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## **Extrasensory Perception (*yogi-pratyakṣa*) in Jainism, Proofs of Its Existence and Its Soteriological Implications\***

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0.1. Most classical Indian philosophical schools accepted the idea of suprasensory, supernatural or mystic perception, usually known as *yogi-pratyakṣa*, i.e. the perception of a *yogin*, or *ārṣa-pratyakṣa*, i.e. the perception of seers (*ṛṣi*), sometimes also or *yogi-jñāna*, cognition of a *yogin*. The idea of *yogi-pratyakṣa* was occasionally related to omniscience (*sarva-jñāna*) in Indian philosophical and religious traditions, such as Buddhism or the systems of Sāṃkhya-Yoga or the post-fifth-century Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. It was in Jainism, however, that the correlation between supernatural perception and omniscience became most conspicuous and pronounced.

The Jainas were also probably the first to develop rational arguments—such as argument from progression, already present in Kundakunda’s works, etc.—which were supposed to substantiate their radical claim of the Jina’s omniscience. An indispensable logical step in these arguments relied on the assumption of the existence of some kind of supernatural perception unmediated by senses. Further, Jaina philosophers treated the idea of *yogi-pratyakṣa* as an intermediate stage to ultimate perfection of knowledge, i.e. to omniscience.

The chapter analyses (1) what doctrinal and philosophical reasons made the link between supernatural perception and omniscience so important in Jaina tradition, (2) what were the implications for the Jaina doctrine of liberation and (3) which particular doctrinal tenets of Jainism made such arguments possible. The focus of the chapter is to collect a range of rational arguments in which the idea of supernatural perception plays crucial role. Further, (4) I will try to identify possibly the earliest formulations of some of such arguments, both within Jaina tradition and outside of it, as well as refer to their epistemologically most developed forms, up to the time of Hemacandra-sūri.

In my analysis I will frequently refer to Hemacandra-sūri’s *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, where a number of earlier arguments for supernatural perception and omniscience were gathered, but I will also try to show earlier formulations of such arguments.

As against a common stereotype that Indian traditions were unanimous in their acceptance of supernatural perception, there were at least three notable exceptions to be mentioned, namely the followers of the schools of the early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika until the beginning of the fifth century<sup>1</sup>, Mīmāṃsā and the materialists, or Cārvāka /

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<sup>1</sup> Supernatural perception was absent in the original *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, as it existed prior to Praśastapāda, see: WEZLER (1982), HONDA (1988), ISAACSON (1993) and BALCEROWICZ (2010: 308 ff.).

Lokāyata. In their realistic approach, these philosophical schools rejected the suprasensory sphere, albeit for different reasons. The criticism of extrasensory perception meted out by the two latter schools will be the subject of another chapter in this volume, ‘Extrasensory perception (*yogi-pratyakṣa*) in Jainism and its refutations’ (references to this chapter below are as ‘see *counter-arguments*’).

Against the criticism of these three main antagonists the Jainas, later Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣikas and Buddhists strove to validate their admission of supernatural perception and its corollary, omniscience.

**0.2.** To understand the nature of supernatural perception, the way it constituted an object of doctrinal belief in some philosophical systems, we should first summarise main features of ordinary, sensory perception (*pratyakṣa*, *loka-pratyakṣa*), against the backdrop of which the former was posited.

Sensory perception of ordinary people was variously defined in different philosophical schools and by different philosophers, but it was generally understood to be characterised by a range of features: innately possessed by all people, being mediated by a particular sense organ, being of five kinds depending on the mediating sense organ, being based on either a direct contact with or a specific relation to the object, grasping spatially and temporarily present objects alone, being characterised by some kind of immediacy (*sākṣāttva*, *sākṣāt-samprayoga-jatva*) and distinctness (*viśadatva*), typically non-erroneousness, leading to a judgement or producing a cognitive decision, primarily non-conceptual character, although its conceptual variety was generally also recognised (with some notable exceptions, e.g. that of Dinnāga). Its scope was proximate, gross (*sthūra*), or macroscopic material objects.<sup>2</sup>

Various aspects or dimensions of ordinary perception were emphasised in a range of definitions produced in various philosophical systems. For instance, the Nyāya defined perception as ‘cognition [which is] produced by a [direct] contact of an object with a sense organ, [which is] non-verbal, [which is] unerring, the nature [of which] is decision,’<sup>3</sup> one of implications being that even visual perception necessitated such direct sense-object contact, which ultimately prompted a theory of eye rays (*caṅkṣū-raśmi*) emitted by the eye to directly ‘touch’ the object.

The early Mīmāṃsā emphasised the fact that a mere presence of a perceptible object suffices to produce perception, provided sense organs are unimpaired: ‘Perception is the production of cognition when a contact of a person’s senses with a [really] existing [thing takes place].’<sup>4</sup> As Pārthasārathi, a later proponent of the system, explains in the *Śāstra-dīpikā* (ŚDī), its scope is limited to macroscopic objects, but also includes introspection, albeit it cannot provide any information about moral law (*dharma*) etc.: ‘Perception, to begin with, occurs as being produced by a contact of a sense organ and an object, inasmuch as it apprehends present [objects]; it is not a ground [for our knowledge] of moral law.’<sup>5</sup> Its status is rooted in the character of respective sense organs which produce perception as cognition which is distinct (*viśada*): ‘What is the defining feature of a sense organ and how does it relate to eye etc. and to the mind? It is explained: That which produces cognition as a distinct representation of an [object] in contact is called “sense organ”. Further, it is twofold: external and internal. The external sense organ is five-fold: consisting in smell, taste, eye, skin and ear. The internal [sense organ] is one: the

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<sup>2</sup> Secondary literature on the subject is extremely ample; a good introduction to the topic is SINHA (1934) and MATILAL (1986). An excellent critique on the subject by a classical Indian philosopher is Jayarāṣi Bhaṭṭa’s *Tattvōpaplava-siṃha* (TUS), esp. its first chapter on perception.

<sup>3</sup> NS 1.1.4 *indriyārtha-sannikarṣōtpannam jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam*.

<sup>4</sup> MS 1.1.4: *sat-samprayoge puruṣasyēndriyāṅām buddhi-janma tat pratyakṣam*.

<sup>5</sup> ŚDī<sub>2</sub> ad MS 1.1.4, p. 35.20: *pratyakṣam tāvad indriyārtha-samprayoga-janyatvena vidyamānōpalambhanatvād bhaviṣyati dharme na nimittam*.

mind.<sup>6</sup> In addition to the property of distinctness qualifying sensory cognition, Pārthasārathi names immediacy (*sākṣāttva*), i.e. being produced through an unmediated, direct contact with the object of cognition (*sākṣāt-saṃprayoga-jatva*), as its another constitutive feature.<sup>7</sup>

In contrast, older Sāṃkhya tradition presented perception merely as ‘the operation of the senses’<sup>8</sup>, for which it was vehemently criticised by most other schools as reducing its functioning to material elements that constitute sense organs and leaving out its cognitive / epistemic aspect.

Buddhist philosophers of the so-called *pramāṇa* tradition, such as Dīnāga and Dharmakīrti, emphasised purely non-conceptual and veridical character of perception which was said to be ‘free from conceptual construction and non-erroneous’<sup>9</sup>, whereas any cognitive error, illusion etc. creep in the moment the contents of the original non-erroneous act of perception subsequently becomes an object of interpretation, categorisation and conceptualisation.

As divergent and complex were interpretations of what constitutes a genuine perception and its definitions among Indian philosophers in general so was Jaina approach.<sup>10</sup> An interpretation of perception, which concludes a century-long classical tradition of Jaina epistemology but which also shows dependence on other systems, especially on Mīmāṃsā and Buddhist Yogācāra-Sautrāntika, is provided by Hemacandra: ‘Perception is clear [cognition]. Clearness is either independence of other cognitive criteria or a distinct representation [of the object] of the form: “this”.’<sup>11</sup> The first feature, i.e. independence of other cognitive criteria (Mīmāṃsā influence), means that perception is a unique means of cognition the scope and procedure of which do not overlap with those of other kinds of cognition, and it is undeniable and obvious in its self-explanatory character, in not requiring any additional justification for its revealed epistemic contents to be accepted as true. In contradistinction to verbal knowledge, inference etc., perception does not depend on any other cognitive criteria in the form of cognition of a word or inferential sign as far as its rise is concerned.<sup>12</sup> The other feature, i.e. a distinct representation of an object of the form ‘this’, is ostension, or an unmediated presenting of a thing in its uninterpreted character, esp. in a non-conceptual way, to the perceiver (Buddhist influence). Worth mentioning in passing in Hemacandra’s definition of perception is the similarity to Cartesian idea of ‘clear and distinct perception’.

Three separate but related problems related to perception in Jainism were: what actually constituted a genuine perception (whether it was essentially sensory or extrasensory), what was the actual instrument of perception (whether a sense-organ or the ultimate perceiver, i.e. the soul), and which term, i.e. whether *pratyakṣa* or *mati-jñāna* / *ābhiniḥbodhika-jñāna*, could correctly apply to what one understood as perception or to one of its subvarieties. Since these issues are generally not directly relevant to the idea supernatural perception, I will not delve into them.

<sup>6</sup> ŚDī<sub>2</sub> ad MS 1.1.4, p. 36.13–14: *kiṃ punar indriya-lakṣaṇaṃ cakṣur-ādiṣu manasi cānusyūtam. ucyate: yat saṃprayukte viśadāvabhāsaṃ vijñānaṃ janayati tad indriyam ity ucyate, tac ca dvi-vidham, bāhyam ābhyantaram ca, bāhyam pañca-vidham ghrāṇa-rasana-cakṣus-tvak-śrotrātmakam. āntaram tv ekaṃ manaḥ.*

<sup>7</sup> ŚDī<sub>2</sub> ad MS 1.1.5, p. 49.10–12: *tasmād avaśyaṃ sākṣāt-saṃprayoga-jatvaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ ity aṅgī-kartavyam, ataḥ sukṭi-rajata-vedane ’pi vyabhicārābhāvād anarthakas tat sator vyatyayaḥ. satyam—sākṣāt-saṃprayoga-jatvaṃ lakṣaṇam.*

<sup>8</sup> YDī ad SKā 5, p. 76: “śrotr-ādi-vṛttiḥ” *iti vārṣagaṇaḥ*, as well as YDī ad SKā 1ab, p. 5.11: *śrotr-ādi-vṛttiḥ pratyakṣam.*

<sup>9</sup> NB 1.4: *tatra pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam.*

<sup>10</sup> For various models, in the period till 8th century CE, we can distinguish at least 14 models of cognitive faculties which assign various roles to perception, which is one of these faculties, see BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming).

<sup>11</sup> PMī 1.13–14: *viśadaṃ pratyakṣam. pramāṇāntarānapekṣēdantayā pratibhāso vā vaiśadyam.*

<sup>12</sup> PMīV 1.13 § 46, p. 11: *na hi śābdānumānādivad pratyakṣam svōtpattau śabda-liṅgādi-jñānaṃ pramāṇāntaram apekṣate.*

This short overview of how (ordinary) perception was understood in classical India, very sketchy and incomprehensive, is meant to merely present a backdrop to the other variety of perception, which was believed not related to or based on sense organs, which is in the actual purview of this chapter.

0.3. A proper understanding of what constituted supernatural perception in Jainism would not be possible without a more general context set for it by a similar idea in other philosophical systems in India, one of the most eminent and well-elaborated expositions of which being that found in the system of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika after the fifth century.

In general, what was known as *yogi-pratyakṣa* or *yogi-jñāna* was claimed to be possessed only by adepts of *yoga*, mystics or ascetics by virtue of some accomplishment (usually believed to be accompanied by some kind of moral superiority) gained through spiritual practice, either meditation / contemplation (*bhāvanā*, *dhyāna*) or asceticism (*tapas*). Its scope was agreed by a range thinkers to encompass past (*atīta*) and future (*anāgata*) objects, as well as things (esp. those present) which are subtle (*sūkṣma*), concealed from sight (*vyavahita*, *dūra*) and distant (*viprakṛṣṭa*). Even the wording in such classifications of the scope of *yogi-pratyakṣa* in various schools was usually identical (see Table 1), which may attest to mutual borrowings and an inter-systemic development of the idea.

	subtle	past and future	concealed	distant
<i>Yoga-sūtra</i> (YS) <sup>13</sup>	<i>sūkṣma</i>	—	<i>vyavahita</i>	<i>viprakṛṣṭa</i>
<i>Yoga-Bhāṣya</i> (YBh) <sup>14</sup>	<i>sūkṣma</i>	<i>atīta-anāgata</i>	<i>vyavahita</i>	<i>viprakṛṣṭa</i>
<i>Vaiśeṣika-sūtra</i> (VS(C)) and <i>Praśastapāda-bhāṣya</i> (PBh) <sup>15</sup>	<i>sūkṣma</i>	—	<i>vyavahita</i>	<i>viprakṛṣṭa</i>
<i>Śābara-bhāṣya</i> (ŚBh) <sup>16</sup>	<i>sūkṣma</i>	<i>bhūta-bhaviṣyat</i>	<i>vyavahita</i>	<i>viprakṛṣṭa</i>
<i>Mīmāṃsā-śloka-vārttika</i> (MŚV) <sup>17</sup>	<i>sūkṣma</i>	<i>atīta-anāgata</i>	<i>vyavahita</i>	<i>dūra</i>
<i>Āpta-mīmāṃsā</i> (ĀMī) <sup>18</sup>	<i>sūkṣma</i>	—	<i>antarita</i>	<i>dūra</i>

<sup>13</sup> YS 3.25: *pravṛtṭy-āloka-nyāsāt sūkṣma-vyavahita-viprakṛṣṭa-jñānam*.

<sup>14</sup> YBh 1.49: *na cāsyā sūkṣma-vyavahita-viprakṛṣṭasya vastuno loka-pratyakṣeṇa grahaṇam asti*.

<sup>15</sup> PBh<sub>1</sub> 8.12.2.1, p. 187 = PBh<sub>2</sub> 22.12.2.a [242]: *viyuktānām punaś catuṣṭaya-sannikarṣād yoga-jadharmānugraha-sāmarthyāt sūkṣma-vyavahita-viprakṛṣṭeṣu pratyakṣam utpadyate*; comp. PBh<sub>1</sub> 11, p. 321 = PBh<sub>2</sub>, p. 85 [370]: *yathāsmad-ādīnām gav-ādiṣv aśvādibhyas tulyākṛti-guṇa-kriyāvayava-samyoga-nimittā pratyaya-vyāvṛttir dṛṣṭā gauḥ śuklaḥ śīghra-gatiḥ pīna-kakudmān mahā-ghaṇṭa iti. tathāsmad-viśiṣṭānām yogīnām nityeṣu tulyākṛti-guṇa-kriyeṣu paramānuṣu muktātma-manahsu cānya-nimittāsambhavād yebhyo nimittabhyah pratyādhāraṇam vilakṣaṇo 'yam vilakṣaṇo 'yam iti pratyaya-vyāvṛttih. Deśa-kāla-viprakarṣe ca paramānu sa evāyam iti pratyabhijñānaṇ ca bhavati te 'ntyā viśeṣāḥ*. See also VSV(C): *sūkṣma-vyavahita-viprakṛṣṭeṣv artheṣu teṣāṃ catuṣṭaya-sannikarṣād api pratyakṣam jāyate, tathā asmad-ādi pratyakṣeṣu*.

<sup>16</sup> ŚBh 1.2.2, p. 4.7–9: *codanā hi bhūtaṃ bhavantaṃ bhaviṣyantaṃ sūkṣmaṃ vyavahitaṃ viprakṛṣṭam ity evaṃ-jāṭīyakam arthaṃ śaknoty avagamayitum, nānyat kiñcanēndriyam*.

<sup>17</sup> MŚV 2.141cd (*Codanā-sūtra*): *sūkṣmātīdī-viṣayaṃ jīvasya parikalpitaṃ* // See also MŚV 114cd: *dūra-sūkṣmādi-dṛṣṭau...*, MŚV 4.26ab (*Pratyakṣa-sūtra*): *atītānāgate 'py arthe sūkṣme vyavahite 'pi ca / pratyakṣaṇaṃ yoginām iṣṭaṃ kaiścin muktātmanām api* //; MŚV 6.119cd-120ab (*Śabdānityatādhikaraṇaṃ*): *yeṣāṃ tv aprāpta evāyaṃ śabdah śrotreṇa grhyate* // *teṣāṃ aprāpti-tulyatvaṃ dūra-vyavahitādiṣu /*

<i>Nyāya-bindu</i> (NB) <sup>19</sup>	<i>svabhāva-</i> <i>viprakṛṣṭa</i>	<i>kāla-</i> <i>viprakṛṣṭa</i>	<i>deśa-</i> <i>viprakṛṣṭa</i> <sub>1</sub>	<i>deśa-</i> <i>viprakṛṣṭa</i> <sub>2</sub>
<i>Vākya-padīya</i> (VP) <sup>20</sup>	<i>avasthā-</i> <i>bheda</i>	<i>kāla-bheda</i>	<i>deśa-bheda</i> <sub>1</sub>	<i>deśa-bheda</i> <sub>2</sub>

Table 1<sup>21</sup>

Also critics of the supernatural, including extrasensory perception, took notice of such views, as is attested by Kumāriḷa who recapitulates this idea in his *Mīmāṃsā-sloka-vārttika*:

‘Some profess that the perception of *yogins* as well as of the liberated beings (i.e. Arhants in Buddhism and Siddhas in Jainism) [grasps] past and future objects, as well as subtle and concealed (from sight).’<sup>22</sup>

It seems that a belief in some kind of extraordinary perception was there in Indian religious and philosophical traditions from quite an early phase, perhaps as an extension of a belief in the supernatural phenomena etc., but the term *yogi-pratyakṣa* (or similar ones) is certainly of rather late origin and found its way into philosophical treatises at a rather late date. A correlated concept is *ārṣa-pratyakṣa*, which is a particular variety of supernatural perception of the seers (*ṛṣi*), who possess it ‘genetically’: they are born with it by virtue of their past good deeds. This seems to be a slightly more specialised concept than *yogi-pratyakṣa*.

Some systems, such as the Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika, gradually changed their attitude to the idea of extrasensory perception. For instance, the concept of *yogi-pratyakṣa* is entirely absent from the early *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, and it is introduced into the system much later, around fourth/fifth centuries or even slightly later. The idea of *yogi-pratyakṣa* developed later within a section of the system of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and is entirely absent from Candramati’s *Daśa-padārtha-sāstra* (DPS), which could be an indication that another section of the system did not endorse the new developments. As we shall also see, the concept of supernatural, extrasensory perception of any form (*yogi-* or *ārṣa-pratyakṣa*) is related to the idea of omniscience, or absolute knowledge (*sarva-jñāna* / *kevala*), and plays a crucial role in establishing the latter’s existence. Unsurprisingly, proofs of the existence or possibility of supernatural perception are likewise of generally late date.

A classical exposition of the nature of supernatural perception is provided by the Vaiśeṣika in a passage which is a later addition to the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* and probably slightly antedates or is contemporaneous with Praśastapāda, a passage which distinguishes two kinds of adepts possessed of it:<sup>23</sup>

‘[A: The state of a *yogin* who is *yukta* = *yuñjāna* (lit. “concentrated”), i.e. temporarily engrossed in meditation:]

<sup>18</sup> ĀMī 5: *sūkṣmāntarita-dūrārthāḥ pratyakṣāḥ kasyacid yathā | anumeyatvato ’gny-ādir iti sarva-jñāsamsthitiḥ* // See also PMīV 1.16 § 55, p. 14: *sūkṣmāntarita-dūrārthāḥ kasyacit pratyakṣāḥ prameyatvāt, ghaṭavad iti.*

<sup>19</sup> NB 2.27: *anyathā cānupalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāpteṣu deśa-kāla-svabhāva-viprakṛṣṭeṣv artheṣv ātma-pratyakṣa-nivṛtter abhāva-niścayābhāvāt.*

<sup>20</sup> VP 1.32:

*avasthā-deśa-kālānām bhedād bhinnāsu śaktiṣu |  
bhāvānām anumānena prasiddhir atidurlabhā //*

<sup>21</sup> For details, see BALCEROWICZ (2005).

<sup>22</sup> MŚV 4.26:

*atītānāgate ’py arthe sūkṣme vyavahite ’pi ca |  
pratyakṣam yoginām iṣṭam kaiścin muktātmanām api //*

<sup>23</sup> See WEZLER (1982), HONDA (1988) and ISAACSON (1993) and BALCEROWICZ (2010: 308 ff.)

[13] Due to particular connection of the self and the mind in the self [there arises] perception of the self.<sup>24</sup>

[14] [This perception] also [grasps] other substances, [i.e. atoms<sup>25</sup> of five elements, time, space, mind].

[B: The state of a *yogin* who is *viyukta* (lit. “no longer concentrated”), i.e. no longer engrossed in meditation:]

[15, interpolation:<sup>26</sup>] And [also] due to the contact of the self, sense-organ, mind and object [there arises supernatural perception].

(≈ VS(Ś): And [also] those whose internal organ (mind) is no [longer] concentrated, whose concentration has been interrupted, [acquire perception] of these [other substances].)

[16] And [there is also supernatural perception] of actions and qualities, since they inhere in [the other substances].

[17] And [also there is supernatural perception] of qualities of the self, since they inhere in the self.<sup>27</sup>

Two levels of a practitioner endowed with such suprasensory vision can clearly be distinguished in the passage. The first is called in the text *yukta*, which might theoretically cover a range of meanings. A one which may immediately be recalled would be related to the discipline of *yoga*, a interpretation seemingly most natural in this context. Hence *yukta* would mean ‘engrossed in the practice of *yoga*’ or ‘disciplined’. Consistently, its correlate *viyukta* in the passage would mean ‘not engrossed in the practice of *yoga*’ or ‘not disciplined’, something which hardly was an intention of the authors, because this kind of extrasensory perception is available to a very elitarian group of practitioners who are disciplined by *yoga*, not to everybody. Alternatively, *yukta* could rather be taken, more specifically, to derive from the verbal root √*yuj* of the fourth class (A, *Dhātu-pāṭha* 4.68): *yujA samādhai* (‘The verbal root *yuj* of the fourth class is used in the sense of concentration’), hence *yukta* = ‘concentrated’, or engrossed in deep meditation (*samādhi*). Its correlate *viyukta* would accordingly denote a practitioner who has ended his deep state of mediation, i.e. an adept who is temporarily ‘not concentrated’, which would make good sense in this particular context. The third option would be to derive *yukta* from the verbal root √*yuj* of the seventh class (A, *Dhātu-pāṭha* 7.7): *yujIR yoge* (‘The

<sup>24</sup> See NBh 1.1.3, p. 9.8–9: *pratyakṣaṃ yuñjānasya yoga-samādhi-jam “ātmany ātma-manasoḥ saṃyoga-viśeṣād ātmā pratyakṣaḥ” iti.*—[Another proof of the existence of soul, beside verbal testimony of an authority or inference, is] perception of a [*yogin*] presently engrossed [in meditation], which is born in the state of concentration in *yoga* [in accordance with] the following [*sūtra* of VS(C) 9.13]: “Due to particular connection of the self and the mind in the self [there arises] perception of the self.” The fact that VS(C) 9.13 is cited in NBh attests to the temporal priority of Vaiśeṣika into which the idea of extrasensory perception was first introduced.

<sup>25</sup> Thus acc. to Candrānanda, VSV(C): ...*vyāpaka-dravyeṣv ātmanāsaṃyukteṣv apratiśiddhātma-saṃyogeṣu ca paramāṇv-ādiṣūbhābyāṃ saṃyukteṣu...*

<sup>26</sup> See ISAACSON (1993) and HONDA (1988).

<sup>27</sup> VS(C) 9.13–17 VS(Ś) 9.1.11–15 VS(D) 9.11–13:

13: *ātmany ātma-manasoḥ saṃyoga-viśeṣād ātma-pratyakṣam.*

[VS(D): absent]

14: *tathā dravyāntareṣu.*

[VS(Ś) 12: *tathā dravyāntareṣu pratyakṣam.*]

[VS(D): absent]

15: *ātmēndriya-mano-’rtha-sannikarṣāc ca.* [= VS(D)]

[VS(Ś) 13: *asamāhitāntaḥ-karaṇā upasaṃhṛta-samādhayas teṣāṃ ca.*]

16: *tat-samavāyāt karma-guṇeṣu.* [= VS(D)]

17: *ātma-samavāyād ātma-guṇeṣu.* [= VS(D)]

verbal root *yuj* of the seventh class is used in the sense of connection’) and to take it to mean ‘connected’, and *mutatis mutandis viyukta* as ‘disconnected’. That would, however, not seem appropriate in view of the ambiguity of what connection would here be implied: certainly it could not be a connection (or lack of connection: *vi-*) of the self with the mind or with the sense organs etc., inasmuch as in the case of *yukta*, the contact is between the self and the mind, whereas in the case of *viyukta*, the contact relates the self, sense-organ, mind and object, viz. the actual picture is just the opposite to what the third interpretation would suggest. Further, the term *yukta* means the same as the term *yuñjāna* (the present middle participle: ‘being himself temporarily engrossed [in meditation]’) found in the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* which speaks of a perception ‘of a [*yogin*] **temporarily engrossed** [in meditation], which is born in the state of concentration in *yoga*’ (NBh 1.1.3: *yuñjānasya yoga-samādhi-jam; vide supra*, n. 24).

Some conclusions about the nature of extrasensory perception can be drawn from the above *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* passage:

- (1) it is a result of the connection of the self with other components or factors;
- (2) it is not a direct, innate function of the self, inasmuch as it requires additional factors (beside the self) to occur;
- (3) it has two subdivisions: one occurring in a state of deep meditation, when the self is in contact with the mind only, the other taking place outside of meditation, when the self is in contact with the mind, sense-organ and object;
- (4) this twofold subdivision reveals a hierarchy of supernatural perception: (a) the *\*yukta-pratyakṣa* (i.e. the perception of a *yogin* temporarily engrossed in meditation) is subtler, its object being either primarily immaterial and non-physical (the self) or material, physical but immanently not amenable to ordinary perception (such as atoms, time, space and mind), and it being based on a contact between the self and the mind, whereas (b) the *\*viyukta-pratyakṣa* (i.e. the perception of a *yogin* who is no longer engrossed in meditation) seems to be lower and more mundane, it being based on a contact of the self, sense-organ, mind and object, and its object being material and physical, including also objects which are potentially perceptible to everyone, but not sensorily accessible at the moment of perception (e.g. due to distance in time or space or due to some physical barrier);<sup>28</sup> both of these kinds being supernatural, the former would be extrasensory, i.e. fully dissociated from the operation of sense organs, whereas the latter, strictly speaking, would also be supernatural, but not fully extrasensory, because a sense organ is somehow engaged in the process of supernatural perception of the *viyukta* practitioner;

<sup>28</sup> See Candrānanda’s gloss: *ad VS 1.16 (viyukta-pratyakṣa)*: ‘In these [“disconnected/undisciplined” *yogins*] there arises perception of objects which are subtle, concealed (from sight) and distant due to the contact of the quadruple (the self, sense-organ, mind and object). And also of things perceptible to people like us.’— VSV(C) *ad VS 1.16 (viyukta-pratyakṣa)*: *sūkṣma-vyavahita-viprakṣeṣu artheṣu teṣāṃ catuṣṭaya-sannikarṣād api pratyakṣam jāyate. tathāsmad-ādi-pratyakṣeṣu*. On the quadruple (*catuṣṭaya*) of the self, sense-organ, mind and object, see DPŚ<sub>2</sub> 146, p. 191–2: ... *yad jñānaṃ tasyātmēndriya-mano-’rtha-catuṣṭaya-sannikarṣaḥ karaṇam*. Cf. also the sequence of connection in NBhū, p. 170 (apropos of NSā: *viprayuktāvasthāyāṃ catuṣṭaya-traya-dvaya-sannikarṣād grahaṇaṃ yathā-saṃbavena yojanīyam*): [*catuṣṭaya*:] *tatra rasana-cakṣus-tvācām ... ātmā manasā saṃyujyate, mana indriyeṇa, indriyam arthenēti*. [*traya*:] *śrotreṇārtha-grahaṇe trayāṇāṃ ātma-maṇaḥ-śrotṛāṇāṃ sannikarṣaḥ*. [*dvaya*:] *manasārtha-grahaṇe dvayor ātma-manaso sannikarṣa iti*.

(5) it is partly related to the idea of liberation, which is implied by the fact that the one possessed of it can enter a meditative trance of *samādhi*, which should ultimately lead to liberation.<sup>29</sup>

Supernatural perception occupies a prominent place in Praśastapāda's commentary, who distinguishes the same two kinds of extrasensory perception, but seems to have slightly modified the scope of both kinds of supernatural perception, retaining the hierarchical order with the *\*yukta-pratyakṣa* (possessed by *yukta-yogins*, i.e. those engrossed in meditation and superior to ordinary humans beings) being superior, above the *\*viyukta-pratyakṣa* of those not engrossed in meditation who perceive merely material, physical objects distant in time or space or separated from ordinary sight by some kind of barrier:

'[240] The grasping of the highest universal (*mahā-sāmānya*) and of [intermediate universals such as] substantiality, qualitiveness, and mobility etc., inherent in a perceptible substratum, through sense-organs which grasp [their] substratum is the [ordinary] perception of people like us. [241] However, in *yogins* who are temporarily engrossed in meditation (*yukta*) [and] who are superior to us, through the mind influenced by moral excellence (*dharma*) produced by [the practice of] *yoga*, there arises an unerring perception of the intrinsic nature with respect to [such invisible substances as] their own self, the self of others, ether, space, time, air, atoms, mind as well as qualities, actions, universals, individuators which are inherent in these [substances]. [242] On the other hand, in [*yogins* who are] no longer engrossed in meditation (*viyukta*) due to the contact of the four [viz. the self, sense-organ, mind and object and] thanks to the efficacy of the influence of moral law produced by [the practice of] *yoga*, there arises perception with respect to objects which are subtle, concealed [from sight] and distant.'<sup>30</sup>

Praśastapāda's elaboration of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* classification, being itself a later interpolation, introduces some new insights as to the nature of supernatural perception:

(6) The precondition for supernatural perception, especially the superior kind, or *\*yukta-pratyakṣa*, is the practice of *yoga* and moral law (*dharma*), whereas it is not clear whether one requires any moral standard to possess *\*viyukta-pratyakṣa*;

(7) Praśastapāda extends the scope of the *\*yukta-pratyakṣa* to embrace one's own and other people's selves, ether, space, time, air, atoms and the mind as well as qualities, actions, universals, individuators which are inherent in these substances; whereas the *\*viyukta-pratyakṣa* is limited to objects which are subtle, concealed from sight and distant.

He further describes how and on what basis adepts of *yoga* distinguish between objects perceived supernaturally:

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<sup>29</sup> Cf. NS 1.1.9: *tad-atyanta-vimokṣo 'pavargah (tad=duhkha)*.

<sup>30</sup> PBh<sub>1</sub> 8.12, p. 187 = PBh<sub>2</sub> 240–242: [240] *bhāva-dravyatva-guṇatva-karmatvādīnām upalabhyādhāra-samavetanām āśraya-grāhakair indriyair grahaṇam ity etad asmad-ādīnām pratyakṣam*. [241] *asmad-viśiṣṭānām tu yoginām yuktānām yoga-ja-dharmānugrāhiteṇa manasā svātmāntarākāśa-dik-kāla-paramānu-vāyu-manahsu tat-samaveta-guṇa-karma-sāmānya-viśeṣeṣu samavāye cāvitatham svarūpa-darśanam utpadyate*. [242] *viyuktānām punaś catuṣṭaya-sannikarṣād yoga-ja-dharmānugraha-sāmarthyāt sūkṣma-vyavahita-viprakṣeṣu pratyakṣam utpadyate*.



[370] Similarly to people like us who experience the differentiation in cognition occasioned by equal shapes, qualities, actions, parts or relations, with reference to cows, etc. [as different] from horses, etc.— [e.g. in the form] “[this] cow is white, of swift pace, with a fat neck hump, with a large bell”—in a similar manner *yogins*, who are superior to us, [experience] the differentiation in cognition with reference to permanent [entities like] atoms as well as minds and souls of liberated people that [all] have identical shapes, qualities and actions. Since there is no other factor [that would make such a differentiation between seemingly identical things possible], the factors thanks to which [the *yogins* are able to distinguish] each and every substratum [of qualities and actions in the form]: “this is different, that is different”, and [thanks to which in those *yogins*] a recognition arises: “this is that [atom]” with regard to an atom in distant place and time, are ultimate individuators. [371] Suppose, on the other hand, without [postulating the existence of] ultimate individuators, that the *yogins* possessed such a discrimination through cognition as well as recognition [of individual atoms, which they could acquire] through moral law (*dharma*) produced by [the practice of] *yoga*, what would happen then? It would not be possible [for them to distinguish between atoms etc.] in this way, [i.e. merely through such a supernatural perception]. Just like the cognition of white in something which is not white or a recognition of something completely invisible does not arise through moral law produced by [the practice of] *yoga*, and if it could [arise] it would be false, in the same manner the *yogins* can possess neither discrimination through cognition nor a recognition through moral law born of [the practice of] *yoga* without [the existence of] ultimate individuators<sup>31</sup>.<sup>32</sup>

The actual position of the fifth-century authors responsible for the above interpolation in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* being unknown, it seems that for Praśastapāda, it was the *\*yukta-pratyakṣa* which necessitated some kind of moral statute (*dharma*) for it to be acquired, whereas it was not necessarily the case with the inferior kind of the *\*viyukta-pratyakṣa*. To distinguish between atoms by means of a supernatural perception of the ultimate individuators (*antya-viśeṣa*) was the domain of the *\*yukta-pratyakṣa*: the ‘recognition of individual atoms’ could be acquired ‘through moral law (*dharma*) produced by the practice of *yoga*’.

This Vaiśeṣika concept of supernatural perception also found its way into the system of Nyāya and was elaborated by representatives of the twin school. Of particular note is the exposition of Bhāsarvajña, who does not really distinguish between *\*yukta-pratyakṣa* and *\*viyukta-pratyakṣa* on the basis of their different scopes but according to the kind of connection between the self and other relata. The former presupposes only a connection between the self and the mind, whereas the

<sup>31</sup> The idea of the individuators that make it possible for the *yogins* to distinguish between various atoms is recapitulated in YBh 3.53, p. 313.7.

<sup>32</sup> PBh<sub>1</sub> 11, p. 321–322 = PBh<sub>2</sub> 370–371: [370] *yathāsmad-ādīnām gav-ādiṣv aśvadibhyas tulyākṛti-guṇa-kriyāvayava-samyoga-nimittā pratyaya-vyāvṛttir dṛṣṭā gauḥ śuklaḥ śighra-gatiḥ pīna-kakudmān mahā-ghaṇṭa iti, tathāsmad-viśiṣṭānām yoginām nityeṣu tulyākṛti-guṇa-kriyeṣu paramāṇuṣu muktātma-maṇaḥsu cānya-nimittāsambhavād yebhyo nimittabhyaḥ pratyādhāraṃ vilakṣaṇo 'yam vilakṣaṇo 'yam iti pratyaya-vyāvṛttiḥ, deśa-kāla-viprakarṣe ca paramāṇau sa evāyam iti pratyabhijñānaṃ ca bhavati te 'ntyā viśeṣāḥ. [371] yadi punar antya-viśeṣam antareṇa yoginām yoga-jād dharmāt pratyaya-vyāvṛttiḥ pratyabhijñānaṃ ca syāt tataḥ kim syāt? nāvamaḥ bhavati. yathā na yoga-jād dharmād aśukle śukla-pratyayaḥ saṃjāyate atyantadrṣṭe ca pratyabhijñānaṃ, yadi syān mithyā bhavet, tathēhāpy antya-viśeṣam antareṇa yoginām na yoga-jād dharmāt pratyaya-vyāvṛttiḥ pratyabhijñānaṃ vā bhavitum arhati.*

latter requires the co-operation of the four elements (the self, the mind, a sense organ and the object):

‘[NSā:] Supernatural perception is the grasping of an object distant in place, time and its own (subtle) nature. [NBhū:] Distant in place [means] places far away like existent worlds etc.; concealed from sight means] hellish abodes etc.; distant in time [means] past etc.; distant in terms of one’s own nature [means] atoms, ether etc. This takes place in both states: in the state of the “concentrated” (*yukta*) and in the state of the “not concentrated” (*viyukta*). Among these two, in the state of the “concentrated” only due to the connection of the self and the mind there arises the grasping of the **complete** object, and this is said with respect to the **highest yogins**. However, an **ordinary yogin** does not have the grasp of the complete object.’<sup>33</sup>

Further, the *\*yukta-pratyakṣa* is said to cognise a complete object (whatever that exactly should mean), not just its spatial slice (e.g. the surface of the object) or its temporal snapshot (e.g. its present condition), which alone remain perceptible to the *\*viyukta-pratyakṣa*. Also this account of Bhāsarvajña preserves a noticeable hierarchy: the former, more comprehensive, is possessed by highest *yogins* (*parama-yogin*) alone, whereas the latter one is the domain of ordinary *yogins* (*yogi-mātra*).

A very special kind of supernatural perception, particularly distinguished in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, was the seers’ perception (*ārṣa-pratyakṣa*), called also intuition (*pratibha* or *pratibhā*): We find this idea in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*: And the seers’ perception is the perfect seeing of the *dharma* [and other thing]s.’<sup>34</sup> However, this *sūtra* must again be a later interpolation, for we find it in Candrānanda’s recension (VS(C)), but it is absent e.g. in Śaṅkaramiśra’s *Upaskāra* (VS(Ś)).

The passage was appended at the very end of the chapter, without no direct connection to the preceding portion. It was apparently a reaction to the claims of the Mīmāṃsā school that only the Vedic revelation, the way it was interpreted and ritually practised by that school, was the only means to know the *dharma*. Here, with a new kind of supernatural perception, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika could reject Mīmāṃsā ritualistic claim and substantiate its independent access to moral law.

**0.4. Jaina epistemology** relied heavily on the general epistemological paradigm developed by other schools, especially that of early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

Despite Jaina epistemological classification’s original terminological incompatibility with the rest of epistemological traditions in classical India—the term *pratyakṣa* (universally: ‘perception’; in Jainism: ‘direct cognition’) was reserved for a range of supernatural cognitions, whereas the actual sensory perception was known as *abhinibodha* or *mati-jñāna*—both kinds of perception were clearly distinguished in the quintuplet of cognitions: sensuous cognition (*abhinibodha*, *mati*; lit. ‘apprehension’, ‘mental process’), testimonial cognition (*śruta*; lit. ‘the heard’), clairvoyance (*avadhi*; lit. ‘mental infiltration’), telepathy, or mind-reading (*manaḥ-paryāya* or *manaḥ-paryaya*; lit. ‘penetration of the mind’) and

<sup>33</sup> NSā, p. 170: *yogi-pratyakṣam tu deśa-kāla-svabhāva-viprakṣṭārtha-grāhakam*, and NBhū, p. 170: *deśa-viprakṣṭāḥ satya-lokādāyo ’tidūrasthā vyavahitās ca nāga-bhuvanādayaḥ, kāla-viprakṣṭās tv atītānāgatāḥ, svabhāva-viprakṣṭāḥ paramāṇv-ākāśādāya iti, teṣāṃ tri-prakārāṇāṃ viprakṣṭānāṃ vyavasthānāṃ va grāhakaṃ pratyakṣaṃ yogi-pratyakṣam ity ucyate. tac cāvasthā-dvaye bhavati: yuktāvasthāyāṃ ayuktāvasthāyāṃ ca. tatra yuktāvasthāyāṃ ātma-manaḥ-samyogād eva dharmādi-sahitād aśeṣārtha-grahaṇaṃ bhavati. etac ca parama-yogi-vivakṣayōktam, na tu yogi-mātrasyāśeṣārthasya grahaṇaṃ bhavati.*

<sup>34</sup> VS 9.28 (C): *ārṣaṃ siddha-darśanaṃ ca dharmebyaḥ*. Candrānanda in his exposition (p. 71) recapitulates PBh<sub>2</sub> 2.12.2.d.1 [288].

perfect knowledge, or omniscience (*kevala*; lit. ‘the singular one’), all being later grouped under two headings of indirect cognition (*parokṣa*) and direct cognition (*pratyakṣa*), respectively.<sup>35</sup>

What would correspond to ordinary, sensory perception was known as sensuous cognition (*abhinibodha, mati*), a natural cognitive endowment of all living beings. The Jainas tried to clearly distinguish it from other kinds of cognition, partly under the influence of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika epistemology, and came to define it as cognition that originates in the contact of a sense organ, the mind and an object. It was not purely non-conceptual or exclusively derived from sensory data. In fact, it also comprised inner apprehension of mental images and memories etc., or mental insight. Its understanding was rather unspecific: within it sensations, perceptions and mental processes overlapped and it covered a range of epistemic events and cognitive processes: it not only covered sensations derived from particular sense organs and their awareness but also mental processes triggered by such sensations, including processes of simple reasoning, sensation of doubt, acts of deliberation and cogitation, recognition etc. Alongside testimonial cognition (*śruta*; lit. ‘the heard’), which covered all cognition that was not based on direct experience of the cognising subject but on verbal communication of another person, particularly the scriptural testimony, sensuous cognition constituted two-fold indirect cognition (*parokṣa*), i.e. mediated either by a sense organ or mind, or both.

The heading of direct cognition proper (*pratyakṣa*) comprised three varieties of what one could call supernatural perception, with no intermediary of sense organs or mind, conceived of as a quasi-sense organ. Clairvoyance (*avadhi*) traditionally comes first. It was believed to grasp material macroscopic objects that were considered physically beyond reach of ordinary, sensuous perception or testimonial cognition. Further, this kind of extrasensory perception was not accessible to everyone: one had to either be born with it or to acquire it through special ascetic practices. In terms of cognitive faculties (*upayoga*) we can speak of two kinds of clairvoyance (*avadhi*): clairvoyant perception and clairvoyant knowledge (*avadhi-darśana* and *avadhi-jñāna*). However, it is also two-fold in terms of its origin:<sup>36</sup> conditioned by birth, i.e. possessed by denizens of hell and divine beings, as well as occasioned by destruction-cum-subsidence of *karman*, possessed by denizens of hell, divine beings, animals and people. The Jainas would further distinguish six varieties of it: ‘not-accompanying’ (*anānugāmika*), viz. present only in a given place, ‘accompanying’ (*ānugāmika*), viz. it accompanies the person after he or she has left the place where he or she obtained it, regressive (*hīyamānaka*), progressive (*vardhamānaka*), oscillating (*anavasthita*) and stable (*avasthita*), that will accompany the person until the moment of death or attainment of omniscience.<sup>37</sup>

Much subtler was telepathy, or mind-reading (*manaḥ-paryāya / manaḥ-paryaya*) which was supposed to directly grasp other persons’ thoughts, i.e. all contents of other minds. Inasmuch as one could achieve it only through a process of spiritual development and as a result of the upliftment of best virtues, it was available only to morally most advanced humans. This concept presupposed an idea, which is a pan-Indian belief, that mental phenomena, including all states of minds of other people, are somatic<sup>38</sup>, i.e. they extend in space and are spatially located. For this very reason telepathy, the way it was conceived of in Jainism, was subtle, sophisticated kind of perception which grasped extremely fine percepts located in the mind. The

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<sup>35</sup> For details and a development of the classifications of cognitive faculties and cognitions in Jainism, see BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming).

<sup>36</sup> TS 1.21: *dvividho ’vadhiḥ*. TBh 1.21: *bhava-pratyayaḥ kṣayôpaśama-nimittaś ca*.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. TS and TBh 1.22–23.

<sup>38</sup> On the concept of somatism in traditional Indian philosophy and psychology see SCHAYER (1936), DANDEKAR (1941) and KUNST (1968).

difference between clairvoyance and telepathy concerned clarity (*viśuddhi*), place (*kṣetra*), possessor (*svāmin*) and domain (*viśaya*).<sup>39</sup> Thus, only telepathy was believed to be restricted to the restrained, or spiritually advanced human beings (*manuṣya-saṃyata*), viz. it was conditioned by high moral standards. This precondition resembles the requirement, postulated by the Vaiśeṣika and other systems, of ‘the moral law produced by the practice of *yoga*’ (*yogaja-dharma*).

We may speculate what were the reasons that prompted the Jainas to accept the existence of clairvoyance or telepathy. Surely, their presence in the structure of Jaina epistemology was not dictated by a reasoned argument, at least not at the initial stage. Probably, these two kinds of direct cognition were accepted as a result of a widespread religious belief in the existence of supernatural cognitive faculties and of supernatural phenomena. But, as we will see, these two kinds of cognition came to fulfil another role, too, being crucial elements in an argumentative structure and rhetorics within Jainism.

A culmination of the hierarchy of the latter of subtler and subtler kinds of supernatural perceptions and the apex of all spiritual and cognitive development as well as the fulfilment of the dream of the imperfect suffering living being was the absolute, perfect knowledge, or omniscience (*kevala*). From the Jaina standpoint, the omniscient perfected being’s (*kevalin*) perception faced no spatial, temporal or structural limitations and *literally* everything was revealed through it all at once, all things past, present and future, distant and sublime, material and mental. Unlike in Buddhism, for instance, omniscience in Jainism was conceived of not as some kind of potentiality available to the perfected being but a cognitive actuality. The attainment of the absolute knowledge as a consummation of mundane existence of a soul transmigrating from times immemorial, being tantamount to liberation and to a complete destruction of all karmic matter.

0.5. A problem which both the Jainas as well as other schools, such as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, which advocated the existence of supernatural cognitive faculties had to face once they entered the public sphere of debate was to counter criticism meted out by the staunch opponents of omniscience, and to do it primarily on rational grounds. One thing was to believe in supernatural phenomena and extrasensory cognitive faculties, which necessitated no reasoned justification, another was to defend one’s position, which required reasoned argumentation. This had to lead to a development of rational arguments to prove the existence and feasibility of such cognitive faculties. At this stage of research it seems quite difficult to determine which rational arguments for the existence of supernatural cognitive faculties came first. Therefore, I will confine myself to merely collecting them, not necessarily in a chronological order.

1. An argument which is most frequently resorted to by thinkers is the argument from progression. One of its full expositions, outside of Jaina literature, can be found in the *Nyāya-mañjarī*. It is recapitulated there by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, which attests to its much earlier origin. Jayanta advances it in order to counter the Mīmāṃsakas’ counter-argument from the lack of evidence (see *counter-arguments*, § 8) to the effect that it is not possible to formulate any rational proof of suprasensory perception. In his reply to the question posited by the Mīmāṃsakas ‘what would be the proof of supernatural perception that could also cognise *dharma*’, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa replies:

‘The proof [of supernatural perception] is the culmination (gradual perfection) of perception. For it is as follows: a person like us whose sight is limited notices a number of things placed in proximity. Cats (lit.

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<sup>39</sup> TS 1.26 and PMī 1.19.

“enemies of mice”), on the other hand, can recognise even a thing that has fallen into a place covered with a layer of mud in the thickest possible darkness. Furthermore, one learns from the *Rāmāyaṇa* epic that the king of vultures named Sampāti could even see Sītā (lit. ‘the spouse of Daśaratha’s son’) in the distance of a hundred miles. This precisely is the culmination (gradual perfection) of perception like the culmination (perfection) of such qualities as white etc. which is based on gradation. Hence it is understood that there is the highest culmination (perfection) without any further gradation (perfection). And therefore those in whom there is the highest intensity (consummation) of this [perception] are praised as *yogins*. And the highest culmination (intensity) means that [yogins’] perception has as its domain [things] that are subtle, concealed (from sight), distant, past, future etc.’<sup>40</sup>

Of special importance in the argument is the actual meaning of the central term *atiśaya*, which normally means ‘excellence’, ‘superiority’, ‘eminence’, ‘pre-eminence’ or ‘ascendancy’, which I render here as ‘progression’, ‘gradual perfection’ (‘gradual development’), ‘culmination’ or ‘gradation’, depending on context. What it means in this particular context is, as Jayanta Bhaṭṭa aptly clarifies, a gradual ascending process of perfection from a rather feeble competence / faculty, or unpronounced feature, through intermediate stages / gradation, up to absolute consummation or ultimate perfection of the faculty, the gradation or improvement of which is no longer possible.

This argument from progression was used by other schools, e.g. by the Buddhists and the Jainas, as well. A good classical exposition of it is found in Hemacandra’s *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*:

‘The proof of this [supernatural perception (sc. omniscience) follows] from the argument that there is completion of the culmination (gradation) of understanding, and from other [proofs].’<sup>41</sup>

Hemacandra himself supplies a few instantiations of this argument:

‘[Let’s first take] the culmination of understanding. Progression [must have] its completion somewhere, because of culmination, just like the culmination of magnitude. Because of this argument, since it is proved that there is understanding with no higher limit, [we have] the proof of this absolute knowledge, because the proof of [the existence of] absolute knowledge depends on the same structure (*rūpa*) as the proof such [understanding with no higher limit].’<sup>42</sup>

What the example ‘like the culmination of magnitude’ (*parimānātiśayavat*) means is that things progress from smallest atoms (*paramāṇu*) as the lowest limit to the

<sup>40</sup> NMa<sub>2</sub> 2, vol. I, p. 157.1–7: *darśanātiśaya eva pramāṇam. tathā hy asmad-ādir apekṣitāloko ’valokayati nikaṭa-sthitam artha-vṛndam, undura-vairiṇas tu sāndra-tama-tamaḥ-paṅka-paṭala-vilīpta-deśa-patitam api sampaśyanti. sampāti-nāmā ca ḡdhra-rājo yojana-śata-vyavahitām api daśaratha-nandana-sundarīm dadarśēti rāmāyaṇe śrūyate, so ’yaṃ darśanātiśayaḥ śuklādi-guṇātiśaya iva tāra-tamya-samanvita iti gamayati param api niratiśayam atiśayam. ataś ca yatrāśya paraḥ prakarṣas te yogino gīyante. darśanasya ca paro ’tiśayaḥ sūkṣma-vyavahita-viprakṛṣṭa-bhūta-bhaviṣyad-ādi-viśayatvam.*

<sup>41</sup> PMī 1.16: *prajñātiśaya-viśrānti-ādi-siddhes tat-siddhiḥ.*

<sup>42</sup> PMīV 1.16 § 55, p. 13: *prajñāyā atiśayaḥ. tāratamyaṃ kvacid viśrantam, atiśayatvāt, parimānātiśayavad ity anumānena niratiśaya-prajñā-siddhyā tasya kevala-jñānasya siddhiḥ, tat-siddhi-rūpatvāt kevala-jñāna-siddheḥ.*

whole space of the universe (*loka*) as the highest limit. Similarly, we can observe, Hemacandra argues, such a progress of cognition / understanding from a very limited one to the cognition of maximum magnitude, i.e. omniscience. We find similar progression, or gradual perfection of the scope of our knowledge in case of astronomy, too.<sup>43</sup>

What is important, as Hemacandra, underlies, clairvoyance and telepathy constitute two consecutive stages of clarity or purity that eventually lead to omniscience:

‘Clairvoyance and telepathy follows gradual progression of this [destruction of *karman*].’<sup>44</sup>

The structure of the argument provides a proper allocation of clairvoyance (*avadhi*) and telepathy (*manaḥ-paryāya* / *manaḥ-paryaya*) within a structured typology of the five kinds of cognition traditionally accepted by the Jainas. Being intermediary stages from limited cognitive faculties, these two served, earlier religious and folk beliefs in the supernatural and rare human faculties to grasp it apart, to prove the strong Jaina claim of omniscience. In other words, for the Jainas, *yogi-pratyakṣa* was treated just as an intermediate stage to perfection of knowledge, a ‘visible’ corroboration that a progression toward perfection is possible.

This approach can be identified already with Kundakunda, who in his *Samaya-sāra* emphasises that the five kinds of cognition ultimately share the same nature, however they can be arranged hierarchically from sensuous cognition as the lowest to the absolute knowledge as the highest, with no further progress:

‘Sensuous cognition, testimonial cognition, clairvoyance, telepathy and absolute knowledge are one and the same state. When that which is the ultimate is attained, there arises liberation.’<sup>45</sup>

Putting aside the question whether the author(s) of the *Pavayaṇa-sāra* is (are) the same person(s) as the author(s) of the *Samaya-sāra*, both texts—composed not earlier than 300 CE—have much affinity in terms of ideas and approach, which finds expression in the Jaina tradition which assumes that the author of both is one and the same person. The same idea of hierarchically structured cognitions is found also in the *Pavayaṇa-sāra*:

‘[34] Monks have scripture for eyes, all beings have their sense organs for eyes, whereas the divine beings have clairvoyance for eyes. However the liberated beings have eyes that see everything.’<sup>46</sup>

The cognition of monks is scriptural, i.e. testimonial cognition (*śruta*), not based on perception. Every living beings is endowed with sensory perception, which is the lowest kind, lower than monks’ scriptural cognition. A more supreme kind is clairvoyance (*avadhi*), and presumably also telepathy (*manaḥ-paryāya*). The highest of all is omniscience of the liberated beings.

Another passage from the same *Pavayaṇa-sāra* sheds additional light on what links the five kinds of cognition:

<sup>43</sup> PMīV 1.16 § 55, p. 14: *jyotir-jñānāvīśamvādānyathānupapatteś ca tat-siddhiḥ*.

<sup>44</sup> PMī 1.18: *tat-tāratamye ’vadhi-manaḥ-paryāyau ca*.

<sup>45</sup> SSā<sub>1</sub> 219 = SSā<sub>2,3</sub> 204:

*abhiṇi-sudōhi-maṇa-kevalam ca taṃ hodi ekkam eva padaṃ /  
so eso paramatṭho jaṃ lahiduṃ ṇivvudim jādi //*

<sup>46</sup> PSā 3.34:

*āgama-cakkhū sāhū iṃdiya-cakkhūṇi savva-bhūdāni /  
devā ya ohi-cakkhū siddhā puṇa savvado-cakkhū // 34 //*

‘[45] Perfected souls (saints) [achieve their condition] as a result of merit (or: auspicious *karman*). Their activity is, however, a natural development, which is free from [inauspicious *karman* such as] confusion etc., and therefore it is known as “resulting from the destruction [of *karman*]” (*kṣāyika*)”<sup>47</sup>. [46] If the soul itself could not become either good or bad by virtue of its own essential nature alone, there would be no mundane world (transmigration) for all the bodies endowed with a soul.’<sup>48</sup>

The saints (*arhant*) who reached the level of perfection, are endowed with the absolute knowledge (*kevala*), which is the apex of the ascending development of cognitive faculties. As Kundakunda explains, this highest cognitive status is a result of the destruction of karmic impurities which keep the souls in the world of death and rebirth. What is significant, is the argument that the souls become good and perfect (but also bad and imperfect) by virtue of their own essential natures alone, without any involvement of some external factor. That coincides with the idea that all the five cognitions, from the least pure to the most pure absolute knowledge, are in a line of spiritual development which is based on a gradual process of perfection and purification of the souls. And the process of purification (but also of pollution) is effectuated by the soul itself, an important observation which emphasises the soul’s role as the only and ultimate ethical agent. By implication, the innermost nature of all souls is pure, all impurities being external to them. Indirectly, the passage provides a method of how to achieve perfection and absolute knowledge: one should first identify the causes of limited perception and then remove them through practice. This motif will reoccur in the argument from purification (§ 5).

The implication of the above passage, compounded with the conviction that cognitive faculties are organised hierarchically in a progressive sequence with omniscience at the apex, is a basis for future argument from progression. As a rule, Kundakunda does not openly argue with opponents, does not rationally justify his position, does not engage in a rational dispute where religious dogmas are supported and consolidated with reasoned arguments. That is why we would not find a well-structured argument from progression to prove omniscience in Kundakunda’s works. But what is already present there, are the building blocks for such an argument to be explicitly formulated in the future.

This task is undertaken by Samantabhadra<sup>49</sup> who uses these threads to weave an argumentative fabric in his *Āpta-mīmāṃsā*:

‘[4] A complete destruction of defects and karmic veils is possible, because a complete consummation [of the gradual purification process] is [possible], just like a [complete] annihilation of both external and internal blemishes in particular cases with the help of respective causes.<sup>50</sup>  
[5] Objects that are subtle, concealed [from sight] and distant remain

<sup>47</sup> Cf. TS 10.1: *moha-kṣayāj jñāna-darśanâvaraṇântarāya-kṣayāc ca kevalam*.

<sup>48</sup> PSā 1.45–46:

*puṇṇa-phalā arahantā tesim kiriyā puṇo hi odaiyā /  
mohādīhim virahiyā tamhā sā khāiga tti madā // 45 //  
jadi so suho va asuho ṇa havadi ādā sayam sahāveṇa /  
saṃsāro vi ṇa vijjadi savvesim jīva-kāyānaṃ // 46 //*

Vgl. auch SSā<sub>1</sub> 219 = SSā<sub>2,3</sub> 204.

<sup>49</sup> Traditionally held to have lived around 550, however, there are valid reasons to maintain that he must have been acquainted with some of Dharmakīrti’s works (e.g. certain passages of *ĀMī* seem to betray Dharmakīrti’s stamp), ergo has to also be considered either posterior to or younger contemporary of Kumārila, see BALCEROWICZ (2008: ii) and (2011: 19–20).

<sup>50</sup> For the analysis of the verse, being a formulation of a proof of liberation, and its soteriological implications see BALCEROWICZ (2005).

[always] directly perceptible to someone, because they are inferable, just as fire etc. [is inferable from visible smoke]—such is a proof of the omniscient [Jina].<sup>51</sup>

The argument, introduced in Verse 4, can be formally arranged as follows:<sup>52</sup>

Thesis (*pratijñā*): There exists complete destruction of defects and karmic veils (*doṣāvaraṇayor hānir niḥśeṣāsti*),  
Logical reason (*hetu*): Because there is a completion of progression, i.e. the consummation of gradual purification process (*atiśāyanāt*),  
Example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*): Like a complete annihilation of both external and internal blemishes in particular cases with the help of respective causes (*kvacid yathā sva-hetubhyo bahir antar mala-kṣayaḥ*).

The thesis amounts to the claim that ‘there exists omniscience’, inasmuch as ‘complete destruction of defects and karmic veils’ is identical with attaining omniscience, and provisionally liberation. The actual structure of the argument is the following:

‘An invisible perfect condition *x* of a particular faculty *F* (e.g. liberation, omniscience, extrasensory perception) is possible, because there can be a gradation of the respective faculty’.

And indeed, as Jayanta Bhaṭṭa notices, the crux of the argument from progression is that ‘there is the highest culmination without any further culmination’ (*param api niratiśayam atiśayam*).

In fact, this specific argument the way it is found with Samantabhadra can be understood to work two ways. First, there is a gradation of purification (a hierarchy of purer and purer cognitions, which terminates with the absolutely pure omniscience). Alternatively, there is a gradation of the destruction of pollution (a hierarchy of states in which karmic veils and defects are more and more destroyed, till a state is reached when all karmic veils and defects are fully destroyed). Whichever way we take it, both formulations ultimately amount to one and the same result: pure cognition in a state of complete destruction of karmic veils and defects.

Further, Verse 5<sup>53</sup>, which supplements the argument of Verse 4, establishes a connection between the scope of *yogi-pratyakṣa* (supernatural perception) and *kevala* (omniscience), which serves as a support for the argument. In fact, it also constitutes an argument in its own right as the argument from potentiality (*vide infra*, § 6).

The argument from progression, explicated in Verse 4, finds its elaboration in a commentary *Aṣṭa-śatī* by Akalaṅka (eighth century):

‘And in this way the complete (consummate) destruction of defects etc. is somehow capable of annihilating all [karmic] blemishes. Thus, why should a proof of a blemish-free condition not be possible? The expunction of dirt etc. [in the case of a gem] does not entail the destruction of the gem, [and similarly the annihilation of *karman* does not destroy the soul], because it

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<sup>51</sup> ĀMī 4–5:

*doṣāvaraṇayor hānir niḥśeṣāsty atiśāyanāt /*  
*kvacid yathā sva-hetubhyo bahir antar mala-kṣayaḥ //*  
*sūkṣmāntarita-dūrārthāḥ pratyakṣāḥ kasyacid yathā /*  
*anumeyatvato ’gny-ādir iti sarva-jña-saṁsthitih //*

<sup>52</sup> See BALCEROWICZ (2013: § 4).

<sup>53</sup> For the argument exposed in Verse 5, see BALCEROWICZ (2013: § 9).



does not stand to reason that something really existent [such as a soul] could be totally annihilated.<sup>54</sup>

What Akalaṅka emphasises in addition is that the process of purification, through the annihilation of impurities, does not necessarily lead to a destruction of the object to be purified. That is particularly important in Jaina context which understands the soul as the only and ultimate ethical agent which is both the object which undergoes purification process and the agent which effectively carries it out.

Akalaṅka refers to the argument in his other work, the *Laghīyas-traya*, too:

‘If excellence (gradation in skills) of man is possible, why there should be no person who could see objects in an extra-sensory manner?’<sup>55</sup>

As we can see, the argument from progression was applied by various Śvetāmbara and Digambara authors, from Kundakunda to Hemacandra-sūri, but its use was not restricted to Jaina authors. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, a representative of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika who used this argument, has already been mentioned, but we find it also with other systems.

An early example is Bhartṛhari, whose argument evinces some similarity with the statements found in the *Prasastapāda-bhāṣya* (*vide supra*, n. 30):

‘However, one knows of cognition, encompassing all sense organs, [of imperceptible universals] on the part of [the omniscient] who are superior to us that it [comes about] from a continued practice, similarly to [professional knowledge] of particular things such as gems, silver etc. on the part of specialists in these [things].’<sup>56</sup>

Further, he lays down the principle of progression which enables one to compare between two similar qualities, or substances possessed of similar qualities, and establish a hierarchy based on the respective intensity of a given quality.

‘A quality is explained to be independently a ground for superiority [of one quality over another quality]. It is solely due to such quality on which another quality is depended that one recognises its superiority over the other quality.’<sup>57</sup>

<sup>54</sup> AṣṢ<sub>1</sub> 53.9–16 = AṣṢ<sub>2</sub> 4.7–9 (ad ĀMī 4): *tathā ca doṣāder hānir atīśayavatī kutaścīt nivartayitum arhati sakalaṃ kalaṅkaṃ iti katham akalaṅka-siddhir na bhavet? na† maṇer malāder vyāvṛtīḥ kṣayaḥ, sato ’tyanta-vināśānupapatteḥ.*

† Both editions [Nagin Shah follows AṣṢ<sub>1</sub>] have no *na* [*na bhavet? maṇeḥ...*], although the commentary makes it clear that one should have here a negated sentence: AṣS 53.15 ff.: *pradhvaṃsābhāvo hi kṣayo hānir ihābhipretā. sā ca vyāvṛtīr eva maṇer kanaka-pāṣāṇād vā* (recte: *-pāṣāṇāder vā*) *malasya kiṭṭāder vā. na punar atyanta-vināśaḥ. sa hi dravyasya vā syāt paryāyasya vā? na tāvad dravyasya nityatvāt...*

<sup>55</sup> LT (*Pramāṇa-praveśa-vivṛti*) 1.4: *puruṣātīśaya-sambhave ’tīndriyārtha-darśī kiṃ na syāt.*

<sup>56</sup> VP 3.1.46:

*jñānaṃ tv asmad-viśiṣṭānām† tāsu sarvēndriyaṃ‡ viduḥ /  
abhyāsān maṇi-rūpyādi-viśeṣeṣv iva tad-vidān //*

† Cf. VS(C) 2.1.18 [p. 13]: *saṃjñā-karma tv asmad-viśiṣṭānām liṅgam*, and PBh<sub>1</sub> 8.12.2.1, p. 187 = PBh<sub>2</sub> 22.12.2.a [241]: *asmad-viśiṣṭānām tu yoginām yuktānām yoga-ja-dharmānugṛhītena manasā svātmāntarākāśa-dik-kāla-paramāṇu-vāyu-manahsu tat-samaveta-guṇa-karma-sāmānya-viśeṣeṣu samavāye cāvitathaṃ svarūpa-darśanam utpadyate* (for the translation of the passage, see p. 2).

‡ The attribute *sarvēndriyaṃ* (‘encompassing all sense organs’) of *jñānaṃ* (‘a cognition’) unambiguously implies omniscience which transcends limitations of sensory cognition (ordinary perception), which is always restricted to its kind; whereas this particular cognition encompasses all kinds of sensory data (see VP 1.155).

<sup>57</sup> VP 1.65:

*guṇaḥ prakarṣa-hetur yaḥ svātantryeṇōpadiśyate /*

Another instance, albeit in a slightly modified form, is found also in Buddhist literature, e.g. in Dharmakīrti's oeuvre (*vide infra*, p. 2, n. 64).

The argument from progression was employed also by other schools of Indian thought where it served to prove the superiority of other qualities, not only omniscience. It is found, for instance in the tradition of the Pātañjala Yoga to demonstrate the pre-eminence of god (*īśvara*), which attests to a wide popularity of this kind of argumentative structure:

‘Further, his (god’s) supremacy is without any equal excellence [that could compare with it]. To begin with, [his] excellence is not exceeded by any other excellence, [because] that very thing which would be excelling over [it] would necessarily be this very excellence [of god]. Therefore, where the excellence reaches its upper limit that is god. Moreover, there is no excellence that is equal his [excellence]. Why? [Because] when out of two [seemingly] equal things one thing is desired at the same time [and] and the thing is selected (lit. established) as follows: “This one must be new; that one must be old”, then it is automatically follows that the other is inferior because it falls short of [satisfying] the desired expectation. And it is not the case that for two [seemingly] equal things they are achieved as the desired object simultaneously, because the object would stand in contradiction. Therefore the one whose supremacy is without any [seemingly equal] excellences is god.’<sup>58</sup>

All these instances, and certainly there will be a lot of more to be traced in various works, attest to a wide popularity of this argument, despite its fundamental logical flaws. One of these could be briefly mentioned here. Let the symbol  $\rightarrow$  stand for any kind of precedence, whether hierarchical, temporal, causal etc.; ‘ $x \rightarrow y$ ’ means ‘ $x$  is superior in degree to  $y$ ’. The main premise of the argument is

‘For any thing  $y$  there exists some other thing  $x$  such that  $x$  is superior to in degree to  $y$  (or “ $y$  is subordinate to  $x$ ”),’ i.e.  $\forall y \exists x (x \rightarrow y)$ .

From it, one intends to draw a conclusion:

“There exists one thing  $x$  which is superior in degree to all  $y$ -s,” i.e.  $\exists x \forall y (x \rightarrow y)$ .

Clearly, such a move, i.e.  $\forall y \exists x (x \rightarrow y) \Rightarrow \exists x \forall y (x \rightarrow y)$ , constitutes a logical fallacy, for it is logically not permissible to interchange the places of the qualifiers.<sup>59</sup>

If, by addition, we know  $x$  as well as  $x+1$ , we can know  $(x+1)+1$ , so we can know  $(x+1)+1+\dots+n$ , etc. There is nothing logically binding that this sequence has to terminate at any point. At the same time, the infinite continuity of the series, i.e. continuous expansion of our knowledge by accumulation, cannot lead to omniscience because the process takes place within a limited time in which only a limited section

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*tasyâśritād guṇād eva prakṛṣṭatvaṃ pratīyate //*

<sup>58</sup> YBh 2.24, p. 56.2–57.4: *tac ca tasyaiśvaryaṃ sāmānīśaya-vinirmuktam. na tāvad aiśvaryaṅtareṇa tad atīśayate, yād evatīśāyī syāt tad eva tat syāt. tasmād yatra kāṣṭhā-prāptir aiśvaryaśya sa īśvara iti. na ca tat-samānam aiśvaryaṃ asti. kasmāt? dvayoḥ tulyayor ekasmin yugapat kāmīte rthe navam idam astu purāṇam idam astu ity ekasya siddhau itarasya prakāmya-vighātād ūnatvaṃ prasaktam. dvayoś ca tulyayor yugapat kāmītārtha-prāptir nāsti, arthasya viruddhatvāt. tasmād yasya sāmānīśayair vinirmuktam aiśvaryaṃ sa evēśvaram.*

<sup>59</sup> For details see BALCEROWICZ (2013: § 7).

of the series can unfold (and a provision has to be made for no loss of the already accumulated knowledge, i.e. loss of memory).

The structure of the proof resembles a proof of god's existence which we find in Thomas Aquinas' *Summa Theologiae* as 'the forth way', or the argument 'from the degrees of perfection'. Just as an argument from hierarchy of beings attempts to prove that a sequence of ever better entities must end with a fully perfect being, so functions the argument from progression to prove omniscience. The logical flaw of these arguments is similar to two other arguments of god's existence ('from the prime mover' and 'from the first cause', or cosmological argument), for the first time formulated by Aristotle at the beginning of his *Metaphysics*.

2. A variant of argument from progression is what could be called reverse argument from progression. It is found in an embryonic form for instance with Kundakunda:

'[236 / 222] When the same conch-shell, having abandoned its white nature, would become of black nature, then it would abandon its whiteness. [237 / 223] Just like a conch-shell, when it has lost its white nature due to [another] substance, it would become of black nature, then it would give up its whiteness. [238 / 223] In the same manner, also the same cogniser, when he—having lost his cognitive nature—would be modified through nescience, he would become of nescient nature.'<sup>60</sup>

In fact, this is a reverse argument from progression by analogy. Just as a conch-shell may gradually lose its whiteness and turn black, in the same way a knowing soul may gradually become bereft of any capacity to cognise. Why Kundakunda uses this argument is another question: it serves probably both to demonstrate that progression works in two ways (towards perfection and towards imperfection) and to warn religious followers not be negligent in their religious practice. For just as there is a progression from whiteness down to blackness and, by analogy, from a state of ordinary, mundane consciousness down to a state of complete cognitive defunctness, there must also be a progression from ordinary, mundane consciousness up to omniscience.

As long as one wishes that the argument could serve to prove a hierarchy of ever diminishing cognitions, down to inanimate senseless objects (*jaḍa*), the problem would be that the argument, at least as far as Jaina ontology goes, is not a good analogy. Omniscience amounts to perfection, with suprasensory perception as an intermediate stage: in this case there is no continuum with ever higher degrees of a quality (here: cognition), but we can rather speak of termination of a sequence which has its apex with omniscience. With a downward progression with ever diminishing cognition, one would *mutatis mutandis* expect some kind of a termination of the sequence, i.e. absolute lack of consciousness. But that is clearly not the case in Jainism: even the lowest possible living beings in the state of *nigoda*, with just one sense active, possess some residual consciousness and cognition related to that

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<sup>60</sup> SSā<sub>1</sub> 236–238 = SSā<sub>2,3</sub> 222–223:

*jaiyā sa eva saṃkho seda-sahāvaṃ tayaṃ pajahidūna /*  
*gacchejja kiṅha-bhāvaṃ taiyā sukkattaṇaṃ pajahe // 236 / 222 //*  
*jaha saṃkho poggalado jaiyā sukkattaṇaṃ pajahidūna / †*  
*gacchejja kiṅha-bhāvaṃ taiyyā sukkattaṇaṃ pajahe // 237 // †*  
*taha ṇāṇī vi hu jaiyā ṇāṇa-sahāvaṃ tayaṃ pajahiūna /*  
*aṇṇāṇeṇa pariṇado taiyā aṇṇāṇadaṃ gacche // 238 / 223 //*

† SSā<sub>2</sub> omits this verse. It seems that this verse is a later interpolation, and does not belong to the original structure; neither Amṛtacandra comments on it nor is the term *poggalado* mentioned or alluded to in his commentary. Further, in SSā<sub>2</sub> and SSā<sub>3</sub>, *poggalado* is Sanskritised as *paudgalikaḥ* which is simply not possible. I take it as an Ablative.

singular sense organ. In other words, in Jainism one never finds a living being downgraded to a state of a complete absence of cognition and consciousness.

3. Another variant of the argument from progression is what could be called an argument from progression by necessity. It emphasises that the gradual process towards absolute perfection through various stages is in a way necessarily determined. Its late version is found in Hemacandra-sūri's *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*:

‘When there is the accomplishment (intensity) of the three jewels<sup>61</sup> practised assiduously for a long time, without interruption and with utmost care by force of reflection, analysis and meditation over one [and the same thing and] when there is complete annihilation of obstructing *karmans* that veil cognition and [perception], [there is a manifestation] of the soul whose own nature is consciousness (*sc.* it knows itself) and whose own nature is illumination (*sc.* it knows external objects).’<sup>62</sup>

The general structure of the argument from progression (‘a progression of a gradable quality / faculty *F* may lead to a perfect condition *x* of that quality / faculty’) is extended to embrace one more element: once one discovers the method to upgrade the faculty or quality and fully and properly implements it, one necessarily achieves the final state of perfection of that faculty or quality. Interestingly, in its second assumption, also this argument confuses two (or three) modalities: (1) possibility, potentiality or probability, on the one hand, and, on the other, (2) necessity, or determination, or (3) actuality. Clearly, from the premise ‘one can achieve a condition *x*’, it does not follow that ‘one will achieve a condition *x*’.

Interestingly, Hemacandra seems to directly rely on Dharmakīrti's and Dharmottara's formulations found in the *Nyāya-bindu* (NB 1.11), except for some necessary doctrinal adjustments.<sup>63</sup>

Dharmakīrti defines supernatural perception as follows:

‘*Yogin's* cognition is produced by the accomplishment (intensity) of contemplation of existing objects.’<sup>64</sup>

Dharmakīrti's commentator, Dharmottara explains that ‘contemplation of (meditation on) an entity is the perpetual (lit. again and again) keeping in mind of [that entity].’<sup>65</sup> He also emphasises the gradual process of perfection that finally leads to supernatural perception and emphatically divides the process into three stages:<sup>66</sup> the consummation (intensity) of contemplation (*bhāvanā-prakarṣa*)<sup>67</sup>, the ultimate

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<sup>61</sup> Viz. the correct cognition, correct conation and correct conduct (*samyag-darśana-jñāna-cāritra*), see e.g. TS 1.1.

<sup>62</sup> PMĪV 1.15, § 48, p. 12.4–6: *dīrgha-kāla-nirantara-satkārāsevita-ratna-traya-prakarṣa-paryante ekatva-vitarka-vicārav-dhyāna-balena niḥśeṣatayā jñānāvarenaḍdīnāṃ ghāti-karmaṇāṃ prakṣaye sati cetanā-svabhāvasyātmanaḥ prakāśa-svabhāvasyēti*. Compare: *dīrgha-kāla-nirantara-satkārāsevita-ratna-traya-prakarṣa-paryante* and NB 1.11: *bhūtārtha-bhāvanā-prakarṣa-paryantajaṃ*

<sup>63</sup> Contemplation is here replaced by Hemacandra with the three jewels (instead of *bhūtārtha-bhāvanā-prakarṣa-paryantajaṃ* we have *dīrgha-kāla-nirantara-satkārāsevita-ratna-traya-prakarṣa-paryante*).

<sup>64</sup> NB 1.11: *bhūtārtha-bhāvanā-prakarṣa-paryantajaṃ yogi-jñānaṃ cēti*. For Dīnnāga's definition of supernatural perception, which was the basis for Dharmakīrti, see HATTORI (1968: 27, 94) and NAGASAKI (1988: 348).

<sup>65</sup> NBṬ 1.11, p. 67.5: *bhūtasya bhāvanā punaḥ punaś cetasi viniveśanam*.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. NAGASAKI (1988: 349–350).

<sup>67</sup> NBṬ 1.11, p. 67.5–6: *bhāvanāyāḥ prakarṣo bhāvyamānārthābhāsasya jñānasya sphuṭābhatvārambhaḥ*.—‘The consummation (intensity) of contemplation is the beginning of [the process in which] cognition [the contents of which is] the image of the object being contemplated represents [this object] in a clear way.’

state of the intensity (*prakarṣa-paryantāvasthā*)<sup>68</sup> and *yogin's* perception (*yogi-pratyakṣa*) as the final stage<sup>69, 70</sup>.

Like in the later argument formulated by Hemacandra, also here in Dharmakīrti's argument two elements are conspicuous: (1) Supernatural perception is a culmination of a longer process (argument from progression) and (2) it is achieved through meditation (the method). Hemacandra's is however a stronger claim. Whereas for Dharmakīrti, this version of the argument from progression brings us to a supernatural perception, which does not have to imply an attainment of full omniscience, such a fully omniscient condition is implied in Hemacandra's formulation. Nevertheless, it is Dharmakīrti's definition of supernatural perception (*yogi-pratyakṣa*) above which at the same time provides a nucleus of a proof of *yogi-pratyakṣa*, which in its crudest form would assume the form: 'supernatural perception is possible, because it can be achieved by consummation (perfection) of some practice (meditation).' In other words, uninterrupted spiritual practice and meditation, carried out properly, have to necessarily lead to their culmination in the form of supernatural perception.

4. An interesting argument for the existence of omniscience, in which it provides guarantee for a possibility of any cognition, is found in Kundakunda's *Pavayaṇa-sāra*. I would call it argument from the collapse of all knowledge:

'[48] For the one who does not know simultaneously the objects that exist in [all] the three time periods and are situated in [all] three worlds it is not possible to know even a single substance with its [infinite] modes. [49] A single substance is possessed of infinite modes. Infinite are aggregates of substances. If one does not know them simultaneously, how can he know them all. [50] If knowledge arises for the knower gradually, dependent on an object, that [knowledge] is not permanent, does not result from the destruction [of *karman*] and is not all-pervasive. [51] The [knowledge] of the Jinas knows simultaneously all variegated occurrences, diversified into both [those that exist] in the three time periods and those that are permanent, in every respect. Indeed great is [their] knowledge.'<sup>71</sup>

<sup>68</sup> NBT 1.11, p. 67.6–68.2: *prakarṣasya paryanto yadā sphuṭābhatvam iṣad asaṃpūrṇaṃ bhavati. yāvad dhi sphuṭābhatvam aparipūrṇaṃ tāvat tasya prakarṣa-gamanam. saṃpūrṇaṃ tu yadā tadā nāsti prakarṣa-gatiḥ. tataḥ saṃpūrṇāvasthāyāḥ prāktany avasthā sphuṭābhatva-prakarṣa-paryanta ucyate.*—'When the representation of [the object] in a clear way by the ultimate intensity is not quite complete. For as long as the representation of [the object] in a clear way is not absolutely complete, this is the progress of the consummation (intensity) of this [contemplation]. But when [it is] complete, then there is no progress [any more]. Therefore, the state prior to the state of complete [representation] is called the ultimate state of the intensity of the representation of [the object] in a clear way.'

<sup>69</sup> NBT 1.11, p. 68.2–3: *tasmāt paryantād yaj jātaṃ bhāvamānasyārthasya sannihitasyēva sphuṭatarākāra-grāhi jñānam yoginaḥ pratyakṣam.*—'Such a cognition which is produced by this ultimate [consummation (intensity) and] which grasps more clear form of the object which is being contemplated as if it were present [in front of the contemplator] is *yogin's* perception.'

<sup>70</sup> For further description of the three stages see NBT 1.11 (pp. 68.4–69.2). However, Vinītadeva in his *Ṭikā* distinguishes four stages, see STCHERBATSKY (1930: II: 31, n. 2) and NAGASAKI (1988: 350–354).

<sup>71</sup> PSā 1.48–50:

*jo na vijānadi jugavaṃ atthe ti-kkālīge ti-huvaṇa-tthe /  
nāduṃ tassa na sakkam sapajjayam davvam egam vā // 48 //  
davvam aṇamta-pajjayam egam aṇamtāṇi davva-jādāṇi /  
na vijānadi jadi jugavaṃ kidha so savvāṇi jānādi // 49 //  
uppajjadi jadi nāṇam kamaso atthe paḍucca nāṇissa /  
taṃ neva havadi ṇiccaṃ na khāīgam neva savva-gadam // 50 //  
ti-kkāla-ṇicca-visamaṃ sayalam savvattha saṃbhavaṃ cittam /*

This argument contends that omniscience (*kevala*) is a guarantee, or a logical prerequisite, that we can know anything: If one does not know everything, how can one know even a single thing with its all features? Without admitting omniscience, or rather that there is an omniscient being, one runs a risk that one could not know anything. To know even a single thing one would have to know it in its all facets, and if knowledge of all its facets is possible, why should knowledge of all things not be possible? Clearly, the argument conflates two kinds of infinities: the infinity of all entities as such and the infinity of aspects of one entity. According to the argument, both are two sides of one and the same equation.

The argument is patently counterfactual: we do happen to know quite a number of things, albeit our cognitions may not encompass all aspects of individual things. That does not prevent us from acquiring some cognition, even in imperfect dimensions. Cognition, albeit partial, is not only possible, it is a fact and something on which we can usually rely in our lives.

Further, the argument confuses two (or even three) modalities: possibility with actuality (and even with necessity), because it rests on a premise that ‘if it is possible to know *P*, then one knows *P*’ (or even, ‘if it is possible to know *P*, then one necessarily knows *P*’), where *P* is any aspect, condition or facet of a thing *x*. This premise is also a precondition for the reasoning: ‘if one knows *x* in one aspect, one knows (or: necessarily knows) *x* in all its aspects’. This premise is likewise erroneous. However, as we shall see, the confusion of modalities will resurface in another argument too (*vide infra*, § 6).

5. This argument, in a significantly modified form, reoccurs in a Jaina text *Nyāyavatāra-vivṛti* by Siddharṣigaṇi, where it is mentioned alongside still another argument for omniscience. We can call the latter the argument from purification. In its elaborate form it runs in two stages. The first stage has the form:

‘[1. The thesis:] The cognitive subject is such whose complete purification is possible,  
 [2. the logical reason:] because the means for [his] purification exists;  
 [3. the invariable concomitance accompanied by the example:] in this world, whatever is such the means for the purification [of which] exists is [also] such the complete purification of which is possibly existent<sup>72</sup>, like a particular gem for the purification of which the means exists, [namely] prolonged calcination in a clay furnace<sup>73</sup> with the alkali, etc.;

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*jugavaṃ jāṇādi jōṇhaṃ aho hi ṇāṇassa māhappam // 51 //*

<sup>72</sup> In other words: if there is a means to purify an object, that very object can be, or will be purified.

<sup>73</sup> The *puṭa-pāka* process is described in BOSE–SEN–SUBBARAYAPPA (1971: 325): ‘The substance is subjected to a prolonged heating which is technically called *puṭa* ... The source of heat is the fire of cow-dung, and depending on the quantity of the cow-dung cakes used as also the way they are heaped, different degrees are sought to be given to the substance. The substance itself is placed in an earthen flat container and enclosed by another, and sealed with a mud plaster.’ For the process of *puṭa-pāka* and its varieties cf. D. JOSHI (1986: 287 ff.). The process of calcination, or roasting a mineral (e.g. a metal or jewel) in a furnace, technically called *puṭa-pāka*, forms a part of a pulverisation process that aims at converting a particular substance into powder (Rṇv 6.83: *bhasmatāṃ gatam*), which in its turn is further used to prepare a medicine. Very often the substance to be calcinated is diamond; its pulverisation processes are described, e.g. in the *vajra-vidhi* section of Rṇv (6.65–122), and are referred to as ‘killing of a diamond’ (*vajra-māraṇa*, Rṇv 6.84); cf. similar expressions: *vajraṃ tu mriyate kṣaṇāt* (Rṇv 6.88). For the *māraṇa*-process, see D. JOSHI (1986: 10 ff.). Diamond is, in its turn, divided into three varieties depending on their ‘sex’, among which ‘male’ diamonds are regarded superior (Rṇv 6.68: *puruṣāś ca striyaś caiva napuṃsakam anukramāt*, cf. RRS 4.27: *vajraś ca trividhaṃ proktaṃ naro narī napuṃsakam | pūrvaṃ pūrvam iha śreṣṭham*), as well as into four subtypes according to colour-classes of each of the three gender-subdivisions (Rṇv 6.66: *brāhmaṇāḥ kṣatriyā vaiśyāḥ sūdrāś caivam anekadhā*; cf. RRS 4.31: *śvetādi-varṇa-*

- [4. the application:] and indeed the cognitive subject is such for whose purification the means exists, [namely] repeated practice of cognition, etc.;
- [5. the conclusion:] hence [the cognitive subject is] such whose complete purification is possibly existent.<sup>74</sup>

The argument starts with two premises: (1) if we have a method to purify an object, that object is ‘purifiable’, (2) we do have means to purify the soul, which is the

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*bhedena tad ekaikam catur-vidham / brahma-kṣatriya-ṣudram sva-sva-varṇa-phala-pradam*). The colours—viz., white, red, yellow and dark-bluish—are enumerated in corresponding section of RRSṬ: *catur-vidha-jāti-bhedam āha: “śvetādīti.” ādi-śabdena rakta-pīta-kṛṣṇa-varṇa-parigrahaḥ*. The purification (*śodhana*) process of substances other than diamond is further described in the tenth chapter of Rṇv, wherein it is mostly referred to as *jāraṇa* and other derivatives of √*jæ* (e.g. Rṇv 11.35,96: *jārayet*) are generally used in the context, although the derivatives of √*mṛt* (Rṇv 11.94: *mārayet*) do occur, less frequently though, as synonymous with more frequent derivatives of √*jæ*. Varieties of furnaces and other alchemic equipment are discussed at length by D. JOSHI (1986: fifth chapter). See n. BALCEROWICZ (2008: n. 551).

Wilhelm RAU (1983: 13–19) cites a passage from the *Agastya-saṃhitā*<sup>a</sup> (AgS) describing a method of polishing a jewel to obtain a burning lens. The described procedure is, apparently, different from the process of calcination.

There are some striking points to be noted here that may justify the analogy between the soul and a gem as well as the juxtaposition of the process of inner purification of the soul and the process of purification of a gem.

(1) The four colours (*varṇa*) of diamond (RRSṬ 4.31) resemble the coloration (*leśyā*) of the soul: *śveta / śukla, rakta / tejas, pīta / padma, kṛṣṇa*. A full list of the traditional six colourings, that correspond to the grade of inner development of an individual, comprise black (*kṛṣṇa*; Pkt., *kaṇha*), blue (*nila*), grey (*kāpota*; Pkt., *kāū*), red (*tejas*; Pkt., *teū*), pinkish yellow (*padma*; Pkt., *paṃha*), white (*śukla*; Pkt., *sukka*); see, e.g. SSi 2.6: *sā śad-vidhā: kṛṣṇa-leśyā nila-leśyā kāpota-leśyā tejo-leśyā padma-leśyā śukla-leśyā cēti*, and TBh 2.6; cf. GLASENAPP (1942: 47).

(2) The use of derivatives of √*jæ*, viz., of the term *jāraṇa* with regard to the purifying pulverisation processes of a diamond and *nirjarā* for the purification of the soul, i.e. the removal of karmic matter by ascetic practices.

(3) The purification of diamond by its pulverisation / calcination does not destroy diamond itself, the process removes only its material impurities.

A comparison of a pious mendicant to a jewel is a well-known motif from Jaina works, e.g. ĀA 176:

*śāstrāgnau maṇivad bhavyo viśuddho bhāti nirvṛtaḥ /  
aṅgaravat khalo dīpto malī vā bhasma vā bhavet //*

‘A [person] competent for liberation, purified [and] restrained, gleams like a jewel in the fire of authoritative treatises; a base man, as one should realise, who burns like charcoal, turns either into filth or into ashes’; cf. ĀA 263cd:

*udāsīnas tasya pragalita-purāṇaṃ na hi navam  
samāskandaty eṣa spurati suvidagdho maṇir iva //*

I do not, by any means, intend to maintain that Jaina salvific doctrine of purification of the soul and its terminology might have influenced in any way the terminology of alchemy, or *vice versa*. Moreover, personally I am convinced that not only such a relation would be extremely difficult to establish beyond doubt, but also that there was any such direct relation whatsoever. The point I have been trying to make is that certain parallelism that concerned both the terminology and processes was responsible for the deliberate choice of particular similes.

<sup>a</sup> Before 1334/5 AD; cf. RAU (1983: 12, n. 30): ‘*Agastya-proktā agastya-saṃhitā. Buddhabhaṭṭa-racitā ratna-parīkṣā ca. etat pustaka-dvayam paṃ. Buddhi-sāgara-śramaṇaḥ adhyakṣatāyāṃ sarva-darśanācārya paṃ. Kṛṣṇaprasāda Bhaṭṭa Rāṭī ity etaiḥ saṃpāditam. vīra-pustakālaya-dvārā prakāśitam = purā-tattva-prakāśana-mālā 15. [Kathmandu / Nepal] vi. saṃ. 2020 [1962/3], pp. 32,22–33.24/.*’

<sup>74</sup> NAV 27.4: *sambhavat-samasta-śuddhika ātmā, vidyamāna-śuddhy-upāyatvād; iha yo yo vidyamāna-śuddhy-upāyaḥ sa sa sambhavat-samasta-śuddhiko; yathā vidyamāna-kṣāra-mṛt-puṭa-pākādi-śuddhy-upāyo ratna-viśeṣas, tathā ca vidyamāna-jñānādy-abhyāsa-śuddhy-upāya ātmātaḥ sambhavat-samasta-śuddhika iti.*

ultimate cognitive subject. These lead to a conclusion that the soul, being the cognitive subject, can be purified. The aspect of cognitive faculties is crucial here because it is supposed to imply potential omniscience of the soul. However, this argument, the way it is formulated, only proves, formally speaking, that purification of the soul is possible, but it does not prove that supernatural perception or omniscience is possible. In other words, from the fact alone that a state of completely pure soul exists does not follow that omniscience, understood as completely purified cognition, is possible.

Therefore, the whole argument requires a second stage. And, indeed, Siddharṣigaṇi explicitly supplements it with the following equation ‘cogniser = cognition’:

‘And the cognitive subject, [when] completely purified, is called the absolute, because there is no difference at all between cognition and cogniser.’<sup>75</sup>

This is a recurrent theme in Jaina literature to equate the soul with cognition and to treat it as the ultimate perceiving organ, or ‘the eye’ (*akṣa*) *per se*, as attested, e.g., in works of Kundakunda or Siddharṣigaṇi:

‘Therefore the living element (soul) is cognition. The cognoscible is the substance, which is proclaimed to be threefold. Substance is further the soul and the other [five inanimate substances], which are connected with transformation.’<sup>76</sup>

‘Concerning that, the linguistic unit “perceiving organ”—with regard to ultimately real perception well-known from the Canon—is well-known as a synonym of the living element (soul).’<sup>77</sup>

Only equipped with the second stage, the whole argument from purification may aspire to prove that since there is a method to purify the soul, and since the soul, being the cogniser, is ultimately also cognition, therefore a complete purification of the soul is tantamount to a completely purified cognition, i.e. omniscience. This inference would still require one more element to be proved, namely that completely purified cognition amounts to omniscience. A hidden premise in the whole argument is that such cognition in the completely purified condition faces no more impairment, understood as a cognitive limit. Therefore, such cognition, being freed from impurities, becomes at the same time freed from all limitations, in temporal, substantial, qualitative or quantitative terms: it is cognition in all times, of all substances, of all their qualities and in all possible numbers.

This was a decisive step to identify the soul, or the cognising subject, with cognition / knowledge, not only with the locus of cognition / knowledge, as was the case in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika or Mīmāṃsā, which had a much weaker claim of the *ātman*, i.e. the cognitive subject, being the receptacle and site of knowledge, namely that

‘Knowledge is located only in the self. It is [therefore] understood that this [self] is the cogniser of this [knowledge]. And this [self] also has efficacy to remember and associate [things].’<sup>78</sup>

<sup>75</sup> NAV 27.4: *sāmastyā-śuddhaś cātmā jñāna-jñāninoḥ kathañcid abhedāt kevalam abhidhīyata iti.*

<sup>76</sup> PSā 1.36, p. 83.1–2:

*tamhā nānaṃ jīvo ṇeyam davvaṃ tihā samakkhādam /  
davvaṃ ti puṇo ādā param ca pariṇāma-sambaddham //*

<sup>77</sup> NAV 1.7: *tatra siddhānta-prasiddha-pāramārthika-pratyakṣāpekṣayākṣa-śabdo jīva-paryāyatayā prasiddhaḥ.*



The idea of immanent purity of the soul, which has to purify itself to regain its omniscience, was a recurrent motif in Jaina argumentation for omniscience, and we find it as early as with Kundakunda's *Samaya-sāra*:

'[278] Just as a gem made of [transparent] rock quartz crystal, being pure, does not modify itself because of red (*rāga*) and other colours, but only it is illuminated by other substances which are red etc., [279] similarly the cogniser, being pure, does not modify itself because of desire (*rāga*) and other [emotions], but only it is illuminated by other defects which are red etc.'<sup>79</sup>

These two verses express a well-grounded conviction in Jainism that the soul's nature is cognition, and form a nucleus of a future argument based on analogy. The identity of the soul and cognition is also expressed by Kundakunda in the *Pavayaṇa-sāra*:

'The cogniser is of the nature of cognition. Objects are the cognisable expanse for the cogniser, just like colours are [the cognisable expanse] for the eyes. They do not occur for each other, [i.e. they function for the cogniser].'<sup>80</sup>

On numerous occasions it is stated by Kundakunda and other Jaina writers that the soul is indestructible in its nature, also as a cognitive subject, and therefore it can endure both the negative implications of karmic matter that adheres to it as well as a burning-like purification process that expunges the karmic dirt from it:

'Just as gold, however much it is heated, never loses its nature of gold, similarly the cognitive subject, however much he is burnt by the rise of *karman*, never loses his nature of the cognitive subject.'<sup>81</sup>

The belief in the indestructible and cognitive nature of the soul was crucial for the argument to prove omniscience for two reasons. It served as the second indispensable step in the argument from purification, and it provided assurance that the soul or its faculties would not be destroyed in the process. An important idea was that the substance, the way the Jainas understood it, retained its character throughout all processes and transformations it was undergoing. The idea was frequently expressed, e.g. by Kundakunda in the *Samaya-sāra*:

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<sup>78</sup> MŚV 4.122:

*ātmany eva sthitam jñānam sa hi boddhātra gamyate /  
smaraṇe cāsya sāmāthyam sandhānādau ca vidyate //*

<sup>79</sup> SSā<sub>1</sub> 300–301 = SSā<sub>2,3</sub> 278–279:

*jaha phaliha-maṇī suddho<sup>†</sup> ṇa sayam pariṇamāi rāyamāṭhiṃ /  
raṃgijjadi aṇṇehiṃ du so rattādīhiṃ davvehiṃ // 278 //  
evaṃ ṇāṇī suddho ṇa sayam pariṇamāi rayamāṭhiṃ /  
rāijjadi aṇṇohiṃ du so rāgādīhiṃ dosehiṃ // 279 //*

<sup>†</sup> SSā<sub>1</sub>: *visuddho*.

Note the play on the word *rāga* used in two meanings: 'red colour' and 'desire'.

<sup>80</sup> PSā 1.28:

*ṇāṇī ṇāṇa-sahāvo aṭṭho ṇeya-ppagā hi ṇāṇissa /  
rūvāṇi va cakkhūṇaṃ ṇeva'ṇṇmṇṇesu vaṭṭanti //*

<sup>81</sup> SSā<sub>2,3</sub> 6.184:

*jaha kaṇayam aggitaviyaṃ pi kaṇaya-bhāvaṃ ṇa taṃ pariccayadi /  
taha kammōdaya-tavido ṇa jahadi ṇāṇī du ṇāṇittam //*

‘[130] Such [golden] occurrences (sc. entities) as earrings etc. originate from a [substance] made of gold by nature, just as [iron] chains etc. originate from a [substance] made of iron by nature. [131] Also [all] such numerous occurrences (sc. states) of an ignorant person originate from a [substance] made of ignorance (sc. *karman*). On the other hand, all occurrences (sc. states) of the cognising subject originate from a [substance] made of cognition.’<sup>82</sup>

The argument from purification in Jainism did not always take recourse to the idea of a gem enwrapped in impurities. In his proof, Hemacandra avails himself of a different example, not of a precious stone, but of clouds veiling the sun and the moon:

‘The veiling of [the self] of knowing essence is possible through cognition-veiling and other types of *karman* just like the moon and the sun [can be covered] by dust, fog, cloud, veil etc.; and like a blow of wind strong enough can remove [the veils obscuring] the moon and the sun, so can meditation and contemplation [remove veils obscuring the knowing self].’<sup>83</sup>

The opponent is quick enough to point out that the veiling of the moon and the sun can have its end because it has a beginning,<sup>84</sup> in accordance with the wide-spread conviction in India that ‘whatever has a beginning can have its end’ (but the reverse implication does not hold, viz. ‘whatever can have its end must have a beginning’). But the analogy is not adequate, inasmuch as the veiling of the soul’s cognitive faculties does not have its beginning, hence it does not follow that it can terminate. Hemacandra then reverts to the well-known analogy of the precious stone and similar objects, which seems to provide a much better illustration:

‘Even though the dross [covering] an ore of gold has no beginning, one can see that the [dross] can be removed by [the process of] calcination in a clay furnace with the alkali, etc. Precisely in the same way even though cognition-veiling and other types of *karman* have no beginning, it is possible to remove them through repeated practice of the three jewels (see n. 61) which are [the proper] counteractive measures.’<sup>85</sup>

To recapitulate, the complete argument from purification amounts to the following: ‘One can purify oneself completely, because there is a method. Since one’s nature is consciousness, then once one is absolutely pure, one is endowed with absolute knowledge.’ This kind of proof was possible only within the framework of Jaina ontology and required three ontological presuppositions on which to rest: (1) a peculiar understanding of the soul’s nature as intrinsically pure and omniscient, (2) the equation of cognition and the cogniser, and (3) the idea of *karman* as subtle

<sup>82</sup> SSā<sub>2,3</sub> 3.130–131:

*kaṇa-mayā bhāvādo jāyaṃte kuṃḍalādayo bhāvā /*  
*aya-mayayā bhāvādo jaha jāyaṃte du kaḍayādi // 130 //*  
*aṇṇaṇa-mayā bhāvā aṇṇaṇiṇo bahuviḥā vi jāyaṃte /*  
*ṇaṇiṣsa du ṇaṇa-mayā savve bhāvā taḥā hoṃti // 131 //*

<sup>83</sup> PMīV 1.15 § 50, p. 12.20–22: *prakāśa-svabhāvasyāpi candrārkhāder iva rajo-nihāhārābhra-paṭalādibhir iva jñānāvaraṇīyādi-karmabhir āvaraṇasya sambhavāt, candrārkhāder iva prabala-pavamāna-prāyair dhyāna-bhāvanādibhir vilasyati.*

<sup>84</sup> PMīV 1.15 § 51, p. 12.23.

<sup>85</sup> PMīV 1.15 § 51, p. 12.23–25: *anāder api suvarṇa-malasya kṣāra-mṛd-puta-pākādinā vilayōpalambhāt, tadvad evānāder api jñānāvaraṇīyādi-karmaṇaḥ pratipakṣa-bhūta-ratna-trayābhyāsena vilayōpapatteḥ.*

matter that obstructs innate capacities of the soul, but does not transform its inner nature, for it was only in Jainism that the soul was considered the cognitive subject (i.e. the subject that experiences / processes knowledge), cognitive agent (*jñātṛ* = *jñāna-kartṛ*) and cognitive instrument (*akṣa*).

It is impossible to say who and in what period formulated the argument from purification for the first time, but it seems that Kundakunda's oeuvre might belong to the earliest corpus of works to which the argument may be traced back with certainty, at least in a condensed formulation, if not in a full-fledged proof formula (*prayoga*) of five or ten members (*pañcāvayava*, *daśāvayava*). And that should be probably located within the period of fourth-fifth centuries. However, the building blocks for this argument are traceable much earlier, even if they are not given a form of a proof. The earliest historical source, perhaps going back to first two centuries BCE, could be the non-canonical *Isi-bhāsiyāiṃ*, which contains some doctrinal building blocks for a future argument:

‘[21] All the time, moment after moment, the prudent and wise should eradicate blemishes of his own soul just like one removes [the dross covering an ore] of gold. [22] After one has seen [how consistently / how slowly] the destruction of the black tincture [of the golden ore], or the erection of an ant-hill, or the collection of honey [proceeds], [one understands that] the exertion in ascetic restraint is superior.’<sup>86</sup>

These two verses already contain a conviction that the soul bears likeness to a precious mineral, in this case gold, not a gem, which can be purified through a gradual process of purification, or repeated practice, as well as that such a process takes places by gradually going through various stages.

6. An argument which briefly surfaced in the preceding (*vide infra*, § 1, p. 2) is argument from potentiality, drafted by Samantabhadra in his *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* (ĀMī 5):<sup>87</sup>

‘[5] Objects that are subtle, concealed [from sight] and distant remain [always] directly perceptible to someone, because they are inferable, just as fire etc. [is inferable from visible smoke]—such is a proof of the omniscient [Jina].’

The verse speaks of ‘objects that are subtle, concealed from sight and distant’, which are generally known in India to naturally fall under the scope of supernatural perception (*yogi-pratyakṣa*), but here we deal with an apparently much stronger claim. The argumentative structure is as follows:

Thesis (*pratijñā*): Objects that are subtle, concealed from sight and distant necessarily remain always directly perceptible to someone (*sūkṣmāntarita-dūrārthāḥ pratyakṣāḥ kasyacid*),  
 Logical reason (*hetu*): because they are inferable (*anumeyatvataḥ*),  
 Example (*drṣṭānta*): just as fire etc. is inferable from visible smoke (*yathā ’gny-ādīḥ*).

<sup>86</sup> Isibh 28.21–22:

*kāle kāle ya mehāvī paṇḍie ya khāṇe khāṇe /*  
*kālāto kancāṇassevêva uddhare malam appaṇo // 21 //*  
*anjaṇassa khayam dissa vammīyassa ya saṃcayam /*  
*madhussa ya samāhāram ujjamō saṃjame varo // 22 //*

<sup>87</sup> For the argument exposed in Verse 5, see BALCEROWICZ (2013: § 9).

What is not explicitly stated in the argument, but is taken for granted, is at least one premise: everything which is inferable (*anumeya*) is potentially perceptible (*pratyakṣa*) to someone, which makes the argument enthymematic. Being rather poor logic, the argument as such could only attempt to prove the existence of supernatural perception, which was believed to grasp the range of normally imperceptible objects. However, the argument is brought forth with the purpose to prove omniscience. That being the case, it presupposes another premise based on the argument from progression, in this case a progression not of subtlety or purity but of scope or magnitude: it is attested (or rather assumed) that some inferable objects can be perceived through supernatural perception, the scope of which is limited; therefore there must be a supernatural cognition that cognises *all* inferable objects.

Samantabhadra was not the only one to deploy this argument. Centuries later Hemacandra takes recourse to the same argument, in fact quoting Samantabhadra (*sūksmāntarita-dūrārthāḥ pratyakṣāḥ kasyacid*), with a significant modification though:

‘Objects that are subtle, concealed [from sight] and distant remain [always] directly perceptible to someone, because they are cognisable in a valid way (*prameya*), like a pot.’<sup>88</sup>

He replaces ‘inferable’ (*anumeya*) with ‘cognisable’ (*prameya*) of much wider scope, which comprises both proving properties, or probantia, i.e. ‘perceptible’ and ‘inferable’. Why he does it might be slightly puzzling, but one possible reason may have been the enthymematic premise, or invariable concomitance, that everything which is inferable (*anumeya*) is potentially perceptible (*pratyakṣa*), which does not really have to be the case. Another possible reason may have been an influence of the Vaiśeṣika claim which I call the knowability thesis, viz. ‘whatever is existent is also nameable and knowable,’<sup>89</sup> which also served the Nayāyika-Vaiśeṣika to prove god’s omniscience<sup>90, 91</sup>. The argumentative structure, therefore, is therefore almost identical, with the logical reason of more comprehensive scope:

Thesis (*pratijñā*): Objects that are subtle, concealed from sight and distant necessarily remain always directly perceptible to someone (*sūksmāntarita-dūrārthāḥ kasyacit pratyakṣāḥ*),  
 Logical reason (*hetu*): because they are cognisable (*prameyatvāt*),  
 Example (*drṣṭānta*): like a pot (*ghaṭavad*).

The argument from potentiality—but it is also a defect from which two other arguments suffer, namely argument from the collapse of all knowledge and argument from progression by necessity—confuses two (or three) modalities: (1) possibility, potentiality or probability, on the one hand, and, on the other, (2) necessity, or determination, or (3) actuality.

Both the predicate of Samantabhadra’s and Hemacandra’s thesis (*pratyakṣa*, or ‘perceptible’) and the logical reasons (*anumeya*, or ‘inferable’ for Samantabhadra, and *prameya*, or ‘cognisable’ for Hemacandra) are gerundives, which cover a range of meanings, including obligation, prescription, necessity, fitness, expectation,

<sup>88</sup> PMĪV 1.16 § 55, p. 14: *sūksmāntarita-dūrārthāḥ kasyacit pratyakṣāḥ prameyatvāt ghaṭavad iti*.

<sup>89</sup> I.e. Praśastapāda’s equation *astitva = abhidheyatva = jñeyatva*) Uddyotakara’s *sattva = abhidheyatva = prameyatva*. For its discussion see BALCEROWICZ (2010).

<sup>90</sup> See BALCEROWICZ (2010: § 4.3).

<sup>91</sup> Less probable is any Buddhist influence in this case, e.g. from the side of the Sarvāstivādin-Vaiśeṣikas, such as Saṅghabhadra, who in his *Nyāyānusāra* also expresses a similar idea in a definition of all that exists, to the same effect, viz. everything that exists is cognisable: ‘To be an object-field that produces cognition (*buddhi*) is the true characteristic of existence’ (see COX (1995: p. 138; p. 375, n. 168)).

likelihood, possibility etc., as described by Pāṇini (A 3.3.164; A 3.3.164; A 3.3.164; A 3.3.169; A 3.1.125; A 3.3.170–171; A 3.3.170–171; A 3.3.171–172 and Kāś *ad loc.*). Being optatives (potentials) by default, they function as passive-like alternatives to the imperative and subjunctive modes, to the construction of the verb root *arh-* with infinitive and to the future, and the optative mood (*lin-* suffixed of the *sarvadhātuka* type).<sup>92</sup>

It comes as no surprise that when one and the same grammatical device can express both possibility and necessity, ambiguity may easily follow. That explains why the crucial step in the argument, i.e. the equation ‘*x can* be perceived’ with ‘*x must* be perceived’. It is quite obvious that what follows from ‘*x can* be perceived’ is certainly not necessity (‘*x is necessarily* perceived’) or actuality (‘*x is actually* perceived’), but merely possibility or absence of necessity (‘it is not necessarily the case that *x* cannot be perceived’).

But this (perhaps unintended, perhaps deliberate) confusion of modalities plays a crucial role in the argument, for it is one thing to claim that ‘subtle and other objects are perceptible’ in the sense of possibility or potentiality (it is not impossible that an ordinary person may perceive them), which does not entail any omniscience claim, and quite another that ‘subtle and other objects are perceptible’ in the sense of necessity (they have to be perceived by someone, viz. their being perceptible requires someone to perceive them), which is about omniscience claim.

Such ambiguity plays a crucial role in the argument from potentiality, whose consecutive stages can be disambiguated as follows:

Premise: Objects which are subtle, concealed from sight and distant are inferable (*anumeya*; possibility: ‘can be inferred’; Samantabhadra), or cognisable (*prameya*; possibility: ‘can be cognised’; Hemacandra).

Step 2. Everything which is inferable (*anumeya*; possibility: ‘can be inferred’) or cognisable (*prameya*; possibility: ‘can be cognised’) is perceptible (*pratyakṣa*; possibility: ‘can be perceived’).

Step 3. These objects are perceived by someone (*pratyakṣa*; necessity: ‘must be perceived’, or actuality: ‘are perceived’).

Conclusion: There is / must be (actuality: ‘is’, or necessity: ‘must be’) someone who perceives them, and that person is omniscient, the Jina.

This argument is found with other authors, too, and perhaps the most elaborate expression is given by Siddharṣiṅgaṇi, who still uses Samantabhadra’s logical reason that ‘all things are inferable’ (*anumeya*):

[1. The thesis:] The clear perception (*sc.* omniscience), whose domain is the range of all real things (*sc.* omniscience), is possible,

[2. the logical reason:] inasmuch as the inference whose domain are [all] these [things] can be drawn;

[3. the invariable concomitance accompanied by the example:] in this world, for any *x*, if inference, whose domain is *x*, is drawn, perception grasping *x* reaches somehow the path of rising (*sc.* occurs), like [the inference as well as the perception] of fire, [viz. fire can be inferred as well as perceived];

[4. the application:] and inference is [indeed] drawn, whose province are all objects;

[5. the conclusion:] hence, there must be also a clear perception, that recognises these [all objects].<sup>93</sup>

<sup>92</sup> For grammatical details see BALCEROWICZ (2013: § 9).

<sup>93</sup> NAV 27.3: *samasti samasta-vastu-vistāra-gocaram viśada-darśanam, tad-gocarānumāna-pravṛtteḥ; iha yad-yad-gocaram anumānam pravartate, tasya tasya grāhakaṃ kiñcit pratyakṣam*

The argument from potentiality is a clear case of equivocation, which uses one and the same term *pratyakṣa* ('perceivable') in two different meanings related to two different modalities: one conveys possibility ('can be perceived') and the other necessity ('must be perceived') or actuality (is actually perceived'). Being based on such equivocation, the argument is a case of a logical fallacy. There are other logical fallacies this argument involves, one of them being circularity.<sup>94</sup>

7. A variety of this argument is what I would call the *reductio* argument from impossibility, and it is found in Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa's *Siddhi-viniścaya*, and later quoted by Hemacandra<sup>95</sup>:

'If the cognition of a thing which is absolutely imperceptible is not possible, how is it possible that there is unanimity among people about, say, astronomy? If it is said: because of testimony, that furnishes another proof [of the existence of an omniscient being].'<sup>96</sup>

Its structure can be analysed as follows:<sup>97</sup>

Premise 1. Things which are absolutely imperceptible (e.g. subtle or distant) cannot be cognised.

Premise 2. People (e.g. astronomers) know of some things (e.g. celestial bodies etc.) which are absolutely imperceptible to humans.

Premise 3. They have this knowledge supplied by someone or derive it from the scripture.

Conclusion 1. Premise 1 has to be abandoned.

Conclusion 2. That 'someone' who provides the knowledge of imperceptible things must be omniscient.

The argument proceeds from the predicate 'absolutely imperceptible' (*atyanta-parokṣe*) to the assumption that people do happen to have knowledge about such seemingly imperceptible things (*jñānāvisaṃvāda*). That means that they either have to infer the existence of such absolutely imperceptible things or obtain it through testimony. In both cases, they have to derive their knowledge via another cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*) which presupposes the existence of someone who *must* have a direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) of the imperceptibles, for both inference and testimony are claimed to be ultimately based on perception. That leads to a conclusion that things which are absolutely imperceptible to ordinary people turn out to be perceptible to those who are capable of perceiving them, i.e. to the omniscient. And this is where the argument from potentiality is hidden.

In addition to the modality equivocation, this argument involves circularity. For how can one obtain a knowledge that there exist objects which are so subtle that an ordinary person cannot perceive them, such as atoms or karmic matter, or objects which are permanently and inherently concealed from an ordinary person's sensory reach (sight etc.) or are so distant that one's senses can never reach them, and one will never be able to know these objects directly, i.e. one will never have any direct cognitive access to them? If such objects are there, they should be permanently

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*udaya-padavīm samāsādayati, yathā citra-bhānoḥ; pravartate ca sakalārtha-viṣayam anumānam; atas tad-avalokinā viśada-darśanenāpi bhāvyaṃ iti.*

<sup>94</sup> For details see BALCEROWICZ (2013: § 9).

<sup>95</sup> PMiV 1.16 § 55, p. 14.

<sup>96</sup> SVi 8.2, p. 526:

*dhīr atyanta-parokṣe 'rthe na cet puṃsām kutah punaḥ /  
jyotir-jñānāvisaṃvādaḥ śrutāc cet sādhanāntaram //*

<sup>97</sup> Cf. BALCEROWICZ (2013: § 9).

barred from our knowledge and they would never be capable of entering our minds. The answer is, Akalaṅka argues, rather straightforward: because one can know of these objects via the scriptural testimony (*śruta*), i.e. via the statements of the omniscient. But then, how do the omniscient know these objects? Because they perceive them directly. And how can we know that the omniscient perceive these things directly, if we cannot verify this perceptually? Because this is what they tell us.

8. A peculiar argument of omniscience—which I would call the argument from the overlapping extensions—is found, again, with Kundakunda, who formulates it in his *Pavayaṇa-sāra*:

‘[23] The soul is of the expanse<sup>98</sup> of cognition. Cognition is explained to be of the expanse of cognisable objects. The cognoscible is the world (*loka*) and non-world (*aloka*). Therefore, cognition is present everywhere.  
[24] For someone who [says that] the soul is not of the expanse of cognition, one thing is certain: the soul has to be either smaller or larger than the soul.  
[25] If [the soul were] smaller, then such cognition [larger from the soul] would be unconscious and would not cognise [anything].  
If [the soul were] larger than cognition, how could the soul cognise [anything] without cognition?’<sup>99</sup>

This argument, if I understand Kundakunda’s intention correctly, apparently rests on the idea of somatic nature of mental phenomena, including cognitions, to demonstrate that the soul is omniscient by nature and its knowledge can embrace everything. It establishes the following extensions of entities:

[Premise 1:] The soul is co-extensive with cognition, because its nature is cognition;  
If it is not co-extensive with cognition, then:  
(a) either it is smaller, but then the cognition of larger extension has to be partly uncognised by the soul;  
(b) or it is larger, then some parts of the soul has to be unconscious, bereft of cognitive faculty.  
[Premise 2:] Cognition as such is co-extensive with cognisable things, including the whole world inhabited by various substances (both animate and inanimate) and the infinite expanse beyond the world (*aloka*), because if things are cognisable, then they have to be reached by cognition, which in turn has to be of their extension;  
[Conclusion:] The soul’s cognition is co-extensive with cognisable things also in numerical terms: being co-extensive with all things, the soul can cognise them all.

This argument presents a number of difficulties, including the major premise that the soul and its cognition are one and the same. Putting it aside, first, it would run

<sup>98</sup> It is unlikely that the term *pramāṇa* (*ṇāṇa-pamāṇam*) is used here in its epistemological sense of ‘cognitive criterion’.

<sup>99</sup> PSā 1.23–25:

*ādā ṇāṇa-pamāṇam ṇāṇam ṇeya-ppamāṇam uddiṭṭham /*  
*ṇeyam loyāloyam tamhā ṇāṇam tu savva-gayam // 23 //*  
*ṇāṇa-ppamāṇam ādā ṇa havadi jassêha tassa so ādā /*  
*hīṇo vā ahio vā ṇāṇādo havadi dhuvam eva // 24 //*  
*hīṇo jadi so ādā taṇ ṇāṇam acedaṇam ṇa jāṇādi /*  
*ahio vā ṇāṇādo ṇāṇeṇa viṇā kahaṇ ṇādi // 25 //*

counter the Jaina claim that souls are spatially limited under ordinary circumstances. As long as the soul remains in the cycle of rebirth (*saṃsāra*), its outer limits are restricted to the space within the body it inhabits.<sup>100</sup> When it becomes liberated, its size is diminished by one third of the size of its last inhabited mundane body. The only moment in its career when its size equals that of the world (*loka*), but never goes beyond it into the expanse of the non-world (*aloka*) (due to the absence of the medium of motion, or *dharmā*, in the non-world), is during the process of *samudghāta*, when the soul expands until it reaches the boundary of the world and thereby permeates the whole world for a single time unit, and the purpose of it is to shed off the remainders of karmic matter before the final liberation.<sup>101</sup> It is certainly not the moment when the soul cognises anything in particular, and it could not be what Kundakunda would have intended. Second, equally problematic is the claim that the extension of cognition has to equal the extension, either spatially or numerically, of the objects it can cognise. Third, the argument also seems to present a case of equivocation in which the spatial extension is confused with numerical extension.

9. In addition to the above arguments, the Jainas have developed some more arguments to prove omniscience from the very nature of inference. One of them is the argument from an addressee of the omniscient lore, phrased by Hemacandra as a reply to a *Śābara-bhāṣya* passage (ŚBh 1.2.2, see n. 16):

‘[The Mīmāṃsaka say] “The injunction enables [people] to know anything of the following sort: past, present, future, subtle, concealed [from sight] and distant; there is no other instrument [to know these]” (ŚBh 1.2.2).<sup>102</sup>—Anyone who says so indeed intends that the knowledge of things that are past etc., [as explained in the *Vedas*, is meant] for some person (an addressee). Otherwise, for whom would the *Veda* communicate its contents about things that belong to the three time periods? Thus, the [*Veda*] communicating [the knowledge of all things to an addressee] gains (sc. presupposes) the entitled [addressee] who indeed knows the truth of things in the three time periods (sc. he becomes omniscient). This has been expressed [by Akalaṅka in his *Siddhi-viniścaya*]: “For whom would the *Veda* communicate the truth the objects (referents) of which belong to the three time periods, if the human, because of having indestructible veils, would not comprehend [the truth] in such a [all-comprehensive] manner?” In this way, because the communication of real things in the three time periods would be otherwise inexplicable, [we have] the proof of the supernatural absolute knowledge (omniscience).<sup>103</sup>

<sup>100</sup> The idea that the soul is spatially co-extensive with its physical body is refuted by Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa in TUS<sub>1</sub>, p. 76.24–78.5 = TUS<sub>3</sub>, p. 153–155.

<sup>101</sup> See BALCEROWICZ (2011). See also TBh 5.15.

<sup>102</sup> The passage is quoted with a slight change: *arthaṃ avagamayati* instead of *arthaṃ śaknoty avagamayitum* in ŚBh 1.2.2.

<sup>103</sup> PMĪV 1.16 § 56, p. 15: *codanā hi bhūtaṃ bhavantaṃ bhaviṣyantaṃ sūkṣmaṃ vyavahitaṃ viprakṛṣṭaṃ ity evaṃ-jātīyakam arthaṃ avagamayati, nānyat kiñcanēndriyam iti vadatā bhūtādy-  
artha-parijñānaṃ kasyacit puṃso ’bhīmatam eva, anyathā kasmai vedas tri-kāla-viṣayam artham  
nivedayet? sa hi nivedayāṃs tri-kāla-viṣaya-tattva-jñam evādhikāriṇam upādatte. yad āha:*

*tri-kāla-viṣayaṃ tattvaṃ kasmai vedo nivedayet /  
akṣayyāvaranāikāntān na ced veda† tathā naraḥ // [SVi 8.3]*

*iti tri-kāla-viṣaya-vastu-nivedanānyathānupapatter atīntriya-kevala-jñāna-siddhih.*

† SVi 8.3, p. 527 has: *vetti*, which is the correct reading.



The argument used by Hemacandra was not his own, as he himself indicated, but phrased, probably for the first time, by Akalaṅka in the *Siddhi-viniścaya*. The argument, as the context itself reveals, is directed against the Mīmāṃsaka, i.e. the followers of the Vedic tradition who at the same time reject the idea of omniscience; the opponents could not be the Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika, likewise the followers of the Vedic tradition, who however accepted the idea of an omniscient being, or god.

The structure of the argument from an addressee of the omniscient lore is as follow:

1. The scripture contains all knowledge, i.e. the knowledge of all things, including imperceptible things;
2. We know this because the scripture speaks of the imperceptible things;
3. For the scripture to be meaningful and purposeful, its contents has to be known and communicable to at least certain people, i.e. to its addressees;
4. To be an addressee of the scripture means to be a competent receptacle of its knowledge that is fully transferable from the scripture to the addressee.
5. As consequence, the contents of the scripture equals the knowledge of the addressee.

To conclude, to say that *Vedas* have an addressee is tantamount to saying that ‘there are people who know extrasensory things’, which for Hemacandra implies nothing but omniscience.

Needless to say, there is a number of logical flaws in this argument, just to mention four. One is the validity of the first premise, i.e. that a scripture presents all knowledge of all things in all their all aspects and all times, i.e. all ‘atomic facts’ which stand for any event, occurrence, thing in its momentary occurrence, an aspect of a thing etc. Such atomic facts are necessarily endless in number, because things and their aspects, occurrences etc. are infinite. Suppose one sentence reflects one piece of knowledge, which is a piece of knowledge related to one particular atomic fact. That being the case, to have a scripture which would contain all knowledge reflecting all atomic facts—and only such a scripture could meaningfully present knowledge which, while acquired by somebody, would amount to omniscience—it would have to consist of an infinite number of sentences, a sheer impossibility.

The second problem is, even granting a possibility of a scripture which potentially presents complete knowledge of everything, that to have such a scripture is not identical to have a person who has actively acquired its full contents. In case of a far less comprehensive compendium of knowledge, let’s say *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, having once read its full contents is not identical with active acquisition of its all contents, i.e. knowledge of everything it has to communicate.

Third, the impermissible stratagem Hemacandra employs is to equate knowing something from the scripture with having a direct knowledge of it, i.e. perceiving it directly: *\*āgama-balaḥ-jñāna = yogi-pratyakṣa*, inasmuch as the knowledge supposedly successfully derived from the scripture, when it concerns all atomic facts, is identified by Hemacandra with omniscience, which is a kind of supernatural perception (*pratyakṣa*) for the Jainas by default.

Fourth, like in most Jaina arguments to prove omniscience, they implicitly argue for the identity of supernatural perception, which clearly does not have to be perception of all things but merely of some, with omniscience.

10. A rather unsophisticated argument is the argument from the scripture, which in Hemacandra’s formulation runs as follows:

‘Only the [true] scripture which is in conformity with perception and inference is a proof for the existence of someone who perceives

suprasensory things. And there is the following conformity: everything which is the scope of the [true] scripture [and is subject to] modal description is also the scope of perception etc. (sc. and of inference).<sup>104</sup>

Like in many other arguments, also in this case someone who is possessed of supernatural perception, i.e. ‘someone who perceives suprasensory things’ (*atīndriyārtha-darśin*), is equated with an omniscient person.

The argument can be systematically reconstructed as follows:

1. The scripture teaches that there are omniscient beings;
2. The contents of the scripture is in agreement with perception and inference in the sense that:
  - 2a. It is contradicted neither by perception nor by inference,
  - 2b. Its scope is the same as the scope of perception and inference.
3. Hence there are omniscient beings whose existence can be perceived and inferred.

The argument is, of course, circular and rests on an unproven (and unprovable) premise that the scopes of perception, inference and scriptures fully overlap. From a Jaina perspective, however, this counterfactual assumption is doctrinally justifiable, because they claim that their scriptures, being an (ultimately indirect) emanation of the wisdom of the omniscient, describe the whole world, which is at the same time the scope of the omniscient’s knowledge, or perception. But this presupposition is also circular in character.

11. Of more interest is the argument from ordinary perception:

‘Even though [ordinary] sensory perception does not have as its domain the cognition of extrasensory [things], nevertheless the supernatural perception as such, produced by force of meditative concentration makes one know both external things as well as itself, hence this [ordinary] perception provides a proof of this [omniscience].<sup>105</sup>

At first this argument is rather unclear, but it boils down to the fact that we can directly perceive *yogins* of whom we know that they are engaged in certain practices which yield supernatural perception as a result, or in more detail:

1. With the help of ordinary sensory perception, we see *yogins*;
2. *Yogins* are engaged in meditative concentration;
3. The result of meditative concentration is supernatural perception.
4. Hence, the *yogins* enjoy supernatural perception, or omniscient knowledge.

The argument in this shape would lead Hemacandra to accept that any *yogin*, also outside of the religious confines of Jainism, whom he sees and who practices meditative concentration is also endowed with supernatural perception and is at the same time omniscient. And this is certainly something he would not like to accede to. Therefore, the more accurate reconstruction of this argument would probably be as follows:

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<sup>104</sup> PMĪV 1.16 § 57: *pratyakṣānumāna-saṃvādaṃ śāstram evātīndriyārtha-darśi-sadbhāve pramāṇaṃ. ya eva hi śāstrasya viṣayaḥ syād-vādaḥ sa eva pratyakṣāder apīti saṃvādaḥ...*

<sup>105</sup> PMĪV 1.16 § 57: *pratyakṣaṃ tu yady apy aīndriyikaṃ nātīndriya-jñāna-viṣayaṃ tathāpi samādhi-bala-labha-janmakam yogi-pratyakṣam eva bāhyārthasyēva svasyāpi vedakam iti pratyakṣato ’pi tat-siddhiḥ.*

1. With the help of ordinary sensory perception, we see *yogins*;
2. *Yogins* are engaged in meditative concentration;
3. The result of meditative concentration is supernatural perception.
4. The *yogins* enjoy lower forms of supernatural perception.
5. Since there supernatural perception can be graded, there are higher forms of it.
6. Hence, there must be a *yogin* who enjoys a perfect form of supernatural perception, which is omniscience.

The argument phrased in the above form would allow to exclude ‘ordinary’ *yogins* from the class of omniscient beings and reserve the special omniscient status to the selected ones of the Jaina creed. The argument in this shape would run in two stages: the first would be the argument from ordinary perception, and the second stage would be the argument from progression.

One of the problems with the argument from ordinary perception is that a mere observation (ordinary sensory perception) has a behaviouristic character: we can observe the outward behaviour of the person, but on mere basis of such observation we can never tell whether the person outwardly appearing to be engaged in *yoga* practice is really engaged in meditative concentration or has merely fallen asleep. Granted that it were possible to distinguish between different mental states of such a person by mere observation, it does not suffice to claim that the person is capable of perceiving extrasensory things, because we have no epistemic access to that person’s actual cognitive states. All we can do is to rely on that person’s own testimony.

12. Another strategy to prove omniscience is by way of demonstrating that it is not possible to disprove it; and if omniscience cannot be disproved, it has to be accepted. One version of it is the argument from the empty subject, which Hemacandra phrases as the following *reductio*-type paradox:

‘Inference cannot disprove this [omniscience] either. Because no inference can be formulated without the grasp (i.e. acceptance) of the subject of inference (property-possessor). And if [we can] grasp the subject of inference (property-possessor), such an inference [against omniscience] can in no way be produced because it is subverted by the valid cognitive procedure that grasps this subject of inference (property-possessor)].’<sup>106</sup>

The idea behind this argument is that any valid statement, including logical proofs, must have an existent subject, viz. the subject of a proposition to be meaningful requires denotation. A thesis (*pratijñā*) of a proof formula (*prayoga*) has to likewise be a meaningful sentence, *ergo* it requires a subject which has a denotation, i.e. which directly refers to an existing thing. That is stipulated by a principle actively promoted by the Nyāya school of logic: any meaningful subject of a sentence has to correspond to a real thing, because otherwise it would not be possible to ascribe any truth value to a sentence with a vacuous subject. For instance, it is not possible to determine whether the following sentences are true or false: ‘a square circle is a square’ and ‘a square circle is not a square’, or ‘a square circle is a circle’ and ‘a square circle is not a circle’? For an assertoric (i.e. non-modal) sentence to be meaningful it is required to be either true or false. Such entities as ‘square circle’ or Pegasus are empty subjects, and not only Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell were well aware of the problem, but also Indian logicians.

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<sup>106</sup> PMIV 1.17 § 61, p. 16: *na cānumānaṃ tad-bādhakaṃ sambhavati. dharmi-grahaṇam antereṇānumānāpravṛtteḥ, dharmi-grahaṇe vā tad-grāhaka-prāmāṇya-bādhitatvād anutthānam evānumānasya.*

This is precisely the principle which Hemacandra attempts to employ in his peculiar way: when we formulate a negative inference about  $x$  to deny its existence, and if  $x$  does not exist, then the inference with such an empty subject ' $x$ ' in the thesis cannot be valid. If such a statement 'omniscience does not exist' is invalid, with omniscience regarded as non-existent and therefore vacuous, then the contrary statement has to be true: 'omniscience exists'. Further, If we are able to rationally speak of  $x$ , then any inference denying the existence of  $x$  is also invalid.

However, if that argument were logically valid, we would never be able to deny the existence of non-existent things, for instance a sentence 'solid liquid does not exist' would force us to accept the contrary 'solid liquid exists' by *reductio*. To accept the requirement at its face value that the subject must denote, i.e. refer to something existent, for the sentence to be meaningful and truth-value-decidable, what we would really mean by ' $x$ ' as a subject of a proposition would actually be 'the existing  $x$ '. Consequently, 'The existing  $x$  does not exist' would plainly be self-contradictory, and we would therefore have to reject it and deny the proposition: 'The existing  $x$  does not exist'; that is, we would be obliged to affirm: 'The existing  $x$  exists'. The argument as such has to be fallacious, for otherwise it would be all too easy to prove the existence of anything one cares to imagine. For instance, one could not meaningfully assert that 'The unicorn does not exist', because of the requirement that for the sentence to be meaningful 'unicorn' has to denote, i.e. refer to a real object. But why are such arguments fallacious?

First, there is obviously no necessary connection between the existing and the description implicit in subject terms 'omniscience', 'solid liquid' or 'unicorn'. But how does this conform to the condition that the subject term should have a denotation?

This is quite easy to demonstrate by appealing to the theory of denotation and contextual analysis, for instance, and by analysing such sentences as 'omniscience does not exist' to atomic propositions:

For some  $x$ , (i)  $x$  is omniscience and, (ii) for all  $y$ , if  $y$  is omniscience then  $y = x$ , and, (iii) there is no such  $x$ .

Thanks to this analytical application of the method of the elimination of the denotations of denoting phrases that actually express vacuous or non-denoting concepts we can see that the above is a molecular formula of a more complex structure. In fact, this reveals that the actual subject term which Hemacandra wants to see in the proposition is not 'omniscience' but it consists of two ideas:  $x$  &  $\exists x$  (where  $x$  stands for omniscience). This analysis reveals also circularity of the argument: existence is necessarily attached to the subject term in the premise of an argument whose conclusion is to confirm this existence.

With this defective logic, Hemacandra finds himself in quite a good company. What he actually did in his proof was very similar to Anselm's and Descartes' methods applied in their respective ontological arguments for the existence of god: they linked existence in a necessary way to god, which consequently was expected to make it impossible to deny his existence in the proposition 'god does not exist', where 'god' in fact means 'existing god'.

13. Hemacandra adds one more argument to show that it is a logical impossibility to deny omniscience of any given person because there is no way to falsify omniscience of someone who is omniscient. It is only possible to confirm that someone is not omniscient. Let us call this proof the argument from partial description:

'When you formulate the proof to deny this [omniscience in the following manner]: "The particular person under discussion is not omniscient, because he is a speaker ... , like a man in street", this is not correct,

because [the logical reason “speaker” is not a complete statement:] if [the logical reason “speaker” means] that there is a speaker of [true] things comprehended through valid cognitive procedures, then [your proof] is self-contradictory, because any speaker of this sort [who always tells the truth] is no one else but an omniscient person! If [the logical reason “speaker” means] that there is a speaker of false things then this is a case of [an argument] in which what you want to prove is [already] proved (viz. a particular kind of fallacy), because it is generally accepted that people who speak things contradicted by valid cognitive procedures are not omniscient.’<sup>107</sup>

The above argument rests on a semantic theory, of crucial importance for the Jainas, that every sentence is necessarily incomplete and its intent should be delimited by or derived from a particular context to which it applies. According to this theory, we always use incomplete descriptions or statements and to properly comprehend them we have to first disambiguate them, viz. to specify precisely their context and meaning. This idea—occasionally expressed by the Jainas with a maxim (*nyāya*): ‘Every sentence functions with a restriction’—lies also at the core of their *syād-vāda* and *naya-vāda*, called respectively a ‘complete account’ (*sakalādeśa*) and ‘incomplete account’ (*vikalādeśa*).<sup>108</sup>

Certainly, we can imagine a situation, as a theoretical experiment, when all a person has said so far has always proved true. However, this does not guarantee that all the person will say will necessarily be true in the future. The reasoning Hemacandra has in mind is that of sampling (§§ 14, 17) when we carry out a limited number of tests verifying a certain hypothesis ‘all *x* are P’ and on the basis of these tests we conclude that since ‘a number *n* of our observations verified that the *n* cases of *x* are P’, therefore ‘all *x* are P’. The generalisation clearly does not logically follow from the limited number of observations, which is a well known case of induction. And to verify the truth value of all the propositions the speaker has to say about all the existent things in all their past, present and future aspects in impossibility, also because it is impossible for such a speaker to express all such statements in a limited time, e.g. one’s lifetime.

14. The argument from no counter-proof, which Kumārila Bhaṭṭa recounts succinctly himself, must have also been used by the Jainas, although I have been unable to trace its formulation in any Jaina work which would with certainty predate Kumārila:

‘If there is an omniscient person [who knows everything] through all six cognitive criteria, who can deny this?’<sup>109</sup>

This argument shifts the weight of proof onto the other side: now it is the opponent’s task to disprove the existence of an omniscient being, if such is his claim. The implication of the argument is that it is not possible to disprove the idea of omniscience from the level, or perspective, of a non-omniscient person, whereas it is only on the level of omniscience (‘meta-level’) that one may evaluate the truth of statements uttered on the lower level of non-omniscience (‘first-level’).

This argument was known to Samantabhadra, who however is most probably posterior to or younger contemporary of Dharmakīrti and hence Kumārila (*vide supra*, n. 49):

<sup>107</sup> PMiV 1.17 § 61, p. 16: *atha vivādādhyāsitaḥ puruṣaḥ sarva-jñō na bhavati, vaktṛtvāt, puruṣatvād vā rathyā-puruṣavad ity anumānaṃ tad-bādhakam brūṣe, tad asat. yato yadi pramāṇa-paridṛṣṭārtha-vaktṛtvam hetuḥ tadā viruddhaḥ, tādrśasya vaktṛtvasya sarva-jñā eva bhāvāt. athāsad-bhūtārtha-vaktṛtvam tadā siddha-sādhyatā, pramāṇa-viruddhārtha-vādinām asarva-jñatvenēṣṭatvāt.*

<sup>108</sup> See BALCEROWICZ (2015: § 3.4, 3.8).

<sup>109</sup> MŚV 2.111cd: *yadi śadbhiḥ pramāṇaiḥ syāt sarva-jñāḥ kena vāryate //*

‘Only you, being faultless, are such [an omniscient person], whose statements are contradicted neither by reasoning nor by scriptural testimony (sc. you are the *pramāṇa*). There is no contradiction, [because] what is accepted by you [as a tenet of your teaching] is not sublated by what is well-proven.’<sup>110</sup>

We find this argument also with Hemacandra:

‘[Omniscience exists] because there is no counter-proof.—[In this *sūtra*] the syntactical relation is: it is proved “both because it is firmly determined and because a cognitive criterion (sc. cognitive procedure) that would disprove it is impossible, [and omniscience can be experienced] like pleasure etc.” (LT 1.4). For it is as follows: is perception the counter-proof disproving omniscience or is another cognitive criterion [the counter-proof]?...’<sup>111</sup>

The argument is extensive and covers a few sections (§§ 59–62), in the course of which Hemacandra essays to demonstrate that any kind of cognition, whether of (sensory or extrasensory) perceptual, inferential or scriptural character, which should serve to disprove omniscience would ultimately have to be such as to comprise all objects in all places and in all the three times (*sakala-deśa-kāla-viṣaya*), but that would necessarily amount to omniscience. No cognition whose scope in place and time (*niyata-deśa-kāla-viṣaya*) is limited could adjudicate whether a particular person’s cognition can indeed grasp all objects everywhere and at all times.

First he mentions a counter-argument against supernatural perception, namely: ‘This [supernatural perception] is subverted not by operative perception but by inoperative [perception],’<sup>112</sup> which means that we can prove that there is no supernatural perception not because we see a positive fact of the absence of supernatural perception, but precisely because we do not see any positive instance of supernatural perception. In his reply, Hemacandra shows that such an argument is inconclusive: we can predicate of instances we have examined directly, but there a wide range of case we will never be able to examine:

‘If this [falsifying perception] operates by having as its object something in a particular place and time, we agree. But if it operates by having as its object everything in all places and times, then it is not possible without direct perception of an assembly of people present in all places and times! Hence your thesis is not proved.’<sup>113</sup>

We can only know particular instances and we cannot make any generalisation on their basis. Therefore, even if we can verify that in a number of places there is no observable case of supernatural perception, it proves only what it says: that there are no cases of supernatural perception in situations investigated by us. But this is not a solid basis for any generalised, universal judgement. Interestingly enough, the Jains

<sup>110</sup> ĀMī 6:

*sa tvam evāsi nirdoṣo yukti-śāstrāvirodhi-vāk /  
avirodho yad iṣṭam te prasiddhena na bādhyate // 6 //*

<sup>111</sup> PMī 17 and PMīV 1.17 § 59 ff.: *bādhakābhavāc ca*. “*sunīścitāsambhavad-bādhaka-prāmaṇatvāt sukhādivat*” (LT 1.4) *tat-siddhiḥ iti sambadhyate. tathā hi kevala-jñāna-bādhakaṃ bhavat pratyakṣaṃ vā bhavet pramāṇāntaram vā?*...

<sup>112</sup> PMīV 1.17 § 60: *na pravartamānaṃ pratyakṣaṃ tad-bādhakaṃ kintu nivartamānaṃ tat.*

<sup>113</sup> PMīV 1.17 § 60, p. 16: *yadi niyata-deśa-kāla-viṣayatvena bādhakaṃ tarhi sampratipadyāmahe. atha sakala-deśa-kāla-viṣayatvena, tarhi na tat sakala-deśa-kāla-puruṣa-pariṣat-sākṣāt-kāram antareṇa sambhavaṭṭi siddhaṃ na samīhitam.*

avail themselves of the same method against the Mīmāṃsaka as the Mīmāṃsaka (e.g. Kumārila) applied in order to show that it will never be possible to fully know invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) as the basis for our inferences and reasonings, for our knowledge of it will always have to be partial and inconclusive. All we are capable of doing is to determine that a postulated *vyāpti* relation does not hold, i.e. we can falsify it. This issue of generalisation from individual instances is very much akin to Karl Raimund Popper’s criticism of the nature of induction, and the solution he proposed. Only falsification has a definitive character, whereas any number of instances of verification are never sufficient. Hemacandra’s argument goes on, however, where Karl Popper left off. Hemacandra adds that if Jaimini or anyone else had the capacity to know that there is no supernatural perception in the whole world, that would precisely amount to omniscience, or supernatural cognition, for someone who is capable of formulating such a conclusion is by definition omniscient.

The above argument was in fact borrowed by Hemacandra from Siddharṣiṅgaṇi:

‘[Can you deny the possibility of omniscience] [1] by the invariable concomitance [limited to] a specific place and time or [2] by ascending to all places and times? [Ad 1] If the first alternative [is assumed], then just the way the quintuplet of cognitive criteria—negating the domain which is that [particular pot]—proves the absence of the pot, etc., in a certain place, in the same way that [quintuplet of cognitive criteria]—negating also the domain which is the sensation of all real things—could prove the absence [of the sensation of all real things] delimited by a specific location and [specific] circumstances, but not everywhere. And consequently, that [sensation of all objects] would be difficult to negate, like the pot, etc. [Ad 2] If the second alternative [is maintained], it is not possible at all, for [only a person] perceiving directly sensations of the lot of people occurring in all places and times is entitled to express himself in that manner, namely “There is no sensation of all objects anywhere,” [but] not you because [you] do not accept the possibility [of existence] of such a person. In the opposite case, precisely such a [person] who—having determined [the facts himself]—stated [explicitly the denial of the possibility of an omniscient person] in this manner, indeed such a [person] would be someone who has insight into the cognition pervading the range of all real things.’<sup>114</sup>

In the remaining portions of the argument Hemacandra borrows from a longer passage of Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa’s *Laghāyas-traya*:

‘This [extra-sensory perception (*atīndriya-jñāna*), i.e. omniscience,] exists, both because it is firmly determined and because a cognitive criterion (*sc.* cognitive procedure) that would disprove it is impossible, [and the extra-sensory perception can be experienced] like pleasure etc. [A cognitive criterion (*sc.* cognitive procedure) that would disprove it is impossible,] because a complete knowledge of a whole assembly of people, each of whom is devoid of cognition that pervades all existent

<sup>114</sup> See NAV 27.4: *pramāṇa-pañcakam tad-gocaram na pravartata iti katham bhavato nirṇayaḥ? kiṃ niyata-deśa-kāla-vyāptyā yad vā samasta-deśa-kālāskandanenēti? yady ādyaḥ pakṣas, tato yathā ghaṭādeḥ kvacit pramāṇa-pañcakam tad-gocaram nirvartamānam abhāvaṃ sādhaty, evaṃ samasta-vastu-saṃvedana-gocaram api tan nivartamānam niyata-deśa-daśāvacchinnam abhāvaṃ sādhaty, na sarvatra; tataś ca ghaṭādivat tad durnivāram syāt. atha dvitīyaḥ pakṣo, ’sāv asambhavy eva; samasta-deśa-kāla-vartī-puruṣa-pariṣat-saṃvedana-sākṣāt-kāriṇo hy evaṃ vaktum yuktaṃ, yad uta na kvacit samastārtha-saṃvedanaṃ asīti — na bhavatas, tathā-vidha-puruṣa-sambhavānabhyupagamāt. itarathā ya eva kaścin niścityaivam abhidadhāt, sa eva samasta-vastu-vistāra-vyāpi-jñānāloka iti.*

cognoscible things, would be inexplicable without this [extra-sensory perception]. There is no one who would know the truth that this [extra-sensory perception] does not exist, because no one like that is apprehended—[such a person would be non-existent] like a sky flower.<sup>115</sup>

The difficulty with the argument is more of rhetorical or metalogical character than merely logical. Anyone proposing a thesis is also obliged to provide a rational justification for it: a hypothesis requires some kind of validation. The Jainas do have their thesis of omniscience, which obviously stands in need of proof. Even though their opponents may seem to likewise forward their own thesis contradicting it ('omniscience does not exist'; see *counter-arguments*, § 10), these two are not on par with each other, and the difference lies not merely in the fact that one is an assertion and the other negation. It is not justified on the part of the Jainas to shift the burden of proof onto those who deny their thesis, because it is them who postulate some positive entity whose existence is under ordinary circumstances imperceptible.

15. There is still one curious case—the argument from sacrilege—which hardly fulfils any rigid criteria of a rational proof, inasmuch as it appeals to the emotional side and religious fury inflamed by irreverence. Nevertheless, it does occasionally feature in a list of proofs of omniscience. Again, we find it in Hemacandra, who having first provided a number of rational arguments is still confronted with the following argument:

'Fine, let us admit that there is omniscience in case of a divine being (e.g. Viṣṇu or Śiva), but it is not possible in case of any man, even though he is endowed with knowledge and [good] conduct,<sup>116</sup>

Hemacandra simply explodes in fury, and going out of any limits merely throws invectives for several lines, without producing any reasonable rejoinder. It all begins with:

'O! You sinner guilty of [the sin of] disavowing the omniscient being!  
You lie-teller! ...<sup>117</sup>

His reply clearly does not appeal to the rational side: How can one be in a position to deny the existence of the omniscient being who has done so much for the humankind and has so much suffered for the humankind sake!? Whether or how is such attitude commensurable with the Jaina precept of *ahiṃsā*, which also involves the avoidance of verbal offence, is a separate question.

This kind of emotional interlude in argumentation is certainly not a solitary case. We find it also with other authors of other philosophical schools in very similar contexts, for instance in Bhāsarvajña's *Nyāya-bhūṣaṇa*, who does not try to prove the existence of supernatural perception but takes recourse to a moral-soteriological argument of psychological nature: 'if you deny it, you'll go to hell, because it's a sin':

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<sup>115</sup> LT (*Pramāṇa-praveśa-vivṛti*) 1.4: *tad* (= *atīndriya-jñānam*) *asti suniścītāsambhavad-bādhaka-prāmaṇatvāt sukhādivat. yāvaj jñeya-vyāpi-jñāna-rahita-sakala-puruṣa-pariṣat-parijñānasya tad-antarenānupapatteḥ. tad-abhāva-tattvajñō na kaścīd anupalabdheḥ kha-puṣpavat.*

<sup>116</sup> PMIV 1.16 § 58, p. 15.4–5: *sarva-jñatvam īśvarādīnām astu, mānuṣyasya tu kasyacid vidyā-caraṇavatōpi tad asaṃbhavanīyam.*

<sup>117</sup> PMIV 1.16 § 58, p. 15–16: *ā! sarva-jñāpalāpa-pātake! durvada-vādin! ...*



‘The existence of *yogins* [possessed of supernatural perception]’<sup>118</sup> is well-known (*sc.* needs no proof) from texts of revelation, texts of authoritative tradition, from mythical texts, stories and from a few treatises on *yoga*. Any denial of those [*yogins* endowed with supernatural perception] generates outspokenly the highest sin, which is the cause of rebirth in hell and other [lower regions] as well as [the cause] of infinite torments.’<sup>119</sup>

16. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Indian authors hardly ever deploy an argument in which the knowledge of the existence of an omniscient person is authoritatively derived from the scripture the validity of which is based on its all-knowing author, because the circularity it involves is too conspicuous. An unusual exception is Haribhadra-sūri:

‘[594] The proof of [the existence / authority of] an [omniscient being] is through the scripture, because [the idea of] such [a person] is a result of scriptural injunction. Further, the scripture<sup>120</sup> is both intrinsically valid and eternal like [Vedic] revelation. [626] To conclude, it is logically correct to establish as distinct righteousness and unrighteousness in this way on the basis of the scripture, the contents of which is everything, which has been revealed by the omniscient, not in any other way whatsoever.’<sup>121</sup>

We can call it an argument from the scripture.

17. We also come across a variant of the above argument, the argument from verifiability of the speaker’s statements, which is not *overtly* circular but suffers from other logical deficiencies. It is found in Jinabhadra-gaṇin’s *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya*:

‘There [may be] some suspicion as to why [I am] omniscient. It is because I remove all doubts. Or, you may ask about anything which you do not know [and I will reply] so that you would have confidence.’<sup>122</sup>

In it the alleged omniscient person asks us to verify all his statements. A process of verification has to necessarily be restricted in time: it is not possible to ask all questions about everything in a real time, so the only available method is by sampling.

It is logically flawed on at least two counts. First, even if we have positively verified the truth of a person *x*’s reply *r* as well as his next reply *r*+1, and his subsequent replies (*r*+1)+1 up to (*r*+1)+...+*n*, it does not follow that his reply (*r*+1)+...+*n*+(*n*+1) is equally accurate. Even if a 999.999 replies prove accurate, a

<sup>118</sup> What is meant by *yogi-sadbhāva* is not simply ‘the existence of *yogins*’ because they could easily be located anywhere, by ‘the existence of the *yogins*’ in the true sense, viz. who possess such a supernatural perception.

<sup>119</sup> NBhū, p. 171: *yogi-sadbhāvas tu śruti-smṛti-purāṇētiḥāsāneka-yoga-śāstreṣu prasiddha iti. tad-apalāpaḥ pāpātīṣayam eva narakādya-ananta-yātanādi-nimittaṃ janayati.*

<sup>120</sup> Or: the omniscient; SVK, vol 7, p. 44.7 takes *tasya* to be *sarva-jñāsyā*.

<sup>121</sup> ŚVS 594, 626:

*āgamād api tat-siddhir yad asau codanā-phalam /  
prāmāṇyaṃ ca svatas tasya nityatvam ca śruter iva // 594 //  
sarva-jñāna hy abhivyaktāt sarvārthād āgamāt parā /  
dharmādharma-vyavasthēyaṃ yujyate nānyataḥ kvacit // 626 //*

<sup>122</sup> VĀBh 2034:

*kidha savaṇṇu tti matī jeṇāhaṃ sarrva-saṃsaya-chettā /  
pucchasu va jaṃ ṇa yāṇasi jeṇa va te paccayo hojjā //*

millionth reply may still be false or he may not know the answer to the millionth question. This is the same problem as in the case of induction. Second, the replies may concern a range of things which cannot be known, are imperceptible or practically unverifiable. And this is where the circularity creeps in: to be able to accept the veracity of the person *x*'s reply about such an practically unverifiable issue we have to rely on the person's authority alone, and the person's authority rests on our acceptance of the person's replies.

17. There is an argument to prove extrasensory perception, but not omniscience, found in the Vaiśeṣika literature whose Jaina counterpart I have failed to find, probably because it could by definition not be used to prove omniscience. I would call it the argument from an analogy of a newly married girl, and it is found at the very end of the following passage from the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya*:

'The seer's perception is described as such cognition which makes things known as they are (*sc.* in correspondence to truth) and which arises, by virtue of the contact of the soul and the mind and due to special moral endowment (*dharma*), in the seers, who are revealers of the Vedic lore, as the insight into past, future and present, and into extrasensory things such as moral law etc., which are expounded in the scriptures and which are not expounded [at all]. This [supernatural perception] is possessed by gods and seers in an extensive form, [but] also sometimes by ordinary people, for instance when a newly married girl says: "my heart tells [me] that tomorrow my brother will come".'<sup>123</sup>

The Vaiśeṣika distinguish this kind of intuition (*pratibhā*) from *yogi-pratyakṣa*, even though the critics of the idea, the Mīmāṃsakas and the Cārvākas, take these two (*yogi-pratyakṣa* and *ārṣa-pratyakṣa*) jointly. Such an intuition is used by Praśastapāda to provide an empirical example that extrasensory perception does exist.<sup>124</sup> For the Jainas, this argument would not serve the purpose because, obviously, such a bride's extrasensory perception, even though it would be demonstrated via such an instantiation, could not be immediately equated with Jina's omniscience.

<sup>123</sup> PBh<sub>1</sub>, p. 258 = PBh<sub>2</sub> 288: *āmnāya-vidhātṛṇām ṛṣiṇām atītānāgata-vartamāneṣv atīndriyeṣv artheṣu dharmādiṣu granthōpanibaddheṣv anupanibaddheṣu cātma-manasoḥ saṃyogād dharma-viśeṣāc ca yat pratibham yathārtha-nivedanam jñānam utpadyate tad āṛṣam ity ācakṣate. tat tu prastāreṇa deva-rṣiṇām, kadācid eva laukikānām, yathā kanyakā bravīti śvo me bhrātāgantēti hṛdayam me kathayati.*

<sup>124</sup> This is refuted by Kumārila (see *counter-arguments*, n. 9) and Pārthasārathi Mīśra (NRĀ *ad* MŚV 4.32. p. 103: NRĀ *ad* MŚV 4.32, p. 103: *asmad-ādi-pratibhā tāval liṅgādy-ābhāsa-janyā pratyakṣādīkam anapekṣya svātantryeṇārtham aniścāyayantī naīva pramāṇam, atas tadvad eva yoginām apīti.*): 'The intuition of ordinary people like us, to begin with, arises by virtue of fallacies of the inferential sign etc., it does not determine its object autonomously, independent of perception and other cognitive criteria, [hence it] is not by any means a cognitive criterion; for the very same reason also *yogins*' [intuition is not a cognitive criterion]. Kumārila demonstrate that any instance of intuition, either mystic or ordinary (the case of the girl predicting her brother's visit), is based on unconscious and erroneous reasoning, viz. it is derived from wrong presupposition and erroneous association of facts: the essential elements of the girl's cognition of realistic, but the way they are associated and conclusions draw is fallacious. Hence such an intuition has no cognitive validity and does not contribute to our knowledge (*niścāya*).

Kumārila rejects the supernatural character of *yogins*' perception and maintains that there is no qualitative difference between the ordinary perception of common people and the supernatural perception of *yogins*, insofar as the very definition accepted by all is that perception applies to present things and it depends on some kind of direct relation with the object (not necessarily the contact). The gist of his argument is that the idea of supernatural perception does not fulfil the requirements set by the definition of perception.

18. We can summarise the arguments for supernatural perception (*yogi-pratyakṣa*), equated with omniscience (*sarva-jñāna*, *kevala*), so far collected in the following list:

- argument from progression (§ 1)
- reverse argument from progression (§ 2)
- argument from progression by necessity (§ 3)
- argument from the collapse of all knowledge (§ 4)
- argument from purification (§ 5)
- argument from potentiality (§ 6)
- reductio* argument from impossibility (§ 7)
- argument from the overlapping extensions (§ 8)
- argument from an addressee of the omniscient lore (§ 9)
- argument from the scripture (§ 10)
- argument from ordinary perception (§ 11)
- argument from the empty subject (§ 12)
- argument from partial description (§ 13)
- argument from no counter-proof (§ 14)
- argument from sacrilege (§ 15)
- argument from the scripture (§ 16)
- argument from verifiability of the speaker's statements (§ 17)
- argument from an analogy of a newly married girl (§ 18)

The list is certainly not exhaustive and more argumentative devices will certainly be found in future research.

19. As we have seen, classical Indian thinkers, especially representatives of Jainism, Buddhism, the systems of Sāṃkhya-Yoga and the post-fifth-century Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, formulated a whole range of arguments to prove the existence of omniscience and an omniscient being, either a human or suprahuman, i.e. god (*īśvara*). Even though none of these arguments was logically tight and refutation-proof, they were all in use, some of them winning a particular popularity which was not at all associated with their more sound logical structure than others'. Whether a particular proof was opted for depended, it seems, more likely on individual liking and 'dogmatic' preference rather than on strictly logical grounds. Some of these arguments were used by non-Jaina thinkers 'merely' to prove the existence of extrasensory perception, not necessarily omniscience.

However, two arguments stand out as uniquely Jainistic. These are the argument from progression with its versions (§§ 1–3) and the argument from purification (§ 2.5).

The first of these, the argument from progression, was also used by representatives of other philosophical schools. The Jaina peculiarity, however, was that the argument was advanced not to prove an 'ordinary' extrasensory perception (*yogi-pratyakṣa*), grasping normally imperceptible objects but with a limited compass. In fact, as indicated before, the argument was produced in order to prove omniscience, which was implicitly, in the argumentative structure, identified with omniscience.

It should be remembered that for the Jainas the idea of extrasensory perception connoted two different things. First, it was a generic description for the three types of direct perception which was neither mediated by sense organs nor by a quasi-sense, or the mind: clairvoyance (*avadhi*), telepathy, or mind-reading (*manah-paryāya* / *manah-paryaya*) perfect knowledge, or omniscience (*kevala*), and with its first two varieties (*avadhi* and *manah-paryaya*) it was comparable to what was almost universally called *yogi-pratyakṣa* in other schools. And indeed, extrasensory perception in Jainism was sometimes likewise called *yogi-pratyakṣa*, even though the

term itself never occurred in taxonomic descriptions of cognitive faculties in Jainism. Instead, the Jainas used different terms—*avadhi*, *manaḥ-paryāya* / *manaḥ-paryaya*, and *kevala*—treated as more or less synonymous with *yogi-pratyakṣa* in certain contexts, albeit in no way co-extensive with each other.

In its second meaning, extrasensory perception is equated with omniscience, especially in such proofs as those described above. In most of them, the distinction between these two meanings of extrasensory perception was intentionally blurred and was often an integral part of the argumentative structure: all these arguments could prove was, at most, existence of some kind of suprasensory faculty, not of cognition grasping all that exists, existed and will exist.

As a matter of fact, for the Jainas the idea of supernatural perception indicates the existence of intermediate stages leading towards the apex, perfect cognition (*kevala*). The precondition for *yogi-pratyakṣa* was the practice of *yoga* and moral law (*dharma*), for instance in Vaiśeṣika. In Jainism it was not, at least not in the case of the lowest type of extrasensory perception, clairvoyance (*avadhi*) which, as it was believed, could also be obtained by denizens of hell. So clairvoyance excelled ordinary perception, but was still limited in scope, in subtlety and in moral predispositions. Higher than that was mind-reading (*manaḥ-paryaya*), which required high moral standing and provided most subtle vision. This progression would culminate in the cognition highest and most subtle of all, namely omniscience. As we can see, the typological hierarchy of types of direct, extrasensory cognition (*pratyakṣa*) reproduced the same pattern on which the argument from progression was based: the types of supernatural perception replicate the upward ladder of epistemic faculties.

The progression of ever subtler, more extensive and perfect cognitive faculties fit well into an ontological presupposition of the Jaina system, namely the idea that our cognitive faculties are limited by ordinary matter, in the form of sense organs and the mind, as well as by subtle matter in the form of *karman*, conceived of as a subtle veil enveloping and restricting our cognitive instruments. The lowest forms of cognitive faculties were various stages of ordinary sensory perception, and then the subvarieties of the two main types of extrasensory perception, viz. *avadhi* and *manaḥ-paryaya* believed to be obscured by corresponding sub-varieties of the so-called veiling *karmans* (*āvaraṇīya-karman*). A gradual removal of such veils would, it was claimed, automatically result in a gradual rise in cognitive faculties and progressive growth of the scope of extrasensory perception. An effect of a complete removal of such karmic veils would be absolute knowledge, or omniscience.

In this manner, both clairvoyance (*avadhi*) and telepathy (*manaḥ-paryāya* / *manaḥ-paryaya*) were not merely corollaries of a range of religious or magical beliefs, prevalent among various groups in South Asia, in diverse supernatural phenomena and extraordinary cognitive faculties some advanced spiritual practitioners were postulated to possess, which had to somehow be accommodated within established tenets. At the same time these two kinds of extrasensory perception were given their adequate space within the typology of cognitive faculties not only as some kind of usual faculties people believed existed, but also as necessary transitional phases on the progressive path to perfection, in the form of omniscience as its logical concomitants.

In this sense, even though they probably entered Jainism at the very outset as a piece and parcel of early beliefs in supernatural faculties, gradually they came to be logical requirements not only of the spiritual path to perfection but also, and perhaps primarily for Jaina thinkers at a later historical stage, of argumentative and rhetorical exigency.

In this sense, the argument from progression was embedded in Jaina epistemology in quite a unique fashion.

Even more unique was the argument from purification, which could not be formulated within ontological and epistemological framework of any other school of Indian thought, including Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika.

An integral part of the argument was the conviction that the purification process of the self (*ātman*), or soul (*jīva*), i.e. the ultimate cognitive subject, had a direct impact on the purity of its cognitive faculties, and *vice versa*, because both were ultimately one and the same substance. The prime source of impurity of the self was believed to be subtle karmic matter of various types and material limitations. Since an impurity-free condition of the self was conceived of as real possibility, it had to correspond to a similar limit-free condition of cognitive faculties. Anything that affected, positively or negatively, the nature of the self had to also affect the quality of the cognitive apparatus and faculties to the same measure.

Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika could not devise a similar argument from purification because the idea that knowledge is the nature of the soul did not exist.

The equation of the self with its cognition was an indispensable element of the argument from purification. The identity of both was usually taken for granted and treated as an established, definite tenet, as something not in need of any additional proof. However, sometimes a need was felt to provide some kind of rational justification for it. Several attempts have been made among Jaina philosophers to prove the intrinsically conscious or knowing nature of the soul (*jīva*, *ātman*), conscious or knowing in both aspects: conscious of its own self (*sva-nirbhāsin*, *cetanā-svabhāva*) and conscious of objects external to it (*anya-nirbhāsin*, *prakāśa-svabhāva*). One of such proofs, highly interesting from the perspective of comparative history of philosophical ideas, was employed as a second stage of the argument from purification, meant to prove the identity of the self and its cognition, by Hemacandra in *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* in order to establish that conscious character of the cognitive subject, or soul:

‘The self has a knowing essence, because he/she cannot doubt his own essence. If *x* does not have a knowing essence, *x* is not someone who cannot doubt his/her essence, like a pot. And the self is not of this sort, for as everyone knows nobody [can entertain] the doubt “Do I exist or not?”’.<sup>125</sup>

The argument addresses the question of doubt as an essential element to establish one’s own existence, and its underlying elements seem to be some sort of a forerunner of the Cartesian argument, although the structure appears a little different from the Cartesian *cogito ergo sum* argument. Hemacandra formulates two other arguments of similar structure, with different logical reasons (*hetu*):

‘The self has a knowing essence, because he is a conscious agent,’<sup>126</sup>

i.e. he able to represent objects in his/her consciousness; and

‘The self has a knowing essence, [because he/she is the agent of the act of knowing (*jñapti-kriyā-kartṛtvāt*)<sup>127</sup>].’<sup>128</sup>

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<sup>125</sup> PMiV 1.15 § 48, p. 12.11–14: *ātma prakāśa-svabhāvaḥ, asandigdha-svabhāvatvāt, yaḥ prakāśa-svabhāvo na bhavati nāsāv asandigdha-svabhāvo yathā ghaṭaḥ, na ca tathātmā, na khalu kaścit aham asmi na vēti sandigdho iti.*

<sup>126</sup> PMiV 1.15 § 48, p. 12.14–16: *ātma prakāśa-svabhāvaḥ, boddhṛtvāt ...*

<sup>127</sup> Viz. *jñapti-kriyā-kartṛtvāt*. This logical reason is not stated explicitly, but it is clear from the formulation of the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*).

<sup>128</sup> PMiV 1.15 § 48, p. 12.16–18: *tathā [\*ātma prakāśa-svabhāvaḥ, jñapti-kriyā-kartṛtvāt], yo yasāḥ kriyāyāḥ kartā na sa tad-viśayo, yathā gati-kriyāyāḥ kartā caitro na tad-viśayaḥ, jñapti-kriyāyāḥ kartā*

Since in Jainism the true nature of the soul was knowledge, then naturally a complete self-realisation, or perfection understood as a full accomplishment of one's own nature, in its case had to necessarily amount to omniscience.

In the light of the above, the admission of extrasensory perception (*yogi-pratyakṣa*) in Jainism—in the form of two lower forms (clairvoyance and telepathy) and the 'cognitive vertex' in the form of perfect omniscience—came to be also a logical requirement in the arguments which ultimately were to prove a possibility of liberation, as a necessary corollary of omniscience.

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*cātmēti*.— 'The self has a knowing essence, [because it the agent of the act of knowing]; if *x* is an agent of the act *y*, *x* cannot be the object of *y*, for instance Caitra is the agent of the act of walking and he is not the object of walking, hence the self is the agent of the act of knowing.'

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