

World View and Theory in Indian Philosophy

Edited by
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**When Yoga is not Yoga.
The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Tradition and the *Artha-śāstra***

PIOTR BALCEROWICZ

1. The tradition of Ānvīkṣikī, which features at the beginning of the *Artha-śāstra*, has attracted the attention of a number of scholars ever since the work of (the collective author known as) Kauṭilya was discovered (or rather a manuscript of it was acquired from a Paṇḍit of the Tanjore District) by R. Shamastry in 1902, the then librarian of the Mysore Government Oriental Library, provisionally translated in 1906 by him and subsequently published in 1909 (AŚ₃). The significance of Ānvīkṣikī and its supposedly philosophical dimension as well as its relation to sciences and philosophical schools have been investigated, among others, by Hermann JACOBI (1911), Satish Chandra VIDYABHUSANA (1920: 4–39), Moritz WINTERNITZ (1929), Paul HACKER (1958), Madhumati CHATTERJEE (1978), Harsh NARAIN (1979), Wilhelm HALBFASS (1988: 263–286, esp. 273 ff.), Bruce PERRY (1997), Karin PREISENDANZ (2000). The present paper re-examines what has been frequently analysed before, viz. the relationship between Ānvīkṣikī of the *Artha-śāstra* and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition. The conclusion of the paper may seem an expression of what many scholars must have felt but, surprisingly, no one has formulated it explicitly, and emerges as something so obvious that the subtitle of the paper given in the conference handout in Barcelona read: ‘All we all knew but we didn’t dare say it aloud...’. We should also remember that my thesis cannot rest on irrefutable foundations for the simple fact that available materials on Ānvīkṣikī are extremely scarce and all we can say about the system is actually based on several lines found here and there. In the passages translated in this paper, I will often render the term ‘Ānvīkṣikī’ as methodology.

2. The *locus classicus* for Ānvīkṣikī are the actual opening passages Kauṭilya’s *Artha-śāstra*:

‘[1] These are the disciplines of learning: methodology (*ānvīkṣikī*),
the triple *Veda*, economics¹ and political science. [8] According

¹ The term *vārttā* comprises triple economic activity: agriculture (*kṛṣi*), cattle breeding (*pāśu-pālya*) and trade (*vaṇijyā*), see AŚ 1.4.1: *kṛṣi-pāśu-pālye vaṇijyā ca vārttā*.

to Kauṭilya there are exactly four disciplines of learning. [9] Particular disciplines of learning [acquire] a genuine status of discipline of learning when with their help one can know moral law (*dharma*) and [the means to accomplish] life goals (*artha*).²

Ānvīkṣikī is counted by Kauṭilya—in which he expressly differs from other traditions, mentioned by him in the sequel—among four sciences, or disciplines of learning (*vidyā*). Further, we learn that, according to Kauṭilya, Ānvīkṣikī as well as the other three disciplines carry moral implications, broadly understood, in the sense that it is with their help that one can live a life which is both meritorious and satisfactory as well as one complies with the rules and injunctions of moral law (*dharma*), understood as a device that regulates social life,³ and one is also capable of satisfying material needs of his own and of his family. Therefore, just like all the other disciplines, such as the Vedic soteriological and religious reflection (*trayī*), theoretical reflection on economy and its practical implementation as well as the reflection on how to successfully and effectively seize, maintain and exercise political power, Ānvīkṣikī is said to be of relevance both for religious or moral life and for social and individual welfare. The goals defined in this way could hardly be compatible with the idea of Ānvīkṣikī as ‘philosophy’, taken as abstract and rational reflection, of little direct practical application, that emancipates itself from the limits of religious and mythical thinking, as it was once suggested by JACOBI (1911) and subsequently questioned by WINTERNITZ (1929), and systematically disproved by HACKER (1958).

Kauṭilya cites some other classifications of disciplines of learning which either include or exclude Ānvīkṣikī. What is symptomatic, even some of those who do not include Ānvīkṣikī in their typology of disciplines of learning do it not because, in their opinion, Ānvīkṣikī does not count as a separate branch of learning of its own, but only because it can be subsumed under soteriological and religious reflection (*trayī*):

‘The representatives of the school of Manu [maintain] that the triple *Veda*, economics and political science [are the only disciplines of learning], because methodology is a special branch of the triple *Veda*.’⁴

² AŚ₁ 1.2.1.8–9: [1] *ānvīkṣikī trayī vārttā daṇḍa-nītiś cēti vidyāḥ*. [8] *catasra eva vidyā iti kauṭilyaḥ*. [9] *tābhir dharmārthau yad vidyāt tad vidyānām vidyātvam*.

³ Kauṭilya takes obligations and duties that are derived from the concept of moral law (*dharma*) primarily in a social and political sense, certainly not a religious one, see AŚ 1.3.4: *eṣa trayī-dharmas caturṇām varṇānām āśramāṇām ca sva-dharma-sthāpanād aupakārikaḥ*.—‘This moral law [prescribed] in the triple *Veda* is wholesome because it helps establish respective roles for the four social strata and for the four life stages.’

⁴ AŚ₁ 1.2.3: *trayī vārttā daṇḍa-nītiś cēti mānavāḥ*. *trayī-viśeṣo hy ānvīkṣikīti*.

Even though Ānvīkṣikī is not separately mentioned in this classification, nevertheless the passage establishes a direct connection between Ānvīkṣikī and the *Vedas*, understood to incorporate the *Upaniṣads*.

This association was from time to time voiced and recollected in the *Mahābhārata* (e.g. MBh 3.149.32–33; 12.59.33), *Manu-smṛti*, and in some *Purānas*⁵. The memory or deep conviction that Ānvīkṣikī was, at least to some extent, closely related to the orthodox tradition and to the *Vedas* is articulated as late as in the *Nyāya-sāra* (NSā, pp. 71–72) in a passage in which Bhāsarvajña (who, in fact, follows Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana in this respect, see p. 194 and n. 50) discusses why there are only four disciplines of learning, and whether the division is because each of the four disciplines has a different subject matter (*viśaya-bhedāt*) or whether because each has a different purpose (*prayojana-bhedāt*). He eventually subscribes to the opinion that

‘Because human goals are primary and secondary, one should recognise four disciplines of learning, namely: the discipline of moral law, welfare, sensual satisfaction and of liberation.’⁶

In this context, the following opinion is expressed to which Bhāsarvajña accedes:

‘[Objection:] “Since both the triple *Veda* and methodology have liberation as their purpose, it turns out that there is no difference [between them, and the number of disciplines cannot be four].” That is true, nevertheless [one can distinguish] the primary classification and subdivisions with respect to all sciences, because a discipline can be a sphere for an enquirer and it can be something that stimulates all other disciplines.’⁷

The reason why Bhāsarvajña finds it justified to classify Ānvīkṣikī as a separate branch of learning is pragmatic, and not due to the system’s salvific purpose. Bhāsarvajña thereby emphasises the role of Ānvīkṣikī, which was still remembered at his times as a discipline that stimulates other branches, viz. provides them with methodology and analytic tools applicable in their respective fields of enquiry, but which can also become an object of enquiry in its own right.

⁵ BhāgP 3.12.44 (*vide infra* p. 180, n. 21), BhāgP 11.16.24 (*vide infra* p. 217, n. 97), and BrP 187.43:

*ānvīkṣikī trayī vārttā daṇḍa-nītis tathāparā /
vidyā-catuṣṭayam tv etad vārttām atra śṛṇuṣva me //*

⁶ NSā, p. 72.3–4: *tasmāt mukhya-gauṇa-puruṣārtha-bhedena catasro vidyā draṣṭavyāḥ, dharmārtha-kāma-mokṣa-śāstrāṅgīti.*

⁷ NSā, p. 72.5–7: *nanu evaṃ tarhi trayy-ānvīkṣikyor apavargārthatvād abhedaḥ prāpnoti. satyam tathāpi vicāraka-viśayatvena sarva-vidyānuḡrāhakatvena cāsyāḥ sarva-vidyābhyāḥ prādhānyam avāntara-bhedaś cāsti.*

3. Much has been said by researchers on the nature of what Ānvīkṣikī actually was and was not.⁸ JACOBI's (1911) interpretation of Ānvīkṣikī as philosophy has been eventually dismissed on various accounts and most researchers would now agree that Ānvīkṣikī is some kind of theoretical reflection on effective, successful and consistent procedures both in the sphere of reasoning and of practical actions, or—to use Paul HACKER's expression—'the art of thinking' (*Denkkunst*), however with both theoretical and pragmatic implications. This methodical, systematic analysis is, as we shall see, what we could tentatively call methodology. That also is why, in my translations of Sanskrit passages throughout, the term 'methodology' is used interchangeably with 'Ānvīkṣikī'.

3.1. What is, therefore, the nature of Ānvīkṣikī? We should start with the first mention of the system in extant Indian literary sources. Kauṭilya enumerates the disciplines comprised by Ānvīkṣikī, or methodology, and thereby provides some important information on the nature of Ānvīkṣikī:

'Methodology [comprises three schools]: Sāṃkhya, Yoga and the materialists (*lokāyata*).'⁹

This is the frequently discussed passage that once led some researchers, e.g. JACOBI's (1911), to see, wrongly as it were, in Ānvīkṣikī an Indian counterpart of philosophy, i.e. a rational, theoretical enterprise which is instantiated through specific philosophical schools.

Instead, the passage can rather be taken as a case of an enumerative or a typological definition that demarcates a notion by mentioning specimens to which the definiendum is applicable, either in a selective way, by mentioning just a few examples (similar to, e.g., 'The cat (*Felis*) is: the domestic cat (*Felis catus*), the jungle cat (*Felis chaus*), the African wildcat (*Felis silvestris lybica*)', without mentioning all the seven members of the genus), or in an exhaustive way, by specifying all the varieties subsumed by the definiens (similar to, e.g. 'The chimpanzee is *Pan troglodytes* and *Pan paniscus*', no more no less). In the case of Ānvīkṣikī, as we will see, it is most probably the former case: Kauṭilya enumerates all the branches of thought and analysis he considers to be most significant representatives of the philosophical-methodological current, but his enumeration does most probably not exhaust all instantiations. What Kauṭilya proposes is not, therefore, a definition proper which would describe the character and essential aspects or intrinsic characteristics of a thing, or the definiendum.

Further, the passage does not postulate Ānvīkṣikī, the way JACOBI (1911) wanted, as a kind of meta-level generic term (*der übergeordnete Artbegriff*) which encompasses, or rather is instantiated in, the three remaining disciplines

⁸ See esp. GLASENAPP 1940: (110 f.), HACKER (1958: 4–13, 29–30), HALBFASS (1988: 263–286), PREISENDANZ (2000).

⁹ AŚ₁ 1.2.10: *sāṃkhyam yogo lokāyatam cēty ānvīkṣikī*.

of learning, especially in the sense of ‘philosophy’, to which the three other branches would be subordinated, but what we have here is merely a list of philosophical strands which apply the same pattern of reasoning and analysis approach or betray the same investigative, methodological approach.¹⁰ Rather, the definition shows what the three other disciplines have in common and what is the theoretical and practical method they share, irrespective of their incompatible world views and irreconcilable differences in metaphysics and ethics.

In the next step, Kauṭilya proceeds to define the role of Ānvīkṣikī as an indispensable instrument for all the remaining disciplines of learning, and this can be treated as something that approximates a definition proper:

‘[Ānvīkṣikī] first investigates (*anvīkṣamāṇā*) with the help of logical tools (*hetu*): (1) in the sphere of the triple *Veda*, what conforms to moral law (*dharma*) and what does not conform to moral law (*adharmā*), (2) in the sphere of economics, what is profitable and what is not profitable, (3) in the sphere of political science, what is conducive [to political power] and what is not conducive [to political power], (4) what is effective and what is ineffective for these [three disciplines of learning, and thereby] it serves people, it keeps the reason steady in misfortune and in prosperity as well as generates / sustains expertise in judgement, speech and action.’¹¹

The defining characteristic of Ānvīkṣikī, derived from the verbal root *anvīkṣ* ‘to observe, investigate methodically, examine, enquire’, as it is described by Kauṭilya, is thus a certain procedure through which one methodically investigates a given object with the help of logical tools and reasoning (*hetubhir anvīkṣamāṇā*). This investigative methodical approach is the main object of the investigation of Ānvīkṣikī, but not exclusively. It is not merely a reflection on how to reason, argue, analyse etc. correctly, but it has a very practical dimension, which is its inherent feature: one applies theoretical methodology to all practical issues that one considers important and relevant to attain one’s goals, and thereby can take a course of action most suited for one’s objectives. And these practical goals can be as divergent as, for instance, how to live morally, viz. what criteria make one judge that a particular deed complies with moral law (*dharma*) or not (*adharmā*), what considerations one has to take into account in order to be able to determine whether the adopted course of action may bring wealth and profit or not, or which stratagems and actions of the monarch are beneficial to the maintenance of his political power and which are not. In fact, as we have seen, Kauṭilya explicitly mentions three such spheres

¹⁰ See HACKER (1958: 4–14), HALBFASS (1988: 263 ff.).

¹¹ AŚ 1.2.11: *dharmādharmāu trayāṃ arthānarthau vārttāyāṃ nayāpanayau daṇḍānīyāṃ balābale cātāsāṃ hetubhir anvīkṣamāṇā lokasyōpakaroti vyasane ’bhyudaye ca buddhiṃ avasthāpayati prajñā-vākya-kriyā-vaiśāradyāṃ ca karoti.*

of application of the Ānvīkṣikī method, and always consistently along the same pattern: the method allows one to distinguish (1) the virtue (*guṇa*), or the appropriate strategy and positive course of reflection or action that leads to desirable results, i.e. what conforms to moral law (*dharma*), what is profitable (*artha*), what is conducive to political power (*naya*) and what is effective (*bala*), and (2) the vice (*doṣa*), or the negative procedure that might bring undesired effects, which one should avoid, i.e. what does not conform to moral law (*adharmā*), what is not profitable (*anartha*), what is not conducive to political power (*apanaya*) and what is ineffective (*abala*).

3.2. This idea of advancing a successful activity which eventually leads to the achievement of one's goals and, at the same time, of avoiding any activity which is counterproductive to one's goals and which should therefore be discarded, at least with respect to the three spheres of religion, economics and political science in Kauṭilya's account, seems to have been at the root of the Ānvīkṣikī enterprise. This strikes a close resemblance with Nyāya, esp. Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana's, account of reasonable activity and purposefulness of human existence. In a passage¹² we read:

“What should be avoided, what keeps one that [to-be-avoided] away, absolute avoidance [of that to-be-avoided and] the means [to accomplish] this [avoidance which] should be realised”—having understood these four beneficial statements properly, one attains the ultimate (sc. liberation).”¹³

In the same spirit and using similar terms, Uddyotakara Bhāradvāja emphasises the role of reflection or reasoning in achieving desired and commendable goals and in avoiding activities which would result in something undesirable:

‘These two, i.e. reasoning (*tarka*) and determination (*nirṇaya*) sustains the progress of people. People, having reflected again and again [by means of reasoning and determination], undertake activities, namely: they avoid what should be avoided and appropriate what should be appropriated thanks to reasoning and determination.’¹⁴

Further, while discussing the typology of cognitive criteria (*pramāṇa*), Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana notes that ‘Whenever cognition occurs, the result is the discernment the nature of which is avoidance, appropriation or indiffer-

¹² This is directly influenced by the four noble truths of Buddhism, see WEZLER (1984) and BALCEROWICZ (2003: 296–301).

¹³ NBh on NS 1.1.1: *heyam, tasya nirvartakam, hānam ātyantikam, tasyōpāyo dhigantavya ity etāni catvāry artha-pādāni samyag buddhvā niḥśreyasam adhigacchati.*

¹⁴ NV₁ 1.1.1, p. 18.8–10 = NV₂, p. 17.8–9: *tāv etau tarka-nirṇayau loka-yātrām udvahata^a iti. buddhvā buddhvā lokaḥ pravartamānaḥ tarka-nirṇayābhyām heyam jahāti upādeyam cōpādatte.* [^a NV₂: *vahata.*]

ence,¹⁵ and the cognition meant here is not just any cognitive state or cognitive act, but a cognitively valid procedure or true cognition that fulfils the criteria of a cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*) proper. What is thus characterised as cognition by Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana is not necessarily limited to perception (the passage occurs between a short definition of perception and definitions of inference, analogy and verbal knowledge) but should be understood as underlying the results of the other three cognitive criteria recognised by the Nyāya school. This is precisely the same approach which is so manifest in the Ānvīkṣikī account of successful action and unsuccessful, unproductive one which should not be undertaken, except perhaps for the third element, namely indifference (*upekṣā*), introduced by Pakṣilasvāmin. This third element, in fact, does not run counter the Ānvīkṣikī approach to successful action, for it merely typologises all those activities which are not irrelevant, i.e. such that neither lead to success nor bring loss.

Akṣapāda Gautama defines the result (*phala*) as ‘the object (circumstances/situation) which is generated by activities and faults’¹⁶, while understanding the activity as ‘the causal effort by means of speech, mind and body’¹⁷ and faults as ‘characterised by the effectuating activity’.¹⁸ While commenting on the definition, Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana remarks:

‘The result is the sensation of happiness or of suffering. And the *karman* is the fruition [in the form] of happiness as well as the fruition [in the form] of suffering. ... Thus, this result is what should be avoided [but is] appropriated again and again; [this result is also] what should be appropriated [but is] discarded again and again; in such a way there is no end or termination of avoidance and appropriation [of results]. This very world, as one should realise, is jostled by the torrent of avoidance and appropriation of the result.’¹⁹

Again in this passage Pakṣilasvāmin directly refers to activities which should be carried out or which should be abandoned, and places the idea of the result (either success or failure) in a wider context of rebirth (mentioned in NS 1.1.19). These are general circumstances or existential predicaments in which everyone is doomed to act: people habitually follow objectives which should be discarded or renounce goals which should be striven for. This lack of con-

¹⁵ NBh.1.1.3: *yadā jñānam tadā hānōpādānōpekṣā-buddhayaḥ phalam.*

¹⁶ NS 1.1.20: *pravṛtti-doṣa-janito ’rthaḥ phalam.*

¹⁷ NS 1.1.17: *pravṛttir vāg-buddhi-śarīrāmbhaḥ.*

¹⁸ NS 1.1.18: *pravartanā-lakṣaṇā doṣāḥ.*

¹⁹ NBh 1.1.20: *sukha-duḥkha-saṁvedanam phalam. sukha-vipākam karma duḥkha-vipākam ca. ... tad etat phalam upāttam upāttam heyam, tyaktam tyaktam upādeyav iti nāsya hānōpādānāyor niṣṭhā paryavasānam vāsti, sa khalv ayaṁ phalasya hānōpādāna-srotasōhyate loka iti.*

sistence in action—viz. avoiding what should be avoided and appropriating what should be appropriated—emphasises the role of proper reflection on the nature of the result and the means to achieve it, if it is desirable, or the means to avoid it, if it is objectionable.

If, as Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana himself sees it, Nyāya was the successor of Ānvīkṣikī at least in some sense, this throws additional light on the original characterisation of Ānvīkṣikī by Kauṭilya and its role for the monarch: since humans, including monarchs, often act inconsistently, i.e. not in consonance with what is desirable or proper and with acceptance for what is objectionable or harmful, one should follow the method of Ānvīkṣikī which sets things right and helps one be fully consistent in one's actions.

To recapitulate, Ānvīkṣikī should be interpreted as some kind of theoretical reflection on what constitutes effective, successful and consistent procedures, both in reasoning and practical activity, which prompts one to undertake an appropriate course of action and reach conclusive judgement in order to achieve desirable and commendable goals, while discouraging one from engaging in activities which bring undesirable results, incompatible with accepted values. This methodical, systematic analysis is what we could call 'methodology', or reason-based methodological enquiry and approach.

4. The very few ideas encapsulated in the *Artha-śāstra* by Kauṭilya are later recapitulated in Kāmandaki's *Nīti-sāra* (fifth century?), hardly adding any new material. First, Kāmandaki repeats *verbatim* the classification of the disciplines of learning, which is identical with that of the *Artha-śāstra* (AŚ 1.2.1):

'Methodology, the triple *Veda*, economics and everlasting political science constitute exactly the four disciplines of learning. These are the causes of stability of the world.'²⁰

Exactly the same enumeration is also repeated in the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*.²¹ Another verse echoes the spheres of application, which is the contents of AŚ 1.2.11:

'Methodology, being the knowledge of the self, [investigates] (1) what conforms to moral law (*dharma*) and what does not conform to moral law (*adharma*) in the sphere of the triple *Veda*, (2) what is profitable and what is not profitable in the sphere of economics, (3) what is conducive [to political power] and what is not conducive [to political power] in the sphere of political science;'²²

²⁰ NīSā 2.2:

*ānvīkṣikī trayī vārttā daṇḍa-nītis ca śāśvatī /
vidyāś catasra evātā loka-saṁsthiti-hetavaḥ //*

²¹ BhāgP 3.12.44ab: *ānvīkṣikī trayī vārttā daṇḍa-nītis tathāva ca /*

²² NīSā 2.7:

whereupon follows an explanation why Ānvīkṣikī is so vital:

‘Methodology is a discipline teaching about the self, because it investigates happiness and suffering. The one who investigates the reality through this [methodology] abandons excitement and grief.’²³

Most importantly, the verse emphasises the purposefulness of Ānvīkṣikī, which is in accord with what Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana has to say above about the investigation of the purpose and result (*phala*) of human actions which end with the sensation of happiness or of suffering (*sukha-duḥkha-samvedanam phalam*),²⁴ and thereby stresses the link between liberation and Ānvīkṣikī.

5.1. To conclude his brief introduction of Ānvīkṣikī as a separate discipline, Kauṭilya emphasises both its importance and its unique character as a branch that is useful in all other disciplines of learning, irrespective of particular world view and particular theoretical presuppositions:

‘Methodology has always been considered to be the lamp for disciplines of learning, the means to [accomplish] all actions, the fundament of all moral laws.’²⁵

This characterisation is significant because Kauṭilya himself shows that he does not limit the scope of application of Ānvīkṣikī to a selected sphere of the monarch’s activities but treats it as a method which can serve anyone in any theoretical or practical discipline, not necessarily in the three mentioned by Kauṭilya.

5.2. A direct trace of the method of Ānvīkṣikī precisely in the sense of its successful application in a range of fields with a view of achieving one’s goals is found in the *Mahā-bhārata*, which contains a few stray references to the current in a contaminated passage in which the place of Ānvīkṣikī is taken by political science (*daṇḍa-nīti*), the main proponent of which was Kauṭilya. The passage, however, must have been influenced by Kauṭilya’s account of Ānvīkṣikī whose ideas are here expanded at great length (emphasised/in bold are phrases that occur also in AŚ 1.2.11):

*ānvīkṣiky ātma-vijñānam dharmādharmau trayī-sthitau /
arthānarthau tu vārttāyām daṇḍa-nītyām nayētarau //*

²³ NīSā 2.11:

*ānvīkṣiky ātma-vidyā syād iḥṣaṇāt sukha-duḥkhaḥ /
iḥṣamāṇas tayā tattvaṁ harṣa-śokau vyudasyati //*

²⁴ NBh 1.1.20, see n. 19.

²⁵ AŚ 1.2.12:

*pradīpaḥ sarva-vidyānām upāyaḥ sarva-karmaṇām /
āśrayaḥ sarva-dharmāṇām śaśvad ānvīkṣikī matā //*

‘[23] Political science is what holds the world [in balance], for the political force contains numerous measures. [24] [It is about] what is profitable and what is not profitable; happiness and unhappiness; what conforms to moral law and what does not conform to moral law; what is effective and what is ineffective; misfortune and prosperity; merit and demerit; virtue and fault; [25] sensual satisfaction and sensual dissatisfaction; dividing [time into] season, month, night, days and a moment; rudeness and kindness; excitement and fury; peace and control; [26] fate and human agency; liberation and want of liberation; fear and lack of fear; injury and non-injury; asceticism, sacrifice and constraint; what is poisonous and what is not poisonous; [27] end, beginning and middle stage as well as maintenance of duties; rapture, joy, insolence, hypocrisy and fortitude; what is conducive [to one’s aims] and what is not conducive [to one’s aims]; [28] power and powerlessness; similarly self-conceit and arrogance; decay and absence of decay; discipline and emancipation; proper time and improper time, O Bhārata; [29] falsehood, truth, state of knowing and of not knowing; also faith and lack of faith; passiveness and activity; profit and want of profit; victory and defeat; [30] sharpness and softness; death as well as acquisition [of new life] and no acquisition [of new life any more] (?); contradiction and lack of contradiction;²⁶ obligation and lack of obligation; what is effective and what is ineffective; [31] indignation and lack of indignation as well as what conforms to moral law and what does not conform to moral law; embarrassment and absence of embarrassment as well as modesty; success and failure; [32] ardour, skill in deeds, [convincing] power of speech, discernment of the true nature [of things]—in such a manner the political power is manifold in this world of the descendants of Kuru.’²⁷

²⁶ MBh₂ and MBh₁ the apparatus, p. 572 (10 mss): *virodhas cāvirodhas ca*. Alternatively, ‘failure and success’, MBh₁: *virāddhis cāva rādhis*.

²⁷ MBh 12.121.23c–32:

daṇḍa-nītir jagad-dhātrī daṇḍo hi bahu-vigrahaḥ // 23 //
arthānarthau sukhaṁ dukkhaṁ dharmādharmau balābale /
daurbhāgyaṁ bhāga-dheyam ca puṇyāpuṇye guṇāguṇau // 24 //
kāmākāmāv ṛtur māsaḥ śarvarī divasaḥ kṣaṇaḥ /
aprasādaḥ prasādaś ca harṣaḥ krodhaḥ śamo damaḥ // 25 //

The passage, which clearly is an expanded account taken from the *Artha-śāstra* and which was apparently reworked more than once as testified by its repetitive character, contains all the dilemmas and alternatives listed by Kauṭilya but includes a lot more. In fact, it is very unlikely that the above was originally a characterisation of political science (*daṇḍa-nīti*) or divine or royal power and dominance (*daṇḍa*); it seems rather that the term *daṇḍa-nīti* simply replaced *ānvīkṣikī*—with basically no metrical change in 23c²⁸—at the time when *Ānvīkṣikī* was already looked down upon, being strongly associated with unorthodox views and smacked of heresy.

The passage demonstrates that *Ānvīkṣikī* was thought of as a discipline which is not limited to the three main spheres delineated in the *Artha-śāstra* but the scope of its application was much wider: it is also pertinent to other aspects of life and human actions, including devising the calendar and the count of time (division of time), individual behaviour and conduct, one's emotional and mental states, i.e. the domain of psychology, sensual (sexual) satisfaction and the lack thereof etc. Most significantly, however, in this account *Ānvīkṣikī* is portrayed as being relevant also to the fields of epistemology and rhetorics—falsehood (*anṛta*), truth (*satya*), state of knowing and of not knowing (*jñājñatā*), contradiction (*virodha*) and lack of contradiction (*avirodha*), convincing power of speech (*vāk-śakti*), that is to the branches so closely related to Nyāya and to the argumentative and debate-related portions of the *Caraka-samhitā* (CarS, esp. *Sūtra-sthāna*, *Vimāna-sthāna*).

Another, this time indirect mention of *Ānvīkṣikī* in the same spirit, i.e. as a discipline that helps one achieve one's goals, and here merely applied to the preservation of royal power, reverberates in what the sage Nārada says in the

daivam puruṣa-kāraś ca mokṣāmokṣau bhayābhaye /
hiṃsāhīṃse tapo yajñah samyamo 'tha viśāviṣam // 26 //
antaś cādiś ca madhyam ca kṛtyānām ca prapañcanam /
*madaḥ pramādo darpaś ca dambho dhairyam **nayānaya** // 27 //*
aśaktiḥ śaktir ity evam māna-stambhau vyayavyayau /
vinayaś ca visargaś ca kālākālau ca bhārata // 28 //
anṛtam jñājñatā satyam śraddhāśraddhe tathāiva ca /
klībatā vyavasāyaś ca lābhālābhau jayājayau // 29 //
tikṣṇatā mṛdutā mṛtyur āgamānāgamau tathā //
*virāddhiś cāiva rādhiś ca kāryākārye **balābale** // 30 //*
*asūyā cānasūyā ca **dharmādharma**u tathāiva ca /*
apatrapānapatrape hrīś ca sampad vipac ca ha // 31 //
tejaḥ karmaṇi pāṇḍityam vāk-śaktiś tattva-buddhitā /
evam daṇḍasya kauravya-loke 'smin bahu-rūpatā // 32 //

²⁸ I.e. **ānvīkṣikī jagad-dhātrī* (with the second syllable long and third short, instead of the second short and third long). One might argue that what remains slightly problematic is *daṇḍo* in *daṇḍo hi bahu-vigrahaḥ* of 23d, if we suppose that *ānvīkṣikī* was the original reading of 23c; if it was, then *daṇḍo* should rather not occur in the passage. However, *daṇḍa*, the power or dominance, is a general theme or framework in a longer account (beginning with MBh 12.121.13) into which this *Ānvīkṣikī* interpolation seems to have been inserted.

Mahā-bhārata, the context of which is, again, the examination of the conduct and qualities of the monarch:

A‘O Impeccable [ruler], I hope you similarly [resort to] the seven expedients with six royal virtues²⁹? Do you properly analyse what is conducive and what is not conducive [to political power] and the fourteen [secret measures]³⁰? O supreme among conquerors, I hope you that after you have examined yourself and your enemies, you pursue the eight occupations in order to have peace?’³¹

²⁹ The expression *rāja-guṇaiḥ ṣaḍbhiḥ* does not really seem originally to refer to any established sixfold set of royal virtues but rather to the list of the monarch’s virtues found in the Sixth Chapter of the *Artha-śāstra* (AŚ 6.1.3–6), which enlists the following four categories of the virtues a monarch should possess: virtues of good social interaction (*ābhigāmika-guṇa*), intellectual virtues (*prajñā-guṇa*), virtues of vigour (*utsāha-guṇa*), personal perfections (*ātma-sampad*). And that would explain the number ‘six’ in the expression, which occurs here not because of the actual number of virtues but because of the chapter number (‘six’), just like in the case of the expression *catur-daśa* (see below). The expression *rāja-guṇaiḥ ṣaḍbhiḥ* (through the compound *rāja-guṇa*) seems to conflate the list of the monarch’s virtues of AŚ 6.1.3–6 with the sixfold character of foreign policy (*ṣaḍguṇya*) of the king *vis-à-vis* his neighbours, mentioned a few lines later in AŚ 6.2.4, and enumerated in full in AŚ 7.1.2 (*saṁdhi-vigrahāsana-yāna-saṁśraya-dvaidhī-bhāvāḥ ṣaḍguṇyam iti ācāryāḥ*; these are: peace, aggression, wait, march, retreat for shelter, dual policy; further in NSā 27.3ab).

Similarly, the idea of the seven expedients (*saptōpāya*) seems to be an extended version of an original concept of four expedients the monarch may avail himself of in order to maintain his power in the kingdom and blended with some other classification. The four expedients are enumerated in AŚ 2.10.47 (*upāyāḥ sāmōpapradāna-bheda-daṇḍāḥ*; these are conciliation, gifts, sowing dissent, outright force), with more details and subvarieties given in AŚ 2.48–56. Seven kinds of treatises are mentioned in AŚ 7.5.11, and these could be treated as means of subduing an enemy. However, the seven expedients are mentioned in the 27th Chapter on the Varieties of Expedients (*Upāya-vikalpa-prakaraṇa*) of the *Nīti-sāra* by Kāmandaki (NSā), who first mentions three basic expedients (NSā 27.2), i.e. buying off (*kośa* = *upapradāna*, *dāna*), counsel (*mantra* = *sāma*), the use of the fourfold army (*caturaṅga-bala* = *daṇḍa*), and then expands it, first, to four (with *iti catuṣṭayam* being a clear reference to AŚ) and then to seven (NSā 27.3): *sāma dānaś ca daṇḍaś ca bhedaś cēti catuṣṭayam / māyōpekṣēndra-jālaṁ ca saptōpāyāḥ prakīrtitāḥ //*, i.e. conciliation, gifts, outright force, sowing dissent, deceit, political indifference, magical practices (this is, again, a reference to AŚ, Chapter 14). On the six virtues and seven means, comp. SCHARFE (1989: 206–210), who does not consider all the sources (e.g. NSā) though.

³⁰ This seems to be an allusion to Chapter 14 (*Aupaniṣadikam*) of the *Artha-śāstra*.

³¹ MBh 2.5.11:

*kac cid rāja-guṇaiḥ ṣaḍbhiḥ saptōpāyāms tathānagha /
balābalam tathā samyak catur-daśa parīkṣase //
kaccid ātmānam anvīkṣya parāṁś ca jayatām vara /
tathā saṁdhāya karmāṇi aṣṭau bhārata sevase //*

The wording (emphasised/ in bold)—*balābala* and *anvikṣya*—cannot be coincidental. The compound *balābala* refers to *daṇḍa-nītyām balābale* of AŚ 1.2.11, whereas the gerund *anvikṣya* invokes the very name of the Ānvikṣikī current.

Such importance and a vital role to play by Ānvikṣikī in the qualifications and general education of the king which transpires from the questions posed by Nārada in the above passage is also highlighted in the advice contained in the *Gautama-dharma-sūtra*:

‘[The king] should be trained in the triple *Veda* and methodology.’³²

As is well known, Kauṭilya who also emphasises the importance of the current, wrote his practical manual with the purpose of imparting comprehensive knowledge system to a future king. The reference to Ānvikṣikī in the *Gautama-dharma-sūtra* is also important because it attests to a positive perception of the current at an early phase, i.e. around and after the collapse of the Mauryas.³³ The current was viewed positively in some circles even in at least the first two centuries of the common era, i.e. around the time of the composition of the *Yājñavalkya-smṛti*³⁴, which refers to it as well:

‘The king who is versed in methodology, political science, economics and the triple *Veda* [knows how to] conceal his own weaknesses.’³⁵

In a creation myth about the beginnings of the royal sovereignty when, after all the virtues, rites etc. in the world disintegrated, Brahmā composes and imparts a mythical text in a hundred thousand chapters which was believed to allegedly contain a section on norms, customs, observances and social rules alongside the following reference to the same four basic disciplines, including Ānvikṣikī, encapsulated in a separate chapter:

‘Likewise, O the Bull of the Bharata, such extensive disciplines of learning as the triple *Veda*, methodology (*ānvikṣikī*), economics and political science were laid down [in the work].’³⁶

³² GDhS₁ 11.3 = GDhS₂ 2.2.3 = GDhS₃ 11.3: *trayyām ānvikṣikyā vābhivinītaḥ*.

³³ The text was composed in the period corresponding to the decline of and posterior to the Mauryan Empire, see OLIVELLE (2000: 8): ‘I think that there is sufficient evidence to conclude that Āpastamba is older than Gautama’ and OLIVELLE (2000: 10): ‘There is no compelling reason at too great a distance in time from Gautama, we would not be far wrong in placing his upper limit around the beginning of the third century BCE.’

³⁴ KANE (1930–1962 I²: 443, 447), DUNCAN–DERRETT (1973: 34).

³⁵ YDhŚ 1.311:

*sva-randhra-goptānvikṣikyām daṇḍa-nītyām tathāva ca /
vinītas tv aṭha vārttāyām trayyām cāva narādhipaḥ //*

³⁶ MBh 12.59.33:

*trayī cānvikṣikī cāva vārttā ca bharata-ṛṣabha /
daṇḍa-nītis ca vipulā vidyās tatra nidarśitāh //*

Ānvīkṣikī is mentioned here as one of the disciplines to sustain the life and welfare of people, one considered so important that it had to be included in the sacred text laying down all the rules for the humankind and being a foundation of culture.

The positive image of Ānvīkṣikī as a theoretical discipline of learning one should master is occasionally emphasised even in such texts as the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, albeit the canonical fourfold list of sciences gets expanded:

‘[The teacher Sāndīpani imparted to the gods] the science of archery and law treatises as well as the path of methodical reasoning (*nyāya-pathin*) and the methodological knowledge (*ānvīkṣikī-vidyā*), and the sixfold royal conduct (political science).’³⁷

These and other stray references in the epic to Ānvīkṣikī as a methodological discipline show that the current was, at least for some centuries and in certain milieux, positively associated with the proper royal conduct, preservation of moral law (*dharma*) etc., even among orthodox Brahmanic circles. The references can also serve as a good illustration of how the methodology of Ānvīkṣikī was used or believed to be used in actual or epic life and in the way Kauṭilya recommended.

5.3. At least one reference in the *Mahā-bhārata* is conspicuous in explicitly leaving Ānvīkṣikī out of the enumeration of the four main branches through which the world is regulated and maintained, thus reducing the list to three:

‘There are three disciplines of learning for the learned ones: the triple *Veda*, economics and political science. It is through them, correctly applied, that the course of the world is regulated.’³⁸

Interestingly, the *pādas* ab (*trayī vārttā daṇḍa-nītis ... vidyā*) look almost like a quotation from *Artha-śāstra* 1.2.1 (*ānvīkṣikī trayī vārttā daṇḍa-nītis cēti vidyāḥ*) or *Nīti-sāra* 2.2a–c (*ānvīkṣikī trayī vārttā daṇḍa-nītis ca śāśvatī / vidyās catasra evātā*), except for the term *ānvīkṣikī* absent. Despite the obvious omission of Ānvīkṣikī in this enumeration—additionally emphasised through the mention of only ‘three disciplines of learning’ (*tisro vidyā*), not four—the verse might nevertheless contain a hidden reference to the methodological current: it apparently reproduces a list of three disciplines which is associated with ‘the school of Manu’ in the *Artha-śāstra* (whatever that school was, certainly it was

³⁷ BhāgP 10.45.34:

*sarahasyam dhanur-vedam dharmam nyāya-panthāms tathā /
tathā cānvīkṣikim vidyam rāja-nītim ca ṣaḍ-vidhām //*

³⁸ MBh 3.149.31:

*trayī vārttā daṇḍa-nītis tisro vidyā vijānatām /
tābhiḥ samyak-prayuktābhir loka-yātrā vidhīyate //*

not the school of the *Manu-smṛti*), and according to which Ānvīkṣikī is simply included in the Vedic soteriological and religious reflection (*trayī*):

‘The representatives of the school of Manu [maintain] that the triple *Veda*, economics and political science [are the only disciplines of learning], because methodology is a special branch of the triple *Veda*.’³⁹

If indeed, as Kauṭilya informs us, there were certain authoritative Brāhmaṇic traditions which ostensibly recognised the triple classification such as the representatives of the school of Manu (*mānava*), but included Ānvīkṣikī as a sub-variety of the Vedic learning (*trayī-viśeṣa*), then it is quite likely that the above verse simply replicates such a view.

There is one more verse which either directly or indirectly refers to Ānvīkṣikī:

‘In this world the livelihood of people is [provided for through] agriculture, tending cattle and trade, [viz. economics; further, there is also] political science, the triple *Veda*, the knowledge—through that people fully exist.’⁴⁰

What it presents is, likewise, the enumeration of the same four—or three, depending on the interpretation of the terms *trayī vidyā* either as two separate words or as a compound *trayī-vidyā*—disciplines. In the first place, economics is here disguised in the three economic activities (*kṛṣi*, *go-rakṣya* and *vāṇijya*) which are identical with the components (*kṛṣi*, *pāśu-pālya* and *vaṇijyā*) of economy (*vārttā*) enumerated in AŚ 1.4.1 (n. 1). The verse allows for two interpretations: either a fourfold classification ([*vārttā*] *daṇḍa-nītis trayī vidyā*), in which Ānvīkṣikī features merely as ‘the knowledge’, or a treefold classification ([*vārttā*] *daṇḍa-nītis trayī-vidyā*), i.e. ‘political science, the knowledge of the triple *Veda*’.

Furthermore, the latter hemistich of the first of the *Mahā-bhārata* verses (MBh 3.149.31) explains that these three disciplines are relevant to people provided ‘they are correctly applied’ (*tābhiḥ samyak-prayuktābhir*). It seems that, first, the fact that the three disciplines become relevant (i.e. ‘the course of the world is regulated ... through them’) means that they ‘acquire a genuine status of disciplines of learning’ (*vidyānām vidyātvam*), to use Kauṭilya’s expression of AŚ 1.2.9, and indeed the implication of the passage corresponds in spirit to the Kauṭilya’s expression. Secondly, the idea of the disciplines being correctly applied (*samyak-prayuktābhiḥ*) calls for an explanation of what criteria or procedures are thereby indicated. And that could possibly be a reference to proper methodology, i.e. to Ānvīkṣikī.

³⁹ AŚ₁ 1.2.2–3: *trayī vārttā daṇḍa-nītis cēti mānavāḥ. trayī-viśeṣo hy ānvīkṣikīti.*

⁴⁰ MBh 3.198.23:

*kṛṣi-go-rakṣya-vāṇijyam iha lokasya jīvanam /
daṇḍa-nītis trayī-vidyā tena lokā bhavanty uta //*

Both verses in their last *pādas* emphasise the role of the chief disciplines of learning, Ānvīkṣikī included, in maintaining the order and proper course of the world and human actions: *loka-yātrā vidhīyate* and *tena lokā bhavanty uta*, precisely the way it is done by Kāmandaki in NīSā 2.2d: these are the causes of stability of the world (*loka-samsthiti-hetavaḥ*). This additionally establishes the link between the two verses and the tradition described by Kauṭilya and Kāmandaki.

A passage that immediately follows *Mahā-bhārata* 3.149.31 both gives some additional explanation as to why the three disciplines are so vital and reiterates that the condition of their relevance is their proper implementation:

‘Indeed, the execution of moral law (*dharma*) would not be possible on earth without the standard of the triple *Veda*. And also without political science, this [whole world] would be without moral limits. Further, [all] these people who do not practice the standard of economics would perish. Indeed, through these three standards, when implemented correctly, people are truly stimulated.’⁴¹

Thus, also the exemplification of the importance of the three disciplines of learning highlighted in the passage, analogous to *Mahā-bhārata* 3.149.31, allocates a fourth category, without mentioning it by name, which is necessary for the three disciplines to make any practical sense at all. This unnamed discipline which furnishes a proper methodological knowledge cannot but be, I would claim, Ānvīkṣikī.

At the same time, as it transpires from rather rare direct references to Ānvīkṣikī, from the fact that the references which would show it in a favourable light are even more scarce and from its omission in the classification of main disciplines of learning, it was indeed the case that for some reasons Ānvīkṣikī became at a certain point, probably in the centuries towards the end of the final compilation of the *Mahā-bhārata* (ca. second to fourth century CE), a current which was either neglected or looked down upon, while an explicit association with it was not particularly ennobling and was rather to be avoided.

6. Let us return to the actual essence of Ānvīkṣikī, of which we know that it was regarded as a successful investigative procedure and methodology associated with proper reasoning, determination of truth and effective course of conduct. But there is more than this. The pivotal, albeit very laconic statement of *Artha-sāstra* 1.2.11 (*vide supra* p. 177 and n. 11), reiterated by Kāmandaki (*vide*

⁴¹ MBh 3.149.32–33:

*sā ced dharma-kriyā na syāt trayī-dharmam ṛte bhūvi /
daṇḍa-nītim ṛte cāpi nirmaryādam idam bhavet //
vārttā-dharme hy avartantyo vinaśyeyur imāḥ prajāḥ /
supravṛttair tribhir hy etair dharmaiḥ sūyanti vai prajāḥ //*

supra p. 180 and n. 22), is, as a matter of fact, the only tangible feature of Ānvīkṣikī as we find it in Kauṭilya's and later in Kāmandaki's, and as much as we can attempt to reconstruct its nature we can see that the starting point for such a practical application of the Ānvīkṣikī methodology presented in the *Artha-śāstra* is the following question:

Is a particular deed (*x*)
 good (P) or bad (not-P)
 in the realm of:
 —religion,
 —economic activity,
 —social coherence and political power?⁴²

Accordingly, is a particular deed (*x*) profitable (*artha*, P) or not profitable (*anartha*, not-P) in the field of agriculture, cattle breeding and trade? Is a particular deed (*x*) conducive (*naya*, P) or not conducive (*apanaya*, not-P) to the maintenance of one's political power? Is a particular deed effective (*bala*, P) or ineffective (*abala*, not-P) in implementing other disciplines of learning? Correspondingly, the starting point for each cases of the application of Ānvīkṣikī which Kauṭilya enumerates is consistently a dilemma whether a particular deed possesses characteristics desired in a given field of application or not: 'Is *x* P or not-P?' In other words, it is consistently a dilemma whether a particular deed possesses characteristics desired in a given field of application or not: 'Is *x* P or not-P?'

And this seems to be precisely a classical case of doubt so vital for the epistemology of the Nyāya system, engrafted in the sixteen epistemological categories of the system as the third one, which opens the whole process of questioning, enquiry and analysis (see NS 1.1.1: *pramāṇa-prameya-samśaya*-^o etc.). As we shall see (§ 8), Ānvīkṣikī is known also to the proponents of Nyāya specifically as a system in which analysis of doubt and its resolution plays a vital role, a system whose 'unique realms are the [epistemological] categories such as doubt etc.' (Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana: *tasyāḥ pṛthak-prasthānāḥ samśayādayaḥ padārthāḥ*) which 'is guided by the categories such as doubt etc.' (Uddyotakara: *samśayādi-bhedānuvidhāyini ānvīkṣikī*). Doubt as a starting point of methodological analysis is therefore one of the thematic points of both the current of Ānvīkṣikī and the school of Nyāya.

6.1. The idea of doubt is of extreme importance to the system of Nyāya and it is defined in the *Nyāya-sūtra* in the following manner:

⁴² Where P, to be exact, stands for: 'conforming to moral law' (*dharma*), 'economically profitable' (*artha*), 'conducive to political power' (*naya*), 'effective' (*bala*), and where non-P stand for: 'not conforming to moral law' (*adharmā*), 'not economically profitable' (*anartha*), 'not conducive to political power' (*apanaya*), 'ineffective' (*abala*)—with respect to the three main spheres of application religion (*trayī*), economic activity (*vārttā*) and social coherence maintained through political power (*daṇḍa-nīti*).

‘Doubt is an inquisitive reflection that depends on a particular characteristic [about which one is not certain and it is] due to perceived possibility of a property common [to different loci], due to perceived possibility of numerous properties, contradictory apprehension, incongruity of apprehension or incongruity of non-apprehension.’⁴³

The *Locus classicus* for the nature of doubt (*saṁśaya*) is a the following passage of the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*:

‘First one sees a property common to a pillar and a person, say, a [particular] height or a [particular] circumference [which could be a feature of both], and becomes curious as regards that particular characteristic [which can be applicable] to both [a pillar and a person] which he has seen before. Then he cannot determine any of the two [possibilities and decide] what it is. Doubt is such a cognition that fails to determine what it is. “I apprehend a property which is common to both [but] I do not apprehend a particular characteristic which belongs only to one of these two”—such a reflection is the basis [of doubt]. This [reflection] emerges as [a cause] that prompts doubt. Such an inquisitive reflection that depends on [this] particular characteristic [which one needs to determine what object one actually sees] is doubt.’⁴⁴

A particular object x subject to doubt is first determined to have a property Q , of which it is known that only a certain set of things possesses it, and out of these things some are P and some are non- P . Thus, doubt for Vātsyāyana assumes a slightly more complex form of reasoning:

$$\begin{array}{l} x \text{ ix } Q \\ (P \text{ and not-}P) \in Q \\ \hline \text{Is } x \text{ } P \text{ or not-}P? \end{array}$$

Further, the importance of doubt is emphasised by Vātsyāyana who considers doubt as a starting point of an enquiry, which is for him called ‘*nyāya*’:

⁴³ NS 1.1.23: *saṁānāneka-dharmōpapatter vipratipatter upalabdhy-anupalabdhy-avyavasthātaś ca viśeṣāpekṣo vimarśaḥ saṁśayaḥ*.

⁴⁴ NBh 1.1.23: *sthāṇu-puruṣayoḥ samānam dharmam āroha-pariṇāhau paśyan pūrvadṛṣṭam ca tayor viśeṣam bhubhutsumānaḥ kiṁsviḍ ity anyataram nāvadhārayati, tad-anavādharaṇam jñānam saṁśayaḥ. samānam anayor dharmam upalabhe viśeṣam anyatarasya nōpalabha ity eṣā buddhir apekṣā. sā saṁśayasya pravarttikā vartate. tena viśeṣāpekṣo vimarśaḥ saṁśayaḥ*. For NS 1.1.23, see n. 43.

‘Methodical reasoning (*nyāya*) is carried out not with respect to an object which has been perceived or which has been determined [conceptually], but with respect to an object under doubt.’⁴⁵

This is clearly an approach which is a continuation of the process of analysis weighing the pros and cons of a particular action or value in the three realms of ritual/religion, economic activity and political power, emphasised, as we have seen, in the *Artha-śāstra*, albeit in a form much more advanced.

6.2. The idea of doubt also significantly features in the *Caraka-saṃhitā*, where it is characterised in quite similar terms:

‘Now, [we describe] doubt. What is called doubt is a lack of certainty concerning things with respect to which one entertains a systemic doubt because of a characteristic of suspicion, for instance: we see people who are endowed with characteristics of an old age and people who are not endowed with characteristics of an old age, similarly people who are active and who are inactive, who get older quickly and those who are long-lived—because one has seen these two [categories, one entertains] doubt: Does untimely death exist or not?’⁴⁶

The quintessence of doubt, according to the *Caraka-saṃhitā* is precisely of the same nature: ‘Is x P or not-P?’, or ‘Is the quality of P ascribable to the object x or is the quality of non-P ascribable to the object x ?’ Clearly, the realm of application in this case which is diagnosis and medical treatment is quite different for obvious reasons, and the instance just quoted is the doubt which concerns death, its actual causes and additional factors which can lead to it as well as, by implication, the natural duration of life and the causes of its prolongation. In other words it is the question: Which of possible ways of life and of possible kinds of medical treatment may preserve life, i.e. rescue one from untimely death?

We notice that the same kind of doubt and subsequent reasoning is behind the idea of Ānvīkṣikī in Kauṭilya’s passage (and subsequently in Kāmandaki’s), albeit cast in a different environment: one entertains doubt whether a particular course of action is beneficial to, or at least compatible with the goals of religion, economics or political science: ‘Is conduct x P or not-P?’, where ‘P’ is ‘beneficial/profitable/serviceable’, in the sphere of religion, moral law, economics and political science. Ānvīkṣikī, the reasoner behind the *Caraka-*

⁴⁵ NBh₁ 1.1.1, p. 35.4 = NBh₂ p. 3.3: *tatra nānupalabdhe na nirṇite ’rthe nyāyaḥ pravartate, kim tarhi? saṃśayite ’rthe.*

⁴⁶ CarS 3.8.43: *atha saṃśayaḥ—saṃśayo nāma sandeha-lakṣaṇānusandigdheṣv artheṣv aniścayaḥ, yathā dṛṣṭā hy āyuṣmal-lakṣaṇair upetās cānupetās ca tathā sakriyās cākriyās ca puruṣāḥ śīghra-bhaṅgās cira-jīvinaś ca, etad ubhaya-dṛṣṭatvāt saṃśayaḥ—kim asti khalv akāla-mṛtyur uta nāstīti.*

samhitā, Akṣapāda Gautama and Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana all share the same concern in their epistemic method: how to resolve the doubt so defined. And that does not seem coincidental.

7.1. Kauṭilya comes to mention Ānvīkṣikī once again but in a different context:

‘Political science is the means of securing the pursuit of (lit. acquisition and maintenance) of methodology (*ānvīkṣikī*), the triple *Veda* and economics...’⁴⁷

In the passage the relations between Ānvīkṣikī and other disciplines, or at least one of them, i.e. political science, is reversed. Before Kauṭilya maintained that Ānvīkṣikī is an indispensable tool to effective political rule. Here he says that the relation is reciprocal: political power is vital for the preservation of Ānvīkṣikī as well as other disciplines of learning.

This emphasises the importance of political and social stability as well as economic welfare for an unrestrained cultivation of Ānvīkṣikī, which in turn reminds us of what Aristotle in his *Metaphysics* says of philosophy and philosophers who for the practice of their philosophical vocation require a society which has reached a certain level of economic development that can enable an elite of intellectuals to focus on philosophical reflection rather than on mundane pursuit of activities indispensable merely for material or biological survival.

The passage also suggests that Kauṭilya treated political science and actual political power based on the theoretical analysis and enlightened advice as a precondition for unrestrained theoretical pursuit of the other three disciplines and practical implementation of their conclusions, which were to serve the preservation of political power. Thus the relation between the two disciplines was reciprocal and that of symbiosis: Ānvīkṣikī, alongside the other two, helped the monarch guide the society, use force, exercise the control in the sphere of social interaction and moral conduct, stimulate economy, stabilise the country etc., and thereby maintain power in a relatively peaceful manner without excessive violence. Political science applied through actual royal rule facilitated the development of the three other disciplines, including Ānvīkṣikī, for its own goals.

7.2. Kauṭilya also mentions how the knowledge of the four disciplines of learning could be acquired, i.e. what its legitimate sources are:

‘After he has gone through the initiation rite, [the prince] should learn the triple *Veda* and methodology from the experts, economics from supervisors of departments, political science from theoreticians and practitioners.’⁴⁸

⁴⁷ AŚ 1.4.3: *ānvīkṣikī-trayī-vārttānām yoga-kṣema-sādhanā daṇḍaḥ...*

⁴⁸ AŚ 1.5.8: *vṛttōpanayanān trayīm ānvīkṣikīm ca śiṣṭebhyo vārttām adhyakṣebhyo daṇḍānītim vaktṛ-prayoktṛbhyah.*

This implies that Ānvīkṣikī was a separate discipline that should be learnt from specialists (*śiṣṭebhyaḥ*) in this particular field and not from experts in any other field. We may assume, that is, that if a student wished to study Ānvīkṣikī, he should clearly not turn to experts in economics or in political science, but exclusively to those learned in the methodology of Ānvīkṣikī, i.e. experts in this particular field in its own right.

That is distantly echoed in the *Mahā-bhārata*, where probably the *traividyaḥ* ('experts in three disciplines'/'triple-discipline' experts') is a short hand for experts in respective fields:

‘From the experts in three disciplines [the prince] should learn the triple *Veda*, the everlasting political science, methodology as well as the knowledge of the self, whereas from ordinary people [he should learn] economics.’⁴⁹

8.1. The crucial question, therefore, arises who these ‘triple-discipline experts’ (*traividyaḥ*) who taught and practised Ānvīkṣikī actually were? As I pointed out earlier (p. 176), Kauṭilya includes three schools under the current of methodology under the names: *sāṃkhya*, *yoga* and *lokāyata*. However, the question is whether these designations really stand for what one may think they do, when one reads the passage and seems justified in taking them at their face value?

Let us first turn our attention to a philosophical school of Nyāya, which is not explicitly mentioned in the *Artha-śāstra* but whose proponent Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana, nevertheless, attempts to explicitly establish a historical link between his own school and the tradition of Ānvīkṣikī. Interestingly, it is not only Nyāya but also its associate school of Vaiśeṣika which is not mentioned as a school related to Ānvīkṣikī in the *Artha-śāstra*, *Mahā-bhārata* and other sources. A question immediately follows why they two not, despite the evidence of Vātsyāyana? Alternatively, what would be the rationale behind Vātsyāyana’s attempt to equate, as we shall see, Nyāya with Ānvīkṣikī and to establish a link between these two, even though Kauṭilya completely ignored to mention either Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika in his account Ānvīkṣikī?

As it is well known, the text of the Nyāya tradition in which the term ‘*ānvīkṣikī*’ features for the first time is the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*:

‘[Opponent’s objection]: “As regards these [epistemological categories mentioned in NS 1.1.1,] a separate mention of [such categories] as doubt etc. is purposeless, because they—as far as they are legitimately included in [the two categories of] cognitive criteria and the cognoscibles—are not distinct [from one of these two].” [Reply.] This is true. However, the following four disci-

⁴⁹ MDhŚ 7.43:

*traividyebhyas trayīm vidyām daṇḍa-nītim ca śāśvatīm /
ānvīkṣikīm cātma-vidyām vārttārambhāmś ca lokataḥ //*

plines of learning, each having its unique realm, are specified for the benefit of living beings, of which the fourth one is methodology (*ānvīkṣikī*), i.e. the discipline of methodical reasoning (*nyāya-vidyā*). Its unique realms are the [epistemological] categories such as doubt etc. Without a separate mention of these [categories] this [methodology] would merely be a discipline teaching about the highest self, like the *Upaniṣads*. Therefore, on account of [epistemological] categories such as doubt etc. [methodology] is established as a distinct [discipline of learning].⁵⁰

Clearly, ‘the following four disciplines of learning’ (*imās tu catasro vidyāḥ*) are precisely the same disciplines as those mentioned by Kauṭilya. In this passage Vātsyāyana equates his own school with *Ānvīkṣikī* and emphasises that the defining characteristic of Nyāya/*Ānvīkṣikī* is the fourteen epistemological categories out of sixteen enumerated in NS 1.1.1 that begin with doubt (*saṁśaya*) and end with points of defeat (*nigraha-sthāna*). Of particular notice is the fact that he singles out doubt as the defining feature of *Ānvīkṣikī* which was, it seems, indeed the case (*vide supra* § 6). It is doubt as a separate category that is crucial both in this passage as well as in the list of the fourteen categories of Nyāya inasmuch as it is a starting point of any enquiry and analysis. And this is exactly what also seems so important for *Ānvīkṣikī* in evaluating particular course of action that is beneficial to accomplish religious, economic or political goals. But for doubt etc., Nyāya—and apparently *Ānvīkṣikī*—would end up as being reduced merely to a salvific doctrine that teaches about the highest self (*adhvātma-vidyā* / *ātma-vidyā*), restricted to the Brāhmaṇic orthodox tradition. Further, in the passage Vātsyāyana treats *Ānvīkṣikī* as primary, while explaining how it differs from *adhvātma-vidyā*, ‘a discipline studying the highest self’, and how it is established as separate branch in its own right (*prthak prasthāpyate*); surprisingly, Nyāya is subordinate to *Ānvīkṣikī* and treated as secondary: it is not Nyāya which is mentioned as the fourth among the main disciplines of learning but *Ānvīkṣikī*. We can, therefore, see that Vātsyāyana’s reference to *Ānvīkṣikī* is not simply coincidental but concerns the very nature of both traditions, which are historically equated by Vātsyāyana: the fourth discipline is in its true essence the discipline of methodical reasoning (*yāsām caturthīyam ānvīkṣikī nyāya-vidyā*), which is what Nyāya is and does.

⁵⁰ NBh₁ 1.1.1, p. 34–35 = NBh₂, p. 2.18–3.2: *tatra saṁśayādīnām prthag-vacanam anarthakam—saṁśayādayo {hy}ḥ yathā-sambhavam pramāṇeṣu prameyeṣu cāntar-bhavanto na vyatiricyanta iti. satyam etat. imās tu catasro vidyāḥ prthak-prasthānāḥ prāṇa-bhṛtām anugrahāyōpadiśyante, yāsām caturthīyam ānvīkṣikī nyāya-vidyā. tasyāḥ prthak-prasthānāḥ saṁśayādayaḥ padārthāḥ. teṣām prthag-vacanam antareṇādhvātma-vidyā-mātram iyaṁ syāt, yathōpaniṣadah. tasmāt saṁśayādibhiḥ padārthaiḥ prthak prasthāpyate.* [^a NBh₂.]

Subsequently, Vātsyāyana raises a crucial question that concerns the very nature of his own school of thought and, at the same time, the foundations of Ānvīkṣikī:

‘What is then this methodical reasoning (*nyāya*)? Methodical reasoning is an examination of an object by means of cognitive criteria. Inference relies on perception and testimony. This is systematic enquiry. Systematic enquiry is a systematic query into [an object] which has already become known by means of perception and testimony. What proceeds by means of this [systematic enquiry] is methodology (*ānvīkṣikī*), i.e. the discipline of methodical reasoning (*nyāya-vidyā*), or the science of methodical reasoning (*nyāya-śāstram*).’⁵¹

In this short account, he draws a direct link between the essential features of his own school and Ānvīkṣikī, which not only is treated as tantamount to the discipline known as *nyāya-vidyā* or *nyāya-śāstra*, or ‘discipline of methodical reasoning’, but determines the method of analysis adopted by Nyāya itself. For all practical purposes, Vātsyāyana clearly equates the method and quintessence of Ānvīkṣikī with the discipline of methodical reasoning (*nyāya-vidyā*), which lies at the core of Nyāya.⁵²

In his *Nyāya-vārttika*, Uddyotakara recapitulates and elucidates on all the main points made by Vātsyāyana as follows:

‘Thus, these [main] disciplines of learning are four. Each of them has its own unique realm. The triple *Veda* has as its unique realm fire sacrifice, fire oblation etc. Economics has as its unique realm a [farmer’s] plough, a [merchant’s] carriage etc. Political science is guided by the categories such as the ruler, ministers etc. Methodology is guided by the categories such as doubt etc. Without its own unique realm such as doubt etc. it would merely be a discipline teaching about the highest self. Why so? Because being merely a discipline teaching about the highest self it would be like the *Upaniṣads*, and thus it would be included into the triple *Veda*, and the fourfold division [of disciplines] would cease.’⁵³

⁵¹ NBh₁ 1.1.1, p. 39.1–2 = NBh₂, p. 3.11–13: *kaḥ punar ayam nyāyah? pramāṇair artha-parīkṣaṇaṁ nyāyah. pratyakṣāgamāsrītam anumānam. sāvīkṣā. pratyakṣāgamābhyām ikṣitasyānvīkṣaṇam anvīkṣā. tayā pravartata ity ānvīkṣikī nyāya-vidyā nyāya-śāstram.*

⁵² Comp. also Jayantabhaṭṭa’s account in the same spirit, NMa₁ I: 9.10–11: *pratyakṣāgamābhyām ikṣitasyānvīkṣaṇaṁ anvīkṣā anumānam ity arthaḥ tad-vyutpādakaṁ śāstram ānvīkṣikī.*

⁵³ NV₁ 1.1.1., p. 12.10–16 = NV₂ 1.1.1., p. 11.17–22: *catasra imā vidyā bhavanti {iti}^a. tāś ca pṛthak-prasthānāḥ. agni-hotra-havanādi-prasthānā trayī. hala-śakaṭādi-prasthānā vārtā. svāmy-amātya-^b{ādi}-bhedānuvidhāyinī daṇḍa-nītiḥ. samśayādi-bhedānuvidhāyinī*

We can see that indeed each of the four disciplines has its unique realm of interest and application, and that of Ānvīkṣikī is precisely doubt and other epistemological categories, i.e. epistemology and general enquiry. Neither Vātsyāyana nor Uddyotakara in their brief definitions of the nature of Ānvīkṣikī mentions any particular practical field of application where it could be employed, apart from a broad theoretical realm of methodical reasoning and examination of an object by means of cognitive criteria, which can practically be applied to almost any field one chooses. The unique subject matter (*prasthāna*) for Ānvīkṣikī is therefore methodological enquiry, epistemology and related issues, and soteriology seems to be merely one of its additional fields of application.

By way of summary of his comments on the enumeration of all the sixteen epistemological categories listed in opening aphorism of the *Nyāya-sūtra*, Vātsyāyana returns to Ānvīkṣikī and cites a verse already known from *Arthaśāstra*, albeit with a significant change:

‘This methodology in question, which is differentiated [as a separate science from all other disciplines of learning] through categories, such as cognitive criteria etc.,

is declared, in the catalogue of disciplines of learning, to be the lamp for disciplines of learning, the means to [accomplish] all actions, the fundament of all moral laws.’⁵⁴

This is by no means an insignificant statement: Vātsyāyana offers a brief description of the categories which found the cornerstone of the Nyāya philosophical project and at the same time recapitulates the nature of his own system with the verse which speaks of nothing else but Ānvīkṣikī, and doing so, he consciously replaces the original *pāda* 4 (*śaśvad ānvīkṣikī matā*) of the *Arthaśāstra* with a new phrase (*vidyōddeśe prakīrtitā*), which additionally emphasises the primary role of the current. ‘The catalogue of disciplines of learning’ (*vidyōddeśe*) of Vātsyāyana’s verse in which Ānvīkṣikī ‘is declared ... to be the lamp for disciplines of learning’ can be a n y fourfold division of disciplines of learning, not necessarily the same as Kauṭilya’s, but most likely it is indeed the *Arthaśāstra*, for the simple reason that the verse itself is a quotation, with a minor change, from this work.

ānvīkṣikī. tasyāḥ saṁśayādi-prasthānam antareṇā{dhyā}c̣tma-vidyā-mātram iyaṁ syāt. tataḥ kim̄ syāt? adhyātma-vidyā-mātratvād upaniṣad-vidyāvat trayyām evāntar-bhāva iti catuṣṭyaṁ nivartate. [a NV₂. b NV₂. c NV₂.]

⁵⁴ NBh₁ 1.1.1, p. 64 = NBh₂, p. 5.18–20: *sēyam ānvīkṣikī pramāṇādibhiḥ padārthair vibhajyamānā*

*pradīpaḥ sarva-vidyānām upāyaḥ sarva-karmaṇām /
āśrayaḥ sarva-dharmānām vidyōddeśe prakīrtitā //*

Cf. RUBEN’S (1926: 354) idea that the change within the verse does not stem for Vātsyāyana himself, unconvincing for the simple fact that the verse is grammatically embedded in the structure of the NBh passage and its grammatical subject is outside of the verse.

Also Uddyotakara's gloss contained in the *Nyāya-vārttika* emphasises the fact that Ānvīkṣikī, in its method, is applicable to all domains of learning and is serviceable to all other sciences, which means that the soteriological aspect does exhaust its multidimensional character and philosophical concerns:

'Therefore, these categories, such as doubt etc., which are included in [the two categories of] cognitive criteria and the cognoscibles, have been described separately in order to emphasise the [fourfold] division of the disciplines of learning. This methodology in question, which is the discipline of methodical reasoning and which is differentiated [as a separate science from all other disciplines of learning] through categories, such as cognitive criteria etc., is declared to be the lamp for disciplines of learning, because it illuminates [its object, i.e. unique realm,] like a lamp, and so it is a lamp [for other disciplines of learning]. Its object has been explained to consist in cognitive criteria and other [categories]. Other disciplines are explained, too. Why cognitive criteria and other [categories] are not [an object] for these other disciplines of learning?'⁵⁵

There can be no doubt that Vātsyāyana, and Uddyotakara following him, view themselves and their own school of Nyāya as direct successors of Ānvīkṣikī. How far, however, does their claim hold validity in a historical sense? And could Nyāya be a genuine successor of Ānvīkṣikī at all, if it was not even contained in Kauṭilya's list comprising the three schools (p. 176)?

8.2. We find a partial confirmation of the accuracy of Kauṭilya's classifying the materialists (*lokāyata*) among the followers of Ānvīkṣikī in a passage from the *Rāmāyaṇa* in which Rāma addresses Bhārata as follows:

'I hope, dear friend, that you do not associate with Brahmins who are materialists, for they are fools whose competence is useless and they consider themselves experts. These malignant people acquire their intelligence in the form of Ānvīkṣikī and then talk nonsense, even when principal law treatises are there at hand.'⁵⁶

⁵⁵ NV₁ 1.1.1, p. 21.8–14 = NV₂ 1.1.1., p. 20.2–7: *tasmād ete saṁśayādayḥ padārthāḥ pramāṇe prameye cāntar-bhavanto vidyā-prasthāna-bheda-jñāpanārtham pṛthag-upadiṣṭāḥ* {iti}^a. *sēyam ānvīkṣikī nyāya-vidyā pramāṇādibhiḥ padārthaiḥ vibhajyamānā pradīpaḥ sarva-vidyānām bhavati prakāśakatvāt pradīpavat* {pradīpaḥ}^b. *pramāṇādi-pratipāditam artham itarā vidyāḥ pratipadyanta iti. kim itarāsu vidyāsu pramāṇādīni na santi?* [^a NV₂. ^b NV₂ omits.]

⁵⁶ R₁ 2.100.38–39 = R₂ 2.94.32–33:

kaccin na lokāyatikān brāhmaṇāms tāta sevase /

Clearly, the verses confirm what Kauṭilya stated that at least some of the followers of Ānvīkṣikī were materialists (*lokāyatika*, *lokāyata*).

Further, in these two verses Rāma warns Bhārata to stay away from mischievous followers of Ānvīkṣikī, who ignore tradition, law and order established through *Dharma-śāstras* and speak against the sacred lore. They are not outcasts, however, being legitimate Brahmins. What precedes these verses is also quite informative:

‘I hope, dear friend, that plans devised by you or your ministers, when not divulged, are never known [to anybody], even while applying all kinds of reasoning.’⁵⁷

The verse refers to methods which can be used against the king and his policy and with which one can uncover royal plans and stratagems. These are the tools of reasoning which belong to the domain of Ānvīkṣikī, referred to explicitly a few verses later. Thus, we obtain quite a different picture of the same Ānvīkṣikī, which is for Vātsyāyana primarily a method and knowledge concerned with the highest self (*adhyātma-vidyā*; see also §§ 8.1, 9.3, 10).

The verses also demonstrate that the attitude towards both Ānvīkṣikī and its methods and subject matter of rational enquiry was viewed among certain circles with suspicion and animosity. This opens a possibility that the threefold—instead of the fourfold (depending on the interpretation)—enumeration of the foremost sciences of the *Mahā-bhārata* (§ 5.3.), which would leave out Ānvīkṣikī and could thereby be a voice against the high status of the current, was not necessarily either an innocuous omission or a concealed reference to Ānvīkṣikī, comprised among the three sciences as a subvariety of one of them, but may have been a deliberate expression of disavowal and disregard for the followers of the current. Clearly, Ānvīkṣikī was not a current everyone would like to subscribe to and be known to be associated with.

anartha-kuśalā^a hy ete bālāḥ paṇḍita-māninaḥ //
dharmā-śāstreṣu mukhyeṣu vidyamāneṣu durbudhāḥ /
buddhim ānvīkṣikīm^b prāpya nirartham pravadanti te //

[^a POLLOCK (2005: 510): *anartha kuśalā*. ^b POLLOCK (2005: 510): *buddhimān vīkṣikīm*. Interestingly, Internet-accessible TITUS machine-readable e-text of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, prepared by Muneo Tokunaga (Kyōtō, 1993) with adaptations by John D. Smith (Cambridge, 1995) on the basis of edition R₂, on which apparently also POLLOCK’s edition is based, all contain the same mistranscription of the Sanskrit text. In the reading adopted by them, *buddhimān* would not relate grammatically to anything in the sentence and would have to be emended to *buddhimantaḥ*. Besides, *vīkṣikīm* is meaningless. The correctness of parsing *buddhim ānvīkṣikīm prāpya* is confirmed by the commentary *Bhūṣaṇa* of Govindarāja in R₁ *ad loc.*, p. 95.26–27: *ānvīkṣikīm buddhim prāpya śuṣka-tarka-viṣayām buddhim āsthāpya nirartham niṣprajānam pravadanti.*]

⁵⁷ R₁ 2.100.21 = R₂ 2.94.16:

kaccin na tarkair yuktvā vā ye cāpy aparikīrtitāḥ /
tvayā vā tava vāmātyair budhyate tāta mantritam //

There is a range of other equally negative references to Ānvīkṣikī, either *verbatim* critical of it or of its method of rational enquiry and subject matter, which confirm that the attitude among various circles towards the current was ambiguous, to say the least. One of these is found in the *Manu-smṛti*:

‘[10] «Scripture» should be recognised as the *Veda*, whereas «tradition» as the law treatise. These two should never be questioned with respect to any matter,⁵⁸ because it is from these two that moral law has emanated. [11] A twice-born who would look down upon these two by reason of the science of argumentation (*hetu-śāstra*) should be cast out by righteous people as a nihilist and a denigrator of the *Veda*.’⁵⁹

The nihilist (*nāstika*) here is clearly a materialist, the term being often associated and synonymous with materialism (Cārvāka, Lokāyata), as numerous references indicate.⁶⁰ Followers of Ānvīkṣikī, associated with materialism and nihilism, are censured with quite similar words in the *Mahā-bhārata* on a few occasions:

‘[11] The rejection of the authority of the *Vedas* and the scriptures is a serious transgression; [to maintain that] inconsistency is everywhere brings one’s own destruction. [12] If a Brahmin, claiming to be an expert, would be a denigrator of the *Veda*, would be fond of methodology, i.e. a discipline of reasoning,

⁵⁸ For an alternative reading and interpretation of the *pāda* C (*te sarvārtheṣu mīmāṃsye*) see OLIVELLE (2006: 244–5, note 2.10).

⁵⁹ MDhŚ 2.10–11:

śrutis tu vedo vijñeyo dharmā-śāstram tu vai smṛtiḥ /
te sarvārtheṣv amīmāṃsye tābhyāṃ dharmo hi nirbabhau //
yo ’vamaneyeta te tūbhe^a hetu-śāstrāśrayād dvijaḥ /
sa sādhubhir bahiṣ-kāryo nāstiko veda-nindakaḥ //

[^a *Varia lectio: sarvārtheṣu mīmāṃsye*, see n. 58. ^b *Varia lectio: mūle*, and the translation: ‘...who would look down upon these two fundamentals’.]

⁶⁰ See e.g. TS 1960–61; Bhā 3.3.53; TRD ad ṢDSa 80–87; p. 452–462; esp. p. 452.3 (*lokyāyatā nāstikā evam itthaṃ vadanti*); MŚVṬ, *Autpattika-sūtra* 10, Part II, p. 4.15 (*lokāyataṃ nām nāstikānām tantram*); NBh ad NS 3.2.61 (*atra nāstika āha: bhūtebhyo mūrty-upādānavat tad-upādānam*).

Another type of reference of the term *nāstika* is to a sceptic who accepts neither the Vedic tradition, the existence of soul, karmic retribution etc., just a Lokāyata, nor the validity of argument or enquiry, and doubts all; see e.g. CarS₁ 1.11.14–15:

na parikṣā na parikṣyam na kartā kāraṇam na ca /
na devā na ṛṣayaḥ siddhāḥ karma karma-phalam na ca //
nāstikasyāsti nāvātmā yadṛcchōpahatātmanaḥ //
pātakebhyah param cātāt pātakam nāstika-grahaḥ //

In the above verse, the *nāstika* cannot be such a ‘sceptic’ who rejects valid methods and objects enquiry (*na parikṣā na parikṣyam*), because he clearly applies *hetu-śāstra*.

which is useless, [13] if he would propound theories based on logical arguments, negated facts, but in reality would argue with logical arguments, permanently calumniate and criticise Brahmins, [14] and would put everything to doubt, such a person should be acknowledged to be a fool and idiot, of harsh and primitive language, and people should know, dear friend, that those like him are like dogs among humans.⁶¹

In another passage, god Indra, in the guise of a jackal, addresses the sage Kāśyapa, in front of whom undergoes a kind of ‘self-criticism’ session for sins apparently committed as a follower of Ānvikṣikī and vows never to fall back in case he would assume a human form again, for from now on he would eventually know what is good and what is wrong:

‘[44] Others, of inauspicious descent, who are born at evil moments under demonic constellations, fall into the demonic race, destitute of sacrifice and progeny. [45] I used to be such a pseudo-expert, a reasoner, a denigrator of the *Veda*, fond of methodology, i.e. a discipline of reasoning, which is useless, [46] I formulated doctrines based on logical reason, in assemblies I spoke about what is based on logical reason, I calumniated and verbally assaulted the twice-born during Vedic sacrifices. [47] I was a nihilist, putting everything to doubt, a thickhead, considering myself an expert. This [present] life of mine as a jackal, O Twice-Born, is a consequence of all this. [48] May I, even after hundreds of days and nights that I am a jackal, obtain a human birth again. Then I would be content and observant, taking pleasure in sacrifices, donations and asceticism, I would know what is to be known, and would avoid what is to be avoided.’⁶²

⁶¹ MBh₁ = MBh₂ 13.37.11–14:

aprāmāṇyaṃ ca vedānāṃ śāstrāṇāṃ cātilaṅghanaṃ /
sarvatra cānavasthānaṃ^a etan nāśanaṃ ātmanaḥ // 11 //
bhavet paṇḍita-mānī yo brāhmaṇo veda-nindakaḥ /
ānvikṣikīṃ tarka-vidyāṃ anurakto nirarthikāṃ // 12 //
hetu-vādān bruvaṇ satsu vijetā hetu-vādikaḥ^b /
ākroṣṭā cātivaktā ca brāhmaṇānāṃ sadāva hi // 13 //
sarvābhīśankī mūḍhaś ca bālaḥ kaṭuka-vāg api /
boddhavyas tādṛśas tāta nara-śvānaṃ^c hi taṃ viduḥ // 14 //

[^a MBh₂: *avyasthā ca sarvatra*. ^b MBh₁ reads: *vijetāhetu-vādikaḥ*. If we read ‘*ahetu-vādikaḥ*’, the translation would be: ‘would be talking without logical arguments’. ^c MBh₂: *naraṃ śvānaṃ*.]

⁶² MBh₁ 12.173.44–49 = MBh₂ 12.180.46–51:

nakṣatreṣv āsureṣv anye dustīrthā durmuhūrta-jāḥ /
saṃpatanty āsurīm yonīm yajña-prasava-varjitām // 44 //
aham āsam paṇḍitako haituko veda-nindakaḥ /

In the passages associating the ‘useless’ (*nīrarthikā*) Ānvīkṣikī with nihilistic materialists, the current is called a ‘discipline of reasoning’ (*tarka-vidyā*) and a ‘theory based on logical arguments’ (*hetu-vāda*), ‘a discipline whose subject matter is vain reasoning’ (*śuṣka-tarka-viṣayā* in the *Bhūṣaṇa* on *Rāmāyaṇa*, see n. 56), whereas its follower is labelled an ‘arguer with logical arguments’ (*hetu-vādikā*), ‘reasoner’ (*haituka*), but also a ‘fool’, ‘idiot’, ‘of harsh and primitive language’, a ‘thickhead’ who ‘brings his own destruction’ and negates facts.

In the same vein, Sāndīpani of Kāśī, Kṛṣṇa’s teacher, provides in the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* the following rule for a wandering ascetic (*saṁnyāsin*):

‘He should not be fond of [critical] disputes about the *Vedas*, should not be a heretic or reasoner (*haituka*), he should not engage in a dry debate or verbal contest (*śuṣka-vāda-vivāda*).’⁶³

The stipulation rules that the orthodox wandering ascetic should not participate in any activity normally associated with Ānvīkṣikī and the social-philosophical context in which it evolved.

The epithets *sarvābhiśankin* and *sarva-śankin* (‘someone who puts everything in doubt’) in the *Mahā-bhārata* quoted above should not be understood literally intimating a sceptical attitude. They rather imply that the person would not accept anything without a proper reason and logic, which is so frequently shown in negative light here. The opposite of the Ānvīkṣikī way of life is ‘to know what is to be known, and to avoid what is to be avoided’, i.e. to know what is good and what is wrong from an orthodox traditional point of view, apparently something the followers of Ānvīkṣikī are incapable of. The passages incidentally paint a picture of a conflict between belief, dogmatism and religious attitude, on the one hand, and reason, reasoning and intellectual openness, on the other, while the side is taken on the former: Ānvīkṣikī and its followers should be ostracised, being the public enemies in view of their critical approach to traditionally and uncritically accepted values.

ānvīkṣikīm tarka-vidyām anurakto nīrarthikām // 45 //
hetu-vādān pravādītā vaktā saṁsatsu hetumat /
ākroṣṭā cābhivaktā ca brahma-yajñeṣu vai^a dvijān // 46 //
nāstikaḥ sarva-śankī ca mūrkhah paṇḍita-mānikaḥ /
tasyēyam phala-nirvṛttiḥ sṛgālatvam mama dvija // 47 //
api jātu tathā tat syād aho-rātra-śatair api /
yad aham mānuṣīm yonim sṛgālah prāpnuyām punah // 48 //
saṁtuṣṭaś cāpramattaś ca yajña-dāna-tapo-ratiḥ /
jñeya-jñātā bhavyam vai varjya-varjayitā tathā // 49 //

[^a MBh₂: *brahma-vākyeṣu ca*.]

For an alternative translation of MBh₂ 12.180.46–47ab see PREISENDANZ (2000: 243).

⁶³ BhāgP 11.18.30:

veda-vāda-rakto na syān na pākhaṇḍī na haitukaḥ /
śuṣka-vāda-vivāde na kañcit pakṣam samāśrayet //

8.3. The epithets mentioned just above, despite the unequivocally negative connotations they carry, along with other references to Ānvīkṣikī such as *nyāya-vidyā* (NBh, NV, MDhŚ) and *hetu-śāstra* (MDhŚ) or *nyāya-pathin* (BhāgP) attest to a direct link between Ānvīkṣikī and its methods of enquiry based on reasoning (*tarka*) and logical argumentation (*hetu*). Independent lexicographic sources⁶⁴ also confirm that reasoning was the essence of Ānvīkṣikī, known under its second name ‘discipline of reasoning’ (*tarka-vidyā*).

What Uddyotakara has to say on the essence of Ānvīkṣikī being *anvīkṣā*, while discussing the nature of suppositional knowledge (*ūha*) and inference, is also quite significant in this context:

‘Others say that inference is [the same as] reasoning (*tarka*). They call inference: logical reason (*hetu*), reasoning (*tarka*), methodical reasoning (*nyāya*) or systematic enquiry (*anvīkṣā*).’⁶⁵

Such designations prove that investigation of the highest self (*adhyātma-vidyā*) and liberation (*mokṣa*) was neither the main nor the sole concerns of the current en masse. Further, if all the proponents of Ānvīkṣikī were to pursue the salvific path, Kauṭilya and others could not have listed the materialists among its followers. And, indeed, we see no suggestion in the passages of the *Artha-śāstra* that Ānvīkṣikī was in any way concerned with any kind of salvific theory and the hereafter. Furthermore, Kauṭilya, who places much emphasis on Ānvīkṣikī as a primary science and who most probably himself subscribed to the current, does not seem bother much about eschatology and emancipation. As Johannes BRONKHORST (2007: 168) notices, ‘... the Artha Śāstra, in spite of explicitly enumerating the four *āśramas*, shows no interest whatsoever in liberation’. One possible candidate for a reference to liberation (*mokṣa*) could be the expression *vyasane ’bhyudaye ca* (‘in misfortune and in prosperity’) in AŚ 1.2.11, but clearly it is not. The concept of liberation may also be implied in AŚ 1.3.14 (*sva-dharmaḥ svargāyānantyāya ca*—‘One’s own moral duty [serves] the [attainment of] heaven and immortality (or: the [attainment of] immortality in heaven’) with the term *ānanta* (immortality), as one of the two main goals (beside heaven, *svarga*) which can be achieved by following one’s own moral duty (*sva-dharma*), but this seems to be rather a mere attestation of commonly accepted view (also by those—the monarch and his retinue—for whom the *Artha-śāstra* was composed) at that time, whereas ‘immortality’ (*ānanta*) does not have to imply the acceptance of the ideal of liberation by Kauṭilya himself but solely a reproduction of a general belief in the afterlife widespread in (at least some circles of) the society.

⁶⁴ ACM 251c: *ānvīkṣikī tarka-vidyā*.

⁶⁵ NV₁ 1.1.40, p. 141.17–18 = NV₂, p. 133.113–14: *apare tv anumānam tarka ity āhuḥ. hetus tarkaḥ nyāyo ’nvīkṣā iti anumānam ākhyāyata iti*.

9.1. In his important paper, HACKER (1958: 19–20) maintains that it was Vātsyāyana who identified Nyāya with Ānvīkṣikī for the first time and before the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* there was no such connection:

‘Since Vātsyāyana managed to pass off his science [i.e. Nyāya—P.B.] as Ānvīkṣikī, which had been identified by some with Sāṃkhya and other systems, it was therefore possible that the classification of Kauṭilya had not won any wider recognition. ... Perhaps Kauṭilya’s classification [of four sciences—P.B.] was forgotten precisely because Sāṃkhya had gradually become extinct, Yoga had been philosophically totally dependent on Sāṃkhya and Lokāyata had become radically materialistic. ... Since there were no more teachers of Sāṃkhya, or not in sufficient numbers, other systems had to be designated, at the guidance of which one could learn the art of methodical reflection. Since Vātsyāyana’s times the system of Nyāya offered its service in this respect.’

This approach in main points is taken over by HALBFASS (1988: 274–277), albeit with some reservation and hesitation. Indeed, there apparently seems to be a kind of ‘historical succession gap’: there is no mention of Nyāya, or its twin system Vaiśeṣika, in the *Artha-śāstra*, on the one hand, and, on the other, it is Vātsyāyana who seems first to establish a connection between Ānvīkṣikī and Nyāya.

HACKER’s, and to some extent HALBFASS’, is the thesis that I now want to challenge.

9.2. The most obvious counter-question that automatically comes to one’s mind is this: Why should, in the first place, Vātsyāyana want to ‘pass off his science, i.e. Nyāya, as Ānvīkṣikī’ if already at his time Ānvīkṣikī triggered negative associations in wider popular reception, or at least any association with it was not particularly dignifying? Would he rather not dissociate himself at any price from a current whose name would carry negative connotations? Why should we doubt the credibility of Vātsyāyana’s account and not take what he says about the direct link between the tradition of Ānvīkṣikī and his own school of Nyāya for what it stands for, i.e. as an expression of a genuine historical continuity, even though the absence of any explicit mention of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika by Kauṭilya may be disturbing? After all, we could argue, there existed no school of Nyāya of which we knew at the time when Kauṭilya’s manual was composed, i.e. in the period of second–first centuries BCE (after the disintegration of the Mauryan empire), and the first Nyāya text known to us, ascribed to Akṣapāda Gautama, was composed from *ca.* the middle of first century CE onwards (till its final redaction in fifth century), so Kauṭilya could not possibly refer to it by name.⁶⁶

⁶⁶ Comp. the remark of HACKER (1958: 19): ‘Had Kauṭilya known Nyāya, which is a science of reflection par excellence, and for which both reflection and argumentation constitute

In my opinion we can easily see that Ānvīkṣikī was not a well-established and celebrated tradition which was at the outset unrelated to Nyāya but to which Vātsyāyana wanted to subscribe, without any historical justification, and it is not the case that he intended Nyāya to take the place of Ānvīkṣikī in the universally established classification of four disciplines of learning outlined by Kauṭilya, as HACKER (1958: 19–20) maintains. First of all, neither had the fourfold classification of the *Artha-śāstra* become a standard one universally accepted at the times of Vātsyāyana as HACKER himself noticed, nor was it the case that all the four disciplines were universally regarded as pre-eminent and celebrated in all circles. There were other classifications which were even more popular: the six limbs of the *Vedas* (*ṣaḍ-vedāṅga*), but also fourteenfold⁶⁷, eighteenfold, nineteenfold⁶⁸ and even much longer lists as attested e.g. by the seventy-twofold list of arts and skills (*kalā*) in ‘the Story of Paesi’ (*Paesi-kahāṇayam*)⁶⁹ of the *Rājaprasnīya-sūtra* (RP 806[211]), the sixty-fourfold list of supplementary sciences and disciplines (*aṅga-vidyā*) of the *Kāma-sūtra* (KS 1.3.15).⁷⁰

A more popular classification was probably the fourteenfold division of sciences which could have diversified contents, but it never included Ānvīkṣikī. It is mentioned by Jayantabhaṭṭa in the *Nyāya-mañjarī*,⁷¹ who describes the four *Vedas* (in a rather unusual sequence: *Atharva-veda*, *R̥g-veda*, *Yajur-veda*, *Sāma-veda*), the legendary-mythological lore (*itihāsa-purāṇa*), the six supplementary sciences (*vedāṅga*), law treatises (*dharma-śāstra*), Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya. Jayanta himself refers to other fourteenfold classifications:

“The *Vedas* rely on legendary-mythological texts (*purāṇa*), reasoning, Mīmāṃsā, law treatises (*dharma-śāstra*)—these are the fourteen supports of disciplines of learning and moral law.”

And it is said with regard to other [disciplines]:

“the supplementary texts, the [minor] *Vedas*, Mīmāṃsā, the realm of Nyāya, legendary-mythological texts (*purāṇa*) and law

not only the method but also the subject matter, as a separate discipline in its own right, he would certainly have mentioned it by whatever name on the occasion of the examination of the nature of Ānvīkṣikī; what follows, it could not have existed as such at his time.’

⁶⁷ This division is mentioned even in the tradition of Nyāya, see e.g. NMa₁ I: 9.12 = NMa₂ I: 9.25: *nanu catasraś ced vidyāḥ tat katham̐ catur-daśa darśitāḥ nāṣa virodhaḥ ...* or NBhū p. 71 ad NBh 1.1.1 (*sēyam ānvīkṣikī...*): *... na tarhi catasra eva vidyāḥ catur-daśānām vidyānām bhinna-viṣayatvāt...*

⁶⁸ Mil₁, p. 3–4, Mil₂ 3.4: *suti sammuti sanhkyā yogā nīti visesikā gaṇikā gandhabbā tikicchā cātubbedā purāṇā itihāsa jotisā māyā hetu mantanā yuddhā chandasā muddā, vacanena ekūnavīsati.*

⁶⁹ BOLLÉE (2002).

⁷⁰ For a brief overview of such lists see: Willem B. BOLLÉE (2002: 192–193, § 806).

⁷¹ NMa₁ I: p. 5–8 = NMa₂ I, I: p. 7–9.

treatises (*dharma-śāstra*)—this is the fourteen disciplines of learning”.⁷²

It is difficult to determine the exact date when the tradition to distinguish fourteen sciences and disciplines of learning was settled down and became widespread. It must have been current and well known already at the time of the composition of the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, for it mentioned by Kālidāsa (fifth century) in the *Raghu-vaṃśa* (RghV 5.21). It is further mentioned by Kumārila-bhaṭṭa in the *Tantra-vārttika* (TV 1.3.6), the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*⁷³, *Yajñavalkya-smṛti*⁷⁴, the *Sarva-darśana-siddhānta-saṃgraha* (SDSS 1.2–25) and even by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in the *Prasthāna-bheda* (PrBh₁ 13.4–14 = PrBh₂ 1.6–12: ...*iti catur-daśā vidhāḥ*), who tries to combine it with the eighteenfold classification. The constitutive elements of the classification were not universal and would change from text to text, albeit with some elements uniform, but the number ‘fourteen’ remained the same. Why should therefore Vātsyāyana wish to equate Nyāya with Ānvīkṣikī, had such a connection not existed, and to classify his philosophical school under the guise of Ānvīkṣikī among the four disciplines in the way which has almost become obsolete by his times?

Second, by the 400–450 CE Sāṃkhya was not dead yet, as HACKER (1958: 19–20) claims: their proponents, Īśvarakṛṣṇa, Vārṣaganya and Vindhyavāsin, were just composing the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* and other texts, no longer extant, and some century or so later was also the *Yukti-dīpikā* to come. Therefore, the place for reasoners within the folds of Ānvīkṣikī—beside Yoga and the materialists (*lokāyata*)—as HACKER wanted, occupied so far by Sāṃkhya was still occupied by it. Third, granted that the place of the followers of Sāṃkhya and of the Lokāyata had become empty by the time of Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana, there was still the place occupied by the followers of Yoga (which hardly had anything to do with methodology in the sense of rational enquiry), who had just produced the *Pātañjala-yoga-śāstra* comprising the *Yoga-sūtra* and the *Yoga-bhāṣya*, if we follow the reasoning of HACKER. Fourth, what is most important, when we read the surviving few references to Ānvīkṣikī, especially

⁷² NMa₂ I: 5–8 = NMa₂ 1, I: 7–9, and the verses NMa₁ 1, I: 9.5–9 = NMa₂ 1: *Vidyā-sthāna-rūpa-vicāra*, I: 9.4–8:

*purāṇa-tarka-mīmāṃsā-dharma-śāstrāṅgam isritāḥ /
vedāḥ sthānāni vidyānām dharmasya ca catur-daśa iti /
anyatrāpy uktam:*

*aṅgāni vedās catvāro mīmāṃsā nyāya-vistarāḥ /
purāṇaṃ dharma-śāstraṃ ca vidyā hy etās catur-daśa iti //*

⁷³ ViP 3.6.28:

*aṅgāni vedās catvāro mīmāṃsā nyāya-vistarāḥ /
purāṇaṃ dharma-śāstraṃ ca vidyā hy etās catur-daśa //*

⁷⁴ YDhŚ 1.3:

*purāṇa-nyāya-mīmāṃsā-dharma-śāstrāṅgam isritāḥ /
vedān sthānāni vidyānām dharmasya ca catur-daśa //*

those in the *Mahā-bhārata*, they are not at all favourably disposed to Ānvīkṣikī. As I pointed out earlier (§ 5, esp. § 5.3), Ānvīkṣikī was rarely mentioned in literary sources and often left out of classifications of the fundamental disciplines of learning, even though its methodological impact was felt in the classifications and descriptions of sciences. Had Vātsyāyana wanted to upgrade the status of his own school of Nyāya in the eyes of, say, orthodox Brahmins he would certainly not have equated it with the tradition of Ānvīkṣikī, because the result would be counterproductive.

In the light of the above, there seems to be no reason to read Vātsyāyana the way proposed by HACKER and HALBFASS, who seems to accept the former's arguments, in the sense that Vātsyāyana fills in an empty space left by the tradition of Sāṃkhya as a discipline of reasoning, and Vātsyāyana comes to equate his own Nyāya with an older tradition. Further I find no justification why we should not take what Vātsyāyana himself says of his own tradition at its face value. What he actually says merely emphasises that his tradition of Nyāya developed from the tradition of Ānvīkṣikī and it is the latter's legitimate and direct successor. I claim, therefore, that it was precisely the other way round—in contrast with the development suggested by HACKER and HALBFASS: Nyāya, along with its twin system of Vaiśeṣika, was closely associated with Ānvīkṣikī from its very beginnings to the extent that it actually developed directly from that tradition. And it was a natural move for Vātsyāyana to equate, in the verse taken from Kauṭilya (AŚ 1.2.12), the term *ānvīkṣikī* with his own tradition, called just before the verse *nyāya-vidyā*.

As Karin PREISENDANZ (2000: 230–237) successfully argued, certain Naiyāyikas included two sequences of *sūtras* at the conclusion of *Nyāya-sūtra* 4.2—viz. NS 4.2.38–45, 46–50—which specifically concern some self-oriented yogic practices, in order to align their system with certain salvific tenets of the *Upaniṣads* that focused on the *adhyātma-vidyā*. These two inclusions were clearly intended to shift the focus from debate and rational enquiry, i.e. the chief preoccupation of Ānvīkṣikī, to which the original *Nyāya-sūtra* was devoted, to the extramundane and salvific, and subsequently 'Vātsyāyana, next to anchoring his philosophical tradition in a prestigious secular classification of science and in the most excellent position to boot, is concerned to accommodate it with the established religious tradition and place it, so to say, in line with the *Upaniṣads*. The *Nyāyasūtra* does not address the topic specifically and explicitly...' (PREISENDANZ (2000: 230)).

9.3. There are a number of additional points, apart from Vātsyāyana's own testimony, that strengthen the thesis of direct historical link between the two traditions.

First of all, as I have indicated above, there is conspicuously a very close affinity in the approach of Ānvīkṣikī and Nyāya to problems they investigate, mainly—from what we can say on the basis of the laconic account in the *Artha-*

śāstra—concerning the idea of doubt, brought to the fore by Kauṭilya in his highly condensed exposition of Ānvīkṣikī.

Further, it seems that the *Caraka-saṃhitā*, which stands in the line of development of Indian epistemology and methodology which eventually led to the Nyāya school, contains a passage that could have been influenced by the metaphor of Ānvīkṣikī as the lamp for disciplines of learning. The passage runs as follows:

[13] It is not accepted that the creation of beginningless element of consciousness [within a living body] is created through something else [such as matter]. If this “something else” is the highest self, it is accepted as the cause [of consciousness in the body and rebirth]; it must [therefore] be accepted that the creation is caused by something else, [which is the highest self]. ... [16] Therefore, a wise person, having abandoned [heretic] opinions which have gone the wrong way, should view the whole [world] correctly with the help of the lamp of reason of the good [people].⁷⁵

The context of the second verse is delineated by the first verse that concerns the highest self, here called *para ātmā*, which is precisely the domain of *adhyātma-vidyā*, later mentioned by Vātsyāyana as a field of investigation common to *Upaniṣads* and to Nyāya. What this verse expresses is a belief that behind the whole world there must be ‘the highest self’. Then comes the conclusion that the wise person should apply ‘the lamp of reason’ (*buddhi-pradīpa*) to see the whole world the way it really is (*yathātatham*). This metaphor betrays close affinity to the metaphor of ‘the lamp of Ānvīkṣikī’ mentioned in the verse by Kauṭilya (n. 25) and, later on, by Vātsyāyana (n. 54).

Of importance is the fact the immediate context in which these verses, which seem to relate to stand in some relation to Ānvīkṣikī, occur betrays close affinity to some ideas characteristic of Nyāya. First, it is the discussion and enumeration of cognitive criteria (*pramāṇa*), without the term *pramāṇa* itself being mentioned:

‘Everything is only twofold: either true or false. Its examination is fourfold: the teaching of an authoritative person, perception, inference and argumentation.’⁷⁶

⁷⁵ CarS₁ 1.11.5, pp. 488, 490 = CarS₂ 1.11.13, 16, pp. 208–209:

*anādeś cetanā-dhātor nēṣyate para-nirmītiḥ /
para ātmā sa ced dhetur iṣṭo ’stu para-nirmītiḥ // 13 //
tasmān matiḥ vimucyātām amārga-prasṛtām budhaḥ /
satām buddhi-pradīpena paśyēt sarvaṃ yathātatham // 16 //*

⁷⁶ CarS₁ 1.11, pp. 490–491 = CarS₂ 1.11.17, p. 210: *dvividham eva khalu sarvaṃ sac cāsac ca. tasya caturvidhā parīkṣā—āptōpadeśaḥ pratyakṣam anumānaṃ yuktiś cēti.*

This list in most elements overlaps with the classification of the four cognitive criteria of Nyāya, except for argumentation (*yukti*)—replaced with the reasoning based on analogy (*upamāna*) in Nyāya—which is defined by Caraka as follows:

‘Such a cognition which apprehends entities originating as a result of a combination of numerous causes and which refers to the three times is known as argumentation, and thereby the three aims of life can be achieved.’⁷⁷

Even though overridden by *upamāna*, *yukti* is still referred to in Nyāya as a methodical devise of reasoning: ‘The argumentation of one’s system is this: another person’s view, when it is not contradicted, is accepted,’⁷⁸ and has not been totally eliminated from the system.

Secondly, the author of the *Caraka-saṃhitā* passage understands the nature of perception exactly the way Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika did:

‘Such a cognition which proceeds as a result of the contact of the self, sense-organ, the mind and the object, which is manifested at the same time, is defined as perception.’⁷⁹

The idea evoked in the verse draws on the contact (*sannikarṣa*) of the four elements for ordinary sensory perception to take place: the self (*ātman*) which is believed to be the ultimate cognitive subject, a sense organ (*indriya*) grasping the physical data, the mind (*manas*) which connects the sense organ with the self, and the external object (*artha*) being cognised.

This is identical with what is regarded as a quasi-definition of perception in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*:

‘[Perception] which arisen from the contact of the self, a sense organ, the mind and an object is still another [reason to prove the existence of the self].’⁸⁰

Even the wording in both the sources matches, except for minor metrical differences: *ātmēndriya-mano-’rthānām sannikarṣāt* in the *Caraka-saṃhitā* and *ātmēndriya-mano-’rtha-sannikarṣāt* in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*. The formulation also corresponds to the definition of perception found in the *Nyāya-sūtra*:

⁷⁷ CarS₁ 1.11, pp. 518 = CarS₂ 1.11.25, p. 213:

*buddhiḥ paśyati yā bhāvān bahu-kāraṇa-yoga-jān /
yuktis tri-kālā sā jñeya tri-vargaḥ sādhyate yayā //*

⁷⁸ NBh 1.1.3: *para-matam apratiśiddham anumatam iti hi tantra-yuktiḥ.*

⁷⁹ CarS₁ 1.11, pp. 501 = CarS₂ 1.11.20, p. 211:

*ātmēndriya-mano-’rthānām sannikarṣāt pravartate /
vyaktā tadātve yā buddhiḥ pratyakṣaṁ sā nirucyate //*

⁸⁰ VS(C) 3.1.13: *ātmēndriya-mano-’rtha-sannikarṣād yan niṣpadyate tad-anyat.*

‘Perception is cognition which is produced by the contact of an object with a sense organ, which is non-verbal, which is non-deviant, which consists in determination;’⁸¹

It also seems that the idea expressed in the *Caraka-saṃhitā* agrees with the notion of non-simultaneity of acts of perception, which involve all the four elements, the description of which is found in the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*:

‘[NS] [Skin] is not [the only sense organ], because [different] objects are not simultaneously perceived. [NBh] [In the case of perception] the self comes into contact with the mind, the mind with [one] sense organ, the sense organ is conjoined with all objects. Therefore, [if we were to accept the opponent’s thesis], there should be simultaneous acts of perception [of all the objects, such as the colour, taste, smell, touch and sound,] because of the contact of the self, sense organs, the mind and the objects. But [such numerous objects as] the colour etc. are not perceived simultaneously. Therefore, it is not the case that there is one sense organ which grasps all sensory data.’⁸²

Also the process of inference described in the *Caraka-saṃhitā* passage which may be related to Ānvīkṣikī bears resemblance to the ideas of the Nyāya, including some formulations which are close to the wording of the *Nyāya-sūtra*:

‘One infers in a threefold manner and in three times something that is preceded by perception. A concealed fire [at present is inferred] from smoke. A sexual intercourse [in the past is inferred] from the observation of the foetus (sc. pregnancy)—in this way [people] determine something that happened in the past. The wise, having seen a fruit that has already been produced from a seed, similarly infer in the present situation (*iha*) a future fruit [produced] from a seed.’⁸³

⁸¹ NS 1.1.4: *indriyārtha-sannikarṣōtpannam jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam.*

⁸² NS₁ 3.1.54 = NS₁ 3.1.53: *na yugapad-arthānupalabdheḥ. NBh ad loc.: ātmā manasā sambadhyate, mana indriyeṇa, indriyam sarvārthaiḥ sannikṣṣam iti ātmēndriya-manor’rtha-sannikarṣebhyo yugapad-grahaṇāni syuḥ. na ca yugapad rūpādayo grhyante. tasmān nākam indriyam sarva-viṣayam astīti.*

⁸³ CarS₁ 1.11, pp. 514 = CarS₂ 1.11.2–12, p. 212:

*pratyakṣa-pūrvam tri-vidham tri-kālam cānumīyate /
vahnir nigūḍho dhūmena maithunam garbha-darśanāt //
evam vyavasyanty atītam bijāt phalam anāgatam /
dṛṣṭvā bijāt phalam jātam ihāva sadṛśam buddhāḥ //*

These three kinds of inference correspond to a threefold obsolete classification of ancient origin and preserved in *Nyāya-sūtra* 1.1.5,⁸⁴ which is extremely ambiguous in itself and allows for more than one interpretation. The *Caraka-samhitā* may even resemble the *Nyāya-sūtra* classification especially in the form of the first interpretation offered by Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana, who himself was no longer certain as to the actual meaning of the three terms: *pūrvavat* (inference *a priori*), *śeṣavat* (inference *a posteriori*) and *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa* / *sāmānyato-'dṛṣṭa* (inference based on general (non-)observation).

'Inference *a priori* is when one infers an effect from a [present] cause, for instance: from the accumulation of clouds [one infers that] it will rain. Inference *a posteriori* is when one infers a [past] cause from [a present] effect, [for instance]: having seen [the high level of] water which stands in contrast with [low] water [level] seen previously as well as swollenness and swiftness of the river, one infers from its current that it has rained [up the river]. Inference based on general observation is the following: one observes in one place an object, when there is motion, seen before in another place; and so is the case with the sun; therefore the sun is in motion, albeit invisible.'⁸⁵

We cannot be sure whether the explanations offered by Vātsyāyana were accurate any more than he was uncertain, because he offered two parallel interpretations (the latter logically and structurally more advanced). However, Vātsyāyana's inference *a priori* corresponds to *Caraka*'s inference of a future fruit from the present seed, inference *a posteriori* matches *Caraka*'s inference of a sexual intercourse in the past from present pregnancy, and the final inference based on general observation conforms to the inference of the movement of the sun. Even if Vātsyāyana's interpretations were not faithful in every detail to what Akṣapāda Gautama had in mind, they do reflect the general spirit of the nature of the three kinds of inference defined in the *Caraka-samhitā*.

The above is, in fact, the only 'lamp metaphor' found in the oldest *Caraka-samhitā* sections that relates to epistemology and logical enquiry in any way and that may lead us to believe that this does not have to be coincidental. The only other occurrence of a metaphor of a lamp in the treatise concerns medicine, but even then it is 'the lamp of knowledge and understanding', being an

⁸⁴ NS 1.1.5: *atha tat-pūrvakam tri-vidham anumānam pūrvavac cheṣavat sāmānyato-dṛṣṭam ca.*

⁸⁵ NBh 1.1.5: *pūrvavad iti. yatra kāraṇena kāryam anumīyate. yathā meghōnnatyā bhaviṣyati vṛṣṭir iti. śeṣavat tad yatra kāryeṇa kāraṇam anumīyate. pūrvōdaka-viparītam udakam nadyāḥ pūrṇatvam śīghratvam ca dṛṣṭvā srotaso 'numīyate bhūtā vṛṣṭir iti. sāmānyato-dṛṣṭam vrajyā-pūrvakam anyatra dṛṣṭasyānyatra darśanam iti, tathā cādityasya, tasmād asty apratyakṣāpy ādityasya vrajyēti.*

instrument of knowledge to investigate the inner self (*antar-ātman*), which looks like an offshoot of the ‘study of the (highest) self’, i.e. (*adhy*)*ātma-vidyā*:

‘The one who knows the truth but does not enquire into the inner self of the sick one with the help of the lamp of knowledge and understanding cannot cure any diseases.’⁸⁶

We can see that the same metaphor that makes use of the lamp which is a particular kind of knowledge and insight in the nature of things and illuminates a respective sphere of reference occurs in the *Artha-śāstra*, *Caraka-saṃhitā* (strongly modified) and in the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*.

To recapitulate, the verses from the *Caraka-saṃhitā* contain references to the study of (*adhy*)*ātma-vidyā*, known to be related to Ānvīkṣikī, and to the metaphor of ‘a lamp of reason’ that allows one to see things the way they really are, a metaphor which informed Kauṭilya’s way of describing Ānvīkṣikī as the lamp for disciplines of learning and was probably later adopted by the authors of the *Caraka-saṃhitā*. These two elements entitle us, in view of otherwise extreme scarcity of material related to Ānvīkṣikī, to tentatively link the verses to the current of Ānvīkṣikī and to its successor Nyāya. There seems to be much in the way of support of the claim that the systems of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika were related to Ānvīkṣikī—both through the rational method of enquiry (*tarka*, *nyāya*) and the specific subject matter of liberation (*adhyātma-vidyā/ātma-vidyā*)—perhaps even more than the systems of Sāṃkhya and Yoga, but what is indeed puzzling is that Kauṭilya did not bother to mention neither Nyāya nor Vaiśeṣika in his catalogue of the representatives of Ānvīkṣikī.

10. Let us now see how far Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana’s (see p. 194 and n. 50), but also Bhāsarvajña’s (see p. 175 and n. 7), assertions to the effect that Ānvīkṣikī is a discipline which, apart from its systemic concerns and methodological applications, investigates the highest self (*adhyātma-vidyā*) and, by implication, the means of liberation (*mokṣa*), find their justification in other sources, external to the system of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, which could confirm their veracity. These are not plenty, but fortunately there are a few.

The *Nīti-sāra* has already been mentioned (n. 22) as a source describing Ānvīkṣikī as investigation or knowledge of the self (NīSā 2.7a: *ānvīkṣiky ātma-vijñānaḥ*; NīSā 2.11a: *ānvīkṣiky ātma-vidyā syād*), and so has the *Manu-smṛti* to the same effect (MDhŚ 7.43c: *ānvīkṣikīm cātma-vidyām*). With the expressions such as *ātma-vijñāna* or *ātma-vidyā*, these passages clearly understand Ānvīkṣikī as a discipline engaged in the examination of the self, and the compounds do not constitute just a reference to a separate fifth discipline *ātma-vijñāna*, different from Ānvīkṣikī, but the terms *ātma-vijñāna* or *ātma-*

⁸⁶ Car 3.4.12:

*jñāna-buddhi-pradīpena yo nāviśati tattvavit /
āturasyāntar-ātmānaḥ na sa rogāṃś cikitsati //*

vidyā are attributive and qualify Ānvīkṣikī. There can be no doubt that in the verse of *Manu-smṛti* 7.43 the authors do not enumerate five but only four disciplines of learning. Similarly, Vijñeśvara in his *Mitākṣarā* (YDhŚM), a mediaeval South-Indian commentary on the *Yājñavalkya-smṛti*, equates Ānvīkṣikī with the salvific doctrine that teaches about the highest self in exactly the same manner as all other texts, attesting to the fact that salvific reflection of the current was well remembered all over India even at a later date.⁸⁷

There is an interesting passage in the *Mahā-bhārata* (MBh 12.306.27–55) which directly concerns Ānvīkṣikī, its methods and its subject matter.⁸⁸ The story presents a conversation between the sage Yājñavalkya and Viśvāvasu, a king of Gandharvas, recounted by the former. Viśvāvasu asks Yājñavalkya a number of questions on various subjects, until he comes to the final broad theme he wants to enquire about, which is Ānvīkṣikī, a theme which culminates a series of twenty-five questions. The number twenty-five is not a coincidence: it concerns the self (*puruṣa*), the twenty-fifth and highest principle of Sāṃkhya-Yoga, and the numeric placement of Ānvīkṣikī which culminates the series of enquires and corresponds to the rank of the self in the system of Sāṃkhya-Yoga thereby reflecting the hierarchical primacy and importance of Ānvīkṣikī. The beginning of the passage runs as follows:

[27] O King, thereupon, [desirous to know the highest knowledge and what is beneficial, Gandharva] Viśvāvasu, well-versed in the knowledge of Vedānta, asked [me, Yājñavalkya,] twenty-four questions relating to the *Vedas*. And then he asked me about methodology (*ānvīkṣikī*) as the twenty-fifth question: [28] What is that made of the universe and the non-universe? What is the mare and the stallion? What is Mitra and Varuṇa? What is cognition, what is the cognoscible? Similarly, what is the one who knows? What is the one who does not know? What is Ka? What is the one who engages in asceticism and what is the one who does not engage in asceticism? What is the devourer of the sun and what is the sun? What is [salvific] knowledge and what is nescience? [29] What is the object of knowledge? What is that which cannot be known, O King? What is the movable? What is the immovable? What is that which is without a beginning? What is that which is indestructible? What is that which is destructible?—These are the profound questions [about Ānvīkṣikī asked by the Gandharva Viśvāvasu]. [30] Then, O King, I replied to the king, most virtuous of Gandharvas, who asked one profound question after another, of deep significance: [31] “Forgive

⁸⁷ MiA *ad loc.*, p. 98.10–11: *ānvīkṣikyām ātma-vidyām*.

⁸⁸ See also DAHLMANN (1895: 225 ff.) who points out to the relationship between the salvific doctrine about the highest self (*ātma-vidyā*) and Ānvīkṣikī in the *Mahā-bhārata*.

me for a while, till I reflect on these [questions].” “So be it”, having so assented, the Gandharva remained quiet. [32] Then, I again summoned the goddess Sarasvatī with my mind. [As a result, the replies to] these questions arose, like butter drawn up [by churning milk]. [33] O King, taking recourse to s u p r e m e m e t h o d o l o g y (*ānvīkṣikī*), I churned with my mind the *Upaniṣads* and ancillary [Vedic] texts. [34] The fourth discipline of learning, O Tiger-King, treats of eschatology (liberation)—I explained it [to you,] O King [already]: it is concerned with the twenty-fifth [principle, viz. the self (*puruṣa*)]. [35] Then, I said the king Viśvāvasu: Listen, O Lord, about the questions you asked me here. [36] [Out of] the universe and the non-universe, which you, O Gandharva King, asked me about, notice that the universe is the unmanifest [primordial factor (*prakṛti*)], the highest [principle] which brings existence and fear to living beings.’⁸⁹

The subsequent verses (MBh 12.306.37–55) explain the nature of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* in the spirit of Sāṅkhya-Yoga, and map all the terms that appear in Viśvāvasu’s questions onto the principles of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*.

⁸⁹ MBh 12.306.27–36:

viśvāvasus tato rājan vedānta-jñāna-kovidah /
catur-vimśatikān praśnān pṛṣṭvā vedasya pārthiva /
pañca-vimśatimān praśnān papraccha ānvīkṣikīm tathā // 27 //
viśvāviśvaṁ tathāśvāsvam mitraṁ varuṇam eva ca /
jñānam jñeyam tathā jño 'jñah† kas tapā atapās tathā /
sūryādaḥ sūrya iti ca vidyāvidye tathāiva ca // 28 //
vedyāvedyaṁ tathā rājann acalaṁ calam eva ca /
apūrvam akṣayaṁ kṣayam etat praśnam anuttamam // 29 //
athōktaś ca mayā rājan rājā gandharva-sattamaḥ /
pṛṣṭavān anupūrveṇa praśnam uttamam arthavat // 30 //
muhūrtam mṛṣyatām tāvad yāvad enam vicintaye /
bādham ity eva kṛtvā sa tūṣṇim gandharva āsthitaḥ // 31 //
tato 'nvacintayam aham bhūyo devīm sarasvatīm /
manasā sa ca me praśno daghno ghṛtam iva uddhṛtam // 32 //
tatrōpaniṣadam cāiva pariśeṣam ca pārthiva /
mathnāmi manasā tāta dṛṣṭvā cānvīkṣikīm parām // 33 //
caturthī rāja-sārdūla vidyāṣā sāmparāyikī /
udīritā mayā tubhyam pañca-vimśe 'dhi dhiṣṭhitā // 34 //
athōktaś tu mayā rājan rājā viśvāvasus tadā /
śrīyatām yad bhavān asmān praśnān sampṛṣṭavān iha // 35 //
viśvāviśvēti yad idam gandharvêndrânuprechasi /
viśvāvyaktaṁ param vidyād bhūta-bhavya-bhayaṁkaram // 36 //

† The edition reads: *tathājño 'jñah*, however it should be emended as *tathājño jñah* (in accordance with MBh 12.306.39c: *ajñas ca jñas ca*) or, less likely, *tathā-jño 'jñah*, to the same effect.

The philosophical and conceptual setting is clearly that of Sāṃkhya-Yoga, which rather unsurprisingly reveals the link between these and Ānvīkṣikī already known from the *Artha-śāstra*. This link with the classification of sciences in the *Artha-śāstra* is highlighted by the expression ‘the fourth discipline’ (*caturthī vidyā*) in Kauṭilya’s catalogue, which clearly is Ānvīkṣikī. Like Sāṃkhya-Yoga, Ānvīkṣikī is presented here as a discipline engaged in the study of the human fate and with the passage from this world into the other (*sāṃparāyikī*), i.e. eschatology, which in the Upaniṣadic context cannot but be the enquiry of liberation. The questions about the ultimate posed by Viśvāvasu were apparently considered quite esoteric and challenging, and that difficulty and profundity is emphasised by the sage Yājñavalkya’s initial silence and consequent supplication to Sarasvatī, the goddess of learning and wisdom. Such profound questions required extraordinary tools and methodology, and Ānvīkṣikī was considered to be the answer. The structure of Viśvāvasu’s most questions follows a similar binary pattern of doubt based on two contrary attributes: what is P and what is non-P, which resembles the structure typical of Ānvīkṣikī enquiry discussed above in § 6, which additionally confirms that the passage is an echo of the method of Ānvīkṣikī.

Towards the end of the whole passage, strongly rooted in Sāṃkhya-Yoga terminology, we come across another explicit mention of Ānvīkṣikī, which repeats the same information about its subject matter and method:

[44] ... [The wise] call the unmanifest [primordial factor (*prakṛti*)] the unborn, because it is indestructible among the created things; [the wise] call the conscious principle (*puruṣa*) indestructible, because there exists no destruction for it; [45] [indestructible is likewise] the primordial factor (*prakṛti*), because it is the qualities (*guṇa*) which undergo destruction, and because [the primordial factor (*prakṛti*)] is active; the wise [call] it the indestructible. All that precisely is the fourth discipline of learning [known as] m e t h o d o l o g y (*ānvīkṣikī*), which treats of eschatology (liberation). [46] When one has assigned the wealth acquired through [the application of] the discipline of learning (i.e. Ānvīkṣikī) for [the performance] of obligatory rites through one’s ritual acts, all the *Vedas*, with their individual schools, are regularly studied, O Viśvāvasu.⁹⁰

⁹⁰ MBh 12.306.44–46:

*akṣayatvāt prajānane ’jam atrāhur avyayam /
akṣayaṃ puruṣaṃ prāhuḥ kṣayo hy asya na vidyate // 44 //
guṇa-kṣayatvāt prakṛtiḥ kartṛtvād akṣayaṃ budhāḥ /
eṣā te ’nvīkṣikī vidyā caturthī sāṃparāyikī // 45 //
vidyōpetam dhanam kṛtvā karmaṇā nitya-karmaṇi /
ekānta-darśanā vedāḥ sarve viśvāvaso smṛtāḥ // 46 //*

Verse 46 underscores the link with the *Artha-śāstra*: Ānvīkṣikī serves here to accumulate wealth and to regulate Vedic ritual and tradition, which are the realms of economics and religious reflection respectively, and correspond to Kauṭilya's *vārttā* and *trayī*. The only missing discipline of learning is political science (*daṇḍa-nīti*). This is not so surprising in an epic verse on Sāṃkhya-Yoga which neither strives to be philosophically accurate nor attempts to give a reliable account of Ānvīkṣikī as known to Kauṭilya.

The concluding verse of the whole discourse on Ānvīkṣikī ends with explicitly ascribing the views expressed in it to the followers of Sāṃkhya-Yoga treated jointly:

‘Therefore, the followers of Yoga and the followers of Sāṃkhya, who strife for the highest goal, do not regard this collection of twenty-five principles as imperishable.’⁹¹

The placing of Ānvīkṣikī in the context of the exposition of the doctrine of the system of Sāṃkhya-Yoga and treating it as an indispensable analytical tool to investigate its fundamental principles is a clear indication of immanent relation between the two. The passage also confirms what the proponents of Nyāya, such as Vātsyāyana and Bhāsarvajña, claimed that Ānvīkṣikī investigated into eschatological matters and one—but not necessarily the only one—of its foci was liberation.

The link between yogic practice of meditation (*dhyānābhyaśa*), the focus on the highest self (*adhyātman*) and methodical examination finds incidental mention in a passage of the *Mahā-bhārata* about

... ‘[the wind Parivaha] which is favourable to immortality of those who examine (*anvīkṣant*) properly [and] happily engage in continuous practice of meditation with tranquil minds which are constantly focused on the highest self (*adhyātman*).’⁹²

Another evidence is provided by the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* which, despite some verses inimically disposed *vis-à-vis* Ānvīkṣikī, mentions the term on a few occasions, and undoubtedly in a favourable light. In one passage, the sage Nārada, while describing the forest recluse (*vāna-prastha*) of the four orthodox life stages (*āśrama*), advises:

‘When [the forest recluse] is not able to perform his duties with respect to the methodological knowledge

⁹¹ MBh 12.306.55:

*tenātān nābhijānanti pañca-vimśakam acyutam /
janma-mṛtyu-bhayād yogāḥ sāmkyās ca paramāśiṅaḥ // 55 //*

⁹² MBh 12.315.50:

*samyag anvīkṣatūṃ buddhyā śāntayādhyātma-nityayā /
dhyānābhyaśābhirāmāṅām yo ’mṛtatvāya kalpate //*

(*ānvīkṣikī vidyā*), either because of disease or old age, he should refrain from food etc.⁹³

Clearly, *Ānvīkṣikī* is put on in this verse par with such important religious duties as maintaining one's own personal fire sacrifice to an extent that a failure to rehearse it should incur special sanction. Nārada comes to speak of *Ānvīkṣikī* again, and again in clearly positive terms:

'Through methodology [one can conquer (*jayet*)] sorrow and delusion, through worship [one can overcome] deceit, through silence [one can remove] other obstacles to [the practice of] *yoga*, through indifference to sensual pleasures etc. [one can triumph over] the harming [of other beings].'⁹⁴

Ānvīkṣikī is seen here as essential means to overcome mundane distress and ignorance by providing adequate forms of worship and ascetic rigorous methods suitable to accomplish mystical and religious goals.

In addition, the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* also contains a warning against forsaking *Ānvīkṣikī*, which is superior to sacrifices and is apparently understood to be instrumental in crossing the ocean of rebirth, i.e. to lead to liberation:

'[The renegade cowherds] abandon the methodological knowledge (*ānvīkṣikī vidyā*) and wish to cross the ocean of rebirth with what is relatively mighty sacrificial rites, consisting of ritual actions, resembling boats [to cross waters].'⁹⁵

The 'renegades' are those who denounce the righteous path and erroneously take rituals for something they cannot provide: the path to liberation, in which *Ānvīkṣikī*, by implication, can apparently be advantageous.

Ānvīkṣikī even turns out to be one of three kinds of crucial spiritual practice through which an adept of *yoga* maintains inner equilibrium on the path to ultimate self-realisation:

'One should remember [to maintain one's] mind fit through the stages of the *yoga* practice such as restraint etc., and through the

⁹³ BhāgP 7.12.23:

*yadākalpaḥ svakriyāyām vyādhibhir jarayāthavā /
ānvīkṣikyām vā vidyāyām kuryād anaśanādikam //*

⁹⁴ BhāgP 7.15.23:

*ānvīkṣikyā śoka-mohau dambham mahad-upāsayā /
yogāntarāyān maunena hiṃsām kāmādy-anīhayā //*

⁹⁵ BhāgP 10.25.4:

*yathā-dṛḍhaiḥ karma-mayaiḥ kratubhir nāma nau-nibhaiḥ /
vidyām ānvīkṣikīm hitvā titīṣanti bhavārṇavam //*

methodological knowledge (*ānvīkṣikī vidyā*), or through the worship and adoration of my self, not through any other means.⁹⁶

In another verse Kṛṣṇa, the protagonist of the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, while presenting his pivotal role and supreme status, comes to speak of Ānvīkṣikī as the foremost among all kinds of skills and disciplines of learning:

‘[Kṛṣṇa said:] I am the most profound self-control among all kinds of *yoga*, I am the sacred incantation for all those who strive after victory, I am the methodology among all kinds of proficiencies, I am the conceptualisation for the propounders of the theory of presentation.’⁹⁷

In some of these verses we can easily observe that the term *ānvīkṣikī* has undergone a metamorphosis and changed both its meaning and grammar: it is no longer associated with rational enquiry and rigorous reasoning (*tarka, nyāya*) and further, in addition to its substantive meaning, it assumes an adjectival aspect qualifying salvific knowledge (*vidyā*), hence ‘the methodological knowledge’ (*ānvīkṣikī vidyā*). The current has thus escaped oblivion, managed to elevate its status and come to serve religious and sectarian purposes in a new fashion, providing a method to cross the *saṁsāra*, or being the method *per se*, and thus retaining, in a way, its eschatological dimension of which Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana spoke.

11.1. I have briefly indicated above that the Yoga we know was a discipline primarily concerned with meditative practice and mystical exercise that is believed to be instrumental in achieving final liberation from the mundane world and suffering and hardly had anything to do with rational and analytical enquiry. Hence arises the difficulty: Yoga as we know it does not fit well into Kauṭilya’s classification of the branches that apply the reasoners’ methods of Ānvīkṣikī, albeit in its essence it is concerned primarily with liberation. In its epistemology, especially as far as inference (*anumāna*) is concerned, Yoga hardly developed its own approach and was heavily reliant on the legacy of Sāṁkhya in this respect. To find its name among the sciences enumerated by Kauṭilya under such circumstances is rather surprising.

At the same time, the compound *sāṁkhya-yoga* was well established in Indian literature. Whether we can speak of an undifferentiated/composite Sāṁkhya-Yoga tradition or of two distinct traditions more or less closely related, it seems that basically all occurrences of the compound *sāṁkhya-yoga* refer to the tra-

⁹⁶ BhāgP 11.20.24:

*yamādibhir yoga-pathair ānvīkṣikyā ca vidyayā /
mamārcôpāsanābhir vā nānyair yogyaṁ smaren manaḥ //*

⁹⁷ BhāgP 11.16.24:

*yogānām ātma-saṁrodho mantrō ’smi vijigīṣatām /
ānvīkṣikī kauśalānām vikalpaḥ khyāti-vādinām //*

dition of Sāṃkhya and Yoga, whatever their exact relation in a given case was.⁹⁸ Alone the *Mahā-bhārata* contains approximately 25 occurrences of the compound, and I have counted about 50 verses in which the terms *sāṃkhya* and *yoga* are mentioned side by side, not necessarily in a compounded form *sāṃkhya-yoga*. We could easily conclude, as all translators of the *Artha-śāstra* and an overwhelming majority of researchers did, that the Yoga of Kauṭilya is the same branch as the Yoga related to Sāṃkhya as the latter's correlate. The only problem with such interpretation is that all we know of the nature of the system of Yoga does not quite fit into the general picture of Ānvikṣikī and, on the basis of this incompatibility, the obvious meaning of the term as it features in the *Artha-śāstra* should be treated at least with suspicion. Or rather, as I will demonstrated in the following, it should be rejected. So, what is actually the Yoga of *Artha-śāstra*?

11.2. In view of all the interpretative difficulties related to the problem what systems were actually included in the list of the *Artha-śāstra*, I propose that the *yoga* in Kauṭilya's list refers to an early form of Vaiśeṣika-Nyāya, a kind of 'proto-Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika', which later evolved into two distinct schools, whereas the *sāṃkhya* of the list is a shorthand for the conjoint systems of Sāṃkhya–Yoga. The identification of Sāṃkhya as one of the schools comprised in the *Artha-śāstra* list is beyond any controversy. Its link to Ānvikṣikī confirms general knowledge preserved in external sources such as the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, which reports a myth of the beginnings of Sāṃkhya:

'[10] Fifth, [god Brahmā] under the name of Kapila, the lord of the accomplished ones, passed on to Āsuri [the doctrine of] Sāṃkhya, which is an exposition of an array of ontological principles but which had gone astray in the course of time. [11] Sixth, when he gained birth as the son of Atri from Anasūyā, he taught about methodology (*ānvikṣikī*) to Alarka, Prahlāda and others.'⁹⁹

As we read there, it was precisely the knowledge of Ānvikṣikī which was passed on by the mythical or legendary founders of the system to their disciples, and it seems that the rational reflection and enquiry representative of Ānvikṣikī constituted an important part of the system.

There are some scholars who have questioned the identification of *yoga* in Kauṭilya's list with the system of Yoga before, although without giving any

⁹⁸ For various shades and occurrences of the term *sāṃkhya-yoga* and its tradition see, e.g. LARSON (1979: 44, 72, 88, 95, 99, 107, 121–122, 127–128, 137, 288 f.).

⁹⁹ BhāgP 1.3.10–11:

*pañcamah kapilo nāma siddhēṣaḥ kāla-viplutam /
provācāsuraye sāṃkhyam tattva-grāma-vinirṇayam //
ṣaṣṭham atrer apatyatvam vṛtaḥ prāpto 'nasūyayā /
ānvikṣikim alarkāya prahlādādībhya ūcivān //*

well-founded justification for their reservations, and suggested to interpret the expression *yoga* in Kauṭilya's list in the sense of Vaiśeṣika.

Perhaps the first one in this line was Rājeśvara Śāstrī Draviḍa (b. 1899), an author of a modern Sanskrit commentary *Vaidika-siddhānta-samrakṣiṇī* (AŚ₂) on the then recently discovered *Artha-śāstra*. He comments on the term *yoga* in Kauṭilya's classification of branches that practise methodology and says that the term *yoga* has been explained as Vaiśeṣika in a subcommentary on the *Nyāya-vārttika* as follows: '«of the Yogas», means «of the followers of Vaiśeṣika».¹⁰⁰ The 'subcommentary' *Nyāya-vārttika-ṭippaṇī* he refers to is in fact a note by Pt. Vindhyeśvarī Prasāda Dvivedin in the 1915 edition to NV₁ 1.1.29, p. 105: *yogānām—vaiśeṣikānām*. That short footnote brings to our attention a passage of the *Nyāya-vārttika* which is not directly related to Ānvīkṣikī, but is of much importance as an internal evidence that the followers of Vaiśeṣika were called *Yogas* within the system of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. A suggestion in this direction was also made by CHAṬṬOPĀDHYĀYA (1927: 858): 'it is possible that "Yoga" here means the Nyāya system and not the Pātañjala, which is more practical and speculative. However, I must leave this question undecided at present.'

The starting point for Pt. Vindhyeśvarī Prasāda Dvivedin's footnote is a passage of the *Nyāya-sūtra* explaining the notion of 'a system's distinctive tenet' (*pratitantra-siddhānta*), which in fact concerns a well-known principle that all propositions, except for those which are explicitly rejected, of the Nyāya system are tacitly accepted in the Vaiśeṣika system, and *vice versa*:

'A system's distinctive tenet is such which is upheld in a similar (*sc.* allied) system (similar, allied systems) but is not upheld in other systems.'¹⁰¹

This is what is nicely explained by Guṇaratna in the *Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā*:

'All this [description of the Naiyāyikas] in the form of the *līṅga* [worship], the outfit, [the worship] of the deity etc. should also be applied to the system of Vaiśeṣika, because there is really a very small difference between the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas, even though there is some divergence as regards the number of cognitive criteria and categories, but the categories are mutually accepted. That is why their views are in general identical. And both [groups] are called ascetics (*tapasvin*).'¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ *Vaidika-siddhānta-samrakṣiṇī* in AŚ₂, p. 124: *yogo vaiśeṣikam iti vyākhyātām nyāya-vārttika-ṭippaṇyām. tad yathā—yogānām vaiśeṣikānām (a° 1 ā° 1 sū° 28) iti.*

¹⁰¹ NS 1.1.29: *samāna-tantra-siddhaḥ para-tantrāsiddhaḥ pratitantra-siddhāntaḥ.*

¹⁰² TRD ad ŚDSa 12, p. 77.16–78.1: *etat sarvaṁ līṅga-veṣa-devādi-svarūpaṁ vaiśeṣika-mate 'py avasātavyam. yato naiyāyika-vaiśeṣikānām hi mithaḥ pramāṇa-tattvānām samkhyā-bhede saty apy anyonyaṁ tattvānām antar-bhāvane 'lpīyān eva bhedo jāyate, tenāteṣāṁ prāyo mata-tulyatā. ubhaye 'py ete tapasvino 'bhidhīyante.*

A similar principle would for instance hold valid in the case of the twin systems of Sāṃkhya and Yoga. The aphorism of Akṣapāda Gautama is commented by Vātsyāyana as follows:

‘For example, [the distinctive tenets] of the representatives of the Sāṃkhya system [also upheld in an allied system] are the following: something non-existent does not acquire existence; something existent does not abandon its existence; conscious beings do not possess any unique feature [that distinguishes one from the other]; distinctive character [occurs] in the body, the sense organs and the mind as well as in the objects [of the sense organs] and in their respective causes. [The distinctive tenets] of the representatives of « Y o g a » [also upheld in an allied system] are the following: the creation [of the world] from material elements is occasioned by the *karman* etc. of humans; defects and activity are the causes of *karman*; conscious selves are characterised by their qualities; the non-existent comes into existence; what has come into existence ceases to exist.’¹⁰³

A more detailed discussion of the passage is provided by Kṣetreśacandra CHAṬṬOPĀDHYĀYA (1927), who was the source of the note of H.N. RANDLE (1930: 3, n. 1) and draws the reader’s attention to the fact that ‘Pandits say that *Yogāḥ* (plural) was used as an early designation of the *Vaiśeṣika* school’, who in turn becomes a source for F.W. THOMAS (1960: 7, n. 1).

It does not require much discussion here to demonstrate that the tenets of ‘Yoga’ in the passage are by no means compatible with anything what we know of the Yoga school and in fact they run counter basic doctrinal fundamentals of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga system.¹⁰⁴ Instead, they neatly correspond to familiar doctrines of Vaiśeṣika, but are also accepted by Nyāya. The first tenet postulates that the world is not a creation of some kind of transformation (*pariṇāma*) of a primeval substance caused by some additional supramundane factors, say, a relation between the consciousness principle (*puruṣa*) and the primordial factor (*prakṛti*) (see SK 21), but rather a result of the cumulated *karman* of living beings. In the process of creation, the world and all aggregate, composite things are created from material elements (*mahā-bhūta*) under the influence or ‘supervision’ of the karmic results of previous deeds of hu-

¹⁰³ NBh 1.1.29: *yathā nāsata ātma-lābhaḥ, na sata ātma-hānam, niratīśayās cetanāḥ dehēndriya-maṅsu viśayeṣu tat-tat-kāraṇeṣu ca viśeṣa iti sāmkyānām. puruṣa-karmādi-nimitto bhūta-sargaḥ, karma-hetavo doṣāḥ pravṛttiś ca, sva-guṇa-viśiṣṭās cetanāḥ, asad utpadyate utpannam nirudhyata iti yogānām*. For an alternative translation of the passage see BHATTACHARYA (1974: 39–40), JACOBI (1930: 608 ff.) and THAKUR (1963: 81); for a structured discussion of its contents see CHAṬṬOPĀDHYĀYA (1927: 854–856).

¹⁰⁴ Comp. CHAṬṬOPĀDHYĀYA (1927: 854–855), BHATTACHARYA (1974: 39–41).

mans. This is indeed an important tenet of the developed¹⁰⁵ Vaiśeṣika, according to which it is the invisible moral principle (*adr̥ṣṭa*), being the cumulated deeds of living beings (*dharmādharma*), which is responsible for a number of events in the world that could not otherwise be explicable, including the moment of the creation of the word, i.e. putting all the separate and immovable atoms in motion and thereby in composite perceivable structures.¹⁰⁶ This was also a tenet tacitly adopted by Nyāya and not so pronounced as in Vaiśeṣika, albeit hardly ever discussed with respect the creation of the whole world, but rather restricted to the discussion of the creation of the new human body¹⁰⁷. The second tenet fits very well into the ideology of Nyāya; the activity (*pravṛtti*) and defects (*doṣa*), such as passion (*rāga*), aversion (*dveṣa*) and confusion (*moha*), are discussed in NS 4.1.1–9, and are explicitly said to be the causes of the circle of birth, being the causes of activity.¹⁰⁸ The idea is also very well at home in the system of Vaiśeṣika, and the defects, albeit not called *doṣas*, such

¹⁰⁵ That was not the idea of the earliest form of Vaiśeṣika, and the meaning of *adr̥ṣṭa*—initially understood without any moral or ‘karmic’ implications—changed to incorporate the moral aspect of cumulated human deeds around fourth–fifth century CE. Comp. THAKUR (2003: 14–19), BRONKHORST (2000: 34).

¹⁰⁶ See VS(C) 5.2.14: *agner ūrdhva-jvalanaṃ vāyoś ca tiryak-pavanam aṇu-manasoś cādyaṃ karmēty adr̥ṣṭa-kāritāni*.—‘The upward movement of the flame of fire, the sideward movement of the wind and the initial movement of the atom and the atomic mind are initiated by the invisible moral principle (*adr̥ṣṭa*)’ and VSV(C) *ad loc.*: *agner avasthāne tiryag vā gamane pacyamānasyābhasmi-bhāvāḥ syād apām vā, tathā vāyor atiryag-gamane pūyamāna-dravyāṇāṃ pavanābhāvo agneś cāprabodhaḥ, vinaṣṭa-śārīrāṇāṃ ātmanāṃ sargādau pṛthivy-ādi-paramāṇuṣv ādyāṃ parasparōpasarpaṇa-karma na syāt, tathā labdha-bhūmīnāṃ yogināṃ kalpānte ’bhisamdhāya prayatnena manaḥ śārīrād vyatiricyāvatiṣṭhamānānāṃ sargādau nava-śārīra-sambandhāya manasa ādyāṃ karma na bhavet adr̥ṣṭād ṛte. tasmād agner ūrdhva-jvalanaṃ vāyoś ca tiryak-pavanam aṇūnāṃ ca upasarpaṇa-karma manasoś ca ādyāṃ karma etāni prāṇināṃ adr̥ṣṭena kṛtāni*. See also PBh 359–360, p. 80: ... *tathā sarga-kāle pratyagreṇa śārīreṇa sambandhārtham karmādr̥ṣṭa-kāritam*. [360] *evam anyad api vmahā-bhūteṣu yat pratyakṣānumānābhyām anupalabhyamāna-kāraṇam upakārāpakāra-samartham ca bhavati tad apy adr̥ṣṭa-kāritam. yathā sargādāv aṇu-karma, agni-vāyvor ūrdhva-tiryag-gamane mahā-bhūtānāṃ prakṣobhaṇam...*

¹⁰⁷ See NS 3 2.60: *pūrva-kṛta-phalānubandhāt tad-utpattiḥ*, and NBh *ad loc.*, esp.: NBh₁ 3.2.60, p. 210.4–1 = NBh₂, p. 900.2–901.4: *yad-adhiṣṭhāno ’yam ātmā yad^a aham iti manyamāno yatrābhivyakto^b yatrōpabhoga-tṛṣṇayā viṣayānupalabhamāno dharmādharmau saṃskāroti tad asya śārīram, tena saṃskāreṇa dharmādharma-lakṣaṇena bhūta-sahitena patitenāsmiṃ^c śārīre niṣpadyate śārīrāntaram^d, niṣpannasya cāsya pūrva-śārīravat puruṣārthakriyā, puruṣasya ca pūrva-śārīravat pravṛttir iti karmāpekṣebhyo bhūtebhyaḥ śārīra-sarge saty etad upapadyata iti. dr̥ṣṭā ca puruṣa-guṇena prayatnena prayuktebhyo bhūtebhyaḥ puruṣārthakriyā-samarthānāṃ dravyāṇāṃ ratha-prabhṛtīnāṃ utpattiḥ. tathānumātavyāṃ śārīram api puruṣārthakriyā-samartham utpadyamānaṃ puruṣasya guṇāntarāpekṣebhyo bhūtebhya upadyata iti*. [^a NBh₂: *ayam*. ^b NBh₂: *yatrābhivyakto*. ^c NBh₂: *bhūta-sahite patite ’smin*. ^d NBh₂: *śārīra uttaram niṣpadyate*. ^e NBh₁: *tayānumātavyāṃ*.] See also NS₁ 4.1.22–24, p. 229–230 = NS₂ 21–23, p. 958–961, and NBh *ad loc.*

¹⁰⁸ NBh 4.1.2: *pravṛtti-hetutvāt punar-bhava-pratisandhāna-sāmarthyāc ca saṃsāra-hetavaḥ*. Cf. See BRONKHORST (2000: 33 ff.).

as desire (*icchā*), aversion (*dveṣa*), ignorance (*avidyā*), as well as activity, are discussed as causes of good and bad deeds (*dharmādharma*), which make up the *karman* (the term preferred is *adṛṣṭa*) on a number of occasions.¹⁰⁹ It may be the case—in fact, it is the most plausible explanation—that Vātsyāyana uses more familiar terms of his own school to refer to the idea common to both Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, which does not prejudice that what he meant was indeed the tenet of Nyāya. Also the third tenet is a clear reference to the *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva* relation (‘qualifier-qualified relation’), constitutive of Vaiśeṣika ontology, but also adopted by and well grounded in Nyāya. The qualities which qualify the souls are frequently mentioned in Vaiśeṣika literature,¹¹⁰ but also by Nyāya authors.¹¹¹ In the formulation of the fourth tenet the passage clearly refers to theory of causality which treats the effect as an entirely new entity (*asat-kārya-vāda*), which stands in clear opposition to the theory of the effect pre-existent in the cause (*sat-kārya-vāda*), promulgated by Sāṃkhya and Yoga. The theory is fundamental to both schools. A bit hesitant on the identification is THAKUR (1963: 81–82), who eventually subscribes to the original connection of the ‘Yogas’ with the Vaiśeṣikas:

‘The Yogas mentioned here are Ārambhavādins and as such, cannot be indentified with the followers of Patañjali. MM. Phaṇībhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa took the word to mean the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas, as both accept creation from the conjunction between *paramāṇus* etc. The title of these philosophers may also be due to their association with the Pāsupatas who had their own system of Yoga. Vidyānandasvāmin (*Patraparīkṣā*, p. 4) and Sālīkanātha (*Rjuvimalā*, p. 209) take the word “yoga” to mean the Vaiśeṣika alone. The tenets mentioned may thus originally be associated with the Vaiśeṣikas and the acceptance thereof in the Nyāya system might be a later event.’

¹⁰⁹ See for instance VS(C) 6.217: *icchā-dveṣa-pūrvikā dharmādharmaḥ pravṛtṭiḥ*. and VSV(C) *ad loc.*: *icchā-pūrvikā dharme pravṛtṭiḥ, anyena dhana-madād abhibhūtasya vā dveṣa-pūrvikāpi grāma-kāmēṣṭy-ādau. adharme picchā-pūrvikā para-dārādiṣu dveṣa-pūrvikā. evaṃ dharmādharmaḥ samcayaḥ*; PBh 292, 294: [*icchā*] *prayatna-smṛti-dharmādharma-hetuḥ*. [*dveṣaḥ*] *prayatna-smṛti-dharmādharma-hetuḥ*.

¹¹⁰ VS(C) 6.1.7: *ātma-guṇeṣv ātmāntara-guṇānām akāraṇatvāt*; VS(C) 9.17: *ātma-samavāyād ātma-guṇeṣu*; VS(C) 10.1: *ātma-samavāyaḥ sukha-duḥkhaḥ pañcebhyo ’rthāntaratve hetus tad-āśrayibhyaś ca guṇebhyaḥ*; VSV(C) 2.1.25: *ye khalv ātma-guṇās te sukhādaya ivāntar-śarīram upalabhyante*; PBh 79: *sukha-duḥkhēcchā-dveṣa-prayatnais ca guṇair guṇy anumīyate, te ca na śarīrēndriya-guṇāḥ. ... tasya guṇāḥ buddhi-sukha-duḥkhēcchā-dveṣa-prayatna-dharmādharma-samskāra-samkhyā-parimāṇa-prthaktva-samyoga-vibhāgāḥ*.

¹¹¹ E.g. NBh₂ 1.1.5, p. 12.16–19: *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭam nāma yatrāpratyakṣe līṅga-līṅginoh sambandhe kenacid arthena līṅgasya sāmānyād apratyakṣo līṅgī gamyate. yathēcchādibhir ātmā, icchādayo guṇāḥ. guṇās ca dravya-saṁsthānāḥ. tad yad eṣāṃ sthānam sātmeti*.

We thus see that all the four tenets of the ‘Yogas’ fit well in both the doctrines of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika and it is not possible to determine solely on the basis of ideas who the ‘Yogas’ who upheld these theories were. The terminology actually employed by Vātsyāyana in the passage is of no help for us, because it cannot be treated as an indicator of the system from which the original ideas and terms stem. In no way should we be misled by the nomenclature of the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*: obviously Vātsyāyana would have the natural systemic propensity to use the terms of his own school rather than the terminology of Vaiśeṣika to denote the same phenomena and ideas. However, he also uses terminology which is not necessarily characteristic specifically of either Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika or terms which are technical in neither of them, e.g. *cetana*. Solely on the basis of Vātsyāyana’s description and vocabulary it seems impossible to decide whether he considered these tenets to belong primarily to the Nyāya system and secondarily accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas or *vice versa*. To judge either way we cannot apply historical criteria as regards which of these schools developed these tenets first, because Vātsyāyana would not have applied such historical criteria himself.

Uddyotakara adds two more examples in his gloss to illustrate the idea of a system’s distinctive tenet (*pratītantra-siddhānta*):

‘A system’s distinctive tenet [also upheld in an allied system] is invariably the acceptance of the universals, the particulars (individuatōrs) and the like. For instance, it is for the «Yogas» that the sense-organs are material (*sc.* derived from the material elements), whereas for the followers of Sāṃkhya it is that they are non-material (*sc.* derived not from the material elements but from the psychic faculty of self-identity, *aham-kāra*).’¹¹²

As against the opinion of Pt. Vindhyaśvarī Prasāda Dvivedin and other *paṇḍits*, Kṣetreśacandra CHAṬṬOPĀDHYĀYA’s (1927: 858) conclusion of the passage is that ‘From all this it is clear that Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara meant the Naiyāyikas when they used the term *Yogānam* in the passages quoted above ... The meaning of the term *yoga* in Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara is certainly “Naiyāyika”.’ And that is an opinion to which Kamaleswar BHATTACHARYA (1974: 42) apparently subscribes. But is such assessment really accurate?

Let us analyse Uddyotakara’s examples. The first of them refers to the idea of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* understood as distinct entities. Both are recognised in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika alike, albeit they primarily constitute the hard-core ontological structure of the Vaiśeṣika set-up of the world as universals and individuatōrs, or a category which introduces the ultimate difference among indi-

¹¹² NV₁, p. 105.7–9 = NV₂, p. 100.3–4: *sāmānya-viśeṣa-tadvatām niyamenābhyupagamaḥ pratītantra-siddhānta iti. yathā bhautikānīndriyānīti yogānām abhautikānīti sāmānyānām iti.*

vidual entities which can be differentiated irrespective of their qualities (*guṇa*) solely through their unique individuators. However, the *viśeṣas* are not necessarily technically used in Nyāya in this sense; they may also stand for what is generally understood as particulars. Further, *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* are recognised as two separate categories of the system of Vaiśeṣika, besides mere four (or five) others, and they do not enjoy a status of separate categories of the Nyāya system: Nyāya does not list them among the sixteen categories, which are primarily of epistemological character. This could be a hint. The second example is rather straightforward and lucidly explained by CHAṬṬOPĀDHYĀYA's (1927: 856): 'The Sāṃkhya system derives the sense-organs directly from *Ahaṃ-kāra*, from which are also produced in a different line the Five Subtle Elements (*Sā. K. 22*); consequently they are "non-elemental". But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas believed in the "elemental" origin of the *indriyas*.' Since the view is so intimately related to both the school, it is not possible to draw any conclusions from this example.

Let us take still another look at the passage. The very nature of the notion of 'a system's distinctive tenet' (*pratitantra-siddhānta*) is that the thesis is shared by both school and, naturally, it is not possible to draw any conclusions as regards the affiliation of the thesis to one school or another solely on the basis of its contents. Indeed, the very idea is that it is a tenet of one school which is at the same time shared by an allied school. How should Vātsyāyana's latter four examples be treated? Are these tenets primarily of the Nyāya school also shared by the Vaiśeṣikas, called 'Yogas', or tenets primarily of the Vaiśeṣika school also shared by the Naiyāyikas, i.e. 'Yogas'?

It is of note that nowhere in his text does Vātsyāyana use the name *vaiśeṣika* to refer to his fellow school, whereas he does use the terms *nyāya* and *naiyāyika* on a few occasions.¹¹³ It would be quite untypical for him to unexpectedly, on this singular occasion, chose a different locution to refer to his own school, if

¹¹³ The only reference to fellow school representatives is in NBh 1.1.32: *daśāvayavān eke naiyāyikā vākye sañcaṣate*. The number of the occurrences of the term *nyāya* in the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* is about two dozen, though most of them do not necessarily refer to the system of Nyāya but to the method of logical-epistemological enquiry. Some of them do contain a possible reference to the school itself, understood via its method: NBh₁ 1.1.1, p. 35.1 = NBh₂ p. 2.20: *nyāya-vidyā*; NBh₁ 1.1.1, p. 35.4 = NBh₂ p. 3.3: *tatra nānupalabdhe na nirṇite 'rthe nyāyaḥ pravartate* (?); NBh₁ 1.1.1, p. 35.6 = NBh₂ p. 3.6: *nyāya-pravṛtīḥ* (?); NBh₁ 1.1.1, p. 38.2 = NBh₂ p. 3.9–10: ... *nyāyaḥ pravartate. kaḥ punar ayaṃ nyāyaḥ. pramāṇair artha-parīkṣaṇaṃ nyāyaḥ*; NBh₁ 1.1.1, p. 39.1–2 = NBh₂, p. 3.11–13: *kaḥ punar ayaṃ nyāyaḥ? pramāṇair artha-parīkṣaṇaṃ nyāyaḥ. ... sāvīkṣā. pratyakṣāgamābhyāṃ ikṣitasyānvīkṣaṇaṃ anvīkṣā. tayā pravartata ity ānvīkṣikī nyāya-vidyā nyāya-śāstram*; NBh₁ 1.1.1, p. 45.2 = NBh₂ p. 4.4: *tad-āśrayā ca nyāya-pravṛtīḥ* (?); NBh₁ 1.1.1, p. 52.1 = NBh₂ p. 4.16: *so 'yaṃ paramo nyāya iti*; NBh₁ 1.1.41, p. 330.6–7 = NBh₂ p. 38.6–7: *so 'yaṃ vimarśaḥ pakṣa-pratīpakṣāv avadyotyā nyāyaṃ pravartatāyī upādīyata iti*; NBh₁ 2.2.17, p. 613 = NBh₂ p. 108.16–17: *śāstra-siddhāntas tu nyāya-samākhyātam anumataṃ bahu-śākhā anumānam*; NBh₁ colophon, p. 1200 = NBh₂ p. 320.17: *yo 'kṣapādam ṛṣiṃ nyāyaḥ pratyabhād vadatām varam*.

he does not do it in other cases. Further, while referring to the views of his own school Vātsyāyana does it directly with verbs in the first person plural.¹¹⁴

Further, it is crucial to remember that the notion of *pratitantra-siddhānta* means a tenet of our system which is acceptable also in a fellow, allied school. Vātsyāyana, while explaining the idea, directs the message primarily to the representatives of his own school. That being the case, it would be rather surprising if he referred to himself and other representatives of his own school with the unusual ‘Yogas’. Rather, he would either say *iti asmākam* or simply *iti*, without mentioning the systemic affiliation of the tenets. The views referred to by Vātsyāyana are therefore the tenets of his own school which are acceptable also to the school of the ‘Yogas’, as the genitive plural indicates. This is exactly what transpires from all comments, including the elucidation, slightly confrontational in nature, by Bhāsarvajña in his *Nyāya-bhūṣaṇa*, where the genitives plural denote the proponents of a fellow, allied school:

‘[Now follows a comment on the aphorism]: «A system’s distinctive tenet is such which is upheld in a similar (sc. allied) system (or similar, allied systems) but is not upheld in other systems». A similar system for the followers of Kapila (sc. Sāṃkhya system) is [the system] of Patañjali’s Yoga, and for the followers of [the system] of Patañjali’s Yoga is the system of Kapila—of this sort is the example accepted by some [e.g. by Uddyotakara etc., vide supra p. 223, n. 112]. The author of the gloss (i.e. Jayantabhaṭṭa?) does not accept it however, because he maintains that [he rejects this] because it cannot be argued for with a rational argument. In his opinion, the following is the [proper] example: A similar system for the followers of the Naiyāyikas is the system of Vaiśeṣika, and for the Vaiśeṣikas it is the school of Nyāya. In contradistinction to that, we will explain as follows: One system (sc. set of beliefs (*tantra*)) which is fundamental and common to many authors of commentaries and for those who listen to the commentators is called similar (i.e. common), like a similar (i.e. common) house, similar (i.e. common) wealth. A thesis which is established in such a similar (common) system but is not established in another system or in no other system at all that is a system’s distinctive tenet. And in such a way it follows that a thesis which is not established in one’s own system, even though it is established in a similar system, is not a system’s

¹¹⁴ Such cases are indeed rare, see NBh₁ 1.1.4, p. 124 = NBh₂ p. 11.19–20: *asannidhiṃ cāsya yugapaj-jñānānutpatti-kāraṇam vakṣyāma iti*; NBh₁ 3.1.60, p. 793 = NBh₂ p. 168.7–8: *tena bhūta-guṇa-viśeṣopalabdher manyāmahe bhūta-prakṛtīndriyāni nāvayakta-prakṛtīnīti*; NBh₁ 3.2.22, p. 854 = NBh₂ p. 186.14–15: *nātrōtpatti-kāraṇam apadiśyate yenātāt pratipadyemahīti*; NBh₁ 5.1.1, p. 1102 = NBh₂ p. 283.9–10: *aviśeṣam tatra tatrôdāharīṣyāmaḥ*.

distinctive tenet. And, accordingly, even though it contradicts it (sc. one's own system), it does not follow that it becomes schismatic tenet.¹¹⁵

The conclusion which obviously follows is that the 'Yogas' of the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* cannot but be the proponents of Vaiśeṣika, to whom a number of the Naiyāyikas' tenets are likewise acceptable.

Interestingly, the sequence of the school names given *verbatim* by Vātsyāyana as examples is: Sāṃkhya-Yoga, and the names correspond to the first two schools mentioned by Kauṭilya; furthermore, what they really mean is: Sāṃkhya, the co-system (*samāna-tantra*) of which was Yoga, and Vaiśeṣika, the co-system of which was Nyāya.

It is nothing new that the name Yoga was a customary designation of the systems of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, as Debiprasad CHATTOPADHYAYA and Mrinalkanti GANGOPADHYAYA (1992, I: 102) aptly noted:

'The theses mentioned by Vātsyāyana are the *pratitantra-siddhānta* of the followers of Yoga are characteristic of both the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. ... The Naiyāyikas were known as *yogin-s* belonging to the Śaiva and the Pāśupata sects. This is evident from the statement of the Jaina philosopher Guṇaratna (*Tarkarahasya-dīpikā*, p. 51). In any case, the Vaiśeṣika system was known as Yoga even in ancient times and the Vaiśeṣika philosophers were accordingly characterised as the "followers of *yoga*". The Jaina philosopher Vidyānanda Svāmi, in his work *Patraparīkṣā*, quotes a sūtra of Kaṇāda (viz. *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* iv. 1.1.) and adds, "As it is said by the followers of *yoga*". Further, Guṇaratna opens his discussion of the Nyāya view with the words: "The Naiyāyikas, also known as the *yauga-s*". Therefore, according to the ancient tradition, Vātsyāyana mentions the theses of the Vaiśeṣikas as characteristic of the followers of *yoga*. ... The thesis referred to here as that of the follower of *yoga* is shared alike by the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas. By the followers

¹¹⁵ NBhū 66.17–26: "*samāna-tantra-prasiddhaḥ para-tantrāprasiddhaḥ pratitantra-siddhāntaḥ*". *samānam tantram kāpilānām pātañjalam, pātañjalānām ca kāpilam ity evam prakāraḥ udāharaṇam kecid icchanti. ṭikā-kārās tu nēcchanti, apramāṇōpapannatvād iti manyamānāḥ. tan-mate tv etad evōdāharaṇam—samānam tantram naiyāyikānām vaiśeṣika-śāstram, vaiśeṣikānām nyāya-śāstram iti. vayan tv anyathā vyācakṣmahe—anekeṣām upanibandha-kārāṇām vyākhyāṭy-śrotīṇām ca mūla-bhūtam ekaṁ tantram sādharmaṇam samānam^a ity ucyate. yathā samānam grham samānam dhanam iti. tasmīn samāna-tantra-yaḥ siddho 'rthaḥ para-tantra tu kvacit sarvatra vā na siddhaḥ, sa pratitantra-siddhāntaḥ. evam ca sva-śāstrā-siddho 'rthaḥ sadṛśa-tantra-siddho 'pi pratitantra-siddhānto na bhavatīti gamyate. tatas ca tad-virodhe 'pi nāpasiddhāntaḥ prasajyate iti. [^a NBhū: *samānam*.]*

of *yoga* are thus to be understood the followers of both Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems. ...’

The same approach of Rājeśvara Śāstrī Draviḍa to identify Yoga of Kauṭilya with Vaiśeṣika was taken, although with much caution, by Wilhelm HALBFASS (1988: 278), who says with respect to the problematic term *yoga*:

‘What Kauṭilya means by *yoga*, the second item in his list, is not easy to determine. In a general sense, it is important to remember that the words *yoga* is by no means exclusively associated with the Yoga system of Patañjali, or with other doctrines and techniques of meditation and inner discipline. Its root *yuj-* also accounts for the word *yukti*, “reasoning”; and likewise, the word *yoga* itself is occasionally used to refer to disciplines of “reasoning” and “argumentation,” such as Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. This usage is documented in older as well as in more recent texts.’

In the same verve, Johannes BRONKHORST (2007: 171) relies here on the opinion of HALBFASS (1988: 278), and writes:

‘Yoga, as is common in early texts, may refer to Nyāya. It follows that Sāṅkhya, Lokāyata and p r o b a b l y (emphasis—P.B.) Nyāya are presented here as investigative sciences (*ānvīkṣikī*).’

The nature of HALBFASS’ arguments in favour of his equation of Yoga with Vaiśeṣika is that it is n o t i m p o s s i b l e t h a t a l s o Vaiśeṣika could be implied by the term *yoga*. In other words, these arguments, indirect in nature, simply do n o t e x c l u d e such a possibility. But we do not find any direct arguments with these authors that could effectively help establish a link between the ‘Yoga’ of Kauṭilya and Vaiśeṣika. HALBFASS (1988: 278), clearly following the above remark of CHATTOPADHYAYA–GANGOPADHYAYA (1992, I: 102), vaguely says that ‘In the doxographic literature of the Jains, the *Naiyāyikas* and *Vaiśeṣikas* are often referred to as “Yogins” or, more specifically, as *Śaiva* and *Pāśupata* Yogins; and their teachings are presented as doctrines of “Yoga”,’ and merely draws our attention (1988: 540 n. 66) to one passage from a late mediaeval commentary of Guṇaratna-sūri (*ca.* 1343–1418) on Haribhadra-sūri’s *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya*, in order to substantiate the claim that ‘Yoga’ of Kauṭilya is Vaiśeṣika, not the Yoga of meditation.

These arguments are not entirely convincing, albeit attractive. Still, the major problem remains: how to account for such a strong relation between the tradition of Nyāya and the current of Ānvīkṣikī given an apparent absence of any reference to it by name in Kauṭilya’s enumeration of branches that practise methodology (*ānvīkṣikī*)? Further, how to link Nyāya with the Yoga of the *Artha-śāstra*, a text composed perhaps two centuries before the emergence of Nyāya and the composition of an early version of the *Nyāya-sūtra* (*vide supra* § 9.2)?

12. The passage from Guṇaratna's *Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā* referred to by Debiprasad CHATTOPADHYAYA and Mrinalkanti GANGOPADHYAYA and, following him, by HALBFASS, opens a separate section on Nyāya in the doxographic treatise *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya*:

'Now, [the author] describes the specific features, such as *līṅga* etc. of the Naiyāyikas, whose another designation is «Yaugas».¹¹⁶

Since the designation of the school representatives was Yauga, it follows that the school's name was Yoga.

The structure of the doxographic treatise of Haribhadra-sūri (ca. 740–800), known as Yākinī-putra, is quite revealing in that it subsumes the discussion of Vaiśeṣika under the heading of Nyāya, and in fact treats the former as a sub-variety of the latter, which is confirmed the commentator Guṇaratna (*vide supra* p. 219, n. 102), who in addition emphasises the nature of the religious-sectarian division between the two:

'Further, in treatises the Naiyāyikas are always called the Śaivas, because they worship Śiva, whereas the Vaiśeṣikas are called the Pāśupatas. Hence, the teaching of the Naiyāyikas is called Śaivism, whereas the doctrine of the Vaiśeṣikas Pāśupatism.¹¹⁷

Such a treatment is by no means an invention of Haribhadra himself but rather a reflection of a continuous centuries-long tradition in which the systems of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika were seen, both within and outside the systems, as complementary.

The close relationship of the systems finds confirmation on many occasions, e.g. in Malliṣeṇa-sūri's *Syād-vāda-māñjarī* who says:

'Since the schools of the Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas are generally similar, one should understand that when the system of the Aulūkyas (Vaiśeṣikas) has been refuted also the system of Yaugas (Naiyāyikas) is refuted.¹¹⁸

Of note is that Malliṣeṇa calls the propounders of the system of Nyāya 'Yauga',¹¹⁹ and by implication the system itself 'Yoga'.

Despite the claims to the contrary, the cases when the term *yoga* is taken to refer to either Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika in Indian philosophical literature are few and

¹¹⁶ TRD ad ṢDSa 12, p. 76.5: *athādau naiyāyikānām yaugāparābhīdhānānām līṅgādīvyaktir ucyate.*

¹¹⁷ TRD ad ṢDSa 12, p. 78.8–10: *param śāstreṣu naiyāyikāḥ sadā śiva-bhaktatvāc chaivā ity ucyante, vaiśeṣikās tu pāśupatā iti. tena naiyāyika-śāsanam śaivism ākhyāyate, vaiśeṣika-darśanam ca pāśupatam iti.*

¹¹⁸ SVM 10.1–2, p. 54.16–17: *vaiśeṣika-naiyāyikayoḥ prāyaḥ samāna-tantratvād aulūkyamate kṣipte yauga-matam api kṣiptam evāvaseyam.*

¹¹⁹ See also SVM 14.138, p. 89.19: *yaugair.*

far between. Despite their scarcity, they do seem sufficient to provide satisfactory evidence to enable certain conclusions. In addition to the cases discussed above, some occurrences of the term *yoga* in the sense of Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika are provided by CHAṬṬOPĀDHYĀYA (1927: 856) who follows MM. Paṇḍit Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa's discussion on pp. 227–230 of the edition of the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* with Bengali translation (Calcutta 1917), which is not available to me. These are the *Patra-parikṣā* (PaP, p. 4.30?) of Vidyānanda Pātrakesarisvāmin, the *Parikṣāmukha-sūtra* (PA 6.57) of Māṇikyanandin, and two sources already referred to, viz. the *Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā* of Guṇaratna (TRD ad ṢDSa 12; *vide supra* p. 219, n. 116) and the *Syād-vāda-mañjarī* of Malliṣeṇa-sūri (SVM 10.1–2, *vide supra* p. 228, n. 118).

An analysis of how Vidyānanda Pātrakesarisvāmin uses the terms *yoga/yauga* in his two works the *Patra-parikṣā* and the *Āpta-parikṣā* will reveal that what he has in mind is the system of the Vaiśeṣika and its followers. In the *Patra-parikṣā* he uses the term *yoga* at least twice,¹²⁰ and in both cases in the same context to designate those who assert that 'The [ultimately] existent [particular] is without a cause and eternal' (*sad akāraṇavan nityam*) which is nothing else but a quote from the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* (VS(C) 4.1.1). Similarly, in his other work, the *Āpta-parikṣā*, Vidyānanda comes to speak of the 'Yaugas'.¹²¹ Also in this case there is no slightest shade of doubt that what he has in mind are again the followers of the Vaiśeṣika system whose founder is referred to by name just a few lines before: *īśvara-kaṇādayor* (ĀpP 6 § 42, p. 29.1).

On the other hand, in an aphorism of Māṇikyanandin's *Parikṣāmukha-sūtra*¹²² which enumerates a range of cognitive criteria (*pramāṇa*) and states that each of the succeeding systems recognises one criterion more, the Yaugas represent a system which admits of four such cognitive criteria, which cannot be Vaiśeṣika, recognising either two or three *pramāṇas*, but Nyāya. On the other hand, in his commentary *Parikṣāmukha-laghu-vṛtti*, also known under the title *Prameyāratna-māla*, Anantavīrya clearly distinguishes in one passage between the Naiyāyikas¹²³ and the Yaugas¹²⁴, who cannot but be the Vaiśeṣikas. On an-

¹²⁰ PaP, p. 4.30: *yogasya sad akāraṇavan nityam ity ādivat*, and PaP 21cd, p. 5.24: *sad akāraṇavan nityam iti yoga-vaco 'pi ca*.

¹²¹ ĀpP₁ 5, p. 7. 25–27 = ĀpP₂ 6 § 43, p. 29.7–8: *tatra teṣu mokṣa-mārga-praṇetr̥tva-karma-bhū-bhṛd-bhet̥tva-viśva-tattva-jñātr̥tveṣu karma-bhū-bhṛtām bhet̥tvam asiddham. munīndrasya viparyāsāt tad-abhet̥tvāt karma-bhū-bhṛd-asambhavāt sadā-śivasya ye vadanti yaugāḥ...*

¹²² PA₁ 6.56₁ = PA 6.57₂: *saugata-sāmkhya-yauga-prābhākara-jaiminīyānām pratyakṣā-numānāgaôpamānārthāpatty-abhāvair ekāikādhikair vyāptivat*.

¹²³ PALV₁ 1.1, p. 9.17–19 = PALV₂ 1.1, p. 3.5–6: *tasya ca jñānam iti viśeṣaṇam ajñāna-rūpasya sannikarśāder naiyāyikādi-parikalpitasya pramāṇatva-vyavacchedārtham uktam*.

¹²⁴ PALV₁ 1.1, p. 9.23–25 = PALV₂ 1.1, p. 3.11–14: *tathā parokṣa-jñāna-vādinām mīmāṃsakānām asvasamvedana-jñāna-vādinām sāmkyānām jñānāntara-pratyakṣa-jñāna-vādinām yaugānām ca matam apākartum sva-padôpādānam ity avyāpty-ativyāpty-asambhava-doṣa-parihārāt suvyavasthitam eva pramāṇa-lakṣaṇam*.

other occasion¹²⁵ the same Anantavīrya enumerates, and subsequently refutes, the five members of the proof formula (*pañcāvayava*) and ascribes the view to the ‘Yauga’, in the wording well-known from the tradition of Nyāya:¹²⁶ *pratijñā-hetūdāharaṇōpanaya-nigamana*. Indeed, also the Vaiśeṣikas recognised the five-membered proof-formula, but named the members differently: *avayavāḥ punaḥ pratijnāpadeśa-nidarśanānusandhāna-pratyāmnāyāḥ* (PBh 265, p. 49). Such terms as *upanayana* and *nigamana* do not even occur in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, Candrānanda’s commentary or in the *Prāśastapāda-bhāṣya*. This may imply that *yauga* in the passage refers, in turn, to the Naiyāyikas, not to Vaiśeṣikas as in the preceding passage. Then again in a passage directly related to the ontology of Vaiśeṣika, which discusses the relation between the universal (*sāmānya*) and the particular (*viśeṣa*) as absolutely different from each other we come across the following remark: ‘Neither the opinion of the «Yaugas» that the universal and the particular are independent of each other seems to be justified through argumentation.’¹²⁷ The idea of the universal and the particular as absolutely different from each other typically forms a favourite butt of Jaina criticism which is usually directed against the Vaiśeṣika, not necessarily against the Nyāya, but not always, as in the case of Siddharṣi-gaṇin, who indicates that this was the claim of both the schools: ‘The Naiyāyika and the Vaiśeṣika [consider the domain of the cognitive criterion to be] «the universal and the particular as [absolutely] separate from each other».’¹²⁸ Apparently, Anantavīrya uses the same term *yauga* still in a third meaning which covers both. He does the same while commenting on Māṇikyanandin’s aphorism which asserts that the resultant cognition is both different and non-different from the cognitive procedures which led to it.¹²⁹ Anantavīrya mentions the opinion of the ‘Yaugas’ to the effect that the result of the cognitive process (cognitive criterion) is absolutely different from the process (criterion) itself¹³⁰, and such is an opinion is shared by both the Naiyāyikas¹³¹ and

¹²⁵ PALV₁ 3.32, p. 29.37–30.2 = PALV₂ 3.37, p. 33.11: *pratijñā-hetūdāharaṇōpanaya-nigamana-bhedāt pañcāvayavam iti yaugaḥ*.

¹²⁶ NS 1.1.32: *pratijñā-hetūdāharaṇōpanaya-nigamanāni avayavāḥ*.

¹²⁷ PALV₁ 4.1, p. 44.27–28 = PALV₂ 4.1, p. 57.1–2: *nāpi sāmānya-viśeṣau parasparā-napekṣāv iti yauga-matam api yukti-yuktam avabhāti*.

¹²⁸ NAV 0.7: *paraspara-vibhaktau sāmānya-viśeṣāv iti naiyāyika-vaiśeṣikāḥ*.

¹²⁹ PA 5.2: *pramāṇād abhinnaṁ bhinnaṁ ca*.

¹³⁰ PALV₁ 5.2, p. 29.37–30.2 = PALV₂ 5.2, p. 62.18–19: *tad dvividham api phalam pramāṇād bhinnaṁ evēti yaughāḥ*.

¹³¹ See for instance: NBh 1.1.1: *tatra yasyēpsā-jihāsā-prayuktasya pravṛttiḥ sa pramātā, sa yenārtham pramiṇoti tat pramāṇam, yo ’rthaḥ pramiyate tat prameyam, yad artha-vijñānam sā pramitiḥ*; NBh 1.1.1: *pramāṇato ’rtha-pratipattiḥ*; NBh 1.1.1: *pramāṇair artha-parikṣaṇam*; *pramāṇam* NBh 1.1.1: *antareṇa nārtha-pratipattiḥ*; NBh 1.1.3: *aḥśasyākṣasya prativiśayam vṛttiḥ pratyakṣam. vṛttis tu sannikarṣaḥ jñānam vā. yadā sannikarṣas tadā jñānam pramitiḥ, yadā jñānam tadā hānōpādānōpekṣā-buddhayaḥ phalam*; NV₁ 1.1.1, p. 18.3 = NV₂, p. 17.4: *nirṇayaḥ tattva-jñānam pramāṇānam phalam*.

the Vaiśeṣikas.¹³² This is one more case when the term *yauga* comprises both systems. We can observe that one and the same author uses one and the same term either to refer to the followers of Nyāya, or the Vaiśeṣika or both, and when the followers of one of the schools are mentioned explicitly by their standard name, say ‘the Naiyāyikas’, ‘the Yaugas’ will refer to the other, e.g. ‘the Vaiśeṣikas’.

As we could see so far, the term *yoga* is never used unequivocally as referring just to one and the same school in philosophical literature. On some occasions it refers to Nyāya, on others to Vaiśeṣika. The external evidence shows that the term *yoga* was predominantly used with reference to Vaiśeṣika, but sometimes (e.g. Guṇaratna) also to Nyāya. Also the system’s internal evidence (NBh 1.1.29) reveals that the term was current as another name for Vaiśeṣika, the older of both schools. Further, followers of Nyāya are sometimes called also *yogas* or *yaugas* (e.g. SVM), but sometimes—as we shall see—also the followers of Vaiśeṣika are known as such.

Even though his judgement is based on an assessment of a much narrower pool of samples, CHATṬOPĀDHYĀYA (1927: 857) seems generally right in concluding that ‘All these passages show that the Naiyāyika or the Vaiśeṣika, more often the former, was known as Yoga or Yauga’, except for his conclusion regarding the frequency of references to either of the schools. Certainly it is not the case that ‘the balance of evidence is in favour of the Naiyāyika’ (1927: 857). As we have seen, the term *yoga* is used to designate both the systems of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, whereas the terms *yauga* or *yoga* alike denote the followers of either of the systems or of both the systems jointly.

The fact that both the schools were here and there referred to by the same name *yoga* should be interpreted as a reflection of their common origin which was grounded in the primary meaning of the verbal root √*yuj*—‘to connect’, esp. ‘to rationally establish a connection between two things’, i.e. ‘to reason’, ‘to be consistent’, ‘to justify’ etc., and its substantive derivative *yukti*—‘argumentation’ or ‘reasoning’, ‘logical congruity’ etc. This line of interpretation is confirmed in a comment by Raghūttama in his *Bhāṣya-candra*, a commentary on the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*:

‘Those who primarily have (sc. practice) *yoga*, i.e. argumentation (*yukti*) or reasoning (*tarka*) are the Yogas, according to [Pāṇini]’s rule 5.2.127 stipulating that the *taddhita* affix] aC [A 3.1.1 is in-

¹³² See e.g. PBh 243, 245, p. 45: [243] *tatra sāmānya-viśeṣeṣu svarūpālocana-mātraṁ pratyakṣaṁ pramāṇam, prameyā dravyādayaḥ padārthāḥ, pramātātmā, pramītir dravyādiviśayaṁ jñānam. ... [45] athavā sarveṣu padārtheṣu catuṣṭaya-sannikarṣād avitatham avyapadeśyaṁ yaj jñānam utpadyate tat pratyakṣaṁ pramāṇam, prameyā dravyādayaḥ padārthāḥ, pramātātmā, pramītir guṇa-doṣa-mādhyasthya-darśanam iti.*

roduced] after [the class of stems] beginning with *arśas* [“hemorrhoids”].¹³³

In addition, we have also seen above that the current of Ānvīkṣikī was methodologically linked to the epistemological, investigative and analytic tradition preserved in the *Caraka-saṃhitā*, which was in its turn linked to the school of Nyāya. I would claim it was not a coincidence but a gradual development of the tradition of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, which did not yet exist as separate schools at the time of ‘Kauṭilya’ (the collective author of the *Artha-śāstra*) in the second–first centuries BCE, but which gradually evolved out the methodical reflection cultivated by the representatives of various groups subsumed under Ānvīkṣikī. These common roots of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika in the current of Ānvīkṣikī are most probably responsible for the fact that the term *yoga* was applied to both schools or to the followers of both schools.

Early epistemology, e.g. the theory of perception (see § 9.3), developed within the circles of the epistemologists of the *Caraka-saṃhitā*, the authors of *Nyāya-sūtra* and the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* are very similar and point to their common origins. All three shared the same concerns of epistemology, analysis, rational enquiry, methodology and reason-based debate as Ānvīkṣikī. Furthermore, the assurances of Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara Bhāradvāja to the effect that there exists a historical link between Nyāya and Ānvīkṣikī and one can genuinely speak of Nyāya’s successorship cannot be disregarded, because they reflect the actual historical development, it seems. What Vātsyāyana did was not artificially equate his own school with Ānvīkṣikī and create a new link, but rather he reaffirmed an existing connection with a current of which Nyāya was a direct successor and, in addition, stressed the orthodox character of his own school as the study of the self (*ātma-vidyā*) so that it should not be confused with other systems which once belonged to and were directly associated with Ānvīkṣikī, such as the materialists, who outspokenly rejected any sort of eschatology:

‘Thus, this knowledge of truth [mentioned in the *sūtra*] as the accomplishment of the highest goal should be known according to respective disciplines of learning. And in this particular discipline, i.e. the study of the highest self, the knowledge of truth means the knowledge of the self etc., and the attainment of the highest goal means the attainment of liberation.’¹³⁴

¹³³ BhC, p. 133: *yogo yuktiḥ tarkaḥ pradhānatayā vidyate yeṣāṃ te yogāḥ, arśa-ādītīvāt ac.* [A 5.2.127: *arśa-ādibhyo ’C*]. BHATTACHARYA (1974: 43) draws attention to this passage.

¹³⁴ NBh₁ 1.1.1, p. 65 = NBh₂, 6.2–3: *tad idam tattva-jñānam niḥśreyasādhigamaś ca^a yathā-vidyam vedītavyam. iha tv adhyātma-vidyāyām ātmādi-jñānam tattva-jñānam, niḥśreyasādhigamo ’pavarga-prāptiḥ.* [^a NBh₁: *niḥśreyasādhigamārtham.*]

Apart from shared epistemological concerns, we can see a consistent line of evolution of a system which applied methodological skills and analytical and epistemological tools to the investigation of the highest human goals, i.e. of what they labelled *adhyātma-vidyā*, the study of the highest self. At this stage my initial claim that the Yoga of the *Artha-śāstra* is precisely an early form of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika seems well grounded. Certainly, it was not the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika we now know. It was a tradition which only gradually assumed its later name of Nyāya, perhaps a tradition which was not clearly distinguished from the Vaiśeṣika, a tradition which I would here call ‘proto-Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika’. That could explain why the term *yoga* is later used, also by the Naiyāyikas, with reference to the proponents of the Vaiśeṣika, but still an early tradition of Nyāya is included in Kauṭilya’s classification of Ānvīkṣikī.

The above conclusion decidedly speaks against theories which would try to explain the name *yoga* for the system of Nyāya by trying to link it to spiritual practices of the system of (Pātañjala) Yoga. Such an explanatory conjecture is found with CHAṬṬOPĀDHYĀYA (1927: 857–858), subscribing to the view of Paṇḍit Gopīnātha Kavirāj (*Sarasvatī Bhavana Studies*, vol. III) who allegedly

‘shows the intimate connexion between Nyāya and Yogic practices. He (Gopīnātha Kavirāj—P.B.) writes, “though Yoga in its wider form has been practically accepted by every system of Indian philosophy, its relation with Nyāya is in some manner more special and, perhaps, fundamental.” The *Sarva-siddhānta-saṃgraha*, he points out, “affords distinct proof in support of a relation existing between Nyāya and Yoga; for it is maintained there that according to Nyāya *mokṣa* follows directly from Yoga, a doctrine which it shares in common with the Patañjali system (as distinguished from the Sāṅkhya, where *jñāna* is held to be the immediate cause of Mukti).” “The Nyāya Darśana, in its present form,” Mr. Kavirāj adds, “contains some *Sūtras* (4–2, 38–49) where the practices of Yoga are strongly recommended.”’

In view of the fact that in Kauṭilya’s work, ‘Yoga’ does not encompass a proto-Nyāya, but also a proto-Vaiśeṣika alike, this theory cannot not explain how also Vaiśeṣika, substantially related to Nyāya, could be linked to the practice of Yoga at the time when it was clearly atheistic and rejected any paranormal explanations and supramundane practices, such as extrasensory perception¹³⁵ and meditation was not the concern of the system. The ties between earliest form of Vaiśeṣika and probably also Nyāya, on the one hand, and the system of Yoga were rather relaxed, to say the least. Further, what the theory referred to above actually claims is that early Nyāya was called Yoga

¹³⁵ A good attestation is the fact that the discussion of supernatural perception in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* (VS(C) 9.13–17) is clearly a later interpolation, see WEZLER (1982), HONDA (1988), ISAACSON (1993) and BALCEROWICZ (2010: 292 f., 308 ff.).

simply because it was associated with Pātañjala Yoga, which in itself is an ahistoric statement: Pātañjala Yoga in the form and texts we know is a product of a turn fourth and fifth centuries CE.¹³⁶ Along these lines, one could as well argue that any school of thought in India could deserve the name ‘Yoga’ simply because of its association the system of Pātañjala Yoga. And, as we know, the influence of Yoga practice on various systems in India was indeed enormous, and still these did not come to be occasionally known as Yoga: clearly, not everything related to Yoga becomes a Yoga.

Our understanding of what systems Ānvīkṣikī comprised and what Kauṭilya’s ‘Yoga’ stood for finds an indirect confirmation in the *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā*, a work on poetics composed by Rājaśekhara (ca. 880–920 CE). In Chapter Two *On Disciplines of Learning (Śāstra-nirdeśa)*,¹³⁷ the author summarises various divisions of sciences and disciplines, and Ānvīkṣikī features in a number of such typologies. The list opens an eighteenfold classification, which comprises Ānvīkṣikī, just as several other lists, including the well-known fourfold classification of Kauṭilya, but also, many of them including Ānvīkṣikī. Of particular interest is a passage (KM 2, p. 4.11–23) commenting on and expanding or updating the *Artha-śāstra* classification:

‘According to Kauṭilya there are four disciplines of learning: methodology (*ānvīkṣikī*), the triple *Veda*, economics and political science. The triple *Veda*, explored with the help of methodology, surpasses both economics and political science. ... Out of these the triple *Veda* has already been discussed. Methodology is two-fold in view of being a preliminary position (*pūrva-pakṣa*) and

¹³⁶ See e.g. BRONKHORST (1984: 191–203), Philipp André MAAS (2006: xii–xix) and (2010: 383 f.) according to whom for the date of the *Pātañjala-yoga-śāstra* and the *Yoga-bhāṣya* ‘a time span reaching from 325 to 425 CE seems to be most likely’ (2010: 383).

¹³⁷ KM 2 (*śāstra-nirdeśa*), pp. 2.16–5.17, esp. the passages 3.11–12, 20–21, 4.5–24: *pauruṣeyaṃ tu purāṇam ānvīkṣikī mīmāṃsā smṛti-tantram iti catvāri śāstrāṇi. ... ānvīkṣikī tu vidyāvasare vakṣyāmaḥ. ... tad dhi śāstrāṇy anudhāvanti. “vārttā kāma-sūtram śilpi-śāstram daṇḍa-nītir iti pūrvaiḥ sahāṣṭā-daśa vidyā-sthānāni” ity apare. ānvīkṣikī trayī vārttā daṇḍa-nītiś cēti vidyāḥ. “daṇḍa-nītir evākā vidyā” ity auśanasāḥ. daṇḍa-bhayād dhi kṛtsno lokāḥ sveṣu sveṣu karmasv avatiṣṭhate. “vārttā daṇḍa-nītir dve vidye” iti bārhaspatyāḥ. vṛttir vinaya-grahaṇam ca sthīti-hetu-loka-yātrāyāḥ. “trayī-vārttā-daṇḍa-nītyas tisro vidyāḥ” iti mānavāḥ. trayī hi vārttā-daṇḍa-nītyor upadeṣṭrī. ānvīkṣikī trayī-vārttā-daṇḍa-nītyaś catasro vidyā” iti kauṭilyaḥ. ānvīkṣikyā hi vivecitā trayī vārttā-daṇḍa-nītyoḥ prabhavati. “pañcamī sahitya-vidyā” iti yāyavariyāḥ. sā hi catasṛṇām api vidyānām niṣpandaḥ. ābhirdharmārthau yad vidyāt tad vidyānām vidyātvam. tatra trayī vyākhyātā. dvidhā cānvīkṣikī pūrvōttara-pakṣābhyām. arhad-bhadanta-darśane lokāyataim ca pūrvāḥ pakṣāḥ. sāmkyam nyāya-vaiśeṣikau cōttaraḥ. ta ime ṣaṭ tarkāḥ. tatra ca tisraḥ kathā bhavanti vādo jalpo vitaṇḍā ca. madhyasthayos tattvāvabodhāya vastu-tattva-parāmarśo vādaḥ. sva-pakṣasyāparigrahitrī para-pakṣasya dūṣayitrī vitaṇḍā. kṛṣi-pāśu-pālye vaṇijyā ca vārttā. ānvīkṣikī-trayī-vārttānām yoga-kṣema-sādhano daṇḍas tasya nītir daṇḍa-nītiḥ. tasyām āyattā loka-yātrēti śāstrāṇi.*

an antithetical position (*pūrva-pakṣa*). The view of the Jainas and Buddhists but also of the materialists constitute a preliminary position. Sāṃkhya and the systems of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika are an antithetical position. All these constitute six schools of reasoning (*tarka*). These also for three kinds of debate: debate proper (*vāda*), paradialectical dispute (*jalpa*) and eristic disputation (*vitandā*). ... Economics comprises agriculture, cattle breeding and trade. Political power (*daṇḍa*) is the means of securing the pursuit of (lit. acquisition and maintenance) of methodology (*ānvīkṣikī*), the triple *Veda* and economics (AŚ 1.4.3), the application of this [political power] is political science.’

In the above classification based on the well-known Kauṭilya’s division of disciplines of learning, Ānvīkṣikī is divided into two sections. The first section, called a preliminary position (*pūrva-pakṣa*), groups non-Brahmanic schools, among which the original materialistic school (*lokāyata*) is still preserved. Furthermore, the system of the materialists is in fact grammatically distinguished in the enumeration as a separate locution, not a part of a compound **arhad-bhadanta-lokāyatika-darśanāni*, which may suggest that the original *lokāyataṃ ca* of *Artha-śāstra* 1.2.10 (*sāṃkhyam yogo lokāyatam cety ānvīkṣikī*) was expanded by the insertion of the additional two systems *arhad-bhadanta-darśane*. The second section, called an antithetical position (*pūrva-pakṣa*), comprises Brahmanic schools such as Sāṃkhya, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, the latter two schools being a later development of the ‘Yoga’ current of Kauṭilya. Thus, the *pūrva-pakṣa* exactly corresponds to the enumeration *sāṃkhyam yogaḥ* of *Artha-śāstra* 1.2.10. All in all, except for the inclusion of Jainas and Buddhists, the original list of Kauṭilya is preserved, except for Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika explicitly replacing ‘Yoga’.

Again, in Chapter Eight *On the Sources of the Meaning of Poetry* (*Kāvyaṛthayonayaḥ*, p. 35 ff.), Rājaśekhara discusses how different schools of thought and disciplines can contribute to the understanding of poetical meaning and what their theories of meaning are. In a passage he says that there are two kinds of thinkers who rely on cognitive criteria (*prāmāṇika*), being the representatives of the discipline of (*pramāṇa-vidyā*):¹³⁸ the *maimāṃśikas*, i.e. those who follow *mīmāṃsā* (reasoned hermeneutics) and the reasoners (*tārkika*), i.e. those who follow *tarka* (reasoning).¹³⁹ Among those who follow reason (*tarka*), are the followers of Sāṃkhya,¹⁴⁰ and their thought is exemplified with a verse from the chapter on Sāṃkhya-Yoga of the *Bhagavad-gītā* (BhG 2.16). Further,

¹³⁸ KM 8, p. 35.2.

¹³⁹ KM 8, p. 36.19–20: *dvidvidhaḥ prāmāṇiko maimāṃśikas tārkikaś ca*.

¹⁴⁰ KM 8, p. 37.1: *tarkeṣu sāṃkhīyaḥ*. We should probably read *tārkikeṣu* instead of *tarkeṣu*.

among the reasoners are the representatives of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika¹⁴¹, the Buddhists¹⁴², the materialists¹⁴³ and the Jainas¹⁴⁴. This is, no doubt, an updated (to the intellectual conditions of the turn of the ninth and tenth centuries) classification of currents which examine the foundations of our cognition: what we have here is the term *pramāṇa-vidyā* which replaced the outdated *tarka-vidyā*, synonymous to *ānvīkṣikī*, and also the list of systems is expanded by the inclusion of Mīmāṃsā, Buddhism and Jainism. (In fact, Jayantabhaṭṭa indicates that another name for Ānvīkṣikī is *pramāṇa-vidyā*.¹⁴⁵)

What we really have here is precisely Kauṭilya's typology of Ānvīkṣikī in a new garb adopted to new requirements of Rājaśekhara's times. Also this updated and extended classification agrees with the core typology of sciences of *Artha-sāstra* 1.2.10, and all the three original representatives of Ānvīkṣikī are preserved in the enumeration.

13. To conclude, in the debated passage of the *Artha-sāstra*, which enumerates the three schools—*sāṃkhya*, *yoga* and *lokāyata*—which were comprised within the current of Ānvīkṣikī, Kauṭilya refers, respectively, (1) with the name *sāṃkhya*, to a joint school of Sāṃkhya-Yoga, regularly mentioned under this double name in the epic literature, (2) with the name *yoga*, to an early form of epistemological method and rational enquiry which we could here call a 'proto-Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika', which gradually developed into the school of Nyāya, from its beginnings associated with Vaiśeṣika and the tradition of rational enquiry and debate preserved in the medical treatise *Caraka-saṃhitā*, and (3) to the materialistic tradition of the Lokāyatas/Cārvākas. What united all these three traditions was not the subject matter of enquiry, being so disparate as dualistic ontology of Sāṃkhya-Yoga, pluralistic ontology of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and monistic ontology of the materialists, or the salvific concerns of the representatives of Sāṃkhya-Yoga and early Naiyāyikas, on the one hand, and purely materialistic interests of the Cārvākas. We would probably be not far from truth assuming that the current of Ānvīkṣikī comprised also other minor traditions which subscribed to similar methods of rational enquiry and participated in the debates in the circles of Ānvīkṣikī. What all these three main branches, and probably a range of minor ones, shared was the method they applied in their respective fields of particular ontologies and axiologies. In the course of its development, Ānvīkṣikī was 'highjacked' by the tradition of Nyāya, which eventually grew out of it and appropriated the name for itself, but it remained in popular memory as a system which focused on rational argument and enquiry and used or—in the eyes of some: misused—logic (*hetu*) and reason

¹⁴¹ KM 8, p. 37.7: *nyāya-vaiśeṣikīyaḥ*.

¹⁴² KM 8, p. 37.13: *bauddhīyaḥ*.

¹⁴³ KM 8, p. 37.19: *laukāyatikaḥ*.

¹⁴⁴ KM 8, p. 37.24: *ārhatāḥ*.

¹⁴⁵ NMa₁ II: 136.1 = NMa₂ II: 100.11: *pramāṇa-vidyā cēyam ānvīkṣakī*.

(*tarka*), and therefore not always triggered positive associations in religious circles. The fear of reason for pious religion-oriented minds is not just a modern phenomenon.

The current of Ānvīkṣikī comprised various philosophical schools and systems which represented divergent ontologies—dualism of Sāṃkhya–Yoga, pluralism of ‘Yoga’ (later developed into Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika) and monism/materialism of the Lokāyata—and axiologies but were united by a common interest in investigative methods, methodological solutions, epistemological concerns and rational enquiry which could be adopted to their respective ontologies and ethical systems. The current of ‘Yoga’ represented a tradition whose main preoccupation was the pursuit of the ultimate goal, which involved both the insight into the ultimate human nature, or the highest self (*adhyaṭma-vidyā/ātma-vidyā*), and its corollary the liberation from mundane bonds and material limitations. Its direct successors were the schools of Nyāya and, to a lesser extent, Vaiśeṣika. Both ‘Yoga’ and Nyāya shared the same salvific concerns and the same method which reflected the name of the schools: *yoga* (as a synonym to *yukti*) and *nyāya* indicated the method of Ānvīkṣikī, i.e. argumentation or methodical reasoning, which in turn were actually synonymous with still another term *anvīkṣā*, or systematic enquiry (*vide supra* NV 1.1.40, p. 202, n. 65). Interestingly, all these three technical terms *anvīkṣā*, *yoga/yukti* and *nyāya*—of more or less the same meaning, gave rise to three separate currents or schools: Ānvīkṣikī, Yoga and Nyāya.

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