

Pramāṇas and language.
A Dispute between Diñnāga, Dharmakīrti and Akalaṅka*

Piotr Balcerowicz

— 1 —

In *Three Simple Chapters* (*Laghīyas-traya*, LT), a concise though seminal work on epistemology written by a Digambara Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa (c. 720–780), we come across a verse that contributed to some controversy and to a variety of interpretations. It reads (LT 10cd–11ab):

*jñānam ādyam matiḥ sañjñā cintā cābhinibodhikam /
prāṇ nāma-yojanāc cheṣaṁ śrutaṁ śabdānuyojanāt //*

Its contents is rather lucid and straightforward, it would seem. At first attempt, we could render it as follows:

Int. 1 ‘The first [kind of] cognition [comprises] sensuous cognition (here: memory), recognitive cognition, and inductive thinking [and] determined cognition, [and occurs] before the association with name (speech). The remaining [kind of cognition] is testimonial (mediated) cognition on account of the application of speech.’

The interpretation of the verse should not be very problematic. In it Akalaṅka continues his exposition of his epistemological ideas. Here he iterates the idea that there are only two cognitive criteria (*pramāṇa*)¹, divided into perception (*pratyakṣa*) and indirect cognition (*parokṣa*). The first variety comprises four subtypes: (1) sensuous cognition (*matijñāna*), which embraces all cognitive processes that are directly based on the activity of sense organs and that culminate in the act of retention (*dhāraṇā*), or ‘saving’ the directly perceived image of an object to the residue memory; (2) recognitive cognition, the idea of which is the determination and identification of things through comparing them with their image preserved in memory; (3) inductive thinking, or association, that consists in generalisation on the basis of a series of single similar events; in the course of it, general ideas, images, principles and rules

* The present paper is a part of my research subsidised by the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung.

¹ For the reasons why I consistently render *pramāṇa* as ‘cognitive criterion’ see: BALCEROWICZ (2001a: 140–145, n. 4).

are derived that may later serve as a background for universal generalisations, indispensable to any inference; and finally (4) determined cognition which completes sense-related cognitive processes with a definite conclusion; for that reason the final stage is also called ‘inference’ (*anumāna*)². The second variety includes all remaining kinds of cognitive process, which in the above verse are given a joint name of testimonial (mediated) cognition (*śruta*), the common feature of which is that they are all mediated cognitions, as opposed to the first variety of cognitions that are acquired directly by the cogniser. The very possibility of cognition to be mediated, i.e. to be conveyed to other people, is due to language, which is the vehicle of information and the means of expressing the contents of one’s own knowledge. For this reason, Akalaṅka seems to relate the first variety of cognition, viz. perception, with non-verbal sphere, and the second variety, viz. indirect cognition, with the use of language and application of verbal symbols.

The continuator of Akalaṅka’s ideas, a commentator of a number of works and an author of independent treatises, Vidyānanda Pātrakesarisvāmin (first half of 9th century) quotes the above verse of *Laghīyas-traya* and offers his own paraphrase of its contents, which entirely agrees with *Interpretation 1*:

Int. 2 ‘The first [kind of] cognition [comprises] memory, recognitive cognition, inductive thinking and determined cognition; it arises before the association with name (speech). The remaining [kind of cognition] is testimonial (mediated) cognition [that arises] on account of the application of speech.

As for this idea, Akalaṅka said the following:

“The first [kind of] cognition [comprises] sensuous cognition (here: memory), recognitive cognition, and inductive thinking [and] determined cognition, [and occurs] before the association with name (speech). The

² Clearly, the Sanskrit term *anumāna* has a much wider connotation than ‘inference’. In a number of contexts it refers to all kinds of reasoning which is based on symbols (including speech elements) of any system of coding; it proceeds from one symbol (word or idea), that has already been comprehended, to another, new one, of which we know it is related to the former one. In this way the term ‘*anumāna*’ is applicable to typical cases of inference, but also to the use of language in which words as symbols connote ideas (universals), which are further related with each other or with their referents. This aspect of *anumāna* is clearly visible, for instance, in Dinnāga’s system. This also explains why Akalaṅka takes *abhinibodha* and *anumāna* as synonyms.

remaining [kind of cognition] is testimonial (mediated) cognition on account of the application of speech”.³

³ TŚVA, p. 239:

*jñānam ādyaṃ smṛtiḥ saṃjñā cintā cābhinibodhikam /
prāg-nāma-saṃvṛtaṃ śeṣaṃ śrutam śabdānuyojanāt //*

atrākalaṅka-devāḥ prāhuḥ—

*jñānam ādyaṃ smṛtiḥ saṃjñā cintā cābhinibodhikam /
prāṇ nāma-yojanāc cheṣaṃ śrutam śabdānuyojanāt //*

These two verses are followed by Vidyānanda’s comment, which is additionally interesting in term of the qualitative usage of the particle *eva* (TŚVA, p. 239–240): *tatrēdaṃ vicaryate—mati-jñānād ādyād ābhinibodhika-paryāntāc cheṣaṃ śrutam śabdānuyojanād evēty avadhāraṇam, śrutam eva śabdānuyojanād iti vā? yadi śrutam eva śabdānuyojanād iti pūrva-niyamaḥ tadā na kaścīd virodhaḥ, śabda-saṃsṛṣṭa-jñānasya aśruta-jñānatva-vyavacchedāt. atha śabdānuyojanād eva śrutam iti niyamaḥ, tadā śrotra-mati-pūrvakam eva śrutam na cakṣur-ādi-mati-pūrvakam iti siddhānta-virodhaḥ syāt. sāmvyavahārikam śabdaṃ jñānam śrutam ity apekṣayā tathā-niyame tu nêṣṭa-bādhāsti cakṣur-ādi-mati-pūrvakasyāpi śrutasya paramārthato ’bhyupagamāt sva-samaya-pratipatteḥ.*—As regards the idea, it is [now] examined. The remaining [kind of cognition different] from sensuous cognition, which is the first [kind of cognition], [with its varieties] up to determined cognition, is testimonial cognition. Is it the restriction of the following kind: [1] “Testimonial cognition [arises] exclusively on account of the application of [articulated] speech” or [2] “Exclusively testimonial cognition [arises] on account of the application of [articulated] speech”? [Ad 2] If it is the foregoing restriction: “Exclusively testimonial cognition [arises] on account of the application of [articulated] speech”, then there is no contradiction, because [in this way] it is excluded that the cognition connected with [articulated] speech is non-testimonial cognition. [Ad 1] If the restriction is: “Testimonial cognition [arises] exclusively on account of the application of [articulated] speech”, then testimonial cognition is exclusively [such a cognition] that is preceded by sensuous cognition derived from the organ of hearing, it is not [a cognition] preceded by sensuous cognition derived from the organ of seeing and other [senses]; [and] that would yield a contradiction with the doctrine. But if [we assume] such a restriction in dependence on the rule that “testimonial cognition is conventional verbal cognition”, then there is no accepted (*sc.* legitimate) subversion, because testimonial cognition is [then] ultimately accepted—in accordance with the contention of [our] own doctrine—as also [a cognition] preceded by sensuous cognition [derived from all sense-organs such as] the eye etc.’ For Vidyānanda’s further comments that follow this passage see n. 85.

To explicate Akalaṅka’s idea, Vidyānanda Pātrakesarisvāmin adds in the same spirit in TŚVA, p. 243:

śabdānuyojanāt tv eṣā śrutam astv akṣa-vittivat /

sāmbhavābhāva-saṃvittir arthāpattis tathānumā //

nāmāsaṃsṛṣṭa-rūpā hi matir eṣā prakīrtitā /

nātaḥ kaścīd virodho ’sti syād-vādāmṛta-bhoginām //—

—‘But if this [sensuous cognition were to arise] on account of the application of speech, then let it be testimonial cognition (*sc.* indirect cognition), like cognition derived from sense organs, and [other cognitive criteria such as] equivalence, apprehension of absence [as

The only difference between Vidyānanda and Akalaṅka is the use of the term ‘*mati*’ (sensuous cognition), which is replaced by Vidyānanda with an unequivocal term ‘*smṛti*’ (memory). This should not surprise us because Akalaṅka himself uses these two terms interchangeably several times (cf. LT 25, LTV 61). This apparent synonymy of such seemingly divergent concepts as ‘sensuous cognition’ (which approximates the idea of perception) and ‘memory’ is in itself a bit eccentric, and will necessitate further explanation.

In his commentary on Siddhasena Divākara’s *Sammati-tarka-prakaraṇa*, another Jaina thinker Abhayadeva-sūri (11th century) extensively commented on the issue of the division of cognitive processes and their relation to language, raised by Akalaṅka in the above verse:

‘Such a cognition [which occurs] before the association with speech is sensuous cognition; it [becomes] the remaining [kind of cognition], viz. testimonial (mediated) cognition, which is of various subdivisions, which is produced owing to the application of speech and which is unclear cognition.’⁴

‘Here, the division is as follows: such cognition [which occurs] before the association with speech, which is divided into memory etc. and which operates as being capable of activating infallible practical action is sensuous cognition; however, [such a cognition] which is manifested as a result of the association with speech is in its entirety testimonial (mediated) cognition.’⁵

Abhayadeva confirms the initial analysis of the contents of Akalaṅka’s verse. Interestingly, we find a new element in Abhayadeva’s exposition, which was absent in Akalaṅka’s: the reference to the practical side of cognition which is ‘capable of activating infallible practical action’ (*avisamvādi-vyavahāra-nirvartana-kṣamaṁ*)—a clear influence of the well-know idea of

negative proof] as well as inference [which arise on account of the application of speech]. However, this sensuous cognition has been declared to have the form which is disconnected from name (speech). Therefore, there is no contradiction for those who take delight in the nectar of the doctrine of modal description.’

⁴ TBV, p. 553.13–14: *prāk śabda-yojanāt mati-jñānam etat śeṣam aneka-prabhedam śabda-yojanād upajāyamānam aviśadam jñānam śrutam.*

⁵ TBV, p. 553.20–21: *atra ca yat śabda-saṁyojanāt prāk smṛty-ādikam avisamvādi-vyavahāra-nirvartana-kṣamaṁ pravartate tan matiḥ, śabda-saṁyojanāt prādur-bhūtam tu sarvaṁ śrutam iti vibhāgaḥ.*

Dharmakīrti, viz. the efficacy to execute causally efficient action (*artha-kriyā-sāmarthya*).

If we suppose that what Vidyānanda and Abhayadeva say, which is unanimous with *Interpretation 1*, accurately depicts what Akalaṅka had in mind, we still face a serious difficulty: how is it possible to reconcile such processes as memory, recognition, recollection, inductive thinking (association) or inference with the idea of direct cognition, or perception? And that is precisely what all these interpretations imply. In addition, Akalaṅka understandably relates inference (*anumāna*) to indirect cognition (*parokṣa*) at another place (LT 4). Did he not notice the contradiction to which his statement of LT 10cd–11ab leads to, namely that inference, said to be synonymous with determined cognition (*ābhinibodhika* = *matī-jñāna*), merges in character with direct cognition, or perception? Was this difficulty not noticed by his commentators?

The premonition that the initial *Interpretation 1* may not portray Akalaṅka's intentions adequately finds its confirmation with Prabhācandra-sūri (11th century), the author of the *Nyāya-kumudacandra* (NKC), the main commentary on Akalaṅka's *Laghīyas-traya*. His gloss on the verse accentuates entirely different aspects and the overall interpretation conveys ideas that radically oppose *Interpretation 1*:

Int. 3 'The first [kind of] cognition is sensuous cognition. Memory, recognitive cognition, as well as inductive thinking and determined cognition are the remaining [kinds of cognition, different from sensuous cognition,] viz. [they make up] testimonial (mediated) cognition [which occurs] before the association with name (speech) and on account of the application of speech.'⁶

⁶ The above translation follows Prabhācandra's commentary, the complete text of which runs as follows (NKC, p. 404.4–405.9): *yat prathama-kārikāyām 'śeṣam' aviśadam jñānam ity uktam tat kim? śrutam avīspaṣṭa-tarkaṇam 'śrutam avīspaṣṭa-tarkaṇam'^a ity-abhidhānāt. kiṁ yat nāma-yojanāj jāyate 'viśadam jñānam tad eva śrutam, utānyad api? ity āha—prāñ nāma-yojanāt. namnaḥ abhidhānasya yojanāt pūrvam upajāyate yad aspaṣṭam jñānam tac chrutam nāma-yojanājanitārthāspaṣṭa^b-jñāna-sādharmyād ity-abhiprāyaḥ. cintā ca ity atra ca-sabdo^c bhinna-prakramaḥ śabdānuyojanāt ity asyānantaram draṣṭavyaḥ. tena na kevalam nāma-yojanāt pūrvam yad aspaṣṭam jñānam upajāyate tad eva śrutam kiṁ tu śabdānuyojanāc ca yad upajāyate tad api śrutam ity saṅgrhītam bhavati. kiṁ tad? ity āha—samjñā ity ādi. cintā ca ity ayaṁ ca-sabdaḥ punar bhinna-prakramaḥ matīḥ ity asyānantaram smṛti-samuccayārtho draṣṭavyaḥ. tena smṛty-ādy aviśadam jñānam^d śrutam ity uktam bhavati. indriya-prabhavam matī^e-jñānam tu deśato vaiśadya-sambhavāt*

To understand Prabhācandra’s commentary it is crucial to notice the following equivocation: he applies the same term ‘*mati*’ twice in two different meanings. First, the term is taken in the sense of ‘sensuous cognition’ in the phrase ‘The first [kind of] cognition is sensuous cognition’ (*jñānam ādyam matiḥ* = NKC: *jñānam ādyam kāraṇam. kim-nāma? ity āha—matiḥ iti*). Secondly, Prabhācandra uses it again in the sense ‘memory;’ (*mati* = *smṛti*) in the phrase: ‘Memory, recognitive cognition, as well as inductive thinking and determined cognition are the remaining [kinds of cognition] viz. testimonial cognition’ (*matiḥ samjñā cintā cābhinibodhikam ... śeṣam śrutam*). He tries to justify his interpretational ‘manoeuvre’ by way of explaining various positions of the copula ‘*ca*’, that is said to be placed wrongly, and suggesting that the actual sequence of words in the verse is slightly different. However, Prabhācandra is justified in taking the term ‘*mati*’ to mean ‘memory’

*sāmvyavahārikam pratyakṣam ity uktam. tasya śrutasya kim kāraṇam? ity āha—jñānam ādyam kāraṇam. kim-nāma? ity āha—matiḥ iti. na cāgama-virodhaḥ—‘mati-pūrvam śrutam’^f ity-abhidhānāt.—‘What is this “remaining” [cognition] of which it was said in the first verse (sc. LT 3) that it is unclear cognition? [It is] testimonial cognition, which is indistinct suppositional reasoning, [thus] on account of the explicit statement: “Testimonial cognition is indistinct suppositional reasoning”. Is testimonial cognition only that which arises through the association with name (speech), or also something else? To answer this, [Akalaṅka] says: **before the association with name** (speech). That non-lucid cognition which arises prior to the association **with name**, i.e. verbal statement, is testimonial cognition, because it is similar to the non-lucid cognition of an object which is not produced by the association with name—such is [Akalaṅka’s] intention. In the following [phrase]: **and inductive thinking**, the speech element “and” occurs in the irregular position (sc. is displaced) and should be interpreted immediately after the phrase: **on account of application of speech**. Therefore, not only is testimonial cognition that [cognition] which arises prior to the association with name (speech), but also is testimonial cognition that [cognition] which arises on account of the application of speech—thus has [the idea] been recapitulated. What is this [testimonial cognition]? To answer this, [Akalaṅka] says: **recognitive cognition** etc. This speech element “and” [in the phrase] **and inductive thinking**, occurs again in the irregular position (displaced) and should be interpreted immediately after the phrase: **sensuous cognition**, as having the meaning of conjunction with “memory”. Thus, what this amounts to is the following: memory etc. are unclear cognition, i.e. testimonial cognition. However, sensuous cognition, which has its origin in senses, has been described as conventional perception [in LTV 4], in so far as it can occur as partially [having] clarity. What is the cause of this testimonial cognition? To answer this, [Akalaṅka] says: **the first [kind of] cognition** is the cause [of this testimonial cognition]. What is its name? To answer this, [Akalaṅka] says: **sensuous cognition**. There is no contradiction with the scriptural testimony [of TS 1.13], because of the explicit statement: “Testimonial cognition is preceded by sensuous cognition” [TS 1.20].’*

^a Cf. TŚVA, p. 237: *śrutam aspaṣṭam tarkaṇam*.

^b Śr: *yojanāj janitārthāspaṣṭa*.

^c Ā, Śr: *atra śabdo*.

^d Ā, Śr: *aviśada-jñānam*.

^e B: °-*prabhava-mati*-°.

^f TS 1.20.

(*smṛti*), apart from its usual meaning, by the Jaina tradition itself, e.g. by Umāsvāmin's remark that 'sensuous cognition, memory, recognitive cognition, inductive thinking [and] determined cognition are synonymous expressions' (TS 1.13: *matih smṛtiḥ samjñā cintābhiniḥ bodha ity anarthāntaram*), a statement that also Akalaṅka refers to at another occasion (SViV 2.17, p. 115.15–18).

The implication of Prabhācandra's interpretation is that such cognitive processes as memory, recognitive cognition, inductive thinking or determined cognition are separated from sensuous cognition (*matī-jñāna*). Such an opinion of Prabhācandra, in turn, contradicts the gist of Umāsvāmin's aphorism of TS 1.13, quoted above. Granted Prabhācandra's exposition be correct, Akalaṅka would have to renounce another vital tenet of Jaina tradition, which he did accept on other occasions explicitly, and thereby he would inevitably run into contradiction again. The problematic nature of such an interpretation was evident to Prabhācandra, who was quick to add in the concluding section of the gloss (NKC, p. 405.7–9) that: 'There is no contradiction with the scriptural testimony [of TS 1.13], because of the explicit statement: "Testimonial cognition is preceded by sensuous cognition" [TS 1.20].' This artifice of interpreting the sequence of cognitive acts such as memory etc. in terms of their causes does not explain the difficulty away: these cognitive acts (*sc.* memory etc.) may be caused by perception but it does not mean that they all share with it the same nature.

— 2 —

To understand the contents of Akalaṅka's enigmatic verse and its far-reaching consequences, one should take a closer look at the historical context in which Akalaṅka formulated it and a range of ideas which are at its intellectual background, namely the centuries-old discussion among Indian philosophers what cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*) is and what its true nature consists in. It is also important to take into account some important shifts in its understanding among the Jainas themselves.

The very notion of 'cognitive criterion' (*pramāṇa*) was a foreign body in the system of the early evolving Jaina theory of cognition. It was adopted gradually under the influence of the methodological-analytical stream of Ānvīkṣikī and the Nyāya school. The influence is undeniably attested by the choice of terminology and the typology of cognitive criteria which we find in Jaina *Āgamas*, which follows that of Ānvīkṣikī and Nyāya. The appropriation of the idea of 'cognitive criterion' by Jaina thinkers must have taken place probably after 1st or

2nd century CE, i.e. when the term and its divisions had already become well-established in the Ānvīkṣikī and Nyāya traditions. Initially, in Jaina sources, the term *pramāṇa* referred exclusively to classifications known from these two traditions, and comprised: perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), analogy-based reasoning (*aupamya*) and scriptural testimony (*āgama*)⁷. Interestingly, the notion of ‘cognitive criteria’ was introduced into Jinism as an idea (along with its classification), not as a separate term. Before the Jainas started using the term ‘*pramāṇa*’, the current term was ‘*hetu*’ (Prakrit *heū*), or ‘source of cognition’ or ‘cognitive tool’⁸. That was also in perfect harmony with the usage we find in the *Caraka-samhitā*⁹.

Further, the earliest fragments of Jaina texts of epistemological relevance (probably after about 3rd or 2nd century BCE) testify that Jainas applied two schemes of classification of cognition that may have coexisted as complementaries.

The first scheme distinguished two basic kinds of cognition: immediate, direct cognition (*pratyakṣa*) and mediated, indirect cognition (*parokṣa*). In the initial phase of the development of Jaina epistemology the borderline between them was regulated by the interpretation of what ‘*akṣa*’, or ‘perceiving organ’, is. Until 6th–7th centuries, for the Jainas the eye and other sense organs were merely physical or physiological mediators in acquiring cognition. The exclusive ‘perceiving organ’ was the cognitive subject (*ātman*) himself, or ‘living element’ (*jīva*), viz. the soul. All cognition which occurs in the cognitive subject (the soul) without the assistance of any additional factors, such as sense-organs or the mind, was taken to be immediate and direct (*pratyakṣa*), whereas any cognitive act which could not possibly take place without the support of senses etc. was considered indirect (*parokṣa*).


Such an approach conspicuously differed from the mainstream of Indian epistemology and general usage with which basically most Indian thinkers complied: direct cognition, or perception, originates in senses, whereas any cognition that follows the activities of the mind is an indirect variety of cognition, and these varieties were named and classified differently. No wonder that Jaina terminological usage must have seemed awkward to many and may have led to unnecessary misunderstanding and complications.

⁷ Viy 5.4.26[3] (vol. 1, p. 201.1–2): *pamāṇe cauvihe paṇṇatte, taṃ jahā—paccakkhe, aṇumāṇe, ovamme, āgame.*

⁸ Ṭhāṇ 336 (p. 149): *ahavā heū cauvihe pannatte, taṃ jahā—paccakkhe aṇumāṇe ovamme āgame.*

⁹ E.g. CarS 3.8.33: *atha hetuḥ—hetur nāmōpalabdhi-kāraṇaṃ. tat pratyakṣam anumānam aitiḥyam aupamyaṃ iti.*

The second typology comprised five kinds of cognition: sensuous cognition (*mati-jñāna*), testimonial cognition (*śruta-jñāna*), clairvoyance (*avadhi-jñāna*), mind-reading (*manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna*¹⁰) and absolute knowledge (*kevala-jñāna*).¹¹ These two models were quickly combined into one consistent scheme which became the standard for centuries to come. It also comprised subdivisions, or stages, of sensuous cognition: sensation (*avagraha*), cogitation (*ihā*), perceptual judgement (*avāya*¹²) and retention (*dhāraṇā*). The scheme found its classical formulation with Umāsvāmin in the *Tattvārtha-sūtra* (TS)¹³:



Model 1

¹⁰ The Digambaras, including Akalaṅka (RVār), preferred the variant: *manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna*.

¹¹ Vīy 8.2.22–23 (p. 336): ...*pañcavihe nāne paṇṇatte, taṃ jahā—ābhinibohiya-nāṇe suya-nāṇe ohi-nāṇe maṇapajjava-nāṇe kevala-nāṇe. ... ābhinibohiya-nāṇe catuvvihe paṇṇatte, taṃ jahā—uggaho ihā avāo dhāraṇā*. NaṃS 6[28–29] i 8 (pp. 6, 9): ...*ñāṇa-dāmsaṇa-guṇāṇam... ṇāṇam pañcaviham paṇṇattam. taṃ jahā—ābhinibohiya-ñāṇam suya-ñāṇam ohi-ñāṇam maṇapajjava-ñāṇam kevala-ñāṇam*.

¹² The Śvetāmbaras prefer the term *avāya*.

¹³ TS 1.9–12, 15. Umāsvāmin’s actual classification, based on classifications found also in the *Āgamas*, was far more complex and contained the blanket idea of ‘cognitive application’ (*upayoga*): (I) *jñāna*: (1) *ābhinibodhika-jñāna* with four stages: (a) *avagraha*, (b) *ihā*, (c) *avāya*, (d) *dhāraṇā*, (2) *śruta-jñāna*, (3) *avadhi-jñāna*, (4) *manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna*, (5) *kevala-jñāna*, (II) *darśana*: (1) *caḥsur-darśana*, (2) *acāḥsur-darśana*, (4) *avadhi-darśana*, (5) *kevala-darśana*. Comp. Vīy 2.10.9[2] (p. 115): ...*jīve ṇam aṇamāṇam ābhinibohiya-nāṇa-pajjavāṇam evam suta-nāṇa-pajjavāṇam ohi-nāṇa-pajjavāṇam maṇapajjava-nāṇa-pajjavāṇam kevala-nāṇa-pajjavāṇam mati-anṇāṇa-pajjavāṇam suta-anṇāṇa-pajjavāṇam vibhaṅga-nāṇa-pajjavāṇam cakkhu-dāmsaṇa-pajjavāṇam acakkhu-dāmsaṇa-pajjavāṇam ohi-dāmsaṇa-pajjavāṇam kevala-dāmsaṇa-pajjavāṇam uvaogam gacchati, upayoga-lakkaṇe ṇam jīve...* See also STP 2.3, 5, 6, 8, 16, 23, 27.

Model 1 underwent various modifications. One of them was to introduce the division into cognitions that are distinct, having definite contents (*sākāra* = *jñāna*), and indistinct, not having any definite contents (*anākāra* = *darśana*, ‘vision’)¹⁴.

All these historical remarks are necessary to understand Akalaṅka’s intention underlying the problematic verse. It will also be vital to bear in mind that Akalaṅka penned the *Royal commentary* (RVār) on Umāsvāmin’s *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, which represented the above Model 1. As the author to the most fundamental Jaina text, which has been considered the paramount exposition of Jaina doctrine until today, Akalaṅka not only knew the above scheme but also accepted it, at least declaratively. What it practically meant was that he had to avoid any open contradictions with the tradition he glossed.

— 3 —

Around the 7th and 8th centuries some radical changes were introduced into Jaina systematics, which were subsequently endorsed by Akalaṅka. The ‘culprits’ were Pātrasvāmin, the author of the lost *Tri-lakṣaṇa-kadārthana*, Siddhasena Mahāmāti, the author of the *Nyāyavatāra* (NA),¹⁵ and the fundamental shift was directly compelled

¹⁴ Cf. the following Canonical model (AṅD): *pramāṇa*: (I) *jñāna*: (1) *pratyakṣa*: (a) *indriya-pratyakṣa* (*śrotra*, *caḥṣus*, *ghrāṇa*, *jihvā*, *sparsā*), (b) *no-indriya-pratyakṣa*: (*avadhi*, *manah-paryāya*, *kevala*), (2) *anumāna*: (a) *pūrvavat*, (b) *śeṣavat*, (c) *sādharmya*, (3) *aupamya* [...], (4) *āgama* [...], (II) *darśana*: (1) *caḥṣur-darśana*, (2) *acaḥṣur-darśana*, *avadhi-darśana*, *kevala-darśana*; see AṅD 435-471 (p. 173-179): [435] *se kiṃ taṃ jīva-guṇa-ppamāṇe? ... taṃ jahā—ñāṇa-guṇa-ppamāṇe daṃsaṇa-guṇa-ppamāṇe caritta-guṇa-ppamāṇe*. [436] *se kiṃ taṃ ṇāṇa-guṇa-ppamāṇe? ... taṃ jahā—paccakkhe aṇumāṇe ovamme āgame*. [437] *se kiṃ taṃ paccakkhe? ... taṃ jahā—imdiya-paccakkhe, ñoimdiya-paccakkhe ya*. [438] *se kiṃ taṃ imdiya-paccakkhe? ... taṃ jahā—soimdiya-paccakkhe cakkhur-imdiya-paccakkhe ghāṇimdiya-paccakkhe jibbhimdiya-paccakkhe phāsimdiya-paccakkhe. se taṃ imdiya-paccakkhe*. [439] *se kiṃ taṃ ñoimdiya-paccakkhe? ... taṃ jahā—ohi-ñāṇa-paccakkhe maṇapajjava-ñāṇa-paccakkhe kevala-ñāṇa-paccakkhe. se taṃ ñoimdiya-paccakkhe. se taṃ paccakkhe*. [440] *se kiṃ taṃ aṇumāṇe? ... taṃ jahā—puvvaṃ sesavaṃ dīṭṭha-sāhammavaṃ...* [471] *se kiṃ taṃ daṃsaṇa-guṇa-ppamāṇe? ... taṃ jahā—cakkhu-daṃsaṇa-guṇa-ppamāṇe acakkhu-daṃsaṇa-guṇa-ppamāṇe ohi-daṃsaṇa-guṇa-ppamāṇe kevala-daṃsaṇa-guṇa-ppamāṇe ceva. cakkhu-daṃsaṇe cakkhu-daṃsaṇissa ghaḍa-paḍa-kaḍa-raghādievsu davvesu, acakkhu-daṃsaṇe acakkhu-daṃsaṇissa āya-bhāve, ohi-daṃsaṇaṃ -daṃsaṇissa davva-davvehiṃ savva-pajjavehi ya. se taṃ daṃsaṇa-guṇa-ppamāṇe*.

¹⁵ Since the author of the *Nyāyavatāra* is different from Siddhasena Divākara, the author of the *Saṃmati-tarka-prakarāṇa*, it is advisable to refer to the former as Siddhasena Mahāmāti, see: BALCEROWICZ (2001b).

by certain Buddhist ideas and new epistemological concepts introduced by Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti.

One of the two sources of new Jaina classification, which found its earliest and fullest expression in the *Nyāyāvatāra*, was Dinnāga's well-known statement of PS and PSV 1.2:

‘The two cognitive criteria are perception and inference, [because] the cognoscible object has two characteristics...

For there is no cognoscible other than the individually marked (unique particular) and the generally marked (universal thing), because we shall further demonstrate that perception has as its datum the individually marked (unique particular), whereas inference has as its datum the generally marked (universal thing).’¹⁶

The passage introduced a new ground for distinguishing two cognitive criteria: two divergent aspects of reality, which can be known either in terms of absolutely unique sensation, or a sense impression which points to itself only, or in terms of concepts that actually convey a synthesised image, embedded in a set of relations that allow the cogniser to group items, construct hierarchies of objects, draw inferences etc., and, finally, to make use of speech, as the medium of all concepts. It is precisely its application that draws the line of distinction between the two spheres:

‘Perception is free from conceptual construction, [which, in its turn,] is connected with name, class, etc.’¹⁷

¹⁶ PS, PSV 1.2:

*pratyakṣam anumānam ca pramāṇe lakṣaṇa-dvayaṃ /
prameyam...*

na hi sva-sāmānya-lakṣaṇābhyāṃ aparam prameyam asti. sva-lakṣaṇa-viṣayaṃ hi pratyakṣam, sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-viṣayam anumānam iti pratipādayiṣyāmaḥ. Quoted in Prajñākaragupta, PVA, p. 169.3, 213.6 and by Siṃha-sūri in DNCV, p. 88.3–89.1; On this quotation see HATTORI (1968: 76–79, notes 1.11, 1.13, 1.14) and E. Steinkellner's notes 44 (p. 28) and 51 (p. 29–30) PV in II₂. Cf. also NM, p. 50: As regards one's understanding there are only two pramāṇas, I mean: inference and direct perception (*pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*) since [the other pramāṇas admitted by different schools] such as tradition (*śabda*), analogy (*upamāna*) etc. are include in these two. Thus there are only *pramāṇas*, by which can apprehend the thing in itself (*svalakṣaṇa*) and its generality (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*). There is no other knowable besides these two, which can be apprehended by a *pramāṇa* different from those [already referred to].’

¹⁷ PS₁ 1.3ed: *pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham nāma-jāty-ādi-yojanā*. Cf. HATTORI (1968: 83, 85).

Perceptual data that constitute the contents of perception, such as a particular patch of colour, a unique touch sensed in a particular moment etc., carry the information which does not extend over their actuality: the unique particular communicates nothing but its self, or its presence. The contents of ‘inference’, which actually stands for any kind of valid speech- and concept-related piece of cognition, is artificially constructed, generated on the basis of a range of perceptual data, memory and conceptual framework imposed on the perceptual data by the language; such conceptualisation conveys a generalised object, be it an arrangement of various perceptual data that have been independently apprehended by different sense organs and subsequently correlated with each other into one ‘whole’, or a set-up of abstracted features, the essential nature of which are its relations with other conceptual entities.¹⁸ It is precisely what facilitates acquisition, or expansion of knowledge of a conceptual object B, of which we have no direct knowledge, on the basis of an object A, which has already become the contents of our cognition and of which we know that it is related to the object B by a certain relation *R*. Diñnāga maintains, that the rules governing acquisition of knowledge and co-ordination of its contents are the same wherever any system of symbols is involved¹⁹. All cognitive processes based on symbols, including verbal communication, can be therefore classified as inference, and for this reason

‘Verbal cognition is not an additional cognitive criterion, different from inference, because it names its object through [the procedure known as] “exclusion of the other” in the same way as [the inference: “*x* is impermanent, because it is produced”, determines its object to have the quality of “impermanence” on the basis of the already known quality of] “being produced” etc.’²⁰

For Diñnāga all our knowledge can be organised in two disconnected compartments, the latter of which is defined by two coextensive and

¹⁸ Cf. HERZBERGER (1986: 106–144), HAYES (1988: 133–144). As regard the historical background which influenced the development of the idea of the unique particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) as the object of perception see: SINGH (1984: 117–135).

¹⁹ Cf. e.g. HAYES (1988: 173–219).

²⁰ PS 5.1:

*na pramāṇāntaram śābdam anumānāt tathā hi tat /
kṛtakatvādivat svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣate //*

The original acc. to TSaP 1513–1514. Cf. the translation in: HAYES (1988: 300) and HERZBERGER (1986: 145–146).

inseparable ideas: conceptualisations and speech. Whether we reach the conclusion that there is fire on a mountain by relying on fire's specific mark, or symbol, viz. smoke which we directly perceive, or by relying on the term 'fire', which is verbally communicated to us, both these procedures are essentially not distinct from each other: a symbol triggers the knowledge of its bearer to which it is 'attached'. Both reliable statements referring to things invisible to us and phenomena perceived by us, of which we know are attributes of other objects, serve the same purpose in precisely the same manner: 'Since there is similarity in terms of infallibility [as regards] the utterance of an authoritative person, it has the status of inference'²¹. What we eventually learn via these two procedures is likewise not different from each other: the cognitive contents is always a general, verbally expressible concept, not a particular individual. In this sense we acquire a vague idea of the inferred or verbally communicated thing, i.e. of its general features only that would not, however, allow us to identify any particular individual on its basis, or to distinguish between similar individuals covered by the same concept.

What Dīnāga actually does in his analysis is to search for one clear criterion that help us reduce all sound cognitive phenomena to a minimum number of subtypes of cognitions.

As it is well known, this general conceptual framework was taken over by Dharmakīrti who introduced some crucial innovations (PV₁ 2.1–3):

'[1] Cognitive criteria are two, depending on two kinds of data [which, in their turn, are also two] because of their potential (in the case of perception) or lack of potential (in the case of inference) to execute causally efficient action. [For instance], a hair-net is not [a really existing] object, because it does not [warrant] the fulfilment of [a causally efficient action that concludes with the appropriation of] the object.

[2] [We recognise that there are only two cognitive criteria] also because of similarity (in the case of inference) and lack of similarity (in the case of perception), and also because of the [capability of the data to become] the contents (in the case of inference) or not [to become] the contents (in the case of perception) of speech, and also because [the object's]

²¹ PS 2.5: *āpta-vādāvisamvāda-sāmānyād anumānatā* / As quoted in PVSV₄ (p. 108.1) and incorporated into PV₄ 3.216 / PVSV₄ (p. 109.5–11) = PV₃ 3.216, PVSV₃ (p. 72.21–26).

image is either present or absent when other causal factors are present.

[3] What is capable of causally efficient action is [called] here the ultimately existent; what is different is called the conventionally real. These two are [respectively] the individually marked (unique particular) and the generally marked (universal thing).²²

In these three verses Dharmakīrti takes over Dinnāga's twofold classification of *pramāṇas* in accordance with two kinds of cognoscible objects. In addition, however, the datum for perception fulfils an additional condition: it is endowed with the capability, or potential, to execute causally efficient action (*artha-kriyā-sāmarthya*). In other words, what is ultimately existent is also causally efficient and triggers perception; when it is subsequently manifested in the cognition as an image (*pratibhāsa*), or verbally expressible concept, and no longer stands for what it really is but for a whole class or bundle of features, it is neither causally efficient nor ultimately real.²³

Inference, on the other hand, is inseparable from conceptualisation and mentally abstracted ideas which are based on similarities which—and that is also Dharmakīrti's innovation, that goes back to

²² PV 2.1–3:

*mānam dvidham viṣaya-dvaividhyāc chakty-aśaktitaḥ /
artha-kriyāyām keśādir nārtho 'narthādhimokṣataḥ //
sadrśāsadrśatvāc ca viṣayāviṣayatvataḥ /
śabdasyānya-nimittānām bhāve dhī-sad-asattvataḥ //
artha-kriyā-samarthaṃ yat tad atra paramārtha-sat /
anyat saṃvṛti-sat proktaṃ te sva-sāmānya-lakṣaṇe //*

Cf. also NB 1.12–17: [12] *tasya viṣayaḥ sva-lakṣaṇam*. [13] *yasyārthasya saṃnidhānāsānidhānābhyām jñāna-pratibhāsa-bhedas tat sva-lakṣaṇam*. [14] *tad eva paramārtha-sat*. [15] *artha-kriyā-sāmarthya-lakṣaṇatvād vastunaḥ*. [16] *anyat sāmānya-lakṣaṇam*. [17] *so 'numānasya viṣayaḥ*.—‘The datum for this [perception] is the individually marked (unique particular). An object in the case of which [we experience] the change in [its] representation in cognition depending on [its] proximity or distance is what is individually marked. Nothing else but this [unique particular] is the ultimately existent, because any real thing is characterised by the efficacy to execute causally efficient action. What is different [from it] is the generally marked (universal thing). It is the datum for inference.’

²³ Cf. PV 2.53d–54:

*...meyam tv ekaṃ sva-lakṣaṇam //
tasmād artha-kriyā-siddheḥ sad-asattā-vicāraṇāt /
tasya sva-para-rūpabhyām gater meya-dvayaṃ matam //*

Bhartr̥hari²⁴—do not exist in real individuals but are superimposed on the phenomenal world. The existence of common features in really existing things is a product of the mind, and it is the fundament for concepts and symbols, including linguistic symbols. Similarity, or generic features, cannot be observed directly in perception: it is the mind that correlates all the perceived data in classes in accordance with the framework imposed by language, and the *correlatum* of the framework is conventional reality (*saṃvṛti-satya*). Accordingly, the contents of inference, viz. the objects indicated by words, symbols and ideas, are conventions dictated by the language. Ultimately real things, absolutely unique, void of any likeness to other objects and not amenable to verbal means of expression, never enter conceptual thinking or mental images (*dhī*). Dharmakīrti avails himself of the nomenclature coined by Diñnāga (*sva-lakṣaṇa* and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*), who took recourse to Vasubandhu’s statements²⁵, but gives it a new tinge. Further, in *Pramāṇa-vārttika*²⁶ and *Nyāya-bindu*²⁷, he augments Diñnāga’s definition of perception with an explicit idea of non-erroneousness: ‘Perception is free from conceptual construction and non-erroneous’, a position tacitly accepted by Diñnāga²⁸. In

²⁴ Cf. HERZBERGER (1986: 81–83, 102–103).

²⁵ AKBh₂ 4.14cd (p. 349.11–13): *kāyam sva-sāmānya-lakṣaṇābhyām parīkṣate, vedanām cittam dharmāns ca. svabhāva evāśām sva-lakṣaṇam. sāmānya-lakṣaṇam tv anityatā saṃskṛtānām duḥkhatā sāsravāṇām śūnyatānātmate sarva-dharmāṇām.*— ‘The body is [now being] examined, as well as sensation, consciousness and elementary constituents of reality, by way of [their] particular and general characteristic. The particular characteristic is their essential nature alone. The general characteristic, on the other hand, is the impermanence in case of [elementary constituents] that are contingent, the condition of suffering in case of [elementary constituents] that are [suffused] with the [four] defilements and both emptiness and insubstantiality in case of all elementary constituents.’

²⁶ PV 2.123–125:

*pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham pratyakṣeṇāiva sidhyati /
praty-ātma-vedyaḥ sarveṣām vikalpo nāma-saṃśrayaḥ //
saṃhṛtya sarvataś cintām stimitenāntarātmanā /
sthito 'pi cakṣuṣā rūpam iṣate sāksajā matiḥ //
punar vikalpayan kiñcid āsīn me kalpanêdṛṣī /
iti vetti na pūrvôktāvasthāyām indriyād gatau //*

²⁷ NB 1.4: *tatra pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam.*

²⁸ Cf. PSV 1.17 = HATTORI (1968: 36–37, esp.: Section 3,1Bb). The idea is also implicit in PS₁ 1.7cd–8ab, where various kinds of cognition are dismissed as perception proper:

*bhrānti-saṃvṛti-saj-jñānam anumānānumānikam //
smārtābhilāṣikam cēti pratyakṣābham sataimiram / —*

—‘(1) The cognition in the form of illusion, (2) [the cognition of] the conventionally real, (3) inference, (4) inferential cognition [as a result of inference], (5) recollection,

contradistinction to perception, which pertains to ultimately existent entities that are effectively causal, inference cannot but be erroneous (*bhrānta*), inasmuch as its actual referents are fictitious.

Another distinction, also introduced by Diñnāga, that will subsequently prove crucial in the context of Jaina epistemological theories, is that of inference for oneself (*svārthānumāna*), as an internal process of association and drawing general conclusions, and inference for others (*parārthānumāna*), as a formalised procedure of persuasion²⁹. These two concepts were taken over not only by the subsequent Buddhist tradition³⁰ and other Indian philosophical schools, but also by Jaina thinkers, with certain interesting modifications.

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(6) mental condition tainted by desire along with (7) cognition affected by ophthalmological disorder—these are [varieties of] fallacious perception (*sc.* are not perception proper).’ This idea is further explicated in PSV 1.8ab: *tatra bhrānti-jñānaṃ mṛga-tṛṣṇikādiṣu toyādi-kalpanā-pravṛttatvāt pratyakṣābhāsam*, etc. (‘Among these [varieties of fallacious perception] the cognition in the form of illusion, in cases of a mirage etc., is a fallacious perception because it is activated by a conceptually constructed idea of water etc., ...’)

What is unclear in the verse is, firstly how we construe *sataimiram*. An alternative interpretation of the verse, if we took it as a qualifier of *pratyakṣābham*, would be: ‘(1) The cognition in the form of illusion, (2) [the cognition of] the empirical reality (the conventionally real), (3) inference, (4) inferential cognition [as a result of inference], (5) recollection or (6) mental condition tainted by desire—these are [varieties of] fallacious perception, which is accompanied by confusion.’ The latter interpretation is that which is preferred by HATTORI (1968: 28), whereas we find the former (adopted by me) in BILJERT (1989).

Another question is which of these cognitions, above enumerated, are genuine cases of fallacious perception. HATTORI (1968) concludes that Diñnāga distinguished three kinds of *pratyakṣābha* (nos. 1, 2, 3), which is contended by WAYMAN (1978), according to whom Diñnāga distinguished four kinds of *pratyakṣābha* (nos. 1, 2, 3, 7); a compromise solution is offered FRANCO (1986), who relies on direct suggestions of Lambert Schmithausen (FRANCO (1986: 85)).

²⁹ See PS₂ 2.1ab (*anumānaṃ dvividhā svārtham tri-rūpāl līngato ’rtha-dṛk / — ‘Inference is twofold. [The first one, inference] for oneself is the discernment of an object by means of the triple-formed inferential sign.’) and PS₂ 3.1ab (*parārthānumānaṃ tu sva-dṛṣṭārtha-prakāśanam / — ‘Whereas inference for others is the proclamation (sc. demonstration) [to others] of the object one has experienced oneself.’), and PSV.2, K 109a.2–3 = V 27a.5 (*svārthānumāna*): *tshul gsum paḥi rtags las rjes su dpag paḥi don (V: rjes su dpag par bya baḥi don) mthoñ ba gañ yin pa de ni ran gi don gyi rjes su dpag paḥo*. See: RANDLE (1926: 28–9), HATTORI (1968: 78, n. I.11) and PVin II₂, n 1, p. 21.**

³⁰ Cf. e.g. NB 2.1–2: /1/ *anumānaṃ dvividhā*. /2/ *svārtham parārtham ca*.

In an approach much the same as Diñnāga's, who drew one clear line dividing all valid cognitive procedures into two main compartments, rather than distinguishing a range of *pramāṇas* in conformity with a set of insignificant individual features, the Jainas attempted to redefine earlier models, maximally simplify general typology of cognitions and specify new criteria for it in a manner that would be commensurable with general Indian standard. Conspicuously, their previous classification of cognitive criteria and the understanding of which cognition is direct or indirect, was strikingly at odds with what most Indians understood under *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*, and must have led to frequent undesired misinterpretations and unnecessary controversies with other schools. Furthermore, engaging in a philosophical discourse necessitated compliance with generally accepted terminology, rather than applying what would appear to others an arbitrary vernacular.

Siddhasena Mahāmāti was probably not only the first Jaina philosopher to define what *pramāṇa* is,³¹ but also to advance an entirely

³¹ Or, at least one of the first Jaina philosophers. Indeed, Samantabhadra, in *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* 101a, characterises cognitive criterion as 'the cognition of truth / reality' (ĀMi 101a: *tattva-jñānaṃ pramāṇaṃ*), or perhaps better: as 'the cognition of reals / doctrinal categories', for what is actually meant are such categories as living elements, lifeless elements etc. mentioned e.g. *Tattvārtha-sūtra* (TS 1.4: *jīva-jīvaśrava-bandha-saṃvara-nirjarā-mokṣās tattvam*). Later Jaina tradition, e.g. Vādirāja-sūri in his *Nyāya-viniścaya-vivaraṇa* (NViV 1.3, p. 57.22), contends that Samantabhadra's statement is a full-fledged definition of cognitive criterion. Some moderns scholars tend to be deceived by that seemingly obvious definitional character of the statement.

The full verse of ĀMi 101 reads as follows:

*tattva-jñānaṃ pramāṇaṃ. taṃ yugapat sarva-bhāsanam /
krama-bhāvi ca taj-jñānaṃ syād-vāda-naya-saṃskṛtam //* §

—'Cognitive criterion is the cognition of reals (doctrinal categories). It [either] is a simultaneous representation of all [entities (which is the case with the absolute knowledge (*kevala*))] or occurs consecutively (of this kind are remaining varieties of cognitive criteria). The cognition of these [reals] is composed of the method of seven-fold modal description and of [conditionally valid] viewpoints.'

[§ Here, I follow an emended text (see: BALCEROWICZ (1999: n. 45), for ĀMi seems faulty:

*tattva-jñānaṃ pramāṇaṃ te yugapat sarva-bhāsanam /
krama-bhāvi ca yaj-jñānaṃ syād-vāda-naya-saṃskṛtam //*]

However, what Samantabhadra really expresses is actually the contents, significantly elaborated, of Umāsvāmin's statement in TS 1.6: *pramāṇa-nayair adhigamaḥ*.—'the comprehension of these [categories representing reality, mentioned in TS.1.4,] is [accomplished] through cognitive criteria and [conditionally valid] viewpoints'. In the context of *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, it is clear that *adhigama* refers to the categories that have been discussed two *sūtras* earlier (TS 1.4: *jīva-ajīva-āśrava-bandha-saṃvara-nirjarā-mokṣās tattvam*). Thereupon Umāsvāmin speaks of 'their descriptive standpoints' from four various perspectives (TS 1.5: *nāma-sthāpanā-dravya-bhāvatas tan-nyāsaḥ*), and clearly the expression *tan-nyāsaḥ* is to be understood as *tattva-nyāsaḥ*. Analogously,

new classification of cognitive criteria, albeit resting on former phraseology. In the opening verse of the *Nyāyavatāra* he asserts:

‘The cognitive criterion is the cognition revealing itself and something else [different from it, and it is] free from subversion; [it is] two-fold: perception as well as indirect cognition, corresponding to [the way of] determination of the cognoscible.’³²

He maintains the traditional principle that perception is a direct cognition ‘that grasps an object not-indirectly’ (*aparokṣatayā*)³³. Subsequent verses imply, however, that he distinguishes two kinds of

adhigamaḥ in TS 1.6 means *tattvādhigamaḥ*, which is confirmed by the *Bhāṣya*: *eṣāṁ ca jīvādīnām tattvānām yathōddiṣṭānām nāmādibhir nyastānām pramāṇa-nayair vistarādhigamo bhavati.*—‘And also a detailed comprehension of these reals such as living elements etc., as they have been enunciated [in TS 1.4], which are described from various standpoints such as appellation etc. (TS 1.5), is [accomplished] through cognitive criteria and [conditionally valid] viewpoints.’ It is only much later, when *adhigamaḥ* in TS 1.6 was connected not only with the reals mentioned in TS 1.4, and thereby with ontological issues, but also with the very first statement of *Tattvārtha-sūtra* (TS 1.1: *samyag-darśana-jñāna-cāritrāṇi mokṣa-mārgaḥ.*—‘Correct knowledge, [correct] conation and [correct] conduct [constitute] the path to liberation.’). It was done by Akalaṅka, much after Samantabhadra, in his commentary *Rāja-vārttika* (RVār 1.6: *pramāṇe ca nayās ca pramāṇa-nayāḥ, tair adhigamo bhavati samyag-darśanādīnām jīvādīnām.*—There are two cognitive criteria and [many] [conditionally valid] viewpoints, hence [in the *sūtra*]: “cognitive criteria and [conditionally valid] viewpoints”. Through these is [accomplished] the comprehension of [the three constituents of the path to liberation, mentioned in TS 1.1: correct] conation etc., and of [the reals, mentioned in TS 1.4]: living elements etc.’

Samantabhadra’s statement *tattva-jñānam* is, therefore, the repetition of the Umāsvāmin’s idea of *tattvādhigama*, and the remainder of the verse ĀMī 101, especially *syād-vāda-naya-saṁskṛtam*, paraphrases Umāsvāmin’s *pramāṇa-nayair* of TS 1.6. For the above reasons, it is highly implausible to interpret ĀMī 101a (*tattva-jñānam pramāṇam*) as a genuine definition of cognitive criterion.

Another problem related to the issue of either Siddhasena Mahāmati’s and Samantabhadra’s priority in the context of the very first Jaina definition of *pramāṇa* is their real temporal dependence: there is no doubt that Samantabhadra lived after Diñnāga, by whom he was influenced, but it is still not clear whether Samantabhadra was prior or posterior to Dharmakīrti, who without any doubt flourished before Siddhasena Mahāmati (see: BALCEROWICZ (2001b)). Certain passages of ĀMī seem to betray Dharmakīrti’s stamp, but that requires further research.


³² NA 1:

*pramāṇam sva-parābhāsi jñānam, bādha-vivarjitam /
pratyakṣam ca parokṣam ca dvidhā, meya-viniścayāt //*

³³ NA 4:

*aparokṣatayārthasya grāhakaṁ jñānam idṛśam /
pratyakṣam, itaraj jñeyam parokṣam grahaṇēkṣayāt //*

perception: conventional, sense-dependent perception and absolute, sense-independent perception (*kevala*; NA 27), probably contingent on what we take to be the ‘perceiving organ’ (*akṣa*)³⁴. For Siddhasena the category of indirect cognition comprises all remaining kinds of cognition—especially verbal cognition (*śābda*, NA 8,9) and inference (NA 10), with its two subtypes ‘for oneself’ and ‘for others’ (*svārtha-pratyakṣa* and *parārtha-pratyakṣa*, NA 11)—that can all be grouped together as a separate kind of cognition based on verbal symbols, in a manner very much similar to what Dīnāga did. This new classification of cognitive criteria can be represented by the following diagram:



³⁴ Compare Siddharṣi-gaṇin’s explanations in NAV 1.7: **pratyakṣam** cēty-ādi; tatra siddhānta-prasiddha-pāramāthika-pratyakṣāpekṣayākṣa-śābdo jīva-paryāyatayā prasiddhaḥ. iha tu vyāvahārika-pratyakṣa-prastāvād akṣa-dhvanir indriya-vacano grhyate. tataś cākṣam pratigatam pratyakṣam. yad indriyam āsṛityōjjihīte rtha-sākṣāt-kāri jñānam tat pratyakṣam ity arthaḥ.—‘As regards the term “perception (*pratyakṣa*)”, [it can be etymologically explained as “directed towards (*prati*^o) the perceiving organ (*akṣa*)”]. ‘Concerning that, the linguistic unit “perceiving organ”—with regard to ultimately real perception, well-known from the Canon—is well-known as a synonym of “the living element”. Here [in this verse], however, the linguistic unit “perceiving organ” is used—since [we] are dealing [here] with conventional perception—as an utterance [denoting] the senses. And, therefore, that which has gone towards (*sc.* pertains) “the perceiving organ” is perception. The meaning is as follows: such a cognition perceiving directly an object which commences resorting to the senses is perception.’

Model 2

What is especially important, Siddhasena Mahāmāti plainly indicates that the source of the two-fold division of cognitive criteria is actually not—as Dinnāga wanted it—the existence of two different aspects of reality the way we can cognise it, but two different modes of apprehending reality, or two different epistemic procedures³⁵. Significantly, the general divisionary binary scheme, traditionally accepted, has been preserved by Siddhasena in NA, albeit nominally, for he has invested it with a new contents that was more consistent with current terminology of the day, and *pratyakṣa* began to mean ‘perception’ the way it was mostly understood.

— 5 —

Akalaṅka adopted the overall model proposed by Siddhasena Mahāmāti and presented it at the outset of the *Laghīyas-traya*:

‘Perception is *clear* cognition, [divided] into primary and conventional, [whereas] indirect cognition [comprises all] remaining [types of] cognition. Thus, by way of summary, there are two cognitive criteria.’³⁶

He expressed the same idea also on other occasions, for instance in the *Nyāya-viniścaya*:

‘Perception is correctly [taken to be] *lucid* [cognition]; the other [type of cognitive criterion] is testimonial cognition (= indirect cognition) which is free of misapprehension,

³⁵ NA 1cd: *pratyakṣam ca paroṣam ca dvidhā, meya-viniścayāt* // —‘[Cognitive criterion is] two-fold: perception as well as indirect cognition, corresponding to [the way of] determination of the cognoscible.’

It should be noted that Siddhasena speaks of two kinds of ‘[ways of] determination of the cognoscible’ (*meya-viniścayāt*), or two procedures of cognising, and not merely of two kinds of ‘the cognoscible’ (**mevāt* = ‘corresponding to the cognoscible’). That is a different approach from Dinnāga’s who as a justification for the number of cognitive criteria mentions two cognisable aspects of reality, not two different ways of cognising these two aspects, see PSV₂ 1.2: *dve eva yasmād lakṣaṇa-dvayam prameyam*—‘...there are only two [cognitive criteria], because the cognoscible object has two characteristics.’

³⁶ LT 3:

*pratyakṣam viśadam jñānam mukhya-saṁvyavahārataḥ /
paroṣam śeṣa-vijñānam pramāṇe iti saṅgrahaḥ //*

divided into [such varieties as] recognition etc. By way of summary, there are two cognitive criteria,³⁷

but also in the *Pramāṇa-saṅgraha*:

‘Perception is *clear* cognition, [and it is] divided in three, [whereas] testimonial cognition is free of misapprehension, [and it is] indirect cognition [which includes] recognition etc. Thus, by way of summary, there are two cognitive criteria.’³⁸

Akalaṅka was seriously concerned, however, with effective criteria that would enable us to differentiate between direct (*pratyakṣa*) and indirect (*parokṣa*) cognitions, but at the same their cognitively valid nature would be preserved. The proper criterion of differentiation involved two issues: non-erroneousness of all perceptions as valid *pramāṇas* and mediacy or lack of mediacy as a defining factor.

Firstly, he had to face the issue of impeded cognitions, e.g. affected by ophthalmological disorder (*taimira*), and the question why these are not reckoned among valid perceptions. In the commentary on the verse PV₁ 2.288, in which Dharmakīrti elaborates on Dīnnāga’s typology of fallacious cases of perception, Prajñākaragupta refers to a certain irksome objection in his *Pramāṇa-vārttikālaṅkāra*, quoting Dīnnāga’s verse:

‘What is the purpose to mention cognition affected by ophthalmological disorder? Some say that also cognition affected by ophthalmological disorder is conceptual. [Therefore,] in order to exclude such [a view], cognition affected by ophthalmological disorder is mentioned. ... If [cognition affected by ophthalmological disorder] is non-conceptual [cognition], then it would be perception [proper]. [But] not all [cognition that is] free from conceptual construction is perception [proper]; on the contrary, [it is perception] when it is [also] non-erroneous. [Only such a cognition which is both] non-erroneous and

³⁷ NV₁ 469 = NV₂ 3.83 (p. 359):

*pratyakṣam añjasā spaṣṭam anyac chrutam aviṣṭam /
prakīrṇam pratyabhijñādaḥ pramāṇe iti saṅgrahaḥ //*

³⁸ PSa 1.2 (p. 97.3–4):

*pratyakṣam viśada-jñānam tridhā śrutam aviṣṭam /
parokṣam pratyabhijñādi pramāṇe iti saṅgrahaḥ //*

free from conceptual construction is perception, not any kind [of cognition].³⁹

To place the above objection and Prajñākaragupta's reply, we should first recall that Dharmakīrti in PV₁ 2.288⁴⁰ distinguished four kinds of fallacious perception (either following or improving on Dīnnāga's varieties, see n. 28) and grouped them according to their character. First three kinds of fallacious perception are conceptual (since they contaminate the perceived data with memory images or impose conceptualised relations on it), and therefore cannot be classified as genuine perception, which is by nature non-conceptual. However, one variety, namely cognition affected by ophthalmological disorder (*taimira*), turns out to be non-conceptual: it is fallacious because it is erroneous, inasmuch as 'it originates through the impediment in [sensory] substratum (sense-organ).' To say, however, that cognition affected by ophthalmological disorder (*taimira*) is, nevertheless, perception proper would seem to be in agreement with Dīnnāga's definition of perception, which only mentions its non-conceptual nature as the proper criterion. In other words, the definition of *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* would allow the following concomitance: 'every cognition free from conceptual construction is perception proper'. That would yield the valid conclusion: 'cognition affected by ophthalmological disorder (*taimira*) is also free from conceptual construction, hence it is perception proper.'

That seemed improper not only do Dharmakīrti, who improved on the definition by explicitly adding the qualifier 'non-erroneous' (*abhrānta*, NB 1.4), but also to Jaina thinkers, including Akalaṅka. The first definiens 'non-conceptual' (both in Dīnnāga and Dharmakīrti) was inadmissible to the Jainas, for it would exclude a number of perceptual processes (*vide infra*). Also the second definiens 'non-erroneous' in Dharmakīrti's definition appeared to the Jainas completely inconsistent with the notion of validity which the definition of *all* cognitive criteria presupposes. The way Dharmakīrti defined it, 'non-erroneousness' (*abhrāntatva*) was limited to *pratyakṣa* only, and did not extend to *anumāna*. The first to criticise Dharmakīrti's seeming amelioration was Siddhasena Mahāmati who contended: 'This [inference] is non-

³⁹ PVA, p. 334.23–27: *sataimirika-grahaṇam kim-artham. taimiram api savikalpakam iti kaścit. tad-vyāvartanārtham tad-vacanam. ... yady [taimiram] avikalpakam kalpanāpoḍhatvāt pratyakṣam prāptam. na sarvaṃ kalpanāpoḍham pratyakṣam, api tv abhrāntatve satī. abhrāntam kalpanāpoḍham pratyakṣam na sarvaṃ.*

⁴⁰ PV₁ 2.288:

*trividham kalpanā-jñānam āśrayōpaplavōdbhavam /
avikalpam ekam ca pratyakṣābham caturvidham //*

erroneous because it is a cognitive criterion, just like perception.’⁴¹ For the Jainas, ‘non-erroneousness’ could safely be adapted to qualify *pratyakṣa*, however, it could not be taken as its definiens which should distinguish it from indirect cognitions, for ‘non-erroneousness’ was a defining mark of all *pramāṇas*. Thus, *abhrānta* could not be employed in the definition of perception.⁴²

That is why Akalaṅka searched for another criterion—apart from the idea of direct/indirect modes of cognising, proposed by Siddhasena Mahāmāti—that would consistently distinguish direct cognition

⁴¹ NA 5cd: *tad* (= *anumānam*) *abhrāntam pramāṇatvāt samakṣavat*.

⁴² Interestingly enough, there seems to be some influence of Dharmakīrti’s claim that inference is erroneous on the way Akalaṅka understood the relationship between absolute non-erroneousness and cognitive validity (*prāmāṇya*). Akalaṅka occasionally admits that no valid cognition is absolutely correct, and even false cognition possess limited validity. See for instance AṣṢ₃ (ad ĀMi 101, p. 88.4–8), especially the comment on inference in the final sentence: *buddher anekāntāt yena ākāreṇa tattva-paricchedaḥ tad-apekṣayā prāmāṇyam. tena pratyakṣa-tad-ābhāsayor api prāyaśaḥ saṅkīrṇa-prāmāṇyētara-sthitiḥ unnetavyā, prasiddhānupahatēndriya-dṛṣṭer api candrārkkādiṣu deśa-pratyāsatty-ādy-abhūtākārāvabhāsanāt, tathā upahatākṣāder api saṅkhyādi-visaṃvāde ’pi candrādi-svabhāva-tattvopalambhāt. tat-prakarṣāpekṣayā vyapadeśa-vyavasthā gandha-dravyādivat. tathā anumānāder api kathamcit mithyā-pratibhāse ’pi tattva-pratipattyāiva prāmāṇyam.*—‘Since cognitive awareness is multiplex, cognitive validity concerns [only] that [aspect of cognition] by means of which determination of factuality (or: categories) [is accomplished]. Accordingly, it should be admitted as established that, as a rule, cognitive validity and its opposite of both perception and its fallacy respectively, are commingled, [i.e. in valid acts of cognition there is an element of illusion, and in fallacious acts of cognition there is some valid component]. [It is so], (1) because even the act of seeing—with a sense organ of which [we] well know it is not disabled—of the moon, the sun etc. manifests [their] unreal forms such as [their] proximity in space etc., [and also] (2) because, similarly, also in case the eye which is disabled [and we see a double moon etc.], even though there is fallibility (unreliability) as regards the number [of the moons] etc., there is [correct] apprehension of the factuality of the essential nature of the moon etc. The distinction in designating [them as cognitive criterion and its fallacy] depends on the degree, like [in the case of] fragrant substance [which is both a substance and a fragrant quality]. Similarly, also inference etc.—even though in a particular respect [it generates] false representation [of the cognoscible object]—has cognitive validity, inasmuch as it does indeed [lead to the correct] comprehension of factuality.’ This idea was expressed by Akalaṅka on other occasions as well, e.g. LTV 22 and SVi 1.15 (and SViV *ad loc.*, p. 73):

*ātma-saṃvedanam bhrānter abhrāntam bhāti bhedivat /
pratyakṣam taimiram cāndram kim nānekānta-vidviṣām //*

... *nāpi tat sarvathā abhrāntam eva svayam advayasyāpi dvaya-nirbhāsa-pratīteḥ ...*
His reasons for the claim, in short, were dictated by his strictly realist stand: no piece of our cognition is absolutely false, because all the contents of our cognition is a representation of the external world, and thus it must correspond to something real. Ultimate components of cognition (presentations of individual events) are true, only the relations between them that are imposed by conceptual activity of the mind can be false.

(*pratyakṣa*) from indirect cognition (*parokṣa*). As a matter of fact, Akalaṅka's intention was to replace Siddhasena's criterion of '[the way of] determination of the cognoscible' (*meya-viniścaya*), which both tended to be a bit vague and yielded some more difficulties that surfaced the moment Siddhasena Mahāmāti restructured the overall model of valid cognitive procedures.

The second problematic issue turned out to be mediacy or lack of mediacy as the feature that could help distinguish between direct and indirect cognitions, respectively. To maintain, in harmony with older Jaina tradition, that *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa* are differentiated on the basis of their either immediate or mediated mode of acquisition, while adopting Siddhasena's new scheme, would ultimately lead to the conclusion that such divergent cognitive acts as sensation or inference are merely two different aspects or varieties of one and the same kind of cognition, insofar as both of them are mediated: either by sense organs in the case of sensation, or by the mind, logical reasons, concepts or words in the case of inference. In practical enterprise, in all empirical spheres of life, every individual has to rely on some agency that mediates cognitive processes, be it perception or inference: on sense organs, the mind, verbal expressions, symbols etc. Preserving the criterion of mediacy, the borders between direct and indirect cognitions would be blurred and the whole edifice would collapse.

The outcome of fitting the new contents, especially the new understanding of what perception is (in consonance with current Indian views), into the old Jaina model was that the only ultimately direct cognitions would be: absolute knowledge (*kevala*), tantamount to omniscience (*sarva-jñāna*), or two less perfect forms of such supernatural cognitive powers: clairvoyance (*avadhi-jñāna*) and mind-reading (*manah-paryāya-jñāna*). All of these three played an important role in soteriology, serving as vital elements in a range of proofs for the existence of soul (*jīva*) and final liberation (*mokṣa*)⁴³, being contemplated as paramount ideal, rendering legitimacy to the authority of the scriptures and being believed in. Yet, these were inaccessible to any contemporaneous mortal, with the exception of ancient personages occurring in myths and hagiographies. Consequently, one would have to acknowledge that an average person has at his or her disposal no direct means of knowing. That would, with certainty, provoke justified and hardly refutable criticism from all other philosophical schools in

⁴³ A number of them are formulated e.g. by Kundakunda in the *Pravacana-sāra* and *Samaya-sāra*, a most of them summarised by Hemacandra-sūri in the *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*.

India, namely, that the Jainas have to entirely rely on unsubstantiated faith in their doctrines, without any prospect to verify them, at least in some part, empirically. Moreover, the immediate conclusion would be that all knowledge of the world a person may have is obtained in an indirect, mediated manner, hence must be by nature liable to doubt and censure. To admit that all judgements we have are derived from second-hand knowledge would, at best, not only lead to scepticism and undermine the rational and realistic outlook Jaina thinkers intended to cultivate, but also subvert doctrinal framework of Jinism. No testimonial statement of Jaina Canonical scriptures and oral tradition could be amenable to any kind of direct verification, not even simple descriptions of worldly matters contained in scriptures that were used—through the reasoning based on analogy and empirical exemplification (*dṛṣṭānta*)—as a basis for supplementary corroboration of extra-mundane and metaphysical tenets (following the principle: ‘if the Canon accurately describes mundane affairs, its description of spiritual matters must also be accurate’). If any judgement, including all the assertions of the *Āgamas*, were beyond any first-hand validation, and could only be proved indirectly, which would necessitate further, indirect as it were, proof, infinite regress (*anavasthā*) would result. Accordingly, one would have to concede that doctrinal and epistemological principles of Jinism are faulty, inasmuch as they lead to logical inconsistencies and defects such as infinite regress and ceaseless search for new warrants to sanction previous conclusions.

In the worst case, retaining a single criterion of mediacy that distinguishes between direct and indirect cognitions and concluding that in all empirical dealings we rely solely on indirect cognitions would result in rejecting the reality of the world we perceive, and in assuming its ultimately illusory character.

Besides, it is a tautology to say that a direct cognition ‘grasps an object not-indirectly’ (*aparokṣatayā*), and therefore is bereft of any substantial contents.

All these considerations may have borne on Akalaṅka’s following reflection expressed in the *Nyāya-viniścaya*:

‘Two first two [kinds of cognition, viz. sensuous cognition (*mati*) and testimonial cognition (*śruta*),] were rightly termed [by Umāsvāmin in TS 1.11] indirect cognition, whereas the remaining [kinds, viz. clairvoyance (*avadhi*), mind-reading (*manaḥ-paryāya*) and absolute knowledge, were termed] direct cognition. However, it is only in order to be in agreement with people’s opinion, that sensuous

cognition is incorporated into the definition of [perception].⁴⁴

Clearly, these were also pragmatic considerations that made Akalañka comply with general usage of the term ‘perception’, even though he himself occasionally endorsed the idea that the ultimate ‘perceiving organ’ is the soul (*ātman*): ‘[Ultimate] perception, [which is acquired] independently of sense organs and the mind [and which is] free of deviation, is the seeing of definite contents.... [In its case, there takes place] the elimination of dependence on other [factors] in the sense: “[perception] is confined to the perceiving organ (*sc.* the soul)”’.⁴⁵ And it is the soul without which no cognition could be possible: ‘If there were no soul, production etc. of [any] cognition would be impossible, because there would be no agent.’⁴⁶

There was no controversy that there is an essential difference between perceptual, first- experience or immediate grasp of sensual data that are currently present, on the one hand, and indirect processes of inference or employment of verbal symbols, on the other, which are operative independently of whether the things we infer or speak about are present or not. All philosophical systems tried to accentuate and explain this difference this way or another, by using such terms as ‘perception’, ‘direct cognition’, ‘sensuous cognition’, or ‘inference’, ‘indirect cognition’, ‘analogy’, ‘presumption’ etc. in a sense that differed from traditional Jaina usage.

What made this essential difference for Diñnāga and Dharmakīrti was the idea of conceptualisation, which characterised all non-perceptual kinds of cognition, and which connoted two main aspects: (1) the use of a system of verbally expressible symbols (either a natural language or a logical system or relations) and (2) the application of such symbols only to general properties (‘universals’), not to unique qualities (‘individuals’).

A detailed analysis of complex cognitive processes which Akalañka introduced in the contentious verse LT 10cd–11ab will reveal that for

⁴⁴ NV₁ 474cd–475ab = NV₂ 3.88 (p. 363):

*ādye parokṣam aparām pratyakṣam prāhur āñjasam /
kevalam loka-buddhyāva mater lakṣaṇa-saṅgrahaḥ //*

Akalañka’s approach became widespread in Jinism, compare for instance identical arguments of Abhayadeva in his commentary (TBV) on STP 2.1, p. 595.24–25, where he states that *mati-jñāna* is ultimately *parokṣa* (as it was described in TS), but according to practical convention it is *pratyakṣa*.

⁴⁵ RVār 1.12 (p. 53.4,11): *indriyānidriyānapekṣam atīta-vyabhicāram sākāra-grahaṇam pratyakṣam. ... akṣam prati niyatam iti parāpekṣānivṛttiḥ.*

⁴⁶ RVār 1.12 (p. 45.8): *ātmābhāve jñānasya karaṇādityānupapattiḥ kartur abhāvāt.*

him such a contention was not only a simplification, but also an inaccurate exposition. In order to improve on Diñnāga's and Dharmakīrti's definitions as well as on Siddhasena Mahāmati's model, Akalaṅka introduces a new notion of clarity (*vaiśadya*), or lucidity (*spaṣṭatva*), for instance in the verses of NVi₂ 3.83 and PSa 1.2 quoted above (p. 21, nn. 37, 38).

For Akalaṅka, clarity consists in the way reality is presented in cognition:

‘In contrast to inference etc., the clarity of [this perception], in the case of discernment (becoming aware of the object), is recognised to be the representing of the particular. What is different from this is non-clarity [in the case of discernment].’⁴⁷

As a matter of fact, in the above manner Akalaṅka modifies and disambiguates Siddhasena Mahāmati's obscure and tautological definiens: ‘[the way of] determination of the cognoscible’ (*meyaviniścaya*) of NA 1 (p. 18, n. 32). Each act of perception—either (1) conventional and sensory, (2) internal and mental, or (3) absolute and extra-sensory—grasps the particular thing, or individual aspect, and this ‘unmediated access to the individual’ is clarity, or lucidity. In other words, perception leads the cogniser to clearly discernible and uniquely identifiable entities that are amenable, at least in theory, to the cogniser's actions. Inference, verbal cognition etc., on the other hand, do not bring the cognitive agent to clearly distinguishable individual features of a thing. What is represented in such inferential or verbal cognitive acts are ideas or concepts that emerge as the contents of indirect cognition. Ideas themselves, classes that correspond to the ideas or words expressing the ideas cannot be acted upon individually. For this very reason such a cognition based on ideas and words is ‘bereft of clarity’ (*aviśada*, *aspaṣṭa*), inasmuch as it delivers merely a vague and imprecise notion of what actual individuals, amenable in practical actions, are denoted by words or are implied by inferences. Such an unclear (*aviśada*) cognition merely extends over the whole range of individuals and refers to each of them in precisely the same manner, by pointing to their general common feature, and making them all indistinguishable from each other in our cognition. Thus, indirect cognition reveals no particular thing that is the designatum of a term or an actual source of the idea presented in the cognition. On the contrary,

⁴⁷ LT 4:

*anumānādy-atirekeṇa viśeṣa-pratibhāsanam /
tad-vaiśadyam matam buddher avaiśadyam ataḥ param //*

on its basis it is not at all possible to make any practically relevant distinction among singular items aggregated into a ‘conceptual bundle’. And this is precisely what is involved in the notion of ‘lack of clarity’ (*avaiśadya*) or ‘absence of lucidity’ (*aspaṣṭatva*).

As a justification for the need to introduce another criterion for genuine perception, other than its conceptual character, Akalaṅka cites the case of fallacious perception which may be by nature non-conceptual, and thus fulfils Diṅṅāga’s criterion, but it remain nonetheless erroneous, inasmuch as it is unclear:

‘Therefore, fallacious perception, which is non-conceptual (indeterminate), is necessarily unclear.’⁴⁸

This is Akalaṅka’s answer to the problem referred to above by Prajñākaragupta: how is it possible that an erroneous act of sensation, even though it is non-conceptual, is not genuine perception?

As one might expect, the concept of clarity (*vaiśadya*) as the defining feature of perception subsequently underwent changes and reinterpretations, and was also taken up by the Śvetāmbaras. Of special note is the definition offered by Hemacandra-sūri in the *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*: ‘Clarity is either independence of other cognitive criteria or the distinct representation of the form: “this”.’⁴⁹ The first feature, independence of other cognitive criteria, invokes the idea that the perceptual cognition is undeniable and obvious in its self-explanatory character, i.e. it requires no additional justification for the accuracy of its contents to be accepted. The second feature, viz. the distinct representation of the form: ‘this’, which is mentioned as an alternative definiens, is a direct extension of Akalaṅka’s idea that clarity of perception consists in ‘the representing of the particular’ (*viśeṣa-pratibhāsanam*, LT 4).

Vādideva-sūri (11th/12th c.) is another example of a Śvetāmbara thinker who borrowed Akalaṅka’s definition verbatim: ‘Lucidity is the manifesting of particular [features] in a greater degree than inference etc.’⁵⁰

⁴⁸ LTV 23: *tasmād aviśadam eva avikalpakam pratyakṣābham.*

⁴⁹ PMi 1.14: *pramāṇāntarānapekṣēdantayā pratibhāso vā vaiśadyam.*

⁵⁰ PNTAA 2.3: *anumānādy-ādhikeyena viśeṣa-prakāśanam spaṣṭatvam.* = LT 4: *anumānādy-atirekeṇa viśeṣa-pratibhāsanam / tad-vaiśadyam.*

A closer examination would now be required to see what is actually clear in a clear cognition? Is clarity simply the way an object is cognised, viz. certainty implied by clear cognition, or is clarity a feature of the object that is presented in the cognition? Unfortunately, on most occasions Akalaṅka is not very clear on this point. When he says in his auto-commentary to the *Laghīyas-traya* (LTV 3): *jñānasyāiva viśadanirbhāsinah pratyakṣatvam, itarasya parokṣatā*, the statement can equally imply both possibilities: ‘Only such a cognition which reveals [its object] clearly (or: as clear) is perception; the other one is indirect cognition.’ The same ambiguity holds true in following passage of PSaV 1.2 (p. 97.5–6): *pratyakṣam viśada-jñānam tattva-jñānam viśadam, indriya-pratyakṣam anindriya-pratyakṣam atindriya-pratyakṣam tridhā*.—‘Perception is a clear cognition (or: cognition of something clear), [for] the cognition of reals (doctrinal categories) [as a cognitive criterion⁵¹] is clear. It is divided in three: sensory perception, non-sensory (mental) perception and extra-sensory perception.’ Other formulations where *spaṣṭa* as a synonym of *viśada* occurs are likewise inconclusive: LTV₁ 61 (p. 21.6–7): *indriyārtha-jñānam spaṣṭam hitāhita-prāpti-parihāra-samartham prādeśikam pratyakṣam*.—‘Perception which is a cognition of an object [amenable] to sense organ is lucid, capable of [triggering an action of] either appropriation of what is wholesome or avoidance of what is unwholesome, [and it is] spatially limited;’ NVi₁ 157 (p. 50.22–23) = NVi₂ 160 (vol. 1, p. 524.21–22): *akṣa-jñānānujam spaṣṭam tad-anantara-gocaram / pratyakṣam mānasam cāha...*—‘Mental perception is brought about as a consequence of a cognition [derived] from sense organs, it is lucid, its domain (contents) immediately [follows] this [cognition derived from sense organ].’

However, in a longer section of the *Nyāya-viniścaya* in which he discusses the possibility of omniscience as the culmination of a series of supernatural perceptions, Akalaṅka mentions the following idea:

‘A lucid discernment with respect to a distant⁵² [object that] correctly [takes place] does not stand in

⁵¹ I take it as a reference to Samantabhadra’s characterisation of the nature of *pramāṇa* in ĀMī 101a: *tattva-jñānam pramāṇam* (see n. 31). In this way, Akalaṅka expresses the idea that perception (*pratyakṣa*) is such a cognitive criterion (*tattva-jñāna* stands for *pramāṇa*) that is clear (*viśada*).

⁵² A ‘distant’ object may connote not only distance in space, but also in time or ‘nature’ (in the sense of: ‘not perceptible with ordinary sense organs’). See for instance: NSā, p. 170: *yogi-pratyakṣam tu deśa-kāla-svabhāva-viprakṣṭārtha-grāhakaṁ* (‘Supernatural perception is the grasping of object distant in place, time and own nature’), and NBhū, p. 170: *deśa-viprakṣṭāḥ satya-lokādayo ’tidūrasthā vyavahitās ca nāga-bhuvanādayaḥ, kāla-viprakṣṭās tv atītānāgatāḥ, svabhāva-viprakṣṭāḥ*

contradiction, because it depends on the loosening of karmic veils obstructing cognition in a dream, or [cognition] of a fortune-teller etc.’⁵³

In the verse we can easily distinguish two separate elements: clarity (*spaṣṭa*), which belongs to cognition (*vijñāna*), and an object of cognition which is spoken of as being ‘distant’ (*viprakṛṣṭa*), not as being ‘clear’. That would imply that clarity or lucidity primarily qualifies the cognition as such, i.e. the cognitive procedures. We come across a similar indication in *Pramāṇa-saṅgraha*:

‘Cognition [derived] from sense organs is multiplex, inasmuch as another form (*sc.* one-sided form) is not established, [and it is] lucid, because the object is proximate.’⁵⁴

Also here lucidity qualifies cognition separately from its object, of which Akalaṅka merely says that it is proximate and its proximity warrants clear and lucid perception. Therefore, on the basis of two latter

paramāṅv-ākāśādaya iti (‘Distant in place [means] places far away like existent worlds etc., concealed (from sight) [means] hellish abodes etc., distant in time [means] past etc., distant in terms of one’s own nature [means] atoms, ether etc.’). These three kinds of ‘distance’ correspond to Śabarāsvāmin’s four separate kinds of objects, viz. (1) past and future (*bhūta, bhaviṣyant*), (2) subtle (*sūkṣma*), (3) concealed from sight (*vyavahita*) and (4) distant (*viprakṛṣṭa*), with kind 3 and 4 subsumed under one heading of *deśa-viprakṛṣṭa*, see ŚBh 1.2.2 (p. 4.7–9): *codanā hi bhūtaṁ bhavantaṁ bhaviṣyantaṁ sūkṣmaṁ vyavahitaṁ viprakṛṣṭam ity evaṁ-jātiyakam arthaṁ śaknoty avagamayitum, nānyat kiñcanēndriyam* (‘The injunction enables [people] to know anything of the following sort: past, present, future, subtle, concealed (from sight) and distant’). Frequently, however, the term *viprakṛṣṭa* does not indicate the temporal span, but is restricted to ‘distance in time’, as for instance in: VSV *ad* VS 1.16 (*viyukta-pratyakṣa*): *sūkṣma-vyavahita-viprakṛṣṭeṣu artheṣu teṣāṁ catuṣṭaya-sannikarṣād api pratyakṣam jāyate*; PBh 22.12.2.a: [242] *viyuktānām punaś catuṣṭaya-sannikarṣād yogaja-dharmānugraha-sāmarthyāt sūkṣma-vyavahita-viprakṛṣṭeṣu pratyakṣam utpadyate*; NMa 2 (I, p. 157.7): *darśanasya ca paro ’tiśayaḥ sūkṣma-vyavahita-viprakṛṣṭa-bhūta-bhaviṣyad-ādi-viṣayatvam*; YS 3.25: *pravṛtṭy-āloka-nyāsāt sūkṣma-vyavahita-viprakṛṣṭa-jñānam*. It seems, however, that Akalaṅka uses the term also in the sense of ‘distant in time’, since as the example he names a female fortune-teller (*īkṣaṇikā*), glossed by Vādirāja-sūri (NViV) as *grāma-dākinī*, i.e. someone who foretells the fate. Vādirāja-sūri further implies that such cognitions when one’s mind is ‘absorbed in meditative trance’ (*samāhita-citta*) are also meant.

⁵³ NVi₁ 407 (P. 84.13–14) = NVi₂ 21 (vol. 2, p. 291.1–2):
*vijñānam aṅjasā spaṣṭam viprakṛṣṭe viruddhyate /
na svapnēkṣaṇikāder vā jñānāvṛtti-vivekataḥ //*

⁵⁴ PSa 4ac (p. 97.16–17):
*akṣa-jñānam anekāntam asiddher aparākṛteḥ /
spaṣṭam sannikitārthatvāt...*

quotations, it seems that Akalaṅka considered clarity (*vaiśadya*) to belong to the way of cognising (to qualify the cognitive process), not necessarily to the object presented in the cognition. Vādideva-sūri in *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokāṅkāra* seems to support the interpretation that clarity of perception refers to ‘clear mode or presenting the object’, rather than the ‘clear object’ itself, for he says: ‘Lucidity [of perception] means the presentation of the particular [in consciousness] in greater degree than in the case of inference etc.’⁵⁵

On the other hand, it is the object as it enters the cognitive act that determines whether it is immediate and direct or whether it is mediated, based on conceptualisation and symbols. It would, however, be mistaken to suppose that the dependency between the object and cognition parallels Diñnāga’s model, viz. that perception grasps uniquely individual feature whereas inference and other forms of indirect cognition comprehend a common property.

Prabhācandra appears to support another view, namely that ‘clarity’ belongs both to the object as it is presented in cognition and to the cognition itself, for he says in his commentary to LT 3: ‘It is [such a cognition] **which reveals** [its object] **clearly**, i.e. it is lucid representation of the intrinsic nature of itself and the other (*sc.* external object), in so far as it is not oriented towards anything else [than itself]—it **is perception**, i.e. it is perceptual cognitive criterion. **The other one**, i.e. that which reveals [its object] not-clearly (or: which reveals an unclear object), **is indirect cognition**, i.e. indirect cognitive criterion.’⁵⁶ Interestingly, Prabhācandra’s interpretation finds support in another statement of Akalaṅka:

‘Furthermore, there is no absolute difference in the datum of these two [kinds of] conceptual (determinate) cognitions: clear (perceptual) and its opposite (inferential), because acts of perception of proximate objects and opposite (*sc.* distant) objects can easily be demonstrated to have as their datum one and the same object.’⁵⁷

The external object for direct and indirect cognitions remains the same entity. However, its representation, or its cognitive ‘image’, in

⁵⁵ PNTĀA 2.3: *anumānādy-ādhikeyena viśeṣa-prakāśanaṁ spaṣṭatvam.*

⁵⁶ NKC, p. 67.12–14: **viśada-nirbhāsinaḥ** para-mukhāprekṣitayā sva-para-svarūpayoḥ spaṣṭa-pratibhāsasya **pratyakṣatvam** pratyakṣa-pramāṇatā. **itarasya** aviśada-nirbhāsinaḥ **parokṣatā** parokṣa-pramāṇatā. Bolded typeface reproduces the *pratīkas* of LT.

⁵⁷ LTV 23: *na ca viśadētara-vikalpayoḥ viśaya-bhedāikāntaḥ pratyāsannētarārtha-pratyakṣāṅgām ekārtha-viśayatōtpatteḥ.*

respective cognitions is different. Therefore, it might seem that the apparent ambiguity in a range of above-quoted passages (LTV 3, PSaV 1.2, LTV 61, NVi₁ 157 = NVi₂ 160) was deliberate and also Akalañka may have understood ‘clarity’ both ways: as belonging to the process and to the presented object.

The supposition that Akalañka understood clarity or lucidity of perception in a two-fold manner, as belonging both to the cognitive process and to the cognitive contents (the object), may find, at first glance, some more reinforcement in a passage of the *Nyāya-viniścaya* 1.3:

It has been correctly stated that the defining characteristic of perception is [that it is] clear and [that it has] definite contents, [and that it is] the percipience of the essence of an object [consisting altogether in] substance, modes, the universal character and the particular character.⁵⁸

Accordingly, the object of perception is constituted by an aggregate of a number of features, such as substantial (persistent in time), modal (momentarily changing), general and individual aspects, that all belong to one and the same substratum, and the contents of perception—that is the representation of the extrinsic object (extrinsic in the sense that it is independent of the given cognitive act, be it an external physical thing or an internal cognition that is being reflected upon)—is definite and not indistinct (lit. ‘with the form’). In the above passage the clarity of the representation of the object in cognition may at first appear to be implied by the qualifier *sākāra*, which could hardly apply to the clarity of the cognitive process. What would, however, be problematic with such an interpretation is that the property of ‘having definite contents’ (*sākāratva*) is introduced by Akalañka as one of two defining features of perception, next to ‘lucidity’ (*spaṣṭatva*). If the idea of definite contents of cognition, viz. the clarity that belongs to the object in cognition, were already implied by the term *spaṣṭa*, it would be redundant to mention it separately in the verse.

Furthermore, on another occasion Akalañka suggests that it is possible to conceive of perception (direct cognition) of an object which itself is unclear, or not clearly manifest:

‘When it comes to the union of the perceiving organ and the object, [first] the seeing of [mere] existence [takes place, and then] a comprehension of the notion (conceptual

⁵⁸ NVi 1.3 (p. 57):

*pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇaṁ prāhuḥ spaṣṭaṁ sākāraṁ añjasā /
dravya-paryāya-sāmānya-viśeṣārthātma-vedanam //*

impression) in the form of the object—[these constitute] sensation...⁵⁹

The passage describes the first phase of perception, viz. sensation (*avagraha*). Following earlier Jaina tradition which distinguished two kinds of sensation: sensation of momentary manifestation (*vyañjanâvagraha*), which is non-conceptual, and sensation of the object (*arthâvagraha*), which is conceptual,⁶⁰ Akalañka speaks of the first moment of sensation in which one merely becomes aware of the fact that something is there (*sattâloka*), and thereupon there emerges a conceptual image the contents of which consists in a definite form of an object (*arthâkâra-vikalpa-dhî*). Both these stages of sensation are an integral part of perception, hence both must be clear (*viśada*), or lucid (*spaṣṭa*). It would be difficult to conceive of an object of the first sensation of the *vyañjanâvagraha* kind which is both clear and non-manifest, of which one only knows that it is present, insofar as it has stimulated a sense organ. This would imply that clarity of perception qualifies rather the process, not the contents or the object that enters cognition.

In another work Akalañka refers to an idea of an illusory image of a firebrand circle which, despite being false, inasmuch it consists of a

⁵⁹ LT 5ac: *akṣârtha-yoge sattâloko 'rthâkâra-vikalpa-dhîḥ / avagraho...*

⁶⁰ See TS 1.17–18: *arthasya. vyañjanasyâvagrahaḥ*. The sensation of the object (*arthâvagraha*) is possible with all sense organs, whereas the sensation of momentary manifestation (*vyañjanâvagraha*) concerns all sensory data with the exclusion of vision, see RVâr 1.18: *vyañjanam avyaktam śabdâdi-jâtaṁ tasyâvagraho bhavati*. — ‘Momentary manifestation [means] not manifest [data] generated by sound etc.; the sensation of such [momentary manifestation] occurs.’ Akalañka subscribes to this division of *vyañjanâvagraha* and *arthâvagraha*, inasmuch as respective parts of Pūjyapāda Devanandin’s *Sarvârtha-siddhi* that clearly state this idea are incorporated into Akalañka’s *Tattvârtha-vârttika*: SSi 1.17 (p. 115.4): *caḥsur-âdi-viṣayo 'rthaḥ* (= p. 65.28) and SSi 1.18: *vyañjanam avyaktam śabdâdi-jâtaṁ tasyâvagraho bhavati* (= RVâr, p. 66.27–28).

The nature of this stage is also described by Akalañka in his *Aṣṭa-śatî*, a commentary on Samantabhadra’s *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* 101, i.e. AṣṢ₃ 101 (AṣṢ₃, p. 88.22–23 = AṣṢ₃, p. 1–2): *dhvaner akhaṇḍaśaḥ śravaṇâd adhigamo 'pi prâthama-kalpikaḥ tattva-nirṇītir eva*. — ‘Even the very fist comprehension [which takes place]^a on hearing a sound as a whole (*sc.* as such) is nothing but a [cognitively valid] ascertainment of the factuality [of the sound].’ The fact that he speaks of acoustic sensation, instead of ocular perception (which is the most usual reference when he speaks of perception), is significant, for it is acoustic perception in the case of which we can have sensation of momentary manifestation (*vyañjanâvagraha*), not possible in the case of ocular sensation.

^a There can be no doubt that what is implied by the expression *tattva-nirṇīti* is cognitive validity, for *tattva-nirṇīti* corresponds to *tattva-jñānam* which is said in ĀMi 101a to be the defining characteristic of *pramāṇa*.

series of momentary perceptions, is nevertheless perceived as a clear object:

‘Since one sees such a false appearance of a firebrand circle etc. [as one unity], which is *lucid*, it is not the case that one perceives individual acts of apprehension of the unique particular as singular and momentary.’⁶¹

In Akalaṅka’s opinion, we can speak of acts of cognition whose contents is a clear image, viz. whose object is characterised by clarity. However, these are not necessarily true, hence cannot be considered genuine kinds of perception. In other words, it is possible that an object that emerges in cognition possesses clarity (*spaṣṭatva*), nevertheless it remains an illusion. This would additionally support my suggestion that clarity is for Akalaṅka primarily a defining feature of the cognitive process, not of its object.

The idea of lucidity or clarity, viz. of the way the object is presented to/in cognition, which is for all practical reasons tantamount to certainty, reminds the two principles, viz. clarity and distinctness (*clairement et distinctement*), employed by Descartes as criteria for validity of our cognitions. For Descartes, they guarantee that what we apprehend correspond to reality, and thus provide certainty to cognitions. For Akalaṅka the indubitability warranted by lucidity of cognition was a hallmark of perception and attested to the veracity and reliability of it: perceptual act necessarily furnished one with certainty that what was presented in cognition was at the same time out there: ‘here and now’.

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The verse of the *Nyāya-viniścaya* 1.3 (quoted on p. 32, n. 58) reveals still another important feature of the object of perception. Its object is not merely a unique particular, absolutely devoid of any general character, whose essence can neither be conceptually constructed nor verbally expressed, as Dinnāga understood it. On the contrary, for Akalaṅka the object of perception is essentially endowed with both particular and universal features, as well as with modal (momentary) and substantial (temporarily persistent) aspects. That is the way an object emerges in a clear manner in cognition as definite data of

⁶¹ SVi 11.27 (p. 733):

*spaṣṭasyālāta-cakrāder vibhramasyāpi vīkṣaṇāt /
sva-lakṣaṇōpalabdihīnām nāka-kṣaṇika-darśanam //*

perception. Thus, the object of perception is a really existing thing which already at the perceptual stage is apprehended as a bearer of multiple features. Its individual, unique aspects are only directly perceived, whereas its common, repeatable characteristics can be comprehended both by perception and indirect cognition alike. This finds confirmation in another passage of the *Nyāya-viniścaya*:

‘[129] A really existent thing, which is individually marked (*sc.* unique particular), can be different (unique), in so far as it is represented as different (unique), [and it is also] endowed with conceptual character; it can [also] be non-different (*sc.* having universal aspects), in so far as it is represented [in cognition] as non-different (universal).
[130] [The same unique individual], which is distinguished from things that are similar to it [and] is endowed with singular [features], is something that is directly perceptible as well as indirectly cognisable, both as external and internal [data],⁶² depending on its own aspect.’⁶³

Thus, it is not the case that our cognitive apparatus, at all stages of cognition, takes an active part and contaminates perceived images with some preconceived notions and ideas, by projecting the contents of memory onto new presentations and by bequeathing some conceptual framework onto phenomenal world, as Dharmakīrti understood it. On the contrary, things in themselves are endowed with a complex character, possessed of individual and general features and it is the role of our cognitive apparatus to recognise these features.

Furthermore, it can hardly ever happen, as Akalaṅka argues in the *Siddhi-viniścaya-vivṛti*, that the object in cognition is apprehended as something absolutely unique, detached from its universal features: ‘we do not perceive cognitive episodes within awareness that concern unique particulars and universal things that are absolutely separate from

⁶² The external contents of perception (*bahiṣ-pratyakṣa*) are for instance physical, gross objects, whereas the internal contents of perception (*antaḥ-pratyakṣa*) are individually apprehended thoughts, contents of introspection etc. that are immediately triggered by individual events. The external contents of indirect cognition (*bahiṣ-parokṣa*) are likewise gross objects etc., which, however, stand for a whole class of which they are merely individual elements, being objects of inference, contents of concepts, denotations of words etc. The internal contents of indirect cognition (*antaḥ-parokṣa*) are general concepts, images, universal contents of symbols etc.

⁶³ NVi 1.129–130 (p. 484):

*sad bhinna-pratibhāsenā syād bhinnam savikalpakam /
abhinna-pratibhāsenā syād abhinnaṁ sva-lakṣaṇam //
samānārtha-parāvṛttam asamāna-samanvitam /
pratyakṣam bahir antaś ca parokṣam sva-pradeśataḥ //*

each other. ... In exactly such a way, [viz. by grasping things as many / much, manifold etc., we arrive at] a proof [that], because of multiplexity [of appearance], on the level of the ultimate truth [unique particulars and universal features coexist in cognition].⁶⁴

That is why the dichotomy of two different modes of cognising the world (directly or indirectly) is not followed by the dichotomy of the world itself. Cognising the world with the help of direct or indirect cognition should not mean that we live in two unrelated worlds and deal with two unconnected sets of entities: with unique individuals, which we grasp perceptually, and with concepts and universal features, which we comprehend by means of indirect cognitions. In fact, one and the same entity is a bearer of a bundle of attributes that are differently approached by our cognitive apparatus:

‘The unique particular is unadulterated (*sc.* singular), similar (*sc.* having features common with other members of the same class), endowed with conceptual character, capable [of causally efficient action] by means of its own qualities which occur concurrently and consecutively,⁶⁵ [and it is numerically] one.’⁶⁶

Such individual entities, being irreducible and non-repeatable, are at the same time conveyors of common characteristics (*samāna-lakṣaṇa*) which make it possible to group individuals into classes, that correspond to concepts and words, on the basis of such similarities. Clearly, this echoes Dīnāga’s claim that we name things on the basis of similarities inherent in them directly.⁶⁷ A similar idea to Akalaṅka’s, namely that one and the same cognoscible entity has two characteristics, is expressed already in *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* 1.2⁶⁸ in the well-known passage quoted above. The difference between the two thinkers is, however, crucial. For Dīnāga these two aspects (unique and general) can never be apprehended together in one act of cognition; there is a strict cognitive gap between both aspects, which never intersect in cognition, each being a compartment for a respective

⁶⁴ SViV 1.27 (p. 115.12–14): *sva-lakṣaṇa-sāmānya-lakṣaṇāḥkānte punaḥ samvedanāḥkṛtīḥ na paśyāmaḥ ... tad evaṁ paramārthataḥ siddhiḥ anekāntāt*. For the complete text of the commentary see n. 95.

⁶⁵ These are the two notions that later came to be known as synchronic homogeneity (*tīryak-sāmānya*) and diachronic homogeneity (*ūrdhvatā-sāmānya*), see: BALCEROWICZ (1999).

⁶⁶ NVi 1.122 (p. 453):

*sva-lakṣaṇam asaṅkīrṇam samānam savikalpam /
samartham sva-guṇair ekaṁ saha-krama-vivartibhiḥ //*

⁶⁷ See HERZBERGER (1986: 124–133), HAYES (1988: 196–204).

⁶⁸ Quoted above on p. 11, n. 16.

pramāṇa. For Akalaṅka, on the other hand, both aspects appear already in perception, side by side: the entity is being perceived with its transient, momentary attributes as its ‘concurrent’ facet (*saha-vivartin*) as well as with its underlying substantial structure (*krama-bhāvin*) that is responsible for the fact that all the changing qualities can be correlated with each other and be identified as belonging to one and the same substratum. Such a bundle of features becomes effectively an object that is capable of being acted upon.

— 8 —

An important terminological issue needs next to be clarified: what is the actual relationship between testimonial cognition (*śruta*) and indirect cognition (*parokṣa*), of which Akalaṅka speaks? When we compare the four verses quoted before (see p. 20 and 26, notes 36, 37, 38 and 44), in all of which Akalaṅka presents the rudimentary division of cognitive criteria and in which he uses *śrutam* and *parokṣam* interchangeably, it becomes obvious that the term *parokṣa* (‘indirect cognition’) is treated as a synonym to *śruta* (‘testimonial cognition’):

LT 3:	<i>pratyakṣam ...</i>	<i>parokṣam ...</i>	<i>pramāṇe iti saṅgrahaḥ //</i>
NVi ₂ 3.83:	<i>pratyakṣam ...</i>	<i>śrutam</i>	<i>pramāṇe iti saṅgrahaḥ //</i>
PSa 1.2:	<i>pratyakṣam ...</i>	<i>śrutam</i>	<i>pramāṇe iti saṅgrahaḥ //</i>
NVi ₂ 3.88:	<i>aparam pratyakṣam ... ādye parokṣam</i>		

Further, in the commentary to the *Pramāṇa-saṅgraha* we read: ‘testimonial (mediated) cognition is free of misapprehension, [it is] occasioned by perception, inference and scriptural testimony.’⁶⁹ Thus, Akalaṅka distinguished three subvarieties of indirect cognition, depending on its source, viz. on the mediating agent (senses, inferable properties and words).

Indeed, the equation *śruta* = *parokṣa* is a direct consequence that follows when sensuous cognition (*matī-jñāna*), along with its four stages of sensation (*avagraha*) etc., is classified as a conventional variety of perception. If we closely examine Model 1 of cognitive

⁶⁹ PSaV 1.2 (p. 97.6): *śrutam aviṣṭam pratyakṣānumānāgama-nimittam. parokṣam pratyabhijñādi smarāṇa-pūrvakam*. The wording (°-nimittam) goes back to the wording of TS 1.14: *tad (= matī) indriyānindriya-nimittam* (albeit TS speaks of *matī-jñāna*), which has inspired a number of statements in Jaina philosophical literature. As regards the contents of the phrase, it likewise goes back to TS 1.20: *śrutam matī-pūrvam...*— ‘testimonial (mediated) cognition is preceded by sensuous cognition.’ The latter is reformulated here by Akalaṅka as *parokṣam ... smarāṇa-pūrvakam*, for *parokṣa* is a synonym of *śruta*, and *matī* is a synonym of *smṛti* / *smarāṇa*.

criteria (p. 9), we discover that as soon as we move the four-fold sensuous cognition to the category of direct cognition (*pratyakṣa*), what remains under the heading of indirect cognition (*parokṣa*) is just one variety, viz. testimonial cognition (*śruta-jñāna*). Thus, it should not be surprising that Akalaṅka makes use of both of these two terms without much distinction: both of them have the same extension, that is to say they are identical as far as the class of cognitive acts they cover is concerned. However, their intension is different, since they connote two different phenomena: *parokṣa*, on the one hand, refers to all indirect, mediated acts of valid cognition, that do not grasp their object in a lucid or clear manner; *śruta*, on the other, indicates such acts of valid cognitions through which a piece of knowledge acquired by one cognitive subject is communicated and transmitted to another cognitive subject.

The verse of the *Nyāya-viniścaya* quoted already (NVi₂ 3.88, p. 21, n. 44) contains one more important clue. In it, Akalaṅka provides the rationale why sensuous cognition (*mati-jñāna*), which has traditionally been classified (together with testimonial cognition (*śruta*)) as indirect cognition, can also be described as a kind of perception: ‘it is only in order to be in agreement with people’s opinion, that sensuous cognition is incorporated into the definition of [perception].’ What is meant here is conventional perception (*sāṃvyavahārika-pratyakṣa*), which is distinguished, in the same verse, from perception proper (*mukhya-pratyakṣa*), called in the verse *aparam*. Even though Akalaṅka mentions neither *avadhi* (clairvoyance) nor *manaḥ-paryāya* (mind-reading)—traditionally grouped together with the perfect, absolute cognition (*kevala-jñāna*)—by name in any of his epistemological works, it is clear that what is implied by *aparam* in the verse NVi₂ 3.88 are precisely all these three varieties. There can be no doubt that he recognised this tripartite classification of *avadhi–manaḥ-paryāya–kevala*, for he explicitly and extensively commented on them in his *Rāja-vārttika*.

To recapitulate, in Akalaṅka’s scheme, the category of direct cognition (*pratyakṣa*) comprises—as its peculiar conventional variety—sensuous cognition (*mati-jñāna*) along with its four stages: sensation (*avagraha*), cogitation (*ihā*), perceptual judgement (*avāya*) and retention (*dhāraṇā*), the latter being the basis for memory, a kind of storage of experienced events that are subsequently reactivated.

An interpretation of the enigmatic verse of LT 10cd–11ab should take into account the defining feature of direct cognition, viz. the criterion of clarity or lucidity, which should help determine how Akalaṅka classified such cognitions as sensuous cognition, memory, recognition, induction, determined cognition etc. It would seem that all these cognitive acts grasp, in the first place, general features of an object, and have little in common with the notion of clarity / lucidity attributed to perception. Should we then conclude that Prabhācandra-sūri's interpretation (*Int.* 3, see p. 5, n. 6), who catalogues them as varieties of indirect cognition, is the right one and all the remaining commentators misunderstood the verse completely, not noticing the patent contradiction in attributing memory, recognition etc. a direct, perceptual character?

Prabhācandra's interpretation would find its support in Akalaṅka's verse of the *Nyāya-viniścaya* 3.83 (quoted in p. 21, n. 37) that 'the other [type of cognitive criterion] is testimonial cognition ... divided into [such varieties as] recognition etc.', insofar as the expression 'recognition etc.' (*pratyabhijñādi*) stands for the whole set of cognitive processes that includes presumptive knowledge / suppositional knowledge (*ūha / tarka*), determined cognition (*ābhinibodhika*), memory (*smṛti*), inference (*anumāna*) etc. In latter part of this verse (NVi₂ 3.83bc) Akalaṅka is, therefore, concerned with varieties of indirect cognition (*parokṣa*). That is also in full agreement with another verse of the *Nyāya-viniścaya* in which Akalaṅka makes it clear that testimonial (mediated) cognition comprises inference and scriptural testimony:

'All this cognition [dealt with just before, including] inference as well as scriptural testimony, is testimonial cognition, provided what is cognised is truth (reality) without inconsistency with tradition.'⁷⁰

The commentator Vādirāja-sūri expresses what is actually understood from the context itself and on the basis of previous verses (NVi₂ 3.83–86): 'Not only memory etc. are testimonial cognition, but also inference and likewise scriptural testimony.'⁷¹

At this stage we should determine how, in Akalaṅka's thought, the notion of clarity / lucidity, that distinguishes perception and indirect

⁷⁰ NVi₂ 3.87 (p. 363):

*sarvam etac chruta-jñānam anumānam tathāgamaḥ /
saṃpradāyāvighātena yadi tattvaṃ pratīyate //*

⁷¹ NViV 3.87 (p. 363.14–15): *tad āha—**anumānam tathāgamaḥ**. na kevalam smṛty-
ādikam eva śruta-jñānam, api tu anumānam tadvad āgamaś cēti.*

cognition, relates to the issue of conceptualisation, which for Dinnāga differentiates perception from inference?

In the *Laghīyas-traya* Akalaṅka describes each of the four cognitive stages comprised under sensuous cognition. Interestingly enough, the conceptual component (*vikalpa*, *kalpanā*), the associating of ‘bare sensory data’ with mental concepts, is present in the process almost from the very beginning; that clearly distinguishes Akalaṅka’s position from that of Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti for whom such conceptual components were a mere fiction, be it a practically useful fiction. To Akalaṅka, however, the involvement of the mind which processes bare sensations is an integral part of perception. Conceptual impression, called by Akalaṅka ‘comprehension of the notion’ (*vikalpa-dhī*), or conceptual awareness of the object, which is a synonym of *kalpanā* and *vikalpa*, emerges in perceptual process as soon as we become aware of the existence of an object:

‘When it comes to the union of the perceiving organ and the object, [first] (1a) the seeing of [mere] existence⁷² [takes place, and then] (1b) a comprehension of the notion (conceptual impression) in the form of the object⁷³—[these constitute] sensation. [It is followed by] (2) cogitation, [which] is the wish [to know] the particular [object, and by] (3) perceptual judgement, [which is] conclusive determination [of the object]. (4) Retention is the cause of memory. Thus sensuous cognition is four-fold.’⁷⁴

Without this conceptual awareness of the object the cognitive subject could not become aware of anything, not even that he perceives anything:

‘Any conceptual states of mind, of whose rise and cessation every one is aware, [if they were non-conceptual at the moment of self-illumination], even if they exist, would not be observed in singular acts of perception, just

⁷² This initial phase called sensation of the object (*arthāvagraha*) corresponds to what the Naiyāyika call *nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa*. See n. 60.

⁷³ This and all the remaining phases are roughly equivalent to the Naiyāyika’s *savikalpa-pratyakṣa*.

⁷⁴ LT 5–6ab:

akṣārtha-yoge sattāloko ’rthākāra-vikalpa-dhīḥ /
avagraho viśeṣākāṅkṣēhāvāyo viniścayaḥ //
dhāraṇā smṛti-hetus tan mati-jñānaṁ catur-vidham /

like the singular character of the unique nature [is not observed].⁷⁵

Conceptualisation thus accompanies through the whole process of cognition, right from the moment when the object enters awareness. Conceptual state of mind defines both acts of perception and indirect cognition, except for the initial stage of mere contact of a sense organ and its object, when no cognition is yet generated.

Akalañka maintains that such conceptually constructed ideas can also occur in a clear and lucid manner. Besides, conceptualisation has two aspects: it may present its object indirectly, as an idea of vague form, but the way it emerges is clear and lucid (*sc.* direct):

‘Any aspect [of cognition] amenable to self-illuminating cognition, in case of conceptual (determinate) cognitions, manifests its contents clearly, because it is manifested as conceptual (determinate), [even] when [a person’s] all thoughts are withdrawn (pacified).’⁷⁶

⁷⁵ LT 24:

*pratisaṁviditôtpatti-vyayāḥ satyo ’pi kalpanā /
pratyakṣe na lakṣeraṁs tat-svalakṣaṇa-bhedavat //*

Cf. SViV 27 (p. 115.11–12): *na hi saṁvitter bahu-bahu-vidha-prabhṛty-ākṛtayaḥ svayam asaṁviditā evôdayante vyayante vā yataḥ satyo ’py anupalakṣitāḥ syuḥ kalpanāvat tathêtarākṛtayaḥ.*—‘For no cognitive episodes [that represent the character] of being many / much, manifold etc. do not arise or cease in the awareness, themselves not becoming the object of awareness, because—although being present—they would not be apprehended, just like the conceptual state of mind; in the same way it is the case with the cognitive episodes of their opposites [such as little, simple etc. (see TS 1.15–16)].’

⁷⁶ LT 23:

*sva-saṁvedyaṁ vikalpānām viśadârthâvabhāsanam /
saṁhṛtyâśeṣa-cintāyām savikalpâvabhāsanāt //*

This is a direct critique of Dharmakīrti’s idea expressed in PV₁ 2.123–125:

*pratyakṣaṁ kalpanâpoḍhaṁ pratyakṣeṇâiva sidhyati /
praty-âtma-vedyaḥ sarveṣām vikalpo nâma-saṁśrayaḥ //
saṁhṛtya sarvataś cintām stimitenântarâtmanā /
sthito ’pi cakṣuṣā rūpam ikṣate sākṣajâ matiḥ //
punar vikalpayan kiñcid âsīn me kalpanêdṛṣī /
iti vetti na pūrvôktâvasthâyām indriyâd gatau //* —

—‘[123] Perception is proved to be free from conceptuality by the very perception itself. [Every] conceptual cognition of all [beings] is cognised by itself individually and is correlated with the words. [124] After one has withdrawn one’s own thought from everything, even though one abides tranquil inside oneself, the mind incited by the senses sees [non-conceptually] some form with the eye. [125] When, again, one conceptually conceives of that something, [in that very moment] one realises: “Such

That may lead to the conclusion that the series of cognitive processes, enumerated in the ambiguous verse LT 10cd–11ab (i.e. memory, recognitive cognition, inductive thinking (association) and determined cognition), even though they are conceptual in nature, could be classified as direct cognitions in terms of the manner in which they themselves become comprehended as acts of cognition.

When we analyse the way Akalaṅka applies the terms referring to the series of cognitive processes, we discover that he makes use of two series of terms that are normally considered synonyms. For instance the term *saṃjñā* (‘recognitive cognition’) is a synonym of *pratyabhijñā* / *pratyabhijñāna*, but both of them are generally used in slightly different contexts. That is the case with other terms occurring in both series.⁷⁷ In this way we have two quasi-synonymous series of cognitive acts that are related causally:

1)	<i>matī</i> → <i>saṃjñā</i>	→ <i>cintā</i>	→ <i>abhinibodha</i>
	[memory → recognitive cognition	→ inductive thinking	→ determined cognition]
		(association)	
.....			
2)	<i>smṛti</i> → <i>pratyabhijñāna</i>	→ <i>ūha</i> / <i>tarka</i>	→ <i>ābhinibodhika</i> / <i>anumāna</i>
	[memory → recognition	→ suppositional	→ inference ‘for oneself’]
		knowledge	

The difference between these two series lies in their either non-verbal or verbal character. The former of this series is rather to be reckoned among direct, perceptual acts of cognition, whereas the latter most frequently is associated with indirect cognition.⁷⁸

and such conceptual judgement has occurred to me!’”, [but] one is not [aware of that] when there is [still] the [non-conceptual] cognitive state [of mind which has arisen] from the sense-organ, [and] the condition of which has just been indicated [with the words: “After one has withdrawn one’s own thought from everything”].’ For an alternative translation of the passage see: DREYFUS (1997: 350).

⁷⁷ See, for instance: (1) LTV 10cd–11ab: ...*dhāraṇā*, *smṛtiḥ saṃjñāyāḥ*..., *cintāyāḥ*..., *abhinibodhasya*..., (2) SVi 2.1 (p. 120.4): *smṛtyā pratyabhijñānatā*, comp. SViṬ 2.1 (p. 120.20–21): *mateḥ smṛtiḥ, tataḥ pratyabhijñā, ata ūhaḥ, asmād asābdānumā śrutam ity uktam bhavati*; and (3) SViV 2.23 (along with SViṬ, p. 217.27–218.1): ***avagraha ādir yasyāḥ sā cāsau matiḥ samāsaḥ: sā ca smṛtiś ca saṃjñā ca cintā ca abhinibodhas ca te ātmāno yasya tathōktam.*** (‘...Sensuous cognition is a compound piece of knowledge: it is both memory, recognitive cognition, thinking and determined cognition alike...’); (4) RVār 1.13 (p. 58.15–16): *mananam matiḥ smaranam smṛtiḥ saṃjñānam saṃjñā cintanam cintā ābhimukhyena niyataṃ bodhanam abhinibodhaḥ iti* = SViV 1.27 (p. 115.14–15).

⁷⁸ Since *matī* and *smṛti* (likewise *abhinibodha* and *ābhinibodhika*) are used interchangeably, in order to determine which of these quasi-synonymous series of cognitive acts occurs in the context of either perception or indirect cognition, we

What ultimately decides whether these four stages are direct or indirect is their relation to language. Their limited equivalence is described by Akalaṅka in his own commentary to the problematic verse:

‘Since [retention] is a cause of infallible memory as the [cognitive] result (cognition), retention is the cognitive criterion [of it]; [similarly] memory [is the cognitive

should look for occurrences of middle terms (*saṃjñā*, *pratyabhijñāna*, *cintā*, *ūha* / *tarka*).

(1) Terms of the first series (*mati* → *saṃjñā* → *cintā* → *abhinibodha*) occur, as far as I could see consistently, in the context of sensuous cognition (*mati-jñāna*), or perception (*pratyakṣa*), e.g.: RVār 1.13 (*mananaṃ matih smaraṇaṃ smṛtiḥ saṃjñānaṃ saṃjñā cintanaṃ cintā ābhimukhyena niyataṃ bodhanam abhinibodhaḥ iti*), SViV 1.27 (*mananaṃ vā it matih, smaraṇaṃ smṛtiḥ, saṃjñānaṃ saṃjñā, cintanaṃ cintā, ābhinibodhanam abhinibodha iti*), SViV 2.23 (...*mati-jñāna-prabheda-lakṣanam avagrahādi-mati-smṛti-saṃjñā-cintābhinibodhātakaṃ...*), LT 10cd–11ab (*jñānam ādyaṃ smṛtiḥ saṃjñā cintā cābhinibodhikam*), LT 25 (*akṣa-dhi-smṛti-saṃjñābhis cintayābhinibodhikaiḥ*), LTV₁ 61 (p. 21.7: *anindriya-pratyakṣam smṛti-saṃjñā-cintābhinibodhātmakam*).

(2) Terms of the second series (*smṛti* → *pratyabhijñāna* → *ūha* / *tarka* → *ābhinibodhika* / *anumāna*) are used in the context of inference (*anumāna*) or verbal cognition, e.g.: NVi₂ 3.83 (*śrutam ... prakīrṇaṃ pratyabhijñādau*), NV₁ 188 (*sadṛśyātmani sambandha-grahe ... pratyabhijñādinā siddhyet*), PSa 1.2 (*parokṣaṃ pratyabhijñādi*), PSaV 1.2 (*parokṣaṃ pratyabhijñādi*), PSa 3.17 (*pratyakṣa-nirṇayān na rte sāmānyānusmṛtis tataḥ / pratyabhijñā tatas tarkaḥ tataḥ sādhyā-parigrahaḥ //*), PSa 73, p. 122.21–22 (...*anvaya-vyatirekārtha-viśayatvaṃ śabda-grahaṇaṃ pratyabhijñānāder...*).

The only case where both series are mixed is SVi 1.27 (*akṣa-jñānair anusmṛtya pratyabhijñāya cintayan / ābhimukhyena tad-bhedān viniścicya pravartate //*), in which only verbal equivalents of the technical terms are used. The context here is perception. Apart from the above analysis of the occurrences of single terms belonging to these two series, an additional support of my thesis that that the series containing recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) as a kind of indirect cognition, is found in a passage of the *Aṣṭa-satī* ad ĀMī 101 (AṣS₃, p. 88.27–28 = AṣS₄, p. 279.19–20): *pratyabhijñānaṃ pramāṇam, vyavasāyātīśayōpapatteḥ, tat-sāmarthyādāhīnatvāt pramāṇatva-sthiteḥ*.—‘Recognition is a cognitive criterion, because the excellence of the determination (*sc.* correct cognition) [of an object though it] is possible, for it is established that it is a cognitive criterion, insofar as it depends on the efficacy of this [determination].’ The reference to *pratyabhijñāna* is inserted among various other types of *indirect* cognitive criterion which Akalaṅka argues to be also valid cognitions, but are different from *anumāna*. Clearly, *pratyabhijñāna* is treated by Akalaṅka as one of varieties of *parokṣa*. Furthermore, in the relevant portion of his *Aṣṭa-sahasrī* ad AṣS, Vidyānanda Pātrakesarīsvāmin confirms that *pratyabhijñāna* is a kind of indirect cognition (AṣS, p. 279.19: *pratyabhijñānaṃ pramāṇam, vyavasāyātīśayōpapatteḥ, pratyakṣādivat*, repeated on p. 280.3–4: *tatḥ pratyabhijñānaṃ tattva-jñānatvāt pramāṇam, pratyakṣādivat*), which is juxtaposed with perception.

criterion] for cognitive cognition, which is the identification; cognitive cognition [is the cognitive criterion] for inductive thinking, which suppositional knowledge; inductive thinking is [the cognitive criterion] for determined cognition, which is inference etc. [still] before the association with speech. {After the association with speech} § [it is] the remaining [kind of] cognition [which is] testimonial cognition, [and] which is of many subdivisions.⁷⁹

As a result, language emerges as an additional criterion that distinguishes direct cognitions from indirect ones. The division into direct (clear and lucid) and indirect (unclear and bereft of clarity) cognitive acts overlaps with the segmentation: non-verbal and verbal:

	<i>pratyakṣa</i> (perception)	<i>parokṣa</i> (indirect cognition)
	<i>viśada</i> (clear)	<i>aviśada</i> (unclear)
	<i>aśābda</i> (non-verbal)	<i>śābda</i> (verbal)
<i>akalpita</i> (non-conceptual)	<i>kalpita</i> (conceptual)	<i>kalpita</i> (conceptual)

The above division immediately evokes Dinnāga's assertion, which must have influenced Akalaṅka's classification and definition of cognitive processes:

When there arises [a cognition as a result of the contact] of a sense organ and an object, it is not possible [for the contents of this cognition to have] verbal character etc. (*sc.* and conceptual character).⁸⁰

⁷⁹ LTV 10cd–11ab: *aviśamvāda-smṛteḥ phalasya hetuvāt pramāṇam dhāraṇa, smṛtiḥ samjñāyāḥ pratyavamarśasya, samjñā cintāyāḥ tarkasya, cintā abhinibodhasya anumānādeḥ prāk śābda-yojanāt. {śābdānuyojanāt} § śeṣam śruta-jñānam aneka-prabhedam.*

⁸⁰ Emendation according to my critical edition of LT / LTV (under preparation).

Without my emendation, and with the reading: *cintā abhinibodhasya anumānādeḥ prāk śābda-yojanāt śeṣam śruta-jñānam aneka-bhedam*, we would have: '...inductive thinking is [the cognitive criterion] for determined cognition, which is inference etc. [What is the first kind of cognition, i.e. sensuous cognition which occurs] before the association with speech, [becomes] the remaining [kind of] cognition, i.e. testimonial cognition, which is of many subdivisions.' Whether we take the suggested emendation into consideration or not, the meaning would not change considerably.

⁸⁰ PSV 1.17ab: *indriyārthōdbhāve nāstī vyapadeśyādi-sambhavaḥ*. Cf. the translation in: HATTORI (1968: 36, Section 3, k. 1ab), Sanskrit text: HATTORI (1968: 121, n. 3.3). The phrasing of PSV 1.17ab seems to have triggered, for instance, LT 5ab (*akṣārtha-yoge sattāloko 'rthākāra-vikalpa-dhīh*).

Diñnāga's above claim is, clearly, a direct consequence of his distinguishing two autonomous kinds of cognition following the criterion of conceptualisation: for him, conceptually constructed ideas were automatically expressible with the help of verbal symbols. Akalañka, however, argued to the contrary: it is possible to have cognition, of which we are aware and which is, at the same time, conceptual, i.e. its contents is already 'contaminated' by the influence of mental activity such as cogitation, the determination of the nature of the perceived object etc. Furthermore, most cognitive processes that constitute perception, with the exception of the initial non-conceptual phase of *vyāñjanāvagraha*⁸¹, have such a conceptual nature. For Akalañka, the validity of such a conceptual perception is warranted by the fact that each and every subsequent step in the perceptual process is causally dependent on the preceding one, from sensation (*avagraha*) up to retention (*dhāraṇā*), and further, such a cognitively valid retention results in the subsequent steps (memory, recognition, induction, inference) that are likewise causally related.⁸² Ultimately, this causal series of cognitions leads to testimonial cognition, which is verbal in character (see LTV 10cd–11ab, p. 42, n. 79). In short, the final element in the process, viz. reliable verbal cognition, is preceded by an act of perception.

Although Akalañka disagrees with Diñnāga as regards conceptual character of perceptions, both of them would agree that verbal cognition that is causally depended on previous direct experience, or perception, is infallible (*avisamvādin*, see PS/PSV 2.5), viz. it is a cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*, see LTV 10cd–11ab). For Akalañka, the

⁸¹ See nn. 60 and 72, pp. 33 and 40.

⁸² Cf. STPṬ 2.1, p. 553,6–9: *atra ca pūrva-pūrvasya pramāṇatā uttarōttarsya ca phalatēty ekasyāpi mati-jñānasya cāturvidhyam kathamcid pramāṇa-phala-bhedas cōpapannaḥ. yathā ca pratibhāsa-bhede 'pi grāhya-grāhaka-samvidāṁ yugapad ekatvaṁ tathā krama-bhāvināṁ avagrahādīnāṁ hetu-phala-rūpatayā vyavasthita-svarūpāṇāṁ ekatvaṁ kathamcid aviruddham anyathā hetu-phala-bhāvābhāva-prasaktir iti pratipāditaṁ anekaśaḥ.*—'And as regards this [four-fold division of the sensuous cognition] each an every previous [act of cognition] is a cognitive criterion, and each and every following [act of cognition] is [their] result; therefore even though the sensuous cognition is one, it is somehow four-fold and what results is the division into the cognitive criterion and [its] result. And just like with regard to a variety, as it were, of representations, acts of awareness [of the form of] something-to-be-grasped and something-which-grasps [preserve] their simultaneous unity, in the same manner unity of [the four stages of the sensuous cognition such as] sensation etc.—that [with their] determined intrinsic natures exist consecutively, since they have the form of either cause or result—somehow [presents] no contradiction; otherwise [one would face] an absurd consequence that the cause and result would [both] exist and not exist. This has been taught in many ways.'

causal sequence of cognitive events, each of which serves as a *pramāṇa* for the subsequent one (LTV 10cd–11ab), warrants the validity of testimonial cognition: a valid cognition yields another valid cognition. That is reminiscent of Dinnāga’s comments on PS 2.5 (quoted on p. 13, n. 21), in which he explains why testimony of an authoritative person, which is as infallible as inference, can be classified as a kind of the latter: ‘Since when one has heard an utterance of an authoritative person, on account of the similarity in terms of infallibility it is called inference. And, as it is said, all name-giving is preceded by perception.’⁸³ Also for Dinnāga a valid act of perception is a necessary ground for the validity of testimony.

Incidentally, Akalaṅka description of perception, as distinct from indirect cognition in terms of its non-verbal character, is a criticism against Bhartṛhari’s claim that all cognition has a verbal character, and every thought must have its verbal equivalent:

‘There is no cognition in the human world which would not result from speech. All cognition appears on account of speech as if permeated [by it].’⁸⁴

As against Bhartṛhari’s opinion,⁸⁵ Akalaṅka endeavours to prove that it is possible to formulate thoughts independently of language;

⁸³ PSV 2.5 (PSV₂, p. 455.1–4): [Vasudhararakṣita:] *yid ches pa’i tshig ñid bzuñ nas kyañ mi bslu bar mtshuñs pa’i phyir de yañ rjes su dpag pa ñid du brjod do || de skad du yañ | miñ gi las rnam ki don du mñon sum soñ ba’i phyir ro zes ’byuñ ño |*, [Kanakavarman:] *yid ches pa’i tshig ñid bzuñ nas don de la mi bslu ba’i phyir dañ | mi ’dra ba’i phyir rjes su dpag pa ñid du bcañ pa yin te | de ltar yañ miñ gi las ni mñon sum sñon du ’gro ba can zes bya ba yin no |*

⁸⁴ VP 1.131:

*na so ’sti pratyayo loke yañ śabdānugamād ṛte |
anuviddham iva jñānañ sarvañ śabdena bhāṣate ||*

⁸⁵ That my contention about the implied criticism against Bhartṛhari’s theory is not arbitrary is proved by Vidyānanda’s following remark, who comment’s on Akalaṅka’s verse of LT 10cd–11ab: in *TŚVA*, p. 240:
athavā

*na so ’sti pratyayo loke yañ śabdānugamād ṛte |
anuviddham ivābhāti sarvañ śabde pratiṣṭhitam ||^a*

ity ekānte nirākartuñ prāg nāma-yojanād ādyam iṣṭam na tu tan nāma-saṃsṛṣṭam iti vyākhyānam akalaṅkaṃ anusartavyam.—

—Alternatively, in order to revoke the following absolutist stand [of Bhartṛhari]:


‘There is no cognition which [can exist] without following speech in the human world; everything shines as if pierced [with words], being firmly based in speech.’^a

it is accepted that the first [cognition, viz. sensuous cognition], [occurs] before the association with name (speech), but it is not connected with name (speech)—such an explanation should be adopted following Akalaṅka.’ See also n. 3.

moreover, even such complex cognitive processes as inner association, induction and reasoning may proceed without any involvement of verbal symbols. Concepts and ideas are an integral component of every thought without which no thinking process would be possible; however, we can think non-verbally.

— 10 —

The final picture of Akalaṅka’s classification of cognitive process that emerges after above examination is shown in Model 3 below:



Model 3

The field marked  comprises those varieties of valid cognitions which are not mentioned by Akalaṅka by name in his works on epistemology (*Laghīyas-traya*, *Nyāya-viniścaya*, *Pramāṇa-saṅgraha* and *Siddhi-viniścaya*). Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that he followed Jaina tradition in this respect and accepted all three: including

[^a VP 1.131, modified in *padās* ed. Vidyānanda’s reading is found also in NBhū, p. 580,24, verse 356.]

clairvoyance and mind-reading. He comments on them and explains their nature for instance in his commentary on the *Tattvārtha-sūtra* (RVār 1.9–12).

In accordance with the results of the above analysis, the initial translation of the enigmatic verse of LT 10cd–11ab should be modified as follows:

Int. 4 ‘The first [kind of] cognition [also⁸⁶ comprises] sensuous cognition (here: memory), recognitive cognition, and inductive thinking [and] determined cognition; [it occurs] before the association with name (speech). [These four become]—on account of application of speech—the remaining kind of cognition, i.e. testimonial cognition.’

Thus, the same sequence of mental processes—i.e. memory, recognitive cognition, inductive thinking and determined cognition, etc.—can be either classified as sensuous cognition (sc. conventional perception), or as testimonial cognition, depending on whether the processes are accompanied by the application of language or not. This interpretation is in agreement with a passage found in the *Siddhivinīścaya*:

‘This sensuous cognition, which consists in the cognitive expectancy [to determine its] datum which is an individual [thing] seized through sensation of its own object (sc. a datum relating to a particular sense organ)⁸⁷, also leads—after perceptual judgement has been reached—to the fact that a subliminal impression (i.e. retention, *dhāraṇā*), amounting to determination [of the object, is deposited]⁸⁸. On account of reason based on the contents of presumptive knowledge [obtained] by a person who recognises [an object] due to memory non-verbal inference is produced, which is determined cognition. It can become testimonial cognition [when] connected with speech.’⁸⁹

⁸⁶ Viz. in addition to the four initial steps: sensation (*avagraha*), cogitation (*ihā*), perceptual judgement (*avāya*) and retention (*dhāraṇā*).

⁸⁷ Alternatively: *svārthāvagraha* could mean: ‘sensation of itself and of [its external] object’, if we follow SViṬ ad loc. (p. 120.6): *svam ca arthaś ca tayoh grāhako ’vagrahaḥ*.

⁸⁸ This is again the description of the four phases: sensation (*svārthāvagraha*), cogitation (*ihā = viṣayākāṅkṣā*), perceptual judgement (*avāya = bhedāvāyām upetya*) and retention (*dhāraṇā = saṃskāratām yāti*).

⁸⁹ SVi 2.1 (p. 120.2–5):

In this manner Akalaṅka accomplishes two seemingly irreconcilable tasks: he introduces a new model of valid cognitive processes and, at the same time, he declaratively remains faithful to older tradition expressed by Umāsvāmin: ‘sensuous cognition, memory, recognitive cognition, inductive thinking [and] determined cognition are synonymous expressions’ (TS 1.13, p. 7).

The idea expressed in the hemistich of LT 10cd (*jñānam ādyaṃ matiḥ saṃjñā cintā cābhinibodhikam*)—as I understand it, viz. that memory, recognitive cognition, inductive thinking (association) and determined cognition are integral parts of perception—is further confirmed by the verse of SVi 1.27, which clearly relates these four mental processes to sensuous cognition, i.e. conventional perception derived from senses:

‘With the help of cognitions [derived] from sense organs, having remembered [and] recognised [perceptible things], one associates (or: reasons inductively) [and] having determined intentionally⁹⁰ individual [objects grasped by] these [cognitive processes, a person] undertakes actions [with respect to these individual objects]^{91,92}.

The verse associates the sequence of cognitive events that are causally related both with acts of perception (*akṣa-jñānaiḥ*) and with practical actions undertaken with respect to individual entities, not universal ideas, for one practically acts towards individual entities. Further, in another place, Akalaṅka describes how individual entities are being grasped through perception, which lends further support that perception, with the exception of the initial step, has generally conceptual character:

*svārthāvagraha-nīta-bheda-viṣayākāṅkṣātmikēyaṃ matiḥ
bhedāvāyāṃ upetya nirṇaya-mayaṃ saṃskāratāṃ yāty api /
smṛtyā pratyabhijñāvatōha-viṣayād dhetor aśābdānumā
kalpyā ābhinibodhikī śrutam ataḥ syāt śabda-saṃyojitaṃ //*

⁹⁰ The expression *ābhimukhyena ... viniścīya* ‘to determine intentionally’ is a paraphrase of the term *ābhinibodha* (‘determined cognition’), see Akalaṅka’s explanation in RVār 1.13 (p. 58.15–16): *mananaṃ matiḥ smaraṇaṃ smṛtiḥ saṃjñānaṃ saṃjñā cintanaṃ cintā ābhimukhyena niyataṃ bodhanaṃ abhinibodhaḥ iti*.

⁹¹ Anantavīrya in his commentary makes it clear that all these processes are indispensable steps in perception, and none of them can be omitted; in SViṬ *ad loc.*, p. 115.19–23, he enumerates six possibilities, each leaving one cognitive step out, which all lead to impeded cognition.

⁹² SVi 1.27 (p. 115.6–7):

*akṣa-jñānair anusmṛtya pratyabhijñāya cintayan /
ābhimukhyena tad-bhedān viniścīya pravartate //*

‘[First,] one does not distinguish its own [individual data] from other [things, i.e. one does not even know with what sense organ one perceives], [then] one sees the existence alone (*sc.* that something is there) because one is not yet aware [of the character of the data];⁹³ [then] one recognises the individual thing etc. and grasps [it] conceptually through [various] stages of sensuous cognition.’⁹⁴

His auto-commentary⁹⁵, in which Akalaṅka elaborates on the main ideas accommodated in the above verse, is quite revealing. At the

⁹³ These two initial steps (*avikalpya svam anyasmāt sattā-mātram acetanāt / paśyan*) are the sensation of momentary manifestation (*vyañjanāvagraha*), which is not conceptual. Thereupon follows the sensation of the object (*arthāvagraha*), which is conceptual, and other conceptual steps of perception.

⁹⁴ SVi 12.4 (p. 742.1–2):

*avikalpya svam anyasmāt sattā-mātram acetanāt /
paśyan vijānāti dravyādi mati-bhedair vikalpayan /*

Compare also Anantavīrya’s relevant comments in SViṬ *ad loc.* (p. 742.6–15).

⁹⁵ SViV 1.27 (p. 115.8–18): *sparsana-rasana-ghrāṇa-cakṣuḥ-śrotra-manāmsi indriyāṇi. taiḥ sva-viśaya-grahaṇam avagrahādy-ātmikā matiḥ bahu-bahu-vidha-kṣiprāniḥsr̥tānukta-dhruvāṇām sētara-prakārāṇām* (TS 1.16). *ata evānekānta-siddhiḥ. na hi saṁvitteḥ bahu-bahu-vidha-prabhṛty-ākṛtayaḥ svayam asaṁviditā evōdayante vyayante vā yataḥ satyo ’py anupalakṣitāḥ syuḥ kalpanāvat, tathētarākṛtayaḥ. sva-lakṣaṇa-sāmānya-lakṣaṇāṅkānte punaḥ saṁvedanākṛtīḥ na paśyāmaḥ, tathādvāpaśyantaḥ katham {kalpanayā}^a ātmānam eva vipralabhāmahe. tad evam paramārthataḥ siddhiḥ anekāntāt. manyate [mananam vā it matiḥ, smaraṇam smṛtiḥ, saṁjñānam saṁjñā, cintanam cintā, ābhinibodhanam abhinibodha iti] tathāmanati tattvārtha-sūtra-kārāḥ—“matiḥ smṛtiḥ saṁjñā cintābhinibodha ity anarthāntaram”* (TS 1.13) *iti. mati-smṛty-ādayaḥ śabda-yojanām antareṇa na bhavantīty ekānto na yatas tatrāntar-bhāvyaeran. tad-ekānte punaḥ na kvacid syuḥ tan-nāma-smṛter ayogāt anavasthānādeḥ.*—‘Touch, taste, smell, vision, hearing and mind are senses. With their help sensuous cognition, which consists in [four stages such as] sensation etc., is an act of grasping of respective data for each of these [senses], [and it concerns] such divisions as many / much, manifold, quick, unclear, implicit, fixed and their opposites (TS 1.16). Precisely on the basis [of this act of grasping] the multiplexity [of data] is established. For no cognitive episodes [that represent the character] of being many / much, manifold etc. arise or cease in the awareness, themselves not becoming the object of awareness, because—although being present—they would not be apprehended, similarly the conceptual state of mind [would not be cognised]; in the same way it is the case with the cognitive episodes of their opposites [such as little, simple etc.]. On the other hand, we do not perceive cognitive episodes within awareness that concern unique particulars and universal things that are absolutely separate from each other. [The Buddhists are deceived, but] why do we, not perceiving [things] in precisely such a manner (*sc.* not perceiving that unique particulars and universal features are absolutely separate from each other), allow ourselves to be deceived {by such assumption}^a [that we can perceive universal things that are

outset, Akalañka enumerates six sense organs, the mind (*manas*) being included as the sixth sense. Since the mind grasps concepts and thoughts, the character of mental perception has to be conceptual. Furthermore, Akalañka takes recourse to an earlier idea, expressed by Umāsvāmin (TS 1.16), that perception involves also ‘such divisions as many / much, manifold, quick, unclear, implicit, fixed and their opposites’, which also directly points to the conceptual nature of perception⁹⁶. Without acknowledging conceptual nature of perception, it would not be possible to explain how the cognising subject becomes aware of his own cognitions; as consequence, no cognition, including conceptual states of mind, would be cognised (*anupalakṣitāḥ syuḥ kalpanāvat*).

Finally, Akalañka examines the supposition that ‘sensuous cognition, memory etc. do not exist without the association with speech’ (*matismṛty-ādayaḥ śabda-yojanām antareṇa na bhavanti*), which he immediately dismisses as simplistic (*ekānta*). If such cognitive processes were verbal, they should be classified as instances of

absolutely separate from each other]? Thus, in exactly such a way, [viz. by grasping things as many / much, manifold etc., we arrive at] a proof [that], because of multiplexity [of appearance], on the level of the ultimate truth [unique particulars and universal features coexist in cognition]. It is maintained that sensuous cognition is understanding, memory is recollecting, recognitive cognition is recognising, inductive thinking is associating, determined cognition is determining intentionally. Accordingly, the author of the *Tattvārtha-sūtra* [1.13] considers that: “Sensuous cognition, memory, recognitive cognition, inductive thinking [and] determined cognition are synonymous expressions.” [Suppose] sensuous cognition, memory etc. do not exist without the association with speech—such is absolutist stand; [but it] is not correct, because [in such a case] these [varieties] should be included in this [testimonial cognition]. On the other hand, if [one accepted] such an absolutist stand [that these cognitions are absolutely verbal], then [these varieties] could not occur with respect to any [object], in so far as it would not be consistent to assume that memory [proceeds with the help] of the names of these [objects], because of infinite regress (*sc.* it would be necessary to have as many names as there are individual things) and other [logical flaws].’ [a SViV 1.27 (p. 115.13 reads: *katham ātmānam*. However, the text should be emended in view of Anantavīrya’s manifest *pratīka*, overlooked by the editor, in SViṬ 1.27 (p. 117.7): ...*katham kalpanayā svalakṣaṇa-sāmānya-lakṣanāikānte samvedanākṛtikalpanayā ātmānam eva vipralabhāmahe vañcayāmaḥ*.]

⁹⁶ Precisely the same idea is expressed in LTV 7ab: *bahu-bahu-vidha-kṣiprānisṛtānukta-dhruvêtara-vikalpānām avagrahâdeḥ svabhāva-bhedān na virudhyate*.—‘There is no contradiction [as regards the distinction between cognitive criterion and its result] in the case of sensation and other [stages of sensuous cognition that grasp] such divisions as many / much, manifold, quick, unclear, implicit, fixed and their opposites, because their essential nature is differentiated.’

testimonial cognition (*na yatas tatrântar-bhāvyaeran*⁹⁷), and would turn out to be indirect cognitions. To accept verbal character of such cognitive processes as memory, recognition etc., that are considered by Akalaṅka to be recognitive cognition, would be tantamount to conceding that each perceptual image or each element of memory would necessarily have its own verbal expression. In consequence, without exact co-reference between perceptible data of experience and verbal symbols no perception would be possible.

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Above remarks about conceptual character of perception in Akalaṅka's thought hold true in the case of all conventional varieties of perception. A separate, though related question is whether Akalaṅka consistently ascribed conceptual character to all other kinds of perception as well, especially to the highest form of perception proper (*mukhya-pratyakṣa*), viz. to absolute knowledge (*kevala-jñāna*), or to two inferior kinds of perception proper (*mukhya-pratyakṣa*), viz. clairvoyance and mind-reading, which corresponded to what other schools would call 'yogin's perception' (*yogi-pratyakṣa*).

As we know, for Diñnāga and Dharmakīrti alike, all subcategories of perception did not differ qualitatively in terms of their non-perceptual character. Diñnāga emphasised that also perception which meditation adepts (yogins) could acquire through their spiritual practices was non-conceptual in character:

'Yogins have the insight into the object as such which (sc. the insight) is unrelated to the spiritual preceptor's account.

Also the seeing of the object as such, in the case of yogins, which (sc. the seeing) is uncontaminated by notions [inculcated] by scriptural testimony is perception.'⁹⁸

⁹⁷ Compare Anantavīrya's paraphrase, SViṬ *ad loc.*, p. 117.25–26: *nanu maty-ādikaṁ sarvaṁ abhidhāna-puras-saram eva svārthaṁ pratyeti iti śabda-śruta evāntar-bhāvo 'sya.*

⁹⁸ PS₁ / PSV₁ 1.6cd: *rnal 'byor rnam kyī bla mas bstan | ma 'dres pa yi don tsam mihong | | rnal 'byor ba rnam kyis kyang lung las rnam par rtog pa dang ma 'dres pa 'i don tsam mihong ba ni mngon sum mo |* For Sanskrit text see HATTORI (1968: 94, nn. 1.48, 1.49), PS₃ (= DKC, p. 106.1), cf. HAYES (1988: 136, 170, n. 18): *yoginām guru-nirdeśāvyatibhinnārtha-mātra-dṛk // yoginām apy āgama-vikalpāvyavakīrṇam artha-mātra-darśanaṁ pratyakṣam.*

PS 1.6cd is quoted by Akalaṅka in RVār 1.12, p. 54.14.

Dharmakīrti directly referred to this passage in his *Pramāṇa-vārttika* and acknowledged that also such yogic perception, which seems to be ultimate perception in mundane world, is absolutely free of any conceptual inner states and conceptually constructed ideas:

‘[Perceptual] cognition of yogins was described before [by Dīnnāga]. This (i.e. perception) of these (i.e. yogins), which arises through meditation [and] in which the net of conceptuality has been shattered off, manifests itself as purely lucid.’⁹⁹

It would, therefore, be highly interesting whether Akalaṅka considered that, like all conventional perception, also yogic perception is to a certain degree tainted by conceptually constructed forms. That would, however, indicate inconsistencies in his framework in which all perceptions he has discussed so far are conceptual.

Indeed, in his commentary *Rāja-vārttika* on the *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, Akalaṅka, having rejected several definitions of perception (RVār 1.12, p. 53.26 ff.), including that of Dīnnāga, declares in the context of yogic perception that:

‘And also the following is not correct: “There are no entities whose essence is conceptual, there are [only entities] whose essence is non-conceptual”; [it is not correct], because there are no means to comprehend these [non-conceptual entities]. For it is possible to demonstrate that there is no object [which would be] non-conceptual and there is no cognition of such [object]; [it is possible to demonstrate that], because there are no characteristics [on the basis of which one could either see them or infer them].’¹⁰⁰

Subsequently (RVār 1.12, p. 55.5–25), Akalaṅka directly criticises Dīnnāga’s claim that ‘Perception is free from conceptual construction’ (PS 1.3cd), and demonstrates that no direct cognition can exist which is ‘free from conceptual construction’ either completely or in a particular respect (p. 55.9–10: *kiṃ tat sarvathā kalpanāpoḍhaṃ utāho kathamcid*

⁹⁹ PV 2.281:

*prāg-uktaṃ yogināṃ jñānaṃ teṣāṃ tad bhāvanā-mayaṃ /
vidhūta-kalpanā-jālaṃ spaṣṭam evāvabhāsate //*

¹⁰⁰ RVār 1.12 (p. 54.19–21): “*parikalpītmanā na santi bhāvā nirvikalpātmanā santi*”
*iti cāyuktam, tad-adhigamōpāyābhāvāt. na hi nirvikalpo ’rtho ’stī tad-viṣayaṃ jñānaṃ
cēti pratipādayituṃ śakyam lakṣaṇābhāvāt.*

iti). In a slightly different context, he adds that: ‘[Ultimate] perception, [which is acquired] independently of sense organs and the mind [and which is] free of deviation, is the seeing of definite contents.’¹⁰¹ This also supports the hypothesis that Akalaṅka consistently regarded all kinds of perception to be conceptual.

However, Diṅnāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s description of yogic perception the validity of which Akalaṅka explicitly rejected (RVār 1.12) brings to light a highly significant evidence. In his commentary (RVār 1.12, p. 54.14), Akalaṅka directly quotes PS 1.6cd and makes reference to Dharmakīrti’s commentary on it (PV 2.281), which features a crucial term: ‘[Perceptual] cognition of yogins ... manifests itself as purely *lucid*’ (*yoginām jñānam ... spaṣṭam evāvabhāsate*). Even though Akalaṅka repudiates Dharmakīrti’s claim that also perception of yogins is completely non-conceptual, this passage as well as the verses that follow (e.g. PV 2.284: *spaṣṭābham nirvikalpaṁ ca bhāvanā-bala-nirmitam*)—and which were certainly known to him—may have been the inspiration for Akalaṅka to introduce the criterion of lucidity or clarity into his definition of perception.

— 12 —


We should now examine how far Prabhācandra’s solution (*Interpretation 3*, p. 5, n. 6) differs from Akalaṅka’s model, and with what aim he offered his own interpretation of LT 10cd–11ab. He classifies all processes enumerated in TS 1.13 (p. 7), viz. sensuous cognition, memory, recognitive cognition, inductive thinking and determined cognition, as types of indirect cognition. In this, he follows Umāsvāmin’s classification (TS 9–12), who indeed reckoned them as types of *parokṣa*, insofar as they were the stages of sensuous cognition (*matī-jñāna*), which was traditionally also classified as indirect cognition. In this way, Prabhācandra proves to be closer to earlier Jaina tradition.

For Prabhācandra perception (*pratyakṣa*) was a clear and lucid cognition as well as completely pre-verbal, although in part accompanied by mental conceptualisation and related to conceptually constructed ideas. Indirect cognition was, on the other hand, divided into two subcategories: strictly non-verbal cognition and verbal cognition:

¹⁰¹ RVār 1.12 (p. 53.4): *indriyānidriyānapekṣam atīta-vyabhicāraṁ sākāra-grahaṇam pratyakṣam*.

<i>pratyakṣa</i> (perception)		<i>parokṣa</i> (indirect cognition)	
	<i>viśada</i> (clear)		<i>aviśada</i> (unclear)
	<i>aśābda</i> (non-verbal)	<i>aśābda</i> (non-verbal)	<i>śābda</i> (verbal)
<i>akalpita</i> (non-conceptual)	<i>kalpita</i> (conceptual)		<i>kalpita</i> (conceptual)

How Prabhācandra's alterations changed the general classification of cognitively valid procedures, adopted by Akalaṅka, can be shown in Model 4 below:



Model 4

The manner in which Prabhācandra reads into Akalaṅka's statements his own concepts does not essentially diverge from the manner in which Akalaṅka himself radically modified earlier Jaina tradition. In terms of historical development of Indian philosophy there was nothing surprising neither about Akalaṅka nor about Prabhācandra. Their manoeuvres were in agreement with general spirit of Indian philosophical tradition: novelties were introduced in disguise of earlier terminology, as faithful expositions of the earlier masters' thought.

How such interpretations may have eventually wiped out the legacy of the preceptor whose works underwent such a thoroughgoing interpretative treatment can best be illustrated by the relation between Dharmakīrti and Diñnāga. In contradistinction to that, Prabhācandra's commentary did not override Akalaṅka's oeuvre.

As we could see from the above, the development of Jaina epistemology closely followed innovations in the Buddhist *pramāṇa* tradition. Dharmakīrti and Diñnāga seem to be primary adversaries who triggered Akalaṅka's criticism and provoked him to reformulate several of his concepts. The influence the Buddhist philosophers exercised on Akalaṅka and other prominent Jaina thinkers was undeniable. That should not however lead one to believe that Akalaṅka's thought was somehow inferior to the sources of his intellectual inspiration, certainly not less than Diñnāga's or Dharmakīrti's systems who ingeniously applied for instance Bhartṛhari's ideas in their original philosophical edifice. Akalaṅka availed himself of borrowed ideas in a highly creative, sophisticated and independent manner; his categorisations of cognitive phenomena were penetrating and his analysis of epistemological questions were very subtle. What is important to realise is that Akalaṅka—as any genuine philosopher and ingenious thinker—was a part not only of a his own doctrinal tradition, but also, to the same degree, of Indian philosophical heritage which included also Buddhist thought.

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- NB = Dharmakīrti: *Nyāya-bindu*. See: DhPr.
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