

**World View
and
Theory
in Indian Philosophy**

Edited by
Piotr Balcerowicz



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface	7
Contributors	13

WORLD VIEWS IN CONTENTION AND EXCHANGE

JOHANNES BRONKHORST: Buddhist Thought <i>Versus</i> Brahmanical Thought	21
VINCENT ELTSCHINGER: Apocalypticism, Heresy and Philosophy	29
EMILIO GARCÍA BUENDÍA: Parmenides and the <i>Sat-kārya-vāda</i> Doctrine of Sāṃkhya	77

WORLD VIEWS AND SYSTEMS

ANDREW J. NICHOLSON: Doxography and Boundary-Foundation in Late Medieval India	103
LAWRENCE MCCREA: Rationalisation and Sincerity in Mīmāṃsā Hermeneutics	119
TAKANORI SUZUKI: On the Variety of Commentarial Approaches among the Commentators of the <i>Padārtha-dharma-sāṃgraha</i> : A Reconsideration of the Notion of the 'Vaiśeṣika School'	137
ERNST PRINZ: A Revisit of the Early Nyāya Fragments	155
PICHA B. KIERONCICZ: When Yoga is not Yoga. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition and the <i>Artha-śāstra</i>	173

WORLD VIEWS AND PERSONS

JONARDON GANERI: Buddhist Individualism and Inward Empathy	249
JOERG TUSKE: Śāntarākṣa on the Emotions	263
JEAN-MARIE VERHEUGEN: Some Aspects of <i>Ātman</i> According to Prabhākara and Śālikanātha	277
THOMAS LUBEN: The Polity of the Philosopher-Bureaucrat: Brahmanical Virtue as a Qualification for Public Office	299
THOMAS MOTEGI: The Concept of Non-Possession in the <i>Mokṣa-dharma</i>	327
PAOLO MAGNONE: <i>Aho kauśalam apūrvam</i> . Hermeneutical wriggings about the <i>Īśōpaniṣad</i>	349

THEORY OF WORLD VIEW

CLAUS OETKE: ‘World View’ as a Topic of Research in Indian Studies	369
BRENDAN GILLON: The Correspondence Principle	381
STEPHEN H. PHILLIPS: Cannibalising Nyāya Epistemology	399
HIROSHI MARUI: The Meaning of a Diversity of Established World Views or Tenets (<i>siddhānta</i>) in the Science of Cosmology: With Special Reference to Jayanta’s Interpretation of the <i>Abhyupagama-siddhānta</i> (NS 1.1.3) and its Evaluation in the Development of Nyāya System	417
GENERAL INDEX	433

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**When Yoga is not Yoga.
The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Tradition and the *Artha-śāstra***

PIOTR BALCEROWICZ

1. The tradition of Ānvīkṣikī, which features at the beginning of the *Artha-śāstra*, has attracted the attention of a number of scholars ever since the work of (the collective author known as) Kauṭilya was discovered (or rather a manuscript of it was acquired from a Paṇḍit of the Banjore District) by R. Shamasastry in 1902, the then librarian of the Mysore Government Oriental Library, provisionally translated in 1906 by him, and subsequently published in 1909 (AŚ₃). The significance of Ānvīkṣikī and its supposedly philosophical dimension as well as its relation to sciences and philosophical schools have been investigated, among others, by Hermann JACOBI (1911), Srinivasa Chandra VIDYABHUSANA (1920: 4–39), Moritz WINTERNITZ (1929), Paul HACKER (1958), Madhumati CHATTERJEE (1978), Harsh NARAYAN (1990), Wilhelm HALBFASS (1988: 271–286, esp. 273 ff.), Bruno PERKINS (1997), Karin PREISENDANZ (2000). The present paper re-examines what has been frequently analysed before, viz. the relationship between Ānvīkṣikī of the *Artha-śāstra* and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition. The conclusion of the paper may seem an expression of what many scholars must have felt out, surprisingly, no one has formulated explicitly, and emerges as something so obvious that the subtitle of the paper given in the conference handout in Barcelona read: ‘All we all know but we didn’t dare say aloud...’ We should also remember that my thesis cannot rest on the futile assumptions for the simple fact that available materials on Ānvīkṣikī are extremely scarce and all we can say about the system is actually based on a few lines found here and there. In the passages translated in this paper I will often render the term ‘Ānvīkṣikī’ as methodology.

2. The *locus classicus* for Ānvīkṣikī are the actual opening passages Kauṭilya’s *Artha-śāstra*:

‘[1] These are the disciplines of learning: methodology (*ānvīkṣikī*), the triple *Veda*, economics¹ and political science. [8] According

¹The term *vārttā* comprises triple economic activity: agriculture (*kṛṣi*), cattle breeding (*gṛh-pālya*) and trade (*vaṇijyā*), see AŚ 1.4.1: *kṛṣi-pāśu-pālye vaṇijyā ca vārttā*.

to Kauṭilya there are exactly four disciplines of learning. [9] Particular disciplines of learning [acquire] a genuine status of discipline of learning when with their help one can know moral law (*dharma*) and [the means to accomplish] life goals (*artha*).²

Ānvīkṣikī is counted by Kauṭilya—in which he expressly differs from other traditions, mentioned by him in the sequel—among four sciences, or disciplines of learning (*vidyā*). Further, we learn that, according to Kauṭilya, Ānvīkṣikī as well as the other three disciplines carry moral implications, broadly understood, in the sense that it is with their help that one can live a life which is both meritorious and satisfactory as well as one complies with the rules and injunctions of moral law (*dharma*), understood as a device that regulates social life,³ and one is also capable of satisfying material needs of his own and of his family. Therefore, just like all the other disciplines, such as the Vedic soteriological and religious reflection (*trayī*), theoretical reflection on economy and practical implementation as well as the reflection on how to successfully and effectively seize, maintain and exercise political power, Ānvīkṣikī is said to be of relevance both for religious and moral life and for social and individual welfare. The goals defined in this way could hardly be compatible with the idea of Ānvīkṣikī as ‘philosophical’ taken as abstract and rational reflection, of little direct practical application, that emancipates itself from the limits of religious and mythical thinking, as it was once suggested by G. OBI (1911) and subsequently questioned by W. F. STERNITZ (1929), and systematically disproved by HACKER (1956).

Kauṭilya cites some other classification of disciplines of learning which either include or exclude Ānvīkṣikī. What is symptomatic, even some of those who do not include Ānvīkṣikī in the typology of disciplines of learning do it because, in their opinion, Ānvīkṣikī does not count as a separate branch of learning of its own, but only because it can be subsumed under soteriological and religious reflection (*trayī*).

‘The representatives of the school of Manu [maintain] that the triple *Veda* [economic and political science [are the only disciplines of learning] because methodology is a special branch of the triple *Veda*.’⁴

² AŚ 1.2.1.8–9: [1] *ānvīkṣikī trayī vārtā daṇḍa-nītiś cēti vidyāḥ*. [8] *catasra eva vidyā iti kaṭṭhāḥ*. [9] *tābhir dharmārthau yad vidyāt tad vidyānām vidyātvam*.

³ Kauṭilya takes obligations and duties that are derived from the concept of moral law (*dharma*) primarily in a social and political sense, certainly not a religious one, see AŚ 1.3.4: *esā trayī-dharmas caturṇām varṇānām āśramāṇām ca sva-dharma-sthāpanād aupakārikaḥ*.— This moral law [prescribed] in the triple *Veda* is wholesome because it helps establish respective roles for the four social strata and for the four life stages.’

⁴ AŚ 1.2.3: *trayī vārtā daṇḍa-nītiś cēti mānavāḥ. trayī-viśeṣo hy ānvīkṣikīti*.

Even though Ānvikṣikī is not separately mentioned in this classification, nevertheless the passage establishes a direct connection between Ānvikṣikī and the *Vedas*, understood to incorporate the *Upaniṣads*.

This association was from time to time voiced and recollected in the *Mahābhārata* (e.g. MBh 3.149.32–33; 12.59.33), *Manu-smṛti*, and in some *Purānas*⁵. The memory or deep conviction that Ānvikṣikī was, at least to some extent, closely related to the orthodox tradition and to the *Vedas* is articulated as late as in the *Nyāya-sāra* (NSā, pp. 71–72) in a passage in which Bhāsarvajña (who, in fact, follows Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana in this respect, see p. 194 and n. 50) discusses why there are only four disciplines of learning, and whether the division is because each of the four disciplines has a different subject matter (*viśaya-bhedāt*) or whether because each has a different purpose (*prayojana-bhedāt*). He eventually subscribes to the opinion that

‘Because human goals are primary and secondary, one should recognise four disciplines of learning, namely: the discipline of moral law, welfare, sensual satisfaction and of liberation.’⁶

In this context, the following objection is expressed to which Bhāsarvajña accedes:

‘[Objection:] “Since both the triple *Veda* and methodology have liberation as their purpose, it turns out that there is no difference [between them, and the number of disciplines cannot be four].” That is true, nevertheless [one can distinguish] the primary classification and subdivisions with respect to all sciences, because a discipline can be a sphere for an enquiry and it can be something that stimulates all other disciplines.’

The reason why Bhāsarvajña finds it justified to classify Ānvikṣikī as a separate branch of learning is pragmatic, and not due to the system’s salvific purpose. Bhāsarvajña thereby emphasises the role of Ānvikṣikī, which was still remembered at his time as a discipline that stimulates other branches, viz. provides them with methodology and analytic tools applicable in their respective fields of enquiry, but which can also become an object of enquiry in its own right.

⁵ BhāgP 3.12.10 (vide infra p. 180, n. 21), BhāgP 11.16.24 (vide infra p. 217, n. 97), and BhāgP 187.43:

‘Ānvikṣikī trayī vārtā daṇḍa-nītiḥ tathāparā /
Nyāya-catuṣṭayam tv etad vārttām atra śṛṇuṣva me //

⁶ NSā, p. 72.3–4: *tasmāt mukhya-gauṇa-puruṣārtha-bhedena catasro vidyā draṣṭavyāḥ, dharma-nārtha-kāma-mokṣa-sāstrāṅgīti*.

⁷ NSā, p. 72.5–7: *nanu evam tarhi trayy-ānvikṣikyor apavargārthatvād abhedāḥ prāpnoti. satyam tathāpi vicāraka-viśayatvena sarva-vidyānuḡrāhakatvena cāsyāḥ sarva-vidyābhyāḥ prādhānyam avāntara-bhedas cāsti*.

3. Much has been said by researchers on the nature of what Ānvīkṣikī actually was and was not.⁸ JACOBI's (1911) interpretation of Ānvīkṣikī as philosophy has been eventually dismissed on various accounts and most researchers would now agree that Ānvīkṣikī is some kind of theoretical reflection on effective, successful and consistent procedures both in the sphere of reasoning and of practical actions, or—to use Paul HACKER's expression—'the art of thinking' (*Denkkunst*), however with both theoretical and pragmatic implications. This methodical, systematic analysis is, as we shall see, what we could tentatively call methodology. That also is why, in my translations of Sanskrit passages throughout, the term 'methodology' is used interchangeably with 'Ānvīkṣikī'.

3.1. What is, therefore, the nature of Ānvīkṣikī? We should start with the first mention of the system in extant Indian literary sources. Kauṭilya enumerates the disciplines comprised by Ānvīkṣikī, or methodology, and thereby provides some important information on the nature of Ānvīkṣikī:

'Methodology [comprises three schools]: Sāṃkhya, Yoga and the materialists (*lokāyata*).'⁹

This is the frequently discussed passage that once led some researchers, e.g. JACOBI's (1911), to see, wrongly, it were, in Ānvīkṣikī the Indian counterpart of philosophy, i.e. a rational theoretical enterprise which is instantiated through specific philosophical schools.

Instead, the passage can rather be taken as a case of an enumerative or a typological definition that demarcates a notion by mentioning specimens to which the definiendum is applicable, either in a selective way, by mentioning just a few examples (similar to, e.g. 'The cat (*Felis*) is: the domestic cat (*Felis catus*), the jungle cat (*Felis pardus*), the African wildcat (*Felis libyca*)', without mentioning all the seven members of the genus), or in an exhaustive way, by specifying all the varieties subsumed by the definiens (similar to, e.g. 'The chimpanzee is *Pan troglodytes* and *Pan paniscus*', no more no less). In the case of Ānvīkṣikī, as we will see, it is most probably the former case: Kauṭilya enumerates all the branches of thought and analysis he considers to be most significant representatives of the philosophical-methodological current, but his enumeration does most probably not exhaust all instantiations. What Kauṭilya proposes is not, therefore, a definition proper which would describe the character and essential aspects or intrinsic characteristics of a thing, or the definiendum.

Further, the passage does not postulate Ānvīkṣikī, the way JACOBI (1911) wanted it as a kind of meta-level generic term (*der übergeordnete Artbegriff*) which encompasses, or rather is instantiated in, the three remaining disciplines

⁸ See esp. GLASENAPP 1940: (110 f.), HACKER (1958: 4–13, 29–30), HALBFASS (1988: 263–286), PREISENDANZ (2000).

⁹ AŚ₁ 1.2.10: *sāṃkhyam yogo lokāyatam cēty ānvīkṣikī*.

of learning, especially in the sense of ‘philosophy’, to which the three other branches would be subordinated, but what we have here is merely a list of philosophical strands which apply the same pattern of reasoning and analysis approach or betray the same investigative, methodological approach.¹⁰ Rather, the definition shows what the three other disciplines have in common and what is the theoretical and practical method they share, irrespective of their incompatible world views and irreconcilable differences in metaphysics and ethics.

In the next step, Kauṭilya proceeds to define the role of Ānvīkṣikī as an indispensable instrument for all the remaining disciplines of learning, and this can be treated as something that approximates a definition proper:

‘[Ānvīkṣikī] first investigates (*anvikṣamānā*) with the help of logical tools (*hetu*): (1) in the sphere of the triple *Veda*, what conforms to moral law (*dharma*) and what does not conform to moral law (*adharmā*), (2) in the sphere of economics, what is profitable and what is not profitable, (3) in the sphere of political science, what is conducive to political power] and what is not conducive [to political power], (4) what is effective and what is ineffective for these [three disciplines of learning, and then what serves people, it keeps the reason steady in misfortune and in prosperity as well as generates/sustains expertise in judgment, speech and action].¹¹

The defining characteristics of Ānvīkṣikī, derived from the verbal root *anvīkṣ* ‘to observe, investigate methodically, examine, enquire’, as it is described by Kauṭilya, is thus a certain procedure through which one methodically investigates a given object with the help of logical tools and reasoning (*hetubhir anvīkṣamānā*). This investigative methodical approach is the main object of the investigation of Ānvīkṣikī, but not exclusively. It is not merely a reflection on how to reason, argue, analyse, etc. correctly, but it has a very practical dimension, which is its inherent feature: one applies theoretical methodology to all practical issues that one considers important and relevant to attain one’s goals, and thereby can take a course of action most suited for one’s objectives. And these practical goals can be as divergent as, for instance, how to live morally, viz. what criteria one can use to judge that a particular deed complies with moral law (*dharma*) or not (*adharmā*), what considerations one has to take into account in order to be able to determine whether the adopted course of action may bring wealth and profit or not, or which stratagems and actions of the monarch are beneficial to the maintenance of his political power and which are not. In fact, as we have seen, Kauṭilya explicitly mentions three such spheres

¹⁰ See HACKER (1958: 4–14), HALBFASS (1988: 263 ff.).

¹¹ AŚ 1.2.11: *dharmādharmau trayāyāṁ arthānarthau vārttāyāṁ nayāpanayau daṇḍānīyāṁ balābale cātāsāṁ hetubhir anvīkṣamānā lokasyōpakaroti vyasane ’bhyudaye ca buddhiṁ avasthāpayati prajñā-vākya-kriyā-vaiśāradyāṁ ca karoti*.

of application of the Ānvīkṣikī method, and always consistently along the same pattern: the method allows one to distinguish (1) the virtue (*guṇa*), or the appropriate strategy and positive course of reflection or action that leads to desirable results, i.e. what conforms to moral law (*dharma*), what is profitable (*artha*), what is conducive to political power (*naya*) and what is effective (*bala*), and (2) the vice (*doṣa*), or the negative procedure that might bring undesired effects, which one should avoid, i.e. what does not conform to moral law (*adharmā*), what is not profitable (*anartha*), what is not conducive to political power (*apanaya*) and what is ineffective (*abala*).

3.2. This idea of advancing a successful activity which eventually leads to the achievement of one's goals and, at the same time, of avoiding any activity which is counterproductive to one's goals and which should therefore be discarded, at least with respect to the three spheres of religion, economics and political science in Kauṭilya's account, seems to have been at the root of the Ānvīkṣikī enterprise. This strikes a close resemblance with Nyāya, esp. Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana's, account of reasoning, activity and purposefulness of human existence. In a passage¹² we read:

“What should be avoided, what keeps one that [to be avoided] away, absolute avoidance [of that to-be-avoided and] the means [to accomplish this [avoidance which] should be avoided”—having understood these four beneficial statements properly, one attains the ultimate (i.e. liberation).”¹³

In the same spirit and using similar terms, Udayotāra Bhāradvāja emphasises the role of reflection or reasoning in achieving desired and commendable goals and in avoiding activities which would result in something undesirable:

“...the two, i.e. reasoning (*tarka*) and determination (*nirṇaya*) sustains the process of people. People, having reflected again and again [by means of reasoning and determination], undertake activities, namely, they avoid what should be avoided and appropriate what should be appropriated thanks to reasoning and determination.”¹⁴

Further, while discussing the typology of cognitive criteria (*pramāṇa*), Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana notes that “Whenever cognition occurs, the result is the discernment the nature of which is avoidance, appropriation or indiffer-

¹² This is directly influenced by the four noble truths of Buddhism, see WEZLER (1984) and BALCEROWICZ (2003: 296–301).

¹³ NBh on NS 1.1.1: *heyam, tasya nirvartakam, hānam āyantikam, tasyōpāyo 'dhigantavya ityāni catvāry artha-pādāni samyag buddhvā niḥśreyasam adhigacchati*.

¹⁴ NV₁ 1.1.1, p. 18.8–10 = NV₂, p. 17.8–9: *tāv etau tarka-nirṇayau loka-yātrām udvahata^a iti. buddhvā buddhvā lokaḥ pravartamānaḥ tarka-nirṇayābhyām heyam jahāti upādeyam cōpādatte*. [^a NV₂: *vahata*.]

ence,¹⁵ and the cognition meant here is not just any cognitive state or cognitive act, but a cognitively valid procedure or true cognition that fulfils the criteria of a cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*) proper. What is thus characterised as cognition by Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana is not necessarily limited to perception (the passage occurs between a short definition of perception and definitions of inference, analogy and verbal knowledge) but should be understood as underlying the results of the other three cognitive criteria recognised by the Nyāya school. This is precisely the same approach which is so manifest in the Ānvīkṣikī account of successful action and unsuccessful, unproductive one which should not be undertaken, except perhaps for the third element, namely indifference (*upekṣā*), introduced by Pakṣilasvāmin. This third element, in fact, does not run counter the Ānvīkṣikī approach to successful action, for it merely typologises all those activities which are not irrelevant, i.e. such that neither lead to success nor bring loss.

Akṣapāda Gautama defines the result (*phalam*) as ‘the object (circumstances, situation) which is generated by activities and faults’¹⁶, while understanding the activity as ‘the causal effort by means of speech, mind and body’¹⁷ and faults as ‘characterised by the effectuating activity’.¹⁸ While commenting on the definition, Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana remarks:

‘The result is the sensation of happiness or of suffering, and the *karman* is the [action in the form] of happiness as well as the fruition [in the form] of suffering. ... Thus, this result is what should be avoided [but is] appropriated again and again; [this result is also] what should be appropriated [but is] discarded again and again, ... such a way there is a kind of termination of avoidance and appropriation [of results]. ... This very world, as one would realise, is jostled by the current of avoidance and appropriation of the result.’¹⁹

Again in this passage, Pakṣilasvāmin directly refers to activities which should be carried out or which should be abandoned, and places the idea of the result (either success or failure) in a wider context of rebirth (mentioned in NS 1.1.19). These are general circumstances or existential predicaments in which everyone is commonly to be met: people habitually follow objectives which should be discarded or renounce goals which should be striven for. This lack of con-

¹⁵ NBh.1.1.3: *yadā jñānam tadā hānōpādānōpekṣā-buddhayaḥ phalam.*

¹⁶ NS 1.1.20: *pravṛtti-doṣa-janito ’rthaḥ phalam.*

¹⁷ NS 1.1.17: *pravṛttir vāg-buddhi-śarīrāmbhaḥ.*

¹⁸ NS 1.1.18: *pravartanā-lakṣaṇā doṣāḥ.*

¹⁹ NBh 1.1.20: *sukha-duḥkha-saṁvedanaṁ phalam. sukha-vipākam karma duḥkha-vipākam ca. ... tad etat phalam upāttam upāttam heyam, tyaktam tyaktam upādeyav iti nāsya hānōpādānāyor niṣṭhā paryavasānam vāsti, sa khalv ayaṁ phalasya hānōpādāna-srotasōhyate loka iti.*

sistence in action—viz. avoiding what should be avoided and appropriating what should be appropriated—emphasises the role of proper reflection on the nature of the result and the means to achieve it, if it is desirable, or the means to avoid it, if it is objectionable.

If, as Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana himself sees it, Nyāya was the successor of Ānvīkṣikī at least in some sense, this throws additional light on the original characterisation of Ānvīkṣikī by Kauṭilya and its role for the monarch: since humans, including monarchs, often act inconsistently, i.e. not in consonance with what is desirable or proper and with acceptance for what is objectionable or harmful, one should follow the method of Ānvīkṣikī which sets things right and helps one be fully consistent in one's actions.

To recapitulate, Ānvīkṣikī should be interpreted as some kind of theoretical reflection on what constitutes effective, successful and consistent procedure both in reasoning and practical activity which prompts one to undertake an appropriate course of action and render conclusive judgement in order to achieve desirable and commendable goals while discouraging one from engaging in activities which bring undesirable results, incompatible with accepted values. This methodical, systematic analysis is what we could call 'methodology', or reason-based methodological enquiry and approach.

4. The very few ideas encapsulated in the *Artha-sāstra* of Kauṭilya are later recapitulated in Kāmaṇḍikī's *Arthi-sāra* (fifth century CE) hardly adding any new material. First, Kāmaṇḍikī repeats *verbatim* the classification of the disciplines of learning, which is identical with that of the *Artha-sāstra* (AŚ 1.2.1):

‘Methodology, the triple *Veda*, economics and everlasting political science constitute exactly the four disciplines of learning. These are the causes of stability of the world.’²⁰

Essentially the same enumeration is also repeated in the *Bhāgavata-purāna*.²¹ Another verse echoes the spheres of application, which is the contents of AŚ 1.2.11:

‘Methodology [concerning the] knowledge of the self, [investigates] (1) what conforms [to] moral law (*dharma*) and what does not conform to moral law (*adharma*) in the sphere of the triple *Veda*, (2) what is profitable and what is not profitable in the sphere of economics, (3) what is conducive [to political power] and what is not conducive [to political power] in the sphere of political science;’²²

NīSā 2.2:

*ānvīkṣikī trayī vārttā daṇḍa-nītis ca śāśvatī /
vidyāś catasra evātā loka-saṁsthiti-hetavaḥ ||*

²¹ BhāgP 3.12.44ab: *ānvīkṣikī trayī vārttā daṇḍa-nītis tathāva ca /*

²² NīSā 2.7:

whereupon follows an explanation why Ānvīkṣikī is so vital:

‘Methodology is a discipline teaching about the self, because it investigates happiness and suffering. The one who investigates the reality through this [methodology] abandons excitement and grief.’²³

Most importantly, the verse emphasises the purposefulness of Ānvīkṣikī, which is in accord with what Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana has to say above about the investigation of the purpose and result (*phala*) of human actions which end with the sensation of happiness or of suffering (*sukha-duḥkha-samvedanam phalam*),²⁴ and thereby stresses the link between liberation and Ānvīkṣikī.

5.1. To conclude his brief introduction of Ānvīkṣikī as a separate discipline Kauṭilya emphasises both its importance and its unique character as a branch that is useful in all other disciplines of learning, irrespective of particular world view and particular theoretical presuppositions:

‘Methodology has always been considered to be the lamp of all disciplines of learning, the means to [accomplish] all actions and the fundament of all moral life.’²⁵

This characterisation is significant because Kauṭilya himself shows that he does not limit the scope of application of Ānvīkṣikī to a selected sphere of the monarch’s activities but views it as a method which can serve anyone in any theoretical or practical discipline, not necessarily the three mentioned by Kauṭilya.

5.2. A direct trace of the method of Ānvīkṣikī, precisely in the sense of its successful application in a range of fields with a view of achieving one’s goals is found in the *Mahā-bhārata*, which contains a few stray references to the current in a contaminated passage in which the place of Ānvīkṣikī is taken by political science (*daṇḍa-śāstri*), the main proponent of which was Kauṭilya. The passage, however, must have been influenced by Kauṭilya’s account of Ānvīkṣikī whose ideas were expanded at great length (emphasised/in bold are phrases that occur also in AŚ 1.2.11):

*ānvīkṣiky ātma-vijñānam dharmādharmau trayī-sthitau /
arthānarthau tu vārttāyām daṇḍa-nīyām nayētarau //*

MSā 2.11:

*ānvīkṣiky ātma-vidyā syād iḥṣaṇāt sukha-duḥkhayoḥ /
iḥṣamāṇas tayā tattvaṁ harṣa-śokau vyudasyati //*

NBh 1.1.20, see n. 19.

²⁵ AŚ 1.2.12:

*pradīpaḥ sarva-vidyānām upāyaḥ sarva-karmaṇām /
āśrayaḥ sarva-dharmāṇām śaśvad ānvīkṣikī matā //*

[23] Political science is what holds the world [in balance], for the political force contains numerous measures. [24] [It is about] what is profitable and what is not profitable; happiness and unhappiness; what conforms to moral law and what does not conform to moral law; what is effective and what is ineffective; misfortune and prosperity; merit and demerit; virtue and fault; [25] sensual satisfaction and sensual dissatisfaction; dividing [time into] season, month, night, days and a moment; rudeness and kindness; excitement and fury; peace and control; [26] fate and human agency; liberation and want of liberation; fear and lack of fear; injury and non-injury; asceticism, sacrifice and constraint; what is poisonous and what is not poisonous; [27] end, beginning and middle stage as well as maintenance of entities; rapture, joy, insolence, hypocrisy and fortitude; what is conducive [to one's aims] and what is not conducive [to one's aims]; [28] power and powerlessness; similarly self-conceit and arrogance; decay and absence of decay; discipline and manipulation; proper time and improper time, O Bhāradvāja; [29] falsehood, truth, state of knowledge and of not knowing; absence and lack of faith; passiveness and activity; profit and want of profit; victory and defeat; [30] sharpness and softness; death as well as acquisition [of new life] and no acquisition [of new life any more]; [31] contradiction and lack of contradiction,²⁶ obligation and lack of obligation; what is effective and what is ineffective; [32] indignation and lack of indignation as well as what conforms to moral law and what does not conform to moral law; embarrassment and absence of embarrassment as well as modesty; success and failure; [32] ardour and calmness, [convincing] power of speech, discernment of the true nature [of things]—in such a manner the political power is maintained in this world of the descendants of Kuru.²⁷

²⁶ MB₂ and MB₁ the apparatus, p. 572 (10 mss): *virodhas cāvirodhas ca*. Alternatively, 'failure and success', MB₁: *virāddhis cāva rādhis*.

²⁷ MB₁ 12.121.23c–32:

daṇḍa-nītir jagad-dhātrī daṇḍo hi bahu-vigrahaḥ // 23 //
arthānarthau sukhaṁ dukhaṁ dharmādharmau balābale /
daurbhāgyaṁ bhāga-dheyaṁ ca puṇyāpuṇye guṇāguṇau // 24 //
kāmākāmāv ṛtur māsaḥ śarvarī divasaḥ kṣaṇaḥ /
aprasādaḥ prasādaś ca harṣaḥ krodhaḥ śamo damaḥ // 25 //

Mahā-bhārata, the context of which is, again, the examination of the conduct and qualities of the monarch:

A‘O Impeccable [ruler], I hope you similarly [resort to] the seven expedients with six royal virtues²⁹? Do you properly analyse what is conducive and what is not conducive [to political power] and the fourteen [secret measures]³⁰? O supreme among conquerors, I hope you that after you have examined yourself and your enemies, you pursue the eight occupations in order to have peace?’³¹

²⁹ The expression *rāja-guṇaiḥ śadbhiḥ* does not really seem originally to refer to any established sixfold set of royal virtues but rather to the list of the monarch’s virtues found in the Sixth Chapter of the *Artha-sāstra* (AŚ 6.1–6), which enlists the following four categories of the virtues a monarch should possess: virtues of good social interaction (*ābhigāmika-guṇa*), intellectual virtues (*rajña-guṇa*), virtues of vigour (*utsaha-guṇa*), personal perfections (*ātma-sampad*), and these could explain the number ‘six’ in the expression, which occurs here not because of the actual number of virtues but because of the chapter number (‘six’), just like in the case of the expression *catur-daśa* (see below). The expression *rāja-guṇaiḥ śadbhiḥ* (though the compound *rāja-guṇa*) seems to conflict the list of the monarch’s virtues of AŚ 6.1–6 with the sixfold character of the reign policy (*śādgunya*) of the king *vis-à-vis* his neighbours mentioned a view lines later in AŚ 6.2.4, and enumerated in full in AŚ 7.1.1 (*saṁdhi-vijayā bhāsana-yāna-saṁśraya-vaidhī nāvāḥ śādgunyam iti ācāryāḥ*; these are: peace, aggression, wait, march, retreat, shelter, dual policy; further in NSā 27.3ab).

Similarly the idea of the seven expedients (*saptōpāyā*) seems to be an extended version of an original concept of four expedients the monarch may avail himself of in order to maintain his power in the kingdom and included with some other classification. The four expedients are enumerated in AŚ 2.1.1 (*upapradāna-sāmōpapradāna-bheda-daṇḍāḥ*; these are conciliation, gifts, sowing dissent, outright force), with more details and subvarieties given in AŚ 2.48–56. Seven kinds of these are mentioned in AŚ 7.5.11, and these could be treated as means of subduing an enemy; however, the seven expedients are mentioned in the 27th Chapter on the Varieties of Expedients (*Upāya-vikalpa-prakaraṇa*) of the *Nīti-sāra* by Kāmandaki (NSā), who mentions three basic expedients (NSā 27.2), i.e. buying off (*kośa* = *upapradāna*, *dāna* = conciliation, *mantra* = *sāma*), the use of the fourfold army (*caturaṅga-bala* = *daṇḍa*), and seven expedients, first, to four (with *iti catuṣṭayam* being a clear reference to AŚ) and then to seven (NSā 27.3): *sāma dānaś ca daṇḍaś ca bhedaś cēti catuṣṭayam / māyōpekṣēndra-śāstram ca saptōpāyāḥ prakīrtitāḥ //*, i.e. conciliation, gifts, outright force, sowing dissent, deceit, political indifference, magical practices (this is, again, a reference to AŚ chapter 14). On the six virtues and seven means, comp. SCHARFE (1989: 206–210), who does not consider all the sources (e.g. NSā) though.

³⁰ This seems to be an allusion to Chapter 14 (*Aupaniṣadikam*) of the *Artha-sāstra*.

MBh 2.5.11:

*kac cid rāja-guṇaiḥ śadbhiḥ saptōpāyāms tathānagha /
balābalam tathā samyak catur-daśa parikṣase //
kaccid ātmānam anvikṣya parāṁś ca jayatām vara /
tathā saṁdhāya karmāṇi aṣṭau bhārata sevase //*

The wording (emphasised/ in bold)—*balābala* and *anvīkṣya*—cannot be coincidental. The compound *balābala* refers to *daṇḍa-nītyām balābale* of AŚ 1.2.11, whereas the gerund *anvīkṣya* invokes the very name of the Ānvīkṣikī current.

Such importance and a vital role to play by Ānvīkṣikī in the qualifications and general education of the king which transpires from the questions posed by Nārada in the above passage is also highlighted in the advice contained in the *Gautama-dharma-sūtra*:

‘[The king] should be trained in the triple *Veda* and methodology.’³²

As is well known, Kauṭilya who also emphasises the importance of the current, wrote his practical manual with the purpose of imparting comprehensive knowledge system to a future king. The reference to Ānvīkṣikī in the *Gautama-dharma-sūtra* is also important because it attests to a positive perception of the current at an early phase, i.e. around and after the collapse of the Maurya.³³ The current was viewed positively in some circles even in at least the first two centuries of the common era, i.e. around the time of the composition of the *Yājñavalkya-smṛti*³⁴, which refers to it as well:

‘The king who is versed in methodology, political science, economics and the triple *Veda* [knows how to] conceal his own weaknesses.’³⁵

In a creation myth about the beginnings of the royal sovereignty when, after all the virtues, rites etc. in the world disintegrated, Brahma composes and imparts a mythical text in a hundred thousand chapters, which was believed to allegedly contain a section on norms, customs, observances and social rules. Alongside the following reference to the same four basic disciplines, including Ānvīkṣikī, encapsulated in a separate chapter:

‘Likewise, O the Bull of the Bharata, such extensive disciplines of learning as the triple *Veda*, methodology (*ānvīkṣikī*), economics and political science [should be] laid down [in the work].’³⁶

³² GDhS₁ 11.3 = GDhS₂ 2.2.3 = GDhS₃ 11.3: *trayyām ānvīkṣikyā vābhivinītaḥ*.

³³ The text was composed in the period corresponding to the decline of and posterior to the Mauryan empire, see OLIVELLE (2000: 8): ‘I think that there is sufficient evidence to conclude that Kaustamba is older than Gautama’ and OLIVELLE (2000: 10): ‘There is no compelling reason, at too great a distance in time from Gautama, we would not be far wrong in placing his upper limit around the beginning of the third century BCE.’

OLIVELLE (1930–1962 I²: 443, 447), DUNCAN–DERRETT (1973: 34).

³⁵ Yājñ 1.311:

*sva-randhra-goptānvīkṣikyām daṇḍa-nītyām tathāva ca /
vinītas tv atha vārttāyām trayyām cāva narādhipaḥ //*

³⁶ MBh 12.59.33:

*trayī cānvīkṣikī cāva vārttā ca bhārata-ṛṣabha /
daṇḍa-nītis ca vipulā vidyās tatra nidarśitāh //*

Ānvīkṣikī is mentioned here as one of the disciplines to sustain the life and welfare of people, one considered so important that it had to be included in the sacred text laying down all the rules for the humankind and being a foundation of culture.

The positive image of Ānvīkṣikī as a theoretical discipline of learning one should master is occasionally emphasised even in such texts as the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, albeit the canonical fourfold list of sciences gets expanded:

[The teacher Sāndīpani imparted to the gods] the science of archery and law treatises as well as the path of methodical reasoning (*nyāya-pathin*) and the methodological knowledge (*ānvīkṣikī-vidyā*), and the sixfold royal conduct (political science).³⁷

These and other stray references in the epic to Ānvīkṣikī as a methodological discipline show that the current was, at least for some centuries and in certain milieux, positively associated with the proper royal conduct, preservation of moral law (*dharma*) etc., even among orthodox Brahmanic circles. The references can also serve as a good illustration of how the methodology of Ānvīkṣikī was used or believed to be used in actual or epic life and in the way Kāṭilya recommended.

5.3. At least one reference in the *Mahā-bhārata* is conspicuous in explicitly leaving Ānvīkṣikī out of the enumeration of the four main branches through which the world is regulated and maintained, thus reducing the list to three:

‘There are three disciplines of learning, the learned ones: the triple *Veda*, economic and political science. It is through them, properly applied, that the course of the world is regulated.’³⁸

Interestingly, the *pādas* ab (*trayī vārttā daṇḍa-nītis ... vidyā*) look almost like a quotation from *Artha-śāstra* 2.2.10 (*ānvīkṣikī trayī vārttā daṇḍa-nītis cēti vidyāḥ*) or *Nīti-sāra* 2.2.10 (*ānvīkṣikī trayī vārttā daṇḍa-nītis ca śāśvatī / vidyās catasra evātā*), except for the term *ānvīkṣikī* absent. Despite the obvious omission of Ānvīkṣikī in this enumeration—additionally emphasised through the mention of only three disciplines of learning? (*tisro vidyā*), not four—the verse might nevertheless contain a hidden reference to the methodological current: it apparently reproduces a list of three disciplines which is associated with ‘the school of Manu’ in the *Artha-śāstra* (whatever that school was, certainly it was

³⁷ Bh. P. 10.45.34:

*sarahasyam dhanur-vedam dharmān nyāya-panthāns tathā /
tathā cānvīkṣikīm vidyām rāja-nītim ca ṣaḍ-vidhām //*

³⁸ MBh 3.149.31:

*trayī vārttā daṇḍa-nītis tisro vidyā vijānatām /
tābhiḥ samyak-prayuktābhir loka-yātrā vidhīyate //*

not the school of the *Manu-smṛti*), and according to which Ānvīkṣikī is simply included in the Vedic soteriological and religious reflection (*trayī*):

‘The representatives of the school of Manu [maintain] that the triple *Veda*, economics and political science [are the only disciplines of learning], because methodology is a special branch of the triple *Veda*.³⁹

If indeed, as Kauṭilya informs us, there were certain authoritative Brāhmaṇic traditions which ostensibly recognised the triple classification such as the representatives of the school of Manu (*mānava*), but included Ānvīkṣikī as a sub-variety of the Vedic learning (*trayī-viśeṣa*), then it is quite likely that the above verse simply replicates such a view.

There is one more verse which either directly or indirectly refers to Ānvīkṣikī:

‘In this world the livelihood of people is [provided for through] agriculture, tending cattle and trade, [i.e. economics; further, there is also] political science, the triple *Veda*, the knowledge through that people fully exist.⁴⁰

What it presents is, likewise, an enumeration of the same four—i.e., depending on the interpretation of the terms *trayī vidyā* either as two separate words or as a compound *trayī-vidyā*—disciplines. In the first place, economics is here disguised in the three economic activities (*kṛṣi*, *go-rakṣya* and *vāṇijya*) which are identical with the components (*kṛṣi*, *śū-pā-pāya* and *vaṇijyā*) of economy (*vāṇijyā*) enumerated in AŚ 1.4.1 (1.4.1.1). The verse allows for two interpretations: either a fourfold classification (*vārtā*] *daṇḍa-nītis trayī vidyā*), in which Ānvīkṣikī features merely as ‘the knowledge’, or a treefold classification (*vārtā*] *daṇḍa-nītis trayī-vidyā*), i.e. ‘political science, the knowledge of the triple *Veda*’.

Furthermore, the later heretism of the first of the *Mahā-bhārata* verses (MBh 3.149.31) explains why these three disciplines are relevant to people provided ‘they are correctly applied’ (*tābhiḥ samyak-prayuktābhir*). It seems that, first, the fact that the three disciplines become relevant (i.e. ‘the course of the world is regulated... through them’) means that they ‘acquire a genuine status of disciplines of learning’ (*vidyānām vidyātvaṃ*), to use Kauṭilya’s expression of 1.2.9, and indeed the implication of the passage corresponds in spirit to the Kauṭilya’s expression. Secondly, the idea of the disciplines being correctly applied (*samyak-prayuktābhiḥ*) calls for an explanation of what criteria and procedures are thereby indicated. And that could possibly be a reference to the proper methodology, i.e. to Ānvīkṣikī.

³⁹ AŚ 1.2.2–3: *trayī vārtā daṇḍa-nītis cēti mānavāḥ. trayī-viśeṣo hy ānvīkṣikīti.*

⁴⁰ MBh 3.198.23:

*kṛṣi-go-rakṣya-vāṇijyam iha lokasya jīvanam /
daṇḍa-nītis trayī-vidyā tena lokā bhavanty uta //*

Both verses in their last *pādas* emphasise the role of the chief disciplines of learning, Ānvīkṣikī included, in maintaining the order and proper course of the world and human actions: *loka-yātrā vidhīyate* and *tena lokā bhavanty uta*, precisely the way it is done by Kāmandaki in NīSā 2.2d: these are the causes of stability of the world (*loka-samsthiti-hetavaḥ*). This additionally establishes the link between the two verses and the tradition described by Kauṭilya and Kāmandaki.

A passage that immediately follows *Mahā-bhārata* 3.149.31 both gives some additional explanation as to why the three disciplines are so vital and reiterates that the condition of their relevance is their proper implementation:

‘Indeed, the execution of moral law (*dharma*) would not be possible on earth without the standard of the triple *Veda*. And also without political science, this [whole world] would be without moral limits. Further, [all] these people who do not practice the standard of economics would perish. Indeed, through these three standards, when implemented correctly, people are truly ruled.’⁴¹

Thus, also the exemplification of the importance of the three disciplines of learning highlighted in the passage, analogous to *Mahā-bhārata* 3.149.31, allocates a fourth category, without mentioning it by name, which is necessary for the three disciplines to have any practical sense at all. This unnamed discipline which furnishes a proper methodological knowledge cannot but be, I would claim, Ānvīkṣikī.

At the same time, as it transpires from rather rare direct references to Ānvīkṣikī, from the fact that the references which would show it in a favourable light are even more scarce and from its omission in the classification of the disciplines of learning, it is indeed the case that for some reasons Ānvīkṣikī became at a certain point, probably in the centuries towards the end of the final compilation of the *Mahā-bhārata* (ca. second to fourth century CE), a current which was either neglected or looked down upon, while an explicit association with it was particularly ennobling and was rather to be avoided.

6. Let us return to the actual essence of Ānvīkṣikī, of which we know that it was regarded as a successful investigative procedure and methodology associated with proper reasoning, determination of truth and effective course of conduct. But there is more than this. The pivotal, albeit very laconic statement of *Arthśāstra* 1.2.11 (*vide supra* p. 177 and n. 11), reiterated by Kāmandaki (*vide*

MBh 3.149.32–33:

*sā ced dharma-kriyā na syāt trayī-dharmam ṛte bhuvī /
daṇḍa-nītim ṛte cāpi nirmayādam idam bhavet //
vārttā-dharme hy avartantyo vinaśyeyur imāḥ prajāḥ /
supravṛttair tribhir hy etair dharmaiḥ sūyanti vai prajāḥ //*

supra p. 180 and n. 22), is, as a matter of fact, the only tangible feature of Ānvīkṣikī as we find it in Kauṭilya's and later in Kāmandaki's, and as much as we can attempt to reconstruct its nature we can see that the starting point for such a practical application of the Ānvīkṣikī methodology presented in the *Artha-śāstra* is the following question:

Is a particular deed (*x*)
 good (P) or bad (not-P)
 in the realm of:
 —religion,
 —economic activity,
 —social coherence and political power⁹⁴²

Accordingly, is a particular deed (*x*) profitable (*artha*, P) or not profitable (*anartha*, not-P) in the field of agriculture, cattle rearing and trade? Is a particular deed (*x*) conducive (*naya*, P) or not conducive (*apanaya*, not-P) to the maintenance of one's political power? Is a particular deed effective (*bala*, P) or ineffective (*abala*, not-P) in implementing other disciplines of learning? Correspondingly, the starting point for each case of the application of Ānvīkṣikī which Kauṭilya enumerates is consistently a dilemma whether a particular deed possesses characteristics desired in a given field of application or not: 'Is *x* P or not-P?' In other words, it is consistently a dilemma whether a particular deed possesses characteristics desired in a given field of application or not: 'Is *x* P or not-P?'

And this seems to be precisely a classical type of doubt so vital for the epistemology of the Nyāya system, engrafted on the sixteen epistemological categories of the system as the third one, which opens the whole process of questioning, enquiry and analysis (see S 1.1.1: *pramāṇa-prameya-samśaya-*^o). As we shall see (§ 8), Ānvīkṣikī is known also to the proponents of Nyāya specifically as a system in which analysis of doubt and its resolution plays a vital role, a system whose unique realms are the [epistemological] categories such as doubt etc.' (Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana: *tasyāḥ pṛthak-prasthānāḥ samśaya-śāstrāḥ pṛthak-ārthāḥ*) which 'is guided by the categories such as doubt etc.' (Udayakeśava: *saṁśayādi-bhedānuvidhāyini ānvīkṣikī*). Doubt as a starting point of methodological analysis is therefore one of the thematic points of both the current of Ānvīkṣikī and the school of Nyāya.

6.1. The idea of doubt is of extreme importance to the system of Nyāya and it is defined in the *Nyāya-sūtra* in the following manner:

⁹⁴² Where P, to be exact, stands for: 'conforming to moral law' (*dharma*), 'economically profitable' (*artha*), 'conducive to political power' (*naya*), 'effective' (*bala*), and where non-P stands for: 'not conforming to moral law' (*adharma*), 'not economically profitable' (*anartha*), 'not conducive to political power' (*apanaya*), 'ineffective' (*abala*)—with respect to the three main spheres of application religion (*trayī*), economic activity (*vārttā*) and social coherence maintained through political power (*daṇḍa-nīti*).

‘Doubt is an inquisitive reflection that depends on a particular characteristic [about which one is not certain and it is] due to perceived possibility of a property common [to different loci], due to perceived possibility of numerous properties, contradictory apprehension, incongruity of apprehension or incongruity of non-apprehension.’⁴³

The *Locus classicus* for the nature of doubt (*saṁśaya*) is a the following passage of the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*:

‘First one sees a property common to a pillar and a person, say, a [particular] height or a [particular] circumference [which could be a feature of both], and becomes dubious as regards that particular characteristic [which can be apprehensible] to both [a pillar and a person] which he has seen before. But he cannot determine any of the two [possibilities and decide] what it is. Doubt is such a cognition that fails to determine what it is. “I apprehend a property which is common to both, but I do not apprehend a particular characteristic which belongs only to one of these two”—such a reflection is the basis [of doubt]. This [reflection] emerges as [a cause] that prompts doubt. Such an inquisitive reflection that depends on [this] particular characteristic, which one needs to determine about object one actually sees, is doubt.’⁴⁴

A particular object x subject to doubt is first determined to have a property Q , of which it is known that only a certain set of things possess it, and out of these things some are P and some are not- P . Thus, doubt for Vātsyāyana assumes a slightly more complex form of reasoning:

$x \in Q$
 $(P \text{ and not-}P) \in Q$
 Is x P or not- P ?

Further, the importance of doubt is emphasised by Vātsyāyana who considers doubt as a starting point of an enquiry, which is for him called ‘*nyāya*’:

⁴³ NS 1.1.23: *saṁānāneka-dharmōpapatter vipratipatter upalabdhy-anupalabdhy-
 tvaś ca viśeṣāpekṣo vimarśaḥ saṁśayaḥ*.

⁴⁴ NBh 1.1.23: *sthāṇu-puruṣayoḥ samānam dharmam āroha-pariñāhau paśyan pūrva-
 dharmam ca tayor viśeṣam bhubhutsumānaḥ kiṁsvit ity anyatarām nāvadhārayati, tad-
 anavādharaṇam jñānam saṁśayaḥ. samānam anayor dharmam upalabhe viśeṣam
 anyatarasya nōpalabha ity eṣā buddhir apekṣā. sā saṁśayasya pravarttikā vartate. tena
 viśeṣāpekṣo vimarśaḥ saṁśayaḥ*. For NS 1.1.23, see n. 43.

‘Methodical reasoning (*nyāya*) is carried out not with respect to an object which has been perceived or which has been determined [conceptually], but with respect to an object under doubt.’⁴⁵

This is clearly an approach which is a continuation of the process of analysis weighing the pros and cons of a particular action or value in the three realms of ritual/religion, economic activity and political power, emphasised, as we have seen, in the *Artha-śāstra*, albeit in a form much more advanced.

6.2. The idea of doubt also significantly features in the *Caraka-saṁhitā*, where it is characterised in quite similar terms:

‘Now, [we describe] doubt. What is called doubt is a lack of certainty concerning things with respect to which one entertains a systemic doubt because of a characteristic of suspicion, for instance: we see people who are endowed with characteristics of an old age and people who are not endowed with characteristics of an old age, similarly people who are active and who are inactive, who get older quickly and those who are long-lived—because one has seen these two categories, one entertains] doubt [over untimely death existing or not].’⁴⁶

The quintessence of doubt, according to the *Caraka-saṁhitā*, is precisely of the same nature: ‘Is *x* *P* or not-*P*?’ or ‘Is the quality of *P* ascribable to the object *x* or is the quality of not-*P* ascribable to the object *x*?’ Clearly, the realm of application in this case which is diagnosis and medical treatment is quite different for obvious reasons, and the instance just quoted is the doubt which concerns death, its actual causes and medical factors which can lead to it as well as, by implication, the natural duration of life and the causes of its protraction. In other words it is the question: Which of possible ways of life and of possible kinds of medical treatment may preserve life, i.e. rescue one from untimely death?

We notice that the same kind of doubt and subsequent reasoning is behind the idea of Ānvīkṣikī in Kaṭyāyana’s passage (and subsequently in Kāmandaki’s), albeit cast in a different environment: one entertains doubt whether a particular course of action is beneficial to, or at least compatible with the goals of religion, economics or political science: ‘Is conduct *x* *P* or not-*P*?’ where ‘*P*’ is ‘beneficial/prevalable/serviceable’, in the sphere of religion, moral law, economics and political science. Ānvīkṣikī, the reasoner behind the *Caraka-*

⁴⁵ NBh 1.1.1, p. 35.4 = NBh 2 p. 3.3: *tatra nānupalabdhe na nirñite ’rthe nyāyah pravartate, kim arhi? saṁśayite ’rthe.*

⁴⁶ CarS 3.8.43: *atha saṁśayaḥ—saṁśayo nāma sandeha-lakṣaṇānusandigdheṣv artheṣv aniścayaḥ, yathā dṛṣṭā hy āyuṣmal-lakṣaṇair upetās cānupetās ca tathā sakriyās cākriyās ca puruṣāḥ śīghra-bhaṅgās cira-jīvinaś ca, etad ubhaya-dṛṣṭatvāt saṁśayaḥ—kim asti khalv akāla-mṛtyur uta nāstīti.*

samhitā, Akṣapāda Gautama and Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana all share the same concern in their epistemic method: how to resolve the doubt so defined. And that does not seem coincidental.

7.1. Kauṭilya comes to mention Ānvīkṣikī once again but in a different context:

‘Political science is the means of securing the pursuit of (lit. acquisition and maintenance) of methodology (*ānvīkṣikī*), the triple *Veda* and economics...’⁴⁷

In the passage the relations between Ānvīkṣikī and other disciplines, or at least one of them, i.e. political science, is reversed. Before Kauṭilya maintained that Ānvīkṣikī is an indispensable tool to effective political rule. Here he says that the relation is reciprocal: political power is vital for the preservation of Ānvīkṣikī as well as other disciplines of learning.

This emphasises the importance of political and social stability as well as economic welfare for an unrestrained cultivation of Ānvīkṣikī, which in turn reminds us of what Aristotle in his *Metaphysics* says of philosophy: ‘philosophers who for the practice of the philosophical vocation require a society which has reached a certain level of economic development that can enable an elite of intellectuals to focus on philosophical reflection rather than on mundane pursuit of activities indispensable merely for material or biological survival.’

The passage also suggests that Kauṭilya treated political science and actual political power based on the theoretical analysis and enlightened advice as a precondition for unrestrained theoretical pursuit of the other three disciplines and practical implementation of their conclusions, which were to serve the preservation of political power. Thus the relation between the two disciplines was reciprocal and that of symbiosis: Ānvīkṣikī, alongside the other two, helped the monarch guide the society, use force, exercise the control in the sphere of social interaction and moral conduct, stimulate economy, stabilise the country etc., and thereby maintain power in a relatively peaceful manner without excessive violence. Political science applied through actual royal rule facilitated the development of the three other disciplines, including Ānvīkṣikī, for its own goals.

7.2. Kauṭilya also mentions how the knowledge of the four disciplines of learning could be acquired, i.e. what its legitimate sources are:

‘After he has gone through the initiation rite, [the prince] should learn the triple *Veda* and methodology from the experts, economics from supervisors of departments, political science from theoreticians and practitioners.’⁴⁸

⁴⁷ AŚ 1.4.3: *ānvīkṣikī-trayī-vārttānām yoga-kṣema-sādhanā daṇḍaḥ...*

⁴⁸ AŚ 1.5.8: *vṛttōpanayanān trayīm ānvīkṣikīm ca śiṣṭebhyo vārttām adhyakṣebhyo daṇḍānītiṃ vaktṛ-prayoktṛbhyah.*

This implies that Ānvīkṣikī was a separate discipline that should be learnt from specialists (*śiṣṭebhyaḥ*) in this particular field and not from experts in any other field. We may assume, that is, that if a student wished to study Ānvīkṣikī, he should clearly not turn to experts in economics or in political science, but exclusively to those learned in the methodology of Ānvīkṣikī, i.e. experts in this particular field in its own right.

That is distantly echoed in the *Mahā-bhārata*, where probably the *travidyāḥ* ('experts in three disciplines'/'triple-discipline' experts') is a short hand for experts in respective fields:

'From the experts in three disciplines [the prince] should learn the triple *Veda*, the everlasting political science, methodology as well as the knowledge of the self, whereas from ordinary people [he should learn] economics.'⁴⁹

8.1. The crucial question, therefore, arises who these 'triple-discipline experts' (*travidyāḥ*) who taught and practised Ānvīkṣikī actually were? As I pointed out earlier (p. 176), Kauṭilya included three schools under the current methodology under the names: *sāṅkhya*, *yoga* and *lokāyata*. However, the question is whether these designations really stand for what one may think they do, when one reads the passage and sees it justified in taking them at their face value?

Let us first turn our attention to a philosophical school of Nyāya, which is not explicitly mentioned in the *Artha-śāstra* but whose proponent Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana, nevertheless, attempts to explicitly establish a historical link between his own school and the tradition of Ānvīkṣikī. Interestingly, it is not only Nyāya but also its associate school of Vaiśeṣika which is not mentioned as a school related to Ānvīkṣikī in the *Artha-śāstra*, *Mahā-bhārata* and other sources. A question immediately follows: why they two not, despite the evidence of Vātsyāyana? Alternatively, what would be the rationale behind Vātsyāyana's attempt to equate, as we shall see, Nyāya with Ānvīkṣikī and to establish a link between these two, even though Kauṭilya completely ignored to mention either Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika in his account of Ānvīkṣikī?

As it is well known, the text of the Nyāya tradition in which the term 'ānvīkṣikī' features for the first time is the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*:

'[Opponent's objection]: "As regards these [epistemological categories] mentioned in NS 1.1.1,] a separate mention of [such categories] as doubt etc. is purposeless, because they—as far as they are legitimately included in [the two categories of] cognitive criteria and the cognoscibles—are not distinct [from one of these two]." [Reply.] This is true. However, the following four disci-

⁴⁹ MDhŚ 7.43:

*travidyebhyas trayīm vidyām daṇḍa-nītim ca śāśvatīm /
ānvīkṣikīm cātma-vidyām vārttārambhāmś ca lokataḥ //*

plines of learning, each having its unique realm, are specified for the benefit of living beings, of which the fourth one is methodology (*ānvīkṣikī*), i.e. the discipline of methodical reasoning (*nyāya-vidyā*). Its unique realms are the [epistemological] categories such as doubt etc. Without a separate mention of these [categories] this [methodology] would merely be a discipline teaching about the highest self, like the *Upaniṣads*. Therefore, on account of [epistemological] categories such as doubt etc. [methodology] is established as a distinct [discipline of learning].⁵⁰

Clearly, ‘the following four disciplines of learning’ (*imās tu catasro vidyāḥ*) are precisely the same disciplines as those mentioned by Kauṭilya. In this passage Vātsyāyana equates his own school with *ānvīkṣikī* and emphasises that the defining characteristic of Nyāya/Ānvīkṣikī is the fourteen epistemological categories out of sixteen enumerated in NB₁ 1.1.1 that begin with doubt (*saṁśaya*) and end with points of defeat (*anigrahasthāna*). Of particular notice is the fact that he singles out doubt as the defining feature of Ānvīkṣikī which was, it seems, indeed the case (see NB₁ 1.1.1 and NB₂ 1.1.1, 1.1.2 which was, it seems, indeed the case (see NB₁ 1.1.1, 1.1.2 and NB₂ 1.1.1, 1.1.2). It is doubt as a separate category that is crucial both in this passage as well as in the list of the fourteen categories of Nyāya inasmuch as it is a starting point of an enquiry and analysis. And this is exactly what also seems so important for *ānvīkṣikī* in evaluating particular course of action that is beneficial to accomplish religious, economic or political goals. Elsewhere, for doubt etc., Nyāya and apparently Ānvīkṣikī—would end up as being reduced merely to a salvific doctrine that teaches about the highest self (*ādhyātma-vidyā/ātma-vidyā*) restricted to the Brāhmic orthodox tradition. Further, in the passage Vātsyāyana treats Ānvīkṣikī as primary while explaining how it differs from *ādhyātma-vidyā*, ‘a discipline of knowledge about the highest self’, and how it is established as separate branch in its own right (*prthak prasthāpyate*), so, surprisingly, Nyāya is subordinate to Ānvīkṣikī and treated as secondary: it is not Nyāya which is mentioned as the fourth among the main disciplines of learning but Ānvīkṣikī. We can, therefore, see that Vātsyāyana’s reference to Ānvīkṣikī is not simply coincidental but concerns the very nature of both traditions, which are historically equated by Vātsyāyana: the fourth discipline is in its true essence the discipline of methodical reasoning (*yāsām caturthīyam ānvīkṣikī nyāya-vidyā*), which is what Nyāya is and does.

⁵⁰ NB₁ 1.1.1, p. 34–35 = NB₂, p. 2.18–3.2: *tatra saṁśayādīnām prthag-vacanam anantakam—saṁśayādayo {hy} yathā-sambhavam pramāṇeṣu prameyeṣu cāntar-bhavanto nyāyapātricyanta iti. satyam etat. imās tu catasro vidyāḥ prthak-prasthānāḥ prāṇa-bhṛtām anugrahāyōpadiśyante, yāsām caturthīyam ānvīkṣikī nyāya-vidyā. tasyāḥ prthak-prasthānāḥ saṁśayādayaḥ padārthāḥ. teṣām prthag-vacanam antareṇādhyātma-vidyā-mātram iyaṁ syāt, yathōpaniṣadah. tasmāt saṁśayādibhiḥ padārthaiḥ prthak prasthāpyate.* [^a NB₂.]

Subsequently, Vātsyāyana raises a crucial question that concerns the very nature of his own school of thought and, at the same time, the foundations of Ānvīkṣikī:

‘What is then this methodical reasoning (*nyāya*)? Methodical reasoning is an examination of an object by means of cognitive criteria. Inference relies on perception and testimony. This is systematic enquiry. Systematic enquiry is a systematic query into [an object] which has already become known by means of perception and testimony. What proceeds by means of this [systematic enquiry] is methodology (*ānvīkṣikī*), i.e. the discipline of methodical reasoning (*nyāya-vidyā*), or the science of methodical reasoning (*nyāya-śāstram*).’⁵¹

In this short account, he draws a direct line between the essential features of his own school and Ānvīkṣikī, which not only is treated as tantamount to the discipline known as *nyāya-vidyā* or *nyāya-śāstram*, or ‘discipline of methodical reasoning’, but determines the method of analysis adopted by Nyāya itself. For all practical purposes, Vātsyāyana clearly equates the method and content of Ānvīkṣikī with the discipline of methodical reasoning (*nyāya-vidyā*), which lies at the core of Nyāya.

In his *Nyāya-vārttika* Uddāhātaka recapitulates and elaborates on all the main points made by Vātsyāyana as follows:

‘Thus these [main] disciplines of learning are four. Each of them has its own unique realm. The triple *Veda* has as its unique realm fire sacrifice, fire oblation etc. Economics has as its unique realm [farmer’s] plough, a [merchant’s] carriage etc. Political science is guided by the categories such as the ruler, ministers etc. Methodology is guided by the categories such as doubt etc. Without its own unique realm such as doubt etc. it would merely be a discipline teaching about the highest self. Why so? Because being merely a discipline teaching about the highest self it would be like the *Upaniṣads* and thus it would be included into the triple *Veda* and the four-fold division [of disciplines] would cease.’⁵³

⁵¹ Bh₁ 1.1.1, p. 39.1–2 = NBh₂, p. 3.11–13: *kaḥ punar ayam nyāyah? pramāṇair artha-pāramāṇam nyāyah. pratyakṣāgamāsrītam anumānam. sāvīkṣā. pratyakṣāgamābhyām ikṣitānvīkṣaṇam anvīkṣā. tayā pravartata ity ānvīkṣikī nyāya-vidyā nyāya-śāstram.*

⁵² Comp. also Jayantabhaṭṭa’s account in the same spirit, NMa₁ I: 9.10–11: *pratyakṣāgamābhyām ikṣitānvīkṣaṇam anvīkṣā anumānam ity arthaḥ tad-vyutpādakam ānvīkṣikī.*

⁵³ NV₁ 1.1.1., p. 12.10–16 = NV₂ 1.1.1., p. 11.17–22: *catasra imā vidyā bhavanti {iti}^a. tāś ca pṛthak-prasthānāḥ. agni-hotra-havanādi-prasthānā trayī. hala-śakaṭādi-prasthānā vārtā. svāmy-amātya-^b{ādi}-bhedānuvidhāyinī daṇḍa-nītiḥ. samśayādi-bhedānuvidhāyinī*

We can see that indeed each of the four disciplines has its unique realm of interest and application, and that of Ānvīkṣikī is precisely doubt and other epistemological categories, i.e. epistemology and general enquiry. Neither Vātsyāyana nor Uddyotakara in their brief definitions of the nature of Ānvīkṣikī mentions any particular practical field of application where it could be employed, apart from a broad theoretical realm of methodical reasoning and examination of an object by means of cognitive criteria, which can practically be applied to almost any field one chooses. The unique subject matter (*prasthāna*) for Ānvīkṣikī is therefore methodological enquiry, epistemology and related issues, and soteriology seems to be merely one of its additional fields of application.

By way of summary of his comments on the enumeration of all the sixteen epistemological categories listed in opening aphorism of the *Nyāya-sūtra*, Vātsyāyana returns to Ānvīkṣikī and cites a verse already known from *Arthaśāstra*, albeit with a significant change:

‘This methodology in question, which is differentiated [as a separate science from all other disciplines of learning] through categories, such as cognitive criteria, etc.,

is declared, in the catalogue of disciplines of learning, to be the lamp for discipline of learning, the means to [accomplish] all actions, the fundament of all moral laws.

This is by no means an insignificant statement. Vātsyāyana offers a brief description of the categories which found the cornerstone of the Nyāya philosophical project and at the same time reconfirms the nature of his own system with the verse which speaks of nothing else but Ānvīkṣikī, and doing so, he consciously replaces the original *pāda* (*śivasvād ānvīkṣikī matā*) of the *Arthaśāstra* with a new phrase (*vidyōddeśe prakīrtitā*), which additionally emphasises the primary role of the subject. ‘The catalogue of disciplines of learning’ (*vidyōddeśe*) of Vātsyāyana’s verse in which Ānvīkṣikī ‘is declared ... to be the lamp for discipline of learning’ can be a many fourfold division of disciplines of learning, not necessarily the same as Kauṭilya’s, but most likely it is indeed the *Arthaśāstra*, for the simple reason that the verse itself is a quotation, with minor change, from this work.

ānvīkṣikī. tasya saṁśayādi-prasthānam antareṇā{dhyā}tma-vidyā-mātram iyaṁ syāt. tatah kīṁ syāt? adyātma-vidyā-mātratvād upaniṣad-vidyāvat trayyāṁ evāntar-bhāva iti ca tasyaṁ nivartate. [^a NV₂, ^b NV₂, ^c NV₂.]

— NBh₁ 1.1.1, p. 64 = NBh₂, p. 5.18–20: sēyam ānvīkṣikī pramāṇādibhiḥ padārthair ājyaṁ nā

pradīpaḥ sarva-vidyānām upāyaḥ sarva-karmaṇām /
āśrayaḥ sarva-dharmānām vidyōddeśe prakīrtitā //

Cf. RUBEN’S (1926: 354) idea that the change within the verse does not stem for Vātsyāyana himself, unconvincing for the simple fact that the verse is grammatically embedded in the structure of the NBh passage and its grammatical subject is outside of the verse.

Also Uddyotakara's gloss contained in the *Nyāya-vārttika* emphasises the fact that Ānvīkṣikī, in its method, is applicable to all domains of learning and is serviceable to all other sciences, which means that the soteriological aspect does exhaust its multidimensional character and philosophical concerns:

'Therefore, these categories, such as doubt etc., which are included in [the two categories of] cognitive criteria and the cognoscibles, have been described separately in order to emphasise the [fourfold] division of the disciplines of learning. This methodology in question, which is the discipline of methodical reasoning and which is differentiated [as a separate science from all other disciplines of learning] through categories, such as cognitive criteria etc., is declared to be the lamp of disciplines of learning, because it illuminates its object, i.e. unique realm,] like a lamp, and so it is a lamp [for other disciplines of learning]. Its object has been explained to consist in cognitive criteria and other [categories]. Other disciplines are expounded too. Why cognitive criteria and other [categories] are not [an object] for these other disciplines of learning?'⁵⁵

There can be no doubt that Utsāyāna, and Uddyotakara following him, view themselves and their own school of Nyāya as direct successors of Ānvīkṣikī. How far, however, does their claim hold validity in the historical sense? And could Nyāya be a genuine successor of Ānvīkṣikī at all, if it was not even contained in Kauṭilya's list comprising the seven schools (p. 176)?

2. We find a partial confirmation of the accuracy of Kauṭilya's classifying the materialists (*lokāyata*) among the followers of Ānvīkṣikī in a passage from the *Arthśāstra* in which Rāmānandya addresses Bhārata as follows:

'I hope, dear friend, that you do not associate with Brahmins who are materialists for they are fools whose competence is useless and they consider themselves experts. These malignant people acquire their intelligence in the form of Ānvīkṣikī and then talk nonsense, even when principal law treatises are there at hand.'⁵⁶

⁵⁵ NV₁ 1.1.1, p. 21.8–14 = NV₂ 1.1.1, p. 20.2–7: *tasmād ete saṁśayādayḥ padārthāḥ pramāṇaḥ prameye cāntar-bhavanto vidyā-prasthāna-bheda-jñāpanārtham prthag-
bhāṣiṣṭāniti*^a. *sēyam ānvīkṣikī nyāya-vidyā pramāṇādibhiḥ padārthaiḥ vibhajyamānā
pramāṇaḥ sarva-vidyānām bhavati prakāśakatvāt pradīpavat {pradīpah}*^b. *pramāṇādi-
pramāṇādītam artham itarā vidyāḥ pratipadyanta iti. kim itarāsu vidyāsu pramāṇādīni na
santi?* [^a NV₂. ^b NV₂ omits.]

⁵⁶ R₁ 2.100.38–39 = R₂ 2.94.32–33:

kaccin na lokāyatikān brāhmaṇāms tāta sevase /

Clearly, the verses confirm what Kauṭilya stated that at least some of the followers of Ānvīkṣikī were materialists (*lokāyatika*, *lokāyata*).

Further, in these two verses Rāma warns Bhārata to stay away from mischievous followers of Ānvīkṣikī, who ignore tradition, law and order established through *Dharma-sāstras* and speak against the sacred lore. They are not outcasts, however, being legitimate Brahmins. What precedes these verses is also quite informative:

‘I hope, dear friend, that plans devised by you or your ministers, when not divulged, are never known [to anybody], even while applying all kinds of reasoning.’⁵⁷

The verse refers to methods which can be used against the king and his policy and with which one can uncover royal plans and stratagems. These are the tools of reasoning which belong to the domain of Ānvīkṣikī, referred to explicitly a few verses later. Thus, we obtain quite a different picture of the same Ānvīkṣikī, which is for Vātsyāyana primarily a method and knowledge concerned with the highest self (*adhyātma-vidyā*), see also §§ 8.1, 9.2 (10).

The verses also demonstrate that the attitude towards both Ānvīkṣikī and its methods and subject matter of rational enquiry was viewed among certain circles with suspicion and animosity. This opens a possibility of the threefold—instead of the twofold—depending on the interpretation, enumeration of the foremost sciences of the *Mahā-bhārata* (§ 1.3.), which would leave out Ānvīkṣikī and would therefore be a voice against the high status of the current, was not necessarily either an innocuous or even a concealed reference to Ānvīkṣikī, comprised among the three sciences as a subvariety of one of them, but may have been a deliberate expression of disavowal and disregard for the followers of the current. Clearly, Ānvīkṣikī was not a current everyone would like to subscribe to and be known to be associated with.

anartha-kuśalā^a hy anāśālāḥ, anā-māninaḥ //
dharmā-sāstresu mukhyaḥ vidyamāneṣu durbudhāḥ /
buddhim ānvīkṣikīḥ prāpya nirartham pravadanti te //

[^a POLLOCK (2005: 510): *anartha kuśalā*. ^b POLLOCK (2005: 510): *buddhimān vīkṣikīm*. Interestingly, Internet-based TITUS machine-readable e-text of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, prepared by Muneo Tokunaga (Kyōtō, 1993) with adaptations by John D. Smith (Cambridge, 1995) on the basis of edition R₂, on which apparently also POLLOCK’s edition is based, all contain the same mistranscription of the Sanskrit text. In the reading adopted by them, *buddhimān vīkṣikīm* would not relate grammatically to anything in the sentence and would have to be emended to *buddhimāntaḥ*. Besides, *vīkṣikīm* is meaningless. The correctness of parsing *buddhim ānvīkṣikīḥ prāpya* is confirmed by the commentary *Bhūṣaṇa* of Govindarāja in R₁ *ad loc.*, p. 26–27: *ānvīkṣikīm buddhim prāpya śuṣka-tarka-viṣayām buddhim āsthāpya nirartham nisāyajanam pravadanti.*]

⁵⁷ R₁ 2.100.21 = R₂ 2.94.16:

kaccin na tarkair yuktvā vā ye cāpy aparikīrtitāḥ /
tvayā vā tava vāmātyair budhyate tāta mantritam //

There is a range of other equally negative references to Ānvīkṣikī, either *verbatim* critical of it or of its method of rational enquiry and subject matter, which confirm that the attitude among various circles towards the current was ambiguous, to say the least. One of these is found in the *Manu-smṛti*:

‘[10] «Scripture» should be recognised as the *Veda*, whereas «tradition» as the law treatise. These two should never be questioned with respect to any matter,⁵⁸ because it is from these two that moral law has emanated. [11] A twice-born who would look down upon these two by reason of the science of argumentation (*hetu-śāstra*) should be cast out by righteous people as a nihilist and a denigrator of the *Veda*.⁵⁹

The nihilist (*nāstika*) here is clearly a materialist, the term being often associated and synonymous with materialism (Śārvāka-lokāyata), as numerous references indicate.⁶⁰ Followers of Ānvīkṣikī, associated with materialism and nihilism, are censured with quite similar words in the *Mahā-bhārata* on a few occasions:

‘[11] The rejection of the authority of the *Vedas* and the scriptures is a serious transgression; [to maintain that] inconsistency is everywhere brings one’s own destruction. [12] A Brahmin, claiming to be an expert, would be a denigrator of the *Veda*, would be fond of methodology, i.e. a discipline of reasoning,

⁵⁸ For an alternative reading and interpretation of the *pāda* C (*te sarvārtheṣu mīmāṃsyē*) see OLLI 2006: 144–5, note 2.10).

⁵⁹ DhŚ 2. 10–11:

...vedo vijñeyo dharmo śāstrāṇyāi smṛtiḥ /
te sarvārtheṣv amīmāṃsyē taphyā dharmaḥ hi nirbabhau //
... ‘vamanyeta te sarvārthe’ hā śāstrāyād dvijaḥ /
sa sādhubhir bahiṣkṛto nāstika-nindakaḥ //

[^a Varia lectio: *sarvārtheṣu mīmāṃsyē*, see n. 58. ^b Varia lectio: *mūle*, and the translation: ‘...who would look down upon the two fundamentals’.]

⁶⁰ See e.g. TS 1. 10–11; Dhā 3.3.53; TRD ad ŚDSa 80–87; p. 452–462; esp. p. 452.3 (*lokyāyatā nāstikā eṣāṃ itām vadanti*); MŚVṬ, *Autpattika-sūtra* 10, Part II, p. 4.15 (*lokāyatām nāstikanam tantram*); NBh ad NS 3.2.61 (*atra nāstika āha: bhūtebhyo mūrty-upādāna-upādānam*).

Another type of reference of the term *nāstika* is to a sceptic who accepts neither the Vedic tradition, the existence of soul, karmic retribution etc., just a Lokāyata, nor the validity of argument or enquiry, and doubts all; see e.g. CarS₁ 1.11.14–15:

...parikṣā na parikṣyam na kartā kāraṇam na ca /
na devā na ṛṣayaḥ siddhāḥ karma karma-phalam na ca //
nāstikasyāsti nāvātmā yadrcchōpahatātmanaḥ //
pātakebhyah param cātāt pātakam nāstika-grahaḥ //

In the above verse, the *nāstika* cannot be such a ‘sceptic’ who rejects valid methods and objects enquiry (*na parikṣā na parikṣyam*), because he clearly applies *hetu-śāstra*.

which is useless, [13] if he would propound theories based on logical arguments, negated facts, but in reality would argue with logical arguments, permanently calumniate and criticise Brahmins, [14] and would put everything to doubt, such a person should be acknowledged to be a fool and idiot, of harsh and primitive language, and people should know, dear friend, that those like him are like dogs among humans.⁶¹

In another passage, god Indra, in the guise of a jackal, addresses the sage Kāśyapa, in front of whom undergoes a kind of ‘self-criticism’ session for sins apparently committed as a follower of Ānvīkṣikī and vows never to fall back in case he would assume a human form again, for from now on he would eventually know what is good and what is wicked.

‘[44] Others, of inauspicious descent, who were born at evil moments under demonic constellations, fell into the demonic race, destitute of sacrifice and progeny. [45] I used to be such a pseudo-expert, a reasoner, a denigrator of the *Veda*, fond of methodology, i.e. a discipline of reasoning, which is useless. [46] I formulated doctrines based on logical reason, essentially. I spoke about what I used in logical reason, I calumniated and verbally assaulted the twice-born during Vedic sacrifices. [47] I was a nihilist, putting everything to doubt, a truth-seeker, considering myself an expert. This [present] life, as a jackal, O Twice-born, is a consequence of all this. [48] May I, even after hundreds of days and nights that I am a jackal, obtain a human birth again. Then I would be contented as servant, taking pleasure in sacrifices, donations and asceticism, I would know what is to be known, and would avoid what is to be avoided.’⁶²

⁶¹ MBh₁ = MBh₂ 13.37.1–14:

*aprāmāṇyaṃ ca vedānaṃ vāstrāṇām cātilaṅghanaṃ /
sarvatra cānāśānam^a eṣān nāśanaṃ ātmanaḥ // 11 //*
*bhavet paṇḍitāṇāṃ brāhmaṇo veda-nindakaḥ /
ānvīkṣikīṇaṃ tārṇikīṇaṃ anurakto nirarthikāṃ // 12 //*
*hetu-vādīṇaṃ bruvan satsu vijetā hetu-vādikaḥ^b /
ākroṣṭā ca vaktā ca brāhmaṇānām sadāiva hi // 13 //*
*sarvābhīṣānaṃ mūḍhaś ca bālaḥ kaṭuka-vāg api /
boddhavyas tādrśas tāta nara-śvānaṃ^c hi taṃ viduḥ // 14 //*

[^a MBh₂: *avyasthā ca sarvatra*. ^b MBh₁ reads: *vijetāhetu-vādikaḥ*. If we read ‘*ahetu-vādikaḥ*’ the translation would be: ‘would be talking without logical arguments’. ^c MBh₂: *nara-śvānaṃ*.]

MBh₁ 12.173.44–49 = MBh₂ 12.180.46–51:

*nakṣatreṣv āsureṣv anye dustīrthā durmuhūrta-jāḥ /
saṃpatanty āsurīm yonīm yajña-prasava-varjitām // 44 //*
aham āsam paṇḍitako haituko veda-nindakaḥ /

In the passages associating the ‘useless’ (*nīrarthikā*) Ānvīkṣikī with nihilistic materialists, the current is called a ‘discipline of reasoning’ (*tarka-vidyā*) and a ‘theory based on logical arguments’ (*hetu-vāda*), ‘a discipline whose subject matter is vain reasoning’ (*śuṣka-tarka-viṣayā* in the *Bhūṣaṇa* on *Rāmāyaṇa*, see n. 56), whereas its follower is labelled an ‘arguer with logical arguments’ (*hetu-vādika*), ‘reasoner’ (*haituka*), but also a ‘fool’, ‘idiot’, ‘of harsh and primitive language’, a ‘thickhead’ who ‘brings his own destruction’ and negates facts.

In the same vein, Sāndīpani of Kāśī, Kṛṣṇa’s teacher, provides in the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* the following rule for a wandering ascetic (*saṁnyāsin*):

‘He should not be fond of [critical] disputes about the *Vedas*, should not be a heretic or reasoner (*haituka*), he should not engage in a dry debate or verbal contest (*śuṣka-vāda-vivāda*).’⁶³

The stipulation rules that the orthodox wandering ascetic should not participate in any activity normally associated with Ānvīkṣikī and the social-philosophical context in which it evolved.

The epithets *sarvābhiśankin* and *sarvābhīṅkin* (‘someone who puts everything in doubt’) in the *Mahābhārata* cited above should not be understood literally intimating a sceptical attitude. They rather imply that a person would not accept anything without proper reason and logic, which is so frequently shown in negative light here. The opposite of the Ānvīkṣikī way of life is ‘to know what is to be done, and to avoid what must be avoided’, i.e. to know what is good and what is wrong from an orthodox traditional point of view, apparently something the followers of Ānvīkṣikī are incapable of. The passages incidentally paint a picture of a conflict between belief, dogmatism and religious attitude, on the one hand, and reason, reasoning and intellectual openness, on the other, while the side taken on the former: Ānvīkṣikī and its followers should be ostracised being the public enemies in view of their critical approach to traditionally and uncritically accepted values.

ānvīkṣikīm toṣaṁśāyāṁ aśrako nīrarthikām // 45 //

hetu-vādān jayāntā raktā saṁsatsu hetumat /

ākroṣṭā bhīṣṭā cā brahma-yajñeṣu vai^a dvijān // 46 //

nāstīti sarva-samā ca mūrkhāḥ paṇḍita-mānikāḥ /

tasyēva bhāṣā-nirvṛtīḥ sṛgālatvaṁ mama dvija // 47 //

api jātu tasya tat syād aho-rātra-śatair api /

yad ahaṁ mānuṣīm yoniṁ sṛgālaḥ prāpnuyām punaḥ // 48 //

saṁtuṣṭaś cāpramattaś ca yajña-dāna-tapo-ratiḥ /

śūnya-jñātā bhaveyaṁ vai varjya-varjayitā tathā // 49 //

[MBh₂: *brahma-vākyeṣu ca*.]

For an alternative translation of MBh₂ 12.180.46–47ab see PREISENDANZ (2000: 243).

⁶³ BhāgP 11.18.30:

veda-vāda-rakto na syān na pākhaṇḍī na haitukaḥ /

śuṣka-vāda-vivāde na kañcit pakṣam samāśrayet //

8.3. The epithets mentioned just above, despite the unequivocally negative connotations they carry, along with other references to Ānvīkṣikī such as *nyāya-vidyā* (NBh, NV, MDhŚ) and *hetu-sāstra* (MDhŚ) or *nyāya-pathin* (BhāgP) attest to a direct link between Ānvīkṣikī and its methods of enquiry based on reasoning (*tarka*) and logical argumentation (*hetu*). Independent lexicographic sources⁶⁴ also confirm that reasoning was the essence of Ānvīkṣikī, known under its second name ‘discipline of reasoning’ (*tarka-vidyā*).

What Uddyotakara has to say on the essence of Ānvīkṣikī being *anvīkṣā*, while discussing the nature of suppositional knowledge (*ūha*) and inference, is also quite significant in this context:

‘Others say that inference is [the same as] reasoning (*tarka*). They call inference: logical reason (*hetu*), reasoning (*tarka*), methodical reasoning (*nyāya*) or systematic enquiry (*anvīkṣā*).’⁶⁵

Such designations prove that investigation of the highest self (*adhyātma-vidyā*) and liberation (*mokṣa*) was neither the main nor the sole concerns of the current en masse. Further, if all the practitioners of Ānvīkṣikī were to pursue the salvific path, Kauṭilya and others could not have listed the materialists among its followers. And, indeed, we find no suggestion in the passages of the *Artha-sāstra* that Ānvīkṣikī was in any way concerned with any kind of salvific theory and the hereafter. Furthermore, Kauṭilya, who places the emphasis on Ānvīkṣikī as a primary discipline and who most probably himself subscribed to the current, does not seem to bother much about eschatology and emancipation. As Johannes KONKHORST (2007: 168) notes: ‘... the *Artha Śāstra*, in spite of explicitly enumerating the four *āśramas*, shows no interest whatsoever in liberation’. One possible candidate for a reference to liberation (*mokṣa*) could be the expression *vyasane ’bhyudaye* (‘in misfortune and in prosperity’) in 1.2.10, but clearly it is not the concept of liberation that may also be implied in 1.3.14 (*sva-dharma mahāvāgyānantyāya ca*—‘One’s own moral duty [serves] the [attainment of] heaven and immortality (or: the [attainment of] immortality in heaven)’) with the term *ānantya* (immortality), as one of the two main goals (beside heaven, *svarga*) which can be achieved by following one’s own moral duty (*sva-dharma*), but this seems to be rather a mere attestation of commonly accepted view (also by those—the monarch and his retinue—for whom the *Artha-sāstra* was composed) at that time, whereas ‘immortality’ (*ānantya*) does not have to imply the acceptance of the ideal of liberation by Kauṭilya himself but solely a reproduction of a general belief in the afterlife widespread in (at least some circles of) the society.

⁶⁴ ACM 251c: *ānvīkṣikī tarka-vidyā*.

⁶⁵ NV₁ 1.1.40, p. 141.17–18 = NV₂, p. 133.113–14: *apare tv anumānam tarka ity āhuḥ. hetus tarkaḥ nyāyo ’nvīkṣā iti anumānam ākhyāyata iti*.

9.1. In his important paper, HACKER (1958: 19–20) maintains that it was Vātsyāyana who identified Nyāya with Ānvīkṣikī for the first time and before the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* there was no such connection:

‘Since Vātsyāyana managed to pass off his science [i.e. Nyāya—P.B.] as Ānvīkṣikī, which had been identified by some with Sāṃkhya and other systems, it was therefore possible that the classification of Kauṭilya had not won any wider recognition. ... Perhaps Kauṭilya’s classification [of four sciences—P.B.] was forgotten precisely because Sāṃkhya had gradually become extinct, Yoga had been philosophically totally dependent on Sāṃkhya and Lokāyata had become radically materialistic. ... Since there were no more teachers of Sāṃkhya, or not in sufficient numbers, other systems had to be designated, at the expense of which one could learn the art of methodical penetration. Since Vātsyāyana’s times the system of Nyāya offered its service in this respect.’

This approach in main points is taken over by HALBFASS (1988: 174–177), albeit with some reservation and hesitations. Indeed, there apparently seems to be a kind of ‘historical succession gap’: there is no mention of Nyāya, or of any system Vaiśeṣika, in the *Arthashastra*, on the one hand, and, on the other, it is Vātsyāyana who seems first to establish a connection between Ānvīkṣikī and Nyāya.

HACKER’s, and to some extent HALBFASS’, is the thesis that I now want to challenge.

9.2. The most obvious counter-question that automatically comes to one’s mind is: Why should, in the first place, Vātsyāyana want to ‘pass off his science, i.e. Nyāya, as Ānvīkṣikī’? (Already, at this time Ānvīkṣikī triggered negative associations in wider popular reception, or at least any association with it was not particularly disturbing? Would he rather not dissociate himself at all prices from a concept whose name would carry negative connotations? Why should we doubt the credibility of Vātsyāyana’s account and not take what he says about the direct link between the tradition of Ānvīkṣikī and his own school of Nyāya at what it stands for, i.e. as an expression of a genuine historical continuity, even though the absence of any explicit mention of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika by Kauṭilya may be disturbing? After all, we could argue, there existed no school of Nyāya of which we knew at the time when Kauṭilya’s manual was composed, i.e. in the period of second–first centuries BC (after the disintegration of the Mauryan empire), and the first Nyāya text known to us, ascribed to Akṣapāda Gautama, was composed from *ca.* the middle of first century CE onwards (till its final redaction in fifth century), so Kauṭilya could not possibly refer to it by name.⁶⁶

⁶⁶ Comp. the remark of HACKER (1958: 19): ‘Had Kauṭilya known Nyāya, which is a science of reflection par excellence, and for which both reflection and argumentation constitute

In my opinion we can easily see that Ānvīkṣikī was not a well-established and celebrated tradition which was at the outset unrelated to Nyāya but to which Vātsyāyana wanted to subscribe, without any historical justification, and it is not the case that he intended Nyāya to take the place of Ānvīkṣikī in the universally established classification of four disciplines of learning outlined by Kauṭilya, as HACKER (1958: 19–20) maintains. First of all, neither had the fourfold classification of the *Artha-sāstra* become a standard one universally accepted at the times of Vātsyāyana as HACKER himself noticed, nor was it the case that all the four disciplines were universally regarded as pre-eminent and celebrated in all circles. There were other classifications which were even more popular: the six limbs of the *Vedas* (*ṣaḍ-vedāṅga*), but also fourteenfold⁶⁷, eighteenfold, nineteenfold⁶⁸ and even much longer lists as attested e.g. by the seventy-twofold list of arts and skills (*kalā*) in ‘the Story of Paesi’ (*Paesi-kahāṇayam*)⁶⁹ of the *Rājasaṁhitā-sūtra* (RP 806[211]), or the sixty-fourfold list of supplementary sciences and disciplines (*aṅga-vidyā*) of the *Kāma-sūtra* (KS 1.3.15).⁷⁰

A more popular classification was probably the fourteenfold division of sciences which could have diversified contents, but it never included Ānvīkṣikī. It is mentioned by Jayantabhaṅga in the *Nyāya-mañjarī*,⁷¹ who describes the four *Vedas* (in a rather unusual sequence: *Atharva-veda*, *Rig-veda*, *Yajur-veda*, *Sāma-veda*), the legendary-mythological lore (*itihāsa-purāṇa*), the six supplementary sciences (*vedāṅga*), law treatises (*dharma-sūtra*), Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya. Jayanta himself refers to other fourteenfold classifications:

“The *Vedas* rely on legendary-mythological texts (*purāṇa*), realisms (Mīmāṃsā), law treatise (*dharma-sūtra*)—these are the four supports of discipline of learning and moral law.”

[This is said with regard to other [disciplines]:

“the supplementary texts [the [minor] *Vedas*, Mīmāṃsā, the realm of Nyāya], legendary-mythological texts (*purāṇa*) and law

not only the method but also the subject matter, as a separate discipline in its own right, he would certainly have mentioned it by whatever name on the occasion of the examination of the nature of Ānvīkṣikī. What follows, it could not have existed as such at his time.’

⁶⁷ This division is mentioned even in the tradition of Nyāya, see e.g. NMa₁ I: 9.12 = NMa₂ I: 9.25: *nana catasraś ced vidyāḥ tat katham catur-daśa darśitāḥ nāṣa virodhaḥ ...* or NBh p. 71 ad NBh 1.1.1 (*sēyam ānvīkṣikī...*): *... na tarhi catasra eva vidyāḥ catur-dasaḥ bhīdyānām bhinna-viṣayatvāt...*

⁶⁸ NBh p. 3–4, Mil₂ 3.4: *suti sammuti sanhkyā yogā nīti visesikā gaṇikā gandhabbā tikāḥ cātubbedā purāṇā itihāsa jotisā māyā hetu mantanā yuddhā chandasā muddā, vacāna ekūnavīsati.*

⁶⁹ BOLLÉE (2002).

⁷⁰ For a brief overview of such lists see: Willem B. BOLLÉE (2002: 192–193, § 806).

⁷¹ NMa₁ I: p. 5–8 = NMa₂ I, I: p. 7–9.

treatises (*dharma-śāstra*)—this is the fourteen disciplines of learning”:⁷²

It is difficult to determine the exact date when the tradition to distinguish fourteen sciences and disciplines of learning was settled down and became widespread. It must have been current and well known already at the time of the composition of the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, for it mentioned by Kālidāsa (fifth century) in the *Raghu-vaṃśa* (RghV 5.21). It is further mentioned by Kumārila-bhaṭṭa in the *Tantra-vārttika* (TV 1.3.6), the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*⁷³, *Yajñavalkya-smṛti*⁷⁴, the *Sarva-darśana-siddhānta-saṃgraha* (SDSS 1.2–25) and even by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in the *Prasthāna-bheda* (PrBh₁ 13.4–14 = PrBh₂ 1.6–12: ...*iti catur-daśā vidhāḥ*), who tries to combine it with the eighteenfold classification. The constitutive elements of this classification were not universal and would change from text to text, albeit with some elements uniform, but the number ‘fourteen’ remained the same. Why should therefore Vātsyāyana wish to equate Nyāya with Ānvīkṣikī, if such a connection not existed, and to classify his philosophical school under the guise of Ānvīkṣikī among the four disciplines in the way which has almost become obsolete by this time?

Second, by the 400–450 CE Sāṃkhya was not dead yet. HACKER (1958: 19–20) claims: their proponents, Vāraṅkṛṣṇa, Vārṣaganya and Vindhyavāsin, were just composing the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* and other texts, which are extant, and some century or so later was also the *Yukti-dīpikā* to come. Therefore, the place for reasoners within the folds of Ānvīkṣikī besides Yoga and the materialists (*lokāyatā*)—as HACKER wanted, occupied so far by Sāṃkhya was still occupied by it. Third, granted that the place of the followers of Sāṃkhya and of the *lokāyatā* had become empty by the time of Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana, there was still the place occupied by the followers of Yoga (which hardly had anything to do with methodology in the sense of rational enquiry), who had just produced the *Pātāñjalī-yoga-śāstra* comprising the *Yoga-sūtra* and the *Yoga-bhāṣya*, if we follow the reasoning of HACKER. Fourth, what is most important, when we read the surviving few references to Ānvīkṣikī, especially

⁷² NMa₂ I: 5–8 = NMa₁ I: 7–9, and the verses NMa₁ I: 9.5–9 = NMa₂ I: *Vidyā-sthāna-rūpa-vicāra*, I: 9.1–4.

*purāṇa-purka-mīmāṃsā-dharma-śāstrāṅgam isritāḥ /
vedāḥ sthānāni vidyānām dharmasya ca catur-daśa iti /
anyatrāpy uktā*

*aṅgāni vedās catvāro mīmāṃsā nyāya-vistarah /
purāṇaṅgāni dharmā-śāstraṅ ca vidyā hy etās catur-daśa iti //*

⁷³ V. 2. 6.28:

*aṅgāni vedās catvāro mīmāṃsā nyāya-vistarah /
purāṇaṅgāni dharmā-śāstraṅ ca vidyā hy etās catur-daśa //*

⁷⁴ YDhŚ 1.3:

*purāṇa-nyāya-mīmāṃsā-dharma-śāstrāṅgam isritāḥ /
vedāṅgāni sthānāni vidyānām dharmasya ca catur-daśa //*

those in the *Mahā-bhārata*, they are not at all favourably disposed to Ānvīkṣikī. As I pointed out earlier (§ 5, esp. § 5.3), Ānvīkṣikī was rarely mentioned in literary sources and often left out of classifications of the fundamental disciplines of learning, even though its methodological impact was felt in the classifications and descriptions of sciences. Had Vātsyāyana wanted to upgrade the status of his own school of Nyāya in the eyes of, say, orthodox Brahmins he would certainly not have equated it with the tradition of Ānvīkṣikī, because the result would be counterproductive.

In the light of the above, there seems to be no reason to read Vātsyāyana the way proposed by HACKER and HALBFASS, who seems to accept the former's arguments, in the sense that Vātsyāyana fills in an empty space left by the tradition of Sāṃkhya as a discipline of reasoning, and Vātsyāyana comes to equate his own Nyāya with an older tradition. Further I find no justification why we should not take what Vātsyāyana says on behalf of his own tradition at its face value. What he actually says merely emphasises that his tradition of Nyāya developed from the tradition of Ānvīkṣikī and it is the latter's legitimate and direct successor. I claim, therefore, that it was precisely the other way round—in contrast with the development suggested by HACKER and HALBFASS: Nyāya, along with its twin system of Vaiśeṣikī, was closely associated with Ānvīkṣikī from its very beginnings to the extent that it actually developed directly from that tradition. And it was a natural move for Vātsyāyana to equate, in the verse taken from Kauṭilya (AS 1.2.12), the term *ānvīkṣikī* with his own tradition, called just before the verse *nyāya-vidyā*.

As Karin PREISENDANZ (2000: 230–2) successfully argued, certain Naiyāyikas inserted two sequences of *sūtras* at the conclusion of *Nyāya-sūtra* (1.2—viz. Nā. 2.38–45, 46–50—which specifically concern some self-oriented *varicā* practices), in order to align their system with certain salvific tenets of the *śāṅkhya* that focused on the *nyāya-vidyā*. These two inclusions were clearly intended to shift the focus from debate and rational enquiry, i.e. the chief preoccupation of Ānvīkṣikī, to which the original *Nyāya-sūtra* was devoted, to the extramundane and salvific, and subsequently 'Vātsyāyana, next to anchoring his philosophical tradition in a prestigious secular classification of science and in the most excellent position to boot, is concerned to accommodate it with the established religious tradition and place it, so to say, in line with the *Upanisads*. The *Nyāyasūtra* does not address the topic specifically and explicitly...' (PREISENDANZ (2000: 230)).

9. There are a number of additional points, apart from Vātsyāyana's own testimony, that strengthen the thesis of direct historical link between the two traditions.

First of all, as I have indicated above, there is conspicuously a very close affinity in the approach of Ānvīkṣikī and Nyāya to problems they investigate, mainly—from what we can say on the basis of the laconic account in the *Artha-*

śāstra—concerning the idea of doubt, brought to the fore by Kauṭilya in his highly condensed exposition of Ānvīkṣikī.

Further, it seems that the *Caraka-saṃhitā*, which stands in the line of development of Indian epistemology and methodology which eventually led to the Nyāya school, contains a passage that could have been influenced by the metaphor of Ānvīkṣikī as the lamp for disciplines of learning. The passage runs as follows:

[13] It is not accepted that the creation of beginningless element of consciousness [within a living body] is created through something else [such as matter]. If this “something else” is the highest self, it is accepted as the cause [of consciousness in the body and rebirth]; it must [therefore] be accepted that the creation is caused by something else, [which is the highest self]. . . . [16] Therefore, a wise person, having abandoned [erratic] opinions which have gone the wrong way, should view the whole [world] correctly with the help of the lamp of reason of the good [people].⁷⁵

The context of the second verse is delineated by the first verse, which concerns the highest self, here called *para ātmā*, which is precisely the main of *adhyātma-vidyā*, later mentioned by Vātsyāyana as a field of investigation common to *Upaniṣad* and to Nyāya. What this verse expresses is a belief that behind the whole world there must be ‘the highest self’. Then comes the conclusion that the wise person should apply ‘the lamp of reason’ (*buddhi-pradīpa*) to see the whole world the way it really is (*yathā-tatvam*). This metaphor betrays close affinity to the metaphor of ‘the lamp of Ānvīkṣikī’ mentioned in the verse by Kauṭilya (n. 25) and, later on, by Vātsyāyana (n. 54).

Of importance is the fact the immediate context in which these verses, which seem to relate to stand in some relation to Ānvīkṣikī, occur betrays close affinity to some ideas characteristic of Nyāya. First, it is the discussion and enumeration of cognitive criteria (*pramāṇa*), without the term *pramāṇa* itself being mentioned:

‘Everything is only twofold: either true or false. Its examination is fourfold: the teaching of an authoritative person, perception, inference and argumentation.’⁷⁶

⁷⁵ CarS₁ 1.11.5, pp. 488, 490 = CarS₂ 1.11.13, 16, pp. 208–209:

*āptopadeś cetanā-dhātor nēṣyate para-nirmītiḥ /
para ātmā sa ced dhetur iṣṭo ’stu para-nirmītiḥ // 13 //
tasmān matiḥ vimucyātām amārga-prasṛtām budhaḥ /
satām buddhi-pradīpena paśyēt sarvaṁ yathātatham // 16 //*

⁷⁶ CarS₁ 1.11, pp. 490–491 = CarS₂ 1.11.17, p. 210: *dvividham eva khalu sarvaṁ sac cāsac ca. tasya caturvidhā parīkṣā—āptopadeśaḥ pratyakṣam anumānam yuktiś cēti.*

This list in most elements overlaps with the classification of the four cognitive criteria of Nyāya, except for argumentation (*yukti*)—replaced with the reasoning based on analogy (*upamāna*) in Nyāya—which is defined by Caraka as follows:

‘Such a cognition which apprehends entities originating as a result of a combination of numerous causes and which refers to the three times is known as argumentation, and thereby the three aims of life can be achieved.’⁷⁷

Even though overridden by *upamāna*, *yukti* is still referred to in Nyāya as a methodical devise of reasoning: ‘The argumentation of one’s system is this: another person’s view, when it is not contradicted, is accepted,’⁷⁸ and has not been totally eliminated from the system.

Secondly, the author of the *Caraka-saṃhitā* understands the nature of perception exactly the way Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika do:

‘Such a cognition which proceeds as a result of the contact of the self, sense-organ, the mind and the object, which is manifested at the same time, is defined as perception.’⁷⁹

The idea evoked in the verse flows on the contact (*sannikarṣa*) of the four elements for ordinary sense perception to take place: the self (*man*) which is believed to be the ultimate cognitive subject, a sense organ (*indriya*) grasping the physical data, the mind (*manas*) which connects the sense organ with the self, and the external object (*artha*) being cognized.

This is identical with what is regarded as the basic definition of perception in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*:

[Perception] which arises from the contact of the self, a sense organ, the mind and an object is still another [reason to prove the existence of the self].⁸⁰

Even the wording in both the sources matches, except for minor metrical differences: *ātmēndriya-manas-’rthānām sannikarṣāt* in the *Caraka-saṃhitā* and *ātmēndriya-mano-’rthānām sannikarṣāt* in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*. The formulation also corresponds to the definition of perception found in the *Nyāya-sūtra*:

⁷⁷ CarS₁ 1.11, pp. 518 = CarS₂ 1.11.25, p. 213:

*buddhiḥ paśyati yā bhāvān bahu-kāraṇa-yoga-jān /
yānti tri-kālā sā jñeya tri-vargaḥ sādhyate yayā //*

NBh 1.1.3: *para-matam apratiśiddham anumatam iti hi tantra-yuktiḥ.*

CarS₁ 1.11, pp. 501 = CarS₂ 1.11.20, p. 211:

*ātmēndriya-mano-’rthānām sannikarṣāt pravartate /
vyaktā tadātve yā buddhiḥ pratyaḥkṣaṃ sā nirucyate //*

⁸⁰ VS(C) 3.1.13: *ātmēndriya-mano-’rtha-sannikarṣād yan niṣpadyate tad-anyat.*

‘Perception is cognition which is produced by the contact of an object with a sense organ, which is non-verbal, which is non-de-
viant, which consists in determination;’⁸¹

It also seems that the idea expressed in the *Caraka-saṃhitā* agrees with the notion of non-simultaneity of acts of perception, which involve all the four elements, the description of which is found in the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*:

‘[NS] [Skin] is not [the only sense organ], because [different] objects are not simultaneously perceived. [NBh] [In the case of perception] the self comes into contact with the mind, the mind with [one] sense organ, the sense organ is conjoined with all objects. Therefore, [if we were to accept the opponent’s theory], there should be simultaneous acts of perception of all the objects, such as the colour, taste, smell, touch and sound,] because of the contact of the self, sense organs, the mind and the objects. But [since numerous objects as] the colour etc. are not perceived simultaneously. Therefore, it is not the case that there is one sense organ which grasps all the objects.’⁸²

Also the process of inference described in the *Caraka-saṃhitā* passage which may be related to *Ānukṣikī* bears resemblance to the ideas of the Nyāya, including some formulations which are close to the wording of the *Nyāya-sūtra*:

‘One infers in a threefold manner and in three times something that is preceded by perception. A concealed fire [at present is inferred] from smoke. A sexual intercourse [in the past is inferred] from the observation of the foetus (sc. pregnancy)—in this way [people] determine something that happened in the past. The wise, having seen a fruit that has already been produced from a seed, similarly infer in the present situation (*iha*) a future fruit [produced] from a seed.’⁸³

⁸¹ NS 1.1.1: *indriyārtha-sannikarṣōtpannam jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam.*

⁸² CarS₁ 3.1.54 = NS₁ 3.1.53: *na yugapad-arthānupalabdheḥ. NBh ad loc.: ātmā manasā sarvādhyate, mana indriyeṇa, indriyaṃ sarvārthaiḥ sannikṣṣam iti ātmēndriya-manor’rthasannikarṣebhyo yugapad-grahaṇāni syuḥ. na ca yugapad rūpādayo grhyante. tasmān ātmā indriyaṃ sarva-viśayam astīti.*

CarS₁ 1.11, pp. 514 = CarS₂ 1.11.2–12, p. 212:

*pratyakṣa-pūrvam tri-vidham tri-kālam cānumīyate /
vahnir nigūḍho dhūmena maithunam garbha-darśanāt //
evam vyavasyanty atītam bijāt phalam anāgatam /
dṛṣṭvā bijāt phalam jātam ihāva sadṛśam buddhāḥ //*

These three kinds of inference correspond to a threefold obsolete classification of ancient origin and preserved in *Nyāya-sūtra* 1.1.5,⁸⁴ which is extremely ambiguous in itself and allows for more than one interpretation. The *Caraka-samhitā* may even resemble the *Nyāya-sūtra* classification especially in the form of the first interpretation offered by Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana, who himself was no longer certain as to the actual meaning of the three terms: *pūrvavat* (inference *a priori*), *śeṣavat* (inference *a posteriori*) and *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa* / *sāmānyato-'dṛṣṭa* (inference based on general (non-)observation).

'Inference *a priori* is when one infers an effect from a [present] cause, for instance: from the accumulation of clouds [one infers that] it will rain. Inference *a posteriori* is when one infers a [past] cause from [a present] effect, [for instance]: having seen [the high level of] water which stands in contrast with [low] water [level] seen previously as well as swollenness and swiftness of the river, one infers from its current that it has rained [up the river]. Inference based on general observation is the following: one observes in one place an object, when there is motion, seen before in another place; and so is the case with the sun; therefore the sun is in motion, albeit invisible.'⁸⁵

We cannot be sure whether the explanations offered by Vātsyāyana were accurate any more than he was uncertain, because he offered two parallel interpretations (the latter logically and structurally more advanced). However, Vātsyāyana's inference *a priori* corresponds to *Caraka's* inference of a future fruit from the present seed, inference *a posteriori* matches *Caraka's* inference of a sexual intercourse in the past from present pregnancy, and the final inference based on general observation conforms to the inference of the movement of the sun. Even if Vātsyāyana's interpretations were not faithful in every detail to what Aśvāpādī Gāṅgādhara had in mind, they do reflect the general spirit of the nature of the three kinds of inference defined in the *Caraka-samhitā*.

The above is, in fact, the only 'lamp metaphor' found in the oldest *Caraka-samhitā* sections that relates to epistemology and logical enquiry in any way and that may lead us to believe that this does not have to be coincidental. The only other occurrence of a metaphor of a lamp in the treatise concerns medicine, but even then it is 'the lamp of knowledge and understanding', being an

⁸⁴ 1.1.5: *atha tat-pūrvakam tri-vidham anumānam pūrvavac cheṣavat sāmānyato-dṛṣṭam ca*.

⁸⁵ NBh 1.1.5: *pūrvavad iti. yatra kāraṇena kāryam anumīyate. yathā meghōnnatyā bhūtiṣyati vṛṣṭir iti. śeṣavat tad yatra kāryeṇa kāraṇam anumīyate. pūrvōdaka-viparītam udakam nadyāḥ pūrṇatvam śīghratvam ca dṛṣtvā srotaso 'numīyate bhūtā vṛṣṭir iti. sāmānyato-dṛṣṭam vrajyā-pūrvakam anyatra dṛṣṭasyānyatra darśanam iti, tathā cādityasya, tasmād asty apratyakṣāpy ādityasya vrajyēti.*

instrument of knowledge to investigate the inner self (*antar-ātman*), which looks like an offshoot of the ‘study of the (highest) self’, i.e. (*adhy*)*ātma-vidyā*:

‘The one who knows the truth but does not enquire into the inner self of the sick one with the help of the lamp of knowledge and understanding cannot cure any diseases.’⁸⁶

We can see that the same metaphor that makes use of the lamp which is a particular kind of knowledge and insight in the nature of things and illuminates a respective sphere of reference occurs in the *Artha-śāstra*, *Caraka-samhitā* (strongly modified) and in the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*.

To recapitulate, the verses from the *Caraka-samhitā* contain references to the study of (*adhy*)*ātma-vidyā*, known to be related to Ānvīkṣikī, and to the metaphor of ‘a lamp of reason’ that allows one to see things the way they really are, a metaphor which informed Kaṭilya’s use of describing Ānvīkṣikī as the lamp for disciplines of learning and was probably later adopted by the authors of the *Caraka-samhitā*. These two elements entitle us, in view of otherwise extreme scarcity of material related to Ānvīkṣikī, to tentatively link the verses to the current of Ānvīkṣikī and its successor Nyāya. This seems to be much in the way of support of the claim that the systems of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika were related to Ānvīkṣikī—both through the rational method of enquiry (*tarka, nyāya*) and the specific subject matter of liberation (*adhyātma-vidyā/ātma-vidyā*)—perhaps even more than the systems of Sāṃkhya and Yoga, but what is indeed puzzling is that Kauṭilya did not bother to mention neither Nyāya nor Vaiśeṣika in his catalogue of the presentatives of Ānvīkṣikī.

10. Let us now see how far Pakṣilasvāmin, Kaśyapa’s (see p. 194 and n. 50), but also Bhāradvāja’s (see p. 176) and many other assertions to the effect that Ānvīkṣikī is a discipline which, apart from its systemic concerns and methodological applications, investigated the highest self (*adhyātma-vidyā*) and, by implication, the means of liberation (*mokṣa*), find their justification in other sources, external to the system of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, which could confirm their veracity. These are not plentiful but fortunately there are a few.

The *Nīti-sāra* has already been mentioned (n. 22) as a source describing Ānvīkṣikī as investigation or knowledge of the self (NīSā 2.7a: *ānvīkṣiky ātma-vijñāna*; NīSā 2.11a: *ānvīkṣiky ātma-vidyā syād*), and so has the *Manu-smṛti* to the same effect (MDhŚ 7.43c: *ānvīkṣikīm cātma-vidyām*). With the expressions such as *ātma-vijñāna* or *ātma-vidyā*, these passages clearly understand Ānvīkṣikī as a discipline engaged in the examination of the self, and the compounds do not constitute just a reference to a separate fifth discipline *ātma-vijñāna*, different from Ānvīkṣikī, but the terms *ātma-vijñāna* or *ātma-*

⁸⁶ Car 3.4.12:

*jñāna-buddhi-pradīpena yo nāviśati tattvavit /
āturasyāntar-ātmānam na sa rogāms cikitsati //*

vidyā are attributive and qualify Ānvikṣikī. There can be no doubt that in the verse of *Manu-smṛti* 7.43 the authors do not enumerate five but only four disciplines of learning. Similarly, Vijñeśvara in his *Mitākṣarā* (YDhŚM), a mediaeval South-Indian commentary on the *Yājñavalkya-smṛti*, equates Ānvikṣikī with the salvific doctrine that teaches about the highest self in exactly the same manner as all other texts, attesting to the fact that salvific reflection of the current was well remembered all over India even at a later date.⁸⁷

There is an interesting passage in the *Mahā-bhārata* (MBh 12.306.27–55) which directly concerns Ānvikṣikī, its methods and its subject matter.⁸⁸ The story presents a conversation between the sage Yājñavalkya and Viśvāvasu, a king of Gandharvas, recounted by the former. Viśvāvasu asks Yājñavalkya a number of questions on various subjects, but when he comes to the final broad theme he wants to enquire about, which is Ānvikṣikī, a theme which culminates a series of twenty-five questions. The number twenty-five is not a coincidence: it concerns the self (*purusa*), the twenty-fifth and highest principle of Sāṃkhya-Yoga, and the numeric placement of Ānvikṣikī which culminates the series of enquires and corresponds to the rank of the self in the system of Sāṃkhya-Yoga thereby reflecting the hierarchical primacy and importance of Ānvikṣikī. The beginning of the passage runs as follows:

‘[27] O King, thereupon [desirous to know the highest knowledge and what is beneficial, Gandharva] Viśvāvasu, well-versed in the knowledge of Vedānta, asked [me Yājñavalkya,] twenty-four questions relating to the Vedas. And then he asked me about the methodology (*ānvikṣikī*) [the twenty-fifth question: ‘What is that which made of the universe and the non-universe? What is the mare and the steed? What is Mitra and Varuṇa? What is cognition, what is the cognoscible? Similarly, what is the one who knows? What is the one who does not know? What is Ka? What is the one who engages in asceticism and what is the one who does not engage in asceticism? What is the devourer of the sun and what is the sun? What is [salvific] knowledge and what is negligence. [29] What is the object of knowledge? What is that which cannot be known, O King? What is the movable? What is the immovable? What is that which is without a beginning? What is that which is indestructible? What is that which is destructible?—These are the profound questions [about Ānvikṣikī asked by the Gandharva Viśvāvasu]. [30] Then, O King, I replied to the king, most virtuous of Gandharvas, who asked one profound question after another, of deep significance: [31] “Forgive

⁸⁷ MiA *ad loc.*, p. 98.10–11; *ānvikṣikyām ātma-vidyām*.

⁸⁸ See also DAHLMANN (1895: 225 ff.) who points out to the relationship between the salvific doctrine about the highest self (*ātma-vidyā*) and Ānvikṣikī in the *Mahā-bhārata*.

The philosophical and conceptual setting is clearly that of Sāṃkhya-Yoga, which rather unsurprisingly reveals the link between these and Ānvikṣikī already known from the *Artha-sāstra*. This link with the classification of sciences in the *Artha-sāstra* is highlighted by the expression ‘the fourth discipline’ (*caturthī vidyā*) in Kauṭilya’s catalogue, which clearly is Ānvikṣikī. Like Sāṃkhya-Yoga, Ānvikṣikī is presented here as a discipline engaged in the study of the human fate and with the passage from this world into the other (*sāṃparāyikin*), i.e. eschatology, which in the Upaniṣadic context cannot but be the enquiry of liberation. The questions about the ultimate posed by Viśvāvasu were apparently considered quite esoteric and challenging, and that difficulty and profundity is emphasised by the sage Yājñavalkya’s initial silence and consequent supplication to Sarasvatī, the goddess of learning and wisdom. Such profound questions required extraordinary tools and methodology, and Ānvikṣikī was considered to be the answer. The structure of Viśvāvasu’s most questions follows a similar binary pattern of doubt based on two contrary attributes: what is P and what is non-P, which resembles the structure typical of Ānvikṣikī enquiries discussed above in § 6, which additionally confirms that the passage is an echo of the method of Ānvikṣikī.

Towards the end of the whole passage, strongly rooted in Sāṃkhya-Yoga terminology, we come here to another explicit mention of Ānvikṣikī, which repeats the same information about its subject matter and method.

[44] ... [The wise] ... of the unmanifest [primordial factor (*prakṛti*)] the unburn, because it is indestructible among the created things; [the wise] call the conscious principle (*puruṣa*) indestructible, because there exists no destruction for it. [45] [indestructible is likewise] the primordial factor (*prakṛti*), because it is the quality (*guṇa*) which undergo destruction, and because [the primordial factor (*prakṛti*)] is active, the wise [call] it the indestructible. All that precisely is the fourth discipline of learning [known as] methodology (*ānvikṣikī*), which treats of eschatology (liberation). [46] When one has assigned the wealth acquired through [the application of] the discipline of learning (i.e. Ānvikṣikī) ... [the performance] of obligatory rites through one’s ritual acts, and the *Vedas*, with their individual schools, are regularly studied, O Viśvāvasu.⁹⁰

⁹⁰ Sh 12.306.44–46:

*akṣayatvāt prajānane ’jam atrāhur avyayam /
akṣayaṃ puruṣaṃ prāhuḥ kṣayo hy asya na vidyate // 44 //
guṇa-kṣayatvāt prakṛtiḥ kartṛtvād akṣayaṃ budhāḥ /
eṣā te ’nvikṣikī vidyā caturthī sāṃparāyikī // 45 //
vidyōpetam dhanam kṛtvā karmaṇā nitya-karmaṇi /
ekānta-darśanā vedāḥ sarve viśvāvaso smṛtāḥ // 46 //*

Verse 46 underscores the link with the *Artha-śāstra*: Ānvīkṣikī serves here to accumulate wealth and to regulate Vedic ritual and tradition, which are the realms of economics and religious reflection respectively, and correspond to Kauṭilya's *vārttā* and *trayī*. The only missing discipline of learning is political science (*daṇḍa-nīti*). This is not so surprising in an epic verse on Sāṃkhya-Yoga which neither strives to be philosophically accurate nor attempts to give a reliable account of Ānvīkṣikī as known to Kauṭilya.

The concluding verse of the whole discourse on Ānvīkṣikī ends with explicitly ascribing the views expressed in it to the followers of Sāṃkhya-Yoga treated jointly:

‘Therefore, the followers of Yoga and the followers of Sāṃkhya, who strife for the highest goal, do not regard this collection of twenty-five principles as imperishable.’⁹¹

The placing of Ānvīkṣikī in the context of the composition of the doctrine of the system of Sāṃkhya-Yoga and treating it as an indispensable analytical tool to investigate its fundamental principles is a clear indication of immanent relation between the two. The passage also confirms what the proponents of Nyāya, such as Uśātsyāyana and Bhāsarvajña, claimed: that Ānvīkṣikī investigates into essential matters and one—but not necessarily the only one—of its focus was liberation.

The link between yoga practice of meditation (*dhyāna*), the focus on the highest self (*adhyātman*) and methodical examination finds incidental mention in a passage of the *Bhāṣya* about

‘[the mind Parivaha] which is favourable to immortality of those who examine (*anvīkṣanti* [propertly]) and happily engage in continuous practice of meditation with tranquil minds which are constantly focused on the highest self (*adhyātman*).’⁹²

Another evidence is provided by the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* which, despite some verses inimically disposed vis-à-vis Ānvīkṣikī, mentions the term on a few occasions, and undoubtedly in a favourable light. In one passage, the sage Nārada, while describing the forest recluse (*vāna-prastha*) of the four orthodox life stages (*āśram*), advises:

‘When [the forest recluse] is not able to perform his duties with respect to the methodological knowledge

⁹¹ MBh 12.306.55:

*tenātān nābhijānanti pañca-vimśakam acyutam /
janma-mṛtyu-bhayād yogāḥ sāmkyās ca paramāṣiṇaḥ // 55 //*

⁹² MBh 12.315.50:

*samyag anvīkṣatūn buddhyā śāntayādhyātma-nityayā /
dhyānābhyaśābhirāmāṇāṃ yo ’mṛtatvāya kalpate //*

(*ānvīkṣikī vidyā*), either because of disease or old age, he should refrain from food etc.⁹³

Clearly, *Ānvīkṣikī* is put on in this verse par with such important religious duties as maintaining one's own personal fire sacrifice to an extent that a failure to rehearse it should incur special sanction. Nārada comes to speak of *Ānvīkṣikī* again, and again in clearly positive terms:

‘Through methodology [one can conquer (*jayet*)] sorrow and delusion, through worship [one can overcome] deceit, through silence [one can remove] other obstacles to [the practice of] *yoga*, through indifference to sensual pleasures etc. [one can triumph over] the harming [of other beings].’⁹⁴

Ānvīkṣikī is seen here as essential means to overcome mundane distress and ignorance by providing adequate forms of worship and ascetic rigorous methods suitable to accomplish mystical and religious goals.

In addition, the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* also contains a warning against forsaking *Ānvīkṣikī*, which is superior to sacrifices and is apparently understood to be instrumental in crossing the ocean of rebirth, i.e. to lead to liberation:

‘[The renegade renegades] abandon the methodological knowledge (*ānvīkṣikī vidyā*) and wish to cross the ocean of rebirth with what is relatively inferiorly sacrificial rites, consisting of ritual actions, resembling boats [to cross waters].’

The ‘renegades’ are those who denounce the righteous path and erroneously take refuge for something they cannot provide – the path to liberation, in which *Ānvīkṣikī*, by implication, can appear to be advantageous.

Ānvīkṣikī then turns out to be one of three kinds of crucial spiritual practice through which an adept of *yoga* maintains inner equilibrium on the path to ultimate self-realisation:

‘One should remember [to maintain one’s] mind fit through the stages of the *yoga* practice such as restraint etc., and through the

⁹³ BhāgP 7.12.3:

*yadākalpaḥ svakriyāyām vyādhibhir jarayāthavā /
ānvīkṣikyām vā vidyāyām kuryād anaśanādikam //*

⁹⁴ BhāgP 7.15.23:

*ānvīkṣikyā śoka-mohau dambhām mahad-upāsayā /
yogāntarāyān maunena hiṃsām kāmādy-anīhayā //*

⁹⁵ BhāgP 10.25.4:

*yathā-dṛḍhaiḥ karma-mayaiḥ kratubhir nāma nau-nibhaiḥ /
vidyām ānvīkṣikīm hitvā titīṣanti bhavārṇavam //*

methodological knowledge (*ānvīkṣikī vidyā*), or through the worship and adoration of my self, not through any other means.⁹⁶

In another verse Kṛṣṇa, the protagonist of the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, while presenting his pivotal role and supreme status, comes to speak of Ānvīkṣikī as the foremost among all kinds of skills and disciplines of learning:

‘[Kṛṣṇa said:] I am the most profound self-control among all kinds of *yoga*, I am the sacred incantation for all those who strive after victory, I am the methodology among all kinds of proficiencies, I am the conceptualisation for the propounders of the theory of presentation.’⁹⁷

In some of these verses we can easily observe that the term *ānvīkṣikī* has undergone a metamorphosis and changed both its meaning and grammar: it is no longer associated with rational enquiry and logical reasoning (*tarka, nyāya*), and further, in addition to its substantive meaning, it assumes an adjectival aspect qualifying salvific knowledge (*vidyā*), hence ‘the methodological knowledge’ (*ānvīkṣikī vidyā*). The current has thus escaped oblivion, managed to elevate its status and come to serve religious and sectarian purposes in a new fashion, providing a method to cross the *saṃsāra*, not being the method *per se*, and thus retaining, in this way, its eschatological dimension of which Pākṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana spoke.

11.1. I have briefly indicated above that the *Yoga* we know was a discipline primarily concerned with meditative practices and mystical exercise that is believed to be instrumental in achieving final liberation from the mundane world and suffering and hardly had anything to do with rational and analytical enquiry. Hence arises the difficulty. *Yoga* as we know it does not fit well into Kaūṭilya’s classification of the branches that apply the reasoners’ methods of Ānvīkṣikī, albeit in its essence it is concerned primarily with liberation. In its epistemology, especially as far as inference (*anumāna*) is concerned, *Yoga* hardly developed its own approach and was heavily reliant on the legacy of Sāṃkhya in this regard. To find its name among the sciences enumerated by Kaūṭilya under such circumstances is rather surprising.

At the same time the compound *sāṃkhya-yoga* was well established in Indian literature. Whether we can speak of an undifferentiated/composite Sāṃkhya-Yoga tradition or of two distinct traditions more or less closely related, it seems that basically all occurrences of the compound *sāṃkhya-yoga* refer to the tra-

⁹⁶ BhāgP 11.20.24:

*yamādibhir yoga-pathair ānvīkṣikyā ca vidyayā /
mamārcōpāsānābhir vā nānyair yogyaṃ smaren manaḥ //*

⁹⁷ BhāgP 11.16.24:

*yogānām ātma-saṃrodho mantrō ’smi vijigīṣatām /
ānvīkṣikī kauśalānām vikalpaḥ khyāti-vādinām //*

dition of Sāṃkhya and Yoga, whatever their exact relation in a given case was.⁹⁸ Alone the *Mahā-bhārata* contains approximately 25 occurrences of the compound, and I have counted about 50 verses in which the terms *sāṃkhya* and *yoga* are mentioned side by side, not necessarily in a compounded form *sāṃkhya-yoga*. We could easily conclude, as all translators of the *Artha-sāstra* and an overwhelming majority of researchers did, that the Yoga of Kauṭilya is the same branch as the Yoga related to Sāṃkhya as the latter's correlate. The only problem with such interpretation is that all we know of the nature of the system of Yoga does not quite fit into the general picture of Ānvikṣikī and, on the basis of this incompatibility, the obvious meaning of the term as it features in the *Artha-sāstra* should be treated at least with suspicion. Or rather, as I will demonstrate in the following, it should be rejected. So, what is actually the Yoga of *Artha-sāstra*?

11.2. In view of all the interpretative difficulties related to the problem which systems were actually included in the list of the *Artha-sāstra*, I propose that the *yoga* in Kauṭilya's list refers to an early form of Vaiśeṣika-Nyāya, a kind of 'proto-Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika', which later evolved into two distinct schools, whereas the *sāṃkhya* of the list is a shorthand for the combined systems of Sāṃkhya–Yoga. The identification of Sāṃkhya as one of the schools comprised in the *Artha-sāstra* list is beyond any controversy. The link to Ānvikṣikī confirms general knowledge preserved in external sources such as the *Bhāgavata-purāna*, which reports a myth of the beginning of Sāṃkhya:

[10] Sixth, [god Brahmā] under the name of Kapila, the lord of the accomplished ones, passed on to Atri [the doctrine of] Sāṃkhya, which is an exposition of a variety of ontological principles but which had gone astray in the course of time. [11] Sixth, when he gained birth as a son of Atri from Anasūyā, he taught about methodology (*ānvikṣikī*) to Alarka, Prahlāda and others.⁹⁹

As we read there, it was precisely the knowledge of Ānvikṣikī which was passed on by the mythical and legendary founders of the system to their disciples, and it seems that the rational reflection and enquiry representative of Ānvikṣikī constituted an important part of the system.

There are some scholars who have questioned the identification of *yoga* in Kauṭilya's list with the system of Yoga before, although without giving any

⁹⁸ For various shades and occurrences of the term *sāṃkhya-yoga* and its tradition see, LARSEN (1979: 44, 72, 88, 95, 99, 107, 121–122, 127–128, 137, 288 f.).

⁹⁹ BhāgP 1.3.10–11:

*pañcamaḥ kapilo nāma siddhēṣaḥ kāla-viplutam /
provācāsuraye sāṃkhyam tattva-grāma-vinirṇayam //
ṣaṣṭham atrer apatyatvam vṛtaḥ prāpto 'nasūyayā /
ānvikṣikim alarkāya prahlādādībhya ūcivān //*

well-founded justification for their reservations, and suggested to interpret the expression *yoga* in Kauṭilya's list in the sense of Vaiśeṣika.

Perhaps the first one in this line was Rājeśvara Śāstrī Draviḍa (b. 1899), an author of a modern Sanskrit commentary *Vaidika-siddhānta-samrakṣiṇī* (AŚ₂) on the then recently discovered *Artha-śāstra*. He comments on the term *yoga* in Kauṭilya's classification of branches that practise methodology and says that the term *yoga* has been explained as Vaiśeṣika in a subcommentary on the *Nyāya-vārttika* as follows: «of the Yogas», means «of the followers of Vaiśeṣika».¹⁰⁰ The 'subcommentary' *Nyāya-vārttika-ṭippaṇī* he refers to is in fact a note by Pt. Vindhyeśvarī Prasāda Dvivedin in the 1915 edition to NV₁ 1.1.29, p. 105: *yogānām—vaiśeṣikāṇām*. That short footnote brings to our attention a passage of the *Nyāya-vārttika* which is not directly related to Ānvīkṣikī, but is of much importance as an internal evidence that the followers of Vaiśeṣika were called *Yogas* within the system of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. A suggestion in this direction was also made by CHAṬṬOPĀDHYĀYA (1927/1958),¹⁰¹ it is possible that "Yoga" here means the Nyāya system and not the *Prāñjala*, which is more practical and speculative. However, I must leave this question undecided at present.

The starting point for Pt. Vindhyeśvarī Prasāda Dvivedin's footnote is a passage of the *Nyāya-sūtra* explaining the notion of 'a system's distinctive tenet' (*pratitantra-siddhānta*) which in fact concerns a well-known principle that all propositions, except those which are explicitly rejected, of the Nyāya system are tacitly accepted in the Vaiśeṣika system, and vice versa:

'A system's distinctive tenet is such which is upheld in a similar (sc. allied) system (similar, allied systems) but is not upheld in other systems.'¹⁰¹

This is what is nicely explained by C. Ratna in the *Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā*:

'All this [description of the Naiyāyikas] in the form of the *līṅga* [worship], the *caṭvā* [worship] of the deity etc. should also be applied to the system of Vaiśeṣika, because there is really a very small difference between the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas, even though there is some divergence as regards the number of cognitive criteria and categories, but the categories are mutually accepted. That is why their views are in general identical. And both [groups] are called ascetics (*tapasvin*).'¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ *Vaidika-siddhānta-samrakṣiṇī* in AŚ₂, p. 124: *yogo vaiśeṣikam iti vyākhyātām nyāya-vārttika-ṭippaṇyam. tad yathā—yogānām vaiśeṣikāṇām (a° 1 ā° 1 sū° 28) iti*.

¹⁰¹ NS 1.1.29: *samāna-tantra-siddhaḥ para-tantrāsiddhaḥ pratitantra-siddhāntaḥ*.

¹⁰² TRD ad ṢDSa 12, p. 77.16–78.1: *etat sarvaṁ līṅga-veṣa-devādi-svarūpaṁ vaiśeṣika-mate 'py avasātavyam. yato naiyāyika-vaiśeṣikāṇām hi mithaḥ pramāṇa-tattvānām saṁkhyā-bhede saty apy anyonyaṁ tattvānām antar-bhāvane 'lpīyān eva bhedo jāyate, tenāteṣāṁ prāyo mata-tulyatā. ubhaye 'py ete tapasvino 'bhidhīyante*.

A similar principle would for instance hold valid in the case of the twin systems of Sāṃkhya and Yoga. The aphorism of Akṣapāda Gautama is commented by Vātsyāyana as follows:

‘For example, [the distinctive tenets] of the representatives of the Sāṃkhya system [also upheld in an allied system] are the following: something non-existent does not acquire existence; something existent does not abandon its existence; conscious beings do not possess any unique feature [that distinguishes one from the other]; distinctive character [occurs] in the body, the sense organs and the mind as well as in the objects [of the sense organs] and in their respective causes. [The distinctive tenets] of the representatives of « Y o g a » [also upheld in an allied system] are the following: the creation [of the world] from material elements is occasioned by the *karman* etc. of humans; defects and activity are the cause of *kaṣṭha*; conscious selves are characterised by their qualities; something non-existent comes into existence; what has come into existence ceases to exist.’¹⁰³

A more detailed discussion of the passage is provided by Kṣemarāja CHAṬṬOPĀDHYĀYA (1927), who is the source of the note of N. RANDLE (1930: 3, n. 1) and draws the reader’s attention to the fact that ‘Pandits say that *Yogāḥ* (plural) was used as an early designation of the *Vaiśeṣika* school’, who in turn becomes a source for F.W. THOMAS (1960: 7, n. 1).

It does not require much discussion here to demonstrate that the tenets of ‘Yoga’ in the passage are by no means compatible with anything what we know of the Yoga school and in fact they even counter basic doctrinal fundamentals of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga system.¹⁰⁴ Instead, they neatly correspond to familiar doctrines of Vaiśeṣika, which are also accepted by Nyāya. The first tenet postulates that the world is not a creation of some kind of transformation (*pariṇāma*) of a primordial substance, caused by some additional supramundane factors, say, a relation between the consciousness principle (*puruṣa*) and the primordial factor (*prakṛti*) (see SK 21), but rather a result of the cumulated *karman* of living beings. In the process of creation, the world and all aggregate, composed of things created from material elements (*mahā-bhūta*) under the influence or ‘supervision’ of the karmic results of previous deeds of hu-

¹⁰³ Bh 1.1.29: *yathā nāsata ātma-lābhaḥ, na sata ātma-hānam, niratīśayās cetanāḥ* *ca, candra-manāhsu viśayeṣu tat-tat-kāraṇeṣu ca viśeṣa itī sāmkyānām. puruṣa-karmādinām bhūta-sargaḥ, karma-hetavo doṣāḥ pravṛttiś ca, sva-guṇa-viśiṣṭās cetanāḥ, asad utpannāyate utpannam nirudhyata itī yogānām.* For an alternative translation of the passage see BHATTACHARYA (1974: 39–40), JACOBI (1930: 608 ff.) and THAKUR (1963: 81); for a structured discussion of its contents see CHAṬṬOPĀDHYĀYA (1927: 854–856).

¹⁰⁴ Comp. CHAṬṬOPĀDHYĀYA (1927: 854–855), BHATTACHARYA (1974: 39–41).

as desire (*icchā*), aversion (*dveṣa*), ignorance (*avidyā*), as well as activity, are discussed as causes of good and bad deeds (*dharmādharma*), which make up the *karman* (the term preferred is *adṛṣṭa*) on a number of occasions.¹⁰⁹ It may be the case—in fact, it is the most plausible explanation—that Vātsyāyana uses more familiar terms of his own school to refer to the idea common to both Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, which does not prejudice that what he meant was indeed the tenet of Nyāya. Also the third tenet is a clear reference to the *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva* relation (‘qualifier-qualified relation’), constitutive of Vaiśeṣika ontology, but also adopted by and well grounded in Nyāya. The qualities which qualify the souls are frequently mentioned in Vaiśeṣika literature,¹¹⁰ but also by Nyāya authors.¹¹¹ In the formulation of the fourth tenet the passage clearly refers to theory of causality which treats the effect as an entirely new entity (*asat-kārya-vāda*), which stands in clear opposition to the theory of the effect pre-existent in the cause (*sat-kārya-vāda*), propagated by Sāṃkhya and Yoga. The theory is fundamental to both schools. A bit hesitant on the identification is THAKUR (1963: 81–82), who eventually subscribes to the original connection of the ‘Yogas’ with the Vaiśeṣika:

‘The Yogas mentioned here are Ārambhavādins and as such cannot be indentified with the followers of Pāṇjali. MM. Phaṇībhūṣaṇa Tarkavācī took the word to mean Jain Nyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣika as both accept creation and the conjunction between *paramāṇu* etc. The title of these philosophers may also be due to their association with the Pāsupatas who had their own system of Yoga. Vidyānandasvāmin (*Ātraparīkṣā*, p. 4) and Ānandadeva (*Rjuvimalā*, p. 209) take the word “yoga” to mean the Vaiśeṣika alone. The tenet mentioned may thus originally be connected with the Vaiśeṣikas and the acceptance thereof in the Nyāya system might be a later event.’

¹⁰⁹ See for instance VS(C) 6.1.7: *icchā-dveṣa-pūrvikā dharmādharmaḥ pravṛttiḥ*, and VSV(C) *ad loc.*: *icchā-pūrvikā adharma pravṛttiḥ, anyena dhana-madād abhībhūtasya vā dveṣa-pūrvikāpi grāhānānā, ādau. adharma icchā-pūrvikā para-dārādiṣu dveṣa-pūrvikā. evaṃ dharmādharmaḥ pravṛttau prayatnāy;* PBh 292, 294: [*icchā*] *prayatna-smṛti-dharmādharma-hetuḥ*. [*dveṣa*] *prayatna-smṛti-dharmādharma-hetuḥ*.

¹¹⁰ VS(C) 6.1.1: *ātma-guṇeṣv ātmāntara-guṇānām akāraṇatvāt*; VS(C) 9.17: *ātma-samavāyād ātma-guṇeṣu*; VS(C) 10.1: *ātma-samavāyaḥ sukha-duḥkhaḥ pañcebhyo ’rātrāratve hetus tad-āśrayibhyaḥ ca guṇebhyaḥ*; VSV(C) 2.1.25: *ye khalv ātma-guṇās te sukha-duḥkha-ivāntar-śarīram upalabhyante*; PBh 79: *sukha-duḥkhēcchā-dveṣa-prayatnais ca śarīreṣu any anumiṣate, te ca na śarīrēndriya-guṇāḥ. ... tasya guṇāḥ buddhi-sukha-duḥkhēcchā-dveṣa-prayatna-dharmādharma-samskāra-sāṃkhyā-parimāṇa-pṛthaktva-saṃyoga-vibhāgāḥ*.

¹¹¹ E.g. NBh₂ 1.1.5, p. 12.16–19: *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭam nāma yatrāpratyakṣe liṅga-liṅginoh sambandhe kenacid arthena liṅgasya sāmānyād apratyakṣo liṅgī gamyate. yathēcchādibhir ātmā, icchādayo guṇāḥ. guṇās ca dravya-saṁsthānāḥ. tad yad eṣāṃ sthānam sātmeti*.

We thus see that all the four tenets of the ‘Yogas’ fit well in both the doctrines of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika and it is not possible to determine solely on the basis of ideas who the ‘Yogas’ who upheld these theories were. The terminology actually employed by Vātsyāyana in the passage is of no help for us, because it cannot be treated as an indicator of the system from which the original ideas and terms stem. In no way should we be misled by the nomenclature of the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*: obviously Vātsyāyana would have the natural systemic propensity to use the terms of his own school rather than the terminology of Vaiśeṣika to denote the same phenomena and ideas. However, he also uses terminology which is not necessarily characteristic specifically of either Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika or terms which are technical in neither of them, e.g. *cetana*. Solely on the basis of Vātsyāyana’s description and vocabulary it seems impossible to decide whether he considered these tenets to belong primarily to the Nyāya system and secondarily accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas or *vice versa*. To judge either way we cannot apply historical criteria as regards which of these schools developed these tenets first, because Vātsyāyana would not have applied such historical criteria himself.

Uddyotakara adds two more examples in his gloss to illustrate the idea of a system’s distinctive tenet (*pratītantra-siddhānta*):

‘A system’s distinctive tenet [also upheld in an allied system] is invariably the acceptance of the universals, the particulars (individuals) and the soul. For instance, it is for the «Yogas» that the sense of Yogas are material (sc. derived from the material elements), whereas for the followers of Sāṃkhya it is that they are immaterial (sc. derived not from material elements but from the psychic faculty of self-identity, *abhautikā*).’¹¹²

As against the opinion of P. Vinodasvarī Prasāda Dvivedin and other pantheists, Kṣetreśacandra CHAKRABHĀYAYA’s (1927: 858) conclusion of the passage is that ‘From the text it is clear that Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara meant the Naiyāyikas when they used the term *Yogānam* in the passages quoted above ... The meaning of the term *yoga* in Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara is certainly “Nyāyika”.’ And that is an opinion to which Kamaleswar BHATTACHARYA (1974: 42) apparently subscribes. But is such assessment really accurate?

Let us analyse Uddyotakara’s examples. The first of them refers to the idea of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* understood as distinct entities. Both are recognised in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika alike, albeit they primarily constitute the hard-core ontological structure of the Vaiśeṣika set-up of the world as universals and individuals, or a category which introduces the ultimate difference among indi-

¹¹² NV₁, p. 105.7–9 = NV₂, p. 100.3–4: *sāmānya-viśeṣa-tadvatām niyamenābhyupagamaḥ pratītantra-siddhānta iti. yathā bhautikānīndriyānīti yogānām abhautikānīti sāmānyānām iti.*

vidual entities which can be differentiated irrespective of their qualities (*guṇa*) solely through their unique individuators. However, the *viśeṣas* are not necessarily technically used in Nyāya in this sense; they may also stand for what is generally understood as particulars. Further, *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* are recognised as two separate categories of the system of Vaiśeṣika, besides mere four (or five) others, and they do not enjoy a status of separate categories of the Nyāya system: Nyāya does not list them among the sixteen categories, which are primarily of epistemological character. This could be a hint. The second example is rather straightforward and lucidly explained by CHAṬṬOPĀDHYĀYA'S (1927: 856): 'The Sāṃkhya system derives the sense-organs directly from *Ahaṃ-kāra*, from which are also produced in a different line the Five Subtle Elements (*Sā. K. 22*); consequently they are non-elemental". But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas believed in the "elemental" origin of the *indriyas*.' Since the view is so intimately related to both the schools, it is not possible to draw any conclusions from this example.

Let us take still another look at the passage. The very nature of the notion of 'a system's distinctive tenet' (*pramāṇa-śāhānta*) is that the thesis is shared by both school and, naturally, it is not possible to draw any conclusions as regards the affiliation of the thesis to one school or another solely on the basis of its contents. Indeed, the very idea is that it is a tenet of one school which is at the same time shared by an allied school. How could Chaṭṭopādhyāya's latter four examples be treated if these tenets primarily of the Nyāya school also shared by the Vaiśeṣikas, called 'Yogas', or tenets primarily of the Vaiśeṣika school also shared by the Naiyāyikas, i.e. 'Yogas'?

It is of course true nowhere in his text does Vātsyāyana use the name *vaiśeṣika* to refer to his fellow school, whereas he does use the terms *nyāya* and *naiyāyika* on a few occasions.¹¹³ It would be quite untypical for him to unexpectedly, on a singular occasion, chose a different locution to refer to his own school, if

¹¹³ The only reference to fellow school representatives is in NBh 1.1.32: *daśāyavān eke naiyāyikā vākye sañcāryaḥ*. The number of the occurrences of the term *nyāya* in the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* is about a dozen, though most of them do not necessarily refer to the system of Nyāya but to the method of logical-epistemological enquiry. Some of them do contain a possible reference to the school itself, understood via its method: NBh₁ 1.1.1, p. 35.1 = NBh₂ p. 2.20: *nyāya-vidyā*; NBh₁ 1.1.1, p. 35.4 = NBh₂ p. 3.3: *tatra nānupalabdhe na nirṇite 'rthe nyāyaḥ pravartate* (?); NBh₁ 1.1.1, p. 35.6 = NBh₂ p. 3.6: *nyāya-pravṛttiḥ* (?); NBh₁ 1.1.1, p. 38.2 = NBh₂ p. 3.9–10: *... nyāyaḥ pravartate. kaḥ punar ayaṃ nyāyaḥ. pramāṇair artha-parikṣaṇaṃ nyāyaḥ*; NBh₁ 1.1.1, p. 39.1–2 = NBh₂, p. 3.11–13: *kaḥ punar ayaṃ nyāyaḥ? pramāṇair artha-parikṣaṇaṃ nyāyaḥ. ... sāvīkṣā. pratyakṣāgamābhyāṃ ākṣitas. parikṣaṇaṃ anvīkṣā. tayā pravartata ity anvīkṣikī nyāya-vidyā nyāya-śāstram*; NBh₁ 1.1.1, p. 50.2 = NBh₂ p. 4.4: *tad-āśrayā ca nyāya-pravṛttiḥ* (?); NBh₁ 1.1.1, p. 52.1 = NBh₂ p. 4.6: *so 'yaṃ paramo nyāya iti*; NBh₁ 1.1.41, p. 330.6–7 = NBh₂ p. 38.6–7: *so 'yaṃ paramo nyāyaḥ pakṣa-pratipakṣāv avadyotyā nyāyaṃ pravartatāṭī upādīyata iti*; NBh₁ 2.2.17, p. 613 = NBh₂ p. 108.16–17: *śāstra-siddhāntas tu nyāya-samākhyātam anumataṃ bahu-śākhā anumānam*; NBh₁ colophon, p. 1200 = NBh₂ p. 320.17: *yo 'kṣapādam ṛṣiṃ nyāyaḥ pratyabhād vadatām varam*.

he does not do it in other cases. Further, while referring to the views of his own school Vātsyāyana does it directly with verbs in the first person plural.¹¹⁴

Further, it is crucial to remember that the notion of *pratitantra-siddhānta* means a tenet of our system which is acceptable also in a fellow, allied school. Vātsyāyana, while explaining the idea, directs the message primarily to the representatives of his own school. That being the case, it would be rather surprising if he referred to himself and other representatives of his own school with the unusual ‘Yogas’. Rather, he would either say *iti asmākam* or simply *iti*, without mentioning the systemic affiliation of the tenets. The views referred to by Vātsyāyana are therefore the tenets of his own school which are acceptable also to the school of the ‘Yogas’, as the genitive plural indicates. This is exactly what transpires from all comments, including the elucidation, slightly confrontational in nature, by Bhāṣyaṅga in his *Nyāya-bhūṣaṇa*, where the genitives plural denote the proponents of a fellow, allied school:

[Now follows a comment on the aphorism]: «A system’s distinctive tenet is such which is upheld in a similar (sc. allied) system (or similar, allied system) but is not upheld in other systems». A similar system for the followers of Kapila (sc. Sāṅkhya system) is [the system] of Patañjali’s Yoga, and for the followers of [the system] of Patañjali’s Yoga is the system of Karṇā—of this sort is the example accepted by some [e.g. by Udayotakara etc., *vide supra* p. 123, n. 112]. The author of the gloss (i.e. Jayanta naṭṭa?) does not accept it however, because he maintains that [he objects this] because it cannot be argued for with a rational argument. In his opinion, the following is the [proper] example: A similar system for the followers of the Naiyāyikas is the school of Vaiśeṣika, and for the Vaiśeṣikas it is the school of Nyāya. In contrast to the above, we will explain as follows: One system (sc. set of tenets (*tantra*)) which is fundamental and common to many authors of commentaries and for those who listen to the commentators is called similar (i.e. common), like a similar (i.e. common) house, similar (i.e. common) wealth. A thesis which is established in such a similar (common) system but is not established in another system or in no other system at all that is a system’s distinctive tenet. And in such a way it follows that a thesis which is not established in one’s own system, even though it is established in a similar system, is not a system’s

¹¹⁴ Such cases are indeed rare, see NBh₁ 1.1.4, p. 124 = NBh₂ p. 11.19–20: *asannidhiṃ yugapaj-jñānānutpatti-kāraṇaṃ vakṣyāma iti*; NBh₁ 3.1.60, p. 793 = NBh₂ p. 168.7–8: *tena bhūta-guṇa-viśeṣopalabdher manyāmahe bhūta-prakṛtīndriyāni nāvayakta-prakṛtīnīti*; NBh₁ 3.2.22, p. 854 = NBh₂ p. 186.14–15: *nātrōtpatti-kāraṇaṃ apadiśyate yenātāt pratipadyemahīti*; NBh₁ 5.1.1, p. 1102 = NBh₂ p. 283.9–10: *aviśeṣaṃ tatra tatrôdāharīṣyāmaḥ*.

distinctive tenet. And, accordingly, even though it contradicts it (sc. one's own system), it does not follow that it becomes schismatic tenet.¹¹⁵

The conclusion which obviously follows is that the 'Yogas' of the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* cannot but be the proponents of Vaiśeṣika, to whom a number of the Naiyāyikas' tenets are likewise acceptable.

Interestingly, the sequence of the school names given *verbatim* by Vātsyāyana as examples is: Sāṃkhya-Yoga, and the names correspond to the first two schools mentioned by Kauṭilya; furthermore, what they really mean is: Sāṃkhya, the co-system (*samāna-tantra*) of which was Yoga, and Vaiśeṣika, the co-system of which was Nyāya.

It is nothing new that the name Yoga was a customary designation of the systems of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, as Debipada CHAKRABADHYAYA and Mrinankanti GANGOPADHYAYA (1992, I: 102) aptly noted:

'The theses mentioned by Vātsyāyana are the *pratitantra-siddhānta* of the followers of Yoga. It is characteristic of both the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. ... The Naiyāyikas were known as *yogin* belonging to the Śāṅkhya and the Pāśupata sects. This is evident from the statement of the Jaina philosopher Guṇaratna (*Garukarahaṣya-dīpikā*, 51) in any case, the Vaiśeṣika system was known as Yoga even in ancient times and the Vaiśeṣika philosophers were accordingly characterised as the followers of *yoga*". The Jaina philosopher Vidyānanda Svāmī, in his work *Patrasaṅgraha* (1977, quotes a sūtra of Kaṇḍalī (i.e. *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* iv. 1.1.) and adds, "As it is said by the followers of *yoga*". Further, Guṇaratna opens his discussion of the Nyāya view with the words: "The Naiyāyikas, also known as the *yauga-s*". Therefore, according to the ancient tradition, Vātsyāyana mentions the theses of the Vaiśeṣikas as characteristic of the followers of *yoga*. ... The thesis referred to here as that of the follower of *yoga* is shared alike by the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas. By the followers

¹¹⁵ NBhū 66.1.1026: "*samāna-tantra-prasiddhaḥ para-tantrāprasiddhaḥ pratitantra-siddhāntaḥ*". *samānaṃ tantraṃ kāpilānāṃ pātañjalam, pātañjalānāṃ ca kāpilam ity evaṃ pratitantra-kam udāharaṇam kecic icchanti. ṭikā-kārās tu nēcchanti, apramāṇōpapannatvād iti manyante tēnāḥ. tan-mate tv etad evōdāharaṇam—samānaṃ tantraṃ naiyāyikānāṃ vaiśeṣika-samānam, vaiśeṣikānāṃ nyāya-śāstram iti. vayanṃ tv anyathā vyācakṣmahe—anekeṣāṃ upa-bandha-kārāṇāṃ vyākhyāt-śrotṛṇāṃ ca mūla-bhūtam ekaṃ tantraṃ sādharmaṇam samānam*" ity ucyate. *yathā samānaṃ grhaṃ samānaṃ dhanam iti. tasmīn samāna-tantre yathā siddho 'rthaḥ para-tantre tu kvacit sarvatra vā na siddhaḥ, sa pratitantra-siddhāntaḥ. evaṃ ca sva-śāstrā-siddho 'rthaḥ sadṛśa-tantra-siddho 'pi pratitantra-siddhānto na bhavatīti gamyate. tatas ca tad-virodhe 'pi nāpasiddhāntaḥ prasajyate iti.* [^a NBhū: *sāmānam*.]

of *yoga* are thus to be understood the followers of both Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems. ...’

The same approach of Rājeśvara Śāstrī Draviḍa to identify Yoga of Kauṭilya with Vaiśeṣika was taken, although with much caution, by Wilhelm HALBFASS (1988: 278), who says with respect to the problematic term *yoga*:

‘What Kauṭilya means by *yoga*, the second item in his list, is not easy to determine. In a general sense, it is important to remember that the words *yoga* is by no means exclusively associated with the Yoga system of Patañjali, or with other doctrines and techniques of meditation and inner discipline. Its root *yuj-* also accounts for the word *yukti*, “reasoning” and likewise, the word *yoga* itself is occasionally used to refer to disciplines of “reasoning” and “argumentation,” such as Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. This usage is documented in older as well as in more recent texts.’

In the same verve, Johannes BROCKHORST (2007: 171) relies here on the opinion of HALBFASS (1988: 278), and writes:

‘Yoga, as is common in earlier texts, may refer to Nyāya. It follows that Sāṅkhya, Jāyati and probably (emphasis P.B.) Nyāya are present in the *Arthashastra* as investigative sciences (*ānvīkṣikī*).’

The nature of HALBFASS’ arguments in favour of his equation of Yoga with Vaiśeṣika is that it is not impossible that also Vaiśeṣika could have used the term *yoga*. In other words, these arguments, indirect in nature, simply do not exclude such a possibility. But we do not find any direct arguments with these authors that could effectively help establish a link between the ‘Yoga’ of Kauṭilya and Vaiśeṣika. HALBFASS (1988: 278), clearly following the above remark of CHATTOPADHYAYA–GANGOPADHYAYA (1992, I: 102), vaguely refers to the doxographic literature of the Jains, the *Naiyāyikas* and *Vaiśeṣikas*, who are often referred to as “Yogins” or, more specifically, as *Śaiva* and *Āśvāpata* Yogins; and their teachings are presented as doctrines of “Yoga” and merely draws our attention (1988: 540 n. 66) to one passage from a late medieval commentary of Guṇaratna-sūri (ca. 1343–1418) on Haribhadra-sūri’s *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya*, in order to substantiate the claim that ‘Yoga’ of Kauṭilya is Vaiśeṣika, not the Yoga of meditation.

These arguments are not entirely convincing, albeit attractive. Still, the major problem remains: how to account for such a strong relation between the tradition of Nyāya and the current of Ānvīkṣikī given an apparent absence of any reference to it by name in Kauṭilya’s enumeration of branches that practise the methodology (*ānvīkṣikī*)? Further, how to link Nyāya with the Yoga of the *Artha-śāstra*, a text composed perhaps two centuries before the emergence of Nyāya and the composition of an early version of the *Nyāya-sūtra* (vide supra § 9.2)?

12. The passage from Guṇaratna's *Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā* referred to by Debiprasad CHATTOPADHYAYA and Mrinalkanti GANGOPADHYAYA and, following him, by HALBFASS, opens a separate section on Nyāya in the doxographic treatise *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya*:

'Now, [the author] describes the specific features, such as *līṅga* etc. of the Naiyāyikas, whose another designation is «Yaugas».¹¹⁶

Since the designation of the school representatives was Yauga, it follows that the school's name was Yoga.

The structure of the doxographic treatise of Haribhadra-sūri (ca. 740–800), known as Yākinī-putra, is quite revealing in that it subsumes the discussion of Vaiśeṣika under the heading of Nyāya, and in fact treats the former as a sub-variety of the latter, which is confirmed by the commentator Guṇaratna (*vide supra*, p. 219, n. 102), who in addition emphasizes the nature of the religious-secularian division between the two:

'Further, in treatises the Naiyāyikas are always called the Śiṅgā because they worship Śiva, whereas the Vaiśeṣikas are called the Pāśupatas. Hence, the teaching of the Naiyāyikas is called śiṅgāyoga, whereas the doctrine of the Vaiśeṣikas Pāśupatam.¹¹⁷

Such a treatment is in no means an invention of Haribhadra himself but rather a reflection of a continuing centuries-long tradition in which the systems of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika were seen, both within and outside the systems, as complementary.

The close relationship of the systems finds confirmation on many occasions, e.g. in Maheśvara-sūri's *Syād-vāda-matam*, who says:

'Since the schools of the Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas are generally similar, one should understand that when the system of the Aulūkyas (Vaiśeṣikas) has been refuted also the system of Yaugas (Naiyāyikas) is refuted.

Of note is that Maheśvara calls the propounders of the system of Nyāya 'Yauga',¹¹⁹ and by implication the system itself 'Yoga'.

Despite the claim to the contrary, the cases when the term *yoga* is taken to refer to either Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika in Indian philosophical literature are few and

¹¹⁶ TRD ad ṢDSa 12, p. 76.5: *athāḍau naiyāyikānām yaugāparābhidhānām līṅgādīvyakāśocyate*.

¹¹⁷ TRD ad ṢDSa 12, p. 78.8–10: *param śāstreṣu naiyāyikāḥ sadā śiva-bhaktatvāc chaivā ityāyante, vaiśeṣikās tu pāśupatā iti. tena naiyāyika-śāsanam śaivam ākhyāyate, vaiśeṣika-darśanam ca pāśupatam iti*.

¹¹⁸ SVM 10.1–2, p. 54.16–17: *vaiśeṣika-naiyāyikayoḥ prāyaḥ samāna-tantratvād aulūkyamate kṣipte yauga-matam api kṣiptam evāvaseyam*.

¹¹⁹ See also SVM 14.138, p. 89.19: *yaugair*.

far between. Despite their scarcity, they do seem sufficient to provide satisfactory evidence to enable certain conclusions. In addition to the cases discussed above, some occurrences of the term *yoga* in the sense of Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika are provided by CHAṬṬOPĀDHYĀYA (1927: 856) who follows MM. Paṇḍit Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa's discussion on pp. 227–230 of the edition of the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* with Bengali translation (Calcutta 1917), which is not available to me. These are the *Patra-parīkṣā* (PaP, p. 4.30?) of Vidyānanda Pātrakesarīsivāmin, the *Parīkṣāmukha-sūtra* (PA 6.57) of Māṇikyanandin, and two sources already referred to, viz. the *Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā* of Guṇaratna (TRD ad ṢDSa 12; vide supra p. 219, n. 116) and the *Syād-vāda-mañjarī* of Malliṣeṇa-sūri (SVM 10.1–2, vide supra p. 228, n. 118).

An analysis of how Vidyānanda Pātrakesarī 500 in uses the terms *yoga/yauga* in his two works the *Patra-parīkṣā* and the *Āpta-parīkṣā* will reveal that what he has in mind is the system of the Vaiśeṣika and its followers. In the *Patra-parīkṣā* he uses the term *yoga* at least twice, and in both cases in the same context to designate those who assert that 'The [ultimately] existent [particular] is without a cause and eternal' (*sad akāraṇavan nityam*) when is nothing else but a quote from the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* (VS(C) 4.1.1). Similarly, in his other work, the *Āpta-parīkṣā*, Vidyānanda comes to speak of the 'Yaugas'. Also in this case there is no ground for doubt that what he has in mind are again the followers of the Vaiśeṣika system whose founder is referred to by name just a few lines before: *svāvara-kaṇādayor* (ĀP 6.3.2, p. 29.1).

On the other hand, in an analysis of Māṇikyanandin's *Parīkṣāmukha-sūtra*¹²² which enumerates a range of cognitive criteria (*pramāṇa*) and states that each of the supposed systems recognises one or more, the Yaugas represent a system which admits of four such cognitive criteria, which cannot be Vaiśeṣika, recognising either two or three *pramāṇas*, but Nyāya. On the other hand, in his commentary *Parīkṣāmukha-lakṣaṇa*, also known under the title *Prameyaraṅgamāla*, Anantavīra clearly distinguishes in one passage between the Naiyāyikas¹²³ and the Yaugas who cannot but be the Vaiśeṣikas. On an-

¹²⁰ PaP, p. 4.30: *nyāyāyāṅgāḥ sad akāraṇavan nityam ity ādivat*, and PaP 21cd, p. 5.24: *sad akāraṇavan nityam avo-nyāyāyāṅgāḥ pi ca*.

¹²¹ ĀpP₁ 5.2.27–28 = ĀpP₂ 6 § 43, p. 29.7–8: *tatra teṣu mokṣa-mārga-praṇetr̥tva-karma-bhū-bhētr̥tva-viśva-tattva-jñātr̥tveṣu karma-bhū-bhētr̥tām bhētr̥tvam asiddham. munīndrasya viprāsāt tad-abhētr̥tvāt karma-bhū-bhētr̥t-asambhavāt sadā-śivasya ye vadanti yaugā...*

¹²² PA₁ 6.56₁ = PA 6.57₂: *saugata-sāmkhya-yauga-prābhākara-jaiminīyānām pratyakṣā-numa-śāḍpamānārthāpatty-abhāvair ekāikādhikair vyāptivat*.

¹²³ PALV₁ 1.1, p. 9.17–19 = PALV₂ 1.1, p. 3.5–6: *tasya ca jñānam iti viśeṣaṇam ajñāna-rūpīya sannikarṣāder naiyāyikādi-parikalpitasya pramāṇatva-vyavacchedārtham uktaṁ.*

¹²⁴ PALV₁ 1.1, p. 9.23–25 = PALV₂ 1.1, p. 3.11–14: *tathā parokṣa-jñāna-vādinām mimāṃsakānām asvasamvedana-jñāna-vādinām sāmkhyānām jñānāntara-pratyakṣa-jñāna-vādinām yaugānām ca matam apākartuṁ sva-padōpādānam ity avyāpty-ativyāpty-asambhava-doṣa-parihārāt suvyavasthitaṁ eva pramāṇa-lakṣaṇam.*

other occasion¹²⁵ the same Anantavīrya enumerates, and subsequently refutes, the five members of the proof formula (*pañcāvayava*) and ascribes the view to the ‘Yauga’, in the wording well-known from the tradition of Nyāya:¹²⁶ *pratijñā-hetūdāharaṇōpanaya-nigamana*. Indeed, also the Vaiśeṣikas recognised the five-membered proof-formula, but named the members differently: *avayavāḥ punaḥ pratijnāpadeśa-nidarśanānusandhāna-pratyāmnāyāḥ* (PBh 265, p. 49). Such terms as *upanayana* and *nigamana* do not even occur in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, Candrānanda’s commentary or in the *Prasastapāda-bhāṣya*. This may imply that *yauga* in the passage refers, in turn, to the Naiyāyikas, not to Vaiśeṣikas as in the preceding passage. Then again in a passage directly related to the ontology of Vaiśeṣika, which discusses the relation between the universal (*sāmānya*) and the particular (*viśeṣa*) as absolutely different from each other we come across the following remark: ‘Neither the opinion of the Naiyāyikas nor the opinion of the Vaiśeṣikas that the universal and the particular are independent of each other seems to be justified through argumentation.’¹²⁷ The idea of the universal and the particular as absolutely different from each other typically forms a favourite butt of Jaina criticism which is usually directed against the Vaiśeṣika, not necessarily against the Nyāya (but not always, as in the case of Śidhārṣi-gaṇin, who indicates that this was the claim of both the schools. ‘The Naiyāyika and the Vaiśeṣika [concede the domain of the cognitive criterion to be] «the universal and the particular as [absolutely] separate from each other».’¹²⁸ Apparently, Anantavīrya uses the same term *yauga* still in a third meaning which covers both. He does the same while commenting on Maṅkyaanandin’s aphorism which asserts that the resultant cognition is both different and non-different from the cognitive procedures which led to it.¹²⁹ Anantavīrya mentions the opinion of the ‘Yaugas’ to the effect that the result of the cognitive process (cognitive criterion) is absolutely different from the process (criterion) itself¹³⁰, and such is an opinion shared by both the Naiyāyikas¹³¹ and

¹²⁵ PALV₁ 3.32, p. 29.3–29.4 = PALV₂ 3.37, p. 33.11: *pratijñā-hetūdāharaṇōpanaya-nigamana-bhedāt pañcāvayavaḥ eva itī yaugaḥ*.

¹²⁶ NS 1.1.32: *pratijñā-hetūdāharaṇōpanaya-nigamanāni avayavāḥ*.

¹²⁷ PALV₁ 4.1, p. 14.7–20 = PALV₂ 4.1, p. 57.1–2: *nāpi sāmānya-viśeṣau parasparā-napekṣāv itī yatīnām anavahatīyuktam avabhāti*.

¹²⁸ NAV 1.1.1: *paraspara-vibhaktau sāmānya-viśeṣāv itī naiyāyika-vaiśeṣikāḥ*.

¹²⁹ PA 5.2: *pramāṇād abhinnaṁ bhinnaṁ ca*.

¹³⁰ PALV₁ 5.2, p. 29.37–30.2 = PALV₂ 5.2, p. 62.18–19: *tad dvividham api phalaṁ pramāṇād bhinnaṁ evēti yaughāḥ*.

¹³¹ For instance: NBh 1.1.1: *tatra yasyēpsā-jihāsā-prayuktasya pravṛttiḥ sa pramātā, sa pramāṇam pramiṇoti tat pramāṇam, yo ’rthaḥ pramiyate tat prameyam, yad artha-vijñānam sā pramitiḥ*; NBh 1.1.1: *pramāṇato ’rtha-pratipattiḥ*; NBh 1.1.1: *pramāṇair artha-pratipattiḥ*; NBh 1.1.1: *antareṇa nārtha-pratipattiḥ*; NBh 1.1.3: *aḥśasyākṣasya prativiśayam vṛttiḥ pratyakṣam. vṛttis tu sannikarṣaḥ jñānam vā. yadā sannikarṣaḥ tadā jñānam pramitiḥ, yadā jñānam tadā hānōpādānōpekṣā-buddhayaḥ phalaṁ*; NV₁ 1.1.1, p. 18.3 = NV₂, p. 17.4: *nirṇayaḥ tattva-jñānam pramāṇānam phalaṁ*.

the Vaiśeṣikas.¹³² This is one more case when the term *yoga* comprises both systems. We can observe that one and the same author uses one and the same term either to refer to the followers of Nyāya, or the Vaiśeṣika or both, and when the followers of one of the schools are mentioned explicitly by their standard name, say ‘the Naiyāyikas’, ‘the Yaugas’ will refer to the other, e.g. ‘the Vaiśeṣikas’.

As we could see so far, the term *yoga* is never used unequivocally as referring just to one and the same school in philosophical literature. On some occasions it refers to Nyāya, on others to Vaiśeṣika. The external evidence shows that the term *yoga* was predominantly used with reference to Vaiśeṣika, but sometimes (e.g. Guṇaratna) also to Nyāya. Also the system’s internal evidence (NBh 1.1.29) reveals that the term was current as another name for Vaiśeṣika, the older of both schools. Further, followers of Nyāya are sometimes called also *yogas* or *yaugas* (e.g. SVM), but sometimes—as we shall see—also the followers of Vaiśeṣika are known as such.

Even though his judgement is based on a assessment of a much narrower pool of samples, CHATṬOPĀDHYĀY (1927: 857) seems generally right in concluding that ‘All these passages show that the Naiyāyikas or the Vaiśeṣika, more often the former, were known as Yoga or Yauga’, except for his conclusion regarding the frequency of references to either of the school. Certainly it is not the case that ‘the balance of evidence is in favour of the Naiyāyika’ (1927: 857). As we have seen, the term *yoga* is used to designate both the systems of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, whereas the terms *yauḡa* or *yoga* alike denote the followers of either of the systems or of both the systems jointly.

The fact that both the schools were historically referred to by the same name *yoga* should be interpreted as reflecting of their common origin which is grounded in the primary meaning of the verbal root \sqrt{yuj} —‘to connect’, e.g. ‘to rationally establish a connection between two things’, i.e. ‘to reason’, ‘to be consistent’, ‘to justify’ etc. and its substantive derivative *yukti*—‘argumentation’ or ‘reasoning’, ‘logical congruity’ etc. This line of interpretation is confirmed in a comment by Raghūttama in his *Bhāṣya-candra*, a commentary on the *Nyāya-nāyā*.

‘Those who primarily have (sc. practice) *yoga*, i.e. argumentation (*yukti*) or reasoning (*tarka*) are the Yogas, according to [Pāṇini]’s rule 5.2.107 stipulating that the *taddhita* affix] aC [A 3.1.1 is in-

¹³² See e.g. PBh 243, 245, p. 45: [243] *tatra sāmānya-viśeṣeṣu svarūpālocana-mātraṁ pratyakṣaṁ pramāṇam, prameyā dravyādayaḥ padārthāḥ, pramātātmā, pramītir dravyādiviśayaṁ jñānam. ...* [45] *athavā sarveṣu padārtheṣu catuṣṭaya-sannikarṣād avitatham avyapadeśyaṁ yaj jñānam utpadyate tat pratyakṣaṁ pramāṇam, prameyā dravyādayaḥ padārthāḥ, pramātātmā, pramītir guṇa-doṣa-mādhyasthya-darśanam iti.*

Apart from shared epistemological concerns, we can see a consistent line of evolution of a system which applied methodological skills and analytical and epistemological tools to the investigation of the highest human goals, i.e. of what they labelled *adhyātma-vidyā*, the study of the highest self. At this stage my initial claim that the Yoga of the *Artha-śāstra* is precisely an early form of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika seems well grounded. Certainly, it was not the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika we now know. It was a tradition which only gradually assumed its later name of Nyāya, perhaps a tradition which was not clearly distinguished from the Vaiśeṣika, a tradition which I would here call ‘proto-Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika’. That could explain why the term *yoga* is later used, also by the Naiyāyikas, with reference to the proponents of the Vaiśeṣika, but still an early tradition of Nyāya is included in Kauṭilya’s classification of Ānvīkṣikī.

The above conclusion decidedly speaks against theories which would try to explain the name *yoga* for the system of Nyāya by trying to link it to spiritual practices of the system of (Pātañjala) Yoga. Such an explanatory conjecture is found with CHAṬṬOPĀDHYĀYA (1927: 77–85), subscribing to the view of Paṇḍit Gopinātha Kavirāj (*Sarasvatībhava Studies*, vol. III) who allegedly

‘shows the intimate connexion between Nyāya and Yoga practices. He (Gopinātha Kavirāj—P.B.) writes, “though Yoga in its wider form has been practically accepted by every system of Indian philosophy, its relation with Nyāya is in a manner more special and, perhaps, fundamental.” In the *Sarasvatī-siddhānta-saṃgraha*, he points out, “affords distinct proof in support of a relation existing between Nyāya and Yoga; for it is maintained that according to Nyāya *nyāyāloka* is directly from Yoga, a doctrine which it shares in common with the Patañjali system and distinguished from the Sāṅkhya, where *jñāna* is held to be the immediate cause of *Mañā*.” “The Nyāya Darśana, in its present form,” Mr. Kavirāj also “contains some *Sūtras* (4–2, 38–49) where the practice of Yoga is strongly recommended.”’

In view of the fact that in Kauṭilya’s work, ‘Yoga’ does not encompass a proto-Nyāya, but also a proto-Vaiśeṣika alike, this theory cannot not explain how also Vaiśeṣika, so substantially related to Nyāya, could be linked to the practice of Yoga at the time when it was clearly atheistic and rejected any paranormal explanations and supramundane practices, such as extrasensory perception¹³⁵ and meditation was not the concern of the system. The ties between the earliest form of Vaiśeṣika and probably also Nyāya, on the one hand, and the system of Yoga were rather relaxed, to say the least. Further, what the theory referred to above actually claims is that early Nyāya was called Yoga

¹³⁵ A good attestation is the fact that the discussion of supernatural perception in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* (VS(C) 9.13–17) is clearly a later interpolation, see WEZLER (1982), HONDA (1988), ISAACSON (1993) and BALCEROWICZ (2010: 292 f., 308 ff.).

simply because it was associated with Pātañjala Yoga, which in itself is an ahistoric statement: Pātañjala Yoga in the form and texts we know is a product of a turn fourth and fifth centuries CE.¹³⁶ Along these lines, one could as well argue that any school of thought in India could deserve the name ‘Yoga’ simply because of its association the system of Pātañjala Yoga. And, as we know, the influence of Yoga practice on various systems in India was indeed enormous, and still these did not come to be occasionally known as Yoga: clearly, not everything related to Yoga becomes a Yoga.

Our understanding of what systems Ānvīkṣikī comprised and what Kauṭilya’s ‘Yoga’ stood for finds an indirect confirmation in the *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā*, a work on poetics composed by Rājasekhara (ca. 880–920 CE). In Chapter Two *On Disciplines of Learning (Śāstra-nirdeśa)*,¹³⁷ the author summarises various divisions of sciences and disciplines, and Ānvīkṣikī features in a number of such typologies. The list opens an eightfold classification, which comprises Ānvīkṣikī, just as several other lists, including the well-known fourfold classification of Kauṭilya, but also, many of them including Ānvīkṣikī. Of particular interest is a passage (KM 2, pp. 11–23) commenting on the updating or updating the *Artha-śāstra* classification:

‘According to Kauṭilya there are four disciplines of learning: methodology (ānvīkṣikī), the triple *Veda*, economics and political science. The triple *Veda*, explored with the help of methodology, surpasses both economics and political science. ... Out of these the triple *Veda* has already been discovered. Methodology is twofold in view of being a preliminary operation (*pūrva-pakṣa*) and

¹³⁶ See also BRONKHORST (1984: 191–2) and Philipp André MAAS (2006: xii–xix) and (2010: 383 f.) according to whom “... the date of the *Pātañjala-yoga-śāstra* and the *Yoga-bhāṣya* is a time span reaching from 250 to 400 CE seems to be most likely” (2010: 383).

¹³⁷ KM 2 (*śāstra-nirdeśa*) pp. 11–23, esp. the passages 3.11–12, 20–21, 4.5–24: *pauruṣeyaṃ tu purāṇam ānvīkṣikī mīmāṃsā smṛti-tantram iti catvāri śāstrāṇi. ... ānvīkṣikī tu vidyāvasare vakṣyate. ... tatra dhi śāstrāṇy anudhāvanti. “vārttā kāma-sūtram śilpi-śāstram daṇḍa-nītiṃ trayi-vidyā saḥāṣṭā-daśa vidyā-sthānāni” ity apare. ānvīkṣikī trayi vārttā daṇḍa-nītiṃ ca vidyā. “daṇḍa-nītir evākā vidyā” ity auśanasāḥ. daṇḍa-bhayād dhi kṛtsno lokāpāpeshu śāstrakarmasv avatiṣṭhate. “vārttā daṇḍa-nītir dve vidye” iti bārhaspatyāḥ. nītir vinaya-grahaṇam ca sthīti-hetu-loka-yātrāyāḥ. “trayī-vārttā-daṇḍa-nītayas tisro vidyā” iti mānavāḥ. trayī hi vārttā-daṇḍa-nītyor upadeṣṭrī. ānvīkṣikī trayī-vārttā-daṇḍa-nītayas catasro vidyā” iti kauṭilyaḥ. ānvīkṣikyā hi vivecitā trayī vārttā-daṇḍa-nītyor prabhavati. “pañcamī sahitya-vidyā” iti yāyavariyāḥ. sā hi catasṛṇām api vidyānām nispannā. ābhirdharmārthau yad vidyāt tad vidyānām vidyātvam. tatra trayī vyākhyātā. ānvīkṣikī pūrvōttara-pakṣābhyām. arhad-bhadanta-darśane lokāyataim ca pūrvah pakṣāḥ. sāmkyam nyāya-vaiśeṣikau cōttaraḥ. ta ime ṣaṭ tarkāḥ. tatra ca tisraḥ kathā bhāṣanti vādo jalpo vitanḍā ca. madhyasthayos tattvāvabodhāya vastu-tattva-parāmarśo vadaḥ. sva-pakṣasyāparigrahitri para-pakṣasya dūṣayitri vitanḍā. kṛṣi-pāśu-pālye vaṇijyā ca vārttā. ānvīkṣikī-trayī-vārttānām yoga-kṣema-sādhano daṇḍas tasya nītir daṇḍa-nītiḥ. tasyām āyattā loka-yātrēti śāstrāṇi.*

an antithetical position (*pūrva-pakṣa*). The view of the Jainas and Buddhists but also of the materialists constitute a preliminary position. Sāṃkhya and the systems of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika are an antithetical position. All these constitute six schools of reasoning (*tarka*). These also for three kinds of debate: debate proper (*vāda*), paradialectical dispute (*jalpa*) and eristic disputation (*vitandā*). ... Economics comprises agriculture, cattle breeding and trade. Political power (*daṇḍa*) is the means of securing the pursuit of (lit. acquisition and maintenance) of methodology (*ānvīkṣikī*), the triple *Veda* and economics (AŚ 1.4.3), the application of this [political power] is political science.’

In the above classification based on the well-known Kauṭilya’s division of disciplines of learning, Ānvīkṣikī is divided into two sections. The first section, called a preliminary position (*pūrva-pakṣa*), groups non-Brahmanic schools, among which the original materialistic school (*lokāyata*) is still preserved. Furthermore, the system of the materialists is in fact grammatically distinguished in the enumeration as a separate locution, not a part of a compound **arhad-bhadanta-lokāyātika-darśanāni*, which may suggest that the original *lokāyataṃ ca* of *Artha-śāstra* 1.2.10 (*sāṃkhyam yogo lokāyataṃ cēty ānvīkṣikī*) was expanded by the insertion of the additional two systems *arhad-bhadanta-darśane*. The second section, called an antithetical position (*pūrva-pakṣa*), comprises Brahmanic schools such as Sāṃkhya, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, the latter two schools being a later development of the ‘Yoga’ current of Kauṭilya. Thus the *pūrva-pakṣa* exactly corresponds to the enumeration *sāṃkhyam yogaḥ* of *Artha-śāstra* 1.2.10. In addition, except for the inclusion of Jainas and Buddhists, the original list of Kauṭilya is preserved, except for the replacement of *lokāyātika* explicitly replacing ‘Yoga’.

Again, in Chapter Eight *On the Sources of the Meaning of Poetry* (*Kāvyaṛthayonirūpāṇa*, p. 35 ff.), Rāṣeṣha discusses how different schools of thought and disciplines can contribute to the understanding of poetical meaning and what their theories of meaning are. In a passage he says that there are two kinds of thinkers who rely on cognitive criteria (*prāmāṇika*), being the representatives of the discipline of *prāmāṇa-vidyā*:¹³⁸ the *maimāṃśikas*, i.e. those who follow *mīmāṃsā* (reason and hermeneutics) and the reasoners (*tārkika*), i.e. those who follow *tarka* (reasoning).¹³⁹ Among those who follow reason (*tarka*), are the followers of Sāṃkhya,¹⁴⁰ and their thought is exemplified with a verse from the chapter on Sāṃkhya-Yoga of the *Bhagavad-gītā* (BhG 2.16). Further,

KM 8, p. 35.2.

¹³⁸ KM 8, p. 36.19–20: *dvividhaḥ prāmāṇiko maimāṃśikas tārkikaś ca*.

¹⁴⁰ KM 8, p. 37.1: *tarkeṣu sāṃkhyāḥ*. We should probably read *tārkikeṣu* instead of *tarkeṣu*.

among the reasoners are the representatives of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika¹⁴¹, the Buddhists¹⁴², the materialists¹⁴³ and the Jains¹⁴⁴. This is, no doubt, an updated (to the intellectual conditions of the turn of the ninth and tenth centuries) classification of currents which examine the foundations of our cognition: what we have here is the term *pramāṇa-vidyā* which replaced the outdated *tarka-vidyā*, synonymous to *ānvīkṣikī*, and also the list of systems is expanded by the inclusion of Mīmāṃsā, Buddhism and Jainism. (In fact, Jayantabhaṭṭa indicates that another name for Ānvīkṣikī is *pramāṇa-vidyā*.¹⁴⁵)

What we really have here is precisely Kauṭilya's typology of Ānvīkṣikī in a new garb adopted to new requirements of Rājaśekhara's times. Also this updated and extended classification agrees with the core typology of sciences of *Artha-sāstra* 1.2.10, and all the three original representatives of Ānvīkṣikī are preserved in the enumeration.

13. To conclude, in the debated passage of the *Artha-sāstra*, which enumerates the three schools—*sāṃkhya*, *yoga* and *lokāyata*—which were comprised within the current of Ānvīkṣikī, Kauṭilya refers, respectively, (1) with the name *sāṃkhya*, to a joint school of Sāṃkhya-Yoga, regularly mentioned under this double name in the epic literature, (2) with the name *yoga*, to an early form of epistemological method of rational enquiry which we could here call a 'proto-Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika', which gradually developed into the school of Nyāya, from its beginnings associated with Vaiśeṣika and the tradition of rational enquiry and debate preserved in the medical treatise *Araka-samhitā*, and (3) to the materialistic tradition of the Lokāyatas/Cārvākas. What united all these three traditions was not the subject matter of enquiry, being so disparate as dualistic ontology of Sāṃkhya-Yoga, pluralistic ontology of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and monistic ontology of the materialists, or the salvific concerns of the representatives of Sāṃkhya-Yoga and early Vaiśeṣikas, on the one hand, and purely materialistic interests of the Cārvākas. We would probably be not far from truth assuming that the current of Ānvīkṣikī comprised also other minor traditions which subscribed to similar methods of rational enquiry and participated in the debates in the circles of Ānvīkṣikī. What all these three main branches, and probably a range of minor ones, shared was the method they applied in their respective fields of particular ontologies and axiologies. In the course of its development, Ānvīkṣikī was 'highjacked' by the tradition of Nyāya, which eventually grew out of it and appropriated the name for itself, but it remained in popular memory as a system which focused on rational argument and enquiry and used or—in the eyes of some: misused—logic (*hetu*) and reason

¹⁴¹ KM 8, p. 37.7: *nyāya-vaiśeṣikīyaḥ*.

¹⁴² KM 8, p. 37.13: *bauddhiyaḥ*.

¹⁴³ KM 8, p. 37.19: *laukāyatikaḥ*.

¹⁴⁴ KM 8, p. 37.24: *ārhatāḥ*.

¹⁴⁵ NMa₁ II: 136.1 = NMa₂ II: 100.11: *pramāṇa-vidyā cēyam ānvīkṣikī*.

(*tarka*), and therefore not always triggered positive associations in religious circles. The fear of reason for pious religion-oriented minds is not just a modern phenomenon.

The current of Ānvīkṣikī comprised various philosophical schools and systems which represented divergent ontologies—dualism of Sāṃkhya–Yoga, pluralism of ‘Yoga’ (later developed into Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika) and monism/materialism of the Lokāyata—and axiologies but were united by a common interest in investigative methods, methodological solutions, epistemological concerns and rational enquiry which could be adopted to their respective ontologies and ethical systems. The current of ‘Yoga’ represented a tradition whose main preoccupation was the pursuit of the ultimate goal, which involved both the insight into the ultimate human nature, or the highest self (*adhyaṭma-vidyā/ātma-vidyā*), and its corollary the liberation from mundane bonds and material limitations. Its direct successors were the schools of Nyāya and, to a lesser extent, Vaiśeṣika. Both ‘Yoga’ and Nyāya shared the same salvific concerns and the same method which reflected the names of the schools: *yoga* (as a synonym to *yukti*) and *nyāya* indicated the method of Ānvīkṣikī, i.e. argumentation or methodical reasoning, which in both were actually synonymous with all the other term *anvīkṣā*, or systematic enquiry (*vide supra* NV 1.1.4, p. 202, 205). Interestingly, all these three technical terms *anvīkṣā*, *yoga-yukti* and *nyāya*—of more or less the same meaning—gave rise to three separate schools or schools: Ānvīkṣikī, Yoga and Nyāya.

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