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**PART ONE**

**INTRODUCTION**

## INTRODUCTION

On Attempts to Formalise the *Syādvāda*  
Piotr Balcerowicz<sup>1</sup>

### **Ontology and Epistemology of the *Syādvāda***

A contribution of Jainism to Indian philosophy which seems most stimulating, inspiring, debated and controversial, one which provoked the most opposition from other systems of India, is beyond doubt the doctrine of multiplexity of reality (*anekāntavāda*). Indisputably it is also the most interesting Jaina contribution to Indian philosophy. The doctrine involved both a very particular realist ontology as well as a corresponding epistemology that was structured in such a way as to most aptly handle certain ontological presuppositions.

The Jaina ontology entailed by the doctrine of multiplexity of reality (*anekāntavāda*) viewed the world structure as consisting of four interrelated aspects: substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), mode (*pariyāya*) and ineffable, transient occurrence (*vivarta*, *vartanā*, often overlooked in both Jaina expositions of the theory and in analyses carried out by modern researchers). However, the point to emphasise is that things, especially when conceived as substances, were believed to preserve their identity and in this aspect they were immutable and permanent. At the same time, however, when conceived as modes, they appeared to change and transform continuously. This seemed to have led to contradictions in ontology. Besides, in order to explain the process of change, Jaina ontology also distinguished three modes of existence, that actually co-existed:

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<sup>1</sup>The following Introduction consists of an edited and abbreviated version of Piotr Balcerowicz's article "Do attempts to formalize the *syād-vāda* make sense?", based on a paper presented at 11th Jaina Studies Workshop: Jaina Scriptures and Philosophy, SOAS, London 12-13.03.2009, and to be published in: Peter Flügel (ed.): *Jaina Scriptures and Philosophy. Willem B. Bollée Festschrift*. In editing the article some stylistic emendations have been exercised by the General Editor (Potter), and footnotes have been omitted to make the message of the text clearer.



origination (*utpāda*, *udaya*), continued existence (*sthiti*, *dhrauvya*) and cessation, or disintegration (*bhaṅga*, *vyaya*, *apavarga*). These four closely corresponded to the Buddhist Sarvāstivāda's and Abhidharma's four (or three) conditioned factors, known as 'markers' (*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*) – origination (*utpāda*), continuity (*sthiti*), deterioration (*jarā*, *vyaya*) and extinction (*bhaṅga*, *nirodha*) – or second-order elementary constituents of reality (*dharma*) that were believed to attach themselves to every other first-order elementary constituent of reality 'marked' (*lakṣya*) by them and thereby determined in its momentary existence (*kṣaṇika*).

The emphasis (which gradually became more pronounced after the second and third centuries CE) of Jaina ontology on both permanence and imperishability of substances, worked out against the Buddhist theories of momentariness (*kṣaṇikavāda*) and insubstantiality (*nairātmya*, *niḥsvabhāvatā*), as well as constant mutability and change of substances in form and occurrence, developed in contrast to the theory of the immutable substance of the Vaiśeṣika, seemed to lead to a contradiction: how to reconcile the idea of a permanent substance with its incessant mutability? Both the dual nature of things and a solution of the paradox was expressed by Umāsvāmin (c. 350–400) in *Tattvārthasūtra* 5.29-31:

[29] The existent is furnished with origination, annihilation and permanence. [30] It is indestructible in its essentiality, i.e. permanent. [31] [The existent is both], because [it is] established as having emphasized [property] and not-emphasized [property].

The conviction that world substances, and their qualities, modes and transient occurrences cannot even be conceived to exist entirely independently as if separated from other elements, and that they all simultaneously originate, are endowed with continued existence and disintegrate in every moment again and again while at the same time preserving their integrity and self-identity, led further to a belief that the world is a complex network within which all the existents are related with all the remaining ones and that their essential character and nature is not only determined by what is in things themselves but also by all the relations in which they enter vis-à-vis all other existents.

Originally ontological or metaphysical considerations eventually led to the exuberant development of a corresponding

epistemology, which ultimately involved what came to be known as the theory of multiplexity of reality (*anekāntavāda*), that comprised three analytical methods: the method (historically the oldest) of the four standpoints (*nikṣepavāda*, *nyāsavāda*), the (usually) sevenfold method of conditionally valid predications, known as the doctrine of viewpoints (*naya-vāda*), and the method of the seven-fold modal description (*saptabhaṅgī*, *syādvāda*).

The most important component of this theory, most hotly criticized by other schools of thought, were the conjunctions of three basic figures (*bhaṅga*), or ways of analyzing an object within a consistent conceptual framework, usually—at an earlier stage—expressed *roughly* as follows:

- (1) *syād asti* ('x is, in a certain sense, P'),
- (2) *syāt nāsti* ('x is, in a certain sense, not-P'),
- (3 or 4) *syād avaktavyam* ('x is, in a certain sense, inexpressible').

The remaining four figures were, as it is widely known, permutations of the three basic ones.

#### **Description of the Syādvāda**

Perhaps the most conspicuous feature of these seven *syādvāda* figures is that they *all are true*. All constructivist interpretations in terms of many-valued logic seem to tacitly assume that at least some *bhaṅgas* can be hierarchically ordered with respect to their truth value, ranging from false and indeterminate to true. The fact is, however, that for Jainism all seven statements are true:

1. <i>syād asti</i>	1
2. <i>syān nāsti</i>	1
3. <i>syād avaktavyam</i>	1
4. <i>syād asti nāsti</i>	1
5. <i>syād asty avaktavyam</i>	1
6. <i>syān nāsty avaktavyam</i>	1
7. <i>syād asti nāsty avaktavyam</i>	1

It is not the case that each member of this septuplet has a different truth value; what each of these figures actually expresses is a different property!

There is no single author, to my knowledge, who would claim, as R. N. Mukerji (in A. N. Upadhye et al, *Mahāvīra and His Teachings*, Bombay 1977, pp. 225-233) does, that the *syādvāda* is 'a game of chance' and that the sentences *syād asti*, *syān nāsti* etc. hit the truth with different probabilities, and therefore we can speak of different 'grades of truth'. No Jaina text ever says that at least one of the seven *syāt* sentences is false or is not really true, nor that it is not possible to say that a sentence is neither true nor false, i.e. the sentence cannot be assigned any truth value. All the Jaina sources are quite unequivocal that *all* these statements are true.

The term *syāt* is a sentential functor which means 'somehow', 'in a certain sense', a particle 'expressive of multiplexity of reality'. The seven sentences, as all textual sources show, are in fact incomplete sentences for which we seek a meaningful context, but they all concern one and the same object (*ekatra vastuni*, *ekavastu*, *ekatra jīvādau vastuni*):

Difference and identity, which are the domain of cognitive criteria, are not empirical deceptions. For you, [Jina,] these two [coexist] without contradiction in one and the same [thing] consistent with the secondary or primary expressive intent [respectively]. (Samantabhadra, *Āptamīmāṃsā* 36)

These seven sentences predicate a particular property (*dharma*) of the object in logically possible ways.

### **Contradiction in the *Syādvāda***

Any model genuinely faithful to the original intentions of the Jainas should take into account their insistence on the lack of contradiction in any of the seven propositions, which has been explicitly articulated on numerous occasions, e.g. by Hemacandra Sūri in *Anyayogyavacchedadvātriṅśikā* 24:

Non-existence, existence and inexpressibility with regard to things are not contradictory [when taken as] conditioned by differentiation through conditioning factors. Only when they do not realise the above, idiots who fear contradiction, who are led to destruction by their simplistic interpretation (absolutism) of these [three], stumble.

Accordingly, the Jainas, it seems, consistently defined

contradiction as based on negation in its classical sense, viz.

$x, y$  are contradictory iff  $x = \sim y$ .

In the same spirit, the question how the notions of universality and particularity (*sāmānyaviśeṣa*) are possible with respect to one and the same real thing (*vastu*) is discussed by Malliṣeṇa in his *Syādvādamañjari* 23.158-162 as a case of *seeming* contradiction. He maintains:

For, just as there is the [seven-fold modal description] of [its] existence and non-existence, similarly there is also a seven-fold, and only (*eva*), seven-fold, modal description of [the thing's] universal character and particular character. For it is as follows: in a certain sense,  $x$  is universal; in a certain sense,  $x$  is particular; in a certain sense,  $x$  is both; in a certain sense,  $x$  is inexpressible; in a certain sense,  $x$  is universal and inexpressible; in a certain sense,  $x$  is particular and inexpressible; in a certain sense,  $x$  is universal, particular and inexpressible. And one should not claim that in these [statements], there is no form of affirmation and negation, because the universal character has the form of affirmation, whereas the particular character consists in negation as having the form of exclusion.

Such a clearly defined idea of non-contradiction is especially important in propositions (3) 'inexpressible' or (4) 'both existence and non-existence', and all their derivative propositions (5)-(7). This certainly leaves no room for a non-classical or paraconsistent interpretation of contradiction.

Accordingly, the Jainas' understanding does not appear to be very much different from the classical definition of contradiction formulated by Aristotle in the *Metaphysics* 1005:

It is impossible that the same thing at the same time both belongs and does not belong to the same object and in the same respect (and all other conditions which one can specify, let them be specified, so that dialectal objections be met).

### **Disambiguation of Complete Sentences**

An important question is what the semantic background of the *syādvāda* actually is? In general, textual sources are quite

unanimous that the idea behind the doctrine of the seven-fold modal description' (*saptabhaṅgī*) is to disambiguate statements, which after a closer inspection are a sort of shorthand for more complex assertions, e.g. 'in a certain sense, it (some object) indeed exists' is a truncated statement, which should be read as 'in a certain sense, it (some object) indeed exists *as ...*', or 'in a certain sense, some object *x* indeed has a property *P*'. In a natural language, all statements stand in need of additional analysis which has to take into account the context. The idea that every sentence is incomplete and its intent should be delimited by or derived from a particular context to which it applies is occasionally expressed by the Jainas with a maxim (*nyāya*): 'Every sentence functions with a restriction.' This is, perhaps, the most crucial aspect when it comes to the proper understanding of the *syādvāda*.

The process of disambiguation not only allows one to determine a proper application of a proposition and its accurate meaning but it also proves indispensable in eliminating other possible meanings the proposition can in theory convey, as Vidyānanda Pātrakesarisvāmin (c. 850) explains:

One should in the first place carry out the process of [semantic] determination of a proposition in order to eliminate [its] undesirable meanings. Otherwise, because the [meaning of the proposition] would be equivalent to anything unsaid, it [could be taken] in any possible meaning. (*Yuktyanuśāsanaṭīkā* I.6.53)

Thus, the primary task of a philosopher, as Jaina thinkers understood it, is to develop adequate tools that should make our language precise and unequivocal. They try to achieve this goal by formulating an appropriate semantic model that would provide reliable instruments to read any statement within its intended context. As Akalaṅka in *Laghiyastraya* 63 puts it, such a disambiguating strategy is indispensable in any successful communication:

Even if it is not explicitly pronounced, the functor "in a certain sense" is understood from the context in all cases, both with respect to an affirmation and negation as well as with respect to any other case (sc. these two

combined), if one should successfully convey [the intended meaning].

As the verse indicates, any successful and, therefore context-sensitive communication procedure should consistently read the functor *syāt* into any sentence, which by nature is incomplete and cannot convey its meaning while taken alone: the crucial semantic elements necessary for its proper understanding have to be supplied from the context. And that is what, as Akalaṅka claims, we regularly do in our daily life.

### The *syāt* particle and the basic figures (*bhaṅga*)

One of the most conspicuous early components of the Jaina seven-fold modal description is the three basic figures (*bhaṅga*), or ways of analysing an object within a consistent conceptual framework:

- (1) *syād asti* ('x is, in a certain sense, P'), i.e.  
 $\sigma$  (x is P).
- (2) *syān nāsti* ('x is, in a certain sense, not-Q'), i.e.  
 $\sigma$  (x is  $\sim$ Q),
- (3) or (4) *syād avaktavyam* ('x is, in a certain sense, inexpressible'),  $\sigma$  (x is (P &  $\sim$ Q)).

where the symbol  $\sigma$  represents the sentential functor *syāt*. As we shall see the above formalisation, which is here treated only as an approximation, is not the most accurate one.

What were historically only three basic figures (*bhaṅga*) later came to be permuted so that the total of seven basic figures was reached, making up a complete version of the doctrine of the modal description (*syādvāda*):

1. 'In a certain sense, x [indeed] is P' – *syād asti* [eva].
2. 'In a certain sense, x [indeed] is not-Q' – *syān nāsti* [eva].
3. 'In a certain sense, x [indeed] is P and [indeed] is not-Q' – *syād asty* [eva] *nāsti* [eva].
4. 'In a certain sense, x [indeed] is inexpressible' – *syād avaktavyam* [eva].
5. 'In a certain sense, x [indeed] is P and [indeed] is inexpressible' – *syād asty* [eva] *avaktavyam* [eva].

6. 'In a certain sense,  $x$  [indeed] is not-Q and [indeed] is inexpressible' – *syān nāsty [eva] avaktavyam [eva]*.
7. 'In a certain sense,  $x$  [indeed] is P, [indeed] is not-Q and [indeed] is inexpressible' – *syād asti [eva] nāsty [eva] avaktavyam [eva]*.

A significant step was an introduction of the particle *eva*—altogether absent in all earlier formulations—by Samantabhadra (c. 580–640?), who was apparently influenced by Dharmakīrti's use of *eva* as a delimiting particle (*vyavaccheda*). The particle *eva* was a highly useful semantic tool to restrict the applicability of the property (*dharma*) predicated of the real thing (*vastu*), or a semantic method to restrict the range of the term that denotes the property.

### The Parameters and Aspects

Most Jaina descriptions of the *syādvāda* make a clear mention of what is called by them variously as aspects (*deśa/deso*) or facets (*aṃśa*), and what I propose to call parameters. Most Jaina thinkers distinguish four such basic parameters that qualify the way we predicate of a thing: substance (*dravya*), place (*kṣetra*), time (*kāla*), condition (*bhāva*).

The four classical parameters have a longer history. They gradually developed during the so-called 'Canonical Period', that ranges from 4th/3rd century BCE till 450–480 CE and are reflected in the Jaina Canon eventually codified in the second half of the 5th century. They assumed their more or less classical form before the 4th/5th century within a complex strategy of 'dialectical ways of analysis' (*anuyoga-dvāra*). Initially these tools of analysis were crucial theoretical determinants known as the four standpoints (*nikṣepa, nyāsa*): substance (*dravya*), place (*kṣetra*), time (*kāla*) and actual condition (*bhāva*) of an entity analysed. Occasionally, other parameters were added in canonical literature, such as a particular quality (*guṇa*), a mode (*paryāya*), spatial extension (*pradeśa*), name (*nāma*), form (*rūpa*), material representation (*sthāpanā*), transformation (*pariṇāma*) etc. Also the post-canonical literature enumerated similar parameters that served the same purpose. Some authors distinguished more than the classical four. A good example is Siddhasena Divākara (c. 450-

500 CE) in the *Sanmatitarka-prakarana* 1.69, who regularly speaks of aspects (*deso*) from which the substance can be predicated of. He mentions eight such parameters which qualify our statements about a thing, although he is rather unique:

The proper method of exposition of entities [in accordance with *syādvāda*] is based on substance (*dravya*), place (*kṣetra*), time (*kāla*), condition (*bhāva*) as well as mode (*paryāya*), aspect (or part, *deśa*) and relation (or combination of elements, *saṃyoga*), and also distinction (*bheda*).

Later on, with the development of the Nyāya school and emergence of the concept of *upādhi*, variously translated as ‘subsidiary condition’, ‘extraneous condition’, ‘limiting adjunct’, ‘conditioning factor’, i.e. additional factors which should be taken into account in inference (*anumāna*) and in establishing the relation of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*), the idea of the parameters came to be identified with *upādhi*. Hemacandra-sūri, in the *Anyayogavyavacchedadvātriṃśikā* 24, uses this new term and applies it in the sense of ‘an additional semantic factor’ one should take into account while analysing the meaning of a sentence. In his opinion, the meaning of every statement is ‘conditioned by differentiation through conditioning factors’, i.e. it should be disambiguated through additional semantic criteria. Commenting on Hemacandra-sūri’s phrase *upādhibhedopahita*, Malliṣeṇa (*Syādvādamañjarī* 24.17-20) develops the idea and establishes an explicit link between the ‘conditioning factors’ and an earlier idea of aspects or facets (*deso / deśa / aṃśa*).

[Non-existence, existence and inexpressibility] are conditioned by, i.e. are emphasised by way of, differentiation, i.e. diversity, of conditioning factors, i.e. delimiters, which are the modes which express an aspect. This [differentiation] is a qualifier of non-existence. When conditioned by differentiation through conditioning factors, non-existence does not stand in contradiction with existent objects. One should correlate it to existence and inexpressibility having introduced such differentiation in utterances.

The relevance of the four basic parameters, and the same holds valid for more parameters than the classical four, is explained by Malliṣeṇa (*Syādvādamañjarī* 24.28-31):



For there would be contradiction only if both existence and non-existence had one and the same conditioning factor. But it is not the case [in the *syādvāda*], because the existence [of the object as *P*] is not [predicated of] with respect to the same fact with respect to which non-existence [as *Q* is predicated of]. Rather, existence [of the object as *P*] has a different conditioning factor and non-existence [of the object as *Q*] has a different conditioning factor. For existence is with respect to the own form [of a real thing], whereas non-existence is with respect to a different form [belonging to another thing].

Such an account clearly avoids an apparent contradiction that ‘*x* is both *P* and  $\sim P$ ’; what we have instead is a statement to the effect that ‘*x* is both *P* and  $\sim Q$ ’. It is never the case under the *syādvāda* scheme, that one and the same property is affirmed and denied from one and the same viewpoint or under one and the same set of circumstances.

But how should we read and apply this scheme in practice? Malliṣeṇa (*Syādvādamañjarī* 23.113-119) provides a lengthy example of how one should interpret modal sentences by applying the parameters for all the seven figures, and what semantic implications the figures carry:

[1] As for these [modal sentences, the first figure is:] “in a certain sense”, or “somehow”, [i.e.] through its own substance, place, time and condition, everything, for instance a pot etc., indeed exists; [it does] not [exist] through another thing’s substance, place, time and condition. For it is as follows: With respect to substance, a pot exists as being made of clay and does not exist as something made of water etc. With respect to place, a pot exists as related to [the city of] Pāṭaliputra, it does not exist as related to [the city of] Kanyakubja etc. With respect to time, it exists as related to autumn, not does not exist as related to spring etc. With respect to condition, it exists as something black, not as something red etc. Otherwise, an undesired consequence would follow that [the thing] would abandon its own form by assuming the other form. And in this method the process of [semantic] determination the aim of which is to exclude unintended meanings is employed, because

otherwise it would absurdly follow that the same proposition would equally have the meaning which has not been expressed, because its own meaning would not be clearly defined in every case.

As it seems, every affirmative sentence predicates certain properties of a real thing with respect to its particular, individually specific substance, place, time and condition. At the same time it carries a hidden meaning which excludes a range of alternative properties predicable of the thing with regard to the same parameters: substance, place, time and condition. However, what can be, for all practical reasons, explicitly conveyed by an affirmative sentence is merely the former range of meanings.

Accordingly, ordinary sentences should always be interpreted through the parameters, and what the particle *syāt* actually expresses are various perspectives one can take while predicating a particular property of a particular object. Accordingly, if we wish to formally symbolise the *syādvāda*, we should first distinguish (positive and negative) sentences that consist of a subject and a range of predicates  $R \{A, C, E, G, H\}$  of the form:  $Px$ , and its hidden implied counterpart is:  $\sim Qx$ , with a range of predicates  $\sim Q \{B, D, F, H, H\}$ . For instance, the example given by Malliṣeṇa can be said to represent, at its face value, the following situation:

$x$ is A	=	' $x$ is made of clay',
$x$ is $\sim B$	=	' $x$ is not made of water etc.',
$x$ is C	=	' $x$ is related to the city of Pātaliputra',
$x$ is $\sim D$	=	' $x$ is not related to the city of Kanyakubja etc.',
$x$ is E	=	' $x$ is existing in autumn',
$x$ is $\sim F$	=	' $x$ is not existing in spring etc.',
$x$ is G	=	' $x$ is something black',
$x$ is $\sim H$	=	' $x$ is not something red etc.'

It should be noted that all negative predicates  $\sim Q \{\sim B, \sim D, \sim F, \sim H, \dots\}$  are merely implied by the affirmative predicates  $R \{A, C, E, G, \dots\}$ , but they are not expressly stated in sentences of the first figure: *syād asti*. It is only in the second sort of sentences, negative ones, that the exclusion comes to the fore:

[2] “In a certain sense”, or “somehow”, the pot etc. indeed does not exist; for in a certain sense there cannot be a thorough determination of the real thing, because its own form is not determined thoroughly when the real thing’s non-existence [as Q] is not accepted also on the basis of a different substance etc. [belonging to other things], like [mutatis mutandis its existence as P is determined] on the basis of [the real thing’s] own substance. And someone who maintains that [the pot] exists in an absolute sense cannot claim that the non-existence [as Q] with respect to the [pot] is not established, because it is somehow established to be congruous with the real thing, just as a proof [requires both positive and negative concomitance] (Syādvādamāñjarī 23.112-140).

The idea of a description of the thing’s essence in a negative manner is related to a considerably common conviction among Indian philosophers that any definition determines the nature of a thing by indicating ‘a property which excludes all that is not the thing’s nature’. Accordingly, the negative aspect of exclusion, so much emphasised by semantic theory of *anyāpoha* (‘exclusion of the other’) developed by the Buddhist tradition of Dīnāga, plays an important role in the Jaina theory of the *syādvāda*.

When the Jainas speak of thing’s non-existence (*vastuno 'sattva*) they mean precisely such an exclusion of the properties that do not constitute the thing’s essence. Although logically equivalent to 'x is P', to say 'x is not non-P' reveals additional intensional, semantically relevant information.

In Malliṣeṇa’s laconic exposition, the combination of the first and second figures should not present any difficulty:

[3] The third one, [i.e. the combination of these two: *syād* and *nāsti*] is absolutely clear.

Since the first and the second figures are logically equivalent, although they do carry different semantic contents, their conjunction involves no contradiction. In addition, it is within our verbal means to express their conjunction. Similarly, the fourth figure which involves the conjunction of the positive and negative statements cannot yield any contradiction, although it is practically inexpressible in the sense that there are no verbal means to express the conjunction with one word.

The outcome of this kind of approach may seem rather trivial and disappointing because all that is meant by the statement *syād avaktavyam* is linguistic incapacity, or human incapability, to express an affirmation of certain properties and negation of some others in one breath, and not some kind of logical third value. It is simply not possible to expressly communicate two ideas simultaneously, even though they can be logically closely related.

As transpires from the foregoing, the sentential functor *syāt* is itself a kind of variable the actual values of which are various parameters. We can distinguish two types of such parameters (for the second-order parameters see below), whose actual values happen to be, as in the above example: 'made of clay', 'made of water etc.', 'related to the city of Pāṭaliputra', 'related to the city of Kanyakubja etc.', 'existing in autumn', 'existing in spring etc.', 'something black', 'something red', etc. What I call first-order parameters are the traditionally accepted following four:

substance (*dravya*) = S,  
 place or occurrence (*kṣetra*) = O,  
 time (*kāla*) = T,  
 condition (*bhāva*) = C.

Their number can be extended and can include other parameters, such as mode, aspect, relation, distinction, material substratum, serviceability, verbal designation etc., depending on the requirements of the analysis.

In other words, if we want to be more accurate, the ranges of predicates R {A, C, E, G, ...} and  $\sim Q$  { $\sim B$ ,  $\sim D$ ,  $\sim F$ ,  $\sim H$ , ...} turn out to be a predicate P indexed with the set of the four basic parameters { $P^Sx$ ,  $P^Ox$ ,  $P^Tx$ ,  $P^Cx$ , ...}, for instance as follows:

'With respect to substance, x is ...':  $P^Sx$ ,  
 'With respect to place, x is ...':  $P^Ox$ ,  
 'With respect to time, x is ...':  $P^Tx$ ,  
 'With respect to condition, x is ...':  $P^Cx$ , etc.

However, a closer reading of textual sources shows that this is still a simplification, insofar as what we really have is a case of double indexicality or double parameterisation, i.e. the four basic, first-order parameters are also indexed in at least

twofold fashion as follows:  $R^S_{1x}$ ,  $\sim Q^S_{2x}$ ,  $R^O_{1x}$ ,  $\sim Q^O_{2x}$ ,  $R^T_{1x}$ ,  $\sim Q^T_{2x}$ ,  $R^C_{1x}$ ,  $\sim Q^C_{2x}$ , ..., for instance:

'with respect to substance $S_1$ , $x$ is ...'	: $R^S_{1x}$ ,
'with respect to substance $S_2$ , $x$ is not ...'	: $\sim Q^S_{2x}$ ,
'with respect to place $O_1$ , $x$ is ...'	: $R^O_{1x}$ ,
'with respect to place $O_2$ , $x$ is not ...'	: $\sim Q^O_{2x}$ ,
'with respect to time $T_1$ , $x$ is ...'	: $R^T_{1x}$ ,
'with respect to time $T_2$ , $x$ is not ...'	: $\sim Q^T_{2x}$ ,
'with respect to condition $C_1$ , $x$ is ...'	: $R^C_{1x}$ , etc.
'with respect to condition $C_2$ , $x$ is not ...'	: $\sim Q^C_{2x}$ , etc.

We can restate the above set of propositions as a general rule as follows:

$$\forall x . \exists \sigma \sigma : P^\pi x ,$$

'For every real thing (*vastu*)  $x$ , there is a particular perspective  $\sigma$  such that it can be interpreted as parameter  $\pi$  with respect to which  $x$  is  $P$ ', where  $\pi = \{S, O, T, C\}$  is the set of the first-order parameters of substance =  $S$ , place (occurrence) =  $O$ , time =  $T$ , and condition =  $C$ .

Thus, every sentence should be taken as embedding a set of hidden parameters that delineate the context, and a predicate, say,  $P$  of any statement  $x$ :  $Px$  is in fact a compound predicate that should be analysed by way of additional parameters.

### 3.5 Emphasis

There is still one more important element to take account of, namely emphasis (*arpaṇa/arpaṇā*). The idea comes to the surface from relatively early works onwards, perhaps the earliest being Umāsvāmin's *Tattvārthasūtra*, where we find the expression '*arpitānarpita*' ('emphasised [property] and not-emphasised [property]').

What emphasis (*arpaṇa*) actually means is a verbal pronouncement of a property, whereas 'non-emphasis'

(*anarpaṇa*) means that a property is not explicitly mentioned in a sentence although it is logically implied or entailed. What is important, the emphasis applies only when we want to express two properties, but it is never mentioned when we express just one property.

A fairly early date of first occurrences of the idea of emphasis attests to its being a vital component of the theory of the *syādvāda* from its outset. The idea becomes a standard element in all expositions of the theory. It is usually used to explain the difference between the figures *syād asti nāsti* and *syād avaktavyam*. Referring to the idea of emphasis and its consecutive or simultaneous application in the *Tattvārtharāja-vārttika* 4.42, Akalaṅka clarifies the difference between the third and fourth statements precisely as a difference in a consecutive and simultaneous emphasis:

The third alternative holds good, insofar as one wants to predicate two [distinct] qualities simultaneously of a numerically one undifferentiated [thing] without any differentiation [between the two]. In this case, when one thing as a whole is consecutively denoted by way of [accentuating] one property of a whole [composite] thing as such with [just] one speech element at one time for each of the first and the second alternatives (figures), [this is consecutiveness]. Similarly, when one wishes to ascribe two opposing qualities, each restricted (sc. expressible by separate words of different denotation), to numerically one thing as an indivisible whole with numerically one speech element at one time simultaneously, without any differentiation [between the two], then it is inexpressible (sc. inexpressible), because there is no such speech element [to convey] this [complex meaning]. In this case, simultaneity (sc. the fourth figure “inexpressible”) operates with regard to implied properties without differentiation with respect to time and other [factors], and their differentiation in the case of [the inexpressible proposition] is not possible.

Clearly, for all practical reasons the third statement (*syād asti nāsti*) *consecutively* expresses two distinct properties, that are not contradictory, because they refer to two different contexts, or they have two different sets of parameters. On the other hand, in the fourth statement (*syād avaktavyam*), we have a case of, again, two distinct parameterised properties, which do not stand in contradiction, but there is no linguistic tools at our disposal to express them *simultaneously*. It seems that the ‘inexpressible’ figure is not a case of indeterminateness or undecidedness either understood as a third logical truth value or in the sense that we are unable to determine which of possible sets of parameters apply.

The idea of simultaneity can, as Akalaṅka points out in the same passage, easily be replaced with the idea of ‘equal expressive force’ applied to both properties one wishes to predicate of the thing:

Alternatively, [the figure] is inexpressible because two properties of equal force, inasmuch as both function as primary, cannot be expressly predicated of a real thing as qualities both of which one intends to express, due to the fact that, when verbal designation of one impedes verbal designation of the other, that would entail either that [the object] would be contrary to what one accepts or it would have no qualities.

As he indicates, various other parameters, not necessarily the time factor alone, can be used as criteria of emphasis, the main idea of which is to facilitate a reference point that determines what particular feature can either be affirmed or denied of an object, viz. in what sense a particular thing ‘is P’ and in what sense it ‘is not-Q’. Due to purely practical or verbal limitations, but certainly not logical constraints, the affirmation or denial cannot be asserted of one and the same object simultaneously.

What is called ‘simultaneity’ (*yaugapadya*) involves the application of one and the same parameter taken as the point of reference which one wishes to apply to various properties affirmed or denied of one and the same thing. In other words, ‘simultaneous’ predications are those which predicate two incompatible sets of properties of a numerically one object from exactly the same reference point.

We can therefore introduce a new symbol  $\varepsilon$  for ‘emphasis’ to a model sentence in our formalisation attempt as follows:

$$\forall x . \exists \sigma \sigma : P^{\pi\varepsilon} x$$

‘For every real thing (*vastu*)  $x$ , there is always a particular perspective  $\sigma$  such that it can be interpreted as parameter  $\pi$  with respect to which  $x$  is  $P$  and the property  $P$  is emphasised under condition  $\varepsilon$ ’.

I will use the symbol  $\varepsilon_1$  ‘property under emphasis’, or ‘emphasised property’, and  $\varepsilon_0$  for ‘property under no emphasis’, or ‘property not emphasised’.

Let us see, at least provisionally, before a final attempt of formalisation, how the idea of emphasis can accordingly be applied formally. Closely following Malliṣeṇa’s interpretation, Yaśovijaya (c. 1600) describes, in his *Jainatarkabhāṣā* 1.22, section 63, the first figure *syād asti eva ghaṭaḥ* under four parameters:

[1] ‘In a certain sense, i.e. with respect to substance  $S$ , a given pot  $x$  exists as being made of clay’ ( $A^S_{1x}$ ) and ‘with respect to substance  $S$ , a given pot  $x$  does not exist as something made of water’ ( $\sim B^S_{2x}$ ) :  $A^S_1\varepsilon_{1x}$  &  $\sim B^S_2\varepsilon_{0x}$  ;

[2] ‘In a certain sense, i.e. with respect to place  $O$ , a given pot  $x$  exists in the city of Pāṭaliputra’ ( $C^O_{1x}$ ) and ‘with respect to place  $O$ , a given pot  $x$  does not exist in the city of Kānyakubja’ ( $\sim D^O_{2x}$ ):  $C^O_1\varepsilon_{1x}$  &  $\sim D^O_2\varepsilon_{0x}$  ;

[3] ‘In a certain sense, i.e. with respect to time  $T$ , a given pot  $x$  exists in the autumn’ ( $E^T_{1x}$ ) and ‘with respect to time  $T$ , a given pot  $x$  does not exist in the spring’ ( $\sim F^T_{2x}$ ):  $E^T_1\varepsilon_{1x}$  &  $\sim F^T_2\varepsilon_{0x}$  ;

[4] ‘In a certain sense, i.e. with respect to condition  $C$ , a given pot  $x$  exists as something black’ ( $G^C_{1x}$ ) and ‘with respect to condition  $C$ , a given pot  $x$  does not exist as something red’ ( $\sim H^C_{2x}$ ):  $G^C_1\varepsilon_{1x}$  &  $\sim H^C_2\varepsilon_{0x}$  .



### 3.6. Formalisation

I propose the following way to formalise the seven propositions of the *syādvāda*:

*bhaṅga* formalisation 1:

1. *syād asti*  $P\pi_1\epsilon_{1x}$
2. *syān nāsti*  $\sim P\pi_2\epsilon_{1x}$
3. *syād avaktavyam*  $P\pi_1\epsilon_{0x} \& \sim P\pi_2\epsilon_{0x}$
4. *syād asti nāsti*  $P\pi_1\epsilon_{1x} \& \sim P\pi_2\epsilon_{1x}$
5. *syād asty avaktavyam*  $P\pi_1\epsilon_{1x} \& P\pi_1\epsilon_{0x} \& \sim P\pi_2\epsilon_{0x}$
6. *syān nāsti avaktavyam*  $\sim P\pi_2\epsilon_{1x} \& P\pi_1\epsilon_{0x} \& \sim P\pi_2\epsilon_{0x}$
7. *syād asti nāsti*  $P\pi_1\epsilon_{1x} \& \sim P\pi_2\epsilon_{1x} \& P\pi_1\epsilon_{0x} \&$   
*avaktavyam*  $\sim P\pi_2\epsilon_{0x}$

where P is a predicate variable, and comprises a range of positive predicates R {A, C, E, G, ...} and a range of negative predicates Q {B, D, F, H, ...};  $\pi$  is a set of the first-order parameters {S, O, T, C} of substance, place (occurrence), time and condition, which determine in what sense predicate P is to be understood;  $\epsilon$  is emphasis, which indicates that a given property is either expressed ( $\epsilon_1$ ) or suppressed ( $\epsilon_0$ ).

How to read this? For instance,  $P\pi_1\epsilon_{1x}$  states that an assertion that an object  $x$  is P should be understood through a certain first-order parameter  $\pi$  ( $\pi_1$ ), e.g. 'in view of its substance, a jar is made of clay', and it is verbally emphasised ( $\epsilon_1$ ), i.e. the predicate is expressly stated in language. The second figure  $\sim P\pi_2\epsilon_{1x}$  means a proposition stating that the same object  $x$  is not P should be understood through some other first-order parameter  $\pi$  ( $\pi_2$ ), e.g. 'in view of its substance, a jar is not made of water', and likewise it is verbally emphasised ( $\epsilon_1$ ). The third figure  $P\pi_1\epsilon_{0x} \& \sim P\pi_2\epsilon_{0x}$  expresses an idea that the object  $x$  is both  $P\pi_1$  and is not  $P\pi_2$ , but no single term or expression can convey this complex meaning, hence the properties in question are verbally suppressed ( $\epsilon_0$ ).

On this reading, we can see that all the seven figures do not overlap and in each of them the component predicates are not repeated, for instance in figure 7 ( $P\pi_1\epsilon_{1x} \& \sim P\pi_2\epsilon_{1x} \& P\pi_1\epsilon_{0x} \& \sim P\pi_2\epsilon_{0x}$ ) no element occurs twice. It is because the

‘inexpressible’ proposition holds only when both properties are not emphasised at the same time. This corresponds to Akalaṅka’s reading of the figure ‘inexpressible’, in which both properties are not emphasised, or ‘non-primary’ (*vide supra*), viz. both are conveyed with equally suppressed ‘expressive force’.

### Final Remarks

There arises a very important question in the general context of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (*anekāntavāda*), which is known to comprise three theories: *nikṣepavāda*, *nayavāda* and *syādvāda*, which complement each other. Especially the latter two make an impression that somehow their application overlaps and, indeed, most researchers seem to have treated them jointly, without making a conscious effort to distinguish them or to keep their respective applications distinct. What is then a practical difference of the doctrine of viewpoints (*nayavāda*) and the method of the seven-fold modal description (*saptabhaṅgī*, *syādvāda*)?

The former takes any potentially meaningful sentence as context-dependent and assigns to it a context within which the sentence is true. The *nayavāda* states that, as far as a real thing (*vastu*) is considered, only one aspect of it can be taken into account, albeit the whole range of possible applications and references of the sentence can be conceived of, but these would become meaningful only within a correspondingly delimited range of context. That is why the *nayavāda* is called an ‘incomplete account’ (*vikalādeśa*), because only one context, out of many, can be verbally expressed by a sentence and is applicable to a particular object under a particular viewpoint. In other words, the *nayavāda* takes a sentence as an object of its analysis and selects a particular context as its proper reference, out of many possible applications. According to this theory, all utterances are in fact incomplete sentences, and the task of the theory is to determine a proper context for a particular sentence by assigning to it its proper point of reference, which is a particular viewpoint. In other words, one sets off with a particular utterance, which is by nature ambiguous, and searches for such a viewpoint, or for an ‘indexed level of description’, under which the sentence is true and relevant. Thus, the primary object of the *naya-vāda* are statements and their application.

The idea of the ‘incomplete account’ (*vikalādeśa*), or partial description of an object, which is merely a ‘side-effect’ of the strategy to assign proper reference to a proposition, is crucial in the way viewpoints operate, whereas cognitive criteria are characterised by the ‘complete account’ (*sakalādeśa*). The idea is often repeated in Jaina philosophical works and finds its succinct form in an unidentified, often quoted passage:

A complete account rests on cognitive criteria,  
[whereas an incomplete account rests on viewpoints.]

In contradistinction to the *nayavāda*, the seven-fold modal description takes a real thing (*vastu*) as the object of its analysis and searches for all possible statements that can be made about it. That is why it is called a ‘complete account’ (*sakalādeśa*), insofar as all possible perspectives relevant in the verbal description of a thing are thereby taken into account. This idea was rather to accommodate all propositions that are conceivable with regard to one and the same object: each of the figures as a distinct locutionary act presents a new context or reveals its new aspect (*deśa*), but does not necessarily have its own distinct truth-value different from truth or falsity. Also, the theory of the seven-fold modal description acts on the presumption that all utterances are incomplete sentences, but the difference as compared to a similar assumption of the *nayavāda* concerns the fact that a sentence undergoes the process of disambiguation through the process of establishing a referential link with its object, which is merely one of innumerable aspects of a real thing. To put it more precisely, one tries to offer a complete account of a real thing and formulates a whole spectrum of assertions and denials about the thing, and the meaning of each and every particular sentence in the seven-fold scheme of such assertions and denials is thereby determined, as if incidentally: it is, so to say, a side effect of the description of a particular real thing in its various aspects. These aspects are proper denotata of a particular sentence, not the real thing as such.

Interestingly enough, in order to incorporate various theories or worldviews into a consistent whole, the Jainas in their textual expositions never apply the *syādvāda*; instead they use a different model, which is the sevenfold method of

‘conditionally valid predications’ (*nayavāda*). As a rule, we find their attempt to give a meaning to each of various philosophical schools and standpoints in a consistent holistic framework in the context of the *nayavāda*, contrary to what some researchers would expect. On the other hand, ‘the doctrine of the seven-fold modal description’ (*saptabhaṅgī*) is primarily discussed in three contexts: that of the triple nature of reality, which is believed to consist of ‘origination, continuation and decay’, that of the relation between the universal and the particular and that of the relationship between the substance and its properties/modes. In short, all these questions could be reduced to that of ‘the identity problem’: how is it possible that a complex entity, composite and extended in space and time, is one and preserves its identity despite its transformations and similarities to other entities? This finds corroboration in Hemacandra’s *Anyayogavyavacchedadvātrimśikā* 25:

In a certain sense, any thing (lit. “this very [thing]”) is [both] perishing and permanent. In a certain sense, any thing is [both] similar (sc. universal) and unique (particular). In a certain sense, any thing is communicable and incommunicable. In a certain sense, any thing is existent and non-existent. O Lord, this [seven-fold modal description] is the tradition the stream of which proceeds forth as nectar of truth enjoyed by the wise.

In this poetically rather awkward verse, Hemacandra aptly sketches the four main thematic groups to which usually the *syādvāda* is most commonly applied. And indeed, most examples of the application of ‘the doctrine of the seven-fold modal description’ we come across in various works essentially pertain to one and the same issue: how to preserve the integrity of a composite thing, a problem which is entailed by the question of the relation between permanence and change, also phrased in terms of the question of how to relate the whole and its parts. However, the *syādvāda* is never applied to doxographic analysis or as an instrument to construct typologies of various doctrines or to pigeonhole the opponents.

There is still one more remark to make and it concerns what I would call the ‘tolerance myth’ of Jainism, repeated in large circles of scholars and Jaina laity. In its popular form the

tolerance myth states that the doctrine of multiplexity of reality was developed by the Jainas, or even by Mahāvīra himself, both as an expression of their intellectual non-violence and tolerance as well as in order to accommodate all conflicting worldviews with the aim of achieving reconciliation or promoting tolerance.

In his well researched review of the dissemination and propagation of the myth in "Intellectual *ahiṃsā* revisited", *Philosophy East and West* 50, 2000, pp. 324-325, John Cort argues, and I could not agree more, that the modern understanding of Jaina tradition as intellectually pluralistic and tolerant

is at odds with the one gained from investigating a wider range of sources than just the logic texts themselves. If one looks at other aspects of the Jain religious world-view, in particular the Jain position on the proper path to liberation (*mokṣamārga*), one finds that the Jains accept other points of view as being at best only partially correct and therefore, inevitably, for the most part incorrect. In return, the Jains assert that only the Jain perspective is based on correct perception (*samyag-darśana*) and correct knowledge (*samyakjñāna*), which are correct because they are rooted in the omniscience of the enlightened and liberated Jinas. Further, if one looks at narrative texts and other sources in which one finds expressions of Jain intellectual and social interaction with non-Jains, one finds that the Jains are frequently intolerant and disputatious in their interactions with non-Jains, and coexistence characterized as "intellectual *ahiṃsā*".

Not only stories and narratives, legendary accounts or historical records belie a belief that Jaina spirit of *ahiṃsā* pervades the *anekāntavāda*, a belief that has in the meantime assumed a status of a prevalent article of faith of most modern Jainas, but we find absolutely nothing in Jaina philosophical texts, in which Jaina philosophers reflect either on the nature of non-violence or on the multiplexity of reality but never establish any link between these two themes, until the twentieth century which could lend even symbolic degree of justification for such a belief. On the contrary, the *anekāntavāda* could be more accurately viewed both as an effective

ideological weapon wielded against other religious traditions and philosophical schools, which are thereby demonstrated to be merely one-sided and true in a very limited sense, and as an expression of the conviction on the part of the Jainas that, since they have such a powerful tool that comprises all partially true worldviews, it is they who enjoy intellectual superiority over other traditions and the supremacy of their salvific doctrine is thereby well grounded.

Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality pretends to provide a meta-philosophical vantage point, or present a supra-doxastic scheme that enables one to evaluate the truth and falsity, always said to be partial, of all particular philosophical claims and beliefs in a wider model of truth, available only to the Jainas. However, this claim, instead of promulgating tolerance and equal respect for other convictions, introduces a doctrine of two truths, in a way similar to what we know from, e.g., Mādhyamika or Yogācāra schools. The difference is that the ultimate truth (*paramārthasatya*) is in Jaina hands. And it is in this sense that the *anekāntavāda* can be treated, contrary to modern claims, as a kind of concealed intellectual violence (*himsā*). Of course, this aspect of Jaina theory is in no way different from similar cases of intellectual violence exercised by other religious and philosophical traditions in a context of debate and rivalry in the sense that the latter, too, would waste no opportunity to take advantage of the strength of their own merits and arguments to secure their own privileged position in philosophical or public discourse. This should not obscure, however, obvious philosophical merits of the *syādvāda*, and other components of the *anekāntavāda*, which can justifiably be reckoned among most important contributions of Indian philosophy and continue to be a source of inspiration for logicians and philosophers. And the progression from earlier position to modern stance that takes the *anekāntavāda* as an expression of *ahimsā* is socially noteworthy.