṇāsiddha*), unproved in its substratum (*āśrayāsiddha*), unproved in part of its substratum (*āśrayaikadeśāsiddha*), unproved in its inapplicable qualificand (*vyarthaviśeṣyāsiddha*), unproved in its inapplicable qualifier (*vyarthaviśeṣaṇāsiddha*), unproved in its other loci (*vyadhikaraṇāsiddha*), unproved in its part (*bhāgāsiddha*). That was the first variety of the unproved type.

And here is the second variety of the unproved type whose certainty is not existent (*avidyamānasattāka*), the example, said to simple-minded person: “Fire is here (on the mountain), because there is smoke” when there is doubt because there is cloud of some material stuff in the form of vapour etc. Another example, said to the follower of the Sāṃkhya system: “Speech is a transformation-possessor (*pariṇāmin*, i.e. is impermanent), because it is produced”; this logical reason is for the Sāṃkhya not known.

Now comes the description of the contrary (*viruddha*) logical reason defined as follows: contrary logical reason is such whose inseparable connection (*avinābhāva*) is determined in a reverse manner, for instance: “Speech is not a transformation-possessor (*apariṇāmin*, i.e. is permanent), because it is produced”. Contrary logical reason subsumes all eight kinds distinguished by the Naiyāyika, out of which four are with respect to the subjectlike class (*sapakṣa*). These are: (1) logical reason which does not occur in the subjectlike class (*sapakṣa*); (2) logical reason which does not occur in subject and the subjectlike class alone, but also occurs in part of unsubjectlike class (*vipakṣa*); (3) logical reason which does not occur in the subjectlike class, but does occur in the subject and part of the unsubjectlike class; (4) logical reason which does not occur in the subjectlike class, but pervades the unsubjectlike class and does not occur in part of the subject.

Further, there is logical reason which occurs in the subject, part of the unsubjectlike class and whose subjectlike class does not exist. There is also logical reason which

physical form, i.e. the proving property, is unproved), (3) like a pot (in this case both being of non-human origin, i.e. the inferable property, and its having no physical form, i.e. the proving property, is unproved), respectively.

Still another type of the fallacies of example with respect to the relation of positive concomitance is an example of reverse positive concomitance (*viparītānvaya*), for instance in the same proof formula as above: “whatever is of non-human origin has no physical form, like lightning or like a forest flower (which are indeed of non-human origin, but it is not necessarily the case that they have no physical form), because to accept such a fallacious example as a proper one would have too far reaching consequences.

The second variety are the fallacies of example with respect to the relation of negative concomitance (*vyatireka*): (1) example in which the inferable property (*sādhya*) is unproved (*asiddha*), (2) example in which the proving property (*sādhana*) is unproved, and (3) example in which both are unproved, like in the same above-mentioned proof formula, the examples are: (1) like atom, (2) like sensory pleasure, (3) like space, respectively.

Still another type of the fallacies of example with respect to the relation of negative concomitance is an example of reverse negative concomitance (*viparītavyatireka*), for instance in the same proof formula as above: “whatever is not something which has no physical form is not something which is of non-human origin”. Here no actual instance of the example is given.

The fallacy of the formal pronouncement of proof formula (*prayogābhāsa*) is any formal pronouncement of proof formula (*prayoga*) lacking either application (*upanayana*) or the conclusion (*nigamana*) or both which one takes to be inferior to the five-membered proof formula (*pañcāvayava*) when it is formulated to an uneducated person, for instance: “This place is fire-possessor, because it is smoke-possessor; whatever is such (i.e. smoke-possessor) is such (i.e. fire-possessor); like in the kitchen” (which lacks the application and the conclusion), or “... (and) this is smoke-possessor” (which lacks the conclusion only).

But a fallacy of the formal pronouncement of proof formula is anything of the inverted or erroneous form, too, for instance: “... therefore this is both fire-possessor and smoke-possessor”, because such a proof does not show the relation properly. In fact, a five-membered proof formula should contain a member which indicates the final judgement about the inferable property (*sādhya*), which is the pronouncement of the conclusion being preceded by application. Why is it so? Because final judgement in a distinct way about something which is already well known is not possible.

The fallacy of scriptural testimony (*āgamābhāsa*) occurs due to utterances of a person who is under the influence of passion, aversion and confusion, who communicates things for fun or as a joke etc. Take, for instance, such a statement: “On the bank of the river there is a sweet shop, run boys, run!”, said by someone full of aversion, or the statement: “on tip of the finger there is a herd of elephants”, said by the Sāṃkhya in his ignorance. Why are such statements fallacies of scriptural testimony? Because of their fallibility (*viśaṃvāda*).

Further, there are fallacies of the number (*sāṃkhyābhāsa*) of cognitive criteria, e.g. the claim of the materialists that “there is just one cognitive criterion, namely perception”. It is a fallacy, because both the negation of the after-world (*paraloka*) and the proof of other persons’ consciousnesses formulated by the Lokāyata and based on perception cannot handle such matters.

Similarly, such fallacies of the number are the classifications of the (1) Buddhists, (2) the Sāṃkhya, (3) the Vaiśeṣika (Yauga), (4) Mīmāṃsā followers of Prabhākara, (5) Mīmāṃsā followers of Jaimini listing: perception, and in addition, (1) inference, (2) scriptural testimony (*āgama*), (3) analogy (*upamāna*), (4) presumption (*arthāpatti*), (5) absence as negative proof (*abhāva*), each of them adding one more kind in the row.

Against the Cārvaka (Lokāyata) one can say, that there must be still another cognitive criterion, i.e. inference, because such matters as the existence of the after-world and other persons' consciousnesses are the scope of inference etc., not of perception.

Against the Buddhist one can say that there must be still another cognitive criterion other than perception and inference because the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) is the domain of suppositional knowledge (*tarka*) only, and something which is not considered a cognitive criterion (i.e. inference) could not establish it.

The fallacy of the scope (*viśaya*) of the cognitive criterion is to say that the scope is either the universal or the particular, or both in their own right independently. The monistic Advaitavedantins accept only the universal, i.e. the existence (*sattā*), whereas the Buddhists accept only the particular. The Vaiśeṣika accept both the universal and the particular, but each as excising independently. These views are fallacies of the scope because none of these, i.e. neither the universal or the particular, are not represented in our cognition in such a way, and also because such a thing – either the universal alone, or the particular alone or both the universal and the particular independently of each other – could not produce any effect. Why? It would have to be either capable or incapable of execution some action on its own. If it in itself alone were incapable, it would not exercise any action, like it has been explained before. If it were capable, it would be producing its effects incessantly, because it would not have to depend on any additional causal factor to produce effects. If, on the other hand, it depended on some additional causal factor, it would have to undergo some transformation, so it would no longer be a permanent universal or absolutely momentary particular, because it could not exist in any other form.

The fallacy of the result (*phalābhāsa*) is to say that the result is either absolutely non-different or different from the cognitive criterion. If there were no difference between the cognitive criterion and its result, it would go counter everyday experience of cause-and-effect relation and one could not explain the experience we have every day that the cause and the effect are different from each other. Neither by assuming their absolute difference could one conceive of cause-and-effect relation because that would lead to the undesired consequence that a result could actually not be a result inasmuch as it could be a cause of still another result, and it could not be both at the same time. By exclusion from being still another cognitive criterion an act of cognition as a result could not serve as a cognitive criterion at all. Therefore there is a real difference between cognitive criterion and its result. But if such a real difference were absolute, neither cognitive criterion nor its result were possible, as something of different natures. And the undesired consequence would concern inherence relation between cognitive criterion and its result.

E 645-649. A recapitulation and a discussion of the rules of the debate follows. The whole section has mostly Nyāya account of the debate in the background. Cognitive criterion and (establishment of) its fallacy are something which are pointed out as defective by respective sides of the dispute, are something the defects of which are either avoided or not avoided by the proponent and by the opponent respectively, and they are the correct proof and its fallacy, respectively, for the proponent and are a legitimate criticism and embellishment, respectively, for the opponent. Further,

cognitive criterion and (establishment of) its fallacy consist a foundation of victory and defeat.

After a quadruplet of debate, consisting of judges of the assembly, the president of the assembly, the proponent and the opponent, has been appointed, the proponent brings forward an argument to prove his thesis which, when applying cognitive criteria is correct, but when the opposite is the case the argument is judged defective.

A Naiyāyika may object this, because the debate (*vāda*) does not require the quadruplet inasmuch as there is no stake for anyone competitor striving to win; a debate is not carried out among two competitors both striving to win, because the aim of the debate is not determination and protection of truth; in fact, the debate proper (*vāda*) fulfils the same objectives as para-dialectical disputation (*jalpa*) and eristic quibble (*vitandā*). As the *Nyāyasūtra* states, “Para-dialectical disputation and eristic quibble serve the purpose of determination and protection of truth, like shield of thorny branches serves to protect the growth of a sprout”.

The objection is rejected, because it is not the case that the debate proper (*vāda*) has no stake for a competitor striving to win, because of points of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*) which determine who wins and who loses, similarly to para-dialectical disputation and eristic quibble. It is also wrong to claim that debate proper does not serve determination and protection of truth; in fact it is only debate proper which adequately fulfils this objective, because it is capable of proving something through cognitive criteria (*pramāṇa*) and suppositional knowledge (*tarka*), it does not contradict one’s own doctrine and is carried out through the five-membered proof formula (*pañcāvayava*) and takes into account both the thesis (of the proponent) and the counter-thesis (of the opponent) in order to judge which is correct. Neither of these conditions is fulfilled by para-dialectical disputation and eristic quibble. References to the definition of the debate proper, para-dialectical disputation and eristic quibble in the *Nyāyasūtra* are given. Their critical analysis follows.

Certainty, found through debate proper, is based on the determination of truth, and its protection is based on refutation of all subverting arguments which is in turn based on proper logical argumentation (*nyāya*). Neither para-dialectical disputation nor eristic quibble can accomplish this.

The only legitimate setting for it is the quadruplet of the debate, where one can establish one’s own thesis. If even one of its four constitutive elements is missing, the desired aim cannot be reached.

The Naiyāyika may object: Let us tentatively accept that debate proper is carried out only within the setting of the quadruplet of debate. However, the determination of victory and defeat can only be accomplished through equivocative misrepresentation of the meaning (*chala*), rejoinders based on false analogies (*jāti*) and points of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*), not through cognitive criterion and (establishment of) its fallacy.

This is wrong because equivocative misrepresentation of the meaning, rejoinders based on false analogies and points of defeat cannot serve to determine victory or defeat in the debate because they, being false, cannot prove or disprove anything.

E 649-663. A critical discussion of types of equivocative misrepresentation of the meaning (*chala*) follows. There are three types: misrepresentation of the sentence (*vākchala*), misrepresentation based on generalisation (*sāmānyacchala*) and misrepresentation based on analogy (*upacāracchala*). Their description, based on the *Nyāyasūtra* and the *Nyāyabhāṣya*, follows. Neither of them can guarantee the victory of the proponent and the defeat of the opponent, even though in some cases they may lead to the establishment of one’s own thesis.

A critical discussion of rejoinders based on false analogies (*jāti*) follows. The types are based on similarity (*sādharmya*) and dissimilarity (*vaidharmya*), and there are numerous. Description refers to quotes from the *Nyāyasūtra*, the *Nyāyabhāṣya*, and, occasionally, the *Nyāyavārttika*. In fact, Prabhācandra points out, all these represent fallacies of criticism (*dūṣaṇābhāsa*). This could be reduced to a fallacy of a proof (*sādhanābhāsa*). But would the advocate of rejoinders based on false analogies (*jātivādin*) admit this? If he does, he should also admit that what causes the fallacy of a proof is a defect of a logical reason (*hetudoṣa*), and this only should be taken as relevant, not rejoinders based on false analogies, because they would serve no purpose. If he does not, he has to face a number of inconsistencies. In fact, it serves no purpose to teach either equivocative misrepresentations of the meaning (*chala*) or rejoinders based on false analogies (*jāti*), because they are irrelevant for who wins and who is defeated in the debate proper, because the victory or defeat cannot be determined through them.

E 663-675. This cannot be determined through points of defeat (*nigrahassthāna*) either. A general definition, quoting the *Nyāyasūtra*, the *Nyāyabhāṣya* and the *Nyāyavārttika*, is provided: “A point of defeat (*nigrahassthāna*) is erroneous cognition or ignorance”. Its kinds are further enumerated, the first being the abandonment of the initial thesis (*pratijñāhāni*). Prabhācandra draws attention to different interpretations among the three Nyāya commentators of what constitutes a point of defeat. The final (rhetoric) question is: who defeats his adversary among two competitors, the proponent and the opponent, through incomplete proof formula or through mentioning a defect: the one who despite this proves his own thesis or the one who does not?

The focus shifts to Dharmakīrti’s account of points of defeat with a paraphrase of the opening lines of his *Vādanyāya*: “The proof formula is the determination (of one’s own position), its (main) member is inferential sign (*liṅga*) which fulfils three conditions of validity (*trirūpa*); the failure to formulate it or a mention of just anything irrelevant silences (the proponent / opponent). Alternatively, the (main) member of the proof formula comprising the triple-formed inferential sign is what is efficacious (to prove) and it consists in the demonstration of a cognitive criterion which sublates counter-proposition (of the opponent); the failure to formulate it is a point of defeat of the proponent”. Prabhācandra points out that basically the approach is very similar in its outline to the Nyāya who advocates a five-membered proof formula: the failure to produce a whole (either three-membered or five-membered) formula constitutes a point of defeat. In fact, it is not possible to combine all the members into one proof formula without accepting the fact that they point to one objective jointly, because each of them separately has a different scope, so none of them can be taken as the main member, for all are indispensable.

This is followed by another paraphrase of the *Vādanyāya*: “When the logical reason has been stated by way of similarity (i.e. in a formulation with a positive concomitance), it is stated again by way of dissimilarity (i.e. in a formulation with a negative concomitance), or when the proof has been stated by way of dissimilarity, the logical reason is stated again by way of similarity again, so the repeated statement is not the member of the proof formula; and such a situation is the case of a point of defeat”. This is criticised: Would it be a point of defeat in the case of an opponent who is proving his thesis through an efficacious and correct argument or in the case of someone who is not proving anything? Etc.

E 676-692. So far only cognitive criterion and its fallacies have been characterised, now it is the time to characterise viewpoints (*naya*) and their fallacies. The *sūtra* 6.74 of the *Parīkṣāmukha* says: “Other possible (issues) should be examined”, and what is meant by that is that we should examine the viewpoints and their fallacies. The main division of viewpoints is twofold: mode-expressive (*paryāyārthika*) and substance-expressive (*dravyārthika*), of which the first has three kinds: comprehensive viewpoint (*naigama*), collective viewpoint (*saṅgraha*) and empirical viewpoint (*vyavahāra*), and the second has four kinds: direct viewpoint (*rjusūtra*), verbal viewpoint (*śabda*), etymological viewpoint (*samabhirūḍha*) and factual viewpoint (*evambhūta*). A detailed description follows.

The last three when they are dependent (*sāpekṣa*) they are correct, when they are independent of each other are incorrect. Further, the first four, i.e. from comprehensive viewpoint to direct viewpoint, take the object as primary, whereas the last three, i.e. verbal viewpoint etc., take the word as primary.

Out of these seven, the first has the largest scope of reference, whereas each subsequent one has a smaller scope. When the last one refers to something, the preceding one necessarily refers to the same thing, but the reverse does not hold. Description of how these seven viewpoints are applicable, examples are given. A consistent application of the whole set of the seven viewpoints is known as seven-fold description through viewpoints (*naya-saptabhaṅgī*).

What is then the seven-fold description through cognitive criteria (*pramāṇa-saptabhaṅgī*)? The difference lies in the fact that the latter give a complete account (*sakalādeśa*), whereas the former incomplete account (*vikalādeśa*), i.e. they refer just to one aspect of a real thing. A short description of the seven-fold description through cognitive criteria (*pramāṇa-saptabhaṅgī*) follows.

It is a coincidence that both are of seven types? It is because of the seven-fold rule (*saptabhaṅgī-niyama*) of questioning and enquiry (*jijñāsā*), because doubt occurs in such a seven-fold manner. The first is: existence (“x’s being P”) is a property of a real thing; then its nonexistence (“x’s being non-P”) is its property too. And in this way gradually, including the property of being inexpressible (*avaktavyatva*), by combination we reach seven. Further, in some cases the properties are emphasised (*arpita*), e.g. in the first and second, whereas in the remaining ones, when combined, some are not emphasised.

The debate explained previously as based on the quadruplet of factors relies on the support of epistles. Speech (*vākya*) which consists of a set of well-known (commonly understood) verbal elements is called ‘epistle’ (*patra*), but ‘epistle’ may also consist of a set of unobjectionable but secret (*gūḍha*) words as long as it proves one’s desired point and is communicated with the help of the members of a proof formula. Quotes from Vidyānanda’s *Patraparīkṣā*. Query: How could possibly a speech be called an epistle? It consists of a collection of words which are directed to a hearer, whereas an epistle is opposite. It is a speech in a metaphorical sense. Speech which consists of a particular collection of words of audible nature which reaches the hearer is used metaphorically with reference to a script; and the speech transferred to a writing consists an epistle, because what is written in it is what “stands there in the speech” (i.e. what is written reflects what can be expressed verbally: the text and speech are convertible). Epistle can be described as “such as speech in which words are preserved, protected and defended against opponents by the proponent striving to win himself”. Brief description of how speech can be written down letter by letter and then

decoded from the written text. A discourse on derivation and how the meaning of words is obtained through derivation process. An example is the term *sainyalaḍbhāj* (“the one taking delight in / enjoying the pleasure of what comes together with the soul in the context of the four strata (*varṇa*) of the society”) being synonymous with *deha* (‘body’).

That leads to the discussion of liberation (*mokṣa*) and its meaning. Can it be compared to the experience of a deep sleep and the everyday experience to the state of dreaming? The starting point are two verses of Aśvaghōṣa’s *Saundarananda* (16.28-29), with a minor alternation: “An oil lamp which has attained its expiration neither reaches to the ground nor to the sky, neither to any cardinal point nor to any intermediate point. Because its oil has been consumed, it enters nothing but peace. In the same way a living being (*jīva*) which has attained its expiration neither reaches to the ground nor to the sky, neither to any cardinal point nor to any intermediate point. Because its afflictions (*kleśa*) have been consumed, it enters nothing but peace”. The discussion is based on grammar and grammatical analysis, *Jainendravvyākaraṇa* regularly quoted.

Teleological discussion on the nature of a substratum and its purpose it is supposed to fulfil. The purpose of the discussion is to prove, with logical means and by taking recourse to ontological necessity (because the existence of properties ontologically necessitates the admission of the existence of their substrata), the existence of a substratum which is capable of attaining liberation (here treated as a property). Such a substratum (here: of omniscience and liberation) is the soul (*jīva*, *puruṣa*). There are two main divisions of any substratum possible: the one who knows the true nature of ‘this and that’ (i.e. the substratum of such properties as cognitive states, including consciousness) and that which is different from it (i.e. a substratum of a range of other properties, except cognitive states). ‘This’ is a real thing which acts as a cause consisting in earthy atoms etc., whereas ‘that’ is a substance which is the effect consisting in earth etc. That which knows this and that is consciousness (*buddhi*). The one who is possessed of such a consciousness the contents of which is the cause and the effect is a man (*puruṣa*). The idea of the substratum also comprises hermaphrodites (*napuṃsaka*), even though they (like women) are not capable of attaining liberation. That leads Prabhācandra to (grammatical / etymological) analysis of the concept of the omniscient person (*sakalavid*) and to the denial of god (*īśvara*).

A discussion of the role which an epistle may play in the debate. Suppose a discrepancy may be found between what the epistle says and what the debater says the that opponent says: “This is not the meaning of my epistle”. What should be done in such a case? The debater should be asked about the proper meaning of the epistle; considered are three possible options: the meaning of the epistle is (1) only what occurs in the debater’s mind; (2) what transpires from the epistle directly on the basis of its speech layer (sentences); (3) what occurs in the debater’s mind and what transpires from the epistle. In the first case, the epistle serves no purpose, there is no way to establish its real meaning or how the opponent’s understanding of it relates to the contents of the epistle, it is not possible to prove or refute anything, and any debate with such a opponent is not possible because there is no point of textual reference which could be verified and it is not possible to establish any linguistic convention governing the proper understanding of the contents of the epistle; it would be like a situation when the opponent says ‘cow’ but what is understood is ‘horse’.

If the opponent says, the second option is the case, then it is “as if a rain of jewels fell to the feet of the Jainas”, because it is precisely what the Jainas mean: the proper

meaning of the epistle is obtained through detailed analysis of its meaning with the help of manifold hermeneutical instruments, including the analysis of inflective bases (*prakṛti*), suffixes (*pratyaya*) etc. If this were not the meaning, how else could one determine its meaning? The third option is not satisfactory, because on the basis of what could we determine whether the meaning of the epistle expounded by the opponent according to his own understanding is correct or not? On the basis of the opinion of the proponent, of the opponent or umpires witnessing the debate? Etc.

E 693-694. The epistle or treatise (*śāstra*) in the form of a mirror (*ādarśa*) serves as an introduction (*mukha*) to analysis (*parikṣā*), or enquiry (*tarka*), has been composed. Just as a good quality mirror correctly reflects ornaments on the body of a person in front of it or the oval of the face of the person so that the person can avoid defects of appearance and achieve the desired effect in the form of beauty, in the same way this treatise teaches the nature of what one should avoid (*heya*) and of what one should achieve (*upādeya*); it has been composed to stimulate the correct understanding of these two things in people who are like the author of the treatise himself, who in fact is still immature (*bāla*). This is what the author of the *Parikṣāmukha* says of himself: “people who are immature like I myself” (*mādrśo balaḥ*). But that is precisely the idea of the text: someone like them can teach immature and simple people who can profit from the text, like an expert in enquiry or savant may compose a treatise for his disciples who are like him in order to foster their understanding. One might object: how can someone who is still immature and of limited understanding can teach others? There’s nothing wrong about this because such an author demonstrates that he has denounced insolence, whereas an expert of excellent knowledge is recognised through the result of his achievement which is an excellent treatise, but it is not possible that a excellent result would be produced from a cause which is not excellent. But in fact the *sūtra* text allows for an alternative reading: instead of immature, one should read mature (*abāla*), because of the sandhi (*mādrśo ’balaḥ*). So the proper understanding of the closing passage of the *Parikṣāmukha* in fact is: this treatise has been composed for the understanding of the nature of what one should avoid and of what one should achieve for someone who is mature like me, i.e. who has profound knowledge, and it has been composed by an author who is like a real expert in enquiry.