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IS ‘INEXPLICABILITY OTHERWISE’ (*ANYATHĀNUPAPATTI*)
OTHERWISE INEXPLICABLE?

In the 8th century we can observe a sudden change in the Jaina epistemology. This was brought about by the introduction of a new model of inference (*anumāna*), based on a new interpretation of the logical reason (*hetu*). The logical reason has been from now on defined as ‘inexplicability otherwise’ (*anyathānupapatti*, *anyathānupapannatva*), and its sole feature is its inseparable connection (*avinābhāva*) with the inferable property (*sādhyā*), which is known through suppositional knowledge (*tarka*, *ūha*). This triple innovation are found in Siddhasena Mahāmāti’s *Nyāyāvatāra*¹, Akalañka’s *Laghīyas-traya*², Vidyānanda’s *Yukty-anuśāsana-ṭīkā*³ and in Māñikyanandin’s *Parīkṣāmukha-sūtra*⁴, just to mention but a few.

1. Pātrasvāmin, the innovator?

The way (i.e. with the word *īritam*) Siddhasena Mahāmāti in his *Nyāyāvatāra* (which would seem at first to be the original source) refers to the idea of *anyathānupapatti* indicates that he was not the innovator (NA 22ab: *anyathānupapannatvaṃ hetor lakṣaṇam īritam /*). These innovations go back to a certain Pātrasvāmin⁵, as it is attested by Śāntarakṣita, who mentions a Pātrasvāmin as the source of the idea, see TSa (1).1364 (p. 405.1): *anyathēty-ādinā pātrasvāmi-matam āśaṅkate...* Apparently the treatise in question is the lost *Tri-lakṣaṇa-kadārthana*⁶, conceived to refute the Buddhist idea of *tri-lakṣaṇa-hetu*,⁷ and apparently the only available fragments of the work are to be found in *Tattva-saṅgraha* 1364–1379 (pp. 405–407).

[1364] If “inexplicability otherwise” is there, then [the logical reason] is seen to be the correct logical reason; if it is not present, then also the triple [logical reason] is not [the correct logical reason]. Therefore, the three characteristics [of the logical reason] are impotent.

[1365] What possesses “inexplicability otherwise” is accepted as [the correct] logical reason. This [correct logical reason] is something possessed of one characteristic [only], not [something] possessed of four characteristics or of any other [number].

[1367] The relation of inseparable connection is not at all [present] in the tree forms of [the logical reason]; [the relation] is observed exclusively in

- logical reasons that possess [only] one constitutive element [in the form] of “impossibility otherwise” (= “inexplicability otherwise”).
- [1368] Only that which possesses “inexplicability otherwise” is the [proper] logical reason. [It does not matter if] both types of the example can be [cited] or not, because [the example] is not any basis [for inference].
- [1369] Where there is no “inexplicability otherwise”, what is the need of the triplet [of characteristics the logical reason]? Where there is “inexplicability otherwise”, what is the need of the triplet [of characteristics the logical reason]?
- [1371] As regards this, the logical reason which is possessed of one characteristic is free from two types of the example: [somehow] existence and non-existence consist in being (are real in a qualified sense), because they are somehow comprehended. ...
- [1379] Therefore let first of all the logical reason be for us that which leads to the comprehension⁸; but what is the use [of other pointless conditions of the logical reason] falsely conceived [by others], such as the presence of a property in the locus, etc.?!⁹

A number of examples of valid inference, offered by Pātrasvāmin, are meant to demonstrate that we *can* infer correctly, even though none or some of the *trairūpya*-conditions are not fulfilled:

- 1) only the condition of *pakṣa-dharmatā* (inherence of a property in the locus) is satisfied, but there are no positive (*anvaya*) and negative (*vyatireka*) instantiations of the logical reason in the form of *sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta* or *vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta* respectively (TSa 1371);
- 2) no example based on similarity (*sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta*) can be cited (TSa 1372–4, 1377);
- 3) no example based on dissimilarity (*vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta*) can be cited (TSa 1375–6);
- 4) the condition of *pakṣa-dharmatā* is not fulfilled (TSa 1378).

Moreover, according to Pātrasvāmin the inference can be invalid, even though it fulfils the three conditions of valid logical reason (*trairūpya*), which is exemplified by the case of the fallacious proof: ‘*x* is dark-complexioned, because *x* is the son of *y*, like the other *y*’s sons’ (TSa 1371ab: *sa śyāmas tasya putratvād dṛṣṭāḥ śyāmā yathētare*)^{10 11}.

It is not important whether these verses are exact quotations or not. What is decisive is that at least the *ideas* the verses quoted in TSa express are (1) authentic and (2) ascribed to a particular representative of Jaina tradition prior to Śāntaraṣṭita and Kamalaśīla.

On the other hand, even though Śāntaraṣṭita and Kamalaśīla do not always offer quotations in the form we know them from extant text editions,¹² their account is as a rule quite faithful to the original ideas. That Śāntaraṣṭita’s account seems authentic—at least when it comes to the essence, not necessarily to the wording—is corroborated by at least three factors:

- 1) At least one of the verses (TSa 1369) is quoted in other works as well,¹³
- 2) Kamalaśīla in his *Pañjikā* on TSa 1369 explicitly mentions that Śāntarakṣita interchanged the *pādas* ab with cd (p. 406.7: *anyathānupapannatvaṃ yatrēty asyānantaram nānyathānupapannēty asyārdhasya pāthah kartavyaḥ*);
- 3) Furthermore, the ideas ascribed by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla to Pātrasvāmin are in complete agreement with Jaina accounts that *directly* follow Pātrasvāmin (e.g. NA, LT, YAṬ, for details see below) as well as with later elucidations¹⁴ pertaining to the issue of *anyathānupapatti* and *trairūpya*.

Even if Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla alter slightly the wording, their account seems very reliable. Methodologically, in my examination I shall never refer to Pātrasvāmin's account in TSa alone. Instead Pātrasvāmin's ideas found in TSa will always be additionally supported by 'authenticated' Jaina sources.

Some features in Pātrasvāmin's model of logic in the above account, based on 'inexplicability otherwise', deserve special emphasis:

- 1) There is no need for any additional characteristic of the logical reason other than *anyathānupapatti*;
- 2) No additional instantiation (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) is necessary to have valid inference (TSa 1368);
- 3) The definition of 'inexplicability otherwise' as *impossibility* in any other way: *anyathānupapatti* = *anyathāsambhāva* (TSa 1367c);
- 4) The correlation of the notion of 'inexplicability otherwise' (*anyathānupapatti*) with the relation of the inseparable connection (*avinābhāva*) (TSa 1367), which is the inseparable connection of the logical reason with the inferable property (*sādhyāvinābhāva*).

I do not intend to evaluate the idea of 'inexplicability otherwise' and its logical rigidity or to demonstrate how far it was accurate or inaccurate, or logically sound or not. My intention is to show how this concept developed and what motives prompted Pātrasvāmin and other Jaina logicians to introduce it.

2. *Anyathānupapatti*

Let us first analyse some other earliest Jaina accounts of the notion of *anyathānupapatti*.

A series of the *kārikās* of *Nyāyāvatāra* (c. 620–800) are in agreement with other accounts:

- '(5) Inference is regarded traditionally to determine the probandum on account of the inferential sign, which is inseparably connected with the probandum. ... (13) Such an utterance that demonstrates the logical reason as inseparably connected with the probandum is the inference

for others, whose essence are propositions, like the thesis, etc. ...
(22) The definition of the logical reason has been proclaimed [to be] the inexplicability otherwise ...¹⁵

Akalaṅka (8th century) in his *Laghīyas-traya* characterises the basis for inference as follows:

‘Inference is the comprehension of the sign-possessor through the inferential sign, which has [as its] the sole characteristic the determined cognition of [its] inseparable connection with the inferable property. Its result is “the faculty of avoidance etc.”^{16,17}

And he adds in his auto-commentary:

‘For it is impossible to know the relation of essential identity and relation of causality without the suppositional knowledge of “inexplicability otherwise”; [and] because [the logical reason is also operative] precisely without these two [relations of essential identity and of causality], this is the proof that [the logical reason] has a sole characteristic. For a tree etc. [inferred on the basis of its shadow] is neither the essential nature nor the effect of the shadow etc.’¹⁸

Vidyānanda (c. 850) also avails himself of the idea of *anyathānupapatti* in his *Yukty-anuśāsana-ṭīkā*, while commenting on Samantabhadra’s *Yukty-anuśāsana*¹⁹:

‘And accordingly, what [Samantabhadra] revealed [in the verse] amounts to the following: the persuasion [based on] logical reasoning (*sc. anumāna*) is the description (*sc. comprehension*) of the object to-be-inferred on the basis of the logical reason the characteristic of which is the determination of the invariant rule “inexplicability otherwise”. [This is so] because what is not contradicted by what is perceived or by testimony [would] otherwise [be] inexplicable. The above has been determined adequately enough²⁰ in holy scriptures etc.’²¹

All the above accounts of Pātrasvāmin, Akalaṅka, Siddhasena Mahāmati and Vidyānanda are unanimous as regards at least two crucial point points:

- 1) The correct logical reason has only one defining characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*), which is a single notion of ‘inexplicability otherwise’ (*anyathānupapatti*) (TSa 1364d, TSa 1365c, TSa 1379, LTV 2.12, NA 22ab);
- 2) The logical reason (*hetu*) is based on the relation of the inseparable connection (*avinābhāva*) (TSa 1367, NA 5a, NA 13a, LT 2.11c, TSVA p. 203²²), which is the inseparable connection of the logical reason with the inferable property (*sādhvāvinābhāva*).
- 3) Occasionally we also find the idea that valid inference requires no instantiation (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) (TSa 1368, NA 20²³ and LT 2.16, however absent in YAṬ).

Since Pātrasvāmin, Akalaṅka, Siddhasena Mahāmati and Vidyānanda avail themselves of well-established terms familiar from other systems,

the Jaina idea of inference must clearly have been conceived after the triple condition of validity of the logical reason (*hetu*) and the notion of inseparable connection (*avinâbhāva*) had been formulated by Diñnāga. Furthermore, they could not have failed to know the Mīmāṃsaka usage of *anyathânupapatti*.

The term *anyathânupapatti* is by no means a Jaina invention, and it is generally associated with presumption (*arthâpatti*), the fifth cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*), accepted by the Mīmāṃsaka. *Locus classicus* for the idea is Śabara's commentary:

'Also presumption [is a cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*); it is] an assumption of [another] object [in the form]: "an object either seen or heard is not explicable otherwise." For instance, as regards Devadatta, who is alive, the assumption of [his] being outside, which is unseen, on the basis of seeing his absence at home.'²⁴

Kumārila specifies:

'A case [of reasoning] in which an object, which [is already] known through [any of] the six cognitive criteria, could not occur otherwise, [and on the basis of it] another unseen [object] is assumed, is called presumption.'²⁵

The similarity between the Mīmāṃsaka notion of presumption and Jaina notion of is 'inexplicability otherwise' not only superficial, based on the occurrence of the same expression *anyathânupapatti*. There are some deeper similarities.

According to the Mīmāṃsaka, in *arthâpatti* we presume either some other object (Śabara: *artha-kalpanā*) or something unseen (Kumārila: *adr̥ṣṭam kalpayed anyam*) on the basis of something grasped directly (by perception—Śabara: *dr̥ṣṭaḥ*) or indirectly (by testimony—Śabara: *śrutaḥ*), or on the basis of any valid piece of knowledge we have (Kumārila: *pramāṇa-ṣaṭka-vijñāto 'rhaḥ*), because we could not *otherwise* explain the situation we are confronted with.

In the section on *anumāna*, Akalaṅka says²⁶:

'[Even] common people [not to mention the experts!] comprehend the absence of invisible [events, grasp the existence of] consciousness of other people etc.²⁷ either through their form (sc. on the basis of symptoms that accompany such events) or through their dissimilarity (sc. contrary symptoms), because [these events are] otherwise inexplicable.'²⁸

In *Nyāya-kumuda-candra*, Prabhācandra explains that even ordinary people infer things which they do not perceive directly, such as imperceptible things, consciousness of other people, both other people's mental disorders (lit. 'possession by ghosts', *bhūta-graha*) and physical diseases *on the basis of something directly perceived*, i.e. from

symptoms sensed directly such as fever etc., the presence of which is not explicable without assuming those unseen events.²⁹

This idea is also expressed by Siddharṣiṅgi. According to him we can infer whether a creature is alive or dead—i.e. we are able to conclude that the material body of a creature is inhabited by the soul, *jīva*, that is imperceptible, or not—³⁰on the basis of external symptoms:

‘... It is an empirical fact that [a person can be] known [to be] alive or dead—even though there is no (lit., ‘there might be the harm of’) perception that [could] grasp directly the living element (*sc.* soul)—due to presence or absence, [respectively,] of [such] characteristic marks of the living element [like] breathing-in and breathing-out, etc.; these characteristic marks are concluded with [the help of the relation of] the inexplicability otherwise in all cases. Otherwise [that would lead to] the undesired consequence that no everyday practice [could] take place among people^{31, 32}

Another similarity between the Mīmāṃsaka and the Jaina accounts is that the basis for inferring something beyond our perceptive reach is something else grasped either through perception or through testimony.³³

Presuming something unseen or unspoken on the basis of something seen or heard is certainly not the sole invention of the Mīmāṃsaka, for we find it in the Nyāya tradition³⁴ as well, but also much earlier in *Kauṭīliya-artha-śāstra*:

‘Something unspoken which is arrived at through the meaning (or, rather more general: due to circumstances), that is presumption.’³⁵

That is why this feature, viz. acquiring knowledge of something beyond our senses on the basis of any valid piece of available evidence, does not prove that there is any direct link between the Jainas and the Mīmāṃsā. In fact, presumptive model seems to be quite a natural element of our reasoning, naturally embedded in our language and argumentation.³⁶

However, the fact that the Mīmāṃsaka and Jaina use of the term *anyathānupapatti* is not coincidental is confirmed by a series of similar examples of reasoning which we find both in MŚV, either as untypical (i.e. lacking *pakṣa-dharmatā*, *sapakṣa* or *vipakṣa*) cases of inference (*anumāna*) or as instances of presumption (*arthāpatti*), and in Jaina sources, as instances of inference (*anumāna*) based on ‘inexplicability otherwise’ (*anyathānupapatti*):

1) From the rise of the constellation of *Kṛttika* we infer the rise of another constellation: MŚV 5.4 (*Anumāna-pariccheda*) 13ab (p. 249): *kṛttikōdayam ālakṣya rohiny-āsatti-klptivat* (an instance of inference concerning individual cases, see n. 72), LT 2.14 (p. 459):

bhaviṣyat pratipadyeta śakaṭam kṛttikōdayāt, NAV 5.2: *kṛttikōdayāc chakaṭōdayam*.

- 2) On the basis of linguistic convention that stipulates that any word that is synonymous to ‘*candra*’, e.g. ‘the natural satellite of the earth’, refers to the moon, one infers that the moon is spoken of, or else one knows that, say, ‘the natural satellite of the earth’ is not something which is different from the moon: MŚV 5.4 (*anumāna-pariccheda*) 64cd-65ab (p. 261): *candra-śabdābhidheyatvam śaśino yo niṣedhati // sa sarva-loka-siddhena candra-jñānena bādhyate /*, and TSa 1372 (‘Pātrasvāmin’s section’): *candratvenāpadiṣṭatvān nācandraḥ śaśa-lāñchanaḥ /*.
- 3) When we determine that a particular person is in a particular place on the basis of one of his aspects (e.g. voice), we infer that he is nowhere else: MŚV 5.7 (*arthāpatti-pariccheda*) 46 (p. 327): *puruṣasya tu kārtsnyena yad ekatrōpalambhanam / tasyānyathā na siddhiḥ syād ity anyeṣv asya nāstītā //* — ‘But if there is perception of a man as a whole in one particular place, it is proved that he cannot be otherwise; hence [we infer] his absence in other [places],’ as well as MŚV 5.4 (*anumāna-pariccheda*) 66cd-67ab (p. 261), TSa 1377: *tvadīyo vā pitātrāsti veśmanīti avagamyate bhāvātka-pitṛ-śabdasya śravaṇād iha sadātmani*.
- 4) Such things as words or lamps, etc., have communicative or revealing power (*jñāpaka*, *abhidhāyaka*): MŚV 5.4 (*anumāna-pariccheda*) 67d (p. 261): *śabde cānabhidhāyake //*, TSa 1378 (‘Pātrasvāmin’s section’): *anyathānupapattiyāva śabda-dīpādī-vastuṣu ... drṣṭā jñāpakatā*.

The above list does not exhaust all instances of reasoning considered in Jaina sources to be valid despite the fact that they do not satisfy one or all validity conditions of the logical reason, i.e. they lack either *pakṣa-dharmatā*, *sapakṣa* or *vipakṣa*, or all. The list can easily be extended:

- 1) ‘From [the reflection of] the moon in the water [we infer] the moon in the sky’ (NAV 5.2: *jala-candrān nabhaś-candraṃ*, LT 2.13cd, p. 450);
- 2) ‘From one blossoming mango-tree [in the proper season we infer] that all mango-trees are blossoming’ (NAV 5.2: *puṣpītāka-cūtāt puṣpītāśeṣa-cūtān*; cf n. 11 above);
- 3) ‘From the rise of the moon, [we infer] the opening of clusters of *kumuda* white water lilies’ (NAV 5.2: *candrōdayāt kumudākara-prabodham*; cf. n. 11 above);
- 4) ‘From a tree [we infer its] shadow’ (NAV 5.2: *vṛkṣāc chāyām*, LTV 2.11cd–12ab; cf. n. 11 above);
- 5) ‘[Somehow] existence and non-existence consist in being (*sc.* they both are real in a qualified sense), because they are somehow comprehended’ (TSa 1371);
- 6) We infer that our skin has got in contact with an insect or a mosquito on the basis of a sensation, the bite (TSa 1373: *pata-kīṭa-kṛtēyam me vedanā*);
- 7) From the perception of a visible thing as an effect of the operation of seeing which takes place in the eye, we infer that the eye possesses the exclusive capacity to perceive (TSa 1374: *caḥṣū rūpa-grahe*

kārye sadātīśaya-sāktimat / tasmin vyāpāryamāṇatvāt yadi vā tasya darśanāt //);

- 8) Since perceptible and imperceptible objects such as a pot or the soul are sometimes invisible, such as a non-existent donkey's horn, one can argue that in a way they are likewise non-existent (TSa 1375: *kathañcid asad-ātmāno yadi vātma-ghaṭādayaḥ / kathañcin nōpalabhyatvāt khara-sāmbandhi-śṛṅgavat //*);
- 9) Since non-existent objects, such as a hare's horn, can be somehow comprehended (e.g. we can formulate their idea or they can be expressed in language), like the soul of a pot, one can argue that they are also in a way existent (TSa 1376: *kathañcana sad-ātmānaḥ śaśa-śṛṅgādayo 'pi ca / kathañcid upalabhyatvād yathāvātma-ghaṭādayaḥ //*);
- 10) The sun will rise tomorrow (LT 2 14cd).

We also have a case of a reasoning which is invalid despite the fact that it satisfies the *trairūpya*, which is not found in the early Mīmāṃsā literature, viz. TSa 1371ab³⁷.

Interestingly, Kumāriḷa himself emphasises that all the *implied* instances of genuine *anumāna* mentioned in MŚV 5.4 (*anumāna-pariccheda*) 66–68 (p. 261) are valid *because of* presumption (*arthāpatti*), that rests on the principle of 'inexplicability otherwise' (*anyathānupapatti*): *bādhas tatrāthāpattito bhavet*. Furthermore, the inferences *implied* by Kumāriḷa in MŚV 5.4.66–68 are meant to refute invalid cases of reasoning expressed in the verses, for instance: the reasoning 'Caitra is not outside, because he is not in the house' (MŚV 5.4.66cd-67ab); 'fire does not burn' (MŚV 5.4.67c)³⁸; 'the word has no denotative capacity' (MŚV 5.4.67d); 'non-existence of the hearing faculty' (MŚV 5.4.68a); 'the [verbal] proof of impermanence of words' (MŚV.5.4.68b). Moreover, to close the chapter on presumption (*arthāpatti-pariccheda*), after having offered a few examples of *arthāpatti*, Kumāriḷa explicitly links the notion of presumption to that of inference:

'[In all above mentioned instances] there is no observation of [any inferential] relation whatsoever. Hence all these and other [cases] would be unsound, if this [presumption] were not different from inference. If [presumption] having such a nature would assume the name of inference, we do not mind, if [you] wish.'³⁹

We can easily see that the Jaina exposition of *anumāna* resembles to a certain degree the Mīmāṃsaka notion of *arthāpatti*. The similarities of expression and structure of arguments make it highly plausible that the Mīmāṃsaka paved the way for the development of the Jaina innovation.

Now, how should we precisely understand the (Jaina) expression *anyathānupapatti*? One of numerous replies is found in NKC p. 449.10–12 *ad* LT 2.12:

sādhyābhāva-prakāreṇa anyathā yā anupapattiḥ aghaṭanā sādhanasya tasyāḥ sambandhī grāhakaiva tarkaḥ ...—

—‘By assuming the absence of the inferable property, i.e. “otherwise”; such inexplicability, i.e. inconceivability,⁴⁰ of the logical reason; related to this [inexplicability]—as that which grasps [inexplicability]—is suppositional knowledge...’

And this brings in another important element entailed by the concept of ‘inexplicability otherwise’, viz. the suppositional knowledge (*tarka*).

3. *Sādhyāvinābhāva*

Like many others, the Jainas were convinced that not all knowledge they had could be derived either through experience (*pratyakṣa*) or through extrapolation from individual experience (*anumāna*). Moreover, they must have been aware that much of their scriptural knowledge (*āgama*) could be censured as a matter of ungrounded belief by non-believers. That is why Jaina thinkers already at an earliest stage attempted to combine inference (*anumāna*) with testimony (*āgama*) into a category of indirect perception (*parokṣa*), which found also its ethical dimension in combining knowledge, conation and conduct.⁴¹ This was probably the same fear that we find with Bhartṛhari⁴² and others contemptuous of reasoning and reasoners⁴³. The fear was also that things vary due to their various conditions, place and time, and accordingly everything by nature would be susceptible to relativism, if we were to rely on pure reasoning.⁴⁴ Furthermore, it would be impossible to reach agreement on interpersonal level, or even subjective certainty, if we were to rely on our reason alone.⁴⁵ Also the suppositional knowledge (*tarka*, *vitarka*, *ūha*), which warrants the reliability of inference, could be censured by opponents as ungrounded belief: ‘[The claim] that “the cognition of the inseparable connection is based on the presumptive knowledge” is also a mere belief.’⁴⁶

What was necessary was an invariant rule that would guarantee reliability and certainty of inferences. The Buddhist theory of inference based on three conditions of validity (*trairūpya*) and on two relations of essential identity (*tādātmya*) and relation of causality (*tad-utpatti*) as the basis for the logical reason⁴⁷ proved insufficient for two reasons. It suffered from the fault of over-extension (*ativyāpti*), because it also embraced such cases that did satisfy all the *trairūpya* conditions but were fallacious (*alakṣya-vṛtti*),⁴⁸ as well as from the fault of under-

extension (*avyāpti*), because it did not comprise all valid cases but only some (*lakṣyātkadeśāvṛtti*).⁴⁹ The query was also how one can infer from individual cases (the problem of induction) or about individual cases (*kevala-vyatirekin* cases), which are uninstantiated except for the subject of inference.⁵⁰ This also entailed the problem of universally present properties (*kevalānvayin*), much debated in *Navya-nyāya*, and the problem of inferences that do not satisfy the first condition of the property present in the locus of inference (*pakṣa-dharmatā*), e.g. the case of the constellations of *Kṛttika* and *Śakaṭa / Rohiṇi*.⁵¹

The Mīmāṃsaka solution was not satisfactory, in as much as it took recourse, beside the *vyāpti* relation, to the presence of the property in the locus of inference (*pakṣa-dharmatā*)⁵², which the Jainas considered faulty⁵³.

The Jainas took the Buddhist relation of *avinābhāva* instead⁵⁴:

hetu is necessarily related to (does not deviate from) *sādhya*, or
sādhya-avinā hetu-abhāva.

In other words:

‘*x* extrapolates *y*, in case there is no *x* without *y*’,⁵⁵ or
y-avinā x-abhāva.⁵⁶

However, they remodelled it, so that it required not additional positive (*anvaya*) or negative (*vyatireka*) instantiations. For Dinnāga this was ‘a “no counter-example” relation’^{57, 58}. In this context, Prabhācandra refers to an interesting objection:

‘This expression of the inseparable connection states that if there is no occurrence of inferable property, there is no occurrence of logical reason; therefore this is merely an expression of the negative concomitance, but not an expression of the relation.’⁵⁹

Prabhācandra’s reply runs as follows:

‘...The expression of the inseparable connection is not restricted only to the negative concomitance, because of the undesired consequence that—even if there was no pot etc.—this [relation would still be] operative. But it is an expression of the relation. And this relation is determined through two modes: [either] by explicability in this way or inexplicability otherwise. Hence both these [modes] are expressed through the expression of the inseparable connection: “wherever there is smoke, there is fire; where there is no fire, there is no smoke either.” Now [this can be objected as follows:] “How can it be known that «where there is no fire, there is no smoke either»? Since smoke is invariantly not cognised when there is no fire, then only if this [fire] is present, that [smoke] can be there. Otherwise just like even though smoke is not present, in some cases fire is perceived, in the same way if the fire is not present, smoke would be perceived in some cases. If *x* is

not inexplicable without y , then x is not invariantly related to y , just like even if smoke is not present, fire is perceived [because] it is not invariantly related to smoke; but smoke is inexplicable without fire; therefore this [smoke] is invariantly related to fire.’⁶⁰

Even though this quotation is of later origin, its contents is very similar to, for instance, NAV 17.1⁶¹ and NAV 18.1, as well as to *Parikṣāmukha-sūtra*⁶², and the detailed expressions of Prabhācandra can easily be derived from such statements which we find in NA 17⁶³.

We find another explanation of the *avinābhāva*-rule in NKC:

‘ x occurs only when y is there, hence it does occur otherwise [i.e. if there is no y , x does not occur].’⁶⁴

Conspicuously, the functioning of the relation of *avinābhāva* is here directly linked to the idea of *anyathānupapatti*.

Historically speaking, there still can be some doubt what different authors considered to be *vyāpti*?⁶⁵ Was it *avinābhāva* or *anyathānupapatti*? Certainly, in most cases I have examined *vyāpti* is considered to be *avinābhāva*. NA 22ab is clear enough that *anyathānupapannatva* is *hetor lakṣaṇam*, and similarly, Pātrasvāmin (TSa 1364–5) takes *anyathānupapannatva* to replace *tri-lakṣaṇāḥ*, hence the *vyāpti* for them is *avinābhāva*. Akalaṅka himself (LT 2.12cd) as well as his tradition follows the same line⁶⁶. The only exception seems to be Vidyānanda. The expression *niyama* is generally taken to mean *vyāpti*, especially in the Mīmāṃsā tradition⁶⁷, but also among the Jainas⁶⁸ or Buddhists⁶⁹, and therefore Vidyānanda’s usage (YAṬ ad YA 49, p. 122.20–123.2: *tathā cānyathānupapannatva-niyama-niścaya-lakṣaṇāt sādhanāt*—‘the logical reason the characteristic of which is the determination of the invariant rule “inexplicability otherwise”’; see n. 21) implies that he apparently equates *vyāpti* with *anyathānupapannatva*. The interpretation depends on how we construe the compound *anyathānupapannatva-niyama*, which I would naturally construe as a *karma-dhāraya* (*anyathānupapannatvaṃ niyamaḥ*). Only if we took the compound to be a *tat-puruṣa* (*anyathānupapannatvāt niyamaḥ*), we could infer that Vidyānanda was no exception.

A question arises whether what the principle of ‘inexplicability otherwise’ amounts to is our inability to offer any other explanation of a particular event apart from the one to which we find no other alternative? In other words, does *anyathānupapatti* express that out of a range of possible explanations of a particular event we chose the one which still remains unfalsified after we have eliminated all other rival answers that have proved unsatisfactory? That would be tantamount to saying that by *anyathānupapatti* we choose the solution which we are only able to conceive of, but this solution does not have to be the

correct one: we may simply not know the proper answer, and the answer we favour has so far not been falsified. The implication would be that the rule of ‘inexplicability otherwise’ merely points to most likely answers and expresses probability, but warrants no certainty. This is precisely what would seem the case to be at this stage of analysis. To overcome the problem of mere likelihood, the Jaina logicians had to combine it with an invariant relation, viz. that of *avinābhāva*, that aimed at revealing not only the most probable but also the only legitimate explanation, thus securing the veracity of our cognitions.

4. *Tarka*

The Jainas had now the new logical reason (*hetu*). Its sole defining characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) was ‘inexplicability otherwise’ (*anyathānupapatti*), which replaced the three characteristics of the *hetu*. The invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*), or the invariant rule (*niyama*, *sambandha*) which relates the inferable property (*sādhya*) and the logical reason (*sādhana*), assumed, in its turn, the role of inseparable connection (*avinābhāva*), and thus it replaced the idea of the Buddhist relations of essential identity (*tādātmya*) and of causality (*tad-utpatti*).

Then another problem arose: how can we know the *avinābhāva* relation with certainty, ‘because just by seeing [two things] together in some cases it is not proved that one [of them] does not occur without the other one in all cases’⁷⁰? It does not suffice *not* to observe two things together to have negative example, either⁷¹. Like the Buddhists, the Jainas rejected the idea of repeated observation (*bhūyo-darśana*) of either co-presence or co-absence of two particulars as the basis for our inference, propounded by the Mīmāṃsaka⁷², because repeated observation, like repeated practice⁷³, does not warrant any certainty, and as such could not be classified as valid form of inference.

The problem concerns the extrapolation from individual cases to a universal rule:

‘Since inseparable connection is a relation, and it is preceded by grasping two relata, and [these] two relata are two separate particulars, how then it is possible to grasp [their] invariable concomitance as something which applies to everything?’⁷⁴

The Jainas tried to solve the dilemma in the following way:

‘...the invariable concomitance is possible as indeed something which applies to everything [when we take it as a relation that relates] two particulars characterised by (sc. typifying) the universal. Therefore, the fault of infinite regress etc. does not find room here.’⁷⁵

In other words, classes of individuals are tokened by their actual particular representations. This move was possible due to the Jaina ontology that recognised that the notions of the particular and the universal are mutually dependent⁷⁶, and that ‘manifold particulars are grounded in the universal (homogeneity)’⁷⁷. Accordingly, at the moment of perceiving a particular, we cognise the universal in which this particular is grounded.⁷⁸

But this still does not solve the question how to know that two separate universal-tokened particulars are related in a necessary way. Repeated observation (*bhūyo-darśana*) does not suffice, because it entails a number of problems, pertaining both to the issue of universally binding validity and to the possible method of arriving at such an extrapolation.⁷⁹ We cannot know the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) either by *pratyakṣa*—one of the reasons is that the *vyāpti* associates different times and places, which is impossible in case of *pratyakṣa*—⁸⁰ or by *anumāna*, because that would lead to the faults of mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*), lack of foundation (*anavasthā*) or *regressus ad infinitum*⁸¹. The conclusion is that we must accept a special cognitive criterion called *tarka* to be able to cognise the *vyāpti*. Both the criticism and the conclusion are stated by Akalaṅka *Laghīyas-traya* in the verse 2.11cd–12ab and in his auto-commentary:

‘No inferential sign can be known through non-conceptual comprehension (viz. perception) or through inference, because it is not established; [hence] another cognitive criterion (suppositional knowledge, *tarka*) is immediately [called for].

For perception is not capable of carrying out such operations as for instance: “a particular smoke is an effect of nothing else but some fire at some other time and some other place, not [an effect] of any other thing,” because [perception] cannot examine [things], insofar as it arises by force of proximate things. Neither [can this be accomplished by] inference, because there is no difference with regard to all cases (*sc.* levels) [of inference]⁸², for—if the invariable concomitance between the inferential sign and the sign-possessor is not established as a whole—there cannot be anything like inference with regard to anything. It is not correct to say that there is no non-perceptual cognitive criterion which different from inference, because the faculty of comprehending the inferential sign is another cognitive criterion.’⁸³

What is meant here is the suppositional knowledge (*tarka*), being only a subdivision of the indirect cognition (*parokṣa*),⁸⁴ one of two main types of cognitive criteria (*pramāṇa*) recognised by the Jainas, which replaces the knowledge based on *tādātmya* and *tad-utpatti* (LTV 2.12cd–13.ab: ‘it is impossible to know the relation of essential identity and relation of causality without the suppositional knowledge of “inexplicability otherwise”’, see p. 4 and n. 18). Suppositional

knowledge warrants the reliability and certitude of inference, because it is maintained to be capable of legitimate extrapolation beyond the present instant.⁸⁵

Further, Akalaṅka states that

‘Observation of one [thing] *without reflection* does not show the invariable concomitance of the logical reason with the inferable property; [and] this is the suppositional knowledge that has as its object uncognised [things] in their totality.’⁸⁶

The cognising of an uncognised object renders additional support to my claim (p. 5 f.) that there is deeper similarity between the Mīmāṃsā notion of *arthâpatti* and Jaina notion of *anyathânupapatti*.

Still, these descriptions are not sufficient to understand the proper nature of *tarka* (suppositional knowledge), also called *ūha* (presumptive knowledge). More revealing on this point is Siddharṣigaṇi:

‘[Suppositional knowledge] arises in the point of time posterior to [either] perception or non-comprehension, grasps positive concomitance or negative concomitance, is undeviating and its domain pervades the three times, which is based on the sensuous cognition.’⁸⁷

This is in complete agreement with another statements of his:

‘Presumptive knowledge is disposed towards grasping the relation of the inferential sign, characterised by the inexplicability otherwise, with the probandum that cannot be sensed by perception or by inference.’⁸⁸

How this presumptive knowledge (*ūha*), or suppositional knowledge (*tarka*), works—in a twofold manner—is explained by Devabhadra:

‘Presumptive knowledge is the cognition of invariable concomitance by reason of comprehension or non-comprehension, e.g.: *x* occurs only when *y* is there, and [*y*] does not occur only when [*x*] is not there.’⁸⁹

what is in agreement with Prabhācandra⁹⁰.

If we also take into consideration the passage of NKC p. 423.10–424.3 *ad* LT 2.10 (*vide supra*, n. 60), we notice that suppositional knowledge (*tarka*) of the Jaina seems to proceed as follow:

whenever there is *x*, there must be *y* too;
only when there is no *y*, there is no *x*.

Thereafter the *avinâbhāva* relation is established:

x is necessarily related to *y* (*y-avinā x-abhāva*)
[i.e. occurrence of *y* logically follows from the occurrence of *x*, and non-occurrence of *y* logically follows from the non-occurrence of *x*];

and *anyathānupapatti* states:

If there were no *y*, there would be no *x*.

Hence the conclusion:

but there is *x*,
so there must be *y*.

In the reasoning, we presume a counter-thesis contrary to ‘*y* is *P*’ and draw a conclusion that is contradicted by observation or other cognitively valid procedures.

This is not a very different way of reasoning from the *tarka / ūha* recorded in the *Nyāya* tradition:

‘Suppositional knowledge [consists in] presumptive knowledge in order to cognise the truth (*sc.* essence) [of an object]—in [the case of] an object the essence of which is unknown—by explicating [its] causes.’⁹¹

A closer description is found in the *Bhāṣya*:

‘Suppositional knowledge is not reckoned among cognitive criteria, [because] suppositional knowledge is not another cognitive criterion; [it merely] assists cognitive criteria, as an ancillary, to [obtain] the cognition of the truth (*sc.* essence) [of an unknown object. So, here] is an illustration of that [suppositional knowledge]: is this birth (*sc.* mundane existence) brought about by a cause in force or by a [cause] not in force, or [is it] fortuitous? In such a manner proceeds presumptive knowledge with regard to an unknown matter by explicating [its] cause: “If [this birth (*sc.* mundane existence)] [were] brought about by a cause in force, then at the destruction of the cause the destruction of this birth (*sc.* mundane existence) [would] take place. If [this birth (*sc.* mundane existence)] were brought about by a [cause] not in force, then the destruction of this birth (*sc.* mundane existence) [could] not take place [at all], because the destruction of the cause would be impotent. If [this birth (*sc.* mundane existence)] were fortuitous, then the cause of [its] termination would not be explicable, since [this birth (*sc.* mundane existence)], once being fortuitously brought about, would not terminate in its turn; hence [the result would be] the non-destruction of this birth (*sc.* mundane existence)”.’⁹²

Here the reasoning is as follows:

Is *x P* or *R* or ... or *S*?
x is *P* → conclusion is contradicted by observation, inference, etc.
x is *R* → conclusion is contradicted by observation, inference, etc.
x is *S* → conclusion is contradicted by observation, inference, etc.
x ... → conclusion is contradicted by observation, inference, etc.
therefore *x* is *Q*.

Here we draw a series of conclusions that are not contrary, but are various possible solutions to the question. Then we eliminate all

conceivable conclusions but one by showing that they are in the end contradicted this way or another by various cognitive criteria. What remains is the only correct solution left. Not only have we here more than one thesis (x is P , x is R x is S ...), but also we do not presume its counter-thesis (x is non- P).

There seems to be some kind of link between the *tarka* of the Naiyāyika and that of the Jainas. Both the Naiyāyika and the Jainas must have been aware that they apply the same term, but classify it either as an additional tool (*anugrahaka*), which in itself is not a *pramāṇa*, or as a genuine *pramāṇa*. In the light of the passage quoted above from NBh 1.1.1, that claims that *tarka* is not a separate *pramāṇa*, it becomes easier to explain the insistence of Jaina authors on the *tarka*'s status of a separate *pramāṇa*.

5. Conclusion

The question now arises whether my demonstration is based on loose associations and verbal analogies?

Revealing for us would therefore be what the Jainas themselves had to say on this matter. Let me refer to two verses quoted from Jaina sources (unidentified, Pātrasvāmin?) by Kamalaśīla in his *Pañjikā*:

‘Some accept what is not observed in the example without the inferable property to be [the correct] logical reason. However, I [accept] what is impossible in the property-possessor without this [inferable property to be the correct logical reason].

Our inference is accepted as indeed different from the presumption of the Mīmāṃsā school as well as from the inference of the Buddhists, like man-lion.’⁹³

These verses confirm my supposition that the Jaina model of inference evolved as a blend of Mīmāṃsaka and Buddhist ideas. The image of *nara-siṃha* is both different from the man and from the lion, but to have this notion at all, we need essential similarity to both the man and the lion. The Jaina author of these two verses was well aware that the novel model of logic he wanted to apply resembled both Buddhist and Mīmāṃsā models, and therefore he considered it crucial to emphasise the new elements.

In their novel concept of inference, the Jainas combined three elements: (1) *anyathānupapatti* of the Mīmāṃsaka, (2) *avinābhāva* of the Buddhist, and (3) *tarka* of the Naiyāyika. Jokingly we may say that this safeguarded their open attitude in the spirit of *anekānta-vāda*!

It is a matter of sheer speculation at this stage of investigation who was the first to combine and reinterpret various elements into a new

definition of *hetu* and a new framework of *anumāna*, and what motives prompted that shift.

Perhaps the inspiration came from the side of the Sāṃkhya. In the *Yukti-dīpikā*⁹⁴ we come across a highly interesting relevant passage, which only confirms the appositeness of the subtitle of the Wezler–Motegi edition (‘The Most Significant Commentary on the Sāṃkhyakārikā’):

‘This [presumption] is twofold: deviating (fallacious) and undeviating (legitimate). ... The [kind of presumption] which is characterised by inseparable connection and which is undeviating (legitimate) is [merely] inference, for instance: After one has seen a fight between a lion and a boar in vicinity, and after one has seen the lion roaming alone with its body marked with wounds [inflicted] by the boar, it is understood that the boar has been defeated. Why? Because there is an undeviating relation between the victory and defeat in case of the lion and the boar. In this case, if one has seen the victory of the lion, the defeat of the other (viz. the boar) is understood in an undeviating manner. What else could that be except inference?! For – [in case] of someone who understands the association of two related [objects *x* and *y*] that have been comprehended – such an understanding of the related [object] *y* from one [object *x*] of two related [objects *x* and *y*] previously perceived is inference. And accordingly, presumption cannot be different from that [inference].’⁹⁵

This is in all probability the first, historically speaking, extant source in which we find the idea of *arthâpatti* (based on *anyathânupapatti*) combined with the relation of *avinâbhāva* to form a variety of *anumāna*.

We do find another attempt to subsume the *arthâpatti* procedure under the *anumāna* scheme in *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya*:

‘Presumption [derived] from an object of perception is nothing but fallacious. [Presumption derived] from hearing is inference [based] on something inferred.’⁹⁶

It is however very unlikely that this tradition influenced the development of the Jaina concept in question, because we lack here even one of crucial elements (*avinâbhāva* and *tarka*).⁹⁷

Despite serious drawbacks, this was a crucial move: the Jainas claimed to have one invariant relation that allows extrapolation irrespective of whether we could cite any positive instantiations (*sapaḥṣa*) or negative instantiations (*vipaḥṣa*). In general, this invariant relation no longer necessitated empirical exemplification, and tended to become an autonomous logically valid rule, and not merely an extrapolation from experience. Perhaps for the first time in Indian philosophy we can observe a strong tendency to emancipate reasoning from empirical instantiations.

There was a price to pay. The burden of proving the invariability of our assumptions was shifted from the logical reason (*hetu*) onto the suppositional knowledge (*tarka*). The situation did become different though: we no longer had inferential rules and relations (*hetu* and *vyāpti*) that were liable to falsification. Instead, in the Jaina model, we were told to be able to infer by using what was believed to be infallible rules. In this way the question of verification of the logical reason was dissociated from the level of the logical reason. The verificatory principles no longer constituted the nature (*lakṣaṇa*) of the logical reason, but were transferred to the second-level domain of the suppositional knowledge (*tarka*). What remained uncertain were still the methods to know infallible principles on which *tarka* rests.

Consequently, I would view Jaina concept of logic based on the notion of *anyathānupapatti* as an attempt to solve the problem of induction, which is entailed by the generally empirically oriented Indian logic. The problem of induction involves primarily two phases: (1) one has to established an invariant relation between two individual particulars (*viśeṣa*), which typify two classes, and subsequently (2) one has to extrapolate in order to establish a invariant relation between the two typified classes (*sāmānya*). The difficulty is that the two phases are equally defeasible and open to possible revision, if a counter-example obtains, and thereby that contributes to the increase in unreliability of the established relation. From the point of view of Jaina ontology, the two phases merged. We no longer had a two-phased inductive reasoning: by observing a relation between two particulars one instantly could extrapolate to whole classes. As soon as one could establish an invariant relation between two classes, the inference would loose its induction-based deficiency.

A question now arises how far is the distinction between induction and deduction relevant to Indian logic at all. The mere fact that Indian models of inference in general, it seems, resorted to empirical exemplification and left no scope for deductive reasoning would rather speak against deductive character of Indian logic. In Indian logic we link not ideas or propositions, but events. That is why the inductive–deductive distinction seems not at all applicable to the realm of *anumāna*. Where it does seem highly relevant is a kind of ‘meta-*anumāna*’, viz. second-level patterns that underlie first-level patterns of particular cases of *anumāna* that pertain to events. What the Jaina seemed to attempt to achieve was to formulate conditions of validity of patterns of reasoning which we could classify as second-level inference, viz. proper logic where the distinction between inductive and deductive starts to apply. That would be the *anumāna* based on the principles of *avinābhāva* and *anyathānupapatti*, whereas the problem

of traditional first-level *anumāna*, which needs to be inductively instantiated, is shifted to the realm of *tarka*. That is why in my opinion the Jaina solution, albeit unique in India, cannot be deemed successful.

The Jaina verses, allegedly by Pātrasvāmin, quoted from Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā* as well as several other formulations also show that we can dispense with *dr̥ṣṭāntas* because our inference is concerned with the subject alone. This was the next step in the 'economical' trend⁹⁸ to dispense with all unnecessary elements of our reasoning, and it opened a genuine possibility of developing strictly formal logic, in the sense of being independent from circumstances. Mere understanding of the logical rules allows us to infer correctly, without taking recourse to empirical instantiations:

'If a [person] to be taught recollects the logical reason as inseparably connected with the probandum in all cases, how could he then—having [re]cognised this [logical reason] in the thesis—not understand the probandum?'⁹⁹

Additional positive and negative instantiations have no logical or formal value, because the inference is valid anyway.¹⁰⁰

Nonetheless, they do have practical, or didactic value of instruction¹⁰¹. The examples do not fulfil any formal role any longer and they are not necessary to validate the inference: the determination of two properties (*sādhya* and *sādhana*) in the example is already established, hence it can be recalled (*sambandha-smaraṇāt*)¹⁰². That is why the Jainas advise to apply a ten-membered proof formula for educational purposes alone.¹⁰³ However, under certain conditions and provided one remembers the invariant relation, one can argue by applying a single-membered proof formula, that consists of the logical reason alone!¹⁰⁴

For Siddhasena Mahāmati, even the thesis (*pakṣa*) does not have to be necessarily expressed, if it can be understood from the context; the demand for a thesis is to disambiguate one's own statements, in case they cannot be easily understood from the context:

'[14cd] the pronouncement of this [thesis] has to be made here as showing the domain of the logical reason. [15] Otherwise, for a [person] to be apprised, who is confused regarding the domain of the logical reason intended by the proponent, the logical reason might appear to be suspected of being contradictory, just like... [16] ...for a person watching an archer's skill, the archer who hits without the specific mention of the target [is endowed with both] skill and its opposite.'¹⁰⁵

Would that mean that this decrease in the number of members of the proof formula finally entails the consequence that the reasoning of the *anyathānupapatti* type, based on the *avinābhāva* relation, tends to

gravitate towards a deductive formula with two variables (*sādhyā* and *sādhana*)? At the same time, however, as a counter-development, the procedures of reasoning seem to become more context-dependent, which gradually requires further developments in context-disambiguating tools of the theory of *syād-vāda* and *naya-vāda*.

Cf. SVR ad 3.11: *niścītā nirnitā, anyathā sādhyam antareṇānupapattir aghaṭanānyathānupapattir avinābhāva ity arthaḥ*.

NOTES

¹ ‘Inexplicability otherwise’ is mentioned in NA 22ab: *anyathānupapannatvaṁ hetor lakṣaṇam īritam* / —‘The definition of the logical reason has been proclaimed [to be] inexplicability otherwise.’ The inseparable connection of *hetu* with *sādhyā* is mentioned in NA 5ac: *sādhyāvinā-bhuno liṅgāt sādhyā-niścāyakaṁ smṛtam / anumānam...*, NA 13ac: *sādhyāvinā-bhavo hetor vaco yat pratipādakam / parārtham anumānam...* (vide *infra*, p. 15).

² ‘Inexplicability otherwise’ is mentioned in Akalaṅka’s auto-commentary (*Sva-vivṛtiḥ*) *ad loc.* (vol. 2, pp. 434–435.1–2): *na hi tādātmya-tad-utpattī jñātum śakyete vinānyathānupapatti-vitarkeṇa, tābhyāṁ vināva eka-lakṣaṇa-siddhiḥ*, vide *infra* n. 18. The inseparable connection of *hetu* with *sādhyā* is mentioned in LT, vol. 2, p. 434 (*Pramāṇa-praveśa* 2 (*Parkoṣa-pariccheda*) 11cd–12ab), vide *infra* p. 4.

³ YAṬ p. 122.20–123.2, *ad* YA 49 (vide *infra*, n. 21) and YAṬ p. 127.2–3 (*ad* YA 50): *tato jivādī-padārtha-jātaṁ parasparājahad-vṛtṭy-ekāneka-svabhāvaṁ vastutvānyathānupapattir iti yukty-anuśāsanam*.

⁴ PĀ 3.10: *sādhyāvinābhāvitvena niścīto hetuḥ*.

⁵ Alias Pātrakesarin / Pātrakesarisvāmin (?), cf. Paṇḍita Dalsukh Mālvaṇiya’s note (p. 270.15–18) in his *Ṭīpṇānī* to Śānti Sūri’s *Nyāyavatāra-sūtra-vārttika* p. 102.27. Pātrāsivāmin is occasionally (SUKHLAL–DOSHI (1928), CHATTERJEE (1978: 331)) identified with Vidyānanda. Pātrāsivāmin, however, preceded Śāntarakṣita (c. 725–788— cf. STEINKELLNER–MUCH (1995: 56)), the teacher of Kamalaśīla; cf. BHATTACHARYYA (1926: ixvi–ixvii): ‘In that case Pātrāsivāmin must be an earlier author than both Śāntarakṣita and Vidyānanda, and he must have first propounded the theory that valid reason is that the existence of which cannot be maintained unless it is invariably concomitant with the major term... *cir.* 700 A.D.’ Therefore, he must be some other Vidyānanda than the author of the *Śloka-vārttika* on Umāsvāti’s *Tattvārtha-sūtra* which was composed around 850 CE; see UPADHYE (1971: *14–15), PATHAK (1930: *passim*) and PATHAK (1930–31: *passim*), who refers to him as Pātrakesari Vidyānanda or as Pātrakesarisvāmi, and BALCEROWICZ (2000: 45).

⁶ A reference to the work is found in DHAKY (1995: 43), who refers to Jugal Kishor Mukhtar’s article: ‘Saṁmatisūtra aur Siddhasena’ in *Jaina Sāhitya aur Itihāsa par Viśada Prakāśa*, Calcutta 1956: 538–543 [the work was not available to me].

⁷ PS 2.5cd: *anumeye ’tha tat-tulye sādhyāvo, nāstītāsati*. Cf. TŚ 2.1, p. 13.16–17: *asmābhis tri-lakṣaṇo hetuḥ sthāpitaḥ. tad yathā: pakṣa-dharmaḥ sapakṣatvaṁ vipakṣa-vyāvṛtṭiś ca; and NP p. 1.5–6: hetus tri-rūpaḥ. kiṁ punas traīrūpyam? pakṣa-dharmatvaṁ sapakṣe sattvaṁ vipakṣe cāsattvam iti*.

⁸ The use of *gamakaḥ* may be an additional clue to post-Kumārīlan date of Pātrāsivāmin, cf. MŚV 5.4 (*anumāna-pariccheda*) 4 (p. 248.3,7):

sambandho vyāptir iṣṭātra liṅga-dharmasya liṅginā /

- vyāpyasya gamakatvaṃ ca vyāpakam gamyam iṣyate //
 and MSV 5.4 (anumāna-pariccheda) 22cd-23ab (p. 251):
 tasmād ya eva yasyārtho dṛṣṭaḥ sādhana-saktiṭaḥ //
 sa eva gamakas tasya na prasaṅgānvito 'pi yaḥ /
- ⁹ [TSa 1364] anyathānupapannatve nanu dṛṣṭā suhetutā /
 nāsati try-amśakasyāpi tasmāt klibās tri-lakṣaṇāḥ //
 [TSa 1365] anyathānupapannatvaṃ yasyāsau hetur iṣyate /
 eka-lakṣaṇakaḥ so 'rthaś catur-lakṣaṇako na vā //
 [TSa 1367] avinābhāva-sambandhas tri-rūpeṣu na jātucit /
 anyathāsambhāvākāṅga-hetuṣv evōpalabhyate //
 [TSa 1368] anyathānupapannatvaṃ yasya tasyāiva hetutā /
 vāntau dvāv api stāṃ vā mā vā tau hi na kāraṇam //
 [TSa 1369] nānyathānupapannatvaṃ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim /
 anyathānupapannatvaṃ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim //
 [TSa 1371] tatrāka-lakṣaṇo hetur dṛṣṭānta-dvaya-varjitaḥ /
 kathañcid upalabhyatvād bhāvābhāvau sad-ātmakau // ...
 [TSa 1379] tenāka-lakṣaṇo hetuḥ prādhānyād gamako 'stu naḥ /
 pakṣa-dharmādibhis tu anyaiḥ kim vyarthaiḥ parikalpitaiḥ //

For verses TSa 1372–1376, see below pp. 7–8. The above fragment is also translated in KUNST (1939).

¹⁰ Cf. NAṬ ad NAV 5.2 (H: p. 54.1 and V: p. 35.4): NAṬ ad loc.: **tat-putrādīnām iti. atrānumānam. sa śyāmaḥ tat-putratvāt, paridṛṣyamāna-putravad iti. ādi-śabdāt pakvāny etāni āmra-phalāni, eka-śākhā-prabhavatvāt, upabhujyamānāmra-phalavad ity-ādi parigrahaḥ.**—[A gloss on the phrase]: “being his son,” etc. Here the inference [is as follows]: “He is dark-complexioned because he is his son, just like the son who is just being seen”. By the word “etc.” a reference [is made to the erroneous following reasoning]: “these mangoes are ripe, because they grow on the same branch, like the mango which is just being eaten”.

Devabhadra clearly regards the above examples as cases of unwarranted inference from sampling. However, in their structure they do not seem to differ from some cases of inference from sampling regarded as valid ones, for instance:

—invalid inference: ‘these mangoes are ripe, because they grow on the same branch, like the mango which is just being eaten,’

—valid inference: ‘all mango-trees are blossoming, because one mango-tree is blossoming’ (see below, n. 11, NAV 5.2).

¹¹ Interestingly enough, Pātrasvāmin’s register, found in TSa, of valid inferences that do not fulfil the *trairūpya*-conditions does not overlap with those mentioned, e.g., in NAV 5.2: *niyamena sādhyāvinābhāvitvasyāvōddīpanāt; tac ced asti kim trailakṣaṇyāpekṣayā, tasyāiva gamakatvāt. tathā hi: jala-candrān nabhaś-candram, kṛttikōdayāc chakaṭōdayam, puṣpitāka-cūtāt puṣpitāśeṣa-cūtān, candrōdayāt kumudākara-prabodham, vṛkṣāc chāyām ity-ādi pakṣa-dharmatva-virahe 'py anumimimahe.*— ‘If [you concede that it is indeed] that [inferential sign inseparably connected with the probandum that is alone the condition of inference, then] what is the use of requirement of the triplet of characteristics [of the logical reason]? Certainly, that being the case, the triplet of characteristics of the logical reason is useless] because this [inferential sign inseparably connected with the probandum] alone leads to the comprehension [of the inferendum]. For it is as follows: we do infer—even without [the characteristics of] the inherence of a property in the locus—like in the following [examples]: (1) from [the reflection of] the moon in the water [we infer] the moon in the sky, (2) from the rise of the constellation of the Pleiads [we infer] the rise of the *Rohiṇī* constellation, (3) from one blossoming mango-tree [in the proper season we infer] that all mango-trees are blossoming, (4) from the rise of the moon, [we infer] the opening of clusters of *kumuda* white water lilies, (5) from a tree [we infer its] shadow, etc.’

¹² Cf. KELLNER (1977: 97, n. 146).

¹³ E.g. in TSVA p. 203 (the discussion of *anyathānupapatti* and the refutation of *tri-lakṣaṇa* is found there on pp. 198–217), in TBV (vol. II, p. 569.28–29), in NASV 43 and PMī 2.1.9 § 33 (p. 45.17–18).

¹⁴ E.g. Hemacandra’s criticism against the Buddhist idea of *trairūpya* in PMī 2.1.9 § 33 (p. 45.1–16) closely follows the exposition of Pātrasvāmin’s aphorisms quoted in TSa.

¹⁵ NA 5ac: *sādhyāvinā-bhuno liṅgāt sādhyā-niścāyakaṁ smṛtam / anumānaṁ ...*

NA 13: *sādhyāvinā-bhuvo hetor vaco yat pratipādakam / parārtham anumānaṁ tat pakṣādi-vacanātmakam //*

NA 22ab: *anyathānupapannatvaṁ hetor lakṣaṇam īritam /*

¹⁶ As regards the expression *hānādi-buddhayaḥ*, cf. YS 2.16 ff. and NBh on NS 1.1: *heyam tasya nirvartakam hānam ātyantikam tasyōpāyo dhigantavya ity etāni catvāry artha-pādāni samyag buddhvā niḥśreyasam adhigacchati*, as well as NA 28: *pramāṇasya phalaṁ sāksād ajñāna-vinivartanam / kevalasya sukhōpekṣe śeṣasyādāna-hāna-dhīḥ //*. On the issue of ‘the avoidance of things which should be avoided, in the appropriation of things which are worth appropriating and in the indifference to things which deserve indifference’, see WEZLER (1984).

¹⁷ LT 2.12cd–13ab (*Pramāṇa-praveśa* 2 (*Parkoṣa-pariccheda*) 12cd–13ab; Vol. 2, p. 434):

liṅgāt sādhyāvinābhāvābhiniḥbodhāka-lakṣaṇāt / liṅgi-dhīr anumānaṁ tat-phalaṁ hānādi-buddhayaḥ //

¹⁸ LTV 2.12cd–13ab (*Pramāṇa-praveśa* 2: *Parkoṣa-pariccheda* 12cd–13ab; Vol. 2, p. 435.1–3): **Vivṛtiḥ**: *nahi tādātmya-tad-utpatti jñātum śakyete vinānyathānupapatti-vitarkeṇa tābhyāṁ vināva eka-lakṣaṇa-siddhiḥ. nahi vṛkṣādīḥ chāyādeḥ svabhāvāḥ kārya vā. na cātra visamvādo ’sti.*

¹⁹ The verse (YA 49, p.122) reads:

drṣṭāgamābhyāṁ aviruddham^b artha-prarūpaṇaṁ yukty-anuśāsanaṁ^a te / pratikṣaṇaṁ sthity-udaya-vyayātma-tattva-vyavasthaṁ sad ihārtha-rūpaṁ //
—‘[O Jina!] Your persuasion [based on] logical reasoning (*sc. anumāna*)^a is the description of an object, which is not contradicted by what is perceived^b or by testimony. Here [in your teaching] the being is an [external and internal] object, determined as an entity the nature of which consists in continued existence, rise and annihilation.’

^a Samantabhadra’s and Vidyānanda’s description equate *yukty-anuśāsana* with *anumāna*, as a separate indirect cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*), in addition to testimony (*āgama*). However, the Jains of the ‘non-Āgamic’ tradition recognise one indirect cognitive criterion (*parokṣa*) that bifurcates into two main divisions, *anumāna* and *śābda*.

^b Comp. similar idea in NA 8ab (*drṣṭēṣṭāvyāhatād vākyāt paramārthābhīdhāyinaḥ*) and NA 9b (*adrṣṭēṣṭa-virodhakam*). See also Vidyānanda’s comments *ad* YA 49: **Ṭīkā**: *drṣṭāṁ cāgamaś ca drṣṭāgamau tābhyāṁ aviruddham abādhiṭa-viṣayaṁ yad arthāt sādhana-rūpād arthasya prarūpaṇaṁ tad eva yukty-anuśāsanaṁ yukti-vacanaṁ te tava bhagavato ’bhīmatam iti pada-ghaṭanā. tatrārthasya prarūpaṇaṁ yukty-anuśāsanaṁ iti vacane pratyakṣam api yukty-anuśāsanaṁ prasajeta tad-vyavacchedārtham arthāt prarūpaṇaṁ iti vyākhyāyate sāmartyād arthasya tad iti pratīteḥ.*

²⁰ For the peculiar use of *prāyam* as the last member of the compound (e.g. *nirṇīta-prāyam*) see for instance NAV 29.17: *vyāpi-rūpasya vicārākṣamatvād ity ukta-prāyam.*

²¹ YAṬ *ad* YA 49, p. 122.20–123.2: *tathā cānyathānupapannatva-niyama-niścaya-lakṣaṇāt sādhanāt sādhyārtha-prarūpaṇaṁ yukty-anuśāsanaṁ iti prakāśitaṁ bhavati drṣṭāgamābhyāṁ avirodhasyānyathānupapatter iti devāgamādaḥ nirṇīta-prāyam.*

²² See also Vidyānanda’s discussion of *anyathānupapatti* and the refutation of *tri-lakṣaṇa* is on pp. 198–217.

²³ Siddhasena maintains that *dr̥ṣṭānta* is not an essential part of ‘syllogistic’ reasoning, inasmuch as the relation of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) suffices to prove the thesis, see NA 20:

*antar-vyāptyāiva sādhyasya siddher bahir-udāhṛtiḥ /
vyarthā syāt tad-asadbhāve ’py evaṁ nyāya-vido viduḥ //*

—‘Since the probandum is proved only by the intrinsic invariable concomitance, an exemplification from outside would be pointless; experts in logic have recognised that also in its absence [this exemplification is] such (pointless).’ Conspicuously Siddhasena refers to some earlier tradition (*nyāya-vido viduḥ*).

²⁴ ŚBh 1.1.5 (p. 11): *arthāpattir api dr̥ṣṭaḥ śruto vārtho ’nyathā nōpapadyate ity artha-kalpanā. yathā: jīvati devadatte gr̥hābhāva-darśanena bahir-bhāvasyādṛṣṭasya kalpanā.*

²⁵ MŚV 5.7 (*arthāpatti-pariccheda*) 1 (p. 320):

*pramāṇa-ṣaṭka-vijñāto yatrārtho nānyathā bhavet /
adr̥ṣṭam kalpayed anyam sārthāpattir udāhṛtā //*

²⁶ LT 2.16 (*Pramāṇa-praveśa* 2 (*Parkoṣa-pariccheda*) 16; Vol. 2, p. 462–463):

*adr̥ṣya-para-cittāder abhāvaṁ laukikā viduḥ /
tad-ākāra-vikārāder anyathānupapattitaḥ //*

²⁷ Sc. people infer the existence of various invisible events, e.g. assume that other people are endowed with consciousness, etc., even though these are not directly perceived.

²⁸ LT 2.16 (*Pramāṇa-praveśa* 2 (*Parkoṣa-pariccheda*) 16; Vol. 2, p. 462):

*adr̥ṣya-para-cittāder abhāvaṁ laukikā viduḥ /
tad-ākāra-vikārāder anyathānupapattitaḥ //*

²⁹ NKC, p. 463.1–6: **adr̥ṣyas** cāsau **para-cittādis** ca, ādi-śabdena bhūta-graha-vyādhi-parigrahaḥ, tasyā**bhāvaṁ laukikā viduḥ**. kuta ity atrāha—**tad-ākāra** ity-ādi. tena *adr̥ṣya-para-cittādinā saha-bhāvī śarira-gata uṣṇa-sparśādi-lakṣaṇa ākāraḥ tad-ākāraḥ anyathā-bhāva ādir-yasya vacana-viśeṣasya tasya anyathānupapattitaḥ.*

³⁰ This is an interesting point to notice how differently the same—ostensibly obvious—case can be described depending on cultural background and presuppositions. In European cultural context in general the question whether a person is dead or alive is determined *in terms* of what the Jainas would consider mere symptoms.

³¹ This attests to practical usefulness of ‘inexplicability otherwise’ and its indispensability in any activity ascribed by the Jainas.

³² NAV 1.8: ... *sarvatrānyathānupapannatāvadhāritōcchvāsa-niḥśvāsādi-jīva-liṅga-sadbhāvāsadbhāvābhyām jīva-sākṣāt-kāri-pratyakṣa-kṣūṇe ’pi jīvan-mṛta-pratīti-darśanād, anyathā loka-vyavahārābhāva-prasaṅgāt.*

³³ For the Mīmāṃsaka position, comp. see above nn. 24, 25 (ŚBh: *dr̥ṣṭaḥ śruto vārtho*, and MŚV 5.7 [*Arthāpatti-pariccheda*] 1). For the Jaina examples, comp. above nn. 19, 21 (YA 49, p. 122: *dr̥ṣṭāgamābhyām aviruddham*, NA 8ab: *dr̥ṣṭēṣṭāvyāhatād vākyaṁ paramārthābhīdhāyinaḥ*, and NA 9b: *adr̥ṣṭēṣṭa-virodhakam*). Similarly, commenting on LT 2.12 (p. 435.4–5), Prabhācandra states explicitly that ‘the invariable concomitance [consists in] the inseparable connection with the inferable property that is qualified by a distinctive feature not subverted by what is accepted (sc. testimony)’ (*sādhyena iṣṭābādhitāsiddha-viśeṣaṇa-viśiṣṭena avinābhāvo vyāptiḥ ...*).

The idea that we may rightfully presume the existence of something perceptually inaccessible, either because of subtlety (e.g. some invisible potential, as in the example below), distance or time, is accurately expressed by Siddharṣigaṇi in NAV 1.14: *arthāpattis tu pratyakṣādi-gocarī-kṛta-sphoṭādi-padārthānyathānupapattiyā dahana-śakty-ādikaṁ pāvakāder arthāntaram pūrva-darśana-gocarāt samadhikam avyabharitām parikalpayantīti pramāṇatām svī-karoty eva, tal-lakṣaṇa-yogāt.*— ‘However, taking into account that [people] conclude from fire, etc., another object, which is additional to the domain of previous perception [and] undeviating, [namely, that fire] is possessed of the power of burning, etc., inasmuch as such entities as

blisters, etc., that constitute the domain of perception, etc., are otherwise inexplicable, presumption [too] appropriates undeniably cognitive validity, because it satisfies the definition of this [cognitive criterion].’

³⁴ Cf. NBh 2.2.1: *arthād āpattir arthāpattiḥ. āpattiḥ prāptiḥ prasaṅgaḥ.*

yatrābhīdhīyamāne ’rthe yo ’nyo ’rthaḥ prasajyate so ’rthāpattiḥ, yathā megheṣv asatsu vṛṣṭir na bhavatīti. kim atra prasajyate? satsu bhavatīti.

³⁵ AŚ (*Tantra-yukti*) 15.29: *yad anuktaṁ arthād āpadyate sārthāpattiḥ.*

³⁶ See, for instance, the usage of the presumptive scheme in Dharmottara’s reasoning in NBT 1.9 (p. 62.2): *itarathā cakṣur-āśritatvānupapattiḥ kasyacid api vijñānasya—* ‘Otherwise, it would be *inexplicable* how the [sensory] consciousness could be based on the eye.’

³⁷ See above p. 2 and n. 10. Despite some similarity, this is a different kind of reasoning that the one found in MŚV 2 (*codanā-sūtra*) 182ab (p. 74–75): *śyāmatve puṁstvavac cātat sādharmaṇye nidarśanam /*

³⁸ Interestingly, this case is first classified by Siddharṣiṅgaṇi as a proper instance of presumption in NAV 1.14: *arthāpattis tu pratyakṣādi-gocarī-kṛta-sphoṭādi-padārthānyathānupapattiyā dahana-śakty-ādikaṁ pāvakāder arthāntaram pūrva-darśana-gocarāt samadhikam avyabharitām parikalpayantīti pramāṇatām svī-karoṭy eva, tal-lakṣaṇa-yogāt.* Immediately afterwards Siddharṣiṅgaṇi adds that even this case is an instance of indirect cognition (*parokṣa*, or in Samantabhadra’s terms: *yukty-anuśāna*), NAV 1.14: *sarveṣāṁ cāteṣāṁ parokṣe ’ntar -bhāvo, ’nyathānupapannārthāntara-darśana-dvāreṇa prastutārtha-saṁvedana-caturatvād iti.*—‘And all these [sub-varieties] are included in the indirect cognition because they are apt to [produce] a sensation of the object under discussion by the means of perception of another object which is otherwise inexplicable.’

³⁹ MSV 5.7 (*arthāpatti-pariccheda*) 87d-88 (p. 335):

sambandha-dṛk tatra kācid asti //

tat sarvaṁ ity-ādy asamañjasaṁ syān na cet iyam syād anumānato ’nyathā /

evam-svabhāvāpy anumāna-sabdāṁ labheta ced asti yathēpsitaṁ naḥ //

⁴⁰ Cf. ‘impossibility otherwise’ (*anyathāsambhāva*) in TSa 1367 (*vide supra*, n. 9).

⁴¹ Cf. TS 1.1: *samyag-darśana-jñāna-cāritrāṇi mokṣa-mārgaḥ.*

⁴² Cf. VP 1.30:

na cāgamād rte dharmas tarkeṇa vyavatiṣṭhate /

ṛṣiṅgām api yaj jñānaṁ tad apy āgama-pūrvakam //

—‘And the normative principle cannot be established by reasoning without testimony; even the knowledge of [Vedic] seers, too, was preceded by testimony.’

Also Siddhasena Divākara (probably around the same time, c. 500 CE) expresses a similar idea that the application of reason is limited and subordinate to scriptural testimony (*āgama*); the eschatological aim, *ergo* the truly ethical dimension and soteriological destiny (e.g. one’s capability to attain liberation), cannot be known without the scriptural testimony, see STP 3.43–45:

duviho dhammā-vāo aheu-vāo ya heu-vāo ya /

tattha u aheu-vāo bhaviyābhaviyādao bhāvā //

bhaviṁ samma-dāmaṇa-nāṇa-caritta-paḍivatti-saṁpanno /

ṇiyamā dukkhamā-kaḍo tti lakkhaṇaṁ heu-vāyassa //

jo heu-vāya-pakkhammi heuo āgame ya āgamio /

so sasamaya-paṇṇavao siddhamā-virāhao anno //

—‘The exposition of normative principle (or: of properties) is two-fold: the exposition without reasoning (scriptural; *āgama*) and the exposition based reasoning. Further, the scriptural exposition (*āgama*) [distinguishes / deals with] beings competent for liberation and incompetent for liberation.

The characteristic feature of the exposition based reasoning is [to argue rationally] that the being competent for liberation, who is endowed with the understanding of

conation, correct cognition and correct conduct, will necessarily bring an end to suffering.

The one who [applies] reasoning to a topic [within the scope] of the exposition based reasoning (sc. in rational discourse) and [who applies] scripture to scriptural exposition, demonstrates his own doctrine. The other one [who fails to do so] abuses teachings.’

⁴³ See e.g. GANERI (2001: 1–2).

⁴⁴ Cf. VP 1.34:

*avasthā-deśa-kālānām bhedād bhinnāsu śaktiṣu /
bhāvānām anumānena prasiddhir atidurlabhā //*

—‘Since the endowments [of things] are different due to difference in condition, place and time, the proof of things is most difficult.’

Notice the pun on it by way of refutation in TSa 1476.

⁴⁵ Cf. VP 1.34:

*yānenānumito ’rthaḥ kuśalair anumātrbhiḥ /
abhiyuktatāir anyair anyathāhvōpadyate //*

‘Even [when] a thing is inferred with much effort by expert logicians, it is [still] explicable in another way by other more skilled [logicians].’

Notice the pun on it by way of refutation in *Tattva-saṅgraha* 1477:

*yānenānumito ’rthaḥ kuśalair anumātrbhiḥ /
nānyathā sādhyate so ’nyair abhiyuktatāir api //*

⁴⁶ NKC ad LT 2.12 (p. 444.16): *tad-pratipattiś ca ūha-jñānāt ity api śraddhā-mātram.*

Here *tad-pratipattiś* = *avinābhāva -pratipattiḥ*, and *ūha* = *tarka*.

⁴⁷ Cf., e.g., PVSV 3.24–25 (p. 185): *tasmāt svabhāva-pratibandhād eva hetuḥ sādhyam gamayati. sa ca tad-bhāva-lakṣaṇas tad-utpatti-lakṣaṇo vā. sa evāvinābhāvo dṛṣṭāntābhyām pradarśyate*, and NB (1).3.31: *sa [= svabhāva-pratibandhaś] ca divi-prakārah sarvasya: tādātmya-lakṣaṇas tad-utpatti-lakṣaṇas cēty uktam.*

⁴⁸ E.g. the cases mentioned in TSa 1371ab and NAṬ ad NAV 5.2; see also n. 10 and p. 2.

⁴⁹ See the examples on pp. 6–8.

⁵⁰ See the criticism in NKC p. 440.11–441.9.

⁵¹ Cf. NKC ad LT 2.12 (p. 440.4 ff.).

⁵² Cf. e.g. BHATT (1989: 218 ff.).

⁵³ *Vide supra* pp. 2 and 6. The above counters the supposition of UNO (1993: 160) that ‘there is no divergence of opinion among Indian philosophical systems that these two (i.e. *vyāpti* and *pakṣa-dharmatā*—P.B.) are postulated as indispensable factors, either separately or jointly, for obtaining the conclusion, or the final inferential cognition (*anumiti*).’

⁵⁴ See e.g. PV (P) 1.287cd (p. 61) = PV (S) 1.287ab (p. 109): *anumānāśrayo liṅgam avinābhāva-lakṣaṇam /* —‘The basis for inference is the inferential sign, which is characterised by the inseparable connection;’ and PVV ad loc.: *avinābhāvaḥ sādhyavyabhicāritvam tal-lakṣaṇam yasya tat tathā.*

The term *avinābhāva* was, however, not the sole property of the Buddhist and it were probably not the Buddhists who coined it (*vide infra*, n. 58). However, I deliberately speak of ‘the Buddhist relation of *avinābhāva*’, for this relation is always discussed by the Jaina authors in the context of such Buddhist notions as *trairūpya* or *tādātmya* and *tad-utpatti*.

⁵⁵ Cf. also Prajñākaragupta’s analysis in PVA (p. 70 in *sva-vṛtti*): *avinābhāva eva hi niyamaḥ, sādhyam vinā na bhavātīti kṛtvā.*

⁵⁶ GANERI (2001: 152). Cf. also the Chapter 4.7 in GANERI (2001: 114–118).

⁵⁷ GANERI (2001: 152). This idea goes back probably to the *Vāda-vidhāna* [VāVi], an earlier work of Vasubandhu (?), see Fr. AI 7: *hetur vipakṣād viśeṣaḥ*—‘The logical reason is the difference from dissimilar cases’.

⁵⁸ The term *avinābhāva* was not an innovation of Diñnāga, for it is already attested in *Vāda-vidhi* [VāVi] of Vasubandhu as a relation validating the logical reason [Fr. B 5]: *tādrg-avinābhāvi-dharmōpadarśanaṃ hetuḥ*—‘Logical reason is the demonstration of a property which is inseparably connected with [a property] of such a kind (to be inferred)’, cf. FRAUWALLNER (1957:118, 136) and FRANCO (1990: 202). We find it also in PBh (2.12.2b.0) [250], p. 46–47: *evaṃ sarvatra deśa-kālāvinā-bhūtam itarasya liṅgam*.—‘In this way the inferential sign of the other (viz. of the sign-possessor) is inseparably connected [with it] as regards place and time in all cases,’ as well as in PBh (2.12.2b.0) [261], p. 49: *sambhāvo ’py avinābhāvitatvād anumānam eva*—‘Equivalence [as a cognitive criterion] is nothing but inference, in so far as it is based on the inseparable connection.’ Cf. also NENNINGER (1992: 124 ff.).

⁵⁹ NKC p. 4218–9 ad LT 2.10: *ayam avinābhāva-śabdah sādhyābhāve sādhanābhāvam vadatīti vyatireka-mātra-vacanaḥ, na sambandha-vacanaḥ*.

⁶⁰ NKC p. 423.10–424.3 ad LT 2.10: *yac cōcyate — avinābhāva-śabdo vyatireka-mātra-vacano na sambandha-vacanaḥ, tad apy ukti-mātram; yato ’vinābhāva-śabdo na vyatireka-mātre paryavasyati ghaṭādi-bhāve ’pi tat-pravṛtti-prasaṅgāt, kintu niyame. sa ca niyamaḥ tathōpapatty-nyathānupapatti-prakārahābhāyāṃ vyavasthitāḥ* [see NA 17, n. 63]. *ataḥ tāv ubhāv api avinābhāva-śabdena ucyate, “yatra yatra dhūmah tatra tatrāgniḥ, yatrāgnir nāsti tatra dhūmo ’pi nāsti” iti. nanu “yatrāgnir nāsti tatra dhūmo ’pi nāsti” ity-etaḥ kuto ’vagamyate ity cet? agny-abhāve dhūmasya niyamena apratīyamānatvāt tat-sadbhāva-niyata evāsau, anyathā yathā dhūmābhāve ’pi kvacid agnir upalabhyate tathā agny-abhāve dhūmo ’pi kvacid upalabhyeta. yasya yena vinā nānupapattir na sa tena niyataḥ yathā dhūmābhāve ’py upapadyamāno ’gnir na dhūmena niyataḥ, agninā vinānupapattiś ca dhūmasya, tasmād asau tan-niyata iti. Comp. also PNT 3.29: hetu-prayogas tathōpapatty-nyathānupapattibhyāṃ dvi-prakārah.*

⁶¹ Cf. NAV 17.1: *tayā tathōpapattyā, yathāgnir atra, dhūmasya tathānupapatter iti. anyathāpi vēty anenāvayave samudāyōpacārād anyathānupapattim lakṣayati. anyathā sādhyā-vyatireke ’nupapattir avidyamānatāva tayā vānyathānupapattyā hetoḥ prayogaḥ syād, yathāgnir atra, dhūmasyānyathānupapatter iti, etc.*

⁶² PĀ (V) 3.89 = PĀ (J) 3.90: *vyutpanna-prayogas tu tathōpapatty-nyathānupapatter vā.*

⁶³ NA 17:

*hetos tathōpapattyā vā syāt prayogo ’nyathāpi vā /
dvi-vidho ’nyatārenāpi sādhyā-siddhir bhaved iti //*

⁶⁴ NKC p. 448.8 (ad LT 2.12): “*idam asmin saty eva bhavati ato ’nyathā na bhavaty eva*”. This passage occurs in NAṬ as a rule for suppositional knowledge (*ūha, tarka*), cf. n. 89.

⁶⁵ On this issue comp. UNO (1993).

⁶⁶ E.g. NKC p. 434–435 ad LT 2.11cd–12ab: *sādhyena iṣṭābādhitāsiddha-viśeṣaṇa-viśiṣṭena avinābhāvo vyāptiḥ*; NKC p. 420.1 ff. ad LT 2.10: *tathā hi: vyāptiḥ sambandho ’rthānām, sā ca deśataḥ kālato vā kasyacit kenacit syāt? na*; NKC p. 418.15–419.1 ad loc. (LT 2.10): *vyāptir hi sādhyā-sādhanayor avinābhāvaḥ*; see also: NKC p. 315.9 etc.

⁶⁷ E.g. NRĀ: ad MŚV 5.4 (*anumāna-pariccheda*) 4ab (p. 248.4): *vyāptiḥ niyamaḥ*.

⁶⁸ E.g. NKC p. 423.11–424.3, or NAV 5.3: *tathā kārya-svabhāvānupalabdhi-rūpa-liṅga-traya-niyamo ’pi kila tādātmya-tad-utpatti-lakṣaṇa-sambandhāstitvam eteṣv evēti*, and NAV 18.1: *sādhanam tad-gamako hetuḥ, tayoh sādhyā-sādhanayor vyāptir, idam anena vinā na bhavatīty-evam-rūpā ...*

⁶⁹ E.g. PV (P) 3.1c: *avinābhāva-niyamād*, and PV (P) 3.31c: *avinābhāva-niyamo*.

⁷⁰ NAV 18.1: *na hi saha-darśanād eva kvacit sarvatrēdam amunā vinā na bhavatīti sidhyati*. Cf. also PV (P) 3.31:

*kārya-karaṇa-bhāvād vā svabhāvād vā niyāmakāt /
avinābhāva-niyamo ’darśanān na darśanāt //*

—‘The law of the inseparable connection is [based] either on the cause-and-effect relationship or on the [essential] identity; [it is not based] on non-observation or on observation,’

as well as PVI in II.63 (p. 94.23–26):

| rgyu dan ‘bras bu’i dños po ‘am |
| rañ bzin ñes par byed pa las |
| med na mi ‘byuñ ñes pa ste |
| ma mthoñ las min mthoñ las min |

⁷¹ Cf. PV (P) 3.13b: *na cādarśana-mātreṇa vipakṣe ‘vyabhicāritā /*

⁷² MŚV 5.4 (*Anumāna-pariccheda*) 12–14 (p. 249–250):
bhūyo-darśana-gamyā ca vyāptiḥ sāmānya-dharmayoḥ /
jñāyate bheda-hāneḥ kvacic cāpi viśeṣayoḥ //
kṛttikōdayam ālakṣya rohiṇy-āsatti-kṛptivat /
vyāpteś ca dṛśyamānāvāḥ kaścid dharmāḥ prayojāḥ //
“asmīn saty amunā bhāvyaṃ” iti śaktyā nirūpyate /
anye para-prayuktānām vyāptīnām upajīvakāḥ //

⁷³ Cf. VP 1.35:

pareṣām asamākhyeyam abhyāsād eva jāyate /
mañi-rūpyādi-vijñānaṃ tad-vidāṃ nānumānikam //

—‘The experts’ knowledge of precious stones and coins, which cannot be conveyed to others, arises from from repeated practice. It is not inferential.’

⁷⁴ NKC p. 421.8–9, *ad* LT 2.10: *kiñca, avinābhāvaḥ sambandhaḥ, sa ca sambandhi-grahaṇa-pūrvakaḥ, sambandhināu ca dvau dvau viśeṣau, ataḥ katham sarvōpasamhāreṇa vyāptir grahītum śakyā?*

⁷⁵ NKC p. 423.8–10, *ad* LT 2.10: *yad apy abhihitam “avinābhāvaḥ sambandhaḥ, sa ca sambandhi-grahaṇa-pūrvakaḥ” ity-ādi; tad apy anenāva pratyākhyātam; sāmānyōpalakṣita-viśeṣayor vyāpteḥ sarvōpasamhāreṇāiva sambhavāt. na hi tatra ānantyādi-doṣo avakāśam labhate.*

⁷⁶ Cf. NAV 29.23: *tasmāt kathañcid bhedābhedināv evātau*—‘Therefore these two, [i.e., the universal and the particulars], are somehow truly [both] different and not different from each other.’

⁷⁷ Cf. LT 2.47cd (p. 646): *dravya-paryāya-sāmānya-viśeṣātmārtha-niṣṭhitam*, as well as YA 40 (p. 94):

sāmānya-niṣṭhā vividhā viśeṣāḥ padaṃ viśeṣāntara-pakṣapāti /
antar-viśeṣāntara-vṛttito ‘nyat samāna-bhāvaṃ nayate viśeṣam //

⁷⁸ Cf. NKC p.423.3–5: *kasya kena vyāpti itī, tatra yasya yena avyabhicāraḥ tasya tena vyāptiḥ, sāmānya-viśeṣavataś ca dhūmādeḥ sāmānya-viśeṣavatāgny-ādināvvyabhicārāt tasya tenāva vyāptiḥ.*

⁷⁹ Both the criticism of *bhūyo-darśana* and the discussion of how *vyāpti* is cognised is found in NKC p. 429.9–434.11 *ad* LT 2.11.

⁸⁰ Cf. e.g. NKC p. 429.19–20 *ad* LT 2.11: *kiñ ca pratyakṣa-mātraṃ bhūyo-darśana-sahāyam anvaya-vyatireka-sahakṛtam vā pratyakṣam vyāpti-grahaṇam prabhavet? na ...*, and NKC p. 431.12 ff. *ad* LT 2.11: *etena bhūyo-dṛṣṭānvaya ity-ādi pratyuktam ...*

⁸¹ Cf. e.g. NKC p. 433.16 ff.

⁸² To establish a first-level inference we have to establish the *vyāpti*, for which we would require a second-level inference, for the *vyāpti* of which to establish we would require a third-level inference, etc. Cf. NKC *ad loc.* (p. 433.21–22): *sarvatra ity-ādi. sarvatra prathamānumānavat dvitīye ‘py anumāne avīśeṣāt*. Very similar argumentation is found in NAV 1.19: *pratyakṣānumānayoś ca prāmānyam kuta itī cintyam. na tāvat pratyakṣāt ...*

⁸³ LT 2.11cd–12ab (p. 426):

avikalpa-dhiyā liṅgaṃ na kiñcit sampratīyate /
nānumānād asiddhatvāt pramāṇāntaram āñjasam //

Vivṛtiḥ: *na hi pratyakṣam* “yāvān kaścīd dhūmaḥ kālāntare deśāntare ca pāvakasāva kāryam nārthāntarasya” *iti iyato vyāpārān karuṁ samarthaṁ sannihita-viśaya-balōtpatter avicāratvāt. nāpy anumāntaram, sarvatrāviśeṣāt. na hi sākalyena liṅgasya liṅginā vyāpter asiddhau kvacit kiñcid anumānam nāma. “tan na apratyakṣam anumāna-vyatiriktaṁ pramānam” ity ayuktam; liṅga-pratipatteḥ pramānāntarāt.* Prabhācandra explains at an earlier portion of NKC p. 418.14–419.2 *ad loc.* (LT 2.10): *kaḥ punar ayam tarko nāma iti cet? vyāpti-jñānam. vyāptir hi sādhyā-sādhanayor avinābhāvaḥ. tad-grāhi jñānam tarko ’bhidhīyate, tatra tasyāva pramānyāt (recte: prāmānyāt), jñānāntarānām tad-grahaṇe sāmāthyāsāmbhavataḥ tatra prāmānyānupapatteḥ.*—‘What is it what you call suppositional knowledge? This is the cognition of the invariable concomitance. For the invariable concomitance is the inseparable connection of the inferable property (*sādhyā*) and the logical reason. Such a cognition that grasps this [invariable concomitance] is called suppositional knowledge, because only this [suppositional knowledge] possesses cognitive validity as regards that [invariable concomitance], in so far as cognitive validity of other kinds of cognition is inexplicable as regards that [invariable concomitance], because [they are] have no efficacy to grasp that [invariable concomitance].’

⁸⁴ Cf. NKC p. 434.9–10 *ad* LT 2.11: **liṅga-pratipatteḥ** *avinābhāva-pratipatteḥ tarkākāyāyāḥ pramānāntaratvād aliṅgajāviśada-svabhāvatayā pramāna-dvayānantarbhūtatvāt.* Akalaṅka follows the Canonical tradition subdivides *parokṣa* into *matijñāna*, or sensuous cognition, and *śruta-jñāna*, which comprises testimony, inference etc., see LT 2.10 and LT 2.61 (p. 682):

*tat pratyakṣam parokṣaṁ ca dvidhāvātrānya-samvidāṁ /
antar-bhāvān na yujyante niyamāḥ parakalpitāḥ //*

The tradition of Siddhasena Mahāmatī (and probably Pātrasvmin) differs from this tradition, see BALCEROWICZ (2001: xii).

⁸⁵ See also NAV 1.19: *tasmād anumānam abhilaṣatā gaty-antarābhāvāt tat-sambandha-grahaṇa-pravaṇas tri-kāla-gocarō ’vyabhicārī vitarko ’bhyupagantavyaḥ.*—‘Therefore, since there is no other logical alternative, anybody postulating inference should [also] accept suppositional knowledge, which is disposed towards grasping that relation, the domain of which are three times [and] which is undeviating.’

⁸⁶ LT 2.49ab (p. 652.1–2): *vyāptim sādhyena hetoḥ sphuṭayati na vinā cintayākatra dṛṣṭiḥ, sakalyenāṣa tarko ’nadhigata-viśayaḥ.*

⁸⁷ NAV 18.2: *anvaya-vyatireka-grāhi-pratyakṣānupalambhōttara-kāla-bhāvino ’vyabhicārī-tri-kāla-vyāpi-gocarasya mati-nibandhanasyōha-samjñitasya pramānāntarasya sambandha-grāhitayēṣṭatvāt.*

⁸⁸ NAV 1.13: *ūho ’pi pratyakṣānumānāsāmvedya-sādhyārthānyathānupapannatvalakṣaṇa-liṅga-sambandha-grahaṇa-pravaṇaḥ pramānāntaram.*

⁸⁹ NĀṬ *ad* NAV 1.14.: *upalambhānupalambha-nimittam vyāpti-jñānam ūhaḥ, yathēdam asmin saty eva bhavati, asati na bhavaty evēti ca.* Note that the same passage occurs in NKC, see n. 64; but there it is the formulation of *avinābhāva!*

⁹⁰ NKC, see p. 9, comp. n. 64.

⁹¹ NS 1.1.40: *avijñāta-tattve ’rthe kāraṇōpapattitas tattva-jñānārtham ūhas tarkaḥ.*

⁹² NBh 1.1.1: *tarko na pramāna-saṅgrahaḥ, tarko na pramānāntaram, pramānānām anugrāhakas tattva-jñānāya kalpate. tasyōdāharaṇam—kim idaṁ janma kṛtakena hetunā nirvartyate āhosvid akṛtakena athākasmikam iti? evam avijñāte ’rthe kāraṇōpapattiyā ūhaḥ pravartate—“yadi kṛtakena hetunā nirvartyate, hetūcchedād upapanno ’yam janmōcchedaḥ. athākṛtakena hetunā, tato hetūcchedasyāśakyatvād anupapanno janmōcchedaḥ. athākasmikam, ato ’kasmān nirvartyamānam na punar nirvartyatīti nirvṛti-kāraṇam nōpapadyate, tena janmānucchedaḥ” itī.*

⁹³ TSaP *ad* TSa 1386 (p. 409.12–14):

*vinā sādhyād adṛṣṭasya dṛṣṭānte hetutēṣyate /
parair mayā punar dharmīny asāmbhūṣṇor vināmunā //*

*arthâpattes ca sâbaryâ bhaikṣavâc^a cânumânataḥ /
anyad evânumânâṃ no nara-sîmhavad iṣyate //*

^a The text in Embar Krishnamacharya's edition *bhaikṣavâs* should be emended as above, cf. PATHAK (1930: 156–7) and KUNST (1939: 26, n. 3).

⁹⁴ If we concern the latest proposal of evaluating the data, YDī is a much earlier work than any of the Jaina sources discussed in my paper: MEJOR (2000: 263): 'all that gives a solid basis for the lower limit of the *Yukti-dîpikâ* at ca. 550 C.E., which is in agreement with the date proposed by FRAUWALLNER.', and MEJOR (2000: 273): 'In this case YD cannot be placed later than 600 C.E.'

⁹⁵ YDī (*ad* SKâ.4) p. 73.7–18: *sâ [arthâpattiḥ] tu dvividhâ vyabhicârîṇî câvyabhicârîṇî ca. ... yâ tv avinâbhâvîni avyabhicârîṇî yathâ kesari-varâhayor upahvare sannipâtam upalabhyôttara-kâlâṃ kevalâṃ kesariṇâṃ varâha-vraṇâṅkita-śarîram prayântam upalabhya pratipadyate jito varâha iti tad anumânam. katham. yasmât kesari-varâhayor yau jaya-parâjayau tayor avyabhicârî sambandhaḥ. tatra yadâ kesariṇo jayam upalabhyâvyabhicârîṇâṃ itarasya parâjayam pratipadyate kim anyat syâd rte 'numânât. adhigatôbhaya-sambandhi-samudâyasya hi pratipattuḥ pratyakṣî-bhûtânyatara-sambandhino yâ sambandhy-antara-pratipattis tad anumânam. itthaṃ cârthapattir ato na tasmât prthag bhavitum arhati.*

⁹⁶ PBh (2.12.2b.0) [260], p. 48–49: *darśanârthâd arthâpattir virodhi eva. śravaṇâd anumitânumânam.*

⁹⁷ Interestingly, Dharmottara (c. 740–800) seems (or pretends) not to know the notion of *anyathânupapatti*, for he does not refer to it, at least not in NBT, even in the discussion of two forms of the examples in NB 3.28 ff. (= DhPr 3.26 ff.). A reference to it is made by Durvekamiśra (970–1030), commenting on NB 3.26 in DhPr p. 167.21–22.

⁹⁸ Cf. BALCEROWICZ (2000: 33): 'In NA 20 Siddhasena maintains that *dr̥ṣṭânta* is not an essential part of "syllogistic" reasoning, inasmuch as the relation of invariable concomitance (*vyâpti*) suffices to prove the thesis. This is a continuation of the "economical" trend in Indian logic—that starts with Vasubandhu and his *Vâda-vidhâna* and *Vâda-vidhi*—to limit the number of necessary members of the proof formula, to simplify the reasoning procedures and to make such procedures universally binding, without any need for further empirical justification than the premises themselves: NA 20: ...' (*vide supra* n. 23).

⁹⁹ NAV 20.1: *yadâ sarvatra sâdhyâvinâbhâvinâṃ hetuṃ smarati pratipâdyas, tadâ pakṣe 'pi tam avabudhya katham sâdhyâṃ na pratipadyeta?*

¹⁰⁰ Cf. e.g. TSa 1368, 1371 p. 2, nn. 9, 23.

; LTV *tâbhyâṃ vinâva eka-lakṣaṇa-siddhiḥ*, n. 18.

¹⁰¹ Cf. NA 17.1: *ete ca dve apy ekasmin sâdhye prayoktavye' iti yo manyeta, tac chiṣyaṇârtham âhânyatarenâpi ... prayogaśya ca sâdhyâ-sâdhanam phalam; tac ced ekenâva sidhyati, dvitīya-prayogaḥ kevalam vaktur akauśalam âcakṣita.*—'And in order to instruct someone who might maintain: "Both of these two together have to be pronounced with regard to one [and the same] probandum," [the author] says: "precisely in either way"... [T]he result of [either] pronouncement is the proof of the probandum. If this [probandum] is proved just by one [of these two ways of pronouncement], the pronouncement of the other one would only evince the ineptitude of the speaker, because it is purposeless.' Further, in NAV 18, we find an opinion that all we need for valid inference are two members: *pakṣa* and *hetu*. Prabhâcandra refers to an interesting (hypothetical?) objection that if a person knows the context very well, he can understand the argument without stating the logical reason and only the thesis is enough, in other words, in certain circumstances it is enough to express the thesis only, not the *hetu*, see NKC p. 436.13–20: *prayojanâprasâdhakatvaṃ ca asiddham; pratipâdya-pratipatti-viśeṣasya tat-prasâdhyâ-prayojanasya sadbhâvât. pratipâdya hi kaścîn manda-matiḥ kaścîc tîvra-matiḥ. tatra yo manda-matiḥ na tasya prakṛtârtha-pratipatti-viśeṣaḥ pratijñâ-prayogaṃ antareṇôpapadyate, nâpi naiyâyikâdeḥ*

pañcāvayava-prayoge pratipanna-saṅketasya [recte: *saṅketasya*] *amanda-mater api, tad-aprayoge tena nigrāha-sthānābhidhānāt, “hīnam anyatamenāpi nyūnam”* [NS 5.2.12] *iti-vacanāt. tīvra-mates tu tat-prayogam antareṇāpi hetu-prayoga-mātrāt prakṛtārtha-pratipatti-pratītes tasya vaiyarthye hetu-prayogasyāpi vaiyārthyam syāt, niścītāvipratāraka-puruṣa-vacanād “agnir atra” ity-ādi-pratijñā-prayoga-mātra-rūpād eva kasyacit prakṛtārtha-pratipatti-darśanāt.*—‘And it is not established that one does not [have to] indicate [one’s own] purpose [in argument], because a particular understanding of the [person] to be taught is the purpose of the matter to be indicated to him. For the [person] to be taught can be someone slow-witted or someone sharp-witted. Out of them, for the one who is slow-witted a particular understanding of the matter in question cannot be accomplished without the pronouncement of the thesis, neither [can this be accomplished] for someone who has understood the linguistic convention [governing] the pronouncement of the five-membered proof formula of the Naiyāyika and others [and] who even is not slow-witted, because when the pronouncement of this [thesis is] not [made] thereby a the point of defeat can be announced, in compliance with NS 5.2.12: “[The proof formula] is deficient even when one of the [members] is missing.” However, if for someone sharp-witted—who has acquired the understanding of the matter in question merely through the pronouncement of the logical reason, even without the pronouncement of this [thesis]—this [pronouncement of the thesis] were [considered] purposeless, then also the pronouncement of the logical reason would [have to] be [considered] purposeless, because it can be empirically observed that someone [may acquire] the understanding of the matter in question merely through the pronouncement of a person who has certain knowledge and who is not deceitful which has merely the form of the thesis ‘There [on the hill] there is fire’, or similar.’ This opinion is subsequently rejected by Prabhācandra as follows. First, we have to state the thesis in order to show what our argument aims at (NKC p. 437.4–11); here Prabhācandra uses the analogy of an archer, well-known from NA 16 (*vide supra*, n. 105). Secondly, even if our argument can be understood by stating the thesis alone, we still have to formulate the logical reason as the rule that warrants the correctness of our reasoning (NKC p. 437.12–438.4).

¹⁰² Cf. NA 18:

*sādhyā-sādhanayor vyāptir yatra niścīyate-tarām /
sādharmyeṇa sa dṛṣṭāntaḥ sambandha-smaraṇān mataḥ //*

—‘Such [a statement] in which the invariable concomitance between the probandum and the probans is determined in the best possible way *because of the recollection of the relation* is known as the example based on similarity.’

¹⁰³ NAV 13.2: ... *tadā hetu-pratipādanam eva kriyate, śeṣābhidhānasya śrotr-saṃskārākāritayā nairarthakyād.*—‘the demonstration of the logical reason alone is carried out (*sc.* it suffices to mention solely the logical reason) because the explicit statement of the remaining [members of the proof formula]—inasmuch as they have the form of subliminal impressions in the hearer—is purposeless.’

¹⁰⁴ NAV 13.2: *evam manyate nākaḥ prakāraḥ parārthānumānasya, kiṃ tarhi yathā parasya sukkena prameya-pratītir bhavati tathā yatnataḥ pratyāyanīyaḥ. tatra daśāvayavaṃ sādhanam pratipādanōpāyaḥ. tad yathā ... tadā hetu-pratipādanam eva kriyate, śeṣābhidhānasya śrotr-saṃskārākāritayā nairarthakyāt.*—‘[The author] maintains that there is not [only] one variety of the inference for others, but also [that the cognoscible object] should be conveyed meticulously [to another person] in such a way so that the awareness of the cognoscible comes about easily [on the part] of the other person. For this [purpose], there is the ten-membered proof as the means of demonstration [of the cognoscible object], namely ... Then the demonstration of the logical reason alone is carried out (*sc.* it suffices to mention solely the logical reason) because the explicit statement of the remaining [members of the proof formula]—inasmuch as they have the form of subliminal impressions in the hearer—is

purposeless.’ Comp. however PV (P) 3.27cd: *viduṣāṁ vācya hetur eva hi kevalaḥ*.—
‘Since for scholars simply the logical reason alone is to be stated.’

¹⁰⁵ NA 14cd–16:

*tat-prayogo ’tra kartavyo hetor gocara-dīpakaḥ //
anyathā vādy-abhipreta-hetu-gocara-mohinaḥ /
pratyaḥyasya bhaved dhetur viruddhārekīto yathā //
dhānuṣka-guṇa-sampreṣi-janasya parividhyataḥ /
dhānuṣkasya vinā lakṣya-nirdeśena guṇetarau //*

The same idea is expressed in NKC p. 437.4–11.

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PVV	=	Manorathanandin: <i>Pramāṇa-vārttika-vṛtti</i> . See: PV (P) and PV (S)
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TBV	=	Abhayadevasūri: <i>Tattva-bodha-vidhāyinī. Saṁmati-tarka-prakaraṇa by Siddhasena Divākara with Abhayadevasūri's Commentary, Tattva-bodha-vidhāyinī</i> . Ed. by Sukhlāl Saṅghavi and Becardās Doṣi; Vol. I & II, RBTS VI-1,2; Kyoto 1984 [Reprinted from the original edition published in 5 vols., <i>Gujarāt-purā-tattva-mandir-granthāvalī</i> 10, 16, 18, 19, 21, <i>Gujarāt-purā-tattva-mandir</i> , Amdāvād, 1924–1931].

TS	= Umāsvāmin: <i>Tattvārtha-sūtra</i> . Ed. together with <i>Tattvārthādhigama-bhāṣya</i> by M.K. Mody, the Asiatic Society, <i>Bibliotheca Indica</i> 1044, Calcutta 1903–5.
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YAṬ	= Vidyānanda: <i>Yukty-anuśāsana-ṭikā</i> . See: YA.
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