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Fragments from the Ājīvikas*

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1. The doctrine of Ājīvikas, an ancient Indian religion and philosophical system which predates—albeit by perhaps a slight margin—the emergence of Jainism and Buddhism, is hardly known. In the period between the fourth and second centuries BCE, it was perhaps one of the most influential non-Brahmanical religions in India, second to Buddhism,¹ and despite some attempts taken by a number of scholars—such as Hermann JACOBI (1880), Bunyiu NANJIO (1884), Ernst LEUMANN (1884), D.R. BHANDARKAR (1912), K.B. PATHAK (1912), Jarl CHARPENTIER (1913), B.M. BARUA (1920), A.F. Rudolf HOERNLE (1926), A. BANERJI SASTRI (1926), B.M. BARUA (1926–1927), N. AIYASVAMI SASTRI (1941), Arthur Llewellyn BASHAM (1951), Arthur Llewellyn BASHAM (1971), Haripada CHAKRABORTI (1973), S.N. GHOSAL (1979) and (1980), Pranabananda JASH (1982a) and (1982b), Gustav ROTH (1993), Johannes BRONKHORST (2000), (2003) and (2007)—we still have an

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¹ Its followers are mentioned three times in two Aśokan edicts, i.e. in two inscriptions from Barābār Hill in Bihar (BLOCH (1950: 159): 1. *lājīnā piyadassinā duvā-ḍasa-vassābhisittenā iyaṃ niggohakubhā dinnā ājīvikehi*.—‘This Banyan Cave was donated to the Ājīvikas by [the king Aśoka] Favourably Disposed, who was consecrated twelve years [ago].’; 2. *lājīnā piyadassinā duvā-ḍasa-vassābhisittenā iyaṃ kubhā khalatika-pavvatassi dinnā ājīvikehi*.—‘This cave of the Khalatika mountain was donated to the Ājīvikas by [the king Aśoka] Favourably Disposed, who was consecrated twelve years [ago].’) and in the seventh pillar edict from Toprā in Haryana (BLOCH (1950: 170): *saṃghaṭṭhassi pi me kaṭe, ime viyāpaṭā hohaṃti ti. hemeva bābhanesu ājīvikesu pi me kaṭe, ime viyāpaṭā hohaṃti ti*.—‘Also with respect to the matters of the [Buddhist] community, I decided that these [high officers (*mahā-mātra*)] are occupied [with them]. Likewise, with respect to Brahmins and Ājīvikas, I decided that these [high officers] are occupied [with them].’), whereas the Jainas are mentioned only once in the latter inscription (BLOCH (1950: 170–171): *nigamṭhesu pi me kaṭe, ime viyāpaṭā hohaṃti. nānā pāsamḍesu pi me kaṭe, ime viyāpaṭā hohaṃti ti*.—‘Also with respect to the Jainas, I decided that these [high officers] are occupied [with them]. Also with respect to various heretics, I decided that these [high officers] are occupied [with them].’), and the sequence reveals the hierarchy of importance: the Buddhists (*saṃgha*), the Ājīvikas, the Jainas, all the remaining heretics. The Buddhists and the Ājīvikas, in precisely this order (which is the same as in the two Aśokan inscriptions), are mentioned by Kauṭilya (AŚ 3.20.16: *sākyājīvakādīn vṛṣala-pravrajitān...*), who is conspicuously silent on the Jainas (Nirgranthas).

impression that we know very little of Ājīvikism and that the sources we have at our disposal to reconstruct their doctrine are both very limited and unreliable.

Any attempt to reconstruct the views propounded by the Ājīvikas and the founders of the system, one of them being Makkhali Gosāla, will face two major difficulties which are the following. First, there are no extant complete texts (except one alleged candidate, see below), or even fragments, which could reliably and genuinely be claimed to have been written by the Ājīvikas or which have been identified beyond doubt as directly stemming from sources known as both closely linked and faithful to the Ājīvikas, because there are no such sources, and all references to the Ājīvikas in the whole history of Indian philosophy originate from rather hostile environment. Secondly, the process of a possible reconstruction of the views of the Ājīvikas has to be based on our decision as to which of the preserved fragments (quotes, paraphrases etc.) we may come across is original or faithfully reproduces Ājīvika views; however, our decision as to which of the preserved fragments we are considering is original or faithfully reproduces Ājīvika views is necessarily based on our knowledge of what the real doctrine of the Ājīvikas actually was (so that we can ascribe such a fragment to the Ājīvika school or not), which in turn is based on the process of the reconstruction of authentic views of the Ājīvikas. And that is clearly a vicious circle. There is, unfortunately, no logical and methodologically satisfactory way out except through a process of gradual approximation, treading the vicious circle itself. All we can do is to examine (or re-examine) the material which was produced by authors and traditions inimically disposed to the Ājīvikas in the hope that a careful comparison and assessment of such sources may reveal some dependable threads from which we will little by little weave a fabric of more definite and tangible texture. And in this way we may give a fresh look to a source which we originally considered not quite related to Ājīvikas to throw more light on the history of the system. A way to approach the extant material is to first determine certain terminology or concepts which were traditionally associated by other systems with the Ājīvikas and then, with the help of these technical terms and notions, we may proceed to identify possible new sources for further examination.

That the Ājīvikas had their early canon known as the eightfold *Mahā-nimitta* is attested in Jaina canonical literature,² and that was already noticed by LEUMANN (1884: 249), BARUA (1920: 20, 41), BASHAM (1951: 213–216) and others. But we also have evidence that the Ājīvikas developed their canon to contain 22 *sūtras*, with divisions rather similar to Jaina canon. A reference to it is found in the Jaina *Namdi-sutta*: ‘Twenty-two *sūtras* are accepted to be the *sūtras* in the arrangement of the

² See e.g. Vīy 15.7–9 = Vīy 15.4–5 = Vīy 15.58 = Vīy 15.77: *tae ṇaṃ te chad-disācarā aṭṭha-vihaṃ puva-gayaṃ magga-dasamaṃ saehiṃ saehiṃ mati-damsaṇehiṃ nijjūhaṃti, nijjūhittā gosālaṃ maṃkhaliputtaṃ uvaṭṭhāiṃsu. tae ṇaṃ se gosāle maṃkhaliputte teṇaṃ aṭṭhagassa mahā-nimittassa keṇai ulloyametteṇa savvesiṃ pāṇānaṃ savesiṃ bhūyānaṃ savvesiṃ jīvānaṃ savvesiṃ sattānaṃ imāiṃ cha aṇatikkamaṇijjāiṃ vāgaraṇāiṃ vagareti...*

Ājīvika *sūtras*, the sections of which are dependent [for meaning] on each other.’³ We may also suspect that they probably developed some literature in Sanskrit. The question, however, is whether anything of that remained, preserved either in exact citations, loose quotes paraphrases or references.

In this paper I will first try to re-examine the material which has already been analysed by some scholars heretofore and determined to not only be related Ājīvikism but to represent genuine quotations from Ājīvika sources. Incidentally, I will also evaluate the methodology so far applied by scholars in their ascribing the authorship of certain passages to the Ājīvikas. Then, I will search for additional passages so far overlooked by scholars and attempt to assess to what extent these can be considered genuine quotations or faithful paraphrases. My intention is to establish a pool of Ājīvika fragments, preferably citations, as broad as possible. In my analysis I will concern myself primarily with Sanskrit passages that are possible candidates for original quotations from Ājīvikas’ lost sources. The aim of this paper primarily is not to reconstruct the doctrine of the Ājīvikas; occasionally such reconstructory attempts are undertaken if they are necessary to judge whether a particular fragment may be considered authentic or not.

2. The earliest reference (or, at least, one of the earliest such references) is the well-known account found in the Buddhist description of the six ‘heretical’ teachers of the *Sāmañña-phala-sutta*, which preserves what is known as ‘the doctrine of Makkhali Gosāla’ (*Makkhali-gosāla-vādo*), which clearly is not a citation but does seem to reveal certain terminological peculiarities characteristic of the Ājīvikas:

‘There is no deed [performed by the agent] himself, there is no deed [performed by] someone else [than the agent], there is no deed [performed by] humans [which could influence future births or determine the course of their lives], there is no strength, there is no vigour, there is no human aptitude, there is no human prowess [which could influence future birth or determine fate]. All animate beings, all breathing things, all living beings, all souls are without power, without strength, without vigour, [instead] **they are developed by destiny, predetermined concurrence of factors and [own] nature**, [and] they experience pleasure and suffering in the six classes [of existence]. ... The following is not the case: on account of this virtue, or on account of this vow, or on account of this austerity, or on account of this pure conduct, I will ripen the unripened *karman* or will bring ripened *karman* to destruction by gradually working on [it through such practices]. This is not the case. Happiness and unhappiness are meted out with a measure, their final end is done in (i.e. through) the cycle of rebirths; there is neither [their] diminishing nor expanding, there is neither

³ NamS₁ 105, p. 74.1–4: ... *icchevāim bāvīsam suttāim acchiṇṇa-cheyanaiyāim ājīviya-sutta-parivāḍḍhī suttāim*; see also NamCū 106, p. 74.6–18, *ad loc.* in the same spirit, esp.: *ete cēva bāvīsam acchiṇṇa-cchedaṇatābhīppāyato ājīviya-sutta-parivāḍḍhī tīhitā*.

[their] increase nor decrease. Just like a ball of thread, when thrown, exhausts itself, [simply] unwinding, exactly in the same manner both the fool and the wise—having transmigrated, having gone through the cycle of rebirths—will put an end to unhappiness.’⁴

On the basis of this passage—followed in the *Sāmañña-phala-sutta* with a detailed list of divisions of the world, living beings etc.—and a comparison of its vocabulary with a number of other passages generally associated by Indian tradition and scholars with the Ājīvikas we can tentatively identify four such ‘Ājīvika keywords’, the fourth one (fate, or *daiva*) being traditionally related to the Ājīvika and often identified with destiny (*niyati*), mentioned in the above passage, from which it is actually absent:

1. *niyati* (destiny),
2. *saṅgati* / *saṅgati* (predetermined concurrence of factors),⁵
3. *svabhāva* (intrinsic nature),
4. *daiva* (fate)⁶.

These—and especially in combinations such as *niyati-vāda* (‘the doctrine of destiny’, or determinism), *Saṅgati-vāda* (‘the doctrine of predetermined concurrence of factors’), *svabhāva-vāda* (‘the doctrine of intrinsic nature’), or *daiva-vāda* (‘the doctrine of fate’, or fatalism), which suggest that the usage of these terms is not casual but refers to some kind of world view—will also be the terms which I will use in order to unearth possible ‘concealed citations’ from the Ājīvikas or at least to identify passages that may closely be linked to them, and then I will critically evaluate such passages with an attempt to discard those which do not betray closer link to Ājīvika doctrine despite the use of one of the above technical terms. In addition, I will follow the obvious procedure: I will examine the passages which are identified by Indian authors with the Ājīvikas, either as describing (paraphrasing) their views or as citing them *verbatim*.

In my critical enquiry I will amply use a selection of passages listed by BASHAM (1951) in his *History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas*, especially a chapter section ‘Quotations by the Commentators’, which he considers genuine quotes from Ājīvika sources. BASHAM (1951: 222–223) concludes his selection of quotations from allegedly

⁴ *Samañña-phala-sutta*, DN 2.20, p. 53–54: *n’atthi atta-kāre, n’atthi para-kāre, n’atthi purisa-kāre, n’atthi balaṃ, n’atthi vīriyaṃ, n’atthi purisa-thāmo, n’atthi purisa-parakkamo. sabbe sattā sabbe pāṇā sabbe bhūtā sabbe jīvā avasā abalā avīriyā niyati-saṅgati-bhāva-pariṇatā chass’evābhijātisu sukha-dukkhaṃ paṭisaṃvedenti. ... tattha n’atthi: imināhaṃ silena vā vatena vā tapena vā brahma-cariyena vā aparipakkamā vā kammaṃ paripācassāmi, paripakkamā vā kammaṃ phussa phussa vyantim karissāmi. h’evaṃ n’atthi [...] doṇa-mite sukha-dukkhe pariyaṇṭa-kaṭe saṃsāre, n’atthi hāyana-vaddhane, n’atthi ukkaṃsāvakaṃse. seyyathā pi nāma sutta-guḷe khitte nibbeṭṭhiyamānam eva paleti, evam eva bāle ca paṇḍite ca sandhāvitvā saṃsaritvā dukkhass’antaṃ karissanti.*

⁵ Equated with *niyati*, see e.g. SūyVṛ 1.1.2.30, p. 38.38: *sā saṅgati niyatis*.

⁶ See §§ 11, 14.

original Ājīvika Sanskrit (1951: 220–223) sources as follows: ‘These verses indicate that, beside their early literature in Prakrit, and the Tamil scripture *Onpatu-katir*, the Ājīvikas possessed a later literature in Sanskrit, containing much philosophical poetry. It might be suggested that these verses were composed by the commentators themselves, to illustrate the views they were discussing. Yet here are eight verses, quoted by different commentators in different centuries, and all attributed to Ājīvikas or *niyatīvādins*. It is more probable that some at least are genuine, than that all are spurious.’

3. With respect to these eight verses mentioned by BASHAM, I will start my critical enquiry with a passage found in Guṇaratna-sūri’s commentary *Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā* (TRD) to Haribhadra-sūri’s *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya* (ṢDSa) which describes a fourth view out of various theories of ‘what makes the world go round’ and contains two such verses:

‘For these [propounders of the fourth view] argue as follows: {A} There is another category [which is responsible for change in the world], namely destiny, [and] by its force all entities without exception manifest themselves in a strictly determined manner, not otherwise. For it is as follows: if [object] *x* arises from [factor] *y* [at time] *t*, then [object] *x* is understood to exist in a strictly determined manner due to [factor] *y* [at time] *t*; otherwise there would be no basis for [any talk about] effect and cause and about any individually definite form [which an object assumes], because there would be no determining factor [for things to occur this way and not otherwise]. Therefore, in this way, who on earth, being expert in the method of cognitive criteria, could possibly disprove destiny [as determining factor] which is [clearly] apprehended on account of strict determinism of effect?! No way he can achieve it, or else there would be an undesired consequence of self-abortiveness of the method of cognitive criteria. So, accordingly, it is said:

V 1: “{B} Since all entities occur in a strictly determined form, therefore [all of] them are produced by destiny in conformity with their own intrinsic nature.
 «The what» (i.e. the object), “«the when» (i.e. the time of its occurrence), «the because of» (i.e. its causal factor), «the as long as» (i.e. its duration) occur as determined in a strictly specified manner. Who could possibly oppose this [destiny]?”⁷

⁷ TRD 1 § 23, p.18.6–19.14: *te hy evam āhuḥ— {A} niyatir nāma tattvāntaram asti yad-vaśād ete bhāvāḥ sarve ’pi niyatenāva rūpeṇa prādur-bhāvam aśnuvate, nānyathā. tathā hi—yad yadā yato bhavati tat tadā tata eva niyatenāva rūpeṇa bhavad upalabhyate, anyathā kārya-kāraṇa-vyavasthā pratiniyata-rūpa-vyavasthā ca na bhavet, niyāmakābhāvāt. tata evam kārya-naiyatyataḥ*

In Guṇaratna-sūri's two layers are distinguishable at first glance: Section {A} is Guṇaratna-sūri's own paraphrase or account of the views of Ājīvikas the way he knew or understood them, whereas Section {B} seems to be a quotation of two verses, which appear to be genuine, especially because of the way they are introduced *tathā cōktam*. However, at a closer inspection Guṇaratna-sūri's introduction to the verses—Section {A}—does not go beyond the contents the two verses, being basically their paraphrase, and does not bring in any new material or information. BASHAM (1951: 222) introduces the two above-mentioned verses as follows: 'Guṇaratna ... quotes further verses which he attributes to the *niyativādins*'.

As a matter of fact, the actual source of these two verses is the *Śāstra-vārttā-samuccaya* (ŚVS₁ 2.173–174, p. 45–46) of Haribhadra-sūri (c. 740–800), the encyclopaedist and author of the *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya*. The two verses occur in a *niyati-vāda* section consisting of altogether four verses, i.e. ŚVS₁ 2.173–176.

That brief passage forms a part of a larger section which collects a number of unorthodox views explaining the causality of the world and events and includes *kāla-vāda* ('the doctrine of time'), *svabhāva-vāda* ('the doctrine of intrinsic nature'), *niyati-vāda* ('the doctrine of destiny'), *karma-vāda* ('the doctrine of deeds'), *kālādi-sāmagrī-vāda* ('the doctrine of causal complex consisting of time and other factors'). This whole section (ŚVS₁ 2.164–193, p. 45–53), which deserves to be reproduced here *in extenso* primarily for the sake of stylistic analysis, reads as follows:

[*kāla-vāda*:]
kālādīnām ca kartṛtvam manyante 'nye pravādinah /
kevalānām tad-anye tu mithaḥ sāmāgry-apekṣayā // 2.164 //
na kāla-vyatirekeṇa garbha-bāla-śubhādīkam /
yat kiñcij jāyate loke tad asau kāraṇam kila // 2.165 //
kālaḥ pacati bhūtāni kālaḥ saṃharati prajāḥ /
kālaḥ supteṣu jāgarti kālo hi duratikramaḥ // 2.166 //
kiñca kālād ṛte nāiva mudga-paktir apīṣyate^a /
sthāly-ādī-samnidhāne 'pi tataḥ kālād asau matā // 2.167 //
kālābhāve ca garbhādi sarvaṃ syād avyavasthayā /
parēṣṭa-hetu-sadbhāva-mātrād eva tad-udbhāvāt // 2.168 //

[*svabhāva-vāda*]

pratīyamānām enām niyatīm ko nāma pramāṇa-patha-kuśalo bādhitum kṣamate. mā prāpad anyatrāpi pramāṇa-patha-vyāghāta-prasaṅgaḥ. tathā cōktam:

{B} *niyatenāiva rūpeṇa sarve bhāvā bhavanti yat /*
tato niyati-jā hy ete tat-svarūpānuvedhataḥ //
yad yadāiva yato yāvat tat tadāiva tatas tathā //
niyataṃ jāyate nyāyāt ka enām bādhitum kṣamaḥ //

BASHAM (1951: 222, n. 4) notices that these verses are found in 'Guṇaratna to *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya*, p. 12.'

*na svabhāvâtirekeṇa garbha-bāla-śubhādikam /
yat kiñcij jāyate loke tad asau kāraṇam kila // 2.169 //
 sarva-bhāvāḥ svabhāvena sva-svabhāve tathā tathā /
 vartante 'tha nirvartante kāma-cāra-parān-mukhāḥ // 2.170 //
 na vinēha svabhāvena mudga-paktir apīṣyate^a /
 tathā-kālādi-bhāve 'pi nāśva-māṣasya sū yataḥ // 2.171 //
 atas svabhāvāt tad-bhāve 'tipasaṅgo 'nivāritaḥ /
 tulye tatra mṛdaḥ kumbho na paṭādītya-yukti-mat // 2.172 //*

[niyati-vāda]

*niyatenāiva rūpeṇa sarve bhāvā bhavanti yat /
 tato niyati-jā hy ete tat-svarūpānuvedhataḥ // 2.173 //
 yad yadāiva yato yāvat tat tadāiva tatas tathā //
 niyatam jāyate nyāyāt ka enām bādhitum kṣamaḥ // 2.174 //
 na ca rte niyatim loke mudga-paktir apīṣyate⁸ /
 tat-svabhāvādi-bhāve 'pi nāśvā aniyatā yataḥ // 2.175 //
 anyathāniyatatvena sarva-bhāvāḥ prasajate /
 anyōnyātmakatāpatteḥ kriyā-vaiphalyam eva ca // 2.176 //*

[karma-vāda]

*na bhoktr-vyatirekeṇa bhogyam jagati vidyate /
 na cākṛtasya bhogaḥ syān muktānām bhoga-bhāvataḥ // 2.177 //
 bhogyam ca viśvam sattvānām vidhinā tena tena yat /
 dṛśyate 'dhyakṣam evēdam tasmāt tat karma-jam hi tat // 2.178 //
 na ca tat karma-vaidhurye mudga-paktir apīṣyate /
sthāly-ādi-bhaṅga-bhāvena yat kvacin nōpapadyate // 2.179 //*

[kālādi-sāmagrī-vāda]

*citraṁ bhogyam tathā citrāt karmaṇo 'hetutānyathā /
 tasya yasmād vicitratvaṁ niyaty-āder na yujyate // 2.180 //
 niyater niyatātmatvān niyatānām samanatā /
 tathāniyata-bhāve ca balāt syāt tad-viciratā // 2.181 //
 na ca tan-mātra-bhāvāder yujyate 'syā viciratā /
 tad-anya-bhedakam muktvā samyag nyāyāvirodhataḥ // 2.182 //
 na jalasyāka-rūpasya viyat-ātād viciratā /
 ūśarādi-dharābhedaṁ antareṇōpajāyate // 2.183 //
 tad-bhinna-bhedakatve ca tatra tasyā na karṣṭā /
 tat-karṣṭve⁹ citratvaṁ tad-vat tasyāpy asaṁgatam // 2.184 //
 tasyā eva tathā-bhūtaḥ svabhāvo yadi cēṣyate /
 tyaktaḥ niyati-vādaḥ syāt svabhāvāsrayaṇān anu // 2.185 //*

⁸ Probably: *apīṣyate*, cf. ŚVS₁ 2.175, 179.

⁹ ŚVS₁ misprints: *tat-karṣṭve*.

svo bhāvaś ca svabhāvo 'pi sva-sattāva hi bhāvataḥ /
*tasyāpi bhakābhāve vaicitryam **nōpapadyate** // 2.186 //*
tatas tasyāviśiṣṭatvād yugapad viśva-sambhavaḥ /
na cāsāv iti sad-yuktyā tad-vado 'pi na saṅgataḥ // 2.187 //
tat-tat-kālādi-sāpekṣo viśva-hetuḥ sa cenn anu /
muktaḥ svabhāva-vādaḥ syāt kāla-vādād aparigrahāt // 2.188 //
kālo 'pi samayādir yat kevalam so 'pi kāraṇam /
*tata eva hy asaṃbhūteḥ kasyacin **nōpapadyate** // 2.189 //*
yataś ca kāle tulye 'pi sarvatrāva na tat-phalam /
ato hetv-antarāpekṣam vijñeyam tat vicakṣaṇaiḥ // 2.190 //
ataḥ kālādayaḥ sarve samudāyena kāraṇam /
garbhādeḥ kārya-jātasya vijñeyā nyāya-vādibhiḥ // 2.191 //
*na cāikāikata evēha kvacit kiñcid **apīkṣyate** /*
tasmāt sarvasya kāryasya sāmagrī janikā matā // 2.192 //
svabhāvo niyatiś cāva karmaṇo 'nye pracakṣate /
dharmāv anye tu sarvasya sāmanenāva vastunaḥ // 2.193 //

Interestingly, the *niyati* section contains no single other doctrinal element which could, at least theoretically, be linked to the Ājīvikas.

The natural question is whether Haribhadra himself composed these two verses (ŚVS₁ 2.173–174) quoted by Guṇaratna himself, along with a number of others, or merely collected verses from original sources in one section, or whether he composed some verses and interwove them with some genuinely original ones. It is highly unlikely, it seems, that these verses are a compilation from original sources for a number of reasons. First, the exposition of the theories *kāla-vāda*, *svabhāva-vāda*, *niyati-vāda*, *kālādi-sāmagrī-vāda* has its own specific argumentative structure, e.g. ŚVS₁ 2.171 (exposition of the *svabhāva-vāda*) rejects the *kāla-vāda*, whereas ŚVS₁ 2.173 (exposition of the *niyati-vāda*) in turn discards the *svabhāva-vāda*, to be rejected itself in ŚVS₁ 2.180. Second, in the exposition of the four respective theories the same patterns occur as a kind of refrain. I have indicated the recurrent similar patterns in bold. For instance, the refrain phrase *mudga-paktir apīkṣyate*, with a variant *apīkṣyate* (167b, 171b, 175b, 179b) or merely *apīkṣyate* (192b) occurs in the exposition of each of the theories, and always in the same metrical pattern in *pāda* b; a range of verses of all the subsections end with *nōpapadyate* (179, 186, 189) in *pāda* b; the expositions of two theories contain the same phrase *garbha-bāla-śubhādikam* (165b, 169b), in addition, in two cases (out of three) compounded with °-vyatirekeṇa or °ātirekeṇa (165, 169, 177) always in the same position in *pāda* a; the *pāda* c of the exposition of two theories has *sthāly-ādi-*° (167c, 179c); the *pādas* cd of the exposition of two theories has the same pattern °-bhāve 'pi nā° °ā yataḥ (171cd, 175cd); and a whole hemistich *yat kiñcij jāyate loke tad asau kāraṇam kila* (165cd, 169cd). It is for all practical reasons impossible, granted these verses were quotes from original sources, that the proponents of respective theories would use the same phrases or even identical hemistiches or phrasal patters. Third, in some

arguments (e.g. ŚVS₁ 2.176) we have a clear use of the argument of *anyathānupapatti* ('inexplicability otherwise'), a specifically Jaina invention of later times:¹⁰ had Haribhadra quoted from earlier sources, it would imply that the opponents had known the Jaina argumentative structure before the Jainas! Fourth, the structure of Haribhadra's work is to present 'a summary of the accounts of (or colloquies among) [various] systems of teaching' (*Śāstra-vārttā-samuccaya*), somehow along the lines of the doxographical text of his *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya*, and indeed the exposition of the theories of *kāla-vāda*, *svabhāva-vāda*, *niyati-vāda*, *karma-vāda*, *kālādi-sāmagrī-vāda* follows such a discursive pattern: each subsequent theory serves to refute the former. It seems most probable that it was Haribhadra's own design to juxtapose all the theories in a dialectical structure and explain them in his own words. The question remains whether he had access to any original sources of the Ājīvikas (*svabhāva-vāda*?, see below p. 32 ff.; *niyati-vāda*) and the exponents of the other theories (*kāla-vāda*, *karma-vāda*, *kālādi-sāmagrī-vāda*), or whether he succumbed to, or delved on some hypothetical descriptions of certain theories which one might entertain by way of a mere theoretical exercise, and that being the case, Haribhadra's account would be of no descriptive character (i.e. it would present no description of actual views) and would have no actual value for our study of the system of the Ājīvikas. Last but not least, we know that Haribhadra in his versified works, the most acclaimed being the *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya*, as a rule restricts himself to his own paraphrases of the views he discusses without quoting the original sources. And his *Śāstra-vārttā-samuccaya* does not appear to be an exception in containing no quotations from external sources. For the above reasons it is quite unlikely that the two verses are actual quotations from Ājīvika sources.

4. As the first of the list in BASHAM's (1951: 220–223) survey of the few Sanskrit quotations from alleged Ājīvika sources, the mention is made of the following verse:

V 2: 'Whatever thing is to be gained, it—whether happy or unhappy—happens to people in a necessary manner on account of the force of destiny. For even if living beings make great effort, that which is not to be does not happen, and there is no destruction of that which is to be.'¹¹

BASHAM (1951: 221, n. 1) traces the verse back to three sources: 'Śīlāṅka to *Sū. kṛ*, i,1,2,2 and ii,1,29; Jñānavimāla to *Praśna-vyākaraṇa*, 7; Abhayadeva to *Uv. Das*, vi,165.' Let us examine these and other sources where these verses occur.

¹⁰ See BALCEROWICZ (2003a).

¹¹ BASHAM's (1951: 221):

prāptavyo niyati-balāśrayeṇa yo 'rthaḥ
so 'vaśyaṃ bhavati nṛṇāṃ śubho 'śubho vā /
bhūtānāṃ mahati kṛte 'pi hi prayatne
nābhāvyāṃ bhavati na bhāvino 'sti nāśaḥ //

4.1. The first source mentioned by BASHAM is Śīlānka's *Sūtra-kṛtāṅga-vṛtti* (SūyVṛ 1.1.2.30, p. 38.41–42), a Śvetāmbara text belonging to 9th century. The verse is introduced there as follows:

‘The propounder of destiny [as the sole determining force] reveals his own intention: Predetermined concurrence of factors, i.e. destiny, is that whose course leads to a particular (*yat*) experience of happiness of unhappiness for a particular person (*yasya*), at a particular time (*yadā*), place (*yatra*) due to a particular transformation of righteousness (*samyaktva*)¹²; its condition is the state of being determined. Further, in this way that due to which happiness and unhappiness etc. are not caused by personal agency etc. is these living beings' state of being determined, i.e. caused by destiny. So, accordingly, it is said...'¹³

The above passage is, in fact, a part of the comment on two verses of the *Sūya-gaḍamga*, which in themselves might at first glance be considered as genuine quotes from Ājīvikas:

V 3: ‘But misery (and pleasure) is not caused by (the souls) themselves; how could it be caused by other (agents, as time, &c.)? Pleasure and misery, final beatitude and temporal (pleasure and pain) are not caused by (the souls) themselves, nor by others; but the individual souls experience them; it is the lot assigned them by destiny. This is what they (i.e. the fatalists) say. (2, 3)'¹⁴.

However, despite the initial impression of being genuine quotes, these two Prakrit verses (V 3) are rather a paraphrase at most, not a direct quote, because of the reference to ‘those some [thinkers] who proclaim such [a theory]’ (*iham egesi āhiam*). The directly following verse of the *Sūya-gaḍamga*, critical of the fatalists, also confirms such a conclusion:

¹² This is a typically Jaina understanding of the *saṃsāra* and its mechanism. However, we cannot exclude that the Ājīvikas maintained the same opinion, which is however rather unlikely.

¹³ SūyVṛ 1.1.2.30, p. 38.36 ff.: *niyati-vādī svābhīprāyam āviṣ-karoti—“saṃgaiyamti” samyak-kha^a-pariṇāmena gati yasya yadā yatra yat sukha-duḥkhānubhāvanam sā saṃgati niyatis tasyām bhavam sāmगतिकाम्, yataś cāvaṃ na puruṣa-kārādi-kṛtam sukha-duḥkhādi atas tat teṣām prāṇinām niyati-kṛtam sāmगतिकाम ity ucyate. tathā cōktam.*

^a Recte: *samyaktva*?

¹⁴ Sūy₂ 1.1.2.29–30:

*na taṃ sayam-kaḍam dukkham kao anna-kaḍam ca ṇam /
suham vā jai vā dukkham sehiyam vā asehiyam // 29 //
na sayam kaḍam na annehim vedayamti puḍho jiyā /
saṃgatiyam taṃ tahā tesim iham egesi āhiam // 30 //*

Translation: JACOBI (1895: 239–240; § 1.1.2.2–3).

V 4: ‘Those who proclaim these opinions, are fools who fancy themselves learned; they have no knowledge, and do not understand that things depend partly on fate, and partly on human exertion.’¹⁵

This particular verse, critical of the straightforward fatalists—which is still not the view accepted by the Jainas, as the subsequent verse (Sūy₂ 1.1.2.32, JACOBI (1895: 240; § 1.1.2.6)) suggests—is further commented by Śīlāṅka:

‘**These**, i.e. the above mentioned **opinions** based on the doctrine of destiny ... [They are] those **who they have no knowledge**, i.e. ignorant ... because [they do not understand that] **things depend partly on fate, and partly on human exertion**, i.e. some things such as happiness etc. are determined by destiny, i.e. their occurrence is caused as something necessary, similarly some things are not determined, i.e. their occurrence is caused by the agency of the soul, person etc.; i.e. they onesidedly conceive existence as caused by destiny. For this reason not knowing the [real] cause of happiness and unhappiness they become those **who have no knowledge** (*abuddhiyā*), i.e. they become devoid of knowledge. For it is as follows: certain happiness and unhappiness etc. of the followers is strictly determined.

It is said [by them] that *karman* is caused by destiny on certain occasions inasmuch as its coming into being occurs necessarily. Similarly [there are] some [things which] are not caused by destiny: they are caused by personal agency, time, god, intrinsic nature, *karman* etc. In such cases, certain instrumentality of personal agency with respect to happiness and unhappiness etc. is the basis. The dead is the fruit on account of an action, but the action proceeds as dependent on the agency of the person. So, accordingly, it is said:

V 5: “Thinking that [things are caused by] fate, one does not renounce his own exertion. How could one get sesamum oil from sesamum seeds without exertion?”¹⁶

¹⁵ Sūy₂ 1.1.2.31:

*evam eyāṇi jāmpaṁtā bālā paṁdya-māṇiṇo /
niyayāniyayaṁ saṁtam ayāṇaṁtā abuddhiyā //*

Translation: JACOBI (1895: 240; § 1.1.2.4).

¹⁶ SūyVṛ 1.1.2.31, p. 39.3 ff.: *etāni pūrvōktāni niyati-vādāsritāni vacanāni ... bālā ajñāḥ ... yato niyayāniyayaṁ saṁtam iti sukhādīkam kiñcin niyati-kṛtam—avaśyaṁ-bhāvy-udaya-prāpitam tathā aniyatam—ātma-puruṣa-kārēśvarādi-prāpitam sat niyati-kṛtam eva-kāntenāśriyanti^a, ato ’jānānāḥ sukha-duḥkhādi-kāraṇam abuddhikā buddhi-rahitā bhavantīti, tathā hi ārhatānām kiñcit sukha-duḥkhādi niyatita eva bhavati.*

tat-karaṇasya karmaṇaḥ kasmimścid avasare ’vaśyaṁ-bhāvy-udaya-sadbhāvān niyati-kṛtam ity ucyate, tathā kiñcid aniyati-kṛtam ca—puruṣa-kāra-kālēśvara-svabhāva-karmādi-kṛtam, tatra

On the one hand, this view of ‘compromised determinism’—viz. some things are determined by destiny, whereas some are not—seems to be principally in agreement with what we think we may actually know of Ājīvikas.¹⁷ On the other hand, the verse quoted by Śīlāṅka serves as an illustration of a view which modifies the theory of strict determinism generally ascribed to the Ājīvikas, and is attributed to those who claim that things are determined by destiny with the participation of other factors, such as the soul, personal agency¹⁸, god etc. (*ātma-puruṣa-kārêśvarâdi-prāpitam sat niyati-kṛtam ekāntenâśriyanti*). It seems, therefore, that Śīlāṅka himself did not take the verse to stem from an Ājīvika source: neither the authors of the *Sūya-gaḍamga* nor Śīlāṅka himself establish any connection between the views expressed in V 4 and V 5 to the Ājīvikas and do not use the ‘key word’ *niyati-vāda*, generally associated with the Ājīvikas in Indian tradition, in the context of the ‘compromised determinism’.

It seems that the description of the ‘compromised determinism’, which in some ways may indeed better correspond to what the Ājīvikas really claimed, cannot be attributed to Śīlāṅka’s (and of the authors of the *Sūya-gaḍamga*) real knowledge of and acquaintance with the tradition of the Ājīvikas but is merely a result dictated by a dialectical structure of the argument along the lines of typically Jaina strategy of the Anekānta-vāda: we first analyse the pure *niyati* position, then the ‘compromised’ version of *niyati-aniyati*, then the *aniyati* position etc.

Now, the question arises as regards Śīlāṅka’s reliability as the source on the Ājīvikas with respect to verse V 2 (*prāptavyo niyati-balâśrayeṇa...*). We may verify his credibility, reliability or accuracy by comparing what he writes about the Ājīvikas, or actually the propounders of determinism, with how he describes systems better known to us. In his commentary (SūyVṛ 1.1.2.28, p. 37) he provides a short account of other

kathañcīt sukha-duḥkhâdeḥ puruṣa-kāra-sādhyatvam âśriyate, hataḥ kriyâtaḥ phalam bhavati, kriyâ ca puruṣa-kârâyattâ pravartate, tathâ cōktam:

*na daivam iti sañcintya tyajed udyamam ātmanah /
anudyamena kas tailam tilebhyah prāptum arhati? //*

^a Recte: *niyati-kṛtam ekāntenâśriyanti* (not *evâkāntenâśriyanti*, another option).

¹⁷ See BRONKHORST (2003: 163): ‘The Jaina ascetic, by practising immobility, aspired to bring about a twofold effect: the annihilation of former actions, and the non-performing of new actions. The inactivity of the Jaina ascetic was not only meant to avoid producing karmic effects in the future, but also to destroy actions carried out in the past. The Ājīvika denied that present inactivity can destroy actions carried out in the past. For him these former actions will carry fruit whatever one does. However, there is no reason to believe that he rejected the possibility of non-performance of new actions. We may therefore formulate the hypothesis that both Jainism and Ājīvikism interpreted the doctrine of *karman* in the same way, believing that bodily and mental movements were responsible for rebirth. But whereas the Jainas believed that motionlessness might destroy past *karman*, the Ājīvikas did not think so.’

¹⁸ I deliberately stray from taking the term *puruṣa* in the standard Sāṃkhya way ‘the conscious principle’ because usually in the discussions on the prime cause of the world, Sāṃkhya view is not necessarily implied, albeit sometimes it is.

śrāmaṇas, including the Ājīvikas and the Buddhists. This is what he has to say about the former:

‘In the opinion of the propounders of destiny there exists no bondage of the sort that one would reflect on it and would destroy it.’¹⁹

‘For the propounders of the fourfold diminution of the *karman* through the knowledge of those ignorant of destiny (?) the very same desire for [a new] birth in the transmigration in the cycle of rebirths is established, [as for the Buddhists].’²⁰

The compound *niyaty-ajñāni-jñāna-catur-vidha-karmāpacaya-vādin* clearly is an extension of the typical phrase *niyati-vādin* (‘the propounder of the doctrine of destiny’), especially in view of the fact that the whole passage is an introduction to the *niyati-vāda* (‘the doctrine of destiny’). This extended phrase may contain a clue to some doctrinal elements of the Ājīvikas, but the actual resolution of the compound cannot be conclusive, for it allows for other interpretations as well. However, if we suppose that it is a credible reflection of an authentic belief, the compound would suggest that the Ājīvikas may have accepted four kinds of decrease of *karman* (of which other sources, e.g. the *Sāmañña-phala-sutta*, are silent).

Now, this is what Śīlāṅka has to say about the Buddhists:

‘The propounders of the five aggregates (*skandha*) of elements (*bhūta*), with their inner self obstructed by a false view of reality (*mithyātva*)—being attached to unreal apprehension [and entertaining] a concept of an awakening to ultimate reality, go to high and low states in the cycle of rebirths characterised by a multitude of disease, death and old age—desire or seek for a [new] birth innumerable times.’²¹

The terminology in the above passage is certainly not quite Buddhistic, but does not contain anything which directly goes counter the Buddhist doctrine either, except for a strange claim the Buddhists desire new birth (*garbham eṣyanti*). The passage does contain some typically Buddhist expressions, e.g. ‘disease, death, old age’ (*vyādhi-mṛtu-jarā*), or echoes certain Buddhist expressions (*pañca-bhūta-skandha*, *paramārthāvabodha*), but are not identical with those used in Buddhist texts (**pañca-skandha*; **yathā-bhūtārthāvabodha* (ABhK, *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*)). However, the passage could hardly be maintained to faithfully represent what the Buddhists said. In

¹⁹ SūyVṛ 1.1.2.28, p. 37.5–6: ‘*bandhanaṃ buddhyeta tac ca troṭayed’ iti tad eva ca bandhanaṃ niyati-vādy-abhiprāyeṇa na vidyate...*

²⁰ SūyVṛ 1.1.2.28, p. 37.13–14: *niyaty-ajñāni-jñāna-catur-vidha-karmāpacaya-vādināṃ tad eva saṃsāra-cakra-vāla-bhramāṇa-garbhānveṣaṇaṃ pratipādyate.*

²¹ SūyVṛ 1.1.2.28, p. 37.11–13: *pañca-bhūta-skandhādi-vādino mithyāvôpahatântarâtmano ’sad-grahâbhiniviṣṭhâḥ paramârthâvabodha-vikalpâḥ santaḥ saṃsâra-cakra-vâle vyâdhi-mṛtu-jarâ-kule uccâvacâni sthânâni gacchanto garbham eṣyanty anveṣayanti vânantasâ iti.*

addition, it contains some typically Jaina terms, e.g. *mithyātva*. The author does not refer to Buddhists directly but as the exponents of a particular doctrine (*pañca-bhūta-skandhādi-vādinah*). Further, both accounts, of the Ājīvikas and of the Buddhists, contain similar expressions (*saṃsāra-cakra-vāla-bhramaṇa / saṃsāra-cakra-vāle ... gacchanto, garbhānveṣaṇam / garbham ... anveṣayanti*), which may imply what Śīlāṅka thinks of both these groups: despite their beliefs and practices, what they actually achieve is in effect a continuous circle of rebirth. In view of the above comparison, it would not be too wise to grant Śīlāṅka with much accuracy and credibility as a source of information, and we cannot rely on what he says about the *niyati-vādins*, i.e. most probably the Ājīvikas.

4.2. The second source for BASHAM’s (1951: 221, n. 1) identification of verse V 2 is Jñānavimāla, and to his *Praśna-vyākaraṇa* 7. Since the work dates from the time around 1688 (?), we may safely assume, that the author no longer had any first-hand acquaintance of the Ājīvikas, and he merely reproduced a verse from earlier sources without probably any knowledge of who the Ājīvikas actually were.

For the same reason we can safely dismiss the usefulness of another source of the verse, i.e. Yaśovijaya’s *Śāstra-vārttā-samuccaya-ṭīkā* (ŚVSV ad ŚVS₂ 2.62, vol. 2, p. 79.7–8 = ŚVS₁ 2.174), for the author belongs to the same late period of 17th century.

Both Jñānavimāla and Yaśovijaya postdate Śīlāṅka by eight centuries.

For similar reasons we can also neglect the testimony of Abhayadeva-sūri (11th century) who quotes verse V 2 at least twice: in his commentary on the *Uvāsaga-dasāo* (UvDVi 166, p. 57) and in his *Tattva-bodha-vidhāyinī* (TBV 3.53 ad *niyati*, p. 714.11–27), as well as the testimony of another very late commentator Vijaya Darśana-sūri, who quotes the verse in his *Sammati-tarka-mahārṇavāvatārikā* (STPMAA, p. 352).

4.3. All other sources for verse V 2 postdate Śīlāṅka, and there seems to be just one which predates him. It is Haribhadra-sūri (8th century), who mentions the verse in his auto-commentary *Yoga-bindu-ṭīkā* (YBiṬ 313, p. 130.7–10). The verse is introduced, and rounded up, as follows:

‘And similar is the view of the doctrine of destiny [which stipulates]: “If [something must happen at time] *t*, then [it happens at time] *t*; if [something must happen at place] *p*, then [it happens at place] *p*; if [something must happen] due to [factor] *f*, then [it happens] due to [factor] *f*; if [some thing] *y* must occur, then [that thing] *y* occurs; if [some thing] *y* must not occur, then [that thing] *y* does not occur.” Accordingly:

“Whatever thing is to be gained...”

Also [the world's] being determined by destiny is nothing but dubious. In order to show that, it is said...'²²

The context of verse V 2 mentioned in the *Yoga-bindu* (YBi 313) is the discussion of the causality of god (*īśvara*), primordial factor (*prakṛti*), souls (*ātman*) etc. Except for this passage, the term *niyati* otherwise does not occur in the text of Haribhadra's *Yoga-bindu-ṭīkā*.

The term is paraphrased in YBi 313 as *niyata-bhāvatva* (*anye niyata-bhāvatvād*), or 'being determined by destiny', which is further explained as follows:

'[Thus speak] **others**, i.e. the propounders [of a theory that] the cause of the world is only destiny **because** [the world] **is determined by destiny**; those ford-makers (religious leaders) etc. whose nature, i.e. existence is due to destiny, i.e. is strictly conditioned by the determinants such as substance, place, time and condition are such [as described in verse 312].'²³

What is striking in the description of determinism associated with the Ājīvikas is the quadruplet of substance (*dravya*), place (*kṣetra*), time (*kāla*) and condition (*bhāva*), which are known to be standard parameters used by the Jainas, mostly in the context of *sapta-bhāṅgī*.²⁴ Therefore, it is rather unlikely that the paraphrase of determinist doctrine actually rests on genuine Ājīvika terminology. It is equally unlikely that the one who reproduces Ājīvika ideas does it both faithfully and with full knowledge. Further, as a rule, in the *Yoga-bindu* and the *Yoga-bindu-ṭīkā*, Haribhadra does not quote from non-Jaina sources. In those rare cases where he apparently does, he seems to quote quite consistently by specifically introducing the verses which he draws from other sources.²⁵ In addition, the principle seems to be that Haribhadra does not

²² YBiṭ 313, p. 130.3–6: *tathā ca niyati-vāda-matam. yad yadā tat tadā, yady atra tat tatra, yad yena tat tena, yad asya tat tasya, yad bhavati tat bhavati, yan na bhavati tan na bhavatīti. tathā:*

prāptavyo niyati-balāśrayeṇa yo 'rthaḥ ...

and p. 130.11: *iti. niyata-bhāvatvam api saṁsiddhikam evēti darśayann āhā...*

²³ YBiṭ 313, p. 129.26–130.2: *anye niyati-mātra-jagat-kāraṇa-vādināḥ niyata-bhāvatvāt niyatito dravya-kṣetra-kāla-bhāva-niyamena pratiniyamavān bhāvaḥ sattā yeṣāṁ tūrtha-kārādīnām te tathā, tad-bhāvas tattvaṁ, tasmāt.*

²⁴ E.g. in RVār 4.42 (p. 254.14 ff.), SVM 23.113 (p. 143.12), JTBh₁ 1.22 § 63 (p. 19) / JTBh₂ 1.22 (p. 19); see BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming), n. 70).

²⁵ E.g. YBiṭ 108, p. 48.1–2 (... *sāṁkhya-samaya-prasiddhaḥ. tathā ca te paṭhanti...*—this introduces SK 53), YBiṭ 119, p. 42.4 (*mato 'bhiprāhaḥ*), YBiṭ 197, p. 83.16–17, 26 (*yataḥ paṭhyate*), YBiṭ 205, p. 88.4 (*yataḥ paṭhyate*), YBiṭ 213, p. 91.5 (*yathōktam*), YBiṭ 217, p. 93.2 (*yataḥ paṭhyate*), YBiṭ 426, p. 171.5 (*tathā ca te paṭhyanti*), YBiṭ 476, p. 190.11 (*tathā ca bhavat-siddhāntaḥ*—introduces Haribhadra's own ŚVS₁ 5.404) with reference to Buddhist Yogācāra), YBiṭ 476, p. 190.15–16 (*tathā ca paṭhanti*—introduces PV₁ 3.35, p. 160; PV₂ 3.35, p. 22.21), YBiṭ 516, p. 203.6–7 (*prāg-abhāvādi-lakṣaṇam cētttham avaseyam*—introduces MŚV *abhāva* 2–3). In other (very few) cases, he rounds up a

specifically introduce his own verses, i.e. composed by him, in any particular way, except for occasional (but not obligatory) *tathā* or *iti* at the end.

A similar case to the one currently discussed (V 2 quoted by Haribhadra) is *Yoga-bindu-ṭikā* 290, in which a *pratīka* of *Yoga-bindu* (YBi 290a: *saṁvignaḥ*) is directly followed by (Haribhadra's own?) verse.²⁶ There is still one more very similar case (YBiṭ 78, *vide infra*, p. 29, n. 59) of the same structure (a *pratīka* followed by a verse, with no *iti*), which however moderates our findings: that verse is an attested quotation from an earlier source.

Nevertheless, considering all the above, it would seem quite likely that verse V 2 found in the *Yoga-bindu-ṭikā* is not a genuine quotation from a lost Ājīvika source but rather Haribhadra's own paraphrase of deterministic ideas entertained by the Ājīvikas.

4.4. There is, however, one difficulty with this conclusion, which in view of it would seem now too hasty, namely that... the verse is also quoted by Mallavādin Kṣamāśramaṇa in his *Dvādaśāra-naya-cakra*, a pre-Dharmakīrti text (most probably 2nd half of the 6th century), a definitely pre-Haribhadra text. It is introduced there as follows:

‘...[Consider the following objection:] “This very claim that it is inconsistent to maintain that the [conscious principle (*puruṣa*)] is the knower etc. can easily be corroborated. But also in the case if one acknowledged that it is consistent [to maintain that the conscious principle (*puruṣa*) is the knower], there is still the exactly same constraint which necessitates the need for the existence of another agent [different from the conscious principle (*puruṣa*)]. [Suppose] there is an agent ..., but it [again] is unconscious. The cause necessarily has to put into effect this constraint, because these [causes (?)] are either such or otherwise; therefore there is only one agent, namely destiny, for occasional and random diversity of its aims is not a defeating argument against the singularity of this [destiny as a single cause]. And it is said in support:

“Whatever thing is to be gained...”.²⁷

verse with an ‘extended’ *iti*-phrase (i.e. a phrase which contains *iti* alongside other elements), e.g. YBiṭ 87, 40.14 (*ity-ādi vacanaiḥ*), YBiṭ 250, p. 105.18 (*ity-ādinā granthena*).

²⁶ YBiṭ 290, p. 119.14–18: ... *saṁvignaḥ*

*tathye dharme dhvasta-hiṁsā prabandhe deve rāga-dveṣa-mohādi-mukte /
sādhau sarva-grantha-saṁdarbha-hiṁe saṁvego 'sau niścalo yo 'nurāgaḥ //*

²⁷ DNC, p. 193.3–4: *nanu taj-jñatvādy-ayuktatātvaiśā samarthate, yuktatvābhimatatve 'pi cāyam eva niyamaḥ kartr-antaratvāpādanāya. bhavati kartā ***** acetano 'pi bhavati. tan-niyama-kāriṇā kāraṇenāvaśyaṁ bhavitavyaṁ, teṣāṁ tathā-bhāvānyathā-bhāvād iti niyatir evākā kartrī. na hi tasyāṁ kadācit kathañcit tad-arthānyarūpyam ekatva-vyāghātī. anvāha ca:*

*prāptavyo niyati-balāśrayeṇa yo 'rthaḥ so 'vaśyaṁ bhavati nṛṇāṁ śubho 'śubho vā /
bhūtānāṁ mahati kṛte 'pi hi prayatne nābhāvyāṁ bhavati na bhāvino 'sti nāśaḥ //*

The introduction to the verse is phrased in the context of a discussion on causality in the world and contains a reference, cryptic in many ways (perhaps also due to insufficiencies of the available text of the *Dvādaśāra-naya-cakra* restored on the basis of the commentary, from which its portions were extracted), to destiny as the only cause of world events, used as an argument against the causality exercised by the conscious principle (*puruṣa*).

It is well known that Mallavādin Kṣamāśramaṇa copiously availed himself of various works which he criticised but also quoted, the best known case being the large portions of Diñnāga's *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*. It is very unlikely that the verse in question was a product of Mallavādin who, in his prose text, normally refrains himself from composing his own verses, and the verses found in his work are generally taken from other sources.

Interestingly, in all the above references verse V 2 is quoted without any modification or variant. In a number of other cases which are analysed in this paper the alleged Ājīvika references are often found with some variants. It would, therefore, seem plausible that verse V 2 could be a genuine Ājīvika verse due to the lack of any contrary evidence (I have not traced the verse in any other earlier work, e.g. of Jaina authorship).

However, it is most probably not the case. The source of the verse seems to be fable tradition, from which the *Pañca-tatra* derives or a version of the *Pañca-tatra* itself. The whole complete verse is found in one of the editions of the *Pañca-tatra* with a slight modification (in bold), in which the verse is adopted to the contents of a story:

‘Whatever thing is to be gained, **even a person who is unconscious lying in bed will obtain it** on account of the force of destiny. For even if living beings make great effort, that which is not to be does not happen, and there is no destruction of that which is to be.’²⁸

One may justifiably argue that the case is actually the other way round: a genuinely Ājīvika verse found its way into the narrative literature and fables, and a verse of originally philosophical pertinence was used and modified to serve fables. However, that counter-argument is somehow weakened, but not overturned, by the fact that portions of verse V 2 are found as parts of other verses of the *Pañca-tantra*.²⁹

²⁸ PañcT₁ 2.7, verse 2.152, p. 163:

*prāptavyo niyati-balāśrayeṇa yo 'rtho niśceṣṭaḥ śayana-gato 'py upāśnute tam /
bhūtānām mahati kṛte 'pi hi prayatne nābhāvyam bhavati na bhāvino 'sti nāśaḥ //*

²⁹ PañcT₃ 2.1, verses 70, p. 324:

*nāivārtho vyasana-gatena śocitavyo harṣo vā sukham upalabhya na prajoyjaḥ /
prāk-karma prati janito hi yo vipākaḥ so 'vaśyam bhavati nṛṇām śubho 'śubho vā //* 70 //

PañcT₁ 2.6, 2.160, p. 163 = PañcT₃ 2.1, verse 71, p. 324:

*kartavyaḥ pratidivasam prasanna-cittaiḥ svalpo 'pi vrata-niyamōpavāsa-dharmaḥ /
praṇeṣu praharati nityam eva daivam^a bhūtānām mahati kṛte 'pi hi prayatne //* 71 //

^a PañcT₁: *daivam*; PañcT₃: *mṛtyur*.

It would rather seem more justified to assume that a repository of fable verses were freely used, recycled and modified as building blocks to serve the needs of a particular story, and such originally narrative verses were later used by philosophical authors, such as Mallavādin Kṣamāśramaṇa, Haribhadra-sūri and others, to illustrate certain points they wanted to make in their own philosophical works.

There is a number of verses found in the *Pañca-tantra* which are meant to illustrate the ‘worldly wisdom’, often with a fatalistic turn, such as this one:

‘On the other hand, in the world the fruition—earned through one’s life—of the own deeds of humans, who always resort to each other, whose actions are sinful, is randomly happy or unhappy. Whatever is to be happens, there is no reason to deliberate over it.’³⁰

This and similar verses (*vide infra*) were to illustrate the idea that one cannot really influence the course of one’s life, that things are in a way predetermined, that the poor will remain poor and if they are to work out a change in their lives that does not happen through their work or effort but only by chance. In a way, such a pessimistic view is a ‘common-sense wisdom’ encountered not only in India, and cannot in any way be directly linked to a systematic deterministic thought of the Ājīvikas. Any resemblance such fable verses bear to real characters of the Ājīvikas is therefore purely incidental.

That is why we should eventually dismiss verse V 2 as a genuine passage which stems from the Ājīvika philosophical or religious literature, but is just a verse taken for the Indian fable lore.

5. Let us examine the second of the passages which BASHAM (1951: 221) believes is a genuine quote from an Ājīvika author:

‘Some [people] say that that the world is brought to existence through destiny, adding that what has to be is more dominant in all cases, as [these verses will illustrate]:

V 3: “The man obtains a thing which he is to obtain [by him]. What is the reason? That is the inescapable fate. Therefore I neither grieve nor wonder that what is my lot is not [the share] of others.”

V 4: “Fateful ordinance instantly produces a desired thing, as if [standing] in front [of the person], bringing it even from another continent, even from the midst of ocean, even from the end of any direction [of the world].”

³⁰ PañcT₂ 1.16, verse 1.403, p. 149 = PañcT₄ 1.16, verse 1.372, p. 98:

*loke ’thavā tanu-bhṛtām nija-karma-pākaṁ nityaṁ samāśritavatām vihita-kriyāṇām /
bhāvārjitaṁ śubham athāpy aśubhaṁ nikāmaṁ yad bhāvi tad bhavati nātra vicāra-hetuḥ //*

PañcT₂: *vihita-°*; PañcT₄ 1.16: *suhita-°*.

V 5: “Exactly such judgement materialises, and exactly such determination as well as one’s allies in the form as they have to be.”³¹

BASHAM (1951: 221, n. 2) traces the source: ‘Jñānavimāla to *Praśnavyākaraṇa sū 7*’ (Paṇ).

The first of these verses, i.e. V 3, can be easily found in the *Pañca-tantra*, with a minor variant (in bold):

V 3*: “The man obtains a thing which is to be obtained [by him]. **Even god is not capable of preventing this.** Therefore I neither grieve nor wonder that what is my lot is not [the share] of others.”³²

The way the verse is used confirms the conclusion of § 4.4. that we deal here with one from a pool of verses which were recycled and applied to various contexts in fables and narratives. As with verse V 2, it is hardly unlikely that the verse was taken from an Ājīvika source.

The second verse, i.e. V 4, quoted by Jñānavimāla is found in Harṣadeva’s *Ratnāvalī-nāṭikā*.³³

The third of these verses, i.e. V 5, is partly (*pādas* cd) found in at least two different sources, with various modifications adopted to different contexts. One of them is the alchemic *Rasārṇava*:

‘What happened, what is to happen now and what will happen in the whole triple world, this [apprehension] would tell. [These are] his allies in the form as they have to be.’³⁴

³¹ *kecin niyati-bhāvitaṃ jagad iti jalpanti, bhavitavyatāiva sarvatra balīyasīti, yathā:*

V 3: *prāptavyam arthaṃ labhate manuṣyaḥ kiṃ kāraṇam daivam alaṅghanīyam / tasmān na śocāmi na vismayāmi yad asmadīyaṃ na hi tat pareṣāṃ // 1 //*

V 4: *dvīpād anyasmād api madhyād api jala-nidher diśo ’py antāt / ānīya jhaṭ iti ghaṭayati vidhir abhimatam abhimukhī-bhūtam // 2 //*

V 5: *sā sā sampadyate buddhir vyavasāyaś ca tādrśaḥ / sahāyās^a tādrśā jñeyā yādrśī bhavitavyatā // 3 //*

^a Recte: *sahāyās*.

For an alternative translation see BASHAM (1951: 221).

³² PañcT₁ 2.4, verse 4.3, p. 147 = PañcT₂ 2.3, verse 2.111 / 113, p. 206 / 207 (repeated) = PañcT₄ 2.3, verse 104 / 109, p. 22 / 26 (repeated):

prāptavyam arthaṃ labhate manuṣyo devo ’pi taṃ laṅghayituṃ na śaktaḥ / tasmān na śocāmi na vismayo me yad asmadīyaṃ na hi tat pareṣāṃ //

³³ RAN 1.6:

dvīpād anyasmād api madhyād api jala-nidher diśo ’py antāt / ānīya jhaṭ iti ghaṭayati vidhir abhimatam abhimukhī-bhūtam // 1.6 //

³⁴ RasA 2.35:

bhūtaṃ bhavyaṃ bhaviṣyaṃ ca trailokye kathayet tu sā / sahāyās tādrśās tasya yādrśī bhavitavyatā //

The other source is the Advaitic *Bhāmatī* (Bhām) of Vācaspatimīśra, who quotes a part of the verse (*pādas* cd) in a very different context:

‘But since this created world is fictional, there is its another ally made of illusion, as they say: “[Its] allies are precisely of such a form as they have to be.”’³⁵

We can observe here a case very similar to the one noticed in the instance of the *Pañca-tantra* and fables which used and recycled the same versified parts in different contexts. What Jñānavimala did in his commentary to the canonical *Praśna-vyākaraṇa* was a patchwork in which various patterns are interlaced and adapted to serve his needs in order to illustrate a rather unspecific thesis that ‘some [people] say that that the world is brought to existence through destiny’. Furthermore, this does not necessarily have to be the same theoretical concept which was expressed by the Ājīvikas but may equally be a ‘common-sense wisdom’ so frequently enunciated in narrative tales and fables. In addition, these three verses in no way form a uniform whole, either in terms of contents or style, and the points of reference in each of them is quite different. As with verse V 2, there is therefore no reason to ascribe any of the verses quoted by Jñānavimala to the Ājīvikas. Jñānavimala apparently draws from fables and tales.

6. Let us now turn our attention to another verse alleged by BASHAM (1951: 222) to genuinely belong to Ājīvika literature.

V 6: ‘For that which is not to be does not happen, and that which is to be happens even without any effort. Even something contained in the palm of [our] hand disappears if it does not possess the necessity to exist.’³⁶

The source from which BASHAM (1951: 222, n. 2) takes the quote is: ‘Abhayadeva to *Uvāsaga-dasāo* 166 (= Uv—P.B.).’ Indeed it is the well-known commentator Abhayadeva, flourishing in 11th century, who avails himself of the verse in his commentary to the canonical work *Uvāsaga-dasāo* (UvDVi 166, p. 57).

However, precisely this verse in precisely the same reading is also found in the *Pañca-tantra*.³⁷ Again, as in similar cases discussed so far, there is no reason to believe that the original source was an Ājīvika text.

³⁵ Bhām 2.2.1.2, p. 419.30–31: *kālpanikyām tu sṛṣṭāv asti kālpanikāṃ dvitīyāṃ sahāyāṃ māyā-mayam. yathāhuḥ:*

sahāyās tādṛśā eva yādṛśī bhavitavyatā /

³⁶ *na hi bhavati yan na bhāvyaṃ bhavati ca bhāvyaṃ vināpi yatnena /*

kara-tala-gatam api naśyati yasya tu bhavitavyatā nāsti //

³⁷ PañcT₁ 2.6, verse 134, p. 156.6–17 = PañcT₂ 2.5, verse 5.130, p. 215.

7. Another verse BASHAM (1951: 222) draws our attention to is the following one, with an introduction which explicitly ascribes the view expressed in the verse to the Ājīvikas:

‘For instance, the followers of the Ājīvika theory say:

V 7: “The cognoscenti who are the makers of the passage (ford) to the moral law, having reached the highest destination, return again to existence on account of the abuse (maltreatment) of the pathway (ford).”³⁸

BASHAM (1951: 222, n. 5) describes his source as: ‘*Syād-vāda-mañjarī*, ed. Dhruva, p. 3.’³⁹

Indeed, this verse is quite peculiar in many ways, including the fact that it has apparently not been traced elsewhere and is singularly instantiated. Malliṣeṇa-sūri’s *Syād-vāda-mañjarī*, dating to 1229, is also the only work which refers to an idea of a return of Ājīvika (apparently) liberated saints to mundane existence. The verse is, however, ambiguous and somewhat eccentric, which makes it a bit doubtful whether Malliṣeṇa-sūri flourishing in the 13th century Gujarat (where there had been no community of Ājīvikas for centuries any longer) had any sound knowledge of the system of the Ājīvikas.

The appellation ‘the makers of the passage (ford) to the moral law’ (*jñānino dharmatīrthasya kartāraḥ*) may seem at first untypical. From Buddhist and Jaina sources, if we can trust them, we know that the Ājīvikas apparently used the term *tīrtham-kāra* to refer to their founders and saints, in the very same way as the Jainas did. The Jainas themselves also used the appellation *dharmatīrtha-kāra* throughout the time, starting from canonical times⁴⁰ as well as Sanskrit philosophical literature⁴¹. It would therefore not be so surprising to find the same term or idea—*dharmatīrthasya kartāraḥ*, *dharmatīrtha-kartṛ*, *dharmatīrtha-kāra*, etc.—being used by the Ājīvikas from early times, and being used in the sense of ‘a fully liberated religious founder’.

³⁸ SVM 1.57, p. 3: *tathā cāhur ājīvika-nayānusāriṇaḥ*:
jñānino dharmatīrthasya kartāraḥ paramam padam /
gatvāgacchanti bhūyo ’pi bhavam tīrtha-nikārataḥ //

³⁹ BASHAM (1951: 222) translates the verse as follows: ‘And thus say those who follow the Ājīvika school: “The knowers, the founders of the faith, having gone to the highest state, return again to existence, when the faith suffers injury.”’ Compare also the translation of F.W. THOMAS (1960: 11): ‘Knowers, makers of the ford of dharma, are the highest station: having gone, they come again into existence for the overthrow of heresies.’

⁴⁰ See, e.g., Uttar 23.1d, 5b: *dharmatīrthayare jīṇe*.

⁴¹ E.g., LT 1.1:

dharmatīrtha-karebhyo ’stu syād-vādibhyo namo-namaḥ /
ṛṣabhādi-mahāvīrāntarebhyaḥ svātmōpalabdhave // 1 //

PMiV 1.1.1 (p. 1):

ananta-darśana-jñāna-vīryānanda-mayātmane /
namo ’rhate kṛpā-kṛpta-dharmatīrthāya tāyine // 1 //

What is ambiguous in the verse are at least two elements, granted that *dharmatīrthasya kartārah* refers to ‘fully liberated religious founders or teachers of the Ājīvikas’. The first is the sentence: *āgacchanti bhūyo ’pi bhavaṃ* (‘they return again to existence’), which—out of context—may denote at least two different things: (1) ‘they return to the mundane world temporarily and at their own will, without any new karmic bondage’, just like the *avatāras* of Viṣṇu, and by implication their highest destination (*paramaṃ padam*) remains the liberated state; (2) ‘they return to the cycle of rebirths (*samsāra*) and start the process of karmic retribution anew’, so by implication their highest destination (*paramaṃ padam*) was merely a temporary liberation, i.e. a kind of heaven.

The second ambiguity is the expression *tīrtha-nikārataḥ*, which could be understood in a variety of ways: (1) because there are obstacles to the pathway, or as BASHAM (1951: 222) translates: ‘when the faith suffers injury’; (2) ‘because the pathway (i.e. religious tradition) is diminished’, i.e. people themselves gradually neglect the pathway and it becomes obsolete and in need of revitalisation; (3) ‘because there is opposition to the pathway’, i.e. non-believers abuse, or maltreat pious followers and oppose the creed, etc.; (4) ‘because of the bringing down of the pathway [by the cognoscenti]’, i.e. they themselves depart from or bring down the pathway. In any case, the verse does not allow for the translation of F.W. THOMAS (1960: 11): ‘they come again into existence for the overthrow of heresies’, albeit this is what BASHAM’s understanding implies.

One of the interpretations of the compound *tīrtha-nikārataḥ* would suggest that the liberated beings would return as a kind of Bodhisattva, who—untainted by *karman* and mundane world—reappear in the material world in order to rectify it and to show the suffering humans the correct path anew. This could not have been an ancient idea of the Ājīvikas, but merely a later development induced by parallel developments in Buddhism and, perhaps, Viṣṇuism. Another interpretation could be that the Ājīvika *tīrtha-kāras* depart from the mundane world and attain liberation (*paramaṃ padam*), whereas new teachers reappear in the world to continue the mission; that would point in a direction of a series of *tīrtha-kāras*, one succeeded by another, well-known from Jainism or Buddhism. Still another possibility would be—even though at first much less likely, but still possible in view of our extremely limited knowledge of the Ājīvika doctrine—that even the liberated beings could themselves overstep certain limits and abuse the pathway, and in the end they would have to go through the whole cycle of *samsāra* anew, an interpretation which would point to a ceaseless cycle of rebirths, at least in some cases. In fact, such an interpretation, or similar, may turn out to be most plausible in view of the context in which it occurs, namely the discussion of the qualities of a real *tīrtha-kāra*, who is of infinite knowledge (*ananta-vijñāna*) and whose faults are eliminated (*atīta-doṣa*); Malliṣeṇa refers to a counter-argument, which incorporates Ājīvikas as an example and embeds the above-quoted verse V 7:

‘With regard to these [qualities of a *tīrtha-kāra* mentioned in the main text], an opponent says: “It is enough to say that [a real *tīrtha-kāra*] must be just someone of infinite knowledge, but not someone whose faults are eliminated”, inasmuch as the meaning [of the latter] is included [in the former], because without a destruction of faults infinite knowledge is not possible.” We reply to this as follows: this [mention that a *tīrtha-kāra* has to be, in addition, someone whose faults are eliminated] serves the purpose of excluding an authority conceived by followers of mistaken theories. For instance, the followers of the Ājīvika theory say:

V 7: “The cognoscenti who are the makers of the passage (ford) to the moral law, having reached the highest destination, return again to existence on account of the abuse (maltreatment) of the pathway (ford). Therefore these [makers of the passage] are not such whose faults are eliminated. How could otherwise their decent back to existence be possible, even if one sees the abuse of the pathway?”⁴²

The frame for the verse, perhaps authentic, is what Malliṣeṇa says; he indeed explains *tīrtha-nikārataḥ* as *tīrtha-nikāra-darśane 'pi*, which does not really fit grammatically into what we have in the verse. In any case, the idea which transpires is that the liberated teachers of the Ājīvikas fall back because their faults and karmic blemishes are never completely eliminated. That would render the whole idea of liberation meaningless, and would also contradict the image of a determined way to liberation, explicated in the *Sāmañña-phala-sutta* above: ‘Just like a ball of thread, when thrown, exhausts itself, [simply] unwinding, exactly in the same manner both the fool and the wise—having transmigrated, having gone through the cycle of rebirths—will put an end to unhappiness’. If this ‘return’ theory had really been maintained by the Ājīvikas, at least at some point of time, their opponents would not have hesitated to immediately point out the actual impossibility of liberation in their theory. However, we do not find such evidence from their critics. Of course, we deal here with two equally unreliable sources—an early Buddhist and a late Jaina—and without access to more reliable data it is impossible to decide what the Ājīvikas really believed in. Here is precisely the methodological vicious circle mentioned at the outset: as long as we do not have a reliable picture of reconstructed doctrine of the Ājīvikas, we cannot assess whether the above verse V 7 is compatible with what the Ājīvikas claimed, *ergo* can be admitted as genuinely Ājīvika, or whether it contradicts their doctrine, *ergo* has to be dismissed as not authentic.

⁴² SVM 1.43–50, p. 3: *atrāha paraḥ. ananta-vijñānam ity etāvad evāstu nātīta-doṣam iti. gatārthatvāt. doṣātyayam vinātyanta-vijñānatvasyānupapatteḥ. atrōcyate. kunaya-matānusāri-parikalpitāpta-vyavacchedārtham idam. tathā cāhur ājīvika-nayānusāriṇaḥ:*

*jñānino dharmā-tīrthasya kartāraḥ paramam padam /
gatvāgacchanti bhūyo 'pi bhavam tīrtha-nikārataḥ //*

iti. tan nūnam na te 'tīta-doṣāḥ. katham anyathā teṣām tīrtha-nikāra-darśane 'pi bhavāvatarāḥ.

In addition, we must also take into account that the doctrine of the Ājīvikas certainly evolved, and it is possible that they did admit an everlasting liberation in the beginning, but in the course of time they (or some of their adherents) adopted another idea that the liberation is never permanent.

Of course, an idea of transitory liberation is a contradiction in terms, because such a picture relegates ‘the highest goal’ merely to one of heavenly abodes from which one falls back to earth, so it is never a liberation. Further, such an idea is incompatible with the determinism according to which the cycle of rebirths ends at a fixed moment after the lapse of a particular, though countless births and deaths. If we accept that one falls back from such ‘limited liberation’, there is no need to speak of a path to it determined by destiny, because ‘limited liberation’ becomes merely one of innumerable existences, and the only difference might be that it would be incorporeal. This would not be logical, but of course logic is hardly ever at work when it comes to religion and belief.

However, such a position of the Ājīvikas would be so peculiar, even more peculiar than the idea of strict determinism, that it would certainly lead a number of critical comments and ridicules from other schools. That was however not the case: we do not hear such reports that the Ājīvikas admitted of a fallible and temporarily ‘limited liberation’.

For precisely these reasons I would be tempted to reject the above verse V 7 as not genuinely Ājīvika, but merely a hearsay reference to their doctrine, which does not faithfully reproduce a real doctrine.

8. In search for data on the Ājīvikas, BASHAM (1951: 226) refers to the following passage, reported by Jñānavimāla:

‘Some [people] maintain that the world is brought to existence through [its] intrinsic nature and that everything originates only through [its] intrinsic nature.’⁴³

In the first place, since the passage is introduced as *kecit ... manyante*, it can only be a paraphrase of an idea at most. In fact, it is quite likely that it is not even a genuine report but a phrasing of one of possible views about the origins of the world, because it is a standard, almost mechanical phrase which Jñānavimāla uses (n. 19):

kecit svabhāva-bhāvitam jagad manyante, svabhāvenāiva sarvaḥ sampadyate.

kecin niyati-bhāvitam jagad iti jalpanti, bhavitavyatāiva sarvatra baliyasīti.

Therefore, we cannot attach any value to such and similar references because their informational value is actually tautological, and they certainly say nothing of the Ājīvikas.

⁴³ BASHAM (1951: 226, n. 1): *kecit svabhāva-bhāvitam jagad manyante, svabhāvenāiva sarvaḥ sampadyate.* To *Praśna-vyākaraṇa* 7, fol. 29. V[ide] also Śīlāṅka to *Sū. kṛ.* i,1,2,2, fol. 30.’ BASHAM (1951: 226) translates the verse: ‘Some believe that the universe was produced by *Svabhāva*, and that everything comes about by *Svabhāva* only.’

9. In fact, in many sources where the idea of determinism and destiny (*niyati*)—closely related to the Ājīvikas—occurs, a range of similar causal factors are discussed, either all or most of them: (1) time (*kāla*), (2) intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*), (3) primordial factor (*prakṛti*), (4) destiny (*niyati*), (5) personal agency (*puruṣa*), (6) former deeds (*pūrva-kṛta*), i.e. karmic retribution (*karman*) and (7) god (*īśvara*), etc.⁴⁴ Since this list covers some of the factors sometimes associated with the Ājīvikas, one may, it seems, justifiably entertain a suspicion that the list jointly and systematically reflects a set of causes which includes also causes which, at a certain point in the evolution of their doctrine, the Ājīvikas adopted to explain the causality of the world and auxiliary factors which assisted the main force of destiny (*niyati*). Especially two would, at least in theory, seem good candidates to complement *niyati*, i.e. *kāla* (time) and *svabhāva* (intrinsic nature). At the same time we can safely exclude *puruṣa* (personal agency) and *īśvara* (god, creator) as causal complements of *niyati*: clearly the doctrine of destiny the way it was conceived in India allowed neither for god or creator as an external factor over and above destiny, nor for former deeds (*pūrva-kṛta*), because that would contradict the force of destiny, nor for *puruṣa*, understood either as human agency or as the active soul (*ātman*) or conscious inactive principle of the Sāṃkhya, because *puruṣa* in both these meanings was either incompatible with or contrary to, respectively, *niyati*.

One of such standard enumerations is found in the *Saṃmati-tarka-prakaraṇa*, a late fifth-century Jaina work of Siddhasena Divākara:

‘The causes [of everything], such as time (*kāla*), inherent nature (*svabhāva*), destiny (*niyati*), former deeds (*pūrva-kṛta*) and personal agency (*puruṣa*), all taken in the absolute sense [constitute] false belief. However, all these taken jointly are the correct belief.’⁴⁵

This verse immediately reminds us of a *Śvetāśvatara-upaniṣad* verse, and even the sequence of a number of causal factors is the same:

‘Suppose [the cause of everything] is time (*kāla*), inherent nature (*svabhāva*), destiny (*niyati*), chance (*yadṛcchā*), material elements (*mahā-bhūta*), the womb (*yoni*) or conscious principle (*puruṣa*), or a combination of these? However, [none] is the case, because there is the self. [Still]

⁴⁴ Some of such doctrines (*svabhāva-vāda*, *niyati-vāda*, *kāla-vāda*) are discussed, alongside *yadṛcchā-vāda*, in: KAVIRAJ (1966: 45–71, ‘Theism In Ancient India’), and two of them (*svabhāva-vāda* and *kāla-vāda*) by BHATTACHARYA (2012). BHATTACHARYA (2001) and (2012: ‘Appendix’, 610–611) lists a number of such causal factors, and claims to have found as many as 28 (2012: 594).

⁴⁵ STP 3.53:

*kālo sahāva ṇiyāi puvva-kayaṃ purisa kāraṇēgaṃtā /
micchattam te cēva samāsao hoṃti sammattam //*

even the self is powerless, because it has as its causal factors pleasure and pain.⁴⁶

If *niyati-vāda* can indeed be taken as a ‘indicator’ reference to the Ājīvikas, and we know of no other system so strongly associated with this notion, the *Śvetâsvatara-upaniṣad* is the earliest Sanskrit reference to the doctrine of *niyati*, ergo to the Ājīvikas.

Since both time and intrinsic nature are not necessarily incompatible with destiny, and may be conceived of as complementary to or supplementing the power of *niyati*, in the sense that they merely emphasise two aspects of destiny over which no one has any control and which override all individual actions and decisions, we should also consider whether they could be used as ‘Ājīvika indicators’, i.e. whether we have any evidence that they were indeed conceived of as such corollaries of destiny and whether there are any verses which refer to time and intrinsic nature which could be classified as genuinely Ājīvika, until proven otherwise.

A Buddhist author Aśvaghōṣa in his *Saundārananda* enumerates other causes: time (*kāla*), inherent nature (*svabhāva*), chance (*yadṛcchā*), primordial factor (*prakṛti*), god (*īśvara*) and *vidhi* (fateful ordinance), of which we know that it is associated or synonymous with *niyati* (see § 4.1. and verse V 4):

‘So, in this world the causal factor for this suffering [bound to] activity is the conglomeration of defects, such as desire etc. It is not god, it is not primordial factor, neither time nor intrinsic nature, neither fateful ordinance nor chance.’⁴⁷

The same author apparently follows a similar pattern in his *Buddha-carita*: BC 9.38 concerns time (*kāla*), BC 9.58–62 deals with intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*), BC 9.57 discusses primordial factor (*prakṛti*), BC 9.63ab pertains to god (*īśvara*), BC 9.63cd seems to speak of destiny (*niyati*) (?),⁴⁸ BC 9.64–65 touches on personal agency (*puruṣa*), here referred to as ‘soul’ (*ātman*) or ‘man’ (*nara*).

⁴⁶ ŚvU 1.2:

*kālaḥ svabhāvo niyatir yadṛcchā bhūtāni yoniḥ puruṣa iti cintyam /
samyoga esām na tv ātma-bhāvād ātmāpy anīśaḥ sukha-duḥkha-hetoḥ //*

Interestingly, commenting on this verse, Rāmānuja no longer knows who the proponents of *niyati* were, see his PSBh *ad loc.*, p. 3.5: *mīmāṃsakās tu niyati-lakṣaṇam karmāiva hetum manyante*. ‘Inherent nature’ is here clearly identified with materialists, PSBh *ad loc.*, p. 3.4–5: *lokāyatikās tu svabhāvam eva hetum ācakṣate*.

⁴⁷ Sau 16.17:

*pravṛtti-duḥkhasya ca tasya loke tṛṣṇādayo doṣa-gaṇā nimittam /
nāvēśvaro na prakṛtir na kālo nāpi svabhāvo na vidhir yadṛcchā //*

⁴⁸ Despite the fact that BC 9.63cd does not seem to be related to BC 9.63ad, still BC 9.63 allows for some ambiguity, for it says:

sargaṃ vadantīśvaratas tathānye tatra prayatne puruṣasya ko ’rthaḥ /
ya eva hetur jagataḥ pravṛtttau hetur nivṛtttau niyataḥ sa eva // 9.63 //*

Another good example of such a list of slightly later date is that provided by a Jaina commentator Śīlāṅka. In his discussion of various causes of the world and of happiness and unhappiness (SūyVṛ 1.1.2.28–34, p. 37–40), In what follows, Śīlāṅka mentions four of them: destiny (*niyati*), personal agency (*puruṣa*), time (*kāla*) and god (*īśvara*). Śīlāṅka explicates the doctrine of destiny, normally associated with the Ājīvikas, but which is not ascribed to them in the passage:

‘[The world is caused] only by destiny. This is what is said at the end of the second verse, namely that time is not the agent either, because—since this [time] is uniform—it would not be possible to explain the manifoldness of results (forms) in the world. For [the rule is that] there is a variety of effects if there is a variety of causes, but not if there is no variety of causes....’⁴⁹

The list does not, however, include intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*), which may indicate, that time and intrinsic nature were not, in fact, corollaries of destiny (*niyati*) associated with the Ājīvikas, but were independent causal factors postulated by schools other than the Ājīvikas.

A rejoinder to the above verse does not represent Śīlāṅka’s own view but a tentative objection or *uttara-pakṣa*, which—in a complex argumentative structure—might be considered, perhaps, representing a genuinely Ājīvika response:

‘It has been criticised: “Since time is uniform, the manifoldness of the world is not be possible.” This is not a [proper] criticism for us, because we do not accept time as the only one agent, but also *karman*. Therefore [the argument based on] the manifoldness of the world is not a [proper criticism]. Similarly, god is an agent as well...’⁵⁰

After the discussion, in speaking of ‘the doctrine of destiny (*niyati-vāda*) and other [doctrines]’⁵¹, Śīlāṅka explicitly keeps destiny separate from the other causal

‘Similarly others claim that the world* is due to god, and as far as this [world] is concerned, what would be the purpose of any effort on the part the human being? Only that which is the cause of any activity in the world is also determined to stop it.’

* In the particular context of the discussion on how to achieve liberation and what is the driving force in the world, *sarga* cannot mean ‘creation [of the universe]’ but rather ‘the world’ or ‘what happens in the world’.

⁴⁹ SūyVṛ 1.1.2.29–30, p. 38.8–9: *niyater evēti. etaṁ ca dvitīya-ślokānte ’bhidhiāsyate nāpi kālaḥ kārta, tasāka-rūpatvāj jagati phala-vaicitryānupapatteḥ, kāraṇa-bhede hi kārya-bhedo bhavati nābhede...*

⁵⁰ SūyVṛ 1.1.2.31, p. 39.19–23: *yac cōcyate “kālasyaāka-rūpetvāj jagad-vaicitryam na ghaṭata” iti, tad asmān prati, yato ’mābhir na kāla evākaḥ karṭṛtenābhupagamyate api tu karmāpi, tato jagad-vaicitryam ity adoṣaḥ tathēśvaro ’pi kartā...*

⁵¹ : SūyVṛ 1.1.2.34, p. 40.26: *niyati-vādādy-ekāntājñāna-vādino...*

theories discussed (time, god etc.) making it clear that the propounders of destiny (the Ājīvikas?) did not combine it with other explanatory factors responsible for the change and causality in the world. Therefore it is extremely unlikely that the Ājīvikas integrated in their belief a complex of causal factors, such as destiny, time, human agency and god taken jointly as a variegated whole. What actually remains as an ‘Ājīvika indicator’ of later period (after approx. 1 century CE) and Sanskrit literature would be *niyati* only.

10. It was much earlier that Mallavādin Kṣamāśramaṇa (6th century) opens a discussion on the prime causal factor of events in the world in his *Dvādaśāra-naya-cakra*. Various suggestions are discussed, e.g. personal agency (*puruṣa*), i.e. the agency of a conscious subject (DNC 189.3–191.2). Then (DNC 191.3 ff.), Mallavādin Kṣamāśramaṇa comes to discuss three stereotypic factors jointly: time (*kāla*), primordial factor (*prakṛti*), destiny (*niyati*) and intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*), beginning in a likewise stereotypic way:

‘This determining force] is nothing but (1) time because it reckons [everything], (2) nature because it gives form [to everything], (3) destiny because it destines the way [everything] is formed etc., (4) intrinsic nature because it exists through its own form.’⁵²

The verse is also quoted in Abhayadeva-sūri’s *Tattva-bodha-vidhāyini* (TBV 3.53, p. 712.1–2). It is the commentator Simha-sūri in his *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* (NĀA) who identifies some of these doctrines. Time (*kāla*) is associated with the Sāṃkhya system⁵³, and a part of a verse is quoted in support: ‘Time brings living beings to maturity’.⁵⁴ Similarly, primordial factor (*prakṛti*) is associated with Sāṃkhya and

⁵² DNC, p. 191.3–4: *sa eva kalanāt kālaḥ. prakaraṇāt prakṛtiḥ. rūpanādi-niyamanān niyatiḥ. svena rūpeṇa bhavanāt svabhāvaḥ.*

⁵³ Notice the pun on the name of the Sāṃkhya system in NĀA 191.13: *kala[h] saṃkhyāne kalanam jñānam saṃkhyānam ity arthaḥ.*—‘Time is used in the sense of counting, “reckoning” means cognition, i.e. counting—such is the meaning.’

⁵⁴ NĀA 191.14–15: *kālaḥ pacati bhūtāni iti ślokaḥ.* The verse must be associated with one current of the Sāṃkhya tradition, but does not belong to the later mainstream classical Sāṃkhya of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and Gauḍapāda. It is a fragment of a longer verse, quoted and ultimately rejected in Gauḍapāda’s *Bhāṣya* (GBh 61, p. 153.6–8): *tathā keṣāmcit kālaḥ karaṇam iti, uktaṃ ca:*

*kālaḥ pacati bhūtāni kālaḥ saṃharate jagat /
kālaḥ supteṣu jāgarti kālo hi duratikramaḥ //*

See also: MaiU₁ 6.15, p. 123.5–6 = MaiU₂, p. 341.20–21:

*kālaḥ pacati bhūtāni sarvāṅy mahātmani /
yasmīns tu pacyate kālo yas taṃ veda sa vedavit //*

In fact, the verse occurs in different variants in the *Mahā-bhārata*, e.g. MBh 1.1.188:

*kālaḥ pacati bhūtāni kālaḥ saṃharati prajāḥ /
nirdahantam prajāḥ kālam kālaḥ śamayate punaḥ //*

It is also quoted in a variant by Guṇaratna-sūri and ascribed to some ‘propounders of time’ (*kāla-vādin*), TRD 1 § 19, p.16.13–14:

kālaḥ pacati bhūtāni kālaḥ saṃharate prajāḥ /

described as related to the three qualities (*guṇa: sattva, rajas, tamas*).⁵⁵ That Simha-sūri identifies two separate driving forces of the universe with one and the same system is in itself rather curious. On the other hand, he does not relate the two other causality doctrines (*niyati* and *svabhāva*) to any particular school. Of *niyati*—which here no longer means ‘destiny’ but rather ‘necessity’ or ‘necessary correlation’—he merely says:

‘Destiny (necessity) because of determination of the following sort: the datum for the eyes is colour because of [it] colouring [the eye], not taste etc.; taste is the datum for the sense of taste because of [it] giving taste [to the sense of taste], not colour etc.’⁵⁶

Neither of intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) does he have much to say:

‘Intrinsic nature because it exists through its own form, i.e. its existence in all by itself. As some people say:

V 8: “What makes the sharpness of thorns and multiform appearance of beasts and birds? All that is driven by intrinsic nature. There is no independent act. Wherefrom [should] any effort [come from if not from intrinsic nature]?”⁵⁷

As aptly noticed by BASHAM (1951: 226),⁵⁸ the verse is cited also by Guṇaratna-sūri (TRD 1 § 24, p.20.1–2). It is also quoted in Haribhadra-sūri’s *Yoga-bindu-ṭīkā*,⁵⁹ and elsewhere, i.e. Bhaṭṭa Utpala’s *Bḥat-samhitā* 1.7, Ḍallana’s commentary on the

kālah supteṣu jāgarti kālo hi duratikramaḥ //

⁵⁵ NĀA 191.15–18, **prakṛti:** *sattva-rajasa-tamaḥ-svatattvān prakāśa-prakṛti-niyamārthān guṇān ātma-svatattva-vikalpān eva bhoktā prakurute iti prakṛtiḥ, yathāhur eke:*

ajām ekām lohita-śukla-kṛṣṇām buddhiḥ prajāḥ sṛjamānām sarūpāḥ /

ajo hy eko juṣamāṇo ’nuṣete jahāty enām buhta-bhogām ajo ’nyaḥ // [ŚvU 4.5]

⁵⁶ NĀA 191.18–20: *rūpaṇāc cakṣuṣo viṣayo rūpam eva na rasādayaḥ, rasanād raso rasana-viṣayo na rūpādaya ity-ādi niyamanān niyatīḥ.*

Even in a whole section on *niyati* begins at NĀA 192.25–205.11 we find no name of any particular school, and the discussion is merely abstract, with nor reference to any existing thinker or philosophical current.

⁵⁷ NĀA 191.20–22: *svo bhāva ātmanāva svena rūpeṇa bhavanāt svabhāvaḥ. yathāhur eke:*

kaḥ kaṇṭakānām prakaroti taiḥṣṇyam vicitra-bhāvam mṛga-pakṣiṇām vā /

svabhāvataḥ sarvam idaṁ pravṛttaṁ na kāma-cāro ’sti kutaḥ prayatnaḥ //

⁵⁸ He translates the verse as follows: ‘What makes the sharpness of thorns and the varied nature of beasts and birds? All this comes about by *Svabhāva*. There is nothing which acts at will. What is the use of effort?’ and traces the source: ‘Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā to *Ṣaddarśanasamuccaya*, p. 13. V. also *Abh. Rāj. s.v.*’ (BASHAM (1951: 226, n. 2)).

⁵⁹ YBiṭ 78, p. 36.21–24, where it is introduced with the phrase: **svabhāva-vādāpattiḥ:** *kaḥ kaṇṭakānām...*, the phrase being merely a *pratīka* of YBi 78a. Apparently, while composing YBi 78, Haribhadra had in mind the original verse V 8 on which he makes pun.

Suśruta-saṁhitā (*Śarīra*, chapter 1) of 13th century.⁶⁰ Its role there is to illustrate *svabhāva-vāda*, and it is coupled with another verse of a similar ‘thorny’ image:

‘Of [numerous] thorns of a jujube tree, one thorn is sharp, another is straight, still another is crooked, but its fruit is round. Say what has fashioned [these forms of one and the same tree]?’⁶¹

In fact, however, in his commentary to the *Dvādaśāra-naya-cakra* Simha-sūri merely repeats just one of two verses quoted later by Mallavādin (DNC, p. 222.6–9), who apparently identifies the idea of intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) with materialists, not with the propounders of the doctrine of destiny (*niyati-vādin*). The other of the two verses says the following:

V 9: ‘Who beautified the eyes of she-deers? And who endowed peacocks with so radiant tail plumage? Who makes the buds of petals in blue lotuses? Or who establishes good conduct among well-born men?’⁶²

The verse strikes a familiar note with a range of similar verses found, e.g., in the *Tattva-saṅgraha*:

‘What makes the diversity of filaments of a lotus flower? What has fashioned the variegated eyes in a peacock’s tail?’⁶³

or in the *Sarva-siddhānta-saṅgraha*,

‘What would colour peacocks? What would make cuckoos coo? In these cases, there is no other cause except intrinsic nature.’⁶⁴

⁶⁰ See KAVIRAJ (1966: 52–53).

⁶¹ TRD 1 § 23, p. 20:

*kaḥ kaṅṭakānām prakaroti taikṣṇyam vicitra-bhāvam mṛga-pakṣiṇām vā /
svabhāvataḥ sarvam idaṁ pravṛttam na kāma-cāro ’sti kutaḥ prayatnaḥ //
badaryāḥ kaṅṭakas tīkṣṇa r̥jur ekaś ca kuñcitaḥ /
phalaṁ ca vartulam tasyā vada kena vinirmitam //*

⁶² DNC, p. 222.8–9:

*kenāñjītāni nayanāni mṛgāṅganānām ko vā karoti rucirāṅga-ruhān mayūrān /
kaś cōtpaleṣu dala-sannicayam karoti ko vā karoti vinayam kulajeṣu puṁsu //*

⁶³ TSa 111:

*rājīva-kesarādīnām vaicitryam kaḥ karoti hi /
mayūra-candrakādir vā vicitraḥ kena nirmitaḥ //*

⁶⁴ SSS 2.5:

*śikhīnaś citrayet ko cā kokilān kaḥ prakūjayet /
svabhāva-vyatirekeṇa vidyate nātra kāraṇam //*

and ascribed to the Lokāyatas / Cārvākas.⁶⁵ Also Śīlānka combines the two images—that of sharp thorns and that of colourful tail plumage of peacocks—and explicitly establishes a connection with the materialists:

‘Thus arises the multiform appearance of the world due to intrinsic nature, as it has been said:

“The sharpness of thorns, colourful appearance of peacock, the colours of pheasants all occur indeed due to intrinsic nature.”

Thus the view of those who say that the soul is the same as the body (sc. materialists) has been described.’⁶⁶

In the very same spirit Simha-sūri links the image of ‘thorny things’ and intrinsic nature to the materialists:

‘As they say: One sees that the origin [of consciousness] depends solely on a complex configuration of material substances such as earth etc., so since [consciousness] is seen to originate in dependence on these [material elements] and because there is no deviance from intrinsic nature (i.e. because these developments are consistently related to intrinsic nature with no exception), one should maintain that [the only cause in the world] is intrinsic nature. For it is as follows: in certain cases of disfigurement etc. one can see some [trees] with thorns among [particular species of] trees etc. without thorns and some [trees] without thorns among [particular species of] trees etc. with thorns as inferential signs of such a particular arrangement [of material elements], as it has been said:

“Some things [normally] without thorns are seen the other way round, i.e. to be with thorns, and other things [normally] with horns are seen the other way round, i.e. to be without thorns. [That is why people] speak of [such cases as] defining feature of a particular arrangement [of material elements].”⁶⁷

As the above examples which consistently link the queries for the cause of the beauty of nature and animals to the materialists, and as Ramkrishna BHATTACHARYA (2012) has demonstrated, also verse V 9 can be easily dismissed as non-Ājīvika. Since the

⁶⁵ For more examples see BHATTACHARYA (2012: 596–7, 604).

⁶⁶ SūyVṛ 1.1.1.12, p. 27.13–17: *evam svabhāvāj jagad-vaicitryam, tathā cōktam:*

kaṅṭakasya ca tīkṣṇatvaṃ mayūrasya vicitratā /

varṇās ca tāmra-cūḍānām svabhāvena bhavanti hi //

iti taj-jīva-tac-charīra-vādi-mataṃ gatam...

⁶⁷ NĀA 223.10–14: *yad ucyate bhūmy-ādi-dravya-vinirvṛtṭy-apekṣāvōtpattir dṛṣṭā ity etat tad-apekṣōtpatti-darśanāt svabhāvavyabhicārāc ca svabhāva evēti mantavyam. tad yathā—utpātādiṣu akaṅṭakānām vṛkṣādīnām kaṅṭakāḥ kaṅṭakinām cākaṅṭakā nidhy-ādi-liṅgatvena dṛṣṭāḥ. yathōktam:*

akaṅṭakāḥ kaṅṭakinaḥ kaṅṭakās cāpy akaṅṭakāḥ /

viparyayeṇa dṛṣyante vadanti nidhi-lakṣaṇam //

sectarian source of V 9 is connected with that of V 8, we can be justified in also dismissing V 8.

However, there are more reasons to dismiss this verse as authentically Ājīvikas. Again BHATTACHARYA (2012: 602) draws our attention to three other variants of verse V 8. In fact, there is still one more variant quoted by Vijaya Darśana-sūri in his *Sammatitarka-mahārṇavāvatārikā*.⁶⁸ All of these cases are associated with *svabhāva-vāda* and none of these cases is related to the Ājīvikas in any way whatsoever.

The sources for both verses V 8 and V 9 are quite clear: V 8 (*kaḥ kaṅṭakānām prakaroti...*) comes from Aśvaghōṣa's *Buddha-carita* (BC 9.62), whereas V 9 (*badaryāḥ kaṅṭakas tikṣṇa...*) comes from Haribhadra-sūri's *Loka-tattva-nirṇaya* (LTN 2.22), and in both cases are associated with the doctrine of intrinsic nature (*svabhāva-vāda*).

In fact, all of the above-mentioned references when V 8 is quoted are solely associated with *svabhāva-vāda* and in none of such references any mention is ever made by the authors about the Ājīvikas. On the contrary, usually—albeit not always—the context makes it clear that the Cārvākas / Lokāyatās are meant. This confirms the observation of Gopinath KAVIRAJ (1966: 46–54) who considers the *svabhāva-vādins* in some contexts as a branch of the Lokāyatikas.

Nowhere do find any reference to the Ājīvikas, and it seems that the authors—Mallavādin and his commentator Simha-sūri as well as others who refer to the *svabhāva-vāda*—do not establish any (either explicit or indirect) link between *svabhāva* and the Ājīvikas, on the one hand, and, on the other, any link between *svabhāva* and *niyati*, and were not really aware of such links.

Still, the lack of any established links between *svabhāva-vāda* and *niyati-vāda* does not provide sufficient ground to criticise BASHAM (1951: 226) for maintaining that '[t]hese ideas have much in common' and for suggesting that *svabhāva-vāda* was 'a small sub-sect of Ājīvikism', as does BHATTACHARYA (2012: 598), who adds: 'Basham's total involvement with the Ājīvikas led him to include every heretical view as a part of Ājīvikism. There is absolutely no evidence to suggest that the doctrine of *svabhāva* was adopted by any community, religious or secular. If the evidence of the *ŚvUp* (i.e. ŚvU—P.B.) and the *Sau* (i.e. Aśvaghōṣa's *Saundarānanda*—P.B.) is to be believed, *svabhāva*, along with but distinct from the doctrines of time, destiny, etc., was proposed by a set of philosophers whom the author/s of the *ŚvUp* did not approve of. *Svabhāva* is mentioned there only in connection with the origin of the universe, "the first cause", so to say.'

First, contrary to BHATTACHARYA's claim, there is some evidence to suggest that the doctrine of *svabhāva* was adopted by some community/ies, in exactly the same way as *niyati-vāda*, *karma-vāda*, *īśvara-vāda*, *puruṣa-vāda*, etc., were. *Svabhāva* did not have to be a term which matched one particular religious community in one-to-one

⁶⁸ STPMAA, p. 352:

*kaḥ kaṅṭakānām prakaroti taikṣṇyam vicitra-bhāvaṃ mṛga-pakṣiṇām ca /
svabhāvataḥ sarvaṃ idaṃ pravṛttaṃ na kāma-cāro 'sti kutah prasaṅgaḥ //
iti-vacanāt kaiś cic ca svabhāvo hetutvenābhyupagamyate.*

relationship, as e.g. *anekānta-vāda* is connected to Jainism and Jainism to *anekānta-vāda*, or as Buddhism and *kṣaṇika-vāda* are connected. One and the same term through its different shades could relate to various schools of thought at the same time, which was noted by Indian thinkers themselves, and one of them says that ‘there are five kinds of the propounders of the doctrine of intrinsic nature.’⁶⁹ The proven connection of *svabhāva-vāda* to the materialists or to the Sāṃkhya⁷⁰ does not exclude its being related also to the Ājīvikas, albeit we would require more solid prove to substantiate the link.

Second, ‘a community’ does not have to be a strictly religious community with a well-established social structure and interlinking network to be a community, and usually when we deal with certain ideas and doctrines in Indian tradition, these are professed by some philosophical schools, philosophical-religious sub-currents, sub-sects, etc. Adopting BHATTACHARYA’S understanding, we could equally dismiss the ideas of, say, *sat-kārya-vāda* or *īśvara-vāda*, because it is neither strictly related to a particular religious group, but was primarily upheld by philosophers and theoreticians, nor to religious followers who generally are not quite concerned with such debates.

Third, contrary to BHATTACHARYA’S claim, there is, no doubt, again some evidence to suggest that one of such communities some representatives of which may have subscribed to *svabhāva-vāda* could have been the Ājīvikas. The idea of *svabhāva* is apparently present as early as the *Sāmañña-phala-sutta* as the third element (*bhāva*) in the compound: *niyati-saṅgati-bhāva-pariṇatā* (‘they are developed by destiny, predetermined concurrence of factors and [own] nature’). The term *svabhāva* also features in the *Niyati-dvātrimśikā* (NiDv 1, 10, 26, see below), which provides an account of the Ājīvikas.

Having said that, both V 8 and V 9 as candidates for a genuine survivors of Ājīvikas’ verses have to be rejected as being clearly related to materialists.

11. There is also some evidence that fate (*daiva*) as a determining cause was a concept associated with the Ājīvikas and sometimes, at least, identified with *niyati*. In the section on ‘the refutation of absolute admission of fate and human causality’ (*daiva-puruṣa-kārāṅkānta-nirāsaḥ*) in his *Aṣṭa-sahasrī-tātparyā-vivaraṇa*, Yaśovijaya-gaṇi cites two verses, and provides a commentary which establishes the link between *daiva* and *niyati* and the Ājīvikas. A verse which illustrates his longer discourse on fate (AṣSTV 90, p. 913.21 ff.) runs in Prakrit:

V 10: ‘Former deeds (*pūrvā-kṛta*), karmic retribution (*karman*), diverse fruition [of past deeds] is called fate (*daiva*), and so is the influence on this

⁶⁹ See e.g. NamVṛ ad NamS₂ 88, p. 78.6: *pañcama-vikalpaḥ svabhāva-vādinah*.

⁷⁰ ŚvU 1.2 mentions inherent nature (*svabhāva*) and the material elements (*mahā-bhūta*) side by side, which indicates that these cannot be both references to the Lokāyata / Cārvāka, and apparently *svabhāva* is in this case a reference to Sāṃkhya. On the other hand, *svabhāva* is clearly identified with materialists in some other cases, e.g., in PSBh ad loc., p. 3.4–5: *lokāyatikās tu svabhāvam eva hetum ācakṣate*.

[karmic fruition] on the part of time etc. as well as human effort (*puruṣa-kāra*).⁷¹

In the interpretation of the verse I follow the context set by Yaśovijaya-gaṇi, who explains that ‘everything is caused by fate’ (*sarvaṁ daiva-kṛtam*), ‘because it has been established that even human effort, in the form of a transformation of the fruition of *karman* under the influence of time etc., is in fact an operation of fate’ (*kālādi-kṛta-karma-vipāka-pariṇāma-rūpasya puruṣa-kārasya tattvato daiva-vyāpāratva-siddheḥ*). The verse understood in this way could in theory be taken as originating from a Prakrit work by an Ājīvika author. Such interpretation would, however, be too hasty.

Clearly without knowing the original context, the verse allows for at least two more interpretations, both of which are more plausible, and can be taken either (1) as an enumeration of six causes of the world:

‘[The primary cause] is called: former deeds (*pūrva-kṛta*), karmic retribution (*karman*), diverse fruition [of past deeds], fate (*daiva*), the influence on this [karmic fruition] on the part of time etc. and human effort’;

or (2) as three separate definitions of *karman*, *daiva* and *puruṣa-kāra*:

‘Former deeds (*pūrva-kṛta*) are called karmic retribution (*karman*); diverse fruition [of past deeds] is called fate (*daiva*); human effort (*puruṣa-kāra*) is the influence on this [karmic fruition] alongside time etc.’

We will be well justified in suspecting that the context set by Yaśovijaya-gaṇi is not the original one, and one should rather subscribe to either of the two alternative interpretations, none of which could be regarded as advancing the Ājīvika claim that fate (*daiva*), or destiny (*niyatī*), is the ruling factor in all that befalls the man.

What is important, however, is that *daiva* (fate) is explicitly related to the Ājīvikas by name and associated with the idea of *niyati* (destiny), after its initial exposition (*ājīvika-samaya-prasiddhaṁ niyati-janyatvam*).⁷² In addition, while closing his

⁷¹ AṣSTV 90, p. 613.21–23:

*puvva-kayaṁ kammaṁ ciya citta-vivāgam iya bhannai divvaṁ /
kālāiehiṁ tappāyaṇaṁ tu taha purisa-gāru tti //*

⁷² The whole passage commenting on the verse, AṣSTV 90–91, p. 613.21–615.21, reads: *śrī-haribhadra-cāryōkta-rītyā kālādi-kṛta-karma-vipāka-pariṇāma-rūpasya puruṣa-kārasya tattvato daiva-vyāpāratva-siddher vyāpāreṇa vyāpāriṇo 'nyathā-siddhatvānanyathā-siddhatvayor vyavahāra-niścayādhiṇatvāt tad-vivakṣā-kṛtāḥ syāt sarvaṁ daiva-kṛtam ity-ādayaḥ sapta-bhaṅgā draṣṭavyāḥ. mokṣe jñāna-janyatva-kriyā-janyatva-sapta-bhaṅgī-karaṇe 'syā evōpāyatvāt. ata eva paramārthataḥ sarvatra niyatāniyate 'pi vastuny ājīvika-samaya-prasiddhaṁ niyati-janyatvam upamaṛdya puruṣa-kāra-janyatvaṁ bhagavad-vaco 'nusāribhir vyavasthāpyate, matāntara-hetor nayasya nayāntareṇa*

comments Yaśovijaya reproduces a verse in order to illustrate the position on destiny/fate of the Ājīvikas, and mentions the source of the verse by name as the *Niyati-dvātrimśikā*:

‘As it is said in the *Thirty-two Verses on Destiny*:

V 11: “If [true] knowledge of the Victorious (liberated Jinas) is non-deviation (non-deviant or certain / inevitable?), then one should not make any exertion. Also if in the case [of the Victorious Jinas, their true knowledge] is multiplex (sc. they are omniscient from one point of view, and not omniscient from another), then these [Victorious Jinas in fact] are already vanquished (not victorious, i.e. liberated). But where is then the Lord [of yours as authority on liberation, if the Jinas’ omniscience cannot be established]?”⁷³

The second hemistich sounds apparently like a (superficial, but common) critique of Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (*anekānta-vāda*): if one accepts that of one and the same object various, apparently even contradictory qualities could be predicated, then a Jina, being omniscient from one point of view, has to be non-omniscient from another point of view, and since complete omniscience for the Jainas is not possible, neither is complete liberation. What is, however, problematic with (the interpretation of) the verse is the first hemistich, beginning with the actual meaning of the term *avyabhicāram*. The term could hardly mean: ‘non-deviation’, in the sense of non-deviant, i.e. true knowledge, because the link between true knowledge of the Jinas and dispensability of any exertion seems very unclear to me in an argument which would run: ‘If knowledge of the Victorious (liberated Jinas) is true, then one should not make any exertion’. If we take *avyabhicāram* as ‘inevitability’, then the argument makes better sense: ‘If knowledge of the Victorious (liberated Jinas) is inevitable, then one should not make any exertion’, i.e. one will sooner or later achieve omniscience without any effort. The problem with the latter interpretation is that it would perhaps sound like a criticism of determinism (*niyati*) of the Ājīvikas, which cannot escape the paradox which the Ājīvikas must have faced: if we are bound to attain liberation (and become omniscient), what is the use of all penance practised

khaṇḍanasyāpi śāstrārthatvāt, niyatāniyata-sapta-bhaṅgī-pravṛtttau tu niyati-janyatā-grāhako 'pi naya āśrīyate eva, dāhako 'pi vahnir iva pākādāv iti tatra vyavasthitam. athavā daiva-śabdena kālādi-catuṣṭayam grhyate, pauruṣa-śabdena cātma-prayatnaḥ, tat-kṛtatvam ca tad-avyavahitōttara-kṣaṇōtpattikatvam tac-chabdārthaś ca sāmāgrī-prativiṣṭo vācya iti, tattvāvinirgamāt syād daiva-kṛtam sarvam ity-ādi-sapta-bhaṅgī-pravṛttir aviruddhā, idṛśa-vivakṣā-mahimnā syād daṇḍa-janyo ghaṭaḥ syāc cakra-janya ity-ādi sapta-bhaṅgī-pravṛtter api sambhavād eka-svabhāvenōbhaya-janyatva-vivakṣāyām avaktavyatva-tad-ghaṭita-bhaṅgānām api sāvakāśatvād iti yuktam utpaśyamāḥ.

⁷³ AṣṬV 91, p. 615.16–18: *yac ca niyati-dvātrimśikāyām:*

*jñānam avyabhicāram cej jinānām mā śramam kṛthāḥ /
atha tatrāpy anekānto jītāḥ smaḥ kin nu^a ko bhavān //*

^a NiDv 16d: *kiṃ tu.*

For an alternative translation see below n. 81.

by the Ājīvikas? If the second interpretation is nevertheless correct (*avyabhicāram* = ‘inevitability’) and it does express criticism, then the verse could hardly be classified as a genuinely Ājīvika verse, a conclusion which would rather rest on my inability to correctly understand both the meaning of *avyabhicāra* in the verse and the gist of the argument. But, perhaps, precisely such a conclusion is correct, as we shall see below (p. 43).

Whatever the case may be, this information provided by the 17th-century author appears to be quite revealing in being apparently the first tangible information about the Ājīvikas and we could hail the first success: what we have here at last is both a direct quotation as well as an unidentifiable title of an Ājīvika work.

12. What is disturbing about the above seemingly successful conclusion is that the source of the verse is a work ascribed to a Jaina Śvetāmbara author Siddhasena-sūri: it is verse 16 of his *Niyati-dvātrimśikā*. And that itself raises a range of questions.

In his paper ‘Siddhasena Divākara on Ājīvika’ presented during 11th Jaina Studies Workshop at SOAS on 12th March 2009 devoted primarily to the *Niyati-dvātrimśikā*, ‘[Olle] Qvarnström believes this hymn is of great historical importance because he thinks it may be an original Ājīvika text that was edited by the compiler of the *Dvātrimśika* and thus is an impartial account of their philosophy’⁷⁴. For various reasons—including structural, conceptual, terminological, thematic, vocabulary, lack of any overlap—one can not only endorse Qvarnström’s claim that ‘it is highly probable that the different hymns neither have a common authorship nor are composed by Siddhasena Divākara’⁷⁵, but may justifiably venture much further and maintain that a range of works ascribed to Siddhasena Divākara do not stem from one and the same author, just to mention two best known: *Sammati-tarka-prakarāṇa* and *Nyāyāvatāra*, which are separated by about 250 years.⁷⁶

In his forthcoming paper ‘The Niyativādadvātrimśikā ascribed to Siddhasena Divākara’, into which his original London paper developed and in which he provides a collated reproduction of the text based on three editions and two manuscripts (not really present in the actual apparatus found in the manuscript OF QVARNSTRÖM’S paper), QVARNSTRÖM gives a closer look at *The Hymn on Destiny in 32 Stanzas* (*Niyati-dvātrimśikā*), which he incorrectly titles *Niyati-vāda-dvātrimśikā*,⁷⁷ and

⁷⁴ *Jaina Studies, Newsletter of the Centre of Jaina Studies* 5 (2010) 12.

⁷⁵ *Jaina Studies, Newsletter of the Centre of Jaina Studies* 4 (2009) 9; see also QVARNSTRÖM (forthcoming): ‘In fact, internal and external criteria also negate the assumption that the *Dvātrimśikā* and its doxographical texts were written by a single author.’

⁷⁶ See BALCEROWICZ (2001a), (2001b), (2003b) and (2004), i.e. evidence which QVARNSTRÖM (forthcoming) apparently overlooks.

⁷⁷ If that is a genuinely Ājīvikan text, it is highly unlikely that an Ājīvika author would call his work describing his own system by reference of *niyati-vāda*-° (one would rather expect *niyati*-° alone). If that is not an Ājīvikan text, but rather a Jaina text providing a report on the Ājīvikas, the title of this particular *dvātrimśikā* as given by QVARNSTRÖM would be the odd one out in the whole series, because °-*vāda*-° features in no other work title in the doxographical range of 32-stanza texts from nos. 12 to 17, and °-*vāda*-° in just one of them would be very peculiar. That is why, unless we have some other

maintains that ‘The *Niyatidvātrīṃśikā* may turn out to be such an Ājīvika Sanskrit text, i.e. an emic portrayal of Ājīvika doctrine—including certain polemical elements—reflecting a fully elaborated doctrinal system whose logic and epistemology resembled that of the Jains’, although it is not quite clear to me what this ‘emic portrayal’, or ‘insider’s perspective’, would really mean: whether it would be a genuine text written by Ājīvikas or not, and if not, how would it differ in essence from a typical doxographical work written by an outsider, i.e. a Jaina author.

I will first reproduce the text of the tiny work before I proceed with further analysis in order to assess how far this text can be considered an Ājīvika text, or ‘an Ājīvika Sanskrit text, i.e. an emic portrayal of Ājīvika doctrine’.

nityānantaram^{1*} *avyakti-sukha-duḥkhābhijātayah /*
svabhāvaḥ *sarva-sattvānām payaḥ kṣīrāṅkarādivat // 1 //*
dharmādharmaत्मकतवे तु सारिन्द्रिया-साम्निदाम /
katham puruṣa-kāraḥ syād idam evēti nēti vā // 2 //
सारिन्द्रिया-निस्पत्ताु यो नāमा स्वयाम अप्रबहु /
tasya kaḥ karṭṛ-vādo ’stu tad-āyattāsu vṛttiṣu // 3 //
dharmādharmau tadānyonya-nirodhātīśaya-kriyau /
deśādy-apekṣau ca tayoh katham kaḥ karṭṛ-sambhavaḥ // 4 //
*yat **pravṛttyōpamardena** vṛttam **śad-asaḍ-ātmaḥ** /*
tad vētara-nimittam vēty ubhayam pakṣa-ghātakam // 5 //
na drṣṭāntākṛtāśakteḥ svātantryam pratiśidhyate /
animittam nimittāni nimittānīty avāritam // 6 //
viśva-prāyām pṛthivy-ādi-pariṇāmo ’prayatnataḥ /
viśayas tat-prabodhas te tulye^{2*} *yasyēti manyate // 7 //*
nōktābhyaṃ saha nārambhāt samam adhyakṣa-sāmpadi /
vināsānupapatteś ca bhojya-bhakṣya-vikalpataḥ // 8 //
pṛthvyā nāvarudhyeta yathā vā rājata-kriyāḥ /
guṇānām puruṣe tad-vad aham kartēty adaḥ-kṛteḥ^{3*} *// 9 //*
*sudūram api te gatvā **hetu-vādo** nivartsyati /*
*na hi **svabhāvān** adhyakṣo loka-dharmo ’sti kaścana // 10 //*
pravartitavyam evēti pravartante yadā guṇāḥ /
atha kim sampramugdho ’si jñāna-vairāgya-siddhiṣu // 11 //
karmād aṣṭāṅgatā buddher na virodha-kṛte ca yaiḥ /
vaktur adya-nimittatvādivat atatha-pratyayād api // 12 //
asato hetuto vēti pratisamdhau ca vighrahaḥ /
asams tu hetur dhī-mātram kartēti ca viśiṣyate // 13 //
bhaṅgara-śravaṇādy-artha-samvin-mātre nirātmake /

very strong evidence, we would have to accept the real title as *Niyati-dvātrīṃśikā* solely on the basis of the internal evidence of the *dvātrīṃśikā*s ascribed to Siddhasena. However, the final argument against QVARNSTRÖM’s title *Niyati-vāda-dvātrīṃśikā* is the one provided by Yaśovijaya who himself provides the correct title (*vide supra* n. 73, AṣSTV 91, p. 615.16: *yac ca niyati-dvātrīṃśikāyām*).

rāgādi-śāntau yatnas te katham̐ kasya kim ity ayam // 14 //
 karma-jaḥ pratyayo nāma karma ca pratyayâtmakam /
 tat-phalam̐ nirayâdyaś ca na ca sarvatra vismṛtaḥ // 15 //
 jñānam avyabhicāram̐ cej jinānām̐ mā śramam̐ kṛthāḥ /
 atha tatrāpy anekānto jītāḥ smaḥ kim tu ko bhavān // 16 //
ekēndriyāṇām avyakter ajāty-antara-saṁgatau /
 vyaktānām̐ ca tadādau kā rāgādi-pravibhaktayaḥ // 17 //
 na saṁsaraty ataḥ kaścit sva-parôbhaya-hetukam /
abhijāti-viśeṣāt tu mithyā-vāda-mukho janaḥ // 18 //
 caitanyam̐ api naḥ sattvo mohādi-jñāna-lakṣaṇaḥ /
 tad-ādi tad-vat saṁkalpo mithyā-rāśiḥ pravartate // 19 //
 tulya-prasaṅgo nānātve tulyenâikena bādhyate /
 akasmāt-kāraṇāveśau hetu-dharmāviśeṣataḥ // 20 //
 sparśanādimaṇo 'ntāni bhūta-sāmānya-jātimān /
 maṇo 'ham̐ niyataṁ^{4*} dravyam̐ pariṇāmy anumūrti ca // 21 //
 sparśāika-viṣayatvādis tattvāntāḥ krama-jātayaḥ /
 arūpād anabhivyakta-bhedāḥ **kr̥ṣṇābhijātayaḥ** // 22 //
 yathā duḥkhādi nirayas tiryakṣu^{5*} puruṣôttamāḥ /
 raktāyām̐ ajanāyām̐ tu sukha-jā na guṇôttarāḥ // 23 //
 himsāvidyābhicārthaḥ pūrvānte madhyamaḥ samāḥ /
samyag-darśana-bhāvāntāḥ pratibuddhas tv ayojitaḥ // 24 //
 na cōpadeśo buddheḥ syād ravi-paṅka-ja-yogavat /
 tattvam̐ ca pratibuddhyante tebhyaḥ **pratyabhijātayaḥ** // 25 //
 samānābhijaneṣv eva guru-gaurava-māninaḥ /
 svabhāvam̐ abhigacchanti na hy agniḥ samam̐ adhyati // 26 //
 pravṛtty-antarikāvyaḥ vibhaṅga-svapna-sambhavat /
 na jātyaḥ saṁsṛter uktaṁ saṁkaro 'ntarikāntajāḥ // 27 //
 surādi-krāma ekeṣām̐ mānasā hy utkrama-kramāt /
 sukha-duḥkha-vikalpāc ca khaṇḍir yā no **'bhijātayaḥ** // 28 //
 vyomāvakāśo nānyeṣām̐ kālo dravyam̐ kriyā **vidhiḥ** /
 sukha-duḥkha-rajo dhātur^{6*} **jīvājīva**-nabhāmsi ca // 29 //
 anumānam̐ maṇo-vṛttir anvaya-niścayâtmikā /
 traikālyāṅgādi-vṛttāntā hetur avyabhicārataḥ // 30 //
 saṁjñā-sāmānya-paryāya-śabda-dravya-guṇa-kriyāḥ /
 etenôktāḥ pṛthak cēti vyavahāra-viniścayaḥ // 31 //
 na nāma tattvam̐ evātan **mithyātvâpara**-buddhayaḥ /
 na cārtha-pratiṣedhena na siddhārthaś ca kathyate // 32 //
 iti niyata-dvātrimśikā^{7*} ṣoḍṣī // 16 //

^{1*} NiDv₁: niyatāntaram; NiDv₃: nityānantaram.

^{2*} NiDv₁: tau tulyau.

^{3*} NiDv_Q = NiDv₁: adaḥ kṛte.

^{4*} NiDv_Q: maṇo 'ham̐ niyataṁ; NiDv₂: maṇo-han-niyataṁ.

^{5*} NiDv_Q, NiDv₁: *tiryakṣi*.

^{6*} NiDv_Q: *sukha-duḥkha-rajo-dhātur*.

^{7*} NiDv₂: *niyata-dvātrimsikā*.

[Since only NiDv₂ (Upadhye) is available to me, in the above list of the *variae lectiones* I rely on QVARNSTRÖM (forthcoming).]

In any preliminary analysis of this short work, we have to take into account the present textual context in which the *Niyati-dvātrimsikā* features. These 32 verses follow a few other *dvātrimsikās* which in quite a consistent way and style recapitulate the views of some other schools:

—*Dvātrimsikā* 12 recapitulates the views of the Nyāya school, but no single verse seems to be a quote from genuine Nyāya sources. The text is most likely a paraphrase. Expressions used seem to be even foreign to Nyāya sources, e.g. verse 1:

daiva-khātam ca vadanam ātmāyattam vān-mayam /
śrotāraḥ santi cōktasya nirlajjaḥ ho na paṇḍitaḥ // 1 //

Even in cases when mostly genuine Nyāya terminology is used, the passages are interwoven either with odd expressions or with an rather eccentric recapitulation of Nyāya ideas which seems to confuse orders of entities, e.g. verse 9 (the order of *pañcāvayava* and the order of the *tattvas* are mixed):

pratijñā nirṇayo hetur dṛṣṭāntam buddhi-kāraṇam /
pramāṇa-hetu-dṛṣṭānta-jāti-tarkās tad-uktayaḥ // 9 //

—*Dvātrimsikā* 13 recapitulates the views of the Sāṃkhya, but no verse seems to be a quote from genuine Sāṃkhya sources. Also this text is most likely a paraphrase. As before, expressions used seem to be even foreign to Sāṃkhya sources in terms of vocabulary, but not necessarily in spirit, e.g. verse 32:

caḥsurvat puruṣo bhoktā bandha-mokṣa-vilakṣaṇaḥ /
ḥṛtārthaiḥ saṃprayukto 'pi śūnya eva guṇair iti // 32 //

—*Dvātrimsikā* 14 recapitulates the views of the Vaiśeṣika. Again, no verse seems to be a quote from genuine Vaiśeṣika sources, and often the recapitulation of Vaiśeṣika ideas is rather unusual, right from the first verse or verse 3:

dharmād dharmēśvarā loka-siddhy-apāya-pravṛttiṣu /
dravyādi-sādhanāv etau dravyād yā vā parasparam // 1 //
saṃsāreṇa tad-āpekṣyam eka-dravya-kṣaṇa-sthitiḥ /
karma kārya-virodhi syād ubhayōbhayathā guṇaḥ // 3 //

—*Dvātrimsikā* 15 recapitulates the views of the Buddhists. Again, no verse seems to be a quote from genuine Buddhist sources, and the text is most likely a paraphrase. Expressions used seem to be even foreign to Buddhist sources, e.g. verse 1:

nāham-kṛtasya nirvāṇam na setsyaty anaham-kṛtaḥ /

na vā vidyā vivekāya na vidyā bhava-gāminī // 1 //

There are also expressions which are not Buddhistic, but rather smack of Jaina accounts, e.g. *naya* or *avaktavya*:

*avaktavyam asabhāvāt praśnārthasya kha-puṣpavat /
saṁtānaṁ bhāvanārthaṁ vā sarit-prota-pradīpavat // 6 //
mahā-bhūtōcchrayo rūpaṁ vijñānaṁ viśayo nayaḥ /
deva-nāṭya-prthag-bhāvo nṛ-jāty-ādi-vikalpavat // 7 //
ahetu-pratyaya-nayaṁ pūrvâpara-samābhavam /
vijñānaṁ tat-samutthaṁ kaḥ saṁvyavasyed vicakṣaṇaḥ // 21 //*

—*Dvātrimśikā* 17 apparently recapitulates the views close to those of a nihilist / materialist (?), see the beginning verses, although the whole terminology is Jainistic:

*na duḥkhena virudhyete dharmādharmau sukkena vā /
pratyavyabhicāritvāt sva-parôbhaya-vṛttiṣu // 1 //
deśa-kāla-nimittāni nimittāny aniyogataḥ /
niyogato vā tat-siddhau na vādhyâtma-viśeṣataḥ // 2 //
na mithyā-darśanāt pāpaṁ na samyag-darśanāc chubham /
na ca nēti kaṣāyāṇāṁ tad-vṛtty-avyatirekataḥ // 6 //*

There is nothing, it seems, which would speak against a common authorship or source of these five works. On the contrary, they are all quite uniform in structure, approach and style as well as in a slightly off-the-mark portrayal of the systems discussed. Moreover, a close reading will reveal a number of close lexical and stylistic similarities between them.

In addition, if we just focus on *Niyati-dvātrimśikā* (NiDv), there are some identical (or almost identical) expressions shared by this work and the other texts of the group in metrically exactly (or almost exactly) the same positions:

- (1) NiDv 6cd: *animittaṁ nimittāni nimittānīty avāritam // 6 //*
Dvātrimśikā 17.1ab: *deśa-kāla-nimittāni nimittāny aniyogataḥ /*
- (2) NiDv 8d: *bhojya-bhakṣya-vikalpataḥ //*
Dvātrimśikā 17.7d: *tad-ādy astu vikalpataḥ //*
- (3) NiDv 18b: *sva-parôbhaya-hetukam /*
Dvātrimśikā 17.1d: *sva-parôbhaya-vṛttiṣu //*
- (4) NiDv 19d: *mithyā-rāsiḥ pravartate //*
Dvātrimśikā 17.5d: *mithyā-dṛṣṭir nivāryate //*
- (5) NiDv 20d: *hetu-dharmāviśeṣataḥ //*
Dvātrimśikā 14.8c: *janma-dharmāviśeṣataḥ /*
Dvātrimśikā 15.8d: *bhāvo bhāva-viśeṣataḥ //*

Dvātrimśikā 17.2d: *na vādhyâtma-viśeṣataḥ* //

- (6) NiDv 24a: *samyag-darśana-bhāvântāḥ*
Dvātrimśikā 13.25c: *na samyag-darśanôpāyi*
- (7) NiDv 28b: *mānasā hy utkrama-kramāt* /
Dvātrimśikā 17.32b: *manas cōpakramaḥ kramaḥ* /
- (8) NiDv 30a: *anumānaṃ mano-vṛttir*
Dvātrimśikā 13.14a: *śrotrādīnām mano-vṛttiḥ*

All the above speaks, in my opinion, strongly against an independent, allegedly Ājīvika origin of the *Niyati-dvātrimśikā*, and instead supports a thesis of a common authorship of this and the other four short versified texts. This does not preclude, however, a possibility that the author (pseudo-Siddhasena Divākara) was sufficiently well informed about the school and his information is quite reliable. However, as long as we do not have a relatively clear picture of what the Ājīvikas actually maintained, we are not able to fully assess the faithfulness of the account found in the *Niyati-dvātrimśikā* and to judge how far the account is that of a picture seen in a distorting mirror. What is important in this context is that none of the verses of the *Niyati-dvātrimśikā* is found to be quoted or referred to anywhere, except for the very late quote by Yaśovijaya. If the work was indeed penned by an Ājīvika author and the work was preserved as such by the Jainas or incorporated with some changes into a doxographical collection of short versified texts, one would expect to find the text quoted also in other sources as an illustration of the Ājīvika doctrine, at least by Jaina authors.

Another problem would be the actual dating of this selection of the *dvātrimśikās*, alongside the *Niyati-dvātrimśikā*, and whether they indeed come from around 6th century or whether they could be ascribed to Siddhasena Divākara. However, there is a strong evidence that Siddhasena Divākara composed his *Saṃmati-tarka-prakarāṇa* before Diñnāga, i.e. before ca. 480.⁷⁸ A close analysis of the textual material is necessary to determine the probable date of the *dvātrimśikās* and their relation to *Saṃmati-tarka-prakarāṇa*.

A closer look at the vocabulary found in the *Niyati-dvātrimśikā* does not help us much to determine the authenticity of the work either. We can distinguish three lexicographic categories:

- (1) Some terms (in bold, dotted underline) are known to be shared by the Jainas and the Ājīvikas:

NiDv 5b: **sad-asad-ātmakam**—this expression is a part of Jaina *Anekānta-vāda*

⁷⁸ See BALCEROWICZ (2001a), (2001b), (2003b) and (2004).

as well as consist the method of the Trairāsikas, identified with the Ājīvikas.⁷⁹

NiDv 29d: **jīvājīva**—this is a basic division of all ontology of both the Jainas and the Ājīvikas.

NiDv 17a: **ekēndriyānām**—as BARUA (1921: 306–307) shows, one-sensed beings probably opened Ājīvika’s classification of living beings based on the number of sense organs possessed by them, in some ways similar to that of the Jainas.

(2) Some expressions (bold, no underline) are known only to be specific to the Jainas, and it is not known whether the Ājīvikas used them as technical terms as well and we have no information which would preclude a possibility that they may have used them:

NiDv 24a: ***samyag-darsana-bhāvāntāḥ***,

NiDv 32b: ***mithyātvāpara-buddhayaḥ***.

(3) Some expressions (in bold, underlined) are known only to be specific to the Ājīvikas, and are not used by the Jainas as technical terms:

(a) **abhijāti** (‘classes of existence’):

—NiDv 1b: *avyakti-sukha-duḥkhā**abhijātayaḥ***,

—NiDv 22d: **krṣṇābhijātayaḥ**,

—NiDv 25d: **pratyabhijātayaḥ**,

—NiDv 28d: *yā no **’bhijātayaḥ***,

—NiDv 28c: **abhijāti**-viśeṣāt tu.

(b) ***svabhāva*** (‘intrinsic nature’):

—NiDv 1c: **svabhāvaḥ** sarva-tattvānām

—NiDv 10c: *na hi **svabhāvān** adhyakṣo*

(c) ***vidhi*** (‘fateful ordinance’):

—NiDv 29b: **vidhiḥ** (‘fateful ordinance’)

(d) ****pravṛtṭy-upamarda*** (‘suppression through action?’):

—NiDv 5a: **pravṛtṭyôpamardena**, which is perhaps reminiscent of the idea of *pauṭṭa-parihāra*⁸⁰.

What conclusions can be drawn for this comparison? The presence of specifically Jaina terms (category 2), provided they were indeed not shared by the Ājīvikas (and that we cannot know with certainty, given the extant material) would rather speak

⁷⁹ See e.g. *Nandi-sutra* (p. 78 ff., 86 ff.).

⁸⁰ ‘Discontinuance / stoppage [of a subsequent birth in a new body] through / due to continuation [in the same reanimated body]’; alternatively ‘reanimation without transmigration’ (BASHAM) or ‘die Beschränkung (der Neuverkörperung) durch Weitergelten’ (SCHUBRING), see BASHAM (1951: 48–49, 57–58, 250–252) and, esp. for the formation (*pravṛtya-parihāra*), SCHUBRING (1954: 258) = (1977: 470). The term is found esp. in Viy 15, and explained in BhCū 15, p. 53.19–21: *...pauṭṭa-parihāro. pāravṛtya vānaspatyās tatrāva jāyate. bhagavatā kathitam itara-sarva-jīvas tathā-dṛṣṭaḥ, pauṭṭha¹-parihāra-ditṭhi jāto* [¹ Recte: *pauṭṭa-°*].

against genuinely Ājīvika origin of the text, whereas the presence of typically Ājīvika technical terms (category 3) would support a thesis that the *Niyati-dvātrimśikā* is actually based on some Ājīvika texts and recapitulates their doctrine second-handedly using the Ājīvika lexicographic material. If it is indeed the case that the text is a recapitulation, not necessarily an objective and non-partisan one, then the above supposition (§ 11, p. 36) that verse NiDv 16, quoted by Yaśovijaya (AṣSTV 91, p. 615.17–18) as V 11, has to be interpreted as authentic criticism directed against the Ājīvikas⁸¹. But even then, the whole text of the *Niyati-dvātrimśikā* can be treated as a highly useful source, albeit biased, of information on the Ājīvikas, their doctrine, certain concepts and terminology, especially when compounded with other similarly weak evidences.

13. There are some more stray references to *niyati* (destiny) and its propounders.

13.1. One is found in Ḍallana's commentary on the *Suśruta-saṁhitā* of 13th century:⁸²

‘The propounders of destiny [claim] that “Destiny is [operative] with respect to righteousness and unrighteousness, which are earned through previous births, and only this [destiny] is the cause of everything”.’

It is most unlikely that it is an independent statement deriving from an authentic Ājīvika work, because it almost identical in wording with the view expressed in Bhaṭṭopala's commentary on Varāhamihira's *Bṛhat-saṁhitā* 1.7:

‘The same *karman* which is earned through previous births and which is people's fortune and misfortune is also the cause of origination and destruction of all living beings,’⁸³

a view which is ascribed there to the Mīmāṃsakas. Further, to take the third person (*iti niyati-vādinah*) as an auto-reference of the Ājīvikas is impossible.

13.2. A selection of references to *niyati* is found in the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* (YVā).⁸⁴ Metrically and stylistically speaking, the verses belong to the texture of *Yoga-*

⁸¹ And the translation of the verse can be more precise: ‘If [true] knowledge of the [Ājīvikan] Victorious (liberated Jinas) is tantamount to inevitability, then one should not make any exertion, [which the Ājīvikas however do undertake]. Also if in the case [of the Ājīvikan Jinas, their true knowledge] is multiplex (sc. they are omniscient from one point of view, and not omniscient from another), then these [Jinas in fact] are already vanquished (they are never victorious / liberated). If that is so, where is the Lord [of the Ājīvikas as authority on liberation, if the Jinas' omniscience cannot be established]?’

⁸² *Suśruta-saṁhitā*, *Śarīra*, chapter 1; I quote after KAVIRAJ (1966: 54–55), as the edition not available to me: *pūrva-janmārjītau dharmādharmau niyatīḥ, sāvya sarvasya kāraṇam iti niyati-vādinah*.

⁸³ Quoted after KAVIRAJ (1966: 54–55), as the edition is not available to me:

*pūrva-janmārjītam yac ca karma puṁsām śubhāśubham /
tad eva sarva-jantūnām sṛṣṭi-saṁhāra-kāraṇam //*

⁸⁴ YVā 2.10.1:

*yathā-sthitam brahma-tattvaṁ tattā niyatir ucyate /
sā vinetur vineyatvaṁ sā vineya-vineyatā // 2.10.1 //*

vāsiṣṭha, of which they are an integral part. Further, the expressions, terms and names used and the ideas (e.g. the beginning of the world or its creation, which presupposes a creator) found in the verses make it highly unlikely that the verses are either quotations from Ājīvika sources or a faithful paraphrase, and they can safely be dismissed as candidates for quotes from Ājīvika sources or even as reports or references to genuine Ājīvika ideas.

14. Last but not least, another Jaina author Samantabhadra (c. 580–640) refers to fate (*daiva*) in his *Āpta-mīmāṃsā*:

‘[88] If the attainment of desired goals is due to fate, then how is it possible that [karmic] fate is due to human perseverance? If it is due to [still another] fate, then no liberation is [possible, and] human perseverance would be futile.

[89] If the attainment [of desired goals] is due to human perseverance, then how is it possible that human perseverance is due to fate? If it is due to [still another] human perseverance, then the perseverance of all living beings should consistently be [successful].’⁸⁵

YVā 3.54.22:

sargāḍau yā yathā rūḍhā samvit-kacana-santatiḥ /
sādyāpy acalitā ’nyena sthitā niyatir ucyate //

YVā 3.54.22:

sargāḍau yā yathā-rūḍhā samvikta-cana-samtatiḥ /
sādyāpy acalitānyena sthitā niyatir ucyate // 3.54.22 //

YVā 3.62.9–11:

ādi-sarge hi niyatir bhāva-vacitryam akṣayam /
anenēttham sadā bhāvyam iti sampadyate param // 3.62.9 //
mahā-sattēti kathitā mahā-citir ita smṛtā /
mahā-śaktir iti khyātā mahā-drṣṭir iti sthitā // 3.62.10 //
mahā-kriyēti gaditā mahōdbhava ita smṛtā /
mahā-spanda ita prauḍhā mahātmākatayōditā // 3.62.11 //

YVā 3.62.26:

avaśyam-bhavitavyāṣā tv idam ittham iti sthitaḥ /
na śakyate laṅghayitum api rudrādi-buddhibhiḥ // 3.62.26 //

YVā 5.89.26:

sarva-jñō ’pi bahu-jñō ’pi mādhavo ’pi haro ’pi ca /
anyathā niyatim martum na śaktaḥ kaścid eva hi // 5.89.26 //

YVā 6.36.21:

ā-mahā-rudra-paryantam idam ittham iti sthiteḥ /
ā-tṛṇa-padma-maha-spandaṁ niyatamān niyatih smṛtā // 6.36.21 //

YVā 6.37.23:

niyatir nityam udvega-varjitā ’parimārjitā /
eṣā nṛtyati vai nṛtyam jagaj-jālaka-nāṭakam // 6.37.23 //

⁸⁵ ĀMī 88–89:

daivād evārtha-siddhaś ced daivaṁ pauruṣataḥ katham /
daivataś ced anirmokṣaḥ pauruṣaṁ niṣphalaṁ bhavet // 88 //
pauruṣād eva siddhiś cet pauruṣaṁ daivataḥ katham /
pauruṣāc ced amoghaṁ syāt sarva-prāṇiṣu pauruṣam // 89 //

These verses somehow echo a criticism against the idea of *niyati*, but they do not really refer to any concrete system, it seems, but are merely a rhetorical and argumentative device in Samantabhadra's work: fate is mentioned only as a vague idea in order to establish the overwhelming influence of *karman* which has to be eliminated through the path proffered by the Jinas. In addition, these verses seem to be genuine creations of Samantabhadra, who does not quote from other works in his *Āpta-mīmāṃsā*, and are found nowhere else.

15. To conclude, out of the verses and passages which were previously identified by BASHAM and other scholars as most probably genuinely Ājīvika, none turns out to be derived from Ājīvika sources. New material brought to our attention in the paper produced some passages which at first could qualify as genuinely Ājīvika, however after some analysis they have to be dismissed as such. All the verses previously cited as genuinely Ājīvika verses are creations of non-Ājīvika authors and usually derive either from Jaina works or from fables and narrative literature. In other words, there is no single genuinely Ājīvika verse or passage to be found.

Even those few which at first remained uncontested after a preliminary analysis are also spurious for a couple of reasons, mostly because they are found to be quoted only in one single work, whereas generally the same handful of allegedly Ājīvika verses are found in several works. That is why they have to be admitted as a product of later non-Ājīvika authors.

Furthermore, there is no single proof that the Ājīvikas developed their own Sanskrit literature, especially philosophical literature in Sanskrit for that matter, but there is no evidence disproving their having such a body of texts.

Conspicuously, references to the Ājīvikas and possible quotes from Ājīvika sources in Sanskrit seem to be found almost exclusively in Jaina sources, perhaps with just a few dubious exceptions (e.g. *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*). Apparently it was mostly Jaina authors who engaged in any discussions of the doctrinal elements of the Ājīvikas, which is in itself quite puzzling.

Perhaps when the Jaina authors composing in Sanskrit were still commenting on selected philosophical ideas of the Ājīvikas, the religious movement had already lost its philosophical impact and become extremely marginal to the extent that it was generally ignored by all, except for the Jainas who themselves had had direct sectarian affiliation with them. That would further suggest that while the Jaina authors were referring to the ideas of the Ājīvikas, there were no more any Sanskrit sources and the Jainas composed all the verses which pretend to be authentic.

Last but not least, the faithfulness and reliability of reports of the Ājīvikas and of paraphrases of their views cannot be assessed with any certainty due to the vicious circle mentioned at the outset. Still, all those stray fragments that we have at our disposal, regardless of their actual reliability and accuracy, is all we have to reconstruct the doctrine of the Ājīvikas.

It is also very difficult, if at all possible, to develop any consistent methodology to assess which of the material at our disposal relies on genuine knowledge of the

Ājīvikas' doctrine on the part of the reporter, which is solely based on hearsay and second- or third-hand knowledge, and which is merely imagining what would it be like if we assumed a deterministic theory of the world. My fear is that in many cases it is the third, least interesting option for a historian of ideas.

BASHAM's (1951) reconstruction of the doctrine of the Ājīvikas, all its merits notwithstanding, seems to be an overoptimistic account: in fact, it seems we know much less of that tradition than BASHAM thought we did.

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