Siddhasena

The name Siddhasena may refer to three important Jain philosophers of the classical period, who will be discussed separately below: Siddhasena Divākara, Siddhasenagaṇi Gandhahastin, and Siddhasena Mahāmati.[1]

Siddhasena Divākara (Second Half of the 5th Cent. CE)

Life

He most probably belonged to the Śvetāmbara tradition of Jainism, since his main oeuvre is commented on only within this tradition, and his legendary biographies stem from the tradition of the Śvetāmbaras. Occasionally, some researchers[2] relate him to the South Indian Jain sectarian tradition of the Yāpanīya, which was present in Karnataka, that is territories where Siddhasena most probably did not live. The connection to the Yāpanīyas primarily hinges on the fact that the title "Śrutakevalin" was used by Haribhadra (8th cent. CE) with reference to Siddhasena Divākara, and the same designation was incidentally borne by the teachers of the Yāpanīya group. However, the title "*śrutakevalin*," a generic term for any teacher who knows the whole canon, should simply be interpreted in the same honorific sense as "a teacher well-read in the scriptures" in this and many other contexts, and does not imply a technical term denoting a high post of a Yāpanīya mendicant. Others[3] have stated that he has also been claimed by the Digambaras, but there is no evidence that historical representatives of the Digambara tradition ever claimed Siddhasena as their author. Also doctrinally, Siddhasena Divākara stands apart from Digambaras who unanimously held that perfect cognition (*kevalajñāna*) and perfect perceptual experience/perfect perception (*kevaladarśana*) of an omniscient being (*kevalin*) retain their difference although they occur simultaneously, whereas Siddhasena maintains that both merge and become identical at the stage of perfection (*kevala*), a position maintained by a number of Śvetāmbara philosophers.[4] Except that Siddhasena's activities were related *perhaps* to west-central India (which in itself is not much telling in the case of an itinerant Jain monk), hardly anything tangible can be said about him, not even the region where he was born, despite a large number of medieval biographies and hagiographies of Siddhasena, which include Āmradevasūri's *Ākhyānakamaṇikośavṛtti* (1134), Bhadreśvara's *Kahāvalī* (12th cent.), Prabhācandra's *Prabhāvakacarita* (1277), Merutuṅga's *Prabandhacintāmaṇi* (1304), Jinaprabhasūri's *Vividhatīrthakalpa* (1333), Rājaśekharasūri's *Prabandhakośa* (1349), Saṅghatilakasūri's *Samyaktvasaptatikāvṛtti* (1366), Devamūrti's *Vikramacarita* (1419), Śubhaśīlagaṇi's *Vikramacarita* (1443), and Vijayalakṣmīsūri's *Upadeśaprasāda* (1787).[5] All these stories emerged centuries after the lifetime of Siddhasena.

A summary of these pseudobiographical stories (*prabandha*)[6] paints a picture of a Siddhasena who was born in a respectable Brahman family, to a father Devarṣi Kātyāyana and a mother Devaśrī, or Devasikā (names invented, as most other names in the stories). Two towns are sometimes associated with him: Avantī, present-day Ujjain (the alleged place of his birth), and Citrakūta, present-day Chitrakoot (the place of his death). As a proud learned youth, who vows to become a disciple of the one who will defeat him in formal dispute, he challenges a Jain monk, Vṛddhavādin ("The Old Debater") in Avantī to a debate. The jury to determine its outcome consists of unlearned cowherds who cannot follow young Brahman Siddhasena's philosophically complex arguments phrased in Sanskrit. These are "summarized," or ridiculed, by Vṛddhavādin in Apabhramsha, the language of farmers, who decrees Siddhasena's defeat, whereupon Siddhasena summons Vṛddhavādin to ordain him as a monk. As a diligent and intelligent monk,

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1 on the three Siddhasenas and their dating, see Balcerowicz, 2008b, ix–x; 2011; 2014.

2 see Upadhye, 1971, xi–xxvii; Jaini, 1979, 83.

3 Dundas, 2002, 118.

4 see Tatia, 1951, 74–79.

5 see Krause, 1948, 217, 221; Granoff, 1989, 329–330.

6 see Upadhye, 1971, *36–*40, *52, *78–*79; Granoff, 1989; 1990; Sanghavi & Doshi, 2000, 15–27.

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he soon rises to a high rank of a teacher (*ācārya*) and "doctor" (*sūri*). One day he suggests to other monks that he translate all the Jain scriptures, believed to be communicated by the Tīrthaṅkaras (Jinas) in the sacred language of Ardhamagadhi, into Sanskrit, an attempt regarded by the community as blasphemous. Ashamed, he pledges to renounce the open marks of a Jain monk and to live *incognito* for 12 years, observing the vow of silence. When the repentance period is over, he performs a miracle at a famous Śiva temple of Avantī. He recites his 32 32-stanza hymns in praise of the Jinas, splitting the image of the deity (or the *liṅga*), out of which emerges either an image of Pārśvanātha or the serpent Dharaṇendra, Pārśvanātha's guardian deity, whereby the king and the populace convert to Jainism. When Siddhasena cannot grasp the meaning of a simple verse in Apabhramsha, he feels abashed and quickly masters both Apabhramsha and Prakrits. Thereafter, he continues to travel around the whole of India, bringing more and more people to the Jain religion and composing numerous hymns in praise of Tīrthaṅkaras in Prakrit, none of which ever survived. During his peregrinations across India, Siddhasena also meets the famous king Vikramāditya (enthronement 58/57 BCE), who – inspired by the former – spends gold and fortune on the Jain monastic community and temples. With magic spells and incantations, Siddhasena makes various wonders. Diverse stories explain his sobriquet Divākara ("Day Maker," or "The Sun"), less frequently Arka ("Resplendence," "The Sun"). One of these makes him convert King Devapāla to Jainism and protect him from the army of an enemy ruler, which has flooded his realm "like darkness." From mustard seeds, he conjures a legion of armed horsemen to disperse enemy troops "like the sun removes darkness" (apparently the vow of *ahiṃsā*, the most fundamental moral principle in Jainism, was not a hindrance to the military assault).

These medieval ahistoric hagiographies of Siddhasena the wonder-worker conflate different historical personalities. They were meant to demonstrate the superiority of popular devotion, faith, and practice, as expressed in vernaculars, over elitist philosophy, erudition, and argumentation phrased in the Sanskrit of the Brahmanical learned elites. They also expressed the preeminence of the monkhood over the rank of a king.

Date

There is no tangible historical material that could allow us to determine when exactly Siddhasena Divākara flourished, and we must rely on the relative chronology based on an analysis of his oeuvre and link ideas that they contain to other philosophers. Sometimes his lifetime is assigned to the 4th–5th century CE,[7] before the 4th century CE,[8] and around 550 CE.[9] However, an examination of all the works ascribed to Siddhasena Divākara, especially 21 32-stanza compositions (*dvātriṃśikā*) in Sanskrit, reveals that they all were composed in different periods and by a few different authors, two of them called Siddhasena. A number of these compositions are by the same person, but it is unlikely that it was Siddhasena Divākara. The only text that can be related to Siddhasena Divākara with certitude is the *Sammaï Suttam* (see below). Since it does not contain any references to the important Buddhist philosopher Dignāga (480–540 CE) and ideas of this period, but refers to the ontology and epistemology of certain philosophical schools (Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, and Yoga) of the early 5th century CE, the most probable date for the text and its author is 450–500 CE.[10]

Works

The Śvetāmbara tradition ascribes to him the composition of a cycle of 32 32-stanza compositions (*dvātriṃśikā*) in Sanskrit, out of which only 21 are actually known,[11] but not all actually contain 32 verses. The number of compositions is most probably fictitious, as is the actual ascription of their authorship to Siddhasena. The best known among these is the *Nyāyāvatāra* (Introduction to Logic), which was written by another Siddhasena, Siddhasena Mahāmati (see below). Another important, albeit anonymous, composition in the cycle is the *Niyatidvātriṃśikā* (Thirty-Two-Stanza Composition on Determinism), an account of the Ājīvikas' doctrine.[12] The most prominent work, perhaps the only one that we can with certainty ascribe to Siddhasena Divākara, is the *Sammaï Suttam* (Aphorisms on Proper Understanding), in three chapters, also known under its Sanskrit title *Saṃmatitarkaprakaraṇa* (Treatise on Reasoning for the Proper Understanding).[13] It is his only work written in Prakrit, and surprisingly no hagiography

7 Sanghavi & Doshi, 2000, 13.

8 Upadhye, 1971, *55.

9 Potter, Soni & Malvania, 2007.

10 Balcerowicz, 2001, 369; 2003a; 2008a; 2008b, ix–xxli.

11 summaries in Upadhye, 1971, *47–*50; Potter, Soni & Malvania, 2007, 177–191.

12 summaries in Qvarnström, 2015; Balcerowicz, 2019.

13 Sanghavi & Doshi, 1924–1931; summary in Potter, Soni & Malvania, 191–201.

of Siddhasena mentions this composition. In it, he primarily addresses a Jain audience and does not enter any serious polemics with other philosophical systems, except for the views held by Jain rival groups. An extensive and informative commentary in Sanskrit on this work, the *Tattvabodhavidhāyinī* (Instructive Guide to the Understanding of Reality), was composed by Abhayadevasūri in the 11th century.

It is not entirely impossible that perhaps a few out of the cycle of 32 32-stanza works were composed by Siddhasena Divākara, but there is no evidence for that. However, judging by stylistic differences and a varied spectrum of ideas, most of these compositions stem from a range of different authors, all of whom were most probably Jains, who represent a world of ideas and a mindset different from that of the author of the *Sammaï Suttam*, that is of Siddhasena Divākara.

Some of these works are religious eulogies of Mahāvīra and other Jinas,[14] occasionally interwoven with polemical elements criticizing other religious/philosophical systems and a biography of Mahāvīra;[15] instructions on debate and its rules; warnings against learning and philosophy as well as moral admonitions or a discourse on Jain morality and virtues;[16] an exposition of causes of suffering and means of liberation therefrom; a sermon on austerities and proper conduct; a characterization of proper teaching; an analysis of the relation among knowledge, conation, and conduct as a path to liberation; an outline of epistemology; observations on the structure of the world and on false views; and an obeisance to the true spirit of the teacher per se, the Jina.[17] Still others, and these were either written or compiled and redacted by a single author, different from Siddhasena Divākara, are expositions of rival philosophical systems: Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Buddhism, the determinism of the Ājīvikas, and materialists (Lokāyata, Laukayātika, Cārvāka).[18]

Philosophy

An outline of philosophy that we can sensibly ascribe to Siddhasena Divākara is necessarily based on his Prakrit work, the *Sammaï Suttam*. Most summaries of Siddhasena Divākara's philosophy conflate him and Siddhasena Mahāmati.[19] His main contribution lies in epistemology, whereas his ontology and soteriology follow a general line of Jainism of his time. Beside a "collective author" (spanning the period between the 3rd and the 7th–8th cents. CE) that comprises a range of authors current under the name Kundakunda, Siddhasena Divākara presents one of the earliest mature versions of the Jain doctrine of the multiplexity of reality (*anekāntavāda*), which comprises three theories: of standpoints (*nikṣepavāda*, *nyāsavāda*), of viewpoints (*nayavāda*), and of the sevenfold modal description (*saptabhaṅgī*, *syādvāda*).

One is required to apply these three theories in order to properly understand the multilayered reality in its complexity, expressed in a language and concepts that are by nature ambiguous. First, the theory of standpoints underscores the reliance of verbal communication on four levels of reference, which may render any description of reality ambiguous: name (*ṇāma*, *nāman*), material representation (*ṭhavaṇā*, *sthāpanā*), substance (*davva*, *dravya*), and actual condition (*bhāva*). "Monk" may refer to (1) anything we agree to call this way, (2) anything that represents a "monk" (a picture, a figurine), (3) a real monk, whether dead or alive, and (4) a monk actually performing monkish rites and duties. For any accurate description, one has to clearly take these four layers apart.

Everything has both a universal character (*sāmaṇṇa*, *sāmānya*) and a particular character (*visesa*, *viśeṣa*), which are inseparable. Further, in every such complex entity, one can distinguish three ontological levels or states: origination (*uppāya*, *utpāda*), continued existence (*ṭhiyi*, *sthiti*), and destruction (*bhaṅga*). These three plains account for the entity preserving its identity in time despite permanent changes that it continuously undergoes. Every entity is a complex in which these layers interplay: that aspect which seems permanent and preserves the self-identity of a thing throughout time is called substance (*davva*, *dravya*). It has a range of perceptible constant properties called qualities (*guṇa*) without which it could not exist. The dual substance–quality model was adopted from the philosophy of nature (Vaiśeṣika), but Siddhasena notes that this dual

14 *ND.* 1–4.
15 *ND.* 5.
16 *ND.* 6–11.
17 *ND.* 18–21.
18 *ND.* 12–17.
19 e.g. Upadhye, 1971, *29–*30; Dixit, 1971, 110–113; Shastri, 2000, 23–28; on the relationship between both Siddhasenas, see Balcerowicz, 2000; 2001; 2003a; 2008b, ix–xxli.

model cannot explain the phenomenon of change, for both substances and qualities are observed to continuously transform; therefore one has to accept the third ontological layer within the complex, that of incessant modifications and change, that is modes (*pajjava*, *paryāya*). All three are not only absolutely different from one another but also inseparable. Every substance, quality, and mode exists within a context of multiple relations without which it would be meaningless. Light is meaningless without, and entails, its contrary, darkness. To comprehend and describe any singular entity, one must not ignore the context and multilayered relations in which it exists. Any one thing can truly be described from different perspectives, each taking into account a particular aspect (of substance, quality, and mode) or its relation to other entities, like a man can be characterized as a "father," a "son," and so on through his various relations, and one description does not contradict or exclude any other. They all are complementary and all equally true.

From the theory of viewpoints, concepts and thoughts, all verbal and expressible in language, necessarily emphasize merely one aspect of such a multiplex entity, and cognitions reflect the reality always from a particular perspective. Two basic layers – the permanent, substantial (*davva*, *dravya*) and the impermanent, modal (*pajjava*, *paryāya*) – are reflected in the mind and language from two fundamental cognitive and semantic perspectives, formally called viewpoints (*naya*): substance expressive (*davvaṭṭhiya*, *dravyārthika*) and mode expressive (*pajjavaṭṭhiya*, *paryāyārthika*). Two basic varieties of the first main perspective, which emphasizes the enduring aspect of an entity, are known as (1) collective viewpoint (*saṃgraha*), which refers to the genus, to the universals and to sets of similar items (e.g. "the cow" understood as a set of individual animals or a universal "cowness"), and (2) empirical viewpoint (*vyavahāra*), which focuses on individual features and refers to singular things (e.g. a particular cow). Accordingly, everything, either the genus or a specimen, endures in time. The other main perspective underscores the transient aspects of origination and disintegration: nothing is permanent but occurs and disappears from moment to moment. The perspective has more varieties. One of them is the direct viewpoint (*ṛjusūtra*), which highlights the absolutely unique, present, and momentary aspect of an entity (e.g. a particular cow here and now), and the remaining ones are perspectives based on language (*śabda*). Albeit Siddhasena Divākara mentions six (he leaves out the first, comprehensive viewpoint [*naigama*], of the standard theory), the number of viewpoints can be infinite depending on the point of reference. Each of such viewpoints taken as an exhaustive and adequate representation of an entity or the world is faulty: just as only pearls strung together on a thread jointly form a necklace, so the viewpoints taken collectively can present the truth. To take a partial account of a particular entity or reality for its complete description is mistaken. It logically follows that to fully know one thing means to know all the reality, and to know everything means to know a singular object in its completeness. This requires that one postulate the existence of omniscience and omniscient beings as warrants that one can know anything particular at all. This is also the necessary conclusion that Siddhasena Divākara draws and is treated by him as a proof for the existence of omniscient beings, namely Jinas.

According to the theory of viewpoints, all other philosophical-religious systems represent merely a fragmentary picture of reality, and, within specific limits corresponding to a particular viewpoint, they are true in a limited sense. For instance, the dualistic system of Sāṃkhya, with the emphasis on an enduring, changeless substance, and Buddhism, focusing on the momentary aspect of the being, represent substance-expressive and mode-expressive viewpoints, respectively. The one who sees the world partially, through the prism of one or two perspectives, is a wrong believer (*micchādiṭṭī*, *mithyādṛṣṭi*). A true doctrine is that which can adequately provide for all such viewpoints and allocate their respective spheres of reference, that is their limits of applicability, and this is Jainism. The one who takes an entity and the world in their complexities represents the right vision (*sammadaṃsaṇa*, *samyagdarśana*). For instance, a pot is both nondifferent from its material cause, clay, and different from it at the same time, being a new configuration. Thus, absolute difference or nondifference does not exist; it is always contingent on some aspect. What is known as the universal is emphasized through the substance-expressive viewpoint, whereas the mode-expressive viewpoint focuses on the particular. To account for the complexity, one must apply the method of differentiative analysis (*vibhajjavāya*, *vibhājyavāda*; a term common with, and probably adopted from, Buddhism), which is soon to be replaced in Jainism with *anekāntavāda*.

Siddhasena Divākara also knows the theory of the sevenfold modal description (*saptabhaṅgī*, *syādvāda*) in its nascent form. He applies all the

seven figures (*bhaṅga*), although he does not mention the sentential functor "in a certain sense" (*syāt*) and other crucial elements of the theory.

These semantic and epistemological theories serve for him as tools to comprehend the reality and the condition of every living being (*jīva*), including human beings. Their fate is determined by karmic retribution (*kamma*, *karman*), understood as deeds undertaken through mind, speech, and body, which inescapably lead to the state of bondage (*bandha*) within the material world in the cycle of rebirth (*saṃsāra*); therein, they are prompted by their passions (*kasāya*, *kaṣāya*) and wander in a deluded state of a wrong believer. The actual cognitive, moral agent is the soul (*jīva*), which is ensnared in the world of matter, a subtle variety of which is called *karman*. This constrains the innate cognitive faculties of soul. From the substance-expressive viewpoint, the soul is bound in transmigration, acts and experiences the results of its actions, whereas considered from the mode-expressive viewpoint, in its unadulterated form, it is pure existence (*bhāvamātra*), neither acts nor experiences the results of its actions (the view influenced by Sāṃkhya), but also the actual acting subject is different from the one who ripens the fruits of deeds (*karman*, an influence of Buddhist momentariness). The true view combines both perspectives.

The soul has two basic cognitive faculties (*upayoga*) in the form of cognition (*jñāna*) and perceptual experience (*darśana*; lit. "seeing, perception"). In *saṃsāra* these two are limited by subtle material particles known as *karman*, which determine basic states (*bhāva*) of the transmigrating soul. Siddhasena elaborates the epistemological model of five types of knowledge and three kinds of perceptual experience, developed before him by Umāsvāmin (c. 350 CE). When the impact of material *karman* is removed in the state of perfection, both cognitive faculties in the form of unlimited omniscience and omniperception merge into one. These characterize the liberated beings, which is the goal of human existence.

Viewpoints allow Siddhasena Divākara also to deal with the ontic structure of the world, in which the universal (*sāmaṇṇa*, *sāmānya*) and the particular (*visesa*, *viśeṣa*) combine into an inseparable unit, and what accounts for its changes are modes (*pajjava*, *paryāya*). To say that an entity ensues through origination, and exists with its past and future, is a dependent description (a reference to the Buddhist theory of dependent origination); however an entity can also be described as a result of a composition of atoms. The proper understanding of causality requires one to consider various aspects, such as momentary, permanent, dependent, atomic, and uniform layers, of any given fact jointly. The parameters that one should necessarily take into account in any proper analysis of an entity are substance, place, time, condition, mode, aspect, relation, and distinction. To emphasize any one of such causal, descriptive, and other aspects is a fault, which Siddhasena Divākara calls a falsehood (*micchatta*, *mithyātva*), or false vision, and a one-sided (*ekaṃta*, *ekānta*) account. Similarly, causal factors such as time, intrinsic nature, fate, former deeds, and human will, only when taken jointly, provide a proper explanation of causality, otherwise each taken separately constitutes a fallacious causal account. He also distinguishes six basic soteriological misconceptions, namely that the soul (which is to be liberated) does not exist (materialists), is momentary (Buddhists), does not act (Sāṃkhya), and does not experience the results of its deeds; that there is no liberation (*ṇivvāṇa*, *nirvāṇa*); and that there are no means of liberation (Mīmāṃsā).

The differentiative analysis through the means of viewpoints is important in order both to eradicate misconceptions about reality and to properly understand the teachings of the Jinas believed to be preserved in scriptures: the mere devotion to tradition does not make one an expert in scriptures, but neither does an erudite necessarily become wise. Accordingly, complex semantical analysis and epistemology are not a mere philosophical enterprise. Combined with practical application and good moral conduct, they are for Siddhasena Divākara of primarily soteriological relevance: understanding and practice jointly are the means to remove the evil in the form of birth, death, and suffering.

Siddhasenagaṇi Gandhahastin (7th–8th Cents. CE)

A Śvetāmbara, Siddhasenagaṇi is the author of the largest exposition of Umāsvāti's *Tattvārtha Sūtra* (Commentary on the Treatise on Reality), composed by Umāsvāmin, namely the *Tattvārthādhigāmaṭīkā* (An Extensive Commentary on the Understanding of Reality), also known as the *Bhāṣyānusāriṇī*

(A Faithful Exposition of the Commentary).[20] Siddhasenagaṇi's commentary has to be seen also in the context of the authorship of the *Tattvārtha Sūtra* and the *Tattvārthādhigāmabhāṣya* and the (non)identity of their authors. I have argued elsewhere that the author of the *sūtra* text and the author of its earliest commentary (*bhāṣya*), which some have understood to be an autocommentary, are two different individuals, named Umāsvāmin and Umāsvati, respectively.[21]

The text of Siddhasenagaṇi's commentary must have been written at the turn of the 7th–8th centuries CE; however it is sometimes dated around 600 CE[22] or the 7th century CE.[23] Its author may be the same Siddhasenagaṇi Gandhahastin who was a disciple of a certain Bhāsvāmin (675–750 CE)[24] and is wrongly identified with Siddhasena Divākara or Siddhasenasūri (c. 1185).[25] Due to its size, detailed exposition of Jain doctrine, clarity of style, and numerous references to a large spectrum of Jain and non-Jain authors, Siddhasenagaṇi's work is a valuable source of information. Unfortunately, nothing is known of its author's life.

Siddhasena Mahāmati (8th Cent. CE)

Life and Date

Late medieval Jain tradition conflates him and his predecessor Siddhasena Divākara, and a number of modern researchers accepted this identity uncritically. There is nothing that we know of his life, not even his correct full name. He can be dated solely on the basis of the relative chronology of his main work, namely influences of philosophical concepts and terminology. He lived after a logician, Pātrasvāmin (also known as Pātrakesarin/Pātrakesarisvāmin?; c. 660–720 CE), an author of the *Trilakṣaṇakadarthana* (A Critique of the Three Characteristics [of the Logical Reason]), probably between 710/720 CE and 770/780 CE,[26] and he was a contemporary of Digambara Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa (720–780 CE) and Śvetambara Haribhadrasūri (c. 740–800 CE), who knew his ideas. The latter quotes him and calls him Mahāmati. These four Jain monks, including Siddhasena Mahāmati, revolutionized Jain philosophy by critically and creatively absorbing ideas developed by Buddhist epistemologists Dignāga (c. 500? CE) and Dharmakīrti (550–610 CE), Kumārila Bhaṭṭa of the Mīmāṃsā school, and the tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. An alternative dating has once been proposed to place Siddhasena Mahāmati after Akalaṅka.[27] His sectarian affiliation is unknown.

Works

His main and the only known succinct work, the *Nyāyāvatāra* (An Introduction to Logic),[28] belongs to the category of 32-stanza compositions (*dvātriṃśikā*), which is one of the reasons for the confusion of the two Siddhasenas, Divākara and Mahāmati. This seminal work was commented on by Siddharṣigaṇi (880–920 CE)[29] in his *Nyāyāvatāravivṛtti* (Commentary on the Introduction to Logic; completed in 906 CE), by Śāntisūri (11th cent.) in two versed commentaries (the *Nyāyāvatārasūtravārttika* and the *Nyāyāvatārasūtravārttikavṛtti*), and by Devabhadrasūri (second half of the 12th cent.) in the *Nyāyāvatāraṭippana* (The Gloss on the Introduction to Logic).

Philosophy

Siddhasena Mahāmati can be seen as an epistemologist and a philosopher who primarily contributed to what can be called a revolution in Jain epistemology.[30] He advanced an entirely new classification of cognitive criteria (*pramāṇa*), or cognitively valid procedures, and offered new definitions. In this way, he brought the earlier Jain classification of cognitive criteria in line with the understanding of these concepts prevalent in Indian philosophy. He can be regarded as the first Jain thinker to offer a descriptive definition of the cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*), which is "the cognition revealing itself and something else different from it (to wit object), and is free from subversion (or sublation)."[31] In other words, such cognition correctly represents itself (it is self-recognizing, or does not require a second act of cognition to be known) as well as its object (either external, e.g. a tree, or internal, e.g. a particular thought present to the mind), and in addition it

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20 Kāpaḍiya, 1926–1930.
21 Balcerowicz, 2008a, 35n23; 2015, 231n1; 2016, 998n16; 2017, 191.
22 Vidyābhūṣaṇa, 1920, 22.
23 Kāpaḍiya, 1926–1930, 64.
24 Sanghavi, 1974, 52–60.
25 Ohira, 1982, 38.
26 Balcerowicz, 2001; 2003a; 2008b.
27 Fujinaga, 2003.
28 a summary in Potter, Soni & Malvania, 2007, 234–238.
29 Dhaky, 1996, 25, 27.
30 Balcerowicz, 2003b; 2008b, ix–xlvii; 2016.
31 *NyA.* 1.

is not contradicted, refuted, or sublated by subsequent evidence. Accordingly, all cognitive criteria have to be, by definition, veracious, nonerroneous, and not contradicted by any other piece of knowledge obtained through other cognitively valid procedures. Any cognitively valid procedure, expected to yield a reliable piece of cognition, must itself be reliable. Further, any such procedure is characterized by patency, or clarity, namely indubitable character of the manner in which it represents objects of cognition.

Siddhasena Mahāmati retains the earlier Jain nominal twofold division of cognitive criteria into direct cognition (*pratyakṣa*) and indirect cognition (*parokṣa*), but the criterion of immediacy of cognition for him is primarily sense organs, unlike the *absence* of sensory contact for the earlier Jain tradition. Thus, two different kinds of knowledge have to be distinguished because of two distinct modes of valid cognition, or *modi* of its acquisition. Accordingly, besides the perfect perception (*kevalapratyakṣa*), he classifies cognition mediated by the senses as conventional perception (*sāṃvyavahārikapratyakṣa*), earlier treated by the Jains as indirect. In this way, the term "perception" came to correspond to the way it was generally understood in India. The other kind, indirect cognition (*parokṣa*), comprises all remaining kinds of nonsensory cognitions, such as verbal cognition (*śabda*) and inference (*anumāna*). Controversially he sees parallelism between perception, on the one hand, and inference (*anumāna*) and verbalization (*vākya*) of cognition, on the other, in both being "for oneself" (*svārtha*) and "for the other" (*parārtha*). In other words, both valid cognitive procedures can be for the sake of the cognizer as well as for the sake of another person to whom the results of the cognizer's own cognition can be transferred. Inference for oneself is an internal reasoning, whereas inference for the other is a formal argument; inner monologue is for oneself, and its verbalization in interpersonal communication serves the other; similarly in perception for oneself, the contents are retained by the cognizer, whereas perception for the other triggers similar perceptual processes in another person, who is the ultimate beneficiary of one's own perceptive act. Both direct cognition, or perception, and indirect cognition, including inference, being two distinct kinds of cognitively valid procedures, have to be nonerroneous. Especially the veracity or nonerroneousness of indirect cognitive procedures, such as inference, was an issue in the debate with Buddhist philosophers, who denied such possibility, the reason being that our cognitions represent inner, mental states, and therefore they do not directly relate to real things outside of our minds; hence, they are cognitively not reliable: their ultimate objects are concepts within, not real things without. Such a supposition is what Siddhasena Mahāmati strongly contests, arguing – in accordance with the correspondence theory of truth – that representations (existing in the mind as mental images) of external objects are both reliable and true as being caused by their objects, and that is why not only direct perceptions but also conceptual cognitions can both be true and have a really existing object that corresponds to the mental image or idea that it produces. Therefore, a conceptualization-based cognitive criterion is not only reliable but also necessarily true and nonerroneous (*abhrānta*), inasmuch as it produces knowledge that truly represents its object. His understanding of cognitive criteria, or cognitively valid procedures, and of resulting knowledge rests on his realist epistemology and realist ontology: only such a cognition that directly represents an external object can be true, which warrants the existence of the external world. In this way, he expresses his criticism of all idealistic philosophies. Conspicuously, Siddhasena Mahāmati seems to reject the centuries-old tradition within Jainism to ground all epistemology in two kinds of cognitive faculties (*upayoga*), that is cognition (*jñāna*) and perceptual experience (*darśana*). Such a division does not fit into the epistemological model that he tries to develop in a consistent manner.

Siddhasena Mahāmati's contribution lies also in the sphere of logic as such. He argues in favor of the principle of economy in formally structured argument, which traditionally in India consisted of either five (most Brahmanic schools) or three (Buddhist tradition) steps: a successful reasoning can be reduced only to two elements (the thesis, *pakṣa*, and logical reason, *hetu*) or to just one (*hetu*) when the context is well known. The standard element of exemplification (example), generally recognized by other traditions as necessary in a proof formula (*sādhanāvayava*, *prayoga*), is not needed. He develops the idea, which originated with Pātrasvāmin, that all kinds of logical reasons that had so far been proposed by Indian logicians could be replaced with a single kind of logical reason called "inexplicability otherwise" (*anyathānupapatti*), which is based on a singular logical relation, that is the inseparable connection (*avinābhāva*) of the proving property

(*sādhana*), or logical reason, with the inferable property (*sādhya*). To account for such a necessary logical relation, Siddhasena Mahāmati introduces the concept of intrinsic invariable concomitance (*antarvyāpti*), which relates both properties in a necessary manner, and therefore needs no external, empirical instantiation. An observation of a relation between such two particulars, each representing both properties, allows one to extrapolate to whole classes on the premise that *otherwise*, that is without some kind of inseparable connection between them, the occurrence of the two related facts would be inexplicable and impossible. In some of his ideas, he extensively draws inspiration from the Buddhist tradition of logic, mainly represented by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.[32]

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