

## Some Remarks on the *Naya* Method\*

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The most significant and intriguing Jaina contribution to Indian philosophical heritage is beyond doubt the theory of the multiplexity of reality (*anekānta-vāda*), that trifurcates into the method of the four standpoints (*nikṣepa-vāda*, *nyāsa-vāda*), the method of the seven-fold modal description (*sapta-bhaṅgī*<sup>1</sup>, *syād-vāda*) and the doctrine of viewpoints (*naya-vāda*), or the (usually) sevenfold method of conditionally valid predications. At the same time no other Jaina concept bred so much controversy as the idea that one and the same sentence can be either true or false, which seems implied by the admission of the multiplexity.

In the present paper, instead of dealing with the historical development of the concept of the *nayas*,<sup>2</sup> I wish to clarify the ramifications that were instrumental in moulding the concept and to analyse internal dependencies within the framework of the seven viewpoints (*naya*), and, finally, to briefly propose a certain interpretative basis for the *naya-vāda*. A closer look at a sample textual material is imperative, in so far as it should help the reader assess whether my understanding based on these

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\* The main ideas found in this paper appeared for the first time in a succinct form in Polish in BALCEROWICZ (1994).

<sup>1</sup> The term *sapta-bhaṅgī* (lit. ‘seven-angled’, ‘seven-twister’) usually refers to *syād-vāda*, cf. e.g. SVM 24.2–3 (p. 148.2–3): *anekāntātmakatvaṃ ca sapta-bhaṅgī-prarūpaṇena sukhōpanneyaṃ syād iti sāpi nirūpitā*. However, it may occasionally in mediaeval period also refer to *naya-vāda* itself, etc. Thus we can eventually speak of *pramāṇa-sapta-bhaṅgī* (which is *syād-vāda*), *naya-sapta-bhaṅgī* (which is *naya-vāda*) and *durnaya-sapta-bhaṅgī*; comp. e.g. SBhT, p. 16.1: *īyaṃ ca sapta-bhaṅgī dviḍdhā: pramāṇa-sapta-bhaṅgī naya-sapta-bhaṅgī cēti*, and NC 254ab (p. 128): *sattēva humti bhaṅgā pamāṇa-ṇaya-duṇaya-bheda-juttāvi* / —‘There are as many as seven conditional perspectives with divisions with respect to cognitive criteria, viewpoints and defective viewpoints.’

<sup>2</sup> The term is well-attested not only in Jaina *Āgamas*, but is also well known—in its not strictly technical meaning—from Pāli commentaries as ‘a method of interpretation’ (e.g. *aparo nayo*, *evam-ādinā nayena*, *ti-ādinā nayena*) and other Buddhist sources (e.g. AN 2.193: *naya-hetu*). Interestingly enough, in Buddhist sources we also come across its opposite *durnaya*, ‘the improper application of exposition’ or ‘misinterpretation’ (e.g. AN 3.178 or *Jātaka* 4.241: *dunnaya*).

passages is correct. Otherwise, to indiscriminately speak of the general concept of the Jaina doctrine of viewpoints would, in its hollowness, resemble investigation of a crow's teeth (*kāka-danta-parīkṣā*).

The textual point of reference will be provided by Umāsvāti's<sup>3</sup> *Tattvārthādhigama-bhāṣya*, Siddhasena Divākara's<sup>4</sup> *Sammati-tarka-prakarāṇa*, Akalaṅka's works (*Rāja-vārttika* and *Laghīyas-traya*), Siddharṣigaṇi's *Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti* and Malliṣeṇa's *Syād-vāda-mañjarī*; only occasionally I shall take recourse to some other Jaina works, and the focus will be more textual-philological, rather than formal-logical.

An ontological assumption underlying the theory of the multiplexity of reality (*anekānta-vāda*) in general, and the doctrine of viewpoints (*naya-vāda*) in particular, consists in the belief which is supposed to defy all simplistic concepts ranging from monism and eternalism (*advaita*) to pluralism and momentariness (*kṣaṇika-vāda*). In other words, the world forms a multifaceted structure, every part of which enters into specific relations and inter-dependencies with other parts of the whole. Its make-up is complex enough to allow for a vast range of statements that can be asserted from various standpoints. The ontological framework is provided by the concept of substance (*dravya*), which is characterised simultaneously by origination (*utpāda, udaya*), continued existence (*sthīti, dhrauvya*) and annihilation (*bhaṅga, vyaya, apavarga*), insofar as it is endowed with qualities (*guṇa*) and transient modes (*paryāya*) as well as with directly experienced, though verbally inexpressible momentary occurrences (*vivarta, vartanā*). Any truth-conducive analysis, which is supposed to map the ontological structure onto epistemological-conceptual framework, should therefore take into account the individual ontological context and accompanying circumstances of any phenomenon or entity under examination. The maxim provides that truth should only be complete truth, whereas incomplete truth would be but a misnomer for utter falsehood. However, limitations of practical dealings and verbal communication by necessity abstract any given thing or facet of reality from all its temporal, spatial, causal and other relations, and emphasise but one aspect, relevant in a given moment.

Due to this infinite manifoldness of inter-dependencies, including various temporal and spatial perspectives as well as either universal or particular reference,

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<sup>3</sup> Since there is some controversy as to whether TBh is the auto-commentary of the author of the *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, I tentatively— not to predetermine the issue—take TS as a work by Umāsvāmin and TBh as a commentary by Umāsvāti.

<sup>4</sup> Not to be confused with the author of the *Nyāyāvatāra*, Siddhasena Mahāmati, who flourished after Dharmakīrti, see: BALCEROWICZ (2000), BALCEROWICZ (2001a: xxxiv–xxxvii), BALCEROWICZ (2001c) and BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming).

a vast range of properties, each of them being equally justified, could be predicated of a given entity with equal right. And that might even lead eventually to seeming contradictions. The Jainas maintain that such contradictions that ensue from unconditional assertions standing in opposition to one another can easily be resolved when individual points of reference for each and every assertion are taken into consideration.<sup>5</sup> Given such ontological presuppositions, the description on the epistemological level becomes equally complex: each of such dichotomic categories as big–small, good–bad, existent–nonexistent, true–false, etc., that are mutually related, when dissociated from its opposite, is false. In other words, each thesis automatically entails its antithesis, but the model is not dialectical, in so far as the synthesis remains integrated with the very same scheme and thus contingent upon its corollaries. To correlate such individual, partial standpoints is the task of the *syād-vāda* method, which systematises possible arrangements of seemingly contradictory statements. This is evident from such Malliṣeṇa’s statements as ‘the method of modal description ... consists in all viewpoints’<sup>6</sup>.

Interestingly enough, it is the *naya* model which the Jainas used to interpret and incorporate various philosophical theories or worldviews into a consistent holistic framework, instead of the doctrine of the seven-fold modal description (*sapta-bhaṅgī*, *syād-vāda*). Numerous Jaina authors such as Akalaṅka, Siddhasena Divākara in STP, Siddhasena Mahāmāti in his NAV 29, Malliṣeṇa in SVM 28 correlate particular theories and views represented by particular thinkers and philosophical schools o n l y under the *naya* scheme.

On the other hand, ‘the doctrine of the seven-fold modal description’ (*sapta-bhaṅgī*) is primarily discussed in three contexts: that of the triple nature of reality, which is believed to consist of ‘origination, continuation and decay’, that of the relation between the universal and the particular (e.g. RVār 4.42, p. 258–259), and that of the relationship between the substance and its properties / modes. Essentially, all the examples of the application of ‘the doctrine of the seven-fold modal description’ pertain to one and the same problem: how to relate the whole and its parts, the problem entailed by the question of the relation between

<sup>5</sup> TBh 1.35: *yathā vā pratyakṣānumānōpamānāpta-vacanaīḥ pramāṇair eko ’rthaḥ pramīyate sva-viṣaya-niyamān na ca tā vipratipattayo bhavanti tadvan naya-vādā iti.*— ‘Or else, just the way one object is cognised by [various] cognitive criteria—such as perception, inference, analogy and testimony [imparted] by an authoritative person—and they become no contradictories (*sc.* they are not at variance with each other), because [each of them is] circumscribed to its own province, similar to them are expositions [by means] of [every conditionally valid] viewpoint.’

<sup>6</sup> SVM 19.76, p. 128.24: *sarva-nayātmakena syād-vādena...*

permanence and change. This finds corroboration in Hemacandra's *Anya-yoga-vyavaccheda-dvātrīṃśikā* 25 and in Malliṣeṇa's *Syād-vāda-mañjarī* (SVM 25.31–36, pp. 152.34–153.4).

Occasionally, to illustrate the principle how such conditionally valid viewpoints (*naya*) apply to the real world and how differences between descriptions of one and the same phenomenon by means of different predications are possible, the Jainas resort to the simile, well-known in India, the elephant and the blind men, well known from *Udāna* 4.4 (pp. 66–69).<sup>7</sup> When such partial views are taken unconditionally (e.g. *sad eva*<sup>8</sup>), they are instances of a defective viewpoint (*durnaya*) and instantiation of 'the maxim of the blind people and the elephant' (*andha-gaja-nyāya*), known also as 'the maxim of people who are blind from birth and the elephant' (*jāty-andha-hasti-nyāya*). Also the maxim as an illustration of philosophical-religious views accepted unconditionally is, as a rule, used in the context of (*dur*)-*naya-vāda*, not *syād-vāda*. It occurs twice in Malliṣeṇa's *Syād-vāda-mañjarī* (14.103–104 and 19.75–77), and in both cases in the same context of *durnaya*. The first instance is rather obvious: '...Simply by force of extreme disorientation produced by a defective viewpoint, foolish people deny one [aspect] and establish the other one. This is the maxim of the blind [people] and the elephant.'<sup>9</sup> Malliṣeṇa's second instance seems equivocal at first, because both the notions of *naya* and of *syād-vāda* are found there: '...Because no entity, which consists in infinite properties cannot be grasped properly without the method of modal description which consists in all viewpoints, for otherwise that would lead to the undesired consequence of seizing [merely] sprouts (sc. superficial,

<sup>7</sup> It is quite remarkable how widespread in other philosophical and religious schools than Buddhism the maxim became. Comp. JACOB (1907–1911: I: 3).

<sup>8</sup> The gist of the defective viewpoint is its unconditionality, expressed by *eva* (*sad eva*), the proper viewpoint (*naya*) is indeterminate and 'open', non-exclusive (*sat*), whereas the modal description expressly avails itself of the modal functor 'in a certain sense' (*syāt*), or 'somehow' (*kathaṃcit*). Cf. SVM 28.10–12, p. 159.14–16: *durnītayaś ca nayāś ca pramāṇe ca durnīti-naya-pramāṇāni taiḥ kenōllekhena mīyetēty āha sad eva sat syāt sad iti*.—'Defective opinions, viewpoints as well as both cognitive criteria are [the members of the compound in Hemacandra's aphorism AYVD 28]; [they are used there in the instrumental case]. "By what manner of description [a thing] is cognised [through them]?" It is replied: (1) *x* is nothing but existent, (2) *x* is existent, (3) *x* is in a certain sense existent.'

<sup>9</sup> SVM 14.103–104, p. 88.9–10: *kevalam durnaya-prabhāvita-mati-vyāmoha-vaśād ekam apalapyānyatarad vyavasthāpayanti bālīśāḥ. so 'yam andha-gaja-nyāyaḥ*.

deficient cognition) following the maxim of the blind [people] and the elephant.<sup>10</sup> In the latter quotation we encounter, as a matter of fact, a triple-level parallelism: *dharma – vastu*, *naya – syād-vāda*, and *andha-gaja-nyāya – pallava-grahitā-prasaṅga*; in other words, an entity pertaining to its properties, the modal description pertaining to viewpoints, and the undesired consequence (*prasaṅga*) pertaining to the maxim (*nyāya*). Accordingly, a complex entity as a whole (*vastu*) is the scope of the comprehensive modal description (*syād-vāda*), the defective form of which is the superficial, deficient cognition (*pallava-grahitā*) that grasps only ‘undeveloped’ sprouts, or scanty, partial data. Furthermore, a single property (*dharma*) is the scope of an particular viewpoint (*naya*), the defective form of which is exemplified by the maxim of ‘the maxim of the blind people and the elephant’, which is tantamount to *durnaya*. Thus, Malliṣeṇa’s both illustrations are consistent in referring to the idea of the unconditional, defective viewpoint. This additionally supports the contention that only the (*dur*)*naya* model is employed to map philosophical opinions.

Due to multifaceted circumstances, all assertoric sentences can only be relatively true:

‘Therefore all viewpoints with no exception are false views [when strictly] related to their respective spheres (*pakṣa*); however, [when understood] as mutually dependent, they become [viewpoints] conducive to truth.’<sup>11</sup>

This relativity, however, is not eventually tantamount to professing scepticism, and the Jainas are quite explicit about that.

The possibility of attaining truth is ensured jointly by the concept of comprehensive and consistence-based cognitive criteria (*pramāṇa*) and partial, aspect-qualified viewpoints, as instruments of detailed examination.<sup>12</sup> However, the existence of truth as such and the possibility that it can become the contents of cognition is eventually warranted, according to Jaina beliefs, by omniscience

<sup>10</sup> SVM 19.75–77, p. 128.23–25: *ananta-dharmātmakasya sarvasya vastunaḥ sarvanayātmakena syād-vādena vinā yathāvad grahitum aśakyatvāt. itarathāndha-gaja-nyāyena pallava-grahitā-prasaṅgāt.*

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Siddhasena Divākara’s statement in STP 1.21:

*tamhā savve vi ṇayā micchā-diṭṭhī sapakkha-paḍibaddhā /  
aṇṇoṇṇa-ṇissīā uṇa havaṃti sammatta-sabbhāvā //*

<sup>12</sup> TS 1.6: *pramāṇa-nayair adhigamaḥ*—‘The comprehension of [the categories representing reality, mentioned in TS 1.4.] is [accomplished] through cognitive criteria and [conditionally valid] viewpoints’. See also n. 19.

(*kevala*). The latter assumption led to such paradoxical contentions that ultimately truth consists of all false statements taken together:

‘[Let there be] prosperity to Jina’s words that are made of an amassment of false views, that are conducive to immortality, that are venerable, and lead to the salvific happiness.’<sup>13</sup>

This relativity of every predication and the impossibility of uttering an unconditionally valid statement about the reality could theoretically lead to two more—beside scepticism—different approaches. On the one hand, it could be a reason good enough to dispense with the soundness of the discursive thinking altogether and, in this way, it would embrace the negative approach of Nāgārjuna and be reflected in the structure of the tetralemma (*catus-koṭī*). The dependent character of every notion and conceptual representation, the ineffable and complex structuring of reality (*prapañca*), as it is reflected in the rational and dichotomic mind, inescapably involves real contradictions (*virodha*) and antinomies (*prasaṅga*). On the other hand, the result could as well be an all-inclusive, positive approach. Two contradictory conclusions derived from one and the same thesis do not have to falsify the initial thesis, e.g., ‘things arise from a cause’ and ‘things do not arise from a cause’ do not have to unconditionally negate the discourse about causality; ‘there is motion’ and ‘there is no motion’; ‘there is time,’ ‘there is a part and the whole,’ etc. Such two seemingly contradictory conclusions should make us only perceptive of the fact that they may—and indeed do—pertain to different contexts. This would be the Jaina approach. Despite this, the Jaina theory of *anekānta-vāda* has frequently, and undeservedly, been blamed to disregard the law of the excluded middle<sup>14</sup> or the law of non-contradiction in stronger or weaker sense<sup>15</sup>. However, one and the same sentence (*p*), when negated conditionally (i.e.

<sup>13</sup> Siddhasena Divākara’s concluding verse of STP 3.69:

*baddam micchā-daṁsaṇa-samūha-maiyassa amaya-sārassa /  
jīṇa-vayaṇassa bhagavao samvigga-suhāhigammassa //*

<sup>14</sup> The criticism concerns especially the conjunction of the first two figures (*syāt*-descriptions) of the *sapta-bhaṅgī* that refer to the predicated object: (1) *syād asti*: ‘from a certain viewpoint, *x* exists,’ and (2) *syād nāsti*: ‘from a certain viewpoint, *x* does not exist.’

<sup>15</sup> Notably, the violation of the law of contradiction is said, mistakenly as it were, to be involved in either or both the third and fourth figures of the *sapta-bhaṅgī*: (3) *syād asty eva syān nāsty eva*: ‘from a certain viewpoint, *x* exists and, from a certain viewpoint, *x* does not exist’ (wherein two predicated features are claimed to be taken subsequently), and (4) *syād avaktavyam*: ‘from a certain viewpoint, *x* is inexpressible,’ (two contrary features are believed to be predicated of a thing in question jointly and simultaneously). Comp.

with the particle *syāt*—‘from a certain point of view’), yields not a contrary statement ( $\neg p$ ) in the sense that when combined with the initial statement  $p$  is an application of the law of the excluded middle ( $p \vee \neg p$ ), but refers to a different context, viz., its point of reference of two conjuncts is different.<sup>16</sup>

PANDEY (1984: 163): ‘[O]nly that logic is indicated by *syādvāda* which challenges the law of contradiction and gives some truth value to contradictory statements’; BHARUCHA–KAMAT (1984: 183); MATILAL (1991: 10–11 [13–15]) or GANERI (2002: 9): ‘When talking about the “law of non-contradiction” in a deductive system, we must distinguish between two quite different theses: (a) the thesis that “ $\neg(p \ \& \ \neg p)$ ” is a theorem in the system, and (b) the thesis that it is not the case that both “ $p$ ” and “ $\neg p$ ” are theorems. The Jainas are committed to the first of these theses, but reject the second. *This* is the sense in which it is correct to say that the Jainas reject the “law of non-contradiction”.’

<sup>16</sup> GOKHALE (1991: [77]) was right to point out that in case of *anekānta-vāda* ‘both  $p$  and not- $p$  are true in some respect. But of course the respect in which  $p$  is true is different from the one in which not- $p$  is true. In this way the role of the term *syāt* in *syāt*-statements is to dissolve the apparent contradiction between statements by pointing out that the truth of apparently contradictory statements is relative to the respective standpoints’. The seeming inconsistency between, or contradictoriness of two sentences, e.g. ‘it (some object) exists’ and ‘it (some object) does not exist’—that are symbolised as  $p$  and  $\neg p$ —is due to the fact that what we have is an incomplete statement. To cite an example attested by textual sources (e.g. JTBh 1.22 § 63):

- ‘with respect to substance ( $S$ ), a given pot  $x$  exists as being made of clay’ ( $A^S_1x$ ) and ‘with respect to substance ( $S$ ), a given pot  $x$  does not exist as something made of water’ ( $\neg A^S_2x$ ),
- ‘with respect to place ( $P$ ), a given pot  $x$  exists in the city of Pāṭaliputra’ ( $B^P_1x$ ) and ‘with respect to place ( $P$ ), a given pot  $x$  does not exist in the city of Kānyakubja’ ( $\neg B^P_2x$ ),
- ‘with respect to time ( $T$ ), a given pot  $x$  exists in the autumn’ ( $C^T_1x$ ) and ‘with respect to time ( $T$ ), a given pot  $x$  does not exist in the spring’ ( $\neg C^T_2x$ ),
- ‘with respect to condition ( $C$ ), a given pot  $x$  exists as something black’ ( $D^C_1x$ ) and ‘with respect to condition ( $C$ ), a given pot  $x$  does not exist as something red’ ( $\neg D^C_2x$ ).

Accordingly, the first two conditional statements, as well as their conjunction should be analysed as a range of indexed predicates:

- (1)  $A^S_1x, B^P_1x, C^T_1x, D^C_1x, \dots$ , and
- (2)  $\neg A^S_2x, \neg B^P_2x, \neg C^T_2x, \neg D^C_2x, \dots$

Here  $A, B, C, D, \dots$  are predicates indexed with the set of parameters of substance (*dravya*) =  $S$ , place (*kṣetra*) =  $P$ , time (*kāla*) =  $T$ , and condition (*bhāva*) =  $C$ .

In this way, we neither have the case of two inconsistent statements (the adjunction of)  $p$  and  $\neg p$  that are both theorems of the system, nor their conjunction  $p \wedge \neg p$ , but

Jaina realism has it that even images in a dream are not purely figments of our conceptualisation but have some kind of objective basis and rational justification. By the same token, our statements pertaining to reality are claimed by the Jainas to possess some truth; however, the infinity of ontological correlations can in no way be reflected in our language due to its inherent limitations (*avadhāraṇa*)<sup>17</sup>. That is why a range of utterances articulated about one and the same object, seemingly standing in contradiction to each other, may take its various contexts and ramifications into consideration. Likewise, different points of reference and time of expression, different intentions and context of apparently one and the same sentence on the verbal level make it h o m o n y m i c .

The way we deal with cognised objects is reflected in the Jaina scheme of *nayas*, and this takes place on the conceptual (*svādhigama*, *jñānātmaka*), verbal (*parādhigama*, *vacanātmaka*) and practical (*vyavahāra*) level,<sup>18</sup> since all these three are interconnected. A set of conditionally valid viewpoints was not only considered an ancillary theoretical device, subordinate to the theory of multiplexity of reality, and was

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rather two related statements expressed under different circumstances or with relation to different parameters.

Furthermore, the conjunction of two apparently contradictory statements  $p$  &  $\neg p$  is in fact a conjunction, which, having been disambiguated, yields no real contradiction:

$$(3) A^S_{1x} \& \neg A^S_{2x}, B^P_{1x} \& \neg B^P_{2x}, C^T_{1x} \& \neg C^T_{2x}, D^C_{1x} \& \neg D^C_{2x}, \dots$$

<sup>17</sup> Cf. NAV 1.9 (p. 17) and NAV 29.28 (p. 472): ‘every sentence functions with a restriction’—*sarvaṃ vākyaṃ (vacanaṃ) sāvadhāraṇaṃ*.

<sup>18</sup> This is implied in the passage of RVār 1.6 (p. 33.11–13): **4. *adhigama-hetur dvividhaḥ***. [*adhigama-hetur dvividhaḥ*] *svādhigama-hetuḥ parādhigama-hetuś ca. svādhigama-hetur jñānātmakaḥ pramāṇa-naya-vikalpaḥ, parādhigama-hetur vacanātmakaḥ. tena śrutākhyena pramāṇena syād-vāda-naya-saṃskṛtena pratiparyāyaṃ sapta-bhaṅgīmanto jīvādayaḥ padārthā adhigamayitavyāḥ*.—‘The cause of comprehension [of the categories representing reality] is two-fold: the cause for one’s own comprehension and the cause for the other’s comprehension. The cause for one’s own comprehension consists in cognition [and] is divided into cognitive criterion and viewpoint, [whereas] the cause for the other’s comprehension consists in statements. Entities such as living elements etc. that are amenable to the seven-fold description should be comprehended from every angle by means of the cognitive criterion called testimony, refined through [the method of the] modal description and through [the method of] viewpoints.’ Clearly, the idea of *svādhigama-hetu* and *parādhigama-hetu* directly corresponds to Siddhasena Mahāmati’s distinction between ‘the sentence for oneself’ (*svārtha-vākya*) and ‘the sentence for others’ (*parārtha-vākya*) in NA 10, which was in its turn influenced by Diñnāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s well-known division of *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna*.

supposed to corroborate the latter, but, from the very beginnings of Jaina epistemology, it coexisted with cognitive criteria (*pramāṇa*) as an alternative epistemic instrument:

‘All states of [all] substances, that are comprehended by means of all cognitive criteria, are [equally] capable of being predicated of by means of all [conditionally valid] viewpoints in a detailed manner.’<sup>19</sup>

Here, we clearly find a conviction that any given utterance functions within its given individual context and it is only within the confines delineated by this context that the sentence retains its veracity. The viewpoints (*naya*) organise the world of things of our practical dealings, and within their sphere of practical application they help us determine the truth-value of a proposition by way of its contextualisation within a given universe of conceivable points of reference. They are not supposed to contribute anything new to our knowledge,<sup>20</sup> as Akalaṅka declares: ‘Application of viewpoints with regard to things cognised by means of cognitive criteria is the basis of everyday practice.’<sup>21</sup> Accordingly, the *nayas* only selectively (*vikalādeśa*) arrange comprehensive data material already acquired<sup>22</sup>. In the same spirit, Yaśovijaya defines conditionally valid viewpoints as ‘particular varieties of cognitive activity that grasp one facet of a real thing, which by its nature has infinite

<sup>19</sup> Uttar 28.24:

*davvāṇa savva-bhāvā savva-pamāṇehi jassa uvaladdhā /  
savvāhi naya-vihim vitthāra-rūi tti nāyavvo //*

<sup>20</sup> Interestingly, the idea that *nayas* are clearly distinguished from cognitive criteria, precisely because they avail themselves of the knowledge already acquired by a *pramāṇa*, complies with the Mīmāṃsaka’s idea that cognitive criterion (*pramāṇam*) contributes a new element to our cognition, or ‘comprehends a not [yet] comprehended object’ (*anadhigatārthadhigantṛ*), see ŚBh 1.1.5: *autpattikas tu śabdasyārthena sambandhas tasya jñānam upadeśo ’vyatirekaś cārthe ’nupalabdhe tat pramāṇam bādarāyaṇasyānapekṣatvāt*; ŚDī, p. 45: *kāraṇa-doṣa-bādhaka-jñāna-rahitam aghṛhita-grāhi-jñānam pramāṇam*; MSV 5.(Vṛtti-kāra).11ab: *sarvasyānupalabdhe ’rthe prāmāṇyam smṛtir anyathā /*

<sup>21</sup> RVār 1.6 (p. 33.6–7): *pramāṇa-prakāśiteṣv artheṣu naya-pravṛtter vyavahāra-hetuvād abhyārhaḥ. yataḥ pramāṇa-prakāśiteṣv artheṣu naya-pravṛttir vyavahāra-hetur bhavati ato ’syābhyarhitatvam.*

<sup>22</sup> Comp. the unidentified quotation in RVār 1.6 (p. 33.9–10): *sakalādeśaḥ pramāṇādhiṇo vikalādeśo nayādhiṇaḥ*—‘Complete account rests on cognitive criteria, [whereas] incomplete account rests on viewpoints’, as well as LT 62 and LTV ad loc. (*Pravacana-praveśa*), pp. 686.2–688.2:

*upayogau śrutasya dvau syād-vāda-naya-samjñitau /  
syād-vādaḥ sakalādeśo nayo vikala-samkathā //*

properties [and] which has been discerned by cognitive criterion, [and that] do not disprove [facets] others than this [one].<sup>23</sup>

Thus, *pramāṇas* serve as criteria of validity and reliability of our cognition and are expected to ensure the acquisition of truth, whereas the viewpoints are an attempt to contextualise any given utterance and determine in which sense it asserts truth.

The process of arrangement and selection is accomplished with the help of *progrressive* indexation, in which each viewpoint (*naya*) delimits the context by introducing indices of spatial co-ordinates, temporal factors, linguistic convention, etc. The idea of the viewpoint (*naya*) as a device to single out a particular aspect of an object, viz. its point of reference, is underscored, for instance, by Siddhasena Mahāmati<sup>24</sup> in NA 29: ‘The real thing, whose essence is multiplex, [forms] the domain of all acts of awareness; an object qualified by [only] one facet is known as the province of the viewpoint.’<sup>25</sup>

The assumption of the manifold character of reality in which things relate to each other by an infinite number of relations finds its expression in the conviction that every situation can be both viewed from infinite angles as well reflected in our language: infinity of interrelations corresponds to a theoretically infinite number of predications, each retaining its validity only conditionally, viz. restricted to its particular perspective.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>23</sup> JTBh 2.1: *pramāṇa-paricchinnasyānanta-dharmātmakasya vastuna eka-deśa-grāhiṇas tad-itaram sāpratikṣepino ’dhyavasāya-viśeṣā nayāḥ*.

<sup>24</sup> See n. 4.

<sup>25</sup> NA 29:

*anekāntātmakam vastu gocaraḥ sarva-saṁvidām /  
eka-deśa-viśiṣṭo ’rtho nayasya viśayo mataḥ //*

Cf. STP 1.22–25.

<sup>26</sup> This idea is explicitly stated by Siddharṣiṅgaṇi in NAV 29.12 (p. 440): *saṁkhyayā punar anantā iti, ananta-dharmatvād vastunas, tad-eka-dharma-paryavasitābhiprāyāṇām ca nayatvāt, tathāpi cirantanācāryaiḥ sarva-saṅgrāhi-saptābhiprāya-parikalpanā-dvāreṇa sapta nayāḥ pratipādītāḥ*.—‘According to the number, however, [viewpoints are] infinite, because the real thing is endowed with infinite properties and because [various] outlooks confined to [one] property of this [real thing] are viewpoints. Nevertheless, ancient preceptors taught that there are seven viewpoints, by means of assuming seven outlooks that collect together all [possible viewpoints].’ The passage is quoted and elaborated in SVM 28.56–60 (p. 161.11–15): *nayās cānantāḥ. ananta-dharmatvād vastunas tad-eka-dharma-paryavastitānām vaktur abhiprāyāṇām ca nayatvāt tathā ca vṛddhāḥ. jāvaiyā vayanava-vaḥ tāvaiyā ceva hoṁti ṇaya-vāyā / [STP 3.47ab] iti*.

Usually, but not always, conditionally valid predications are divided into two major classes: substantial (*dravyāstika-naya*), or substance-expressive (*dravyārthika-naya*), and attributive (*paryāyāstika-naya*), or mode-expressive (*paryāyārthika-naya*)<sup>27</sup>. Whereas the former emphasises continuity and essential identity of evolving things, the latter predominantly deals with the mutable character of phenomena and their transient manifestations and accentuates the attributive side of reality. Most commonly these two classes of conditionally valid viewpoints are further subdivided into seven following types<sup>28</sup>:

<sup>27</sup> Cf., e.g., STP 1.3. Akalaṅka (RVār 1.33, p. 94) has substantial (*dravyāstika-naya*) and attributive (*paryāyāstika-naya*). Kundakunda, e.g. in PSā 2.22, has: *davvaṭṭhiṇa* (*dravyārthika*) and *pajjayatṭhiṇa* (*paryāyārthika*), without any further subdivision. It is well known that Kundakunda (e.g. in SSā 353) uses also another two-fold classification of viewpoints, viz. *vavahāra* (*vyavahāra-naya*), or empirical, and *ñicchaya* (*niścaya-naya*), or ultimate, the former not be confused with the *vyavahāra-naya* of the sevenfold ‘*naigamādi*’ classification. This classification in its import goes back to the earlier Buddhist distinction of the empirical truth (*saṃvṛti-satya*, *vyavahāra*, *laukika-satya*) and the ultimate truth (*paramārtha-satya*), which is already attested in *Kathā-vatthu* and *Milinda-pañha*, finds its classical expression with Nāgārjuna (e.g. MMK 24.8–9) and is taken over in such Yogācāra works as *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra* (MSA 11.3) and *Uttara-tantra* (UtT 1.84). On Kundakunda’s *vavahāra–ñicchaya* division see in this volume Jayandra Soni’s ‘Kundakunda and Umāsvāti on *Anekānta-vāda*’ (pp. 25–35, esp. p. 28 ff.), and Christoph Emmrich’s ‘How many times? Pluralism, dualism or monism in early Jaina temporal description’ (pp. 69–88, esp. p. 71 f.).

<sup>28</sup> Cf. STP 1.4–5:

*davvaṭṭhiya-naya-payaḍi suddhā*<sup>(1)</sup> *saṃgaha-parūvaṇāvisao* /  
*paḍirūve*<sup>(2)</sup> *puṇa vayaṇa-ttha-ñicchao tassa vavahāro* //  
*mūla-nimeṇaṃ*<sup>(3)</sup> *pajjava-ṇayassa ujjusuya-vayaṇa-vicchedo* /  
*tassa tu saddāī sāha-pasāhā*<sup>(4)</sup> *suhuma-bheyā*<sup>(4)</sup> // —

—‘The pure nature of the substance-expressive viewpoint is the province of the description [by means] of the collective [viewpoint]. As regards [its] countertype, in its turn, the empirical [viewpoint] of this [substance-expressive category consists in] the determination of the meaning of an utterance. The prime support of the mode[-expressive] viewpoint is the division of the utterance [expressing] the direct viewpoint. Of this, the verbal and other [viewpoints] are subtle[r] divisions, [like] branches and twigs.’

[<sup>(1)-(4)</sup> Abhayadevasūri’s relevant glosses in STPṬ. *ad loc.* are quite useful:

<sup>(1)</sup> [p. 315.9–10:] *suddhā ity asañkīrṇā viśeṣāsaṃsparśavati*. (‘‘Pure’’ means not mingled, having no association with the particular.’), <sup>(2)</sup> [p. 316.11–12:] [*a*] *suddham paḍirūvaṃ ... pratirūpaṃ pratibimbaṃ pratiniḍhir iti yāvat* (countertype = impure),

substance-expressive ( <i>dravyārthika</i> )	mode-expressive ( <i>paryāyārthika</i> )
1. comprehensive ( <i>naigama</i> )	4. direct ( <i>rju-sūtra</i> )
2. collective ( <i>saṅgraha</i> )	5. verbal ( <i>śabda</i> )
3. empirical ( <i>vyavahāra</i> )	6. etymological ( <i>samabhirūḍha</i> )
	7. factual ( <i>evam-bhūta, ittham-bhāva</i> )

Table 1

This scheme, found also in Akalaṅka's *Rāja-vārttika*, is not universally followed in Jaina literature. For certain reasons (*vide infra* n. 80) STP does not distinguish separately *naigama-naya* and speaks of only six viewpoints.

Furthermore, we find the divisions of *dravyārthika-naya* and *paryāyārthika-naya* neither in the canonical works such as *Aṇuoga* or *Ṭhāṅga*, nor in such relatively late treatises as TS, TBh, NA or NAV. As against the frequently quoted opinion (e.g. JAINI (1920: 45 ff.), SCHUBRING (1978: 161, § 76)), they are entirely absent from TS and TBh. Thus, for instance, TS in TBh-recension subsumes the varieties of (5), (6) and (7) under the head of *śabda-naya* (*vide infra*).

NAV 29 classifies the seven viewpoints into two main divisions slightly differently:

object-bound, operating by means of object ( <i>artha-dvāreṇa</i> [ <i>pravṛtta</i> ])	speech-bound, operating by means of speech ( <i>śabda-dvāreṇa</i> [ <i>pravṛtta</i> ])
1. comprehensive ( <i>naigama</i> )	5. verbal ( <i>śabda</i> )
2. collective ( <i>saṅgraha</i> )	6. etymological ( <i>samabhirūḍha</i> )
3. empirical ( <i>vyavahāra</i> )	7. factual ( <i>evam-bhūta</i> )
4. direct ( <i>rju-sūtra</i> )	

<sup>(3)</sup> [p. 317.12, 349.2–3:] **mūlam ādiḥ ne(ṇi)meṇaṃ ādhāraḥ**, <sup>(4)</sup> [p. 349.5–6:] **śākhā-prasākhā iva sthūla-sūkṣmatara-darśitatvāt sūkṣmo bhedo viśeṣo yeṣāṃ te tathā.**]

See also PALV 6.74, p. 54.7–9: *tatra mūla-nayau dvau dravyārthika-paryāyārthika-bhedāt. tatra dravyārthikas tredhā naigama-saṅgraha-vyavahāra-bhedāt. paryāyārthikas caturdhā rju-sūtra-śabda-samabhirūḍhāvam-bhūta-bhedāt.* For the purely sevenfold division see: AṇD 606 (*satta mūla-ṇayā paṇṇattā. taṃ jahā—ṇegame saṃgahe vavahāre ujjusue sadde samabhirūḍhe evambhūte*) = Ṭhāṇ 552, as well as TBh 1.35, SSi 1.33, NAT 29, etc. Umāsvāmin's tradition of TS enumerated only five major types. The comprehensive viewpoint was divided into two subtypes, viz. selective (*deśa-parikṣepin*) and all-inclusive (*sarva-parikṣepin*), even though Umāsvāti does not explicate them further in TBh, whereas the verbal viewpoint was further subdivided into three viewpoints (*tiṇṇi sadda-ṇayā*): accurate (*sāmpai-sadda-naya, sāmprata-naya*), etymological (*samabhirūḍha*) and factual (*evam-bhūya*). See TS 1.34,35: /34/ *naigama-saṅgraha-vyavahāra-rju-sūtra-śabdā nayāḥ*, /35/ *ādya-śabdau dvi-tri-bhedau.* (This is according to the reading preserved in TBh 1.34–35). SSi 1.33 offers a *varia lectio* of TS: *naigama-saṅgraha-vyavahāra-rju-sūtra-śabda-samabhirūḍhāvam-bhūtā nayāḥ.*

Table 2

A scheme rather similar to that of Table 2 is apparently followed also by TS in view of the explicit mention (TS 1.34) of the group *naigama-saṅgraha-vyavahāra-rju-sūtra* appended by the uniform *śabda* subcategory, which is subdivided only in the following aphorism of TS 1.35—this would correspond to *śabda-dvāreṇa* [*pravṛtta*] of NAV.

Also TBh seems to share a similar model not only because of the absolute absence of *dravyārthika-naya* and *pariyāyārthika-naya*, but also because, in the introductory part<sup>29</sup>, the viewpoints 5–7 are singled out by a special preliminary description of their common feature under the head *śabda* (*yathārthābhīdhānam śabdam*), and because, in the four recapitulatory verses on p. 35.4–36.2, the stress is specifically laid on the comprehensive *śabda* category<sup>30</sup>:

1. comprehensive ( <i>naigama</i> )	2. collective ( <i>saṅgraha</i> )	5. verbal ( <i>śabda</i> )
a. partially inclusive ( <i>deśa-parikṣepin</i> )	3. empirical ( <i>vyavahāra</i> )	a. present ( <i>sāmprata</i> )
b. all-inclusive ( <i>sarva-parikṣepin</i> )	4. direct ( <i>rju-sūtra</i> )	b. etymological ( <i>samabhirūḍha</i> )
		c. factual ( <i>evam-bhūta</i> )

Table 3

Let us have a closer look at the character of each of the viewpoints in order to examine exact relationship between them.

The comprehensive viewpoint (*naigama-naya*) grasps a given phenomenon in a most general way and takes recourse to a possibly most extensive, all-inclusive context, which is referred to by a particular utterance. From the perspective of the comprehensive viewpoint, what is taken into account is a complex of meanings and connotations evoked by an utterance, irrespective of either distinctive features of individuals or of constitutive characteristics representative of a given class: ‘Speech elements that are expressed in inhabited localities (*sc.* colloquially) [have] their

<sup>29</sup> TBh 1.35 (p. 32.13–17): *nigameṣu ye ’bhīhītāḥ śabdās teṣām arthaḥ śabdārtha-parijñānam ca deśa-samagra-grāhī naigamaḥ. arthānām sarvāka-deśa-saṅgrahaṇam saṅgrahaḥ. laukika-sama upacāra-prāyo vistṛtārtho vyavahāraḥ. satām sāmpratānām arthānām abhīdhāna-parijñānam rju-sūtraḥ. yathārthābhīdhānam śabdām. nāmādiṣu prasiddha-pūrvāc chabdād arthe pratyaḥ sāmprataḥ. satsv artheṣv asaṁkramaḥ samabhirūḍhaḥ. vyañjanārthayor evam-bhūta iti.*

<sup>30</sup> Esp. in verse 4cd (p. 36.2): *vidyād yathārtha-śabdām viśeṣita-padam tu śabdānāyam /*—‘One should understand the verbal viewpoint as [consisting of] words in distinguished (*sc.* analysed) [meaning] in accordance with a speech element [denoting] an object.’

meaning; and the comprehension of [such a] meaning of speech elements [is what] the comprehensive viewpoint, which grasps collectively partial [denotations of a speech element, consists in].<sup>31</sup> Clearly, what is meant here is a colloquial, unreflected usage of an unspecified reference, which comprises indiscriminately both the particular and the universal: ‘When one says “pot” what [is meant] is this particular substance (*sc.* thing) produced by the effort [of a pot-maker], with a rounded, elongated neck [and] a rounded edge at the top [as well as] with a spherical container below, [which is] suited for fetching and carrying water etc., [and has been] finished off by secondary operations [like baking]. [Accordingly,] the comprehensive viewpoint [consists in] the comprehension without [making] any distinction between such an individual [thing] furnished with particular features or [things] belonging to its class.’<sup>32</sup> Conspicuously, the category of comprehensive viewpoint is absent from STP.

<sup>31</sup> TBh 1.35 (p. 32.13–14): *nigameṣu ye ’bhīhitāḥ śabdās teṣām arthaḥ śabdārthaparījñānaṁ ca deśa-samagra-grāhī naigamaḥ.*

<sup>32</sup> TBh 1.35 (p. 33.9–12): *ghaṭa ity ukte yo ’sau ceṣṭābhīnirvṛtta ūrdhva-kunḍalāiṣṭhāyata-vṛtta-grīvo ’dhasāt parimaṇḍalo jalādīnām āharaṇa-dhāraṇa-samartha uttara-guṇa-nīrvartanānīrvṛtto dravya-viśeṣas tasmīn ekasmin viśeṣavati taj-jātyeṣu vā sarveṣv aviśeṣāt parījñānaṁ naigama-nayaḥ.* Cf. the exposition in the same spirit in NAV 29.13 (p. 441), e.g.: *tatrāpi ye paraspara-viśakalītau sāmānya-viśeṣāv icchanti tatsamudāya-rūpo naigamaḥ.*—‘And out of these [four object-bound varieties], the comprehensive [viewpoint] consists in an aggregate of such [outlooks] that consider [jointly] the universal and the particular as being disconnected from each other;’ as well as NAV 29.23 (p. 455): *vyavahāro ’pi sarvaḥ pradhānōpasarjana-dvāreṇa kathañcid itarētārvīnīrḷhita-sāmānya-viśeṣa-sādhyā eva; na hi sāmānyaṁ doha-vāhādi-kriyāyām upayujyate, viśeṣāṇām eva tatrōpayogān, nāpi viśeṣā eva tat-kāriṇaḥ, gotva-śūnyānām teṣām vṛkṣādy-aviśiṣṭatayā tat-kāraṇa-sāmarthyābhāvāt. ... tasmāt kathañcid bhedābhedināv evātau, tad-anyatara-samarthakaḥ punar nirāmbanatvād durnayatām svī-karotīti sthitam.*—‘Also the whole everyday practice can only be effected [with regard to] the universal and the particular, which are somehow mutually not detached, by means of the main [import] and the subordinate [level], for neither the universal [alone] can be employed in such actions like milking, carrying [commodities], etc., because only the particulars are employed in these [actions], nor the particulars alone accomplish these [actions] because these [particulars] void of [the universal] cow-ness would lack the efficacy to accomplish these [actions], inasmuch as they would not be distinguished from tress, etc. ... Therefore, it is established that these two, [i.e. the universal and the particulars], are somehow truly [both] different and not different from each other. [Such a viewpoint], however, which corroborates [only] one of these [two, i.e. either the universal or the particular], appropriates the status of a defective viewpoint, because [it is] void of [any] objective substratum.’ See also RVār 1.33 (p. 95.12 ff.): *artha-samkalpa-mātra-*

The collective viewpoint (*saṅgraha-naya*) pertains cumulatively to a whole class of individuals, which constitutes the denotation of a given utterance, and thereby it forms a basis for any taxonomy. In fact, Umāsvāti defines it briefly as ‘the synthesising of one facet out of all [possible facets] of things’<sup>33</sup> and further explicates: ‘The collective viewpoint [consists in] the comprehension of, [say,] present, past and future pots, distinguished by the name and other [standpoints (*nikṣepa*)], whether with regard to one [individual] or to many [things belonging to its class].’<sup>34</sup> At first glance, one might consider the wording *ekasmin vā* to refer to a particular, but in fact the phrase *ekasmin vā bahuṣu vā* links the whole statement to the previous section explaining the character of the comprehensive viewpoint and the phrase: *tasminn ekasmin viśeṣavati taj-jātīyeṣu vā sarveṣv aviśeṣāt*. Accordingly, the idea of the universal is indicated here in the phrase ‘present, past and future pots’ (*sāmpratâtîâtânâgatesu ghaṭeṣu*). Akalaṅka likewise explicitly refers to the idea of the class, or the universal: ‘The collective viewpoint grasps everything as a whole by referring to oneness without contradicting (viz. without relinquishing, *apracayavana*) its own class.’<sup>35</sup> In other words, the scope of the comprehensive viewpoint (*naigama-naya*) is narrowed down by excluding the particular and laying stress on the universal alone.<sup>36</sup>

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*grāhī naigamaḥ. ... tad yathā: kaścit pragrhya paraśuṁ puruṣaṁ gacchantam abhisamīkṣyāha ‘kim arthaṁ gacchati bhavān’ iti? sa tasmai ācaṣṭe prasthārtham iti, etc.—‘Comprehensive [viewpoint] grasps only the general idea of the purpose. ... For instance someone notices a man walking, who has taken an axe [with him], and asks: “For what reason are you going, Sir”? He replies to him: “[I’m going] my way”,’ etc. Here in RVār, Akalaṅka generally follows the examples taken from SSi 1.33.*

<sup>33</sup> TBh 1.35 (p. 32.14): *arthānām sarvāka-deśa-saṅgrahaṇam saṅgrahaḥ*.

<sup>34</sup> TBh 1.35 (pp. 33.12–34.2): *ekasmin vā bahuṣu vā nāmādi-viśeṣiteṣu sāmpratâtîâtânâgatesu ghaṭeṣu saṁpratayayāḥ saṅgrahaḥ*.

<sup>35</sup> RVār 1.33 (p. 95.12 ff.): *sva-jāty-avirodhenâkatvôpanayāt samasta-grahaṇam saṅgrahaḥ*.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. NAV 29.13 (p. 441): *punaḥ kevalam sāmānyam vāñchanti tat-samūha-sampādyaḥ saṅgrahaḥ*.—‘The collective [viewpoint], in its turn, is produced out of an amassment of such [outlooks] that affirm solely the universal.’ See also NAV 29.23 (p. 462): *tad-apalāpī kevala-sāmānya-pratiṣṭhāpakaḥ kad-abhiprāyaḥ saṅgraha-durnaya-vyapadeśam svī-kurute, viśeṣāpekṣayāiva sāmānya-sthāpakasya saṅgrahanayatvād iti*.—‘[Such] a defective outlook which denies that [multifarious object and] which determines the universal alone appropriates the designation of the defective collective viewpoint because [only such a viewpoint which] determines the universal precisely with regard to the particulars is the collective viewpoint [proper].’

When only a particular specimen of the whole class of objects—that has previously been defined from the perspective of the collective viewpoint—is selected for practical purposes and directly referred to by an utterance, or becomes an object of one’s action, we have an instance of the empirical viewpoint (*vyavahāra-naya*). It is especially in early analyses that the commonplace aspect (*laukika*) and the conventional practice prevalent among people (*lokōpacāra*) is said to be emphasised in this case.<sup>37</sup> Clearly, the point of reference is further limited<sup>38</sup> to such individual things, or elements of a class, that can become directly subject to practical activity: ‘The empirical viewpoint consists in the comprehension of precisely such [present, past and future things like pots, grasped by the collective viewpoint,] comprehensible to common people and experts, [and] accessible to the conventional practice just as they are gross objects.’<sup>39</sup> This clearly nominalist perspective reflects an aspect of speech commonly encountered in linguistic usage: most frequently we refer to particular things, viz. to individuals, by means of linguistic units of general denotation that correspond to respective classes: ‘The empirical viewpoint [consists in] appropriating [a thing], which is preceded by practical application [of the thing] from this [class of things embraced by the collective viewpoint] (*atas = etasmāt*).’<sup>40</sup> Akalaṅka proceeds to illustrate the rule: ‘When one admits that “[any] healing decoction is a medicine”, then— insofar as the universal has the nature of the particular—[one knows] healing efficacy of a particular fig etc. (i.e. one grasps [the universal] through the efficacy of the particular).’<sup>41</sup>

However, a relevant statement of NAV 29, taken at its face value, seems to contradict the contention that the scope of the empirical viewpoint is the particular:

<sup>37</sup> TBh 1.35 (p. 32.15): *laukika-sama upacāra-prāyo vistṛtārtho vyavahāraḥ*.—‘The empirical viewpoint has an extended meaning, similar to [the way] common people [understand it], like in the conventional practice.’ Cf. TBh 1.35 (p. 35.9, verse 3cd): *lokōpacāra-niyatam vyavahāram vistṛtam vidyāt* /—‘One should understand the empirical [viewpoint in an] extended [way] as confined to the conventional practice [prevalent] among people.’

<sup>38</sup> PALV 6.74 p. 54.11: *saṅgraha-grhīta-bhedako vyavahāraḥ*.—‘The empirical viewpoint differentiates what has been grasped [in a general way] by the collective viewpoint.’

<sup>39</sup> TBh 1.35 (p. 34.2–3): *teṣu eva laukika-parīkṣaka-grāhyeṣūpacāra-gamyēṣu yathāsthūlārtheṣu saṁpratyaḥ vyavahāraḥ*.

<sup>40</sup> RVār 1.33 (p. 96.20): *ato vidhi-pūrvakam avaharaṇam vyavahāraḥ*.

<sup>41</sup> RVār 1.33 (p. 96.25–26): *‘kaṣāyo bhaiṣajyam’ ity ukte ca sāmānyasya viśeṣātmakatvān naiyagrodhādi-viśeṣa-sāmarthyam (viśeṣasya sāmarthyena grahaṇam)*.

‘The empirical [viewpoint], on the other hand, is produced out of a complex of such [outlooks] that intend an entity, like a pot, etc.—[when it] enters into people’s everyday practice—in case of which [both] the universal and the particular, being of philosophic pertinence, are disregarded.’<sup>42</sup> The context for this statement is a discussion with the Buddhist. What the term *viśeṣa* in this particular case is supposed to mean is ‘the ultimate particular’, viz. the momentary, insubstantial entity (*viśeṣāḥ paramāṇu-lakṣaṇāḥ kṣaṇa-kṣayiṇaḥ*). Clearly, the author differentiates here between *svalakṣaṇa* (the ultimate individual) and *vastu*, or the real, non-momentary, gross thing.<sup>43</sup> Consequently, what constitutes the point of reference for the empirical viewpoint also in NAV is indeed the particular understood as a real entity, that is graspable in daily experience, that retains its individual character but at the same time is made up of atoms, not the particular as a momentary, imperceptible atom: ‘Such a [real thing,] like a pot, etc., which lasts for some time, which possesses grossness, which is instrumental to people’s everyday practice [and] which is intended by you as really existing, is not accidental, but rather [it is] combined of permanent infinitesimal atoms...’<sup>44</sup> Thus, what is meant by *laukika* and *lokōpacāra* in TBh (above p. 52, n. 37) clearly corresponds to *yathā loka-grāha* (‘just the way people take’, n. 43) and *loka-vyavahāra-kāritva* of NAV

<sup>42</sup> NAV 29.13 (p. 441): *ye punar anapekṣita-sāstrīya-sāmānya-viśeṣam loka-vyavahāram avatarantaṁ ghaṭādikaṁ padārtham abhiprayanti tan-nicaya-janyo vyavahārah.*

<sup>43</sup> NAV 29.16 (p. 445): *yathā loka-grāham eva vastu astu ... na hi sāmānyam anādinidhanam ekaṁ saṅgrāhābhimataṁ pramāṇa-bhūmiḥ. ... nāpi viśeṣāḥ paramāṇu-lakṣaṇāḥ kṣaṇa-kṣayiṇaḥ pramāṇa-gocaras, tathā pravṛtter abhāvāt. tasmād idam eva nikhila-lokābādhitam pramāṇa-prasiddham kiyat-kāla-bhāvi-sthūratām ābibhrāṇam udakāharaṇādy-artha-kriyā-nirvartana-kṣamaṁ ghaṭādikaṁ vastu-rūpaṁ pāramārthikam astu.*— ‘Let the real thing be exactly just the way people take [it] ... For the universal—with no beginning nor end, [numerically] one, considered by the collective [viewpoint]—[does] not [constitute] the scope of a cognitive criterion ... The particulars—[which are] characterised by infinitesimal atoms [and which are] perishing in a moment (*sc.* momentary)—[do] not [constitute] the domain of cognitive criterion, either, because [they do] not occur in that manner. Therefore only this [what is] not subverted by opinions prevalent among people, [what is] well-known due to cognitive criterion, [what] possesses grossness lasting for some time, [what is] capable of executing efficient action such as fetching water, etc., [and what] consists in the real thing, like a pot, etc., must be ultimately real.’

<sup>44</sup> NAV 29.25 (p. 463): *yad idam kiyat-kāla-bhāvi sthūratām ābibhrāṇam loka-vyavahāra-kāri ghaṭādikaṁ bhavatas tāttvikam abhipretam tan nākasamikam...*

(‘accomplishing of the people’s everyday practice’, n. 44). Eventually, the practical aspect means the feasibility, on the part of an object, to become the object of human activity.

The last one in the quadruple classification of the ‘object-bound’ viewpoints that ‘operate by means of an object’ (*artha-dvāreṇa [pravṛtta]*) is the direct viewpoint (*rju-sūtra*). It is defined as ‘the comprehension by way of the denotative acts concerning the existent and present objects’<sup>45</sup> and its province is the present point of time<sup>46</sup>, viz. particular things that have already been pointed out by the empirical viewpoint<sup>47</sup>, which are being perceived here and now. Accordingly, the direct viewpoint narrows the point of reference down to the present manifestation of an individual (*vartamāna-kṣaṇa-vivarti-vastu*), and puts aside its past and future facets (*atītānagata-vakra-parityāga*).<sup>48</sup> At the same time, the direct viewpoint opens up—according to the other tradition—the fourfold catalogue of mode-expressive viewpoints (*paryāyārthika-naya*), or conditionally valid attributive predications, which view things according to their transitory properties and modes and neglect their incontrovertible substantial nature and existence as substrata of those properties and modes. From such an angle, in this viewpoint, which ‘grasps pure modes with regard to their antithesis (*sc.* substance)’<sup>49</sup>, the substantial and non-momentary character of an entity is entirely ignored and merely its transient aspects (generally the present moment) are taken into account: ‘it neglects previous[ly mentioned] objects belonging to the three times [and] embraces the object belonging to the present time.’<sup>50</sup> Here, it is irrelevant which linguistic expressions we choose to refer to one and the same individual.

<sup>45</sup> TS 1.35 p. 32.15–16: *satām sāmpratānām arthānām abhidhāna-parijñānam rju-sūtraḥ*.

<sup>46</sup> TS 1.35 p. 36.1, verse 4ab:

*sāmprata-viṣaya-grāhakam rju-sūtra-nayam samāsato vidyāt /*

<sup>47</sup> TS 1.35 p. 34.3–4:

*teṣv [= vyavahṛteṣv] eva satsu sāmprateṣu sampratayaya rju-sūtraḥ*.

<sup>48</sup> NAV 29.17 (p. 446): *tatra rju praguṇam akuṭīlam atītānagata-vakra-parityāgād vartamāna-kṣaṇa-vivarti-vastuno rūpaṁ sūtrayati niṣṭāṅkitam darśayātīty rjusūtraḥ*.—‘In this case, the direct [viewpoint is explained as follows]: [it] draws out, [i.e.] plainly demonstrates—directly, [i.e.] in a straight manner, [or] not crookedly, [viz.] by evading past and future bends [of the real thing]—the form of the real thing, whose transient occurrence [falls to] the present moment.’

<sup>49</sup> PALV 6.74 p. 54.11–12: *śuddha-paryāya-grāhī pratipakṣa-sāpekṣa rju-sūtraḥ*.

<sup>50</sup> RVār 1.33 (p. 96.31): *pūrvāms tri-kāla-viṣayān atīśayya vartamāna-kāla-viṣayam ādatte*. Cf. NAV 29.26: *tasmāt tiro-hita-kṣaṇa-vivartam alakṣita-paramāṇu-vaiviktyam*

The three remaining viewpoints operate on the speech level and, in addition, analyse the verbal structure of an utterance, the domain for them being external objects that are nameable within a strictly limited range of verbal expression. What is common for the three varieties of the verbal viewpoint is declared (which in itself is not a very revealing observation) by Umāsvāti to be ‘the denoting according to the meaning.’<sup>51</sup> The proper point of reference for the speech-bound viewpoints is therefore the thing as it enters the linguistic practice. Accordingly, all they are about is rather the Austinian *how to do things with words*, not *how to do things with things*.<sup>52</sup>

*vastu sarva-sāṃvyavahārika-pramāṇair gocarī-kriyata iti tat-tiras-kāra-dvāreṇādṛṣṭa-kṣaṇa-kṣayi-paramāṇu-pratiṣṭhāpako ’bhiprāya rjusūtra-durnaya-samjñām āsnute, tad-apekṣayāiva tad-darśakasya nayatvād iti.*—‘Therefore, the real thing becomes the domain [of cognition] through all cognitive criteria, that are of importance in practical life, as something whose momentary transient occurrences are ruled out (*sc.* neglected) [and] in which the fact that it is differentiated into infinitesimal atoms is not [directly] observable. Thus, the outlook that determines invisible infinitesimal atoms which perish in a moment (*sc.* are momentary) by means of ruling out (*sc.* neglecting) this [persistence] receives the denotation of a defective direct viewpoint, because [such an outlook alone] which demonstrates these [momentary invisible infinitesimal atoms] only by putting aside this [persistence] is the [direct] viewpoint [proper].’

<sup>51</sup> TBh 1.35 (p. 32.16–17): *yathārthābhīdhānam śabdām.*

<sup>52</sup> The following passage of NAV 29.15 (p. 450) delineates the character of the three verbal viewpoints: *tasmān na paramārthato ’rthaḥ śabdātirikto ’sty, upacārataḥ punar laukikair aparyālocita-paramārthair vyavahriyate. asāv apy aupacārikaḥ śabdātmako vārthaḥ pratikṣaṇa-bhaṅguraḥ svi-kartavyo, varṇānām kṣaṇa-dhvaṃsitā-pratīteḥ ...* — ‘Consequently, on the level of the ultimate truth there is no [external] object in addition to speech elements, whereas, metaphorically, [object] is used practically by common people, who do not reflect upon the ultimate truth. Also this object, either the metaphorical one or the one having speech element as its essence, should be held to be momentary (lit. perishable at every moment), because phonemes are known to be annihilated after a moment (*sc.* to be momentary) ...’ As a matter of fact, the preceding is incorporated in an account of a fallacious viewpoint (*nayābhāsa*), nevertheless it is quite an accurate description of how the verbal viewpoint operates, with the proviso that the proper viewpoint (*naya*) does not deny the existence of an external object, but takes the real thing and the word denoting it to point to each other: NAV 29: *ato ’mī śabdādayo yadētarētarābhīmatā-śabdārthōpekṣayā svābhīmatam śabdārtham darśayanti, tadā nayās, tasyāpi tatra bhāvāt.*—‘Consequently, when these [viewpoints like] the verbal [viewpoint], etc., demonstrate an object (denotatum) [denoted by a particular] speech element, which is intended by a respective [viewpoint], putting aside (*sc.* neglecting) [the fact that] object (denotatum) and [respective] speech elements are

What the majority of Jaina epistemologists named simply the verbal viewpoint (*śabda-naya*), Umāsvāti called the accurate (or: present) verbal viewpoint (*sāmprata-śabda-naya*) and defined it as ‘the cognition of an object through a speech element already well-known on [account of] such [categories like] name etc.’<sup>53</sup> and as ‘the comprehension of precisely those [objects, grasped by means of the direct viewpoint, like] pots, that are present, that comprise one of [such categories like] name etc. [and] that are already well-known’<sup>54</sup>. Two things in these passages are conspicuous: the further diminishing of the scope (*teṣv eva*) to present (*sāmprateṣu*) phenomena and the verbal reference. The verbal viewpoint (*śabda-naya*) was interpreted variously by the subsequent Jaina tradition, but one thing remained common: the verbal point of reference and the role of verbal (or grammatical) means of expression relevant for the interpretation.<sup>55</sup> Applying the verbal viewpoint is tantamount to the recognition of the prevalent linguistic convention and to the overlooking of fine differentiation between meanings of synonymical expressions, etc., that may go back to different derivation, grammatical construction etc.: ‘the verbal [viewpoint] intends, as they say, by the force of understanding, one object (denotatum) for all such linguistic units, like *Indra*, *Śakra*, *Purandara*,<sup>56</sup> etc., that are used—in accordance with the usage—to denote

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intended by (*sc.* point to) each other, then they are [proper] viewpoints, because also this [object (denotatum)] exists in (*sc.* is related to) these [speech elements].’

<sup>53</sup> TBh 1.35 (p. 32.17): *nāmādiṣu prasiddha-pūrvāc chabdād arthe pratyayaḥ sāmprataḥ*.

<sup>54</sup> TBh 1.35 (p. 34.4–5): *teṣv eva sāmprateṣu nāmādinām anyatama-grāhiṣu prasiddha-pūrvakeṣu ghaṭeṣu sāmpratayayaḥ sāmprataḥ śabdāḥ*.

<sup>55</sup> Just to mention two Dīgambara opinions: SSI 1.33 (§ 246, p. 102): *liṅga-saṁkhyā-sādhanaḍi-vyabhicāra-nirvṛtti-paraḥ śabda-nayaḥ. tatra liṅga-vyabhicāraḥ: puṣyas tārakā nakṣatram iti ...*—‘[The verbal viewpoint] aims at removing discrepancy [in meaning] due to gender, number, case etc. Among these [various factors], the discrepancy [among synonyms] due to gender is e.g.: *puṣyas* (masc., “constellation”), *tārakā* (fem., “cluster of stars”), *nakṣatram* (n., “asterism”), etc.’ and PALV 6.74 p. 54.12–13: *kāla-kāra-ka-liṅgānām bhedāt śabdasya kathaṅcid artha-bheda-kathanam śabda-nayaḥ*.—‘the verbal viewpoint speaks somehow of [various] differences between meanings of [one and the same] speech element depending on difference in tense, contributory factors [of an action] (semantic categories) and gender.’

<sup>56</sup> The above series of various names of a Vedic god has surprisingly become the standard sequence in Jaina literature. The idea may go back to Patañjali’s *Vyākaraṇa-mahā-bhāṣya* (MBhā under sūtra 1.3.1, vol. II, p. 117): *bahavo hi śabdā ekārthā bhavanti. tad yathā—indraḥ śakraḥ puruhūtaḥ puramḍaraḥ. kantu koṣṭhaḥ kusūla iti. ekaś ca śabdo bahv-arthāḥ. tad yathā—akṣāḥ pādāḥ māṣā iti*.

[one and the same] specific object (denotatum).<sup>57</sup> As Akalaṅka put it: ‘It primarily overrides any difference [in meaning] due to gender, number, case etc.’<sup>58</sup> In other words, the users of the language agree upon a conventionally determined selection of verbal expressions that denote a particular individual.

If one further limits the context of an utterance and draws a distinction among synonyms which is based on their divergent derivation, viz. if one sticks to a viewpoint which, ‘denies any equivalence among existing meanings’<sup>59</sup>, we have the case of the etymological viewpoint (*samabhirūḍha-naya*). Thus, two expressions, for instance, ‘contemplation, speculation’ (*vitarka*) and ‘meditation, reflection’ (*dhyāna*), that are [generally] considered synonymous, may refer to different phenomena in some particular contexts<sup>60</sup>. To cite another example (NAV 29), although three epithets in an indiscriminating commonplace usage pertain to one and the same god, nonetheless the name ‘Indra’ refers in fact to a divine sovereign, the appellation ‘Śakra’ describes a being possessed of might and the epithet

<sup>57</sup> NAV 29.19 (p. 450): *rūḍhito yāvanto dhvanayaḥ kasmimścid arthe pravartante; yathēndra-śakra-purandarādayaḥ, teṣām sarveṣām apy ekam artham abhipraiti kila pratīti-vaśād*. See also NAV 29.13 (p. 441): *tathā ye rūḍhitaḥ śabdānām pravṛttim vāñchanti tan-nivaha-sādhyāḥ śabda iti*.—‘Similarly, the verbal [viewpoint] is established by a collection of such [outlooks that] affirm that the usage of speech elements [complies] with the linguistic convention;’ and NAV 29.27 (p. 471): *tataś ca kvacid anapekṣita-vyutpatti-nimittā rūḍhitaḥ pravartante ...*.—‘And therefore, they are used to denote certain [objects (denotata)] in accordance with the usage [when] the factors [accountable for their] grammatical formation [are] disregarded...’

<sup>58</sup> RVār 1.33 (p. 98.12): *sa ca liṅga-samkhyā-sādhanādi-vyabhicāra-nivṛtti-paraḥ*.

<sup>59</sup> TS 1.35 p. 32.18: *satsv artheṣv asaṁkramaḥ samabhirūḍhaḥ*. See also NAV 29.13 (p. 441): *ye tu vyutpattito dhvaninām pravṛttim vāñchanti nānyathā tad-vāra-janyaḥ samabhirūḍha iti*.—‘Further, the etymological [viewpoint] is produced out of the multitude of such [outlooks] that affirm that the usage of a linguistic units [complies] with the grammatical formation, and not otherwise.’ and NAV 29.27 (p. 471): *...kvacit sāmānya-vyutpatti-sāpekṣāḥ ...*.—‘...[they are used to denote] certain [other objects (denotata)] depending on the grammatical formation [based on] the universal...’

<sup>60</sup> TS 1.35 (p. 34.5–6): *teṣām eva sāmpratānām [=arthānām] adhyavasāyāsaṁkramo vitarka-dhyānavat samabhirūḍhaḥ*. Cf. JTBh 2.6: *paryāya-bhede bhinnārthān abhimanyate*.—‘If there is any difference among synonyms, one means different objects,’ as well as PALV 6.74 p. 54.14: *paryāya-bhedāt padārtha-nānārtha-nirūpakam samabhirūḍhaḥ*.—‘Due to the difference in synonyms, the etymological viewpoint describes diverse objects [following diverse] meanings of words.’

‘Purandara’ denotes a destroyer of strongholds etc., in the same manner as words like ‘Indra’, ‘pot’ or ‘man’ have different denotata<sup>61</sup>.

The issue is further elaborated by Pūjyapāda Devanandin (SSi 1.33 § 247, p. 103) who takes the etymological viewpoint to deal, firstly, with homonyms: out of several possible meanings of one and the same expression, in a given context we select the meaning which is current and widely accepted in the society. For instance, the word ‘go’ denotes a cow in accordance with the convention, even though it might theoretically refer to any ‘walking creature’, as a derivative of  $\sqrt{gam}$ , or ‘speech’, as a derivative of the root  $\sqrt{gai}$ , etc. When differentiating between various synonyms denoting a cow, we use the term ‘go’ of the derivation that corresponds to popular usage<sup>62</sup>. Furthermore, what is crucial, this viewpoint forms a basis for distinguishing among a range of synonyms in correspondence to their etymologies.<sup>63</sup> Thirdly, out of several meanings a word could hypothetically convey in accordance with its etymology, only the well-known conventional meaning of an expression is selected.<sup>64</sup> Irrespective of minor interpretative differences, Pūjyapāda Devanandin agrees that the etymological viewpoint distinguishes between meanings on the basis of etymology or convention.<sup>65</sup>

<sup>61</sup> See NAV 29.20 (p. 451): *paryāya-śabdā vibhinnārthāḥ, prativibhakta-vyutpatti-nimittakatvād, iha ye ye prativibhakta-vyutpatti-nimittakās te te bhinnārthāḥ, yathēndraghaṭa-puruṣa-śabdā vibhinnārthā[h]*.—‘Speech elements that are synonyms have different objects (denotata), because they have the factor [accountable] for their grammatical formation individually (*sc.* in every individual case) distinct. In this world, whatever [speech elements] have the factor [accountable] for their grammatical formation individually distinct, they have [also] different objects (denotata), [for instance such] speech elements like “Indra”, “pot”, “man” have different meanings.’

<sup>62</sup> SSi 1.33 § 247, p. 103.4: *gaur ity ayaṁ śabdo vāg-ādiṣv artheṣu vartamānaḥ paśāv abhirūḍhaḥ*.—‘The term “go” applicable to (lit. present in) [various] things such as speech [derived from the root  $\sqrt{gai}$ ] is conventionally applied to an animal.’

<sup>63</sup> SSi 1.33 § 247, p. 103.4–6: *athavā artha-gaty-arthaḥ śabda-prayogaḥ. tatrāikasyārthasyâkena gatârthatvât paryāya-śabda-prayogo 'narthakaḥ. śabda-bhedaś ced asti artha-bhedenâpy avaśyam bhavitavyam iti*.—‘Or else, the use of words aims at (*sc.* leads to) the understanding of the meaning. Since one meaning has its meaning understood through [only] one word, the use of synonymous words is meaningless. If there is difference in words, there must also be necessarily the difference in meaning.’

<sup>64</sup> SSi 1.33 § 247, p. 103.77–8: *athavā yo yatrâbhirūḍhaḥ sa tatra samety abhimukhyenârohaṇât samabhirūḍhaḥ*.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. the exposition in the same spirit in TBV 1.3 (*Naya-mīmāṃsā*), p. 313.15–21: *eka-samjñā-samabhirohaṇât samabhirūḍhas tv āha—yathā hi viruddha-liṅgâdi-yogād bhidyate vastu tathā samjñā-bhedād api. tathā hi—samjñā-bhedaḥ prayojana-vaśât*

The factual viewpoint (*evam-bhūta*, *ittham-bhāva*) functions with reference to the narrowest possible context in case of any expression. It lies down the rule according to which, out of a series of synonyms, we select such a term in a given context which describes its denotatum in the p r e s e n t state in the closest possible way, for instance, the appellations ‘Indra’, ‘Śakra’ and ‘Purandara’ can be applied to the god only when he either is actually displaying his sovereign authority (*indana*), or is exhibiting his might (*śakana*) or is destroying a stronghold, respectively.<sup>66</sup> In other words, according to this viewpoint we may apply only such a term with regard to a phenomenon which describes this phenomenon in its present condition most adequately or the etymology or grammatical derivation of which corresponds most closely to the present state of an object it refers to: ‘the factual [viewpoint] means the grasping of the meaning mutually dependent on subtle momentary manifestation [of an object] and the meaning [of the word denoting it, but] only [in case] of these [present objects grasped by the etymological viewpoint]’<sup>67</sup>.

*saṅketa-kartṛbhir vidhīyate na vyasanitayā anyathā anavasthā-prasakteḥ tato yāvanto vastunaḥ svābhidhāyakāḥ śabdās tāvanto ’rtha-bhedāḥ pratyartham śabda-niveśāt nākasyārthasyānekenābhidhānam yuktim iti ’ghaṭaḥ’ ’kuṭaḥ’ ’kumbhaḥ’ iti vacana-bhedād bhinna evārthaḥ, kriyā-śabdatvāt vā sarva-śabdānām sarve ’py anvarthā eva vācakāḥ tato ’ghaṭate’ ’kuṭite’ ’kau bhāti’ iti ca kriyā-lakṣaṇa-nimitta-bhedāt naimittikenāpy arthena bhinnena bhāvyaṃ iti ’ghaṭaḥ’ ity ukte kuṭaḥ ’kuṭaḥ’ iti pratipattiḥ tena tad-arthasyānabhihitatvāt.*

<sup>66</sup> Cf. SSi 1.33 and NAV 29. Similarly, the word ‘go’ (as the derivative of √gam) may be used—in consonance with the factual viewpoint—with reference to a cow only when the animal is actually walking.

<sup>67</sup> TS 1.35 p. 34.6–7: *teṣām eva [=sāmpratānām arthānām] vyañjanārthayor anyonyāpekṣārtha-grāhitvam evam-bhūta iti.* In the same spirit TS 1.35 p. 32.18: *vyañjanārthayor evam-bhūta iti.*—‘The factual viewpoint [refers] to the momentary manifestation [of an object] and to the meaning [of the word denoting it];’ and NAV 29.13 (p. 442): *ye tu vartamāna-kāla-bhāvi-vyutpatti-nimittam adhikṛtya śabdāḥ pravartante nānyathēti manyante tat-saṅgha-ghaṭitaḥ khalv evam-bhūta iti.*—‘The factual [viewpoint], however, as one should realise, is combined out of a conglomeration of [outlooks that] maintain that speech elements function by taking account of the factor [accountable] for the grammatical formation [and] existing in the present point of time, not otherwise;’ as well as NAV 29.27 (p. 471): *...kvacit tat-kāla-varti-vyutpatti-nimittāpekṣayēti.*—‘...[they are used to denote] certain [other objects (denotata)] depending on the factors [accountable for their] grammatical formation that occur at their [point of] time (*sc.* when the speech elements are uttered).’

These seven conditionally valid viewpoints are boldly maintained by Siddharṣiṅgaṇi to exhaust all possibilities of the predicating of an object and to make use of all conceivable optional perspectives an object could be viewed from: ‘Thus, it has been established in the above manner that these [seven viewpoints listed above] collect together all [possible] outlooks, because there is not any other alternative referring to the real thing that does not count among this septuplet of the viewpoints.’<sup>68</sup> It is emphasised by the Jainas that contradictions involved in this theory are only apparent,<sup>69</sup> in so far as each of the utterances has a different point of reference. What is significant is that not some abstract, eternal sentences are dealt with in the method of conditionally valid predications, but particular concrete utterances pronounced in a particular situation.

Even though only the seven-staged method of description is as a rule mentioned, the Jainas admitted a theoretical possibility of infinite number of thinkable viewpoints. Some instances, which are usually not mentioned in secondary literature, are to be found, e.g., in the *Tattvārthādhigama-bhāṣya* itself. While discussing the nature of liberated beings (*siddha*), Umāsvāti avails himself of two viewpoints, which he contrasts with each other, viz. the one revealing the previous existence (*pūrva-bhāva-prajñāpanīya-naya*), during which the particular liberated being destroyed the bondage of transmigration, and the other one revealing the present existence (*pratyutpanna-bhāva-prajñāpanīya-naya*), viz. the condition of being emancipated<sup>70</sup>. Here two different perspectives are assumed with respect to time, and one could easily add another viewpoint predicating a property or a condition of a being in next existence (*\*uttara-bhāva-prajñāpanīya-naya*). Naturally, Umāsvāti does not do that with regard to liberated beings, for the liberated being is beyond any contingencies and dependencies, also temporal, and any discussion of the future existence in this particular case does not apply. However, in the commentary on the same *sūtra* the author does speak about other properties of a liberated being, taking the viewpoint of ‘the existence directly

<sup>68</sup> NAV 29.13 (p. 441): *tad evaṃ na kaścid vikalpo 'sti vastu-gocarō yo 'tra naya-saptake nāntar-yātīti sarvābhīprāya-saṅgrāhakā ete iti sthitam.*

<sup>69</sup> TS 1.35 p. 38.3–4, verse 5:

*iti naya-vādās citrāḥ kvacid viruddhā ivātha ca viśuddhāḥ /  
laukika-viṣayātītās tattva-jñānārtham adhigamyāḥ // —*

—‘Such are the variegated expositions [by means] of conditionally valid predications, that seem contradictory with regard to something (*sc.* one thing), nevertheless they are subtle, transcend the province of common people [and] should be understood in order to know the truth.’

<sup>70</sup> TBh 10.7.

preceding the moment of liberation' (*anantara-paścāt-kṛta-gatika-naya*) and the viewpoint of 'the last but one rebirth before the liberation' (*ekāntara-paścāt-kṛta-gatika-naya*). Other instances are to be found in the *Āgamas*.

What is conspicuous in this method of description by way of applying seven conditionally valid predications is the gradual limitation of the context: from the most general one, viz. the comprehensive viewpoint (*naigama*), down to the most specialised, context-restricted factual and qualified viewpoint (*evam-bhūta*) of narrowest extension. At the same time the informative contents gradually and cumulatively increases from the most undistinguished and 'contextless' *naigama* viewpoint to the most circumstantial and semantics-laden *evam-bhūta* viewpoint with most complex point of reference. Thus every subsequent viewpoint is directly related to the one preceding it and it represents a further restriction of the point of reference. This hierarchical arrangement is apparent from the expressions used by various authors that explicitly indicate that the extension of successive viewpoints is included in that of their antecedents.<sup>71</sup> This twofold subordinating relation is stated by Akalaṅka: 'There is [such] an arrangement of these [viewpoints] because each and every subsequent [viewpoint] has more and more refined scope and is grounded in every preceding [viewpoint].'<sup>72</sup> The same idea, viz. that every subsequent viewpoint is hierarchically related to the preceding one, is expressed by many other Jaina authors including Malliṣeṇa<sup>73</sup> and Yaśovijaya<sup>74</sup>.

These findings are crucial for any further analysis of the logical structure of the doctrine of viewpoints (*naya-vāda*). They also help us to evaluate such misconstrued conjectures that rest on the alleged presence of contradiction embedded in the *naya*-structure or claims, such as that of PANDEY's (1984), that all *nayas* can be assigned the third truth-value I (indeterminate) of Łukasiewicz's three-valued system S3.

<sup>71</sup> E.g. in TBh 1.35 (*teṣv eva, teṣv eva satsu, teṣv eva sāmprateṣu, teṣām eva teṣām eva sāmpratānām*, etc.) or RVār 1.33 (p. 95 ff.): 1. (*naigama* as most general): *artha-saṁkalpa-mātra*, 3. (*vyavahāra* as included in *saṅgraha*): *atas = etasmāt, saṅgraha-grhīta-bhedakaḥ*, etc.

<sup>72</sup> RVār 1.33 (p. 99.17): *uttarōttara-sūkṣma-viṣayatvād eṣām kramaḥ pūrva-pūrva-hetukatvāc ca*.

<sup>73</sup> SVM 28.204–213 (p. 167.9–18).

<sup>74</sup> JTBh 2 § 9, p. 14.1 ff.

In<sup>75</sup> view of the multiplex character of all phenomena and due to limitations of verbal means of expression at our disposal, it is a practical impossibility to express the homogeneous ‘whole truth’ about an object. Even though we may be aware of many other features and circumstances thanks to cognitive criteria (*pramāṇa*), we refer to any object or situation by way of an arbitrarily selected set of features which distinguish it from all other objects or phenomena in a particular situation in compliance with our practical demands.<sup>76</sup> How such various modes of reference operate is precisely what the *naya*-theory attempts to formalise. The general, *pramāṇa*-based knowledge of an object is thus a prerequisite for any *naya*-based reference to the same object.<sup>77</sup>

Since every statement is uttered in a particular situation, it does communicate truth as long as we keep in mind its particular context. In other words the relation between a statement and its referent is not a one-to-one relation of the sort ‘utterance to truth-value’, e.g. ‘the relation characterised by the association of the denotatum and the denoter’ (*vācya-vācaka-bhāva-lakṣaṇa-sambandha*). As a matter of fact, we are forced to use incomplete statements that are correctly understood by others, provided we are able to apply them to their particular context. Since the process of interpretation is not a simple binary function (utterance → truth-value), a simple statement ‘Devadatta is’ can trivially be either true or false depending on the context.<sup>78</sup> Siddharṣigaṇi explicitly states that to determine the truth-value of an utterance we have to take into account at least the intention of the speaker and the linguistic convention,<sup>79</sup> beside the denoter-denotatum relation. Thus, the simple relation ‘utterance–truth-value’ is intermediated by a range of additional parameters. Altogether the Jainas distinguish seven major parameters, or interpretative factors, comprised within the consistent scheme of the *nyayas* (see p. 58 and n. 68). For the

<sup>75</sup> For the sake of completeness, on the subsequent pages I shall very briefly recapitulate the findings of a detailed logical analysis in BALCEROWICZ (2001b).


<sup>76</sup> NAV 29.10 (p. 438): *tasya viṣayo gocaro mato 'bhipreta eka-deśenānityatvādi-dharma-lakṣaṇena viśiṣṭaḥ para-rūpebhyo vibhinno 'rthaḥ prameya-rūpaṃ*.

<sup>77</sup> NAV 29.10 (p. 438): *pramāṇa-pravṛtter uttara-kāla-bhāvī parāmarśa[ḥ].—* ‘[Viewpoint is] the reflection which arises in the point of time posterior to the operation of cognitive criterion.’

<sup>78</sup> NAV 29.28 (p. 472): *yathāneka-puruṣa-sampūrṇe sadasi dvārādau sthitasya kim atra devadattaḥ samasti nāstīti vā dolāyamāna-buddheḥ kenacid abhidhīyate—yathā devadatto 'stīti*.

<sup>79</sup> NAV 29.28 (p. 473): ... *tad-vyavacchedābhiprāyeṇa prastuta-vākya-prayogāt, prayoktr-abhiprāyādi-sāpekṣatayāiva dhvaneḥ svārtha-pratipādana-sāmarthyāt, and NAṬ 29 ad loc.: prayoktr-abhiprāyādīti. ādi-śabdāt saṅketād-grahaḥ*.

sake of simplicity, we can subsume all such parameters, or context-indicators, under an index as follows:



No utterance is simply either true or false. In order to ascertain its truth-value one has to ascribe it to its specific viewpoint type, that supplies the contextual information which is lacking. In this model all meaningful context-indicators (intermediary parameters) are comprised under the index  $i$ . The utterance yields truth or falsehood depending on the adequate interpretation of its context which is determined by means of indexation.

Accordingly, we have the following model of the context-based interpretation  $\mathbf{I}$  of the utterances  $\alpha, \beta, \gamma \dots$  that belong to a class  $\mathbf{F}$  of formulas:

$$\mathbf{I} = \langle D, I, \mathbf{A} \rangle$$

In the model,  $D$  is the domain of admissible interpretations, i.e. a class of conceivable individuals denotable by the utterances  $\alpha, \beta, \gamma \dots$ ;  $I$  is a class of indices  $i$ , or context-indicators;  $\mathbf{A}$  comprises  $i$ -indexed classes of actual denotata.

The truth-value of any  $i$ -interpreted utterance  $\alpha$  depends on the actual context represented by indices, or *nayas*, of the class  $I$  in the interpretation  $\mathbf{I}$ , and the paradigm index comprises the following co-ordinates:

$$i = \langle c, a, t, l, e, s \rangle$$

In the formula, the variable  $c$  designates the subsets of meanings belonging to the general class  $C \in D$  of all possible denotata of utterances  $\alpha, \beta, \gamma \dots$ . The variable  $a$  is an element of the class  $C$  (viz. a particular individual of the class  $C$ ). The variable  $t$  is the point of time of reference (usually the present moment of 'now', which is steadily changing along the time axis). The variable  $l$  is the prevalent linguistic convention in accordance with which utterances  $\alpha, \beta, \gamma \dots$  are pronounced and understood. The variable  $e$  indicates etymology and other verbal means of expression, such as prevalent convention, relevant for the proper understanding both of apparent synonyms  $\alpha, \beta, \gamma \dots$  and of the difference between them based on etymology etc. The variable  $s$  stands for the present status of the individual that is the denotatum of

$\alpha, \beta, \gamma \dots$ ; in other words,  $s$  refers to present condition in which the referent actually manifests the quality by which it is being referred to by  $\alpha, \beta, \gamma \dots$

In this hierarchical model every subsequent viewpoint introduces a new indexical co-ordinate; the only exception being the first *naya*, the comprehensive viewpoint (*naigama*), in the case of which the context-defining parameters remain indeterminate and the interpretation is open<sup>80</sup>:

1. the comprehensive (*naigama*):  $i = \langle \rangle$
2. the collective (*saṅgraha*):  $i = \langle c \rangle$
3. the empirical (*vyavahāra*):  $i = \langle c, a \rangle$
4. the direct (*rju-sūtra*):  $i = \langle c, a, t \rangle$
5. the verbal (*śabda*):  $i = \langle c, a, t, l \rangle$
6. the etymological (*samabhirūḍha*):  $i = \langle c, a, t, l, e \rangle$
7. the factual (*evam-bhūta*):  $i = \langle c, a, t, l, e, s \rangle$

Thus, the truth-value of the utterance  $\alpha$  is not simply  $\|\alpha\| = 1$  for truth or  $\|\alpha\| = 0$  for falsity, but rather  $\|\alpha\|_i^1 = 1$  or  $\|\alpha\|_i^1 = 0$ , in so far as the utterance  $\alpha$  is by necessity always understood according to the interpretation **I** at a particular point of reference  $i$ . Accordingly, the domain  $D$  of possible interpretations of the utterances  $\alpha, \beta, \gamma \in \mathbf{F}$  is mapped onto the class **A** of actual denotata via the context delimited by  $i \in I$ .

That is why one may consistently express both ‘Devadatta is’ and ‘Devadatta is not,’ or ‘hedgehog is’ and ‘hedgehog is not’ in one breath without involving any contradiction. What one actually expresses is not  $\alpha \wedge \neg\alpha$ , but rather, for instance,  $\alpha_{i1}^1 \wedge \neg\alpha_{i4}^1$  (‘There are hedgehogs in the world, but there is no hedgehog here and now’), or  $\alpha_{i3}^1 \wedge \neg\alpha_{i7}^1$  (‘I have a pet hedgehog but it is *not* a hog that is presently in the hedge’), etc.

Thus, at least as far as the theory of the *nayas* is concerned, the claim of multi-faceted reality (*anekānta*) not only does not involve any contradiction but it also does not necessitate any admission of multi-valued logic and can be understood with the classical interpretation of the law of non-contradiction or the law of the excluded middle.

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<sup>80</sup> This ‘contextlessness’ (the empty contents of  $i = \langle \rangle$ ) of the *naigama-naya* may be the reason why Siddhasena Divākara in his STP does not include the comprehensive viewpoint (*naigama*) in his classification of the *nayas* at all.

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