

What Exists for the Vaiśeṣika?*

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1.1. Introduction: the knowability thesis

In his *Padārtha-dharma-saṁgraha* (PBh), Praśastapāda ascribes three common properties to all ontological categories: existentiality¹ (*astitva*), nameability (*abhidheyatva*) and cognisability (*jñeyatva*). The well-known and often debated passage of PBh₁ 2.3, p. 16 = PBh₂ 11 reads:

T° *ṣaṅṅām api padārthānām astitvābhidheyatva-jñeyatvāni.*

* I gratefully acknowledge the feedback I have received from Stephen Phillips on the notion of *astitva* and related issues and thank him for all his comments on the paper.

¹ To translate *astitva*, I deliberately choose 'existentiality', which might appear odd at first, in order not to project any ready-made ideas on the term, the semantics of which first requires proper analysis. Its meaning will become clear in the sequel, esp. p. 256 ff.

‘All the six ontological categories have [the following three properties in common]: existentiality, nameability and cognisability.’

This idea is sometimes simplified to the statement that ‘whatever exists is nameable and knowable;’² however, such a rendering occurs not without a semantic loss of the original statement and prejudging the exact relation, such as co-extension or partial overlap, between the three properties, a relation that should first be studied more carefully. We can call it the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thesis of the knowability of everything, or the knowability thesis for short.

The present paper will take up the question again,³ whether these three properties were thought to be coextensive or not, by supplying some additional material, and will demonstrate how far the issue is related to the idea of omniscience accepted by the Vaiśeṣika. I will also argue that the triad of existentiality (*astitva*), nameability (*abhidheyatva*) and cognisability (*jñeyatva*) entered the system of Vaiśeṣika in the late fifth century CE at the earliest in a package of four interrelated concepts that necessarily complement each other. The other three ingredients are: the belief in god’s existence⁴, belief in god’s omniscience and belief in supernatural perception. What is important, the paper is an attempt to reconstruct early historical developments in the tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and not to engage the subsequent development of these ideas. I deliberately avoid discussing such philosophers as Udayana or Gaṅgeśa or ideas (e.g. *upādhi*) that were later developed as, perhaps, a response to some problems also posed by issues discussed in the present paper in order to avoid a methodological error of projecting later ideas onto an early phase of the system.

² See Karl H. POTTER (1968: 275): ‘to be is to be knowable and nameable’, and POTTER (1995: 48): ‘whatever is, is knowable and nameable’.

³ The issue was dealt with already in such works, for example, as POTTER (1968), SHAW (1978), HALBFASS (1989), HALBFASS (1992: 158), POTTER (1995), PERRETT (1999).

⁴ I consistently translate *īśvara* as ‘god’ for a few reasons. First, *īśvara* should be distinguished from *deva* (‘divine being’) in translation. Second, I consider it a better practice to translate Indian Sanskrit terms into English rather than leave them untranslated, because otherwise, in extreme cases, a translation would purely consist of Sanskrit terms embedded in English morphology and be a case of a ‘Sanskritic new speech’, and because even a rough English translation approximates the idea of how we understand a given Sanskrit term, albeit it does not always convey the meaning in a most adequate manner. Third, the Indian concept of *īśvara* does not really overlap with what is understood under ‘God’ in monotheistic traditions of Judaism, Christianity or Islam. Fourth, to an extent the meaning of *īśvara* partially relates to theistic concept of Western-Asian and European traditions, I consider the term ‘god’ (unlike Yahveh/Jehovah, Allah, Śiva etc.) a common noun (albeit with necessarily only one instantiation for the monotheists), not a proper name, and as such it should be consistently written lower case, despite the tradition.

1.2. Other examples of the knowability thesis

Praśastapāda was not unique in the tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. At more or less the same time Uddyotakara alludes to these ideas in the *Nyāya-vārttika* with similar words,⁵ taking the idea of the three properties as already well-known and necessitating no additional explanation.

Likewise Candramati (Maticandra?) refers to these ideas at the end of his *Daśa-padārtha-śāstra* (DPŚ)—now preserved only in Chinese translation,⁶ that presents the Vaiśeṣika system partly independent of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*—which is cited here in two different English renderings:

‘Which of these (five kinds of *abhāva*—P.B.) are objects of perception; which are not objects of it? All the five non-existences are not objects of perception. On the other hand, even those which exist without being supported by other things are altogether objects of inference. [Section 11.—*Conclusion*]

Which of these ten categories are knowable; which are not knowable? All are knowable and also causes of their recognitions’⁷;

‘[253] Among these five [kinds of absences], how many are the objects of direct cognition, and how many are not the objects of direct

⁵ NV₁ 1.1.5, p. 56.21 = NV₂ 1.1.5, p. 50.17: *sattva-praśmeyatvābhidheyatvādy-anumānam prāptam*.

⁸ NV₂. The passage is quoted in HBṬĀ, p. 317.26.

Worth noting is that Uddyotakara uses the term *astitva* not in the Vaiśeṣika sense of ‘existentiality’, which is discussed in the present paper, as it stands in triad of *astitva-abhidheyatva-jñeyatva*, but in the sense of ontological existence, e.g. in such phrases and contexts as ‘the existence of soul’ (NV₁ 1.1.10, p. 66.17–18 = NV₂, p. 60.11–12: *icchādīnām pratisandhānam ātmāstitva-pratipādakam*; NV₁ 1.1.34, p. 119.8–9 = NV₂ 1.1.33, p. 109.21–22: *tad yathā ātmano ’stitva-nāstitva-vicāraṇāyām iti. ātmano ’stitva-nāstitva-saṁśayaḥ iti*, etc.) or ‘the existence of god’ (NV₁ 4.1.21, p. 461.4–7 = NV₂, p. 433.7 ff.: *īśvara eva nyāyam. tatra hi pramāṇāny aviḥātana pravartante iti. astitvāsiddhiḥ iti cet atha manyase siddhe īśvarasyāstित्वे kāraṇāntara-nirākaraṇam nimitta-kāraṇa-bhāvaś ca siddhyet*, etc.).

⁶ After a first fragmentary attempt by Paramārtha, DPŚ was eventually fully translated into Chinese by Xuanzang (Hsuan-tsang, 600–664) under the title *Shengzong shijuyi lun* (a rendering of *Vaiśeṣika-nikāya-daśa-padārtha-śāstra*) in 648 (or between 646 and 648), after his return to China from Nālandā; see UI (1917: 1) and BAGCHI (1944: 151).

⁷ Translated by UI (1917: 119). Cf. also a relevant note of UI (1917: 224): “‘Knowable’ represents *jñeyatva*, while *astitva* and *abhidheyatva* are included in “causes of their recognition”.’

cognition? [254] Any [kind of absence] is not the object of direct cognition. But all [kinds of absences], which exist without having any locus other [than their own], are the objects of inference. [255] Among these ten categories of entities, how many are cognizable and how many are non-cognizable? [256] All are cognizable and are the cause of expressions⁸ (emphasis—P.B.).

The idea is also expressly echoed in the *Praśastamati-ṭīkā* passages quoted in DNC (p. 517.5–7; see below, p. 274) by Mallavādin, albeit it does not seem to be known to the original author(s) of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*.⁹

2. The structure of Praśastapāda's argument

Let us first take a closer look at the structure of Praśastapāda's statement.

2.1. Possible formulations and loss of ontology

As it is well-known, in the Vaiśeṣika ontology, the structure of the world is described as reducible to atomic facts, analysable as follows:

A property (*dharma*, *q*) is related to its substratum (*dharmin*, *p*) with a particular relation (*sambandha*, *R*): $R(q, p)$.

One of the relations possible in Vaiśeṣika, the relation of inherence (*samavāya*), acquired a predominant role and was classified as the sixth ontological category. Praśastapāda defined it as 'the relationship between the locus and the located property'¹⁰. Others defined it later as 'the qualifier-qualificand relationship' (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva*)¹¹.

⁸ Translated and reconstructed into Sanskrit by MIYAMOTO (1996: 206), DPŚ₂ 253–256: [253] *etādṛṣṭāṇāṃ pañcābhāvānāṃ kati dṛṣṭa-viṣayāḥ katy adṛṣṭa-viṣayāḥ?* [254] *sarve 'dṛṣṭa-viṣayāḥ. kiṃ tu ananyāśrītya vartamānāḥ sarve 'numāna-viṣayaḥ.* [255] *eteṣāṃ darśa-padārthānāṃ kati jñeyāḥ katy ajñeyāḥ?* [256] *sarva eva jñeyāḥ. te cātvābhīdhāna-hetuḥ.* Cf. also MIYAMOTO (1996: 251): *praśastapāda-bhāṣya-dravya-granthe sādharma-vaidharmya-nirūpaṇānāṃ ṣaṇṇām api padārthānāṃ astivābhīdheya-jñeyatvāni.*

⁹ Cf. n. 23.

¹⁰ PBh₁ 12, p. 326.1 = PBh₂ 375: *adhikaraṇādhikartavyayor eva bhāva[h].*

¹¹ Uddyotakara, e.g. NV₁ 1.1.4, p. 32.16.

In the Vaiśeṣika-specific terminology, the Western-type predicate proposition of the form

‘ x is P ’:
 $P(x)$

would thus correspond to:

‘The property P -ness is related to its substratum x with the relation of inherence I ’:
 $I(P\text{-ness}, x)$,

which can be simplified to:

‘ x possesses the property P -ness.’¹²

This is why the idea expressed by Praśastapāda’s statement: ‘anything that possesses the property of existentiality, also possesses the property of nameability and cognisability’, could be logically converted to a typical predicate statement: ‘whatever is existent is also nameable and cognisable’.

That would not, however, happen without consequence. The transformation would, first, involve the obvious loss of the specific ontological relation between subject and predicate typified by the relation of inherence, and, second, would reduce the property-substratum relation of inherence to a predicate-subject relation. What remains intact is the logical relation between the subject and the predicates, or between the substratum and its properties. In the paper, I shall occasionally use the shorthand ‘whatever is existent is also nameable and knowable’, or similar expressions, for the complete proposition: ‘among all the six categories anything that possesses the property of existentiality, also possesses the property of nameability and cognisability’.

2.2. Possible readings of Praśastapāda’s statement

We notice that the three properties can, theoretically, be coextensive, partially overlap or be in the relation of inclusion. To save paper, I will not discuss all the theoretical possibilities, but only refer to those that are contextually most plausible.

Accordingly, Praśastapāda’s complete statement: ‘All the six ontological categories have [the following three properties, inherently related to them, in common]:

¹² For instances cf. PBh₁ 2.3, p. 19 = PBh₂ 15 (n. 26 below), and DNC, p. 517.5 f.: *yat punaḥ dravyādīnām svata evābhīdhāna-pratyaya-ṣaḥyatvaṁ sattvāt sattādivat* (see n. 30 below).

existentiality, nameability and cognisability', which assumes the reality of the relation of inherence, can be converted to one of the following predicate statements:

- F1° 'Among the six ontological categories, whatever is existent, is also nameable which is in turn cognisable': $astitva \subseteq (jñeyatva \subseteq abhidheyatva)$, or
 F2° 'Among the six ontological categories, whatever is existent, is also cognisable which is in turn nameable': $astitva \subseteq (abhidheyatva \subseteq jñeyatva)$, or
 F3° 'Among the six ontological categories, whatever is nameable, is also existent which is in turn cognisable' $abhidheyatva \subseteq (jñeyatva \subseteq astitva)$, or
 F4° 'Among the six ontological categories, whatever is nameable, is also cognisable which is in turn existent' $abhidheyatva \subseteq (astitva \subseteq jñeyatva)$, or
 F5° 'Among the six ontological categories, whatever is cognisable, is also existent which is in turn nameable': $jñeyatva \subseteq (astitva \subseteq abhidheyatva)$, or
 F6° 'Among the six ontological categories, whatever is cognisable, is also nameable which is in turn existent': $jñeyatva \subseteq (abhidheyatva \subseteq astitva)$.¹³

What needs to be clarified is also the exact relation between the sets of properties, i.e. the equation/inclusion sign \subseteq should be diambiguated as either = or \subset , e.g.:

$$\begin{aligned} jñeyatva &= astitva = abhidheyatva, \text{ or} \\ astitva &\subset (jñeyatva \subset abhidheyatva), \text{ or} \\ jñeyatva &\subset astitva \subset abhidheyatva, \text{ or} \\ jñeyatva &\subset (astitva = abhidheyatva), \text{ etc.} \end{aligned}$$

The relation between nameability (*abhidheyatva*) and cognisability (*jñeyatva*) does not seem to pose much difficulty due to the *e v e n t u a l l y*¹⁴ verbal character of cognition, accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, but also because the commentators take them both as coextensive: $jñeyatva = abhidheyatva$.

For instance at a much later period, in the *Kiraṇāvalī*, Udayana singles them out and treats in the same manner:

'[Objection:] "But these two [categories of nameability and cognisability] exist even with respect to [the seventh ontological category of] absence". They do, indeed. However, what is intended to be expressed

¹³ The possibilities of formal notation are larger depending on how we use the parentheses, e.g. $F2^* (astitva \subseteq jñeyatva) \subseteq abhidheyatva$, $F2^* (astitva \subseteq abhidheyatva) \subseteq jñeyatva$, etc. For our purposes the issue is of no practical importance.

¹⁴ By 'eventually' I mean that, even in the case of the contents of the non-conceptual (indeterminate) perception (*nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*), one becomes aware of it only at a subsequent stage of conceptual (determinate) perception (*savikalpaka-pratyakṣa*), which in principle can be verbalised.

[here in the *Prāśastapāda-bhāṣya*] is not the difference [between all the ontological categories] with respect to this [absence], but the similarity with respect to six ontological categories.’¹⁵

Similarly, in the *Nyāya-kandalī* (NKan), Śrīdharamiśra says that:

‘Nameability is indeed the intrinsic nature of the real thing, i.e. it is nothing but the intrinsic nature of something that exists; and, in view of the difference of [the particular] condition [of the real thing], nameability is called cognisability.’¹⁶

What remains problematic is how the pair nameability–cognisability actually relates to existentiality, viz. whether it is the equation: *astitva* = (*jñeyatva* = *abhidheyatva*), or the inclusion of either of two kinds: nameability–cognisability is the proper subset of existentiality, viz. *astitva* ⊂ (*jñeyatva* = *abhidheyatva*), or the other way round, viz. (*jñeyatva* = *abhidheyatva*) ⊂ *astitva*.

Researchers interpreted *Prāśastapāda*’s thesis in diverse ways. Karl H. POTTER, for instance, took it for granted that all the three properties are coextensive:

“‘To be is to be knowable and nameable’”. The Naiyāyika reads this as fully reversible: whatever exists (in the broadest sense) can be known and can be spoken of, named; furthermore, if something is known, or if it is named, then it exists. Likewise, if something is nameable, it is knowable, and vice-versa. The three abstract nouns in the Sanskrit motto apply to each and every thing in the universe’ (1968: 275),

as well as

‘whatever is, is knowable and nameable’ (1995: 48).

Also Roy W. PERRETT (1999: 401) echoed the thought: ‘Whatever exists is knowable and nameable’. The same interpretation was expressed several decades earlier by Gaṅgānātha JHĀ (1982: 37):

‘Though “beingness” would seem to belong to Abhāva also, and as such the mention of “six” categories only would appear incorrect,—yet when we bear in mind the fact that our author has enumerated only six categories, the incongruity ceases; as to mention “six” categories, as having “beingness” is as much as to say that it belongs to *all things*.

¹⁵ KA, p. 19.5–7: *nanv etad eva dvayam abhāve ’py astīti cet, astu, na hi tad-apekṣayā vaidharmyam idaṁ vivakṣitam, api tu śad-apekṣayā sādharmaṁyam.*

¹⁶ NKan₁, p. 16: *tac ca vastunaḥ svarūpam eva bhāva-svarūpam evāvasthā-bhedena jñeyatvam abhidheyatvam cōcyate.*

And any thing that exists is also capable of being “predicated”’ (emphasis—P.B.).

And in the same spirit Jaysankar Lal SHAW (1978: 259–260) asserted that:

‘To exist is to be knowable and nameable. It is claimed that if something has one of the three properties, it has the remaining two properties as well. ... Every object has the property of being communicable through language. ... This amounts to saying that an object can be an object of knowledge of cognition.’

However, Wilhelm HALBFASS (1992: 158) was far more cautious in his judgments:

“All six categories possess is-ness, nameability, and knowability” (*ṣaṅṅāṃ api padārthānām astitvābhidheyatvajñeyatvāni*).¹¹⁰ Praśastapāda’s short statement is elusive; its simplicity is deceptive. It does not clarify the relationship between *astitva*, on the one hand, and predicability and knowability or objectifiability, on the other. The fact that he coordinates them as common attributes (*sādharmya*) of the six categories does not necessarily mean that he considers them to be coextensive.¹¹¹ The commentators usually include nonbeing (*abhāva*) under *abhidheyatva* and *jñeyatva*, but are reluctant to do so with regard to *astitva*; although we may know and speak of nonbeing, nothing knowable or speakable exists (or “is there”) apart from the six positive categories.¹¹² [¹¹⁰ PBh, p. 16.]’

I will return to this important question whether the three properties are coextensive or not in § 3 below (p. 273 ff.).

2.3. Existentiality and existence

Praśastapāda, Candramati and Uddyotakara are too laconic to judge the way they conceived of the relation of the three properties. Not only do they not define them, but also treat them as meta-categories¹⁷ that underlie the system and its categories and are

¹⁷ Cf. HALBFASS (1992: 1945): ‘*Astitva* is not part of the fundamental “nomenclature of the world.” It is not “listed” and “named” among the categories, but used to describe and analyze them. I is a second-order concept, an abstraction.’ Indeed, the problem of the property of *astitva* to be considered a separate category is pointed out by Śāntarakṣita in TSaP 572:

*saṃjñāpaka-pramāṇasya viśaye tattvam iṣyate /
ṣaṅṅām astitvam iti cet ṣaḍbhyo ’nyas te prasajyate //*

too well known to be defined or explained. They must have already become a ‘common assumption’ of the discourse at that time. All Praśastapāda says about them is, for instance, that they apply to all the six categories to which the universe is reducible, i.e. they apply to everything. Most importantly, *astitva* is clearly distinguished from the highest universal (*sāmānya*) of existence (*sattā*), which is possessed only by the first three categories of ‘concrete things’ (*artha*): substances (*dravya*), qualities (*guṇa*) and movements (*karman*). Existentiality (*astitva*) along with two other meta-categories, in their turn, are predicated of everything. Only ‘concrete’ things need ‘existence’ (*sattā*) for their existence, whereas the remaining three categories—i.e. universals (*sāmānya*), individuators (*viśeṣa*)¹⁸ and inherence (*samavāya*)—do not and cannot; they do possess, however, existentiality (*astitva*).

Some clarification with respect to the actual relation between the concepts of *sattā* and *astitva* can be found in PBh. In the chapter on the relation of inherence, Praśastapāda explains that

‘Just as the presence (sc. the universal existence, *sattā*) of substances, qualities and movements, which consists in [their] being existent,¹⁹ has no additional association with the universal existence (sc. it needs no second-order universal of existence), similarly inherence, consisting in occurrence has no additional (sc. second order) occurrence; therefore [inherence] occurs in itself.’²⁰

In other words, the highest universal of existence that characterises substances, qualities and movements, does not need any second-order universal of existence; it does need though the quality of ‘being existent’, or ‘having the nature of something existent’ (*sad-ātmaka*), i.e. existentiality (*astitva*).

Thus, the highest universal of existence (*sattā*) is inherently related—through the relation of *samavāya*—to only those entities and all those which can ostensibly be referred to as denotata with specific terms denoting them. Accordingly, the extension, or application, of *sattā* is narrower than that of *astitva*.²¹ This contention finds further

¹⁸ An idea that only partially resembles Duns Scotus’ notion of haecceity (‘thisness’), the main difference being that for Duns Scotus it was the notion of a particular non-qualitative property or aspect of a thing responsible for its distinct individuality or essence, whereas for Vaiśeṣika it is a separate category.

¹⁹ Cf. VS(C) 1.2.4 (*bhāvaḥ sāmānyam eva*) and VSV(C) ad loc.

²⁰ PBh₁ 12, p. 328 = PBh₂ 384: *yathā dravya-guṇa-karmanām sad-ātmakasya bhāvasya nānyaḥ sattā-yogo ’sti, evam avibhāgino vṛtṭy-ātmakasya samavāyasya nānyā vṛttir asti tasmāt svātma-vṛtṭiḥ*.

²¹ This was eventually perceived as problematic by some. See for instance Bhaṭṭa Vādindra who, in his *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra-vārttika* (VSV), equates *astitva* with *sattā* to avoid a range of

support in Praśastapāda's following statement which indirectly associates the property of being related to the universal existence (*sattā-sambandha*) with the property of being nameable according to a linguistic convention that governs the process of conventional naming of the first three categories (substances, qualities and movements):

‘All three [categories, viz.] substance etc. (sc. qualities and movements), possess the relation with [the universal] existence, [possess] the status of [entities] that are endowed with intermediate universals, [possess] the status of [entities] that are nameable with [the help of] speech elements that [express their] denotata [in accordance] with the convention [that applies] to them^{22, 23}’

We can see that for Praśastapāda there are two different strategies to denote entities, or—to put it differently—different categories are all amenable to being denoted in two different ways. All the six categories, which are also possessed of existentiality (*astitva*), are nameable (*abhidheya*), whereas the first three of them, which are pos-

difficulties; see ISAACSON (1995: 28–29): ‘What Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra does here is attempt to solve an inherent difficulty in Vaiśeṣika ontology by equating what originally was a “second-order concept,” which fell outside of the supposedly all-inclusive categories, with the highest universal. This attempt to make the description and classification of really existing things as complete as possible with a small set of first-order concepts and avoiding the use of concepts at a higher (meta-) level as far as possible, inevitably entails infinite regress, circularity or *ātmāśrayaḥ* at some key points; how persuasive Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra is in arguing that this does not invalidate his proposals I shall leave to philosophers to debate. No Indian thinker, as far as I know, has followed Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra in this.’

²² This is in accordance with VS(C) 7.2.24: *sāmāyikaḥ śabdād artha-pratyayaḥ*.—‘The understanding of the meaning [takes place] by virtue of the speech element governed by a convention.’

A reference to such an understanding of the meaning of a word, which denotes concrete entities (substances and their qualities) as well as their movements, which expresses both the universal and the particular aspect—and only these first three categories possess universals (*sāmānya*) and individuators (*viśeṣa*), may earlier have been referred to by Bhartṛhari in VP 2.125, which is slightly cryptic:

*niyatās tu prayogā ye niyataṁ yac ca sādhanam /
teṣāṁ śabdābhidheyatvam aparair anugamyate //*

‘Others conclude that specific application [of words] (sc. universals) and means [to apply them] (sc. particulars) are what is expressed by the speech element.’

²³ PBh₁ 2.3, p. 17 = PBh₂ 14: *dravyādīnām trayāṇām api sattā-sambandhaḥ, sāmānya-viśeṣavattvaṁ, sva-samayārtha-śabdābhidheyatvaṁ, dharmādharma-kartṛtvaṁ ca*.

It is generally accepted by later Vaiśeṣika authors that the idea goes back to Praśastapāda, which further implies that the first to adopt the three properties (*astitva-abhidheyatva-jñeyatva*) common to all ontological categories was Praśastapāda, see VSU 8.2.3, p. 370.3–4: *tad uktam praśastadevācāryaiḥ “trayāṇām artha-śabdābhidheyatvaṁ ca” iti*.—‘It was stated by the esteemed preceptor Praśasta that the three [categories possess] the status of [entities] that are nameable with [the help of] speech elements that [express their] denotata.’

sessed of the highest universal of existence (*sattā*), are in addition nameable through speech elements that express their denotata following the convention that applies to these categories (*sva-samayārtha-śabdābhidheya*). Such an interpretation is additionally strengthened by a mediaeval commentary called *Prāśastapāda-bhāṣya-samālocana*:

‘[All first three categories, viz. substances, qualities and movements,] possess the relation with [the universal] existence, which (sc. the relation) consists in inherence. Intermediate universals are substantiality etc. (i.e. qualitiveness (*guṇatva*) and mobility (*karmatva*)). [These three categories also possess] the status of [entities] endowed with these [intermediate universals]. Only three [categories, viz.] substance etc., are named with the help of an independent (sc. not connected with a subordinate word) speech element that [expresses] its denotatum (object), not any other [category]. This precisely is the convention, [expressed] in the own literature of the Vaiśeṣikas, to facilitate practice, just as [the statement] of *The Instruction on Yoga* (YBh): “The triad of meditation, contemplation and concentration with respect to one [object constitute] restraint”.²⁴

Thus, only the first three ontological categories can be related through inherence to existence, whereas such categories as intermediate universals (*dravyatva*, *guṇatva*, *karmatva*), individuators and inherence are excluded; they possess *astitva* (‘existentiality’) instead. *Prāśastapāda* explicitly states that they are not nameable in the same way as the first three categories. In other words, universals etc. are not ostensibly nameable, i.e. cannot be ostensibly indicated with an accompanying verbal expression:

‘[The subsequent] three categories such as universals etc. (i.e. individuators and inherence) [possess] the status of [entities] that are existent in their own essence (sc. are self-existent), [possess] the status of [entities] that are characterised (or: recognised) by cognition²⁵, [possess] the status of [entities] that are not effects, [possess] the status of [entities] that are not causes, [possess] the status of [entities] that do not possess

²⁴ PBhS, p. 10.15–20 (ad PBh₂ 14): *sattā-sambandhaḥ samavāya-lakṣaṇaḥ sāmānya-viśeṣā dravyatvādayaḥ tadvattvaṁ nirupapadenārtha-śabdena dravyādayas traya evābhidhīyante nāpare. eṣa eva samayo vaiśeṣikāṇāṁ sva-śāstre vyavahāra-lāghavāya yathā “dhyāna-dhāraṇā-samādhi-trayam ekatra samīyama”^s iti yogānuśāsane.*

^a YBh 3.4: *dhāraṇā-dhyāna-samādhi-trayam ekatra samīyamaḥ.*

²⁵ As regards the ambiguity of the expression *buddhi-lakṣaṇa* (‘those whose characteristic is cognition’ or ‘those who are recognised through cognition’) cf. VyV, p. 40.21–22: *tathā buddhir lakṣaṇaṁ yeṣāṁ buddhyā lakṣyanta iti vā buddhi-lakṣaṇās teṣāṁ bhāvo buddhi-lakṣaṇatvam.*

any intermediate universals (i.e. subtypes), [possess] the status of [entities] that are permanent and [possess] the status of [entities] that are not nameable with [the help of] speech elements that [express their] denotata.²⁶

Centuries later, Śāṅkaramiśra restates the idea slightly differently:

‘... even though [universals, individuators and inherence] are bereft of existence, [which is the highest universal], they are the contents of cognition that [they are] existent...’²⁷

All that means is that all the six categories of the classical Vaiśeṣika can become the contents of both verbal expressions (*abhidhāna*) and cognitive acts (*pratyaya*), but only first three of them can be indicated directly (by pointing) as well as both named (with either general or non-abstract singular terms, or names) and veridically thought of as concrete objects, whose qualities or states are spatio-temporarily limited and which are potentially observable directly.

Worth noting is that the same idea is paraphrased (quoted?) and ascribed to Praśastamati by Mallavādin in DNC, where he introduces a longer quotation from the *Praśastamati-ṭīkā*:

‘Further, one may object: “[All three categories, viz.] substance etc. (sc. qualities and movements), are the contents of verbal designation and cognition <as something existent>²⁸ only by their own force, because they are existent (or: because of their existentiality), just as the existence and other [universals are the contents of verbal designation and cognition because they are existent by their own force]. Just as there is verbal designation and cognition of the existence and other [universals] by their own force, not because of their union with [the universal] existence, similarly there is verbal designation and cognition also of [the three categories of] substance etc. (sc. qualities and movements) by their own force, not because they are endowed with [the universal] existence”. That is not correct, because [substance, qualities and movements] do not share the na-

²⁶ PBh₁ 2.3, p. 19 = PBh₂ 15: *sāmānyādīnām trayāṅām svātma-sattvaṃ buddhi-lakṣaṇatvaṃ akāryatvaṃ akāraṇatvaṃ asāmānya-viśeṣavattvaṃ nityatvaṃ artha-śabdānabhidheyatvaṃ cēti*.

²⁷ PBhṬS, p. 177.3–7: *sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyānām svātma-sattvaṃ. tac ca sattā-śūnyatve sati sat-pratyaya-viśayatvaṃ. buddhi-lakṣaṇatvaṃ cānuvṛtta-buddhi-vyāvṛtta-buddhi-hetu-buddhi-viśayatvaṃ eva lakṣaṇam sāmānyādīnām trayāṅām ity uktam*.

²⁸ The edition reads: *dravyādīnām svata evābhidhāna-pratyaya-viśayatvaṃ*, but—in view of the recurring reading *sad-abhidhāna-pratyayau* in DNC, p. 517.6, p. 517.6–7 and p. 519.7—we should perhaps read *dravyādīnām svata eva sad-abhidhāna-pratyaya-viśayatvaṃ*.

ture of it (i.e. of universal existence). Since substance etc. (sc. qualities and movements) do not have the nature of this [universal existence],²⁹ [their] verbal designation etc. (i.e. cognition) as something existent is based on [the universal] existence, like [the ideas] “the one with no stick” and “the one with a stick” are based on [the idea of] “a stick”.³⁰

Thus, what renders the first three categories ostensibly expressible and cognisable as concrete denotata, i.e. as objects or phenomena that can be directly indicated, seems to be the universal existence that is related to them. The remaining three categories, including universals (the primary of them being existence (*sattā*)), can neither be expressed ostensibly (sc. pointed to) nor be directly cognised in the same manner, i.e. as potentially spatio-temporarily determinable objects that are related to particular qualities, albeit they can be spoken and veridically thought of as general objects or ideas. Praśastamati rejects an unidentified opponent’s opinion that the first three categories (substance, qualities and movements) would not need any additional factor or determinant to be expressed and cognised as existent entities, the way the remaining three categories can, on the grounds that the idea of existence as a universal is already entailed in any statement that addresses an object that exists or an object that does not exist. While Mallavādin subsequently rejects the idea, he nonetheless refers to Praśastamati’s formulations:

‘What has been said, viz. “Since they do not share the nature of it (i.e. of universal existence), verbal designation and cognition of substance etc. (sc. qualities and movements) as something existent is [possible]

²⁹ See remark ^b in n. 30. With the reading *asad-ātmatvāt*, as it is (wrongly) printed, we would have to read: ‘Since substance etc. (sc. qualities and movements) do not have the nature of something existent [on its own]’.

In addition, the idea of *sad-ātmakatva/sad-ātmatva* corresponds to *astitva* (see p. 257), and what is meant here is the idea that the three categories of substances etc. need the third category to be amenable to verbal expression etc.

³⁰ DNC, p. 517.5–518.1 (Vol. II): *yat punaḥ “dravyādīnām [dravya-guṇa-karmanām]^a svata evābhīdhāna-pratyaya-viśayatvaṃ sattvāt sattādivat. yathā sattādeḥ sad-abhīdhāna-pratyayau svata eva, na sattā-yogāt, evaṃ dravyādīnām api sad-abhīdhāna-pratyayau svata eva, na sattā-yogād” ity ukte ucyate—nātat, atādātmyāt. dravyādīnām asad-ātmatvāt^b sattā-nimittam sad-abhīdhānādi daṇḍa-nimittādaṇḍa-daṇḍitvavad iti.*

^a DNC, p. 517.3: *teṣāṃ trayaṇām.*

^b Read: *atad-ātmatvāt* in view of (1) the preceding *atādātmyāt*, (2) DNC, p. 519.7: *atad-ātmatvād dravyādīnām...* (see n. 31), and (3) DNCV, p. 519.26–27: *atad-ātmatvād ity-ādy asattātmakatvād dravya-guṇa-karmanām sad-abhīdhāna-pratyayau sattā-yogāt.*

Cf. MŚVṬ, III, p. 29.5–8: *tad yadi daṇḍa-puruṣa-sambandho daṇḍi-śabdasyābhīdheyāḥ, tathā sati tan-niṣkarse daṇḍitvaṃ daṇḍitēti tva-talor anuśāsanam upapadyate. yathā go-śabdābhīdheyāṃ sāmānyam gotvam iti tv apratyayena niṣkṛṣyate.*

only because they are endowed with [the universal] existence, it is not possible by their own force”, that too is not [correct].³¹

We can further notice that members of the compound *sad-abhidhāna-pratyaya*—resolved as *sad-abhidhāna* (‘verbal designation [of *x*] as existent’) of *Prāśastamati* and *sad-pratyaya* (‘cognition [of *x*] as existent’)—correspond to the triad *astitva-abhidheyatva-jñeyatva* of *Prāśastapāda*.³²

2.4. How do existentiality and existence differ?

The comparison of *Prāśastapāda*’s vocabulary (*astitva-abhidheyatva-jñeyatva*) and that of *Uddyotakara* (*sattva-abhidheyatva-prameyatva*, quoted in n. 5) reveals that the terms *astitva* and *sattva* can, at least on some occasions, be treated as interchangeable, depending on the choice of authors. The specific character of *astitva* (‘existentiality’) and the way it differs from *sattā* (‘existence’) will become clearer when we compare the usage of still another term, viz. *bhāva*, which may at first appear to cover some of the semantics of ‘existence’ and which occurs in selected passages of *Prāśastapāda*’s work and of the *Prāśastamati-ṭīkā* as quoted by *Mallavādin* and *Siṃha-sūri*. The term *bhāva* occurs in at least the following meanings in both works:

³¹ DNC, p. 519.7–520.1: *yad apy uktam “atad-ātmatvād dravyādinām sad-abhidhāna-pratyayau sattā-yogāt, na svataḥ” tad api na.*

³² In his criticism *Mallavādin* directly refers to *Prāśastamati*’s ideas. This also throws additional light on the relations between the three properties (existentiality, nameability and cognisability): DNC, p. 521.7–522.1: *yataś cāvam tasmāt sato bhāvaḥ sattēti vyutpattir dravyādy-vyatirikta-sattārthāva kartari ṣaṣṭhi-ṛtteḥ. yat tat sadbhīr bhūyate ... sad ity-abhidhāna-pratyaya-kāraṇam sarvatra.*—‘Since it is so, [viz. the universal existence of substances etc. is there by its own force,] therefore the presence of that which is existent [is the universal] existence—such is the etymological formation the meaning of which is nothing but [the universal] existence as something different from substances etc., inasmuch as the genitive case is used [to indicate] the agent. ... That which obtains by virtue of existent [entities] (sc. the fact that existent entities occur as such) is the cause of verbal designation and cognition of the form: “[it] is existent” with respect to everything.’ Cf. DNCV, p. 521.20–522.–11: *yataś cāvam ity-ādi, yasmāt svata eva sattā dravyādinām yuktā tasmāt sato bhāvaḥ sattēti yā śabda-vyutpattir bheda-ṣaṣṭhy-āpādanārthā sā dravyādy-avyatirikta-sattārthāva jñāyate satām bhāvaḥ sattēti. kim kāraṇam? kartari ṣaṣṭhi-ṛtteḥ. tad-vyākhyānam—yat tat sadbhīr ity-ādi gatārtham yāvat sad ity-abhidhāna-pratyaya-kāraṇam sarvatrēti.* Comp. also DNCV, p. 535.23–24: *yat tat tena bhūyate sa sattā “bhū sattāyam” [PāDhā 1] iti pāṭhāt sāmānyam.*

- (1) *bhāva* in the sense of ‘presence’, ‘occurrence’, where it is equivalent to *sadbhāva*, viz. ‘*x* is there’, ‘*x* is present here’;³³
- (2) *bhāva* in the sense of ‘existence [of]’, viz. ‘there is’, ‘there exists’;³⁴
- (3) *bhāva* in the copulative meaning of ‘is’, viz. ‘*x* is *P*’;^{35,36}
- (4) *bhāva* in the sense of *sattā-sāmānya*, viz. the highest universal.³⁷

The last meaning is technical, and thus relevant to our discussion, whereas the first three express the ideas of ‘being’ (i.e. ‘being there’, ‘being a *P*’ etc.) in a rather loose sense, especially in ontological, existential or predicative senses respectively. Most importantly, *bhāva* in the fourth meaning is equated with the universal existence, which is in agreement with an earlier tradition of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*³⁸, and it is nowhere associated with the idea of *astitva*, whereas the term *sattva* is. We see that, in other words, existentiality (*astitva*, *sattva*) corresponds neither to the highest universal (*sattā-sāmānya*) nor to existence (*bhāva*) in the ontological sense as ‘presence’, or ‘being there’ etc., nor to the copulative meaning of the verb ‘to be’ (\sqrt{as} , $\sqrt{bhū}$).

What is existentiality (*astitva*, *sattva*) then, and how does it differ in its meaning and application from the universal existence (*sattā*, *bhāva*)? It is, in my opinion, the

³³ PBh₁, p. 238 = PBh₂ 270: *ubhayāsiddho ’nyatarāsiddhas tad-bhāvāsiddho ’numeyāsiddhas cēti. ... tad-bhāvāsiddho yathā dhūma-bhāvenāgny-adhigatau kartavyāyām upanyasyamāno bāṣpo* [PBh₁: *vāṣpe*] *dhūma-bhāvenāsiddha iti. Cf. VNT*, p. 14: *vāsa-grhādiṣu tarhi dahanābhāve ’pi dhūma-sadbhāvād vyabhicāra iti cet.*

³⁴ PBh₁ 10, p. 312 = PBh₂ 364–365: *aparam dravyatva-guṇatva-karmatvādy anuvṛtti-vyāvṛtti-hetutvāt sāmānyam viśeṣas ca bhavati. ... prāṇy-aprāṇi-gatānām anuvṛtti-vyāvṛtti-hetutvāt sāmānya-viśeṣa-bhāvaḥ siddhaḥ. See also DNC*, p. 518.1–2: *katham idam tādātmyam (of dravyādi and sattā)? kim sato bhāvāt uta sat-karatvāt?*

³⁵ In one of its two meanings, either = or \subset , viz. \in ; cf. BOCHENSKI (1956: 357; § 40.16).

³⁶ PBh₁ 9.5, p. 308.1 = PBh₂ 356: *ākāśa-kāla-dig-ātmanām saty api dravya-bhāve niṣkriyatvam sāmānyādivad amūrtatvāt.*

³⁷ PBh₁ 8, p. 187.3–7 = PBh₂ 171: *buddhi-sukha-duḥkhēcchā-dveṣa-prayātṇānām dvayor ātma-manasoḥ saṃyogād upalabdhiḥ. bhāva-dravyatva-guṇatva-karmatvādīnām upalabhyādhāra-samavētānām āśraya-grāhakaḥ indriyair grahaṇam ity etad asmad-ādīnām pratyakṣam. Comp. the paraphrase in NKan₂, p. 454.9: *sattā-dravyatvādīnām sāmānyānām āśrayo...* See also PBh₁ 12, p. 326.12 ff. = PBh₂ 376–377: *sa ca dravyādibhyaḥ padārthāntaram, bhāvaval lakṣaṇa-bhedāt. yathā bhāvasya dravyatvādīnām svādhāreṣu ātmānurūpa-pratyaya-kartṛtvāt svāśrayādibhyaḥ parasparataś cārthāntara-bhāvaḥ, tathā samavāsyāpi pañcasu padārtheṣv ihēti-pratyaya-darśanāt tebhyaḥ padārthāntaratvam iti. na ca saṃyogavan nānātvam, bhāvaval liṅgāviśeṣād viśeṣa-liṅgābhāvāc ca. tasmād bhāvavat sarvatrākaḥ samavāya iti. [here: bhāva = sattā-sāmānya. Comp. the paraphrase in in NKan₁, p. 236.21.**

³⁸ VS(C) 1.2.4: *bhāvaḥ sāmānyam eva. Cf. VSV(C) ad loc.: bhāvaḥ sattā sāmānyam eva, triṣv api dravyādiṣv anuvartamānatvāt na viśeṣaḥ.*

capability of any category of the Vaiśeṣika system to enter the ontological structure of the word and to relate to other categories, viz. it is that peculiar capacity that enables any category to be a part of the atomic facts (see § 2.1., p. 252) down to which the world structure is analysable. In other words, in terms of extension, the property of existentiality of entities that can be parts of atomic facts concerns primarily such entities that are subjects of existential statements ‘*x* exists’/ ‘there is *x*’, and as such the property seems to be characterised by existential entailment, controversial as it may seem (especially having taken into consideration Kant’s argument). This aspect is highlighted centuries later by Śāṅkaramiśra, who avails himself of Navya-Nyāya terminology to make it unequivocally clear that *astitva* attaches to absolutely everything that is there, can be thought of and accordingly categorised:

‘With respect to these [six categories] existentiality means precisely the fact [that all these categories] are referred to as “*x* exists”. Further, this [property of existentiality] is indeed traditionally [considered] as something different, i.e. as [a property] common to absences. Accordingly, one should understand that everything, whether having the status of a property or a property-possessor, shares a common property of being universally present.’³⁹

If my understanding of the above is correct, existentiality is, consequently, such a property that typifies a reification of the ontological commitment expressed in existential statements.

Precisely such reification is questioned by the Buddhist opponent Kamalaśīla, who—while referring to T° (PBh₁ 2.3, p. 16 = PBh₂ 11)—argues that to postulate such a property lacks any objective basis insofar as it never occurs separately from and as something separate from all the six categories; to say that ‘*x* possesses existentiality’ and ‘there is *x*’ is one and the same thing and the difference is merely linguistic, but not ontological:

‘In such [statements as] “the six ontological categories have existentiality” and “there is a group of six [categories]”, even though there is no real difference [in what they express], the genitive form is used. For you do not admit existentiality as something over and above the six categories.’⁴⁰

³⁹ PBhṬS, p. 175.4–7: *tatra cāstītvam astīti-viśayatvam eva tac cābhāva-sādhāraṇam anyad yathā-śrutam eva. evaṁ ca dharmatva-dharmitvādīkam api sarvaṁ kevalānvayi sādharṁyam iha pratyetavyam.*

⁴⁰ TSaP 572, p. 192.9–10: *ṣaṅṅāṁ padārthānām astītvam teṣāṁ ca ṣaṅṅāṁ varga ity-ādāv asaty api vāstave bhede ṣaṣṭhy-ādi bhavaty eva. nahi bhavadbhiḥ ṣaṭ-padārtha-vyatīrīktaṁ astītvādiṣyate.*

The property of *astitva* singles entities as a part of the ontological framework, whereas the property of *sattā* ('existence') turns them into elements of our concrete experiences. The latter thus concerns merely entities that are potentially⁴¹ amenable to ostension, i.e. they are capable of being demonstrated e.g. by pointing, and are relata, i.e. the loci of relations. At the same time, *sattā* points to the entities' capability of being subjects of predicative sentences of the type 'x is P' as entities that are loci of relations and thus are predicated of as being endowed with properties, i.e. as related to other entities by a relation different than a relation of inherence (*samavāya*). Accordingly, we can predicate of qualities (*guṇa*) and movements (*karman*) of substances (*dravya*), and of other properties or relations (but not qualities) of qualities and movements, whereas we cannot predicate of any properties of the remaining three categories that do not possess *sattā*, but only possess *astitva*.

The relation between *astitva* and *sattā* is, therefore, additive in the sense that all the six categories possess the former, and some (i.e. the first three) are, in addition, endowed with the latter: *sattā* adds to *astitva* in some cases, but the converse of the relation does not hold. We could also use the term 'bare existence' for *astitva* in a very particular sense to imply that an entity is merely there at least as an object of thought in its bare form, divested of all its possible properties and relations; however it would not imply that the entity actually and objectively exists as an observable part of atomic facts, i.e. that it is endowed with various relations and properties. What is important, *astitva* in no way implies an object's existence in mind or an intentional content of a thought (*vide supra*, p. 269). Further, we could use the term 'actual existence' for *sattā* in the sense that an entity actually and objectively is a part of an atomic fact and, therefore, is possessed of particular properties and is related to other relata, i.e. that it is actually instantiatable. Since *sattā* only attaches to entities of which we can predicate properties and relations, we could also call it 'predicative existence'.

Interestingly, what we might thus provisionally call 'bare existence' will be described by subsequent authors exclusively and emphatically in positive terms, e.g. as '[the property of] being endowed with intrinsic nature' by Śrīdharamiśra (*sva-*

⁴¹ In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology, not all concrete entities are directly perceptible to an ordinary eye, e.g. atoms are not, being of infinitesimal size beyond ordinary perception. Similarly, qualities and movements of such entities are not directly perceptible to an ordinary eye, e.g. the vibrating movement of atoms (*spandana*) is not, unless—as the Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika believed—one is endowed with a kind of suprasensory perception (*yogi-pratyakṣa*) or the so-called seers' perception (*ārṣa-pratyakṣa*), known also as intuition (*pratibha* or *pratibhā*), see VS(C) 9.28 (see n. 162) and PBh₁ 8.12, p. 258 = PBh₂ 288 (see n. 161). However, all these objects are potentially amenable to ostention, provided one is endowed with a special kind of suprasensory perception, or adequate sensory apparatus to perceive them.

*rūpavattva*⁴²), ‘the ability to be cognised in a cognitive act primarily through affirmation’ by Śaṅkaramiśra (*vidhi-mukha-pratyaya-vedyatva*)⁴³, ‘the ability to become the datum for a cognitive act primarily as affirmation’ by Udayana (*vidhi-mukha-pratyaya-viśayatva*)⁴⁴ as well as ‘the existence of the thing in its intrinsic nature’ and ‘the ability to become the datum for a cognition primarily as affirmation’ by Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra in his *Prasastapāda-bhāṣya-sūkti* (*svarūpa-sattva vidhi-mukha-pratīti-viśayatva*)⁴⁵).

Thus, the usage of the term *astitva* as well as its subsequent paraphrases highlight the affirmative aspect of all the ontological categories and accentuate the opposition to the Buddhist *apoha* theory: all categories are amenable both to cognitive and verbal acts directly, as they are, not via the semantic exclusion (*apoha*).

2.5. Existentiality, existence and non-existence

If, as it seems, by ascribing a property of existence (*sattā*) to an entity that belongs to one of the first three categories, one is ontologically committed, how would it harmonise with the non-existence of such objects as a hare’s horn (*śāśa-viṣāṇa*) or sky flower (*kha-puṣpa*) that we can think of and speak of?

To answer this, we should first see how the ascription of a property of existentiality (*astitva*) to such non-existent entities is compatible with its ontological commit-

⁴² NKan₁ p. 16: *astitvaṁ svarūpavattvaṁ ṣaṅṅām api sādharmyaṁ yasya vastuno yat svarūpaṁ tad eva tasyāstitvam. abhidheyatvaṁ apy abhidhāna-pratipādana-yogyatvaṁ, tac ca vastunaḥ svarūpaṁ eva bhāva-svarūpaṁ evāvasthā-bhedena jñeyatvaṁ abhidheyatvaṁ cōcyate.*

⁴³ PBhṬS, p. 174.14–175.3: *nirūpitā ṣaṭ-padārthī vaidharmyam (recte: vaidharmyam) api nirūpitam eva lakṣaṇa-prasaṅgena samprati sādharmyaṁ nirūpyate. ṣaṅṅām astitvaṁ abhidheyatvaṁ jñeyatvaṁ. tatrāstitvaṁ vidhi-mukha-pratyaya-vedyatvaṁ. nanu abhāvo ’stīty abhāve ’py etat sādharmyaṁ gatam iti cet na nañ-uparāgena vidhitva-pratikṣepāt. tamo ’stīti pratītir astīti cet na nañ-arthāntar-bhāveṇāiva tamaḥ-pada-pravṛtteḥ bhābhāvo hi tama iti. abhidheyatvaṁ abhidhāna-karma-bhāvatvaṁ sat-padābhidheyatvaṁ vārthābhidheyatvaṁ vā. jñeyatvaṁ api sattā-prakāraka-jñāna-viśayatvaṁ jñāna-viśaya-bhāvatvaṁ vā.*

⁴⁴ KA, p. 19.3–7: *astitvaṁ—vidhi-mukha-pratyaya-viśayatvaṁ; pratiyogy-anapekṣa-nirūpaṇatvaṁ iti-yāvat. abhidheyatvaṁ—abhidhāna-yogyatā. śabdena saṅgati-lakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ. jñeyatvaṁ—jñāna-yogyatā, jñāpya-jñāpaka-lakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ. nanv etad eva dvayaṁ abhāve ’py astīti cet, astu, na hi tad-apekṣayā vaidharmyam idaṁ vivakṣitam, api tu ṣad-apekṣayā sādharmyam.*

⁴⁵ PBhSū, p. 114: [Sūkti] *astitvaṁ svarūpa-sattvaṁ tac cōbhayāvṛtti-dharmavattvam. abhāvasyālakṣyatve tu tādrśa-bhāvatvaṁ vācyam. evam agre ’pi. astitvaṁ vidhi-mukha-pratīti-viśayatvaṁ. tac ca—pratiyogy-anapekṣa-nirūpaṇa-viśayatvaṁ ity ācārya-vyākhyānantu cintyam. nirūpaṇam hi tatra yadi sāksāt-kāras tadātindriye dravyādāv avyāptiḥ. yadi ca jñāna-mātraṁ tarhy abhāve ’ti vyāptiḥ, anapekṣānta-vaiyarthyaṁ ca syād iti. abhidheyatvaṁ pada-śakyatvaṁ. jñeyatvaṁ jñāna-viśayatam.*

ment within the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika framework, insofar as it is the property of existentiality that carries the ontological commitment, whereas the property of existence (*sattā*), that applies to a narrower set of things, merely inherits it.

It seems that the latter three categories of universals (*sāmānya*), individuators (*viśeṣa*) and inherence (*samavāya*) do not pose any significant difficulty once their existence is accepted within the ontological framework of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. This is precisely what the list of the ontological categories (*padārtha*) is all about: it offers a catalogue of all that is there. Since the three categories, by definition, have no properties, they cannot function as subjects of predicative sentences that predicate a mismatched quality of, say, movement of them. Such sentences would suffer from defective construction of faulty ascription of a incompatible property. The problem, therefore, is with the first three categories that seem to allow for such entities as a hare's horn (*śaśa-viśāṇa*), a sky flower (*kha-puṣpa*), a trembling of the hands etc. of the son of a barren woman⁴⁶, a colourless paint, or immovable wind. They 'allow' in the sense that it is only in the context of these first three categories that we can face the problem of a combination of incompatible or contradictory constituents into one contradictory, impossible or empirically unattested whole.

We should remember that, *generally* (there might be some exceptions though), the philosophers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika do not distinguish between non-existent objects, such as 'Pegasus', a hare's horn (*khara-viśāṇa*) or a crow's teeth (*kāka-danta*), that are generally not impossible but are merely not attested in experience, i.e. *empirically not instantiated*, on the one hand, and, on the other, purely fictitious objects, such as 'the present king of the Republic of India' or 'a barren woman's son' (*vandhyā-suta*), that contain contradictory properties, which makes them *logically impossible*. All of these are subsumed in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika under the same category of absolute non-existence, or absence (*atyantābhāva*, *sāmānyābhāva*, see VS(C) 9.5). It seems that such a two-fold distinction is conceived of only by Candramati in his DPŚ 1.11, where he additionally speaks of relational non-existence, or absence (*samsargābhāva*), i.e. the absence of (at least) two (or more) particular constituents that are not related in a particular place.⁴⁷

So, the question arises whether, for the early Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika, the property of existentiality (*astitva*) can also be predicated of such fictitious, non-existent objects?

⁴⁶ The example is taken from NBhū, p. 109: **vandhyā-putrasya pāṇy-ādi-kampa*-°.

⁴⁷ DPŚ₁, p. 101: 'Natural non-existence is that whereby existence, substances, ad so on do not yet come either to conjoin with or entirely to abide in one another', DPŚ₂ 1.11 [81], p. 181: 'Relational absence: That in which the highest universal, substances and so on are neither connected with nor inherent in some place is called relational absence (*samsargābhāva itī yasmin sattā-dravyādīny ekaikapradeśe 'samyuktāny asamevatāni vā sa eva samsargābhāva ity ucyate*).'

Or, does it attach to existent objects only? If it does, what is the status of fictitious objects? Do they possess existentiality or not? If they do not, how is it possible to claim, as Praśastapāda does, that all the six ontological categories, including fictitious entities, have the property ‘existentiality’? Further, how does existentiality relate to the fact that something exists or to the fact that something does not exist? Some light is on the problem is shed by the pre-Dharmakīrtian⁴⁸ Naiyāyika Aviddhakarṇa, whose view is referred in passing to by Śāntarakṣita (inexplicitly) and Kamalaśīla (explicitly) as follows:

‘Aviddhakarṇa, however, formulated the following reasoning to prove the permanence (eternality) of atoms: indivisible atoms do not possess anything that can be accepted as [their] producer which is [at the same time] furnished with a property [that attaches] to something existent, because it is not a datum [that can be cognised] by cognitive criteria which demonstrate existence, like a hare’s horn. [To explain word for word:] A property [that attaches] to something existent [means] a property of a thing in existence, [and this property is] existentiality; something that is furnished with this [property of existentiality] means something that is endowed with it; [the above statement] is the negation of such [a property that attaches to something existent]. [All this means] that there is no cause that produces atoms.’⁴⁹

If we accept the veracity of Kamalaśīla’s testimony—and Kamalaśīla generally proves quite reliable in this regard—that this is Aviddhakarṇa’s view, and he was probably not unique, we can see the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika considered existentiality to be a property of real or potentially existent entities (*sad-dharma*). Existentiality cannot therefore attach to such entities as a hare’s horn (*śaśa-viṣāṇa*), a sky flower (*kha-puṣpa*) etc.⁵⁰

That would be an indirect reply to a query whether it is at all conceivable that a fictitious compounded entity, e.g. a hare’s horn, which does not possess the highest universal of existence (*sattā*), could be endowed with existentiality (*astitva*). Theoretically it could, the way universals, individuators and inherence do: they possess *astitva* but not *sattā*. Aviddhakarṇa seems to suggest that such a fictitious com-

⁴⁸ His proof of god (‘from the unique structure’, *saṁsthāna-viśeṣa*, *saṁniveśa-viśiṣṭa*), is referred to by Dharmakīrti in PV 1.12 ac (*Pramāṇa-siddhi*).

⁴⁹ TSaP 553, p. 187.3–7: *aviddhakarṇas tv aṅūnām nityatva-prasāadhanāya pramāṇam āha—paramāṅūnām utpādakābhimataṁ sad-dharmōpagataṁ na bhavati, sattva-pratipādaka-pramāṇāviṣayatvāt khara-viṣāṇavad iti. sato vidyamānasya dharmah sad-dharmo ’stitvaṁ tenōpagataṁ prāptam astīty arthaḥ. tasya pratiśedho ’yam. aṅūtpādakaṁ kāraṇam nāstīty arthaḥ.*

⁵⁰ It does, however, attach to their absences, see p. 278 ff.

pounded entity possesses neither. That conclusion is further strengthened by the series of paraphrases referred to above (p. 265), such as: ‘[the property of] being endowed with intrinsic nature’, ‘the ability to be cognised in a cognitive act primarily through affirmation’, ‘the ability to become the datum for a cognitive act primarily as affirmation’, ‘the existence of the thing in its intrinsic nature’ or ‘the ability to become the datum for a cognition primarily as affirmation’. Clearly, such descriptions would hardly apply to fictitious entities. Since such fictitious entities simply do not exist in any way, they can be possessed neither of existentiality nor of existence. Their ‘existence’ even as a content of thought or as an idea is merely an illusion which is a result of erroneous ascription of real properties to a real thing: a hare exists, a horn exists, a relation of a horn to a particular animal likewise exists; however such a property–substance–relation compound does not hold in the case of a hare.⁵¹ That explains why *astitva* is not merely ‘existence in mind’ (*vide supra*, n. 265).

In addition, it is well-known that the Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika claimed that words do refer to existent things only, i.e. to things that possess existentiality (*astitva*). That is confirmed e.g. by Praśastapāda’s statement that to say that ‘a speech element does not denote an object’ is a contradiction in terms⁵². That is perfectly in line with what Uddyotakara says elsewhere:

‘For we do not find any single term which is non-denoting. Even if you considered that the term “soul” has the body etc. as its contents (referent), also in that case the inconsistency would not be eliminated. Why [not]? Because then what becomes the contents of the statement “there is no soul” is the following: “there is no body etc.”. [If you say]: “What you imagine to be the soul does not exist”, [we reply]: we do not imagine the soul, inasmuch as what the imagination [of a certain object *x*] is is a cognition of such [an object *x* which is formed] through wrong attribution of the properties of a certain [object onto another object] due to the [imagined] similarity of a certain [object *x*] which is not of that kind to [objects *y*] which are to be of such kind. However, we do not consider that the soul is of that kind. [If] you say: “[We consider the soul to be of such kind] as you imagine the soul”, then you are confronted with the following query: In what way do we imagine the soul? [Do we imagine it] as something existent or as something non-existent? If [we imagine it] as something existent, then what is the affinity between something non-existent and some-

⁵¹ See p. 271 ff., and nn. 57, 58.

⁵² PBh₁ 8.12, p. 234 = PBh₂ 267: *na śabdo ’rtha-pratyāyaka iti sva-vacana-virodhī*. Praśastapāda mentions it in the context of logical fallacies (*ābhāsa*).

thing existent (sc. what is the shared property), on the basis of which the soul is the contents of the imagination? And [the existence of] the soul has already been accepted by anyone who advocates the affinity (sc. the shared property) of the soul and non-soul, because there is no affinity between something non-existent and something existent.

If [you] first imagine, in the soul, some personal identity the contents (sc. referent) of which is the body⁵³ and then [you] contradict it, [you do] not eliminate the inconsistency, because in such a way [you] accept the existence of the contents (referent) which is the personal identity as something different from the body etc. If you think that there can by no means exist an object for a single term, for instance the void, darkness etc., that is not [correct], because it [still] does not eliminate the inconsistency. The [denoted] object for the term “the void”, to begin with, is the following: such a substance for which there exists no occupant, because it is [an empty space] fit for dogs (?)⁵⁴, is called “the void”. Likewise, [the denoted object that corresponds] to the term “darkness” is the data such as substances, qualities and movements in the case of which the conditions [that make them amenable] to apprehension have not been reached⁵⁵. Substances etc. (sc. qualities and movements) [found] in all such cases wherever there is absence of light are called “darkness”. Someone (i.e. the Buddhist) who says that the term “darkness” is non-denoting contradicts his own doctrine because darkness consists in the four kinds of clinging [admitted in Buddhism]. Therefore there is no single term which is non-denoting.’⁵⁶

⁵³ I.e. ‘if you, although you deny the existence of soul, claim that, while using the word “soul”, we in fact use the word as referring to a body...’

⁵⁴ The phrase *svabhyo hitavāt* is a bit unclear to me; it certainly relates to the etymology of both *śūnya* and *śvan*, traditionally derived from the verb $\sqrt{śū}$ / $\sqrt{śvi}$ (‘to swell, to grow, to become inflated’). It definitely relates to the uselessness of things given dogs, an idea we find e.g. in MDhŚ 8.90:

*janma-prabhṛti yat kiñcīt puṇyam bhadra tvayā kṛtam /
tat te sarvaṃ śuno gacched yadi brūyās tvam anyathā //*

‘Whatever merit you have done since your birth, my dear, all that will go to the dogs, if you speak untruth.’

⁵⁵ Sc. ‘invisible’; for the expression *(an)upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāpta* see KELLNER (1999: 195-198) and BALCEROWICZ (2005).

⁵⁶ NV₁ 3.1.1, p. 340.7–341.6 = NV₂ 3.1.1, p. 320.16–321–9: *na hy ekaṃ padaṃ nirathakaṃ paśyāmaḥ. athāpi śarīrādi-viṣayam ātma-śabdaṃ pratipadyethāḥ, evam apy anivṛtto vyāghātaḥ katham iti? na asty ātmēti vākyasya tadānīm ayam artho bhavati śarīrādayo na santīti. atha yaṃ bhavanta ātmānaṃ kalpayanti sa nāstīti na vāyam ātmānaṃ kalpayāmaḥ. kalpanā hi nāmātathā-*

Clearly, such descriptions as ‘a hare’s horn’ or ‘a sky flower’—and, similarly, names (expressing complex ideas) such as ‘Pegasus’ or such compounded descriptions as ‘the present King of the Republic of India’—do not denote any real entity taken as a whole, and are non-denoting expressions. On the other hand, these expressions do connote, inasmuch they represent particular cognitive states or intentional objects, albeit non-existent as a whole.⁵⁷ The solution of the problem how such non-denoting expressions are meaningful utterances lies in their composite nature.⁵⁸

In a nutshell, a lucid explanation of the problem is given by Uddyotakara in his commentary on NS 3.1.1, where he defends the existence of soul:

‘Even if the following [argument] is brought up: “[The concept «the soul»] is like [the concept] «the hare’s horn», that too is an unproved example. Why? Because the statement “a hare’s horn” has [a particular] relation as its contents (sc. refers to a particular relation). [Therefore] we negate the relation [of the horn to the hare, but] we do not negate the horn [as such]. [The opponent:] “Let the example be: «the re-

bhūtasya tathā-bhāvibhiḥ sāmānyāt tad-dharmādhyāropeṇa^a tad-pratyayaḥ^b. na cātmanam evam-bhūtaṁ pratipadyāmahe. yaṁ bhavanta ātmānaṁ kalpayantīti bruvāṇo^c bhavān praṣṭavyo jāyate, kathāṁ vayam ātmānaṁ kalpayāma iti. kim sattvenāthāsattvena vā? yadi sattvena kim asataḥ satā sādharmyaṁ yena kalpanā-viśaya ātmā^d, ātma-sāmānyāṁ cānātmano bruvatā ātmābhyupagato bhavatīti. na hy asataḥ satā sāmānyam astīti.

atha śarīrādi-viśayam ahaṁkāram ātmani kalpayitvā viparyeti^e evam^f śarīrādi-vyatirikta-ahaṁkāra-viśaya-satva-abhyupagamād anivṛtto vyāghātaḥ. atha manyase eka-padasya nāvaśyam arthena bhavitavyam iti yathā śūnyaṁ tama iti^g tan na, vyāghāta-anivṛtteḥ. śūnya-śabdasya tāvad ayam artho yasya rakṣitā dravyasya na vidyate tad dravyaṁ śvabhyo hitatvāc chūnyam ity ucyate. tamaḥ-śabdasyāpy anupalabdhi^h-lakṣaṇa-prāptāni dravya-guṇa-karmāṇi viśayaḥ. yatra yatrāsannidhis tejaśaḥ tatra tatra dravyādi tamaḥ-śabdenābhdhīyateⁱ. tamaḥ-śabdaś cānarthaka iti bruvāṇaḥ sva-siddhāntaṁ bādgate caturṇām upādāna^j-rūpatvāt tamasa iti tasmān nānarthakam ekam^k padam iti.

^a NV₁: °-dharmāropeṇa. ^b NV₁: °-pratyaya-viśayatvam. ^c NV₁: bruvāṇo. ^d NV₁: ātmāna. ^e NV₁: viparyasyati. ^f NV₂: evam ca. ^g NV₂: iti ca. ^h NV₂: °-śabdasyānupalabdhi-°. ⁱ NV₁: °-śabdenocyate. ^j NV₁: °-upādeya. ^k NV₁ omits ekam.

Some portions of the section NV 3.1.1 have been translated by CHAKRAVARTI (1982: 230–231), albeit the references to the Buddhists are not.

⁵⁷ See e.g. SHAW (1974: 336).

⁵⁸ Much has been written on how such non-denoting expressions can be meaningful utterances, and how the analysis of such compounded expressions on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika account—to the excitement of a number of scholars—compares to various Western logicians, mostly Bertrand Russell; see e.g. McDERMOTT (1970), MATILAL (1970), MATILAL (2005: 92 ff., Chapt. ‘4. Empty Subject Terms in Logic’), SHAW (1974), SHAW (1978), SHAW (1980), CHAKRAVARTI (1982), PERSZYK (1983), PERSZYK (1984), MATILAL (1985: 78–88), CHAKRABARTI (1985). Most of these authors focus, however, on later Nyāya tradition.

lation of the hare and the horn»”. That too is not correct, because sometimes there can occur a relation of a hare and a horn, [e.g. we can tie a real horn to a real hare]. [The opponent:] “[But] that stands in contradiction with what people know. If you maintain that there is a horn on a hare, [you] contradict what people [know, i.e. you commit a formal fallacy called «a faulty example»]”. We do not contradict, because the activity of people [occurs] by way of the denial of the cause-effect relation (sc. what the people are concerned with is the denial of the causal relation between the hare and the horn). People, to begin with, deny that the hare has a horn either as its effect or its cause. There is no cause-effect relation between a hare and a horn the way there is cause-effect relation between a cow and a horn. And, by [merely] denying a cause-effect relation [between the two, we do] not [assert] non-existence [of either of them], because it is not the case that if x is neither the effect nor the cause of y , x does not exist, like in the case of Devadatta’s blanket (sc. we can deny that Devadatta has a blanket, but we do not have to assert the non-existence of the blanket as such or the non-existence of Devadatta as such, even though there is no causal relation or possession between the two). Further, if [you] say that a hare’s horn does not exist, then you [have to] answer the query: is it a generic (absolute) denial or a specific (partial) denial? If it is a generic (absolute) denial, then it is not correct, because it is not possible. [From the statement] “the hare does not have a horn” also follows that “the hare does not have any horns of a cow etc.”, and that [thesis] is not possible [to assert], because it is not the case that the [horns of a cow] do not exist [or that one cannot tie a cow’s horn onto a hare’s head]. If it is a specific (partial) denial, then [we] deny a particular horn of a [particular] hare, [such a horn] of which the hare is not the effect and which is not the cause of the hare. What [we] deny is precisely such a cause-effect relation [between the hare and the horn]. On the other hand, a cause-effect relation that is found in other cases is denied here [in this particular hare-horn case]. Therefore, the example [of a hare’s horn] is not applicable when you [want to] prove the absolute non-existence [of something]. By the same token the non-existence of a sky flower is understood to have been explained.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ NV₁ 3.1.1, p. 343.3–20 = NV₂ 3.1.1, p. 322.20–323.11: *yad apīdam ucyate śaśa-viṣāṇavad ity ayam apy asiddho dṛṣṭāntaḥ. katham iti śaśa-viṣāṇa-śabdasya sambandha-viṣayatvāt. sambandha-pratiśedho na viṣāṇa-pratiśedhaḥ. śaśa-viṣāṇa-sambandha udāharaṇam bhaviṣyatīti so 'pi na yuktaḥ,*

Accordingly, the Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika do not assert the reality, in any sense, of such non-existent entities as a hare's horn (*śaśa-viṣāṇa*) or a sky flower (*kha-puṣpa*), which, it seems, can neither possess the property of existentiality (*astitva*) nor the property of existence (*sattā*). In the case of a non-existent object of this kind, all the three elements exist, viz. the hare, the horn and a causal relation. However, what is non-existent is a compound of all the three.⁶⁰

For the above reason, such compounded fictitious entities cannot apparently possess the property of existentiality (*astitva*). Likewise, the expressions that seem to refer to them do not turn out to be non-denoting terms, possessing neither *astitva* nor *sattā*, but what they actually denote are existent components of such a compound, albeit causally or factually unrelated. It follows that the Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika neither postulate that such expressions may refer to fictitious, non-existent objects, the way MEINONG (1904), PARSONS (1980) or ZALTA (1983) and (1988) did, nor do they claim that these expressions are meaningful, albeit they cannot be assigned any truth-value, the way STRAWSON (1950) did.

What still remains unclear is the status of such fictitious entities and how they can be thought of if they are denied existentiality and, with this, a place within an ontological framework of entities that can be thought of.

3.1. Do the properties overlap?

After we (have gained an impression that we) have understood the meaning of the property of existentiality (*astitva*) and the way it differs from the highest universal of existence (*sattā*), we should return to the issue brought up in § 2.2, namely whether ex-

kaḍācid viṣāṇena śaśasya sambandhōpapatteḥ. loka-virodha iti cet. atha manyase yadi śaśe viṣāṇam asti nanu loko viruddhyata iti. na viruddhyate kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva-pratiṣedha-dvāreṇa laukika-pravṛtteḥ. lokas tāvat kāryam kāraṇam vā śaśasya viṣāṇam nāstīty evam pratiṣedhati. yathā gor viṣāṇasya ca kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvaḥ, nāvam^a śaśasya viṣāṇasya ca kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvaḥ. na ca kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva-pratiṣedhād asattvam na hi yad yasya na kāryam na kāraṇam tan nāsti. yathā devadattasya paṭa^b iti. idam ca śaśa-viṣāṇam nāstīti bruvāṇaḥ praṣṭavyaḥ kim ayam sāmānya-pratiṣedho 'tha viśeṣa-pratiṣedha iti. yadi sāmānya-pratiṣedhaḥ tan na yuktam aśakyatvāt. śaśasya viṣāṇam nāstīti gav-ādi-viṣāṇāny api śaśasya na santīti prāptam etac cāśakyam. na hi tāni na santi. atha viśeṣa-pratiṣedhaḥ kimcid viṣāṇam śaśasya pratiṣiddhyate yasya śaśo na kāryam yac^c ca śaśasya na kāraṇam iti. so 'yam kārya-kāraṇa-sambandha eva pratiṣidhyate. kārya-kāraṇa-sambandhas tv anyatra^d dṛṣṭa iha pratiṣidhyata iti nātyantāsattva-pratipādane dṛṣṭānto bhavati. etena kha-puṣpādy-asattvam vyākhyātam veditavyam.

^a NA₁: na cāvam. ^b NA₁: ghaṭaḥ. ^c NA₁: tac. ^d NA₁: °-sambandhas cānyatra.

The passage has also been translated in CHAKRAVARTI (1982: 232–233).

⁶⁰ The issue whether fictitious, non-existent objects have *sattā* or *astitva* is different from the question whether the *absences* of such fictitious objects have either of them; see p. 278 ff.

intentionality, nameability and cognisability are coextensive properties or whether they partially overlap. A useful hint as regards the relationship between the three properties as they were understood in the sixth century can be found in the *Praśastamati-ṭīkā* passage, already quoted above (see p. 261 and n. 30) and reproduced in DNC, p. 517.5–7.

I leave aside the question whether the author of the *Praśastamati-ṭīkā* is the same person as the author of the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya*, or whether ‘Praśastamati’ is just another name for Praśastapāda.⁶¹ What is beyond doubt is, however, that both the

⁶¹ A number of scholars opted for Praśastamati being different from Praśastapāda, e.g. B. BHATTACHARYYA (1926: lxv): “Śāntarakṣita² refers to the opinions held by another Naiyāyika scholar who is called Praśastamati. This author seems to be different from the Vaiśeṣika. Like his compeer Aviddhakarṇa we have no information about him, his doctrines, opinions and his time. All that we can hazard to say is that he flourished before Śāntarakṣita, and the latest date that can be assigned to him is *cir.* 700 A.D.’ Also Surendranath DASGUPTA (1922–1955: I: 306, n. 1) assigns Praśastapāda to ‘5th or 6th century A.D.’ and, following B. BHATTACHARYYA (1926), Praśastamati to ‘A.D. 700’ (1922–1955: II: 172), implying that these two were different authors. Some other scholars claim that Praśastamati and Praśastapāda are one and the same person, e.g. Anantalal THAKUR (1961: 14–16, esp. 14/15): ‘This goes to prove that this Praśastamati is identical with Praśastapāda’, George CHEMPARATHY (1970), Wilhelm HALBFASS (1989: 555), (1992: 170), and Johannes BRONKHORST (1996), (2000).

The question of the identity of Praśastamati and Praśastapāda does not seem conclusively settled to me, though, for various reasons. In the most comprehensive analysis of the question so far, CHEMPARATHY (1970: 249–251, §§ 9, 10) lists a number of quotations ascribed to Praśastamat / Praśastamati in various sources, and tries to find either their direct source or equivalents in PBh. Of the largest portion of them (§ 9, § 10, (a)–(g)), he himself opines that ‘It is to be observed that none of these fragments from the TSP [= TSaP] mentioned hitherto can be traced in PDS’ (1970: 250). The remaining instances (§ 10, (h)–(i)), he cites, are indeed fragments found in TSaP ‘slight modifications and the order of the sentences being changed’, ‘or leaving out of phrases or short sentences of the original’ (1970: 250). CHEMPARATHY (1970: 251) arrives at his conclusion that ‘Of the ten names under which we have classified these references and quotations, all, except that of Praśastamat, are clearly identical with Praśastapāda, either because they are associated with the *Padārthadharmasamgraha* as author or because the fragments handed down under these names have been traceable in the *Padārthadharmasamgraha*.’ However, CHEMPARATHY’s methodology follows the (logically faulty!) scheme:

- P1** If passages ascribed to authors named 1. Praśasta, 2. Praśastācāra, 3. Praśastadeva, 4. Praśastadevācārya, 5. Praśastadevapāda, 6. Praśastakara, 7. Praśastakaradeva, 8. Praśastakāra, 9. Praśastamat, 10. Praśastamati, are found in PBh, then all of these authors are identical with Praśastapāda.
- P2** Indeed some passages are traceable to PBh.
- C** Ergo, all these authors are identical with Praśastapāda.

Indeed, most (if not all the authors 1–8) seem identical with Praśastapāda, also because their quotations are traceable to PBh. However, it is not the case with Praśastamati. Close similarities of Praśastamati’s fragments to passages of PBh may be simply due to the fact that both Praśastapāda and Praśastamati (if we suppose they are two distinct persons) were propounders of the same modified system of Vaiśeṣika and, naturally, expressed their ideas in similar words. That

texts belong to more or less the same period and to the same philosophical system. For practical reasons and out of cautiousness, I will treat Praśastamati, an important exponent of the Vaiśeṣika system, as different from Praśastapāda. My argument will, however, be equally valid in case Praśastapāda and Praśastamati are one and the same person.

Clearly, what Praśastamati (DNC, p. 517.5–7) calls ‘being the scope for verbal designation’ (*abhidhāna-viṣayatva*) and ‘being the scope for cognition’ (*pratyaya-viṣayatva*) corresponds to Praśastapāda’s nameability (*abhidheyatva*) and cognisability (*jñeyatva*); similarly, Praśastamati’s *sattva* is equivalent to Praśastapāda’s *astitva*.⁶²

The following passage contains a proof formula (*prayoga*) that shows exact logical relations between the terms:

Thesis (*pratijñā*): ‘Substance etc. (sc. qualities and movements) are the contents of verbal designation and cognition as something existent only by their own force’ (*dravyādīnām svata evābhidhāna-pratyaya-viṣayatvam*).

Logical reason (*hetu*): ‘Because they are existent’ (*sattvāt*).

Example (*drṣṭānta*): ‘Like existence and other universals’ (*sattādivat*).

Invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*): ‘Just as there is verbal designation and cognition of the universal existence and other universals by their own force, not because of their union with the universal existence, similarly there is verbal designation and cognition also of the three categories of substance etc. by their own force, not because they are endowed with the universal existence’ (*yathā sattādeḥ sad-abhidhāna-pratyayau svata eva, na sattā-yogāt, evaṁ dravyādīnām api sad-abhidhāna-pratyayau svata eva, na sattā-yogāt*).⁶³

should not surprise anybody who knows how much similar ideas are expressed in very similar terms by philosophers of the same school who are not so distant in time. And both Praśastapāda and Praśastamati lived sometime between 450-550 CE. A decisive proof of the identity of the two would be based on (1) an exact quote of Praśastamati that is traceable word for word in PBh, and supported by (2) a certain opinion propounded by Praśastapāda and Praśastamati, but rejected by other followers of the Vaiśeṣika system. On the other hand, a conclusive argument to prove that these two were different authors would be Praśastamati’s opinion that stands in contradiction with views held by Praśastapāda and expressed in PBh. And there are still reasons (see n. 62) that make the identity of the authors improbable. I for myself consider it not unlikely that the two are one and the same person, however as far as I can see the reasons presented heretofore to assume such identity are insufficient.

⁶² Also Uddyotakara has *sattva* instead of *astitva*, see n. 5. The difference of vocabulary might be one of such hints that point to different identity of Praśastamati and Praśastapāda.

⁶³ For the complete text see n. 39.

It does not bear on the cogency of my argument that the above proof is subsequently rejected by Praśastamati, because the reasons for the rejection are of different nature (i.e. faulty relation of the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*)) and thus irrelevant to the ontological framework in which the argument is formulated; they concern neither the structure of the proof formula as such nor the relations between the members of the formula.

Both the properties of ‘being the contents of verbal designation’ (*abhidhāna-viśayatva*) and ‘being the contents of cognition’ (*pratyaya-viśayatva*), which correspond to nameability (*abhidheyatva*) and cognisability (*jñeyatva*) respectively, are the pervaders (*vyāpaka*) and stand in the same relation to existentiality (Praśastamati: *sattva* = Praśastapāda: *astitva*), which is thereby implied to be the pervaded property (*vyāpya*). In other words, the extension of *abhidheyatva* and *jñeyatva* is either identical with or larger than the extension of *astitva*. Accordingly, the passage clearly and logically eliminates other options listed in § 2.2 above and stipulates that it is existentiality that is the subset or proper subset of nameability–cognisability:

T1° $astitva \subseteq (jñeyatva = abhidheyatva)$.

It is still left to be decided whether the set covered by existentiality (*astitva*) and the set covered by both nameability (*abhidheyatva*) and cognisability (*jñeyatva*) are coextensive or whether the former is a subset of the latter.

3.2. Coextensiveness of meta-categories?

Before I return to this problem, let us first examine the question whether for the Vaiśeṣika of the sixth century (Praśastamati, Praśastapāda, Candramati) there were indeed things which possessed nameability (*abhidheyatva*) and cognisability (*jñeyatva*), but would not possess existentiality (*astitva*). The problem boils down to the question which of the alternatives of the sentence ‘whatever is existent is also nameable and knowable’ holds true in the Vaiśeṣika system:

Q1 $astitva \subset (jñeyatva = abhidheyatva)$,
‘*x* is existent only if it is nameable and cognisable’,

or

Q2 $astitva = (jñeyatva = abhidheyatva)$,
‘*x* is existent if and only if it is nameable and cognisable.’

Through conversion by contraposition, the two propositions yield the following statements, both equivalent to the assertion ‘whatever is neither nameable nor knowable is non-existent’:

Q1* (*ajñeyatva = anabhidheyatva*) \subset *anastitva*, or
‘*x* is neither nameable nor cognisable only if it is non-existent’,

or

Q2* (*ajñeyatva = anabhidheyatva*) = *anastitva*,
‘*x* is neither nameable nor cognisable if and only if it is non-existent.’

The bold claim of the Vaiśeṣika that follows propositions Q1, Q2, Q1* and Q2* would seem to be not only that anything which can, potentially, enter the conceptual framework can at the same time be known and referred to in language,⁶⁴ but also—which is a much stronger claim—that anything which exists can at the same time be known and referred to in language.

The difference between the pairs Q1/Q1* and Q2/Q2* is that the former expresses the idea that the set of things that are nameable and cognisable is larger than the set of things that are existent, whereas the latter postulates that there are no existent things which are not amenable to cognition and not amenable to verbal designation: there is a concept and a name for everything, and there exists nothing for which there would be no name and which would remain beyond all cognition.

Most importantly, the latter claim of the pair Q2/Q2* is not ontological, but should be understood merely within the conceptual framework of Vaiśeṣika categories that help us to analyse the world.

The first implication of the pair Q1/Q1* would therefore be that some entities could both be named and cognised without being existent in the Vaiśeṣika framework of categories; in other words, something could have its verbal denotation and could function as an idea, but it would not be a category of the system. And we are not talking here merely of compounded entities that happen to be at the same time

⁶⁴ This claim would not only be uncontroversial, but to a certain degree even tautological, given the Indian context in which anything that is conceptualised can be referred to by speech. The context was greatly influenced by ‘the grammarian paradigm’ of Indian philosophy. In contradistinction to Western philosophy, which took recourse to mathematics in search of the paradigm of philosophising and science, Indians turned to grammar, and the grammatical way of thinking, linguistic structuring of the world etc., greatly influenced Indian philosophy, including logic. A good example of the grammarian paradigm in the realm of Indian logic is the development of the grammatical relations *anvaya* and *vyatireka* and their impact on Indian philosophy, cf. CARDONA (1967).

fictitious (see pp. 271–273) but of primary entities, e.g. individuals (*avāntara-viśeṣa*, intermediate particular), that are further unanalysable.

The consequence of such a claim would be disastrous for the system: the carefully designed fabric of a complete⁶⁵ set of categories and relations to optimally and economically describe the universe, viz. the primary design of the Vaiśeṣika to name all the irreducible categories, and only such categories that are absolutely necessary to accurately represent all the phenomena of the world by eliminating any other potential, redundant category that can be reduced to or which overlaps with another category, would be in ruin.

The second implication of the pair Q1/Q1* would be that things could have a name and a concept the mind corresponding to them without actually having any kind of existence in mind, which would be a contradiction.

For the above reasons I consider the interpretation Q1/Q1*—according to which, first, the set of existent entities is a subset of entities that can be named and cognised, and, secondly, a set of entities without a name and concept for them is smaller than the set of entities that do not exist (*ergo* there are ‘non-existential’ entities for which we have a name and concept)—as a genuine exegesis of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system highly unlikely, and would rather advocate the interpretation Q2/Q2*, viz. to treat the three properties (or meta-categories) as coextensive: *astitva* = *abhidheyatva* = *jñeyatva*.

My conjecture that the meta-categories of existentiality, nameability and cognisability are coextensive seems to gain support in Candramati’s statement of DPŚ₂ 254 (*vide surpa*, p. 251), which pertains to the extended system of ten ontological categories:

‘Any [kind of absence] is not the object of direct cognition. But all [kinds of absences], which exist without having any locus other [than their own], are the objects of inference.’⁶⁶

According to Candramati, even the fivefold category of absence (*abhāva*) should ultimately possess existentiality (*astitva*) in order to become nameable and cognisable. The two properties of nameability (*abhidheyatva*) and cognisability (*jñeyatva*) are implied in the passage by the fact that absences (*abhāva*) are not directly perceived, but are inferred, i.e. are expressible as a concept (i.e. are cognisable) endowed with verbal dimension (i.e. are expressible).

⁶⁵ Cf. NKan₁ (p. 230): *ṣaṭ-padārthebhyo nānyat prameyam asti*.—‘There is no cognoscible thing other than the six ontological categories.’

⁶⁶ Translated and reconstructed by MIYAMOTO (1996: 206), *sarve ’drṣṭa-viśayāḥ. kim tu ananyāśrītya vartamānāḥ sarve ’numāna-viśayāḥ*.

This conclusion is corroborated also by Praśastamati's statement quoted in DNC (p. 517.5–518.1) by Mallavādin (see p. 30 above), who explains that that predicative existence (see p. 265) of entities, such as substances, qualities and movements, which are known to primarily possess existentiality (*astitva*) and to be elements of the ontological structure of the world, attaches to them only secondarily by virtue of their possessing the highest universal of existence (*sattā*), which renders them predicable:

'Since substance etc. (sc. qualities and movements) do not have the nature of this [universal existence], [their] verbal designation etc. (i.e. cognition) as something existent is based on [the universal] existence, like [the ideas:] "the one with no stick" and "the one with a stick" are based on [the idea of] "a stick".' (*dravyādīnām atad-ātmatvāt sattā-nimittam sad-abhidhānādi daṇḍa-nimittādaṇḍa-daṇḍitvavad iti.*)

The passage would, therefore, lead us to accept the following conclusion of co-extensiveness of all the three meta-categories:

T2° (*jñeyatva = abhidheyatva*) \subseteq *astitva*.

In addition, the passage shows that it is the idea of universal existence (*sattā*) that introduces a relational character by virtue of which the first three categories become invested with predicative existence, i.e. they can be referred also in other sentences than existential ones. Just the way compounded, relational concepts, such as 'a person without a stick' (*adaṇḍa*) and 'a person with a stick' (*daṇḍin*),⁶⁷ involve a relation that links them to another entity, e.g. to a stick (*daṇḍa*), in the same manner substances, qualities and movements, which are possessed of existentiality (*astitva*), become predicable, i.e. 'acquire'⁶⁸ their nameability (*abhidheyatva*), when they are linked to universal existence (*sattā*).

Also Śāṅkaramiśra, who explicitly claims that existentiality attaches to absence (*abhāva*)⁶⁹ as well, lends some support to my interpretation. He relates the pair of nameability and cognisability to existentiality in a similar manner, taking the pair as logically subordinate to, i.e. subsets of, existentiality:

⁶⁷ Of course, such objects as 'a person' and 'a stick' (*daṇḍa*) exist independently of other entities and, as such, are not relational concepts, at least on this level of description.

⁶⁸ Clearly, this is purely conceptual and, generally speaking, atemporal, i.e. it is not the case that some entities first exist without their existence (*sattā*), and at a certain point of time they acquire it through some process that extends in time. On this problematic relation of entities with the universal existence (*sattā-sambandha*) in the context of the Vaiśeṣika theory of causality see: HALBFASS (1989).

⁶⁹ See n. 39.

‘Nameability is the capacity to become an object of verbal designation, which is either the capacity to be named with a word that refers to something existent or the capacity to be named as a concrete thing. Also cognisability is the ability to be an object of cognition that reproduces [the object’s] existence or the ability to become the contents of cognition.’⁷⁰

In both cases, i.e. Praśastamati’s and Śaṅkaramiśra’s, the manner of exposition is very alike: for nameability (*abhidheyatva*) we have ‘verbal designation etc. as something existent’ (*sad-abhidhānādi*) and ‘the capacity to be named with a word that refers to something existent’ (*sat-padābhidheyatva*), respectively; and cognisability (*jñeyatva*) corresponds to ‘[cognition] as something existent’ (*sad-jñāna*)⁷¹ and ‘the ability to be an object of cognition that reproduces [the object’s] existence’ (*sattā-prakāraka-jñāna-viśayatva*), respectively.

We can easily see that one and the same author Praśastamati, on one occasion (see p. 39 and 274), expresses the ideas that entail thesis T1°:

T1° $astitva \subseteq (jñeyatva = abhidheyatva)$,

and, on another occasion (see pp. 30 and 279), he implies thesis T2°, which is supported also by Śaṅkaramiśra’s reading:

T2° $(jñeyatva = abhidheyatva) \subseteq astitva$.

The conjunction of T1° and T2° yields the only conclusion possible:

T3° $astitva = abhidheyatva = jñeyatva$.

The controversial character of the equation $astitva = abhidheyatva = jñeyatva$ —which is a statement of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thesis of the knowability of everything—could be considered to be delusive. First, the equation implies that any thought or idea can be formulated with words and that its elements are existent as entering into relations with other elements of the idea.

Interestingly, the equation $astitva = jñeyatva$ corresponds to what is nowadays called ‘knowability principle’ PK, which claims that all truths are knowable:⁷²

⁷⁰ PBhṬS, p. 175.1–3: *abhidheyatvam abhidhāna-karma-bhāvatvaṃ sat-padābhidheyatvaṃ vārtābhidheyatvaṃ vā. jñeyatvam api sattā-prakāraka-jñāna-viśayatvaṃ jñāna-viśaya-bhāvatvaṃ vā.*

⁷¹ This is, of course, implied by the °ādi in *sad-abhidhānādi*.

⁷² Although it is the case that truths are not things, but to say ‘all truths are knowable’ is equivalent to the claim that we can know all of everything, which is the gist of the equation $astitva = jñeyatva$. If everything can be known, it means that it is possible to the contents of all true statements about everything and to know that they are true.

KP $\forall p (p \rightarrow \Diamond Kp)$,

where the symbol ‘ \Diamond ’ is the modal operator: ‘it is possible that ...’. The principle, frequently taken for granted also in Western science, states that for everything that exists it is possible that one can, in principle, know it. In other words, there are no logical limits to our cognition, except for factual limits: we just happen not to know some (perhaps: most?) truths, but there is intrinsically logically nothing that could prevent one from knowing these truths at some time.

Secondly, it is an obvious condition for meaningfulness of philosophical reflection: we can know and sensibly predicate of things that exist, and there is nothing in the world which could not, even potentially, become the contents of our judgements. It does not, however, have to imply that our knowledge has no limits in the sense that we will eventually know everything. Conversely, absolutely non-existent things cannot become the contents of our thoughts and utterances;⁷³ even dreams and illusions are made up of real things. That would be an unequivocal statement of realism of the Vaiśeṣika system.

The most troubling problem, however, is how to account for such an equation (*astitva = jñeyatva = abhidheyatva*), also within the conceptual framework of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and whether there could be anyone who might practically attest that indeed all that exists can be known and expressed, or whether it is a matter of (rather optimistic) belief⁷⁴. What the equation actually called for in Indian context presently discussed was a being who would epitomise all the cognitive faculties needed to validate the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika claim.

3.3. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika knowability thesis and Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability

This brings us to a strictly logical-epistemic problem which eventually, since the publication of a seminal and much debated paper by Frederic Brenton FITCH (1963)⁷⁵,

⁷³ When absolutely non-existent, fictitious things are claimed to become the contents of our cognition all that means is either that the contents are compounded wholes that consists of real components related in a *fictitious* way or that names we use are empty terms the contents of which is analysable to a set of real elements.

⁷⁴ For one thing is to know that something is logically not impossible and another thing is to know that something is *actually* the case.

⁷⁵ FITCH’s paper seemed to be neglected for some time and received wider recognition much later, after the Paradox of Knowability was revived in HART (1979: esp. 164–165, n. 3.). A handy account of the paradox is given by BROGAARD–SALERNO (2004).

came to be known as Fitch's Paradox of Knowability. In it, FITCH (1963: 139) formulates THEOREM 5, relevant for our discussion, which states that

'If there is some true proposition which nobody knows (or has known or will know) to be true, then there is a true proposition which nobody can know to be true.'

He bases his THEOREM 5, first, on an general notion of a truth class α of propositions for which every member of it is true, symbolically expressed as $(p) [(\alpha p) \rightarrow p]$ (where ' \rightarrow ' stands for strict implication), which later serves him as a model to substitute a range of operators that map what he calls value concepts ('striving for', 'doing', 'believing', 'knowing', 'desiring', 'ability to do', 'obligation to do', 'value for'). One of such operators, 'knowing', corresponds to what is now generally known as the epistemic operator K: 'somebody at some time knows that ...', or 'it is known by someone at some time that ...'. Thus, with the epistemic operator K instantiating α (other such instantiations are 'truth', 'causal necessity', 'logical necessity', 'doing', 'proving' etc.), one arrives at the assumption: $\forall p (Kp \rightarrow p)$ ('for all propositions p , if one knows that p , then it is the case that p '). Second, the theorem rests on his THEOREM 1:

'If α is a truth class which is closed with respect to conjunction elimination, then the proposition, $[p \ \& \ \sim \alpha p]$, which asserts that p is true but not a member of α (where p is any proposition), is itself necessarily not a member of α .'⁷⁶

Again, using the epistemic operator K, one can reformulate the theorem to say if there is truth p which is unknown, $(p \ \& \ \sim Kp)$, then it is itself unknowable that it is an unknown truth.

The condition for both the theorems, and further proofs which FITCH lays down, is the idea of closure with respect to conjunction elimination: 'a class of propositions ... will be said to be closed *with respect to conjunction elimination* if (necessarily) whenever the conjunction of two propositions is in the class so are the two propositions themselves'⁷⁷, i.e. $(p) (q) [(\alpha(p \ \& \ q) \rightarrow (\alpha p) \ \& \ (\alpha q))]$. Again, what it means in our context of the epistemic operator K is that, for instance, if one knows both that Vincent d'Indy was French (p) and that Sigismondo d'India was Italian (q), then one also knows that Vincent d'Indy was French (p) *and* one knows that that Sigismondo d'India was Italian (q): $K(p \ \& \ q) \rightarrow (Kp \ \& \ Kq)$.

⁷⁶ FITCH (1963: 138).

⁷⁷ FITCH (1963: 136).

Accordingly, what THEOREM 5 eventually states is that from the assertion that there are truths that merely happen to be unknown, $\exists p (p \ \& \ \sim Kp)$, it follows that ultimately there are necessarily unknowable truths, $\exists p (p \ \& \ \sim \Diamond Kp)$, which is a paradox. Further, the conclusion that there are truths that cannot be known is in conflict with the knowability principle PK: $\forall p (p \rightarrow \Diamond Kp)$, according to which any truth can, in principle, be known.

As I have pointed out above (p. 281), the knowability principle corresponds to the (Prašastapāda and post-Prašastapāda) Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika equation: existentiality = nameability = cognisability. Consequently, FITCH's conclusions seem to threaten precisely this equation.

It was Nicholas RESCHER (1984: 150 ff.) who took up FITCH's conclusions and devised a proof⁷⁸ that has stimulated a prolonged debate, to the effect that there are logical limits for science and any cognitive enquiry, provokingly adding that 'perfected science is a mirage; completed knowledge a chimera'. And RESCHER's elaborated proof that not every truth can be known seems directly relevant to the (in)validity of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika equation, inasmuch as it seems to invalidate the latter. A rather similar line of reasoning based on FITCH's proof is applied by Roy W. PERRETT (1999) to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika equation.

Following RESCHER, let us consider four elementary theses of epistemic logic which all seem perfectly acceptable:

K1° 'Authentic knowledge is inherently veridical: $Kp \rightarrow p$.'

In other words, it is not possible to know anything that is false. K1° would also be a thesis accepted by the Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika realists who claimed that all that enters our minds and all we know is a result of something that is factual: if we know a proposition, then it is true.

K2° 'A conjunction can only be known if both its conjuncts are known: $K(p \ \& \ q) \rightarrow (Kp \ \& \ Kq)$.'

If we know a conjunction of two propositions to be true, then we also know both the conjuncts. This corresponds to FITCH's (1963: 136) closure with respect to conjunction elimination (*vide supra*, p. 282).

⁷⁸ The proof is also reproduced and discussed for instance in SCHLESINGER (1986), which is later incorporated *in extenso* in SCHLESINGER (1988: 36 ff.), as well as in ZEMACH (1987), who attempts to demonstrate that RESCHER's, and thus also FITCH's, proof is valid only when taken in *de re* reading, not in *de dicto* (*vide supra*, p. 286 f.). A different approach, taking into account intuitionistic approach, to defend the Paradox of Knowability to the effect that not all truths can be known is found in FLORIO-MURZI (2008). See also Rafał PALCZEWSKI (2007: 460 ff.).

K3° ‘Some truth is not known: $\exists p (p \ \& \ \sim Kp)$.’⁷⁹

It is a premise of FITCH’s THEOREM 5. Since there are a vast number of propositions which we do not know, it is a thesis that nobody would seriously question, lest we boldly declare we know everything. It is also Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thesis that some truths are not known to humans. In fact, it is the condition for transmigration (*saṃsāra*) to persist that transmigrating beings do not know all the truth⁸⁰. K3° follows from the fundamental tenet of both systems that the cognition of the true nature of all the categories, either epistemic, in case of Nyāya⁸¹, or ontological, in case of Vaiśeṣika⁸², leads to liberation. As long as

⁷⁹ As regards PERRETT’s (1999: 405 ff.) analysis (*vide infra*, n. 84), in itself an inspiring and valuable endeavour, of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika equation and his attempt to demonstrate that ‘the human knowability thesis is demonstrably false’, he asks us to ‘consider first the following pair of theses:

Human Knowability: All truths are knowable by humans.

Human Knownness: All truths are known by humans.

Indeed, as he rightly points out, ‘Nyāya affirms human knowability and denies human knownness.’ Further, he asks us to ‘symbolize these two Nyāya theses thus:

T₁: $p \rightarrow \Diamond Kp$.

T₂: $\sim(p \rightarrow Kp)$.’

PERRETT’s T₁ is, of course, an instantiation of our knowability principle PK: $\forall p (p \rightarrow \Diamond Kp)$, arrived at by universal instantiation.

We may have doubts whether PERRETT’s T₂ is an accurate description of the Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika’s denial of the *Human Knownness* thesis. What the *Human Knownness* thesis states actually is:

T_{HK}: $\forall p (p \rightarrow Kp)$.

Therefore, its denial by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school should merely state:

D_{HK}: $\sim\forall p (p \rightarrow Kp)$,

which is equivalent to

$\exists p \sim(p \rightarrow Kp)$,

and to

$\exists p (p \ \& \ \sim Kp)$,

which is our K3°. From K3° one can easily obtain, by existential instantiation, PERRETT’s T₂, which is a much stronger claim, however, not vice versa. I am not quite sure whether the application of the inference rule of existential elimination is at all legitimate here. On some problems concerning the existential instantiation in this proof—i.e. from $\exists p (p \ \& \ \sim Kp)$ deriving $(p \ \& \ \sim Kp)$ —see ZEMACH (1987: 529). Having this in view, one would have to redraft the whole argument, albeit the flaw does not render PERRETT’s demonstration pointless.

⁸⁰ *Vide infra*, p. 290.

⁸¹ NS 1.1.1: *pramāṇa-prameya-saṃśaya-prayojana-dṛṣṭānta-siddhāntāvayava-tarka-nirṇaya-vāda-jalpa-vitaṇḍā-hetv-ābhāsa-cchala-jāti-nigraha-sthānānām tattva-jñānān niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ*.

⁸² PBh₁ 2.1, p. 6 = PBh₂ 2, p. 1.6–7: *dravya-guṇa-karma-sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyānām ṣaṇṇām padārthānām sādharma-vaidharmya-tattva-jñānām niḥśreyasa-hetuḥ*. See p. 295, n. 111.

we do not know the categories, which is tantamount to saying that there are some truths unknown to us, we transmigrate and endure existential pangs.

K4° ‘All truths are knowable: $p \rightarrow \diamond Kp$.’

This is precisely an instantiation of the knowability principle PK (pp. 281, 283), and is also admitted by Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika in the equation *astitva* = *jñeyatva*.

RESCHER’s demonstration that the above four rules are inconsistent runs in nine steps as follows:

- | | | |
|----|--|--|
| 1. | $K\sim Kp \rightarrow \sim Kp$ | substitution in K1° [Kp/p]. |
| 2. | $\sim(K\sim Kp \ \& \ Kp)$ | from 1 by the definition of ‘ \rightarrow ’ [$(P \rightarrow Q) \equiv \sim(P \rightarrow \sim Q)$]. ⁸³ |
| 3. | $K(\sim Kp \ \& \ p) \rightarrow (K\sim Kp \ \& \ Kp)$ | substitution in K1° [Kp/q]. |
| 4. | $\sim K(\sim Kp \ \& \ p)$ | from 2, 3 by <i>modus tollens</i> . |
| 5. | $\Box \sim K(\sim Kp \ \& \ p)$ | from 4 by the rule of necessitation RN (anything derivable from necessary truths is a necessary truth). |
| 6. | $\sim \diamond K(\sim Kp \ \& \ p)$ | from 5 by the equivalence: $\Box \phi \leftrightarrow \sim \diamond \sim \phi$. |
| 7. | $\sim(\sim Kp \ \& \ p)$ | from 6, K4° by <i>modus tollens</i> . |
| 8. | $\forall p \sim(\sim Kp \ \& \ p)$ | from 7 by generalisation. |
| 9. | $\sim \exists p (\sim Kp \ \& \ p)$ | from 8. |

Since step 9 contradicts K3°, therefore the set of theses K1°–K4° is incongruous, because they lead to a contradiction. Theses K1°–K3° appear to be legitimate, and therefore it is thesis K4° that should be rejected. ‘We must concede that some truths are unknowable’, concludes RESCHER (1984: 150).⁸⁴

⁸³ Cf. an inspiring discussion in BENETT (2003: esp. 20 ff.).

⁸⁴ PERRETT’s (1999: 405–407) demonstration applied to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is based on a rather similar, with some reservations (see n. 79) though, set of assumptions K1°–K4°, and he likewise dismisses thesis K4° (in his notation T₁), that corresponds to knowability principle PK.

His argument in full starts with the following theses and assumptions as follows (PERRETT (1999: 406)):

- | | | |
|------------------|--|---|
| T ₁ : | $p \rightarrow \diamond Kp$ | Nyāya’s <i>Human Knowability</i> thesis (‘All truths are knowable by humans’). |
| T ₂ : | $\sim(p \rightarrow Kp)$ | Nyāya’s denial of <i>Human Knownness</i> thesis (‘It is not the case that all truths are known by humans’). |
| A ₁ : | $Kp \rightarrow p$ | Assumption one (‘what is known is true’). |
| A ₂ : | $K(p \ \& \ q) \rightarrow Kp \ \& \ Kq$ | Assumption two (‘knowledge distributes over conjunction’). |

Should we, therefore, completely dismiss the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika equation: *astitva* = *jñeyatva* = *abhidheyatva* as illogical and invalid? There are two issues involved here. Firstly, it is whether FITCH's / RESCHER's argument indeed is correct or, granted that it is, under what conditions it is correct. Secondly, supposing that the logical structure of the Paradox of Knowability is in principle right, how far does it invalidate Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika claims?

There is here no room even for a brief discussion of (in)validity, lest for a mere review of numerous supporters and critics, of FITCH's/RESCHER's argument.⁸⁵ What is, however, vital to note is that Paradox of Knowability⁸⁶ does not merely boil down to SCHLESINGER's (1986: 26) observation that 'The final conclusion " $(\exists p) p \& \sim PKp$ " states nothing more noteworthy than that there is some true proposition which at the present time is in principle unknowable'. It is not simply about some empirical observation that our knowledge, or science for that matter, faces some practical or technical limits at a given point of time, but it declares that it is *p r i n c i p a l l y* a n d *l o g i c a l l y* *i m p o s s i b l e* to know some true proposition. This point seems to have been far too often misunderstood.

A possible way to defend against the paradox would be, for instance, the one taken by Eddy M. ZEMACH (1987) who proposes to distinguish two readings of the

Next, 'the *reductio* proof of the inconsistency of the premise set (T_1, T_2, A_1, A_2) goes through as follows:

- | | | |
|-----|------------------------------|------------------|
| (1) | $p \rightarrow \sim Kp$ | From T_2 |
| (2) | $\diamond K(p \& \sim Kp)$ | From (1) & T_1 |
| (3) | $\diamond (Kp \& K \sim Kp)$ | From (2) & A_2 |
| (4) | $\diamond (Kp \& \sim Kp)$ | From (3) & A_1 |

Since (4) is a contradiction, we know that at least one of our original assumptions is false. ... Hence the conclusion to be drawn is that T_1 is false.'

Steps (1)–(4) in PERRETT's arguments are *identical* to MACKIE (1980: 90), reproduced in EDGINGTON (1985: 558), to an extent which does not seem coincidental. See also PALCZEWSKI (2007: 460), in which the premisses are extended.

⁸⁵ Just to mention a few critics, on different grounds: George N. SCHLESINGER (1988: 39 ff.), E.M. ZEMACH (1987), Michael DUMMETT (2007: 348–350), cf. for a brief review: BROGAARD–SALERNO (2004), and most recently Rafał PALCZEWSKI (2007), who makes use of additional operators and applies the idea of group knowledge and group knowability; this, although the author does not states it explicitly and may even not be aware of, presupposes Karl R. POPPER's (1970), (1972) notion of 'the third world', the world of the products of the human mind as a group knowledge.

⁸⁶ Which is basically an off-shot of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem, just as its opposite, verificationism (i.e. a view that all meaningful/true statements are verifiable) is related to what Gödel's first incompleteness theorem invalidates (i.e. a view that we can construct a consistent and complete theory).

epistemic operator K , *de dicto* and *de re*.⁸⁷ To illustrate the distinction, let us take one of the opacity verbs that cause some interpretation problem in the following sentence:

S1° Jago believes that someone is faithful.

This ambiguous sentence could be interpreted either (syntactically) *de dicto* ('of word'):

S2° Jago believes that there are faithful women. $B_{\text{Jago}} \exists x (Fx)$,

or (syntactically) *de re* ('of thing'):

S3° Jago believes of a particular woman that she is faithful. $\exists x (B_{\text{Jago}} Fx)$.

Now, let us suppose that Barbie once learnt Thales' theorem in a TV talk show, but has forgotten its contents the very next morning and all she knows now is that Thales' theorem is true. Is the statement asserting of Barbie that she knows Thales' theorem true or not? In other words, is $K_{\text{Barbie}} p$ (where p stands for 'Thales' theorem') true, and if it is, is it true unconditionally? If we read it *de re* ('Of a proposition called «Thales' theorem», Barbie knows that it is true') $K_{\text{Barbie}} p$ is true. However, if we read it *de dicto* ('Barbie knows that if A, B and C are points on a circle where the line AC is a diameter of the circle, then the angle ABC is a right angle'), $K_{\text{Barbie}} p$ turns out to be false. We can see that Kp may yield two different results when read it either *de re* or *de dicto*.

Let us now see whether the statement 'Barbie knows that she does not know Thales' theorem' is true or not? This is the case of the proposition $K\sim Kp$, which occurs in RESCHER's argument. Under what conditions is $K\sim Kp$ true of Barbie and Thales' theorem? Indeed, we can justifiably claim that 'Barbie knows that she does not know Thales' theorem', but that can make sense only when read *de re*: 'Barbie knows that she does not know what «Thales' theorem» is all about'. It would not be very understandable when read *de dicto*: 'Barbie knows that she does not know that if A, B and C are points on a circle where the line AC is a diameter of the circle, then the angle ABC is a right angle'. This shows that $K\sim Kp$ in RESCHER's argument may not be as unproblematic as it seems at first. Even taken intuitively, to claim that 'I know that I do not know that I am listening to music', in which p is 'I am listening to music', may seem puzzling. As ZEMACH (1987: 530) and EDGINGTON (1985: 560 ff.) point out, 'although " $\sim Kp$ " may be read *de dicto*, if it is embedded in an-

⁸⁷ For the distinction see Willard Van Orman QUINE (1956), Alvin PLANTINGA (1969), that also contains some brief historical sketch of the distinction, Ernest SOSA (1970) and Roderick CHISHOLM (1976). Thomas MCKAY (2005) highlights some additional points by distinguishing three different conceptions of the *de re* / *de dicto* distinction: syntactically, semantically and metaphysically.

other *de dicto* epistemic operator relative to the same person, it must be read *de re*. “ $K_S \sim K_J p$ ” (i.e., “Smith knows that Jones does not know that the car is stolen”) is true iff Smith knows the contents of p , and that Jones does not know it. ... But for “ $K_J \sim K_J p$ ” to be true, it is not required that Jones knows the content of p (that the car is stolen) and that he does not know it.⁸⁸ Taking the *de re* / *de dicto* distinction into account, we will see that RESCHER’s argument stalls at a certain point.⁸⁹

The same strategy that distinguishes between *de re* and *de dicto* readings may cast doubt on assumption $K2^\circ$: $K(p \ \& \ q) \rightarrow (Kp \ \& \ Kq)$, instead on $K4^\circ$.⁹⁰ Suppose Barbie heard from a reliable source, say, her boyfriend Ken the arithmetician, that Gödel’s theorems are true. Hence Barbie knows that both Gödel’s incompleteness theorems are true⁹¹: $K_{\text{Barbie}}(p \ \& \ q)$. Does it follow from $K_{\text{Barbie}}(p \ \& \ q)$ that Barbie knows both that (p), i.e. that it is not possible to construct an effectively strong arithmetic theory which is both consistent and complete, because one can construct an arithmetical statement that is true, but not provable in the theory, and that (q), i.e. that the consistency of an arithmetic theory cannot be proved in the arithmetic itself, because the theory could contain a statement of its own consistency only if the theory were inconsistent? In other words, does it follow from $K_{\text{Barbie}}(p \ \& \ q)$ that $K_{\text{Barbie}} p \ \& \ K_{\text{Barbie}} q$? Suppose Barbie has, surprising as it may be, never heard anything more detailed about Kurt Gödel and has never studied arithmetic and logic. Read *de dicto*, the statement $K_{\text{Barbie}}(p \ \& \ q) \rightarrow (K_{\text{Barbie}} p \ \& \ K_{\text{Barbie}} q)$ is true, because Barbie does not have to know the contents of both p and q to have a justified true belief (thanks to Ken the arithmetician) that p and q are true. However, when read *de re*, the assumption $K_{\text{Barbie}}(p \ \& \ q) \rightarrow (K_{\text{Barbie}} p \ \& \ K_{\text{Barbie}} q)$ is plainly false, because Barbie neither knows what a theorem is nor what consistency and completeness of an arithmetic theory are, etc. She probably would not even be able to genuinely grasp the difference between Gödel’s completeness theorem and his two incompleteness theorems at all.

Under the *de dicto* reading, assumption $K2^\circ$ would also bring us to an undesired conclusion that if we know something of p and if a piece of information r is logically entailed by p ($p \rightarrow r$) or is a part of p ($r \subset p$), we would automatically know r .

⁸⁸ In ZEMACH’s convention, roman ‘p’ is a schematic letter substituting for propositions, whereas italicised p is taken as a name of a proposition, not a proposition itself; in my notation, it is p and ‘ p ’ respectively.

⁸⁹ For details see ZEMACH (1987: 530–531).

⁹⁰ Cf. ZEMACH (1987: 531–532).

⁹¹ That her knowledge is indeed a case of justified true belief can be seen on various counts, e.g. it fulfils Fred DRETSKE’s (1971) conclusive reasons or the conditions of Robert NOZICK’s (1981: 172–178) truth-tracking account (1. p is true; 2. S believes that p ; 3. if p weren’t true, S wouldn’t believe that p ; 4. if p were true, S would believe that p) etc.

Suppose Barbie knows that Thales' theorem is true, astonishing as it sounds, she even knows that if A, B and C are points on a circle where the line AC is a diameter of the circle, then the angle ABC is a right angle. However, does she also automatically know that the sum of the angles in a triangle is equal to two right angles (180°) and that the base angles of an isosceles triangle are equal, which is knowledge entailed by Thales' theorem? This does not automatically follow and she does not have to have such knowledge. Applied consistently on reading it *de dicto*, assumption K2° would lead us to an undesired consequence that one would know everything conceivable, whether already known to somebody at one point in history or so far never discovered by anybody, of p . That would approximate something like ' p -bound omniscience'.⁹²

Therefore it seems far from proven that one would have to, on purely logical grounds, e.g. by applying Fitch's Paradox of Knowability, reject Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika claim that all truths are, in principle, knowable and expressible.

Now, there is another problem, reflected in Roy W. PERRETT's (1999: 405 ff.) analysis of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika equation. He takes it for granted that what the equation refers to is what he calls 'Human Knowability' thesis, viz. that all truths are knowable by humans.

Throughout his paper Roy W. PERRETT, assumes that what the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika equation, as an expression of the knowability of everything, comprises is not only god's but also human knowability: 'I suggest instead that this omission is because the scope of the knowability thesis is not supposed to be restricted just to knowability by God, but is supposed also to include knowability by humans' (1999: 402). Precisely such a postulate of unrestricted human knowability, viz. the knowability of everything potentially by every human being, can be problematic within the system of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. My point is that what the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika knowability thesis actually expresses is knowability only by god and, perhaps, by a select group of (super-)humans, in other words: the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika knowability

⁹² Cf. NOZICK's (1981: 204 ff., 227 ff.) discussion of non-closure and criticism of the subjunctive principle $K(p \rightarrow q) \& Kp \rightarrow Kq$ ('if S knows that p and he knows that p entails q , then he also knows that q ') and his rejection of the claim that if a person S knows a conjunction, then he also knows the conjuncts, which is our K2°. PERRETT (1999: 407 ff.) considers an intuitionist line of defence, following Timothy WILLIAMSON (1982), for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thesis of the knowability of everything. This seems to be completely unnecessary at least for the most of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika till, perhaps, the 16th century and Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, for the system of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika throughout its classical and mediaeval history admitted the elimination of double negation: $\sim\sim p = p$, viz. that the negation of the negation of p is identical with p , the denial of which is both one of the fundamentals of intuitionistic logic and necessary to evaluate and defend the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika equation from the standpoint of intuitionistic logic.

thesis directly entails the acceptance of omniscience of god and, perhaps in addition, of certain humans, i.e. most spiritually advanced adepts of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika or *yogins* whose knowledge, for all practical reasons, equals omniscience (*vide infra*, §§ 4.3 and 4.4). Most importantly, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika knowability thesis does not concern ordinary humans at all and, therefore, it loses some of its attractive flavour to a philosopher.

As I have already pointed out (p. 284), the theoretical edifices of both the systems rest on the assumption that their systems provide us with a scheme of all sufficient categories that comprehensively cover all that exists and with a method to cognise all of them.⁹³ The pragmatic and ethical relevance of such bold claims lay in the fact that the comprehensive scheme mapping all that exists onto a system of categories and relations was both a sufficient and necessary tool to bring transmigration to its end. As long as we do not achieve, apparently complete, knowledge of the categories and what they entail, we are going to endure hardships of *saṃsāra*. This is the salvific aspect of cognition within Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.⁹⁴ Religious life in conformity with moral law (*dharma*) may secure mundane prosperity and better next birth (*abhyudaya*), but it is the cognition of the true nature of the categories that results in liberation.⁹⁵

There is no doubt that, on logical analysis, the set of premisses $K1^\circ$ – $K4^\circ$ are inconsistent. Usually it is either premiss $K2^\circ$ (p. 288 f.) or the knowability principle $K4^\circ$ (p. 285), or the validity of $K\sim Kp$ (steps 1–3, p. 285 f., viz. the validity of the substitution of either ‘ $\sim Kp$ ’⁹⁶ or ‘ $p \ \& \ \sim Kp$ ’⁹⁷ for ‘ p ’), when read *de dicto*, that are

⁹³ A view expressed in the introductory *sūtras* of Nyāya (n. 81) and Vaiśeṣika (n. 82).

⁹⁴ See NS 1.1.1: *pramāṇa-prameya-saṃśaya-prayojana-dṛṣṭānta-siddhāntāvayava-tarka-nirṇaya-vāda-jalpa-vitaṇḍāhetv-ābhāsa-cchala-jāti-nigraha-sthānānām tattva-jñānān niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ*, and NBh 1.1.1: *ātmādeḥ khalu prameyasya tattva-jñānān niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ*.—‘The attainment of well-being is [possible] by means of the cognition of the true nature of [such categories as] cognitive criterion, the cognoscible ...’

⁹⁵ Cf. VS(C) 1.1.2, see p. 292 f., n. 104. The tradition of Nyāya lays more stress on the cognition of one of the cognoscibles (*prameya*), i.e. the soul (*ātman*), see NS/NBh 4.2.1 ff. However, even that being the case, Vātsyāyana Pakṣilasvāmin’s introduction to NS 4.2.1 reveals that it is not only the cognition of the soul and the imperfections responsible for erroneous attribution of the idea of self (*ahamkāra*, NS 4.2.1) that is important but also the cognition of other categories. Even the lengthy discussion on the whole and on the atoms which starts with NS 4.2.3 shows how important is the cognition of the environment in which the idea of the soul can be assessed. Further, Vātsyāyana Pakṣilasvāmin emphasises the role of cognition as the means to liberation: ‘The cognition of the true nature of [the cognoscibles as the second category] is the means to achieve this [liberation]’ (NBh 4.2.0, p. 259.1: *tasyādhigamōpāyas tattva-jñānam*).

⁹⁶ Questioned in ZEMACH (1987: 530 ff.)

⁹⁷ Questioned in EDGINGTON (1985: 560 ff.).

blamed for the inconsistency. However, the validity of the thesis of the limits of human knownness— $\exists p (p \ \& \ \sim Kp)$, equivalent to $\exists p \sim(p \rightarrow Kp)$ —i.e. that there are some truths that happen not to be known, has never been questioned in the analyses of the Paradox of Knowability, also applied to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika equation.

Whether various strategies taken to defend against Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability (see n. 85) prove indeed successful or not⁹⁸ is rather irrelevant to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thesis of the knowability of everything, because—in view of omniscience asserted of god and of certain elevated individuals—the premiss rejected by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is K3°. ⁹⁹In other words, since Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika admit the existence of at least one being, i.e. god, that knows everything, it rejects the thesis that ‘Some truth is not known’. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system explicitly admits a thesis, contrary to K3°, that all truths can be, and actually are known: $\forall p (p \rightarrow Kp)$, which is equivalent to $\forall p \sim(p \ \& \ \sim Kp)$, or rather, more specifically, that there is someone α (god, a *yogin*) who knows all truths: $\exists \alpha \forall p (p \rightarrow K_{\alpha}p)$, equivalent to $\exists \alpha \forall p \sim(p \ \& \ \sim K_{\alpha}p)$. Therefore, for the proponents of the system, around and after the times of Praśastapāda at the latest, i.e. after the admittance of god into the system, the Paradox of Knowability simply, when based on premisses K1°, K2° and K4°, does not arise.¹⁰⁰

Nevertheless, even seen on purely logical grounds, what the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika equation requires is the elimination of assumption K3°, i.e. the acceptance of a being that is omniscient. We can easily see that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika equation seemed controversial on various grounds, and that also includes modern interpretations of anti-realist claims. Indeed, the equation seems to be most defensible in the context of omniscience, and at first sight the equation of the knowability of everything smacks of omniscience (*vide supra*, p. 307).¹⁰¹

4.1. Knowability thesis and the ‘knowability thesis package’

The idea of the three meta-categories, i.e. the properties *astitva–abhidheyatva–jñeyatva*, must have entered the system of Vaiśeṣika at a later date, most probably in

⁹⁸ There have been many attempts undertaken. See for instance a rejoinder to EDGINGTON’s (1985) Timothy WILLIAMSON’s (1987) arguments in favour of Paradox of Knowability.

⁹⁹ For a fruitful analysis of the idea of (un)knowability in the context of (god’s) omniscience see Jonathan L. KVANVIG (1989: 488 ff.).

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Jonathan L. KVANVIG (1989) for the analysis of the untenability of the claim that unknowable truths may exist vis-à-vis the doctrine of omniscience, and Charles TALIAFERRO’s (1993) rejoinder to KVANVIG.

¹⁰¹ Logically, however, the statement ‘... can know everything’ does not entail ‘... knows everything’, whereas the latter does entail the former.

the fifth century, insofar as it is not present in the extant text of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* itself. However, it must have become a part of the system of beliefs either slightly before or, which is much less likely, at the time of Praśastapāda, otherwise it would be hardly difficult to account for its relatively widespread presence in other works such as those of Praśastamati (granted that he is different from Praśastapāda), Candramati and Uddyotakara Bhāradvāja (550–610 CE) around the same time, i.e. in the first half of the sixth century, i.e. after Diñnāga (480–540 CE) and before Malavādin (c. 600 CE), or even earlier, i.e. in the second half of the fifth century, i.e. the time of Vātsyāyana Pakṣilasvāmin¹⁰².

I shall now argue that the reasons that prompted Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers to adopt such a controversial claim were of different nature than philosophical analysis and purely rational concerns.

My thesis is that (1) the idea expressed in the equation *astitva = abhidheyatva = jñeyatva* was adopted by Vaiśeṣika thinkers simultaneously along with three other concepts at approximately the same period: (2) the idea of god's existence, (3) the idea of god's omniscience and (4) the idea of twofold supernatural perception (*ārṣa-pratyakṣa* and *yogi-pratyakṣa*), which were absent in the original *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, as it existed prior to Praśastapāda¹⁰³. Further, all these latter three ideas were indispensable to justify each other. To wit, it was a package of four tenets that entered Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system in the late fifth century CE.

4.2. Knowability thesis and god's existence

Let me start with the idea of god, which was a foreign body to and incompatible with the system of early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. It hardly needs any additional prove now, since it is widely accepted, that the idea of god was absent in the original text of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*. There are no references to that idea in VS, and the only passage of VS into which the existence of god is read into by later tradition is VS 1.1.3, which reads in a concrete context:

‘[2] That from which [results] the attainment of mundane prosperity and the highest good is moral law. Vedic tradition possesses cognitive validity, because of **its** statement.’¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² Cf. p. 298, n. 125.

¹⁰³ See WEZLER (1982), ISAACSON (1993) and HONDA (1988) and p. 308 ff.

¹⁰⁴ VS(C) 1.1.2–3: *yato 'bhyudaya-niḥśreyasa-siddhiḥ sa dharmah. tad-vacanād āmnāya-prāmāṇyam*. VS(C) 1.1.3 is explicitly quoted in PBh₁ 8.12.2.2, p. 213 = PBh₂ 257, see p. 297, n. 123.

The expression ‘because of **its** statement’ (*tad-vacanāt*)—which was later interpreted as referring to god¹⁰⁵—could be, in this particular context, interpreted either as:

- (a) ‘because [Vedic tradition] communicates moral law’ (*tad = dharma*), or
- (b) ‘because [Vedic tradition] speaks of the attainment of mundane prosperity and the highest good’ (*tad = abhyudaya-nihśreyasa-siddhiḥ*), or
- (c) ‘because [Vedic tradition] speaks of mundane prosperity and the highest good’ (*tad = abhyudaya-nihśreyasa*).

All the interpretations could be linguistically plausible here. The idea connoted roughly by the interpretations (a), (b) or (c) is echoed by Candramati with the statement that ‘the *Vedas* and sacred texts proscribe moral law and prohibit unrighteousness [respectively]’ (**śruti-smṛti-vihita-pratiśiddha-dharmādharma*) in the passage of DPŚ:

‘Of merit and demerit, the cause is the connection of mind with soul after [the production of] desire and aversion, assisted by both pure and impure intention on those means for performing merit and demerit which are ordered and prohibited by the *Vedas* and the authoritative sacred texts.’¹⁰⁶

The anonymous author of the commentary *Vaiśeṣika-darśana-vyākhyā* clearly interprets the statement in the sense (c):

‘Because of the statement, or the teaching about these two, viz. heaven and liberation, which produces knowledge, Vedic tradition, viz. the *Vedas*, sacred texts, historic stories etc., possess cognitive validity, viz. they are the causes of knowledge.’¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ Cf. e.g. Candrānanda and his VSV(C) 1.1.3: *tad iti hiraṇya-garbha-parāmarśo hiraṇyaṁ reto ’syēti kṛtvā bhagavān mahēśvara evōcyate*.—‘The [pronoun] “that” invokes the idea of the golden egg (sc. Brahman). Having taken this to mean “that whose golden [egg] is progeny” it refers to the Supreme Lord.’ See BRONKHORST (1996).

¹⁰⁶ DPŚ₂ 154 (reconstructed): *dharmādharmaḥ icchā-dveṣa-pūrvakaḥ śruti-smṛti-vihita-pratiśiddha-dharmādharma-sādhana-śuddhāśuddhābhisandya-ubhayāpekṣa ātma-manah-samyogaḥ kāraṇam*. = DPŚ₁ 2.2.5.25, p. 110: ‘Merit and demerit are preceded by desire and aversion, and have their causes in contact of self with mind, caused by hearing and reflecting on, or by disregarding the fact that merit and demerit (severally) bring about a pure or impure state in the future life.’

¹⁰⁷ VSV(D) 1.3, p. 2: *tayoḥ svargāpavargayoḥ vacanāt pratipādanāt pramīti-jananād āmnāyasya śruti-smṛtītiḥāsādeḥ prāmāṇyaṁ pramīti-kāraṇatvam*.

However, against any philologically possible interpretation of the VS passage, Praśastapāda gives an entirely new sense to VS 1.1.3, by taking *tad*-° to mean ‘god’ (*īśvara*-°):

‘Vedic tradition is based on the cognitive validity of the speaker’
(*vaktṛ-prāmāṇyāpekṣaḥ*),¹⁰⁸

in which ‘the speaker’ for Praśastapāda is the only ultimately reliable and indisputably trustworthy speaker, i.e. god.

With his novel interpretation, Praśastapāda overrides the original meaning of VS 1.1.3 at the very outset of his *Padārtha-dharma-saṁgraha*, by stating that

‘This [cognition, operating by way of positive procedure and by way of negative procedure, of the true nature of the six ontological categories] is [attained] because of moral law revealed by god’s injunction.’¹⁰⁹

Interestingly, Praśastapāda’s statement fulfils a double role.

First, it gives a new meaning to VS 1.1.3, as against the original purport of the *sūtra*. Most importantly for the present issue, in the context of moral law (*dharma*) related to Vedic tradition that is considered to be a valid and reliable source of knowledge, Praśastapāda takes Kaṇāda’s phrase *tad-vacanāt* to eventually connote the meaning: *īśvara-codanābhivyaktād dharmāt*. It becomes conspicuous when we compare the argumentative structure of relevant portions of VS(C) and PBh. We obtain the following either causal or explanatory dependence, which is very similar in both cases:

Kaṇāda, VS(C):¹¹⁰

dharma → *abhyudaya-niḥśreyasa*

1. Moral law leads to prosperity and liberation.

tad-vacana → *āmnāya-prāmāṇya* → *dharma*

- 2a. The utterance of/by ‘this’ leads to cognitive validity of Vedic tradition.
- 2b. Vedic tradition leads to moral law.

¹⁰⁸ See PBh₁ 8.12.2.2, p. 213 = PBh₂ 257: *śruti-smṛti-lakṣaṇo ’py āmnāyo vaktṛ-prāmāṇyāpekṣaḥ tad-vacanād āmnāya-prāmāṇyam, liṅgāc cānityo, buddhi-pūrvā vākya-kṛtir vede buddhi-pūrvō dadātir ity uktatvāt*. For the translation of the whole passage see p. 297.

¹⁰⁹ PBh₁ 2.1, p. 7 = PBh₂ 2, p. 1.8: *tac cēśvara-codanābhivyaktād dharmād eva. [tat = ṣaṅṅāṁ padārthānām sādharma-vaidharma-tattva-jñānam]*.

¹¹⁰ VS(C) 1.1.2–3: *yato ’bhyudaya-niḥśreyasa-siddhiḥ sa dharmāḥ. tad-vacanād āmnāya-prāmāṇyam*.

Praśastapāda, PBh.¹¹¹*dharmā* → *tattva-jñāna* → *niḥśreyasa*

- 1a. Moral law leads to the cognition of the true nature of the categories.
- 1b. The cognition of the true nature of the categories leads to liberation.

īśvara-codanābhivṛtya → *dharmā*

2. The demonstration of the injunction by god leads to moral law.

In both cases it is ultimately *dharmā* ('moral law') that leads, either in one or two steps, to liberation (or mundane prosperity) and in both cases *dharmā* is communicated this way or another. Praśastapāda leaves no doubt that the source is the injunction revealed by god.

Second, Praśastapāda's above statement expresses, at the same time, a criticism directed against the Mīmāṃsaka and Jaimini's well-known claim that 'Moral law is something characterised by injunction'¹¹², viz. moral law is known directly from Vedic injunction without the mediation of anyone, including god. It cannot be a coincidence that Praśastapāda avails himself of a rather unusual term for the Vaiśeṣika, which is nowhere attested in VS and occurs only once in PBh. For Jaimini, the atheist, and for his tradition, people's adherence to *dharmā* was due to a very special character of the language of Vedic revelation, which was characterised by injunction and therefore required no author or authority, being self-explanatory, or self-enforcing. That was the Mīmāṃsaka strategy to explain what provided the imperative character of Vedic statements that communicated *dharmā* without taking recourse to god's authority and reliability. Praśastapāda the theist seems do deliberately refer to Jaimini's thesis, to modify it and augment it with the new element *īśvara*-°:

Jaimini:**codanā-lakṣaṇo dharmah*Moral law is characterised by injunction, *ergo* n o t r e v e a l e d .**Praśastapāda:****īśvara-codanābhivṛtya dharmah*

Moral law is manifested through injunction r e v e a l e d b y g o d .

Praśastapāda, with his two-purpose comment, made therefore a statement: an unequivocal manifestation of his conviction as a theist.

¹¹¹ PBh₁ 2.1, p. 6–7 = PBh₂ 2, p. 1.6–8: *dravya-guṇa-karma-sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyānām śaṅṅām padārthānām sādharma-vaidharma-tattva-jñānam* [PBh₁, n. 5 = PBh₂, n. 2: °-vaidharmyābhivṛtyā tattva-°] *niḥśreyasa-hetuḥ. tac cēśvara-codanābhivṛtyā dharmād eva.*

¹¹² MS 1.1.2: *codanā-lakṣaṇo 'rtho dharmah.*

There is one more Kaṇāda's passage that was later interpreted in the theistic sense:

'[1] The composition of sentences in the *Vedas* is preceded by conscious design. [2] And it does not [come] from our conscious designs. It is the inferential sign of a seer's [conscious design].'¹¹³

What Kaṇāda says is that behind the rational structure and meaningful contents of the *Vedas* stands a conscious design of a seer, who composed them. The phrasing and contents of Kaṇāda's words contains nothing that would allude to god as such. He merely says that it was a product of a consciousness higher than that of an ordinary being. The expression he uses is *na cāsmad-buddhibhyaḥ* ('not ... from our conscious designs') bears a resemblance to Praśastapāda's wording *asmad-viśiṣṭānām yoginām* (PBh 241, 370: 'yogins ... who are superior to us', pp. 311, 312)¹¹⁴. It is hardly feasible that what he meant was god.¹¹⁵

However, Candrānanda, in his *Vṛtti*, offers a completely different exposition in the purely theistic spirit:

'For our [human] cognition is not of this kind [to know the *Vedas*], having as its scope [only] objects that are present, not concealed [from sight] and [directly] connected [to our sense organs]¹¹⁶. Of such kind is only the cognition of god. For this reason god's cognition has as its scope extrasensory objects.'¹¹⁷

Also Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra (c. 1230–1250¹¹⁸), the author of *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra-vārttika* (*Tarka-sāgara*), gives a purely theistic exposition of the *sūtra*: '<And this> vener-

¹¹³ VSV(C) 6.1.1–2: *buddhi-pūrvā vākya-kṛtir vede. na cāsmad-buddhibhyo liṅgam ṛṣeḥ*.

¹¹⁴ Cf. Bhartṛhari's expression: *asmad-viśiṣṭānām* (VP 3.1.46: 'those who are superior to us', p. 321).

¹¹⁵ There existed an idea of *īśvara* being a kind of superman, a powerful superhuman being, 'a particular kind of soul, untainted by afflictions, *karman* and karmic fruition [caused by subliminal disposition]' (YS 1.24: *kleśa-karma-vipākāśayair aparāṃṣṭaḥ puruṣa-viśeṣa īśvarah.*) in the tradition of the *Pātañjala-yoga-śāstra* (ca 325 to 425 CE?, for the dating see MAAS (2006: xii–xix) and (2009: 383)). However, that idea is not what Kaṇāda or Praśastapāda refer to.

¹¹⁶ This cognition is exactly the opposite of the *yogin*'s supernatural perception described, e.g., in VSV(C) 1.15, see n. 150.

¹¹⁷ VSV(C) 6.1.2, p. 45.9–11: *na hi yādṛśam asmad-vijñānam vartamānāvvyavahita-sambaddhārtha-viśayam tādṛśam eva bhagavato vijñānam. ataḥ sambhavati bhagavato 'indriyārtha-viśayam vijñānam*.

¹¹⁸ ISAACSON (1995: 4).

able seer is god¹¹⁹. Clearly, such reinterpretations of Kaṇāda's intention presuppose Praśastapāda's theistic innovation in the system.

4.3. Knowability thesis and god's omniscience

Since, prior to Praśastapāda and his contemporaries, the Vaiśeṣika system as such knew no idea of god's existence¹²⁰, there could neither be any idea of god's omniscience known to the system before that time either. However, the idea of god's omniscience—as a corollary of the belief in god's existence—is present, which is my contention, as early as Praśastapāda's afore-mentioned statements that explicitly refer to god,¹²¹ or even earlier, i.e. at the time of Vātsyāyana Pakṣilasvāmin (after c. 450).

There are at least two ideas that, when combined, lead us to the conclusion that Praśastapāda, while accepting the existence of god, also admitted of his omniscience.

First, it is his conviction that the composition of the *Vedas*, which reliably communicate all the knowledge and describe the whole world in its entirety, (a) entails the existence of their author and (b) presupposes prior knowledge of their contents in the author's consciousness:

‘Vedic tradition, consisting in Vedic revelation (*śruti*) and authoritative testimony (*smṛti*), is based on the cognitive validity of the speaker: “Vedic tradition possesses cognitive validity, because of <its>¹²² statement (here: because of god's statement)” [VS 1.1.3]. And [the word (*śabda*)] is [proved to be] impermanent on the basis of the inferential sign, because it has been said [in VS 6.1.1]: “The composition of sentences in the *Vedas* is preceded by conscious design”, [and in VS(C) 6.1.1 = VS(Ś) 6.1.3]: “Benefaction is preceded by conscious design”.¹²³

¹¹⁹ VSV₂ *ad loc.*, p. 57: <sa ca> bhagavān ṛṣir īśvaraḥ. VSV₁ *ad loc.*, p. 298.11 = VSV(D), p. 58.11: <veda-kartā> bhagavān ṛṣir īśvaraḥ.

¹²⁰ I don't mean to say that theistic views were altogether unknown to Kaṇāda but that he did not subscribe to them.

¹²¹ See PBh₁ 2.1, p. 7 = PBh₂ 2, p. 1.8 (*tac cēśvara-codanābhivyaktād dharmād eva*) and PBh₁ 8.12, p. 213 = PBh₂ 257; see nn. 109 & 111, and n. 108 respectively.

¹²² See § 4.2, p. 292 ff.

¹²³ PBh₁ 8.12.2.2, p. 213 = PBh₂ 257: *śruti-smṛti-lakṣaṇo 'py āmnāyo vaktṛ-prāmāṇyāpekṣaḥ* “*tad-vacanād āmnāya-prāmāṇyam*” (VS 1.1.3), *liṅgāc cānityo*, “*buddhi-pūrvā vākya-kṛtir vede*” (VS 6.1.1), “*buddhi-pūrvō dadātir*” (VS(C) 6.1.4 = VS(D) 6.1.4 = VS(Ś) 6.1.3) *ity uktatvāt*. Passage partially cited above on p. 294, n. 108.

Secondly, the admission of the idea of a complete knowledge of all the categories, which is indispensable to construct an exhaustive ontology attempted by the Vaiśeṣika, necessitates the acceptance of the idea of knowledge that embraces all the elements of the universe; and that is eventually tantamount to omniscience.

By the time of Praśastapāda the idea of omniscience as such, i.e. either human or divine, had already entered the body of beliefs professed by the representatives of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and it is already present in the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, just to quote two examples:

‘Out of these [twelve cognoscible categories, the first one, viz.] the soul is the perceiver of everything, the experiencing subject of everything, the omniscient, the sensor of everything.’¹²⁴

and

‘[It is known] through scriptural testimony [that] god is the perceiver, the knower, the omniscient. And who could possibly explain god, who is inexpressible [and] beyond the scope of perception, inference and scriptural testimony, by means of the soul’s attributes, such as sentience etc.?!’¹²⁵

These two instances demonstrate that the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* related the idea of omniscience to two categories of the soul (*ātman*). Firstly, it was a potential property of the soul as such, being its dormant innate aptitude that was correlated to its omnipresence and spatial infinity, features that, for Praśastapāda, the soul shared with three other substances.¹²⁶ Secondly, it was an actual property of god, a supreme kind of soul. This twofold division of the souls was later expressed in plain terms, e.g. by Udayana in his *Lakṣaṇāvalī*: ‘Soul is twofold: god and non-god.’¹²⁷

Even though Praśastapāda nowhere mentions god’s omniscience directly, apparently taking it for granted and as something that necessitates no further proof, he does make use of the idea on a few occasions. The first is the description of the act of (re)construction of the world:

‘Now the principle of the construction and dissolution of the four [atomic] material elements is described in the following. At the end of

¹²⁴ NBh 1.1.9: *tatrātmā sarvasya draṣṭā sarvasya bhoktā sarva-jñāḥ sarvānubhāvī*.

¹²⁵ NBh 4.1.21, p. 228.13: *āgamāc ca draṣṭā boddhā sarva-jñātā īśvara iti. buddhy-ādibhiś cātma-liṅgair nirupākhyam īśvaraṃ pratyakṣānumānāgama-viṣayātītaṃ kaḥ śakta upapādayitum*.

¹²⁶ PBh₁ 3, p. 22 = PBh₂ 19: *ākāśa-kāla-dig-ātmanām sarva-gatatvaṃ, parama-mahattvaṃ, sarva-sāmyogī-samāna-deśatvaṃ ca*.

¹²⁷ LA 114 (p. 70): *sa dvividha īśānīśa-bhedāt*.

a hundred years [measured] by Brahma units, at the time of liberation of the current divine being Brahman—simultaneously with the wish of supreme god, the lord of the whole universe, to dissolve [the universe] in order to give rest during the [period of Brahma] night to all living creatures wearied by transmigration—the activity of invisible moral principles, which are present in all souls and which govern [the souls'] bodies, sense-organs and material elements, comes to halt. Then the suspension of the connection between these [atomic particles] occurs by means of the separations of the atomic particles which are the causes of bodies and sense-organs, [the separations being] accomplished through the actions that result from the connection of supreme god's wish, the souls and the atomic particles. Subsequently, the dissolution of these [atomic particles takes place] up to the indivisible atoms.¹²⁸

After the period of the world's dissolution comes to an end, god performs his role through a divine being Brahman and launches the world again to a new round of active manifest existence, having in the first step introduced motion into the universe anew and having brought the first two atoms together to form a particle¹²⁹:

‘And this [divine being] Brahman—being entrusted by supreme god [and] being endowed with cognition characterised by absolute excellence (*sc.* omniscience), and with passionlessness and divine might—gets to know the fruition of the deeds of living creatures (*sc.* souls), [first] begets [his] sons who are made of his mind and are lords of the creatures, [and then he creates] law-givers, divine beings, seers and classes of forefathers, the four social strata that sprung from [Prajā-pati's] mouth, arms, thighs and feet, as well as other higher and lower [corporeal] living beings—so that the knowledge, experience and life span [of all these beings] correspond to their previous deeds. [In these acts of construction, divine Brahman] endows [all the created beings]

¹²⁸ PBh₁ 5, p. 48.7 ff. = PBh₂ 57: *ihédānīm caturṇām mahā-bhūtānām sṛṣṭi-saṁhāra-vidhir ucyate. brāhmaṇa mānena varṣa-śatānte vartamānasya brahmaṇo 'pavarga-kāle saṁsāra-khinnānām sarva-prāṇinām niśi viśrāmārthaṁ sakala-bhuvana-pater mahēśvarasya saṁjihirṣā-samakālaṁ śarīrēndriya-mahā-bhūtōpanibandhakānām sarvātma-gatānām adṛṣṭānām vṛtti-nirodhe sati mahēśvarēcchātmaṇu-saṁyoga-ja-karmabhyaḥ śarīrēndriya-kāraṇāṇu-vibhāgebhyas tat-saṁyoga-nivṛttau teṣām ā paramāṇv-anto vināśaḥ.*

¹²⁹ PBh₁ 5, p. 48.19 ff. = PBh₂ 58: *tataḥ punaḥ prāṇinām bhoga-bhūtaye mahēśvara-sisṛkṣānantaraṁ sarvātma-gata-vṛtti-labdhatādṛṣṭāpekṣebhyas tat-saṁyogebhyaḥ pavana-paramāṇuṣu karmōtpattau teṣām paraspara-saṁyogebhyo dvy-aṅukādi-prakrameṇa mahān vāyuh samutpanno nabhasi dodhūyamānas tiṣṭhati. etc.*

with their [respective] moral duty, knowledge, passionlessness and divine might that conform to their potencies stored [as their *karman*].¹³⁰

Clearly, such an arduous task, as it probably would have to be, of putting the universe of all living beings together along with their respective *karmans*, to be accomplished by divine Brahman, would have to necessitate absolute and supreme knowledge (*atiśaya-jñāna*), which is c o n s i g n e d , or subcontracted, to Brahman by god (*mahēśvareṇa viniyuktaḥ*) as an act of divine outsourcing.

Another indirect reference to god's omniscience, or at least some kind of extraordinary cognition, is found in the section that describes how dimensions larger than atomic size as well as the idea of plurality in the world originate:

'Impermanent [dimensions] of all four kinds have their source in number, dimension and multitude. Out of these [dimensions, the idea of] the plural number arises thanks to god's mind with respect to atomic dyads, made of indivisible atoms; [the said plural number] produces [the qualities of] magnitude and length—simultaneously with the formation of colour and other [secondary qualities]—in [complex] substantial things, understood as atomic triads (i.e. particles composed of three pairs of atoms) and as other [larger macroscopic bodies], which are effects brought about by these [atomic dyads].¹³¹

In other words, it is god's mind that stores the idea of two-atom particles as well as the notion of complex wholes based on the idea of plurality (plural number), inherent in the composition of atomic triads, that are composed of six atoms (i.e. three pairs). Praśastapāda wants us to believe that without that notion present in god's mind complex wholes could not emerge.

Three questions immediately arise here. First, what does the idea of plurality, or duality, have to do with atomic dyads (*dvy-aṅuka*)? Second, what does god have to do with it? And, third, what does it all have to do with god's omniscience?

To answer the first question, i.e. what relates the idea of plurality with two-atom particles, we have to take a closer look at the idea of the cognition of recurrent con-

¹³⁰ PBh₁ 5, p. 49.11 ff. = PBh₂ 59: *sa ca mahēśvareṇa viniyukto brahmātiśaya-jñāna-vairāgyāśvarya-sampannaḥ prāṇinām karma-vipākam viditvā karmānurūpa-jñāna-bhogāyuṣaḥ sutān prajāpatin mānasān manu-deva-rṣi-pitṛ-gaṇān mukha-bāhūru-pāda-taś caturo varṇān anyāni cōccāvacāni bhūtāni ca sṛṣṭvā, āśayānurūpair dharma-jñāna-vairāgyāśvaryaiḥ samyojayatīti.*

¹³¹ PBh₁ 8.7, p. 131 = PBh₂ 155–156: *anityam catur-vidham api saṅkhyā-parimāṇa-pracaya-yoni. tatrēśvara-buddhim apekṣyōtpannā paramāṇu-dvy-aṅukeṣu bahutva-saṅkhyā tair ārabdhe kārya-dravye try-aṅukādi-lakṣaṇe rūpādy-utpatti-samakālaṁ mahattvam dīrghatvam ca karoti.*

tinuity (*apekṣā-buddhi*)¹³², sometimes called enumerative knowledge, and the process through which our mind forms the notion of the number ‘two’ and larger numbers, as was understood by Praśastapāda, who surprisingly devoted a lot of space to the problem:

‘[130] The [number “two” and numbers larger than “two”] arise, as one should realise, from many [single instances] of oneness combined with the idea of a multiple object, and disappear with the disappearance of the cognition of recurrent continuity. [131] How [does it take place]? ‘When it comes to a contact of the perceiver’s eye with two individual substantial things, belonging either to the same class or to a different class (i.e. two homogeneous or heterogeneous things), there arises the cognition of generality of oneness which inheres in each [individual substantial thing] that is in contact with the [eye; and it has the form: “This is one. This is one”]; then from [three] acts of cognition: one of the generality of oneness and [two] of the relation [of the two single things] to this [oneness], there arises one single notion of two single-instantiated [things] with respect to a multiple object [made of these two individual substantial things]. Then, contingent on this [single notion of two single-instantiated things], the notion of duality emerges with respect to (sc. instantiated in the form of) these two onenesses, each of which having their respective substrata (i.e. the single-instantiated things). And, subsequently, with respect to this [singular notion of duality instantiated in the form of the two onenesses] there arises the cognition of generality of duality. As a consequence of this cognition of generality of duality the cognition of recurrent continuity (here: the cognition of duality dependent on two instantiations) gradually disappears and, from the acts of cognition: of the generality of duality, of the relation [of the two onenesses] to this [duality] and of [this singular] duality, there gradually arises one single notion of the quality of duality—[these two processes take place at] the same time. [132] Then, immediately on the disappearance of the cognition of recurrent continuity (here: the cognition of duality dependent on two instantiations), the quality of duality disappears. [Since] the cognition of the quality of duality is the cause of the disappearance of cognition of the generality of duality, there gradually arises—because of the quality of duality, its cognition and its relation—the notion of [two] individual substantial things of the form: “two individual substantial things”;

¹³² On *apekṣā-buddhi* see e.g. MIYAMOTO (1996: 78–84).

[these processes take place at] the same time. [133] Immediately afterwards there arises the cognition of [two] individual substantial things of the form: “two individual substantial things”, the duality disappears, the notion of the quality of duality gradually disappears; from the cognition of individual substantial thing subliminal impression gradually arises; [these processes take place at] the same time. [134] Immediately afterwards from the cognition of individual substantial thing the notion of the quality of duality disappears; also the notion of individual substantial thing [disappears] due to the subliminal impression. [135] In this way [we] have also described how [the notion of] the number “three” etc. originates. [Their] production proceeds from many [single instances] of oneness combined with the idea of a multiple object, and [their] disappearance follows the disappearance of the cognition of recurrent continuity.’¹³³

This lengthy account on number two, and similar procedures, apply also to numbers larger than two, and shows that to conceive of a notion of number was maintained by Praśastapāda to be a highly complex process that involved a sequence of stages and a special cognitive ability called the cognition of recurrent continuity (*apekṣā-buddhi*). Equally easily can we see that Praśastapāda thought a clearly formed notion of the number ‘two’, or ‘duality’, and that of larger numbers as well, was indispensable for the existence of compounded entities, which by nature are aggregates consisting of numerous (at least two) parts, for instance for the existence of two-atom particles. In other words, the existence of a whole consisting of two ele-

¹³³ PBh₁ 8.6, p. 111–112 = PBh₂ 130–135: [130] *tasyāḥ (= sāmkyāyāḥ) khalv ekatvebhyo 'neka-viṣaya-buddhi-sahitebhyo niṣpattir apekṣā-buddhi-vināśād vināśa iti.* [131] *katham. yadā boddhuś cakṣuṣā samānāsamāna-jāṭīyayor dravyayoḥ sannikarṣe sati tat-samyukta-samaveta-samavetākatva-sāmānya-jñānōtpattāv ekatva-sāmānya-tat-sambandha-jñānebhya eka-guṇayor aneka-viṣayiṇy ekā buddhir utpadyate tadā tām apekṣyākatvābhyām svāśrayayor dvitvam ārambhyate. tataḥ punas tasmīn dvitva-sāmānya-jñānam utpadyate. tasmād dvitva-sāmānya-jñānād apekṣā-buddher vinaśyattā dvitva-sāmānya-tat-sambandha-taj-jñānebhya dvitva-guṇa-buddher utpadyamānatēty ekaḥ kālaḥ.* [132] *tata idānīm apekṣā-buddhi-vināśād dvitva-guṇasya vinaśyattā dvitva-guṇa-jñānam dvitva-sāmānya-jñānasya vināśa-kāraṇam dvitva-guṇa-taj-jñāna-sambandhebhyo dve dravye iti dravya-buddher utpadyamānatēty ekaḥ kālaḥ.* [133] *tad-anantaram dve dravye iti dravya-jñānasyōtpādo dvitvasya vināśo dvitva-guṇa-buddher vinaśyattā dravya-jñānāt saṃskārasyōtpadyamānatēty ekaḥ kālaḥ.* [134] *tad-anantaram dravya-jñānād dvitva-guṇa-buddher vināśo dravya-buddher api saṃskārāt.* [135] *etena tritvādy-utpattir api vyākhyātā. ekatvebhyo 'neka-viṣaya-buddhi-sahitebhyo niṣpattir apekṣā-buddhi-vināśāc ca vināśa iti.*

On the process of conceiving the idea of the number ‘two’, the way Praśastapāda understood it, see MIYAMOTO (1996: 59–77) and THAKUR (2003: 203–207): ‘Duality (*dvitva*)’.

ments (e.g. a two-atom particle) entails prior existence of the notion of ‘two’ and a respective design based on this notion.

To understand why—and this is a reply to the second question: what is god’s role in the process—we must recall that for Praśastapāda all movements and actions in the universe ultimately proceed from conscious entities, viz. the souls¹³⁴ of two kinds¹³⁵, because atoms, hence all other material entities composed of atoms alike, are not capable of autokinesis on their own. Further, movement and action is indispensable to produce a whole, therefore any compounded whole is thus a result of a series of events that eventually go back to the first mover, clearly an idea that was used to formulate one of a number of arguments for the existence of god, the argument from the first mover:

‘Material substratum, atoms and *karman* operate, because—as they were put in motion earlier—they are superintended by a cause endowed with cognitive awareness (sc. god), insofar as they [themselves] are unconscious, like an axe etc., viz. just like an axe and other [tools] operate being superintended by a carpenter endowed with cognitive awareness, because they [themselves] are unconscious ...’¹³⁶

Even to combine elements into a smallest possible whole, viz. an atomic dyad (*dyv-aṇuka*), it takes a conscious being that would capacitate atoms to conjoin by applying his cognition of recurrent continuity (*apekṣā-buddhi*) to separate elements. We can

¹³⁴ Cf. e.g. PBh₁ 6.4, p. 69.6 ff. = PBh₂ 76: *tasya sauṅṣmyād apratyakṣatve sati* [PBh₁, n. 5: ‘*pī*] *karaṇaiḥ śabdādy-upalabdhy-anumitaiḥ śrotrādibhiḥ samadhigamaḥ kriyate. vāsyādīnām* [PBh₁, n. 7: *vāsyādīnām iva*] *karaṇānām kartṛ-prayojyatva-darśanāc chabdādiṣu prasiddhyā ca prasādhako ’numīyate.*—‘Since due to its subtlety the [soul] is imperceptible, it is made known through sensory organs such as the organ of hearing whose [existence] is inferred through [the existence of sensory data] such as sound etc. Similarly, since instruments, such as axe etc., are empirically attested to [entail] that they are employed by an agent [with a purpose], and [sensory instruments] are well established to [be employed] with respect to sound and other [data, the soul] is inferred [to exist] as an executor [of all actions].’

¹³⁵ See p. 298, n. 127.

¹³⁶ NV₁ 4.21, p. 461.11–13: *pradhāna-paramāṇu-karmāṇi prāk pravṛtteḥ buddhimat-kāraṇādhiṣṭhītāni pravartanta ’cetanavād vāsy-ādivad iti yathā vāsy-ādi buddhimatā takṣṇā adhiṣṭhītam acetanavāt pravartate ...* Cf. n. 229. The argument was frequently repeated by subsequent authors, e.g. by Udayana in NKA 5, p. 503.15: *paramāṇv-ādayo hi cetanā-yojitāḥ pravartante acetanavād vāsy-ādivat.*—‘Indivisible atoms etc. operate when propelled by consciousness, because they are unconscious, like an axe etc.’ Jayanta-bhaṭṭa devotes a longer passage to the argument in NMa₁ I: 488–490. Cf. NS 1.1.11: *ceṣṭēndriyārthāśrayaḥ śarīram.*—‘The body is a seat of action, sense organs and objects.’

speak here of something resembling Aristotelian final cause (*causa finalis*)¹³⁷, i.e. of a particular design god has while bringing about a combination of two atoms. Since in the (endlessly cyclical) beginning of the world after the period of its dissolution all other conscious beings are each time dormant, the only conscious agent is god who needs to have a well-formed notion of the number ‘two’ etc. in order to initiate the process of the composition of the universe, from finest particles to large macroscopic wholes.

The problem remains, which is our third question, what does god’s omniscience have to do with all this? After a period of a complete dissolution of the world (*pralaya*), when all conscious beings are dormant and all matter has dissolved into separate, uncombined atoms in rest, god requires—in order to bring the world into existence back again—the ideas of the number ‘two’ etc. in order to initiate the union of two atoms and to induce the process of forming larger wholes. However, as Praśastapāda’s account suggests, the notions of duality and plurality are as such an abstract synthesis derived from experience that requires elements somehow linked together with the help of the cognition of recurrent continuity (*apekṣā-buddhi*). To form a complex whole, necessarily based on notions of duality and plurality, requires a prior knowledge of such an idea of number larger than one. In the world emerging from the dissolution, in the first stage, there is nothing that could serve as a source for an experience that could subsequently trigger the conception of such numbers, because all objects are unitary and no objects are combined in pairs. Therefore, it has to be postulated that god must be possessed of such knowledge that is not derived from experience at all. His knowledge of this sort does not necessarily have to amount to omniscience, however, it certainly remains outside the scope of any experience or ordinary knowledge derived from experience.¹³⁸ No doubt it must be regarded as some kind of extraordinary knowledge: it is beyond the capability of any ordinary being to have knowledge which is not derived from experience of any form, including testimony communicated by another agent, which also entails some kind of experience. To put it plainly, the existence of wholes compounded of atoms rests on the notion of ‘two’ along with a respective design based on this notion; and that presupposes extra-empirical, perfect and, probably, omniscient mind of god, the (re)constructor, in which all such notions are stored.

¹³⁷ *Met* 983^a31-32: τετάρτην δὲ τὴν ἀντικειμένην αἰτίαν ταύτη, τὸ οὐδ ἕνεκα καὶ τὰγαθὸν (τέλος γὰρ γενέσεως καὶ κινήσεως πάσης τοῦτ’ ἐστίν).—‘The fourth [cause] is the opposite of the latter (i.e. of efficient cause), namely that for sake of which something happens (sc. purposefulness) and goodness, for it is the purpose of all that arises and moves.’

¹³⁸ An argument that god acquired such a knowledge empirically, i.e. before the dissolution, while the complex world was still there in developed form, and therefore, while the world is re-emerging after the dissolution, god’s knowledge of duality and plurality would merely be a case of memory from previous, i.e. pre-dissolution experience, would lead to infinite regress.

Consequently, to postulate such a knowledge of simple numbers, as trivial as it may sound at first, in the context where the universe offers no observable data for one to empirically derive such a knowledge from it, is tantamount to asserting that god possesses at least some kind of supernatural cognition that transcends all a mundane soul could possibly know.

A very similar indication of the same kind of supreme knowledge, which exceeds everything known in the universe, is found in the following passage quoted in Abhayadeva-sūri's *Tattva-bodha-vidhāyinī* and ascribed to Praśastamati:

'Praśastamati, on the other hand, says: "In the beginning of (re)construction [of the world, verbal] usage of people is preceded by someone else's instruction, because later on [people's usage] awakened [after the dissolution of the world] is [properly] delimited with respect to their specific objects¹³⁹, just as verbal usage of children, who have not learnt verbal usage yet, [when properly] delimited with respect to their specific objects, is preceded by the instruction of [their] mothers and other [people].'

In his comment immediately following the passage, Abhayadeva-sūri explicates what is actually self-evident in the quote, that, first, that what Praśastamati has in mind as the primary source of verbal usage, when no knowledge yet exists, is god, and secondly, what lies at the core of god's capability of bestowing upon the humankind linguistic skills is his supreme cognition:

'... It is proved that the one by whose instruction [verbal] usage [of people] is preceded in the beginning of [re]construction [of the world] is god; indeed, he is not deprived of excellence of cognition during the dissolution [of the world].'¹⁴⁰

Further, Abhayadeva-sūri either recapitulates or quotes what Praśastamati apparently has to say on god's omniscience (*sarva-jñatva*), as being related to god's act

¹³⁹ I.e. people correctly use words and denote objects. The same expression occurs in PBh₁ 8.12, p. 171= PBh₂ 212: *buddhir upalabdhir jñānam pratyaya iti paryāyāḥ. sā cāneka-prakārārthānanyāt praty-artha-niyatatvāc ca.*—'Cognitive awareness [of an object], apprehension, cognition, comprehension—these are synonyms. This [cognitive awareness] has numerous varieties, because objects are infinite and it is delimited with respect to its specific objects.'

¹⁴⁰ TBV, p. 101.19–23: *praśastamatis tv āha: "sargātau puruṣāṇām vyavahāro 'nyōpadeśa-pūrvakaḥ, uttara-kālaṁ prabuddhānām praty-artha-niyatatvād, aprasiddha-vāg-vyavahārāṇām kumārāṇām gav-ādiṣu praty-artha-niyato vāg-vyavahāro yathā mātrādy-upadeśa-pūrvakaḥ" iti. prabuddhānām praty artha-niyatatvād iti prabuddhānām satām praty artham niyatatvād ity arthaḥ. yad-upadeśa-pūrvakaś ca sa sargātau vyavahārah sa īśvaraḥ pralaya-kāle tu alupta-jñānātiśaya iti siddham.*

of composition or construction (not an act of creation *ex nihilo*, of course!) of the world:

“Now, on the basis of this [argumentation] it must be taken as proven that god, consisting in multiple causes, is the cause of all the world. But how can it be proved that he is omniscient, so that he could become the object of devotion for all those [people] desirous of the highest good and mundane prosperity¹⁴¹? We say it is because it has been proved beyond doubt that [god] is the constructor of the world.” And this is what Praśastamati and others said along these lines: “[1. Thesis:] God is omniscient], {Logical reason:} because [he as] the agent has the knowledge of the product, of its material cause, of the tools (assisting causes) [to produce it], of the purpose [of the product] and of its recipient. {Invariable concomitance and example:} For in this world, whoever is the agent [producing] something, he has the knowledge of the material cause of the material cause etc. of that [thing]. For instance the potter, being the agent [producing] a pot [as the product] etc., has the knowledge of a clod of clay, which is the material cause [of the pot]; [he has the knowledge of] the potter’s wheel, which are the tools [to produce the pot]; [he has the knowledge of] the fetching of water etc., which is the purpose [of the pot]; and [he has the knowledge of] the householder as the recipient. That is obvious. {Application:} Similarly, god is the agent [producing] all the world layers, he has the knowledge of their material causes, consisting in atoms etc.; [he has the knowledge of] the tools (immediate assisting causes) [to produce them], i.e. the moral law, space, time etc.; [he has the knowledge of] factual tools [to produce them], consisting in universals, individuators and inherence; [he has the knowledge of] the purpose, i.e. the benefit and [he has the knowledge of] people who are technically called recipients. {Conclusion:} Therefore it is proved that he is omniscient”¹⁴².

¹⁴¹ Two goals mentioned in VS(C) 1.1.2 (v n. 104); *nota bene* the sequence of both the goals is interchanged.

¹⁴² TBV, p. 101.27–35: *atha bhavatv asmād dhetu-kadambakādīśvarasya sarva-jagad-dhetutva-siddhiḥ, sarva-jñatvaṃ tu katham tasya siddham yenāsau niḥśreyasābhyudaya-kāmānām bhakti-viśayatām yāyāt? jagat-kartṛtva-siddher evēti brūmaḥ. tathā cāhuḥ praśastamati-prabhṛtayah: “kartuḥ kāryōpādānōpakaraṇa-prayojana-saṃpradāna-parijñānāt. iha hi yo yasya kartā bhavati sa tasyōpādānādīni jānīte, yathā kulālah kuṇḍādīnām kartā, tad-upādānaṃ mṛt-piṇḍam, upakaraṇāni cakrādīni, prayojanam udakāharaṇādī, kuṭumbinaṃ ca saṃpradānaṃ jānīta*

What we find embedded in the passage as a quote is a full-fledged, five-membered proof formula of god's omniscience and its authorship is ascribed either to Praśastamati or to his immediate tradition. What is missing in the proof formula is an explicit formulation of the thesis; however, the context is so unequivocal that one can phrase it as follows beyond a shadow of doubt: **īśvarasya sarva-jñatvaṃ* ('god is omniscient').

Whether the Vaiśeṣika author of the above argument for god's omniscience was Praśastamati himself or his immediate disciples, or whether Praśastamati was Praśastapāda or not, the passage attests to the fact that around the time when Praśastamati and Praśastapāda flourished the idea of god's omniscience not only circulated but attempts were undertaken to prove it. The contention holds valid even when the above five-membered proof formula is not an original formulation but merely a paraphrase: it still attest to the fact that the Vaiśeṣikas attempted to prove their theistic stance. And that renders a strong support to my thesis that what Praśastapāda himself spoke of as supreme knowledge (*atiśaya-jñāna*, n. 130; or *jñānātiśaya*, n. 140), which was beyond this world and did not undergo the process of dissolution when everything else was temporarily dissolved, was in fact omniscience.

To recap, we can see that although Praśastapāda did not make any consistent attempt, at least in his only extant work, to characterise the essence of god or to prove either his existence or his omniscience, he did, for all practical purposes, use the notion of god and god's omniscience as self-evident. These reservations will not hold if he indeed were the same person as Praśastamati, of course. For, as regards Praśastamati, granted he is different from Praśastapāda, we may not know whether at all or how he defined god's essence, but we do know that either he or someone of his direct disciples conceived of god as an omniscient being and, in addition, provided what he thought to be a valid proof formula for that. In any case, what is beyond doubt is that by the end of the fifth century a clear idea of god as an omniscient constructor of the world was a well-established doctrine of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system.

Although they did not have all the theoretical apparatus of modern logic (*vide supra*, p. § 3.3), the intuition of the Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika seemed quite appropriate to relate the belief in omniscience to either god or to select humans of extraordinary qualities. It is therefore not at all surprising to find the knowability thesis enter their system. It would be too far-reaching to claim that the philosophers thought that the ability to know everything was really applicable to ordinary humans. It must

ity etat siddham. tathēśvaraḥ sakala-bhuvānām kartā, sa tad-upādānāni paramāṅv-ādi-lakṣaṇāni, tad-upakaraṇāni dharma-dik-kālādīni, vyavahārōpakaraṇāni sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāya-lakṣaṇāni, prayojanam upabhogam, saṃpradāna-saṃjñakāmś ca puruṣān jānīta iti. ata siddham asya sarvajñatvam iti.

have therefore been correlated with the idea of divine omniscience and yogic experience, which warranted their systems completeness and (seeming) consistency.

4.4. Knowability thesis and supernatural perception

The third and last idea that entered the body of tenets upheld by later Vaiśeṣika philosophers simultaneously with the equation ‘existentiality = nameability = cognisability’ (*astitva* = *abhidheyatva* = *jñeyatva*), and was complementary to it was the belief in supernatural perception. It eventually came to be believed to be of two kinds: the *yogin*’s perception (*yogi-pratyakṣa*) and the seer’s perception (*ārṣa-pratyakṣa*).

4.4.1. Supernatural perception of the *yogins*

We may safely assume that the admission of some sort of supernatural powers, including extrasensory perception, was quite a widespread popular ‘folk-religious’ belief at quite an early age also in India. However, it was not until the first half of the first millennium CE that the actual term for such a phenomenon, e.g. either *yogi-pratyakṣa* (‘the *yogin*’s perception’) or *ārṣa-pratyakṣa* (‘the seer’s perception’), was coined and found its way into philosophical treatises in general. Attempts to prove the existence of such a belief-based concept are generally even later.

Both the concept and the term are absent in earliest versions of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*; their addition must have taken place later, about the turn of 4th/5th centuries at the earliest, and antedate Praśastapāda, as WEZLER (1982), HONDA (1988) and ISAACSON (1993) convincingly argued. The latter (ISAACSON (1993: 141-142)) also draws attention to the following passage of Vātsyāyana Pakṣilasvāmin’s *Nyāya-bhāṣya*,¹⁴³ which directly mentions the idea and explicitly quotes VS(C) 9.13, apparently the earliest Vaiśeṣika reference to supernatural perception.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³ NBh 1.1.3 (p. 9.8–9): *pratyakṣam yuñjānasya yoga-samādhijam “ātmany ātma-manasoḥ saṁyoga-viśeṣād ātmā pratyakṣaḥ” iti.*—‘[Another proof of the existence of soul, beside verbal testimony of an authority or inference, is] perception of a [*yogin*] temporarily [engrossed] in meditation, which is born in the state of concentration in *yoga* [in accordance with] the following [*sūtra*]: “Due to particular connection of the self and the mind in the self [there arises] perception of the self”.’

¹⁴⁴ Indeed, there is a reference to *samādhi* in NS 4.2.38: *samādhi-viśeṣābhyāsāt.*—‘[The cognition of the true nature of imperfections (see NS 4.2.1 and 1.1.18)] arises due to rehearsed exertion of a particular kind of concentration.’ However, one should not take such a reference to

Accordingly, the section into which the discussion of supernatural perception is some time later inserted is VS(C) 9.13–17 and actually, in the version we have in front of us, deals with two kinds of it¹⁴⁵:

‘[A: The state of a *yogin* temporarily engrossed in meditation (*yukta*, lit. “connected” or “disciplined, concentrated”¹⁴⁶):]

[13] Due to particular connection of the self and the mind in the self [there arises] perception of (through?) the self.¹⁴⁷

[14] [This perception] also [grasps] other substances, [*sc.* atoms¹⁴⁸ of five elements, time, space, mind].

meditative concentration (*samādhi*) as an indication that Akṣapāda Gautama accepted supernatural perception because there is no necessary link between the two. The explanation of Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana in NBh ad loc. is a clear indication that what *samādhi* meant was a process that has nothing to do with supernatural perception but was a process of withdrawal of the self’s attention from the sense-data: ‘This [concentration is a connection of the mind with the soul [only, the mind being] withdrawn (*sc.* disconnected) from sense-organs and held under control by a restraining effort, and [this connection] is characterised by a desire to understand the true nature [of the categories]’ (*sa tu pratyāhṛtasyēndriyebhyo manaso vidhārakeṇa prayatnena dhāryamāṇasyātmanā saṁyogas tattva-bubhutsā-viśiṣṭaḥ*).

¹⁴⁵ We should be aware, though, that this two-fold division—achieved through the later insertion of VS(C) 9.15—was most probably subsequently imposed on an earlier interpolation which did not know the two kinds of supernatural perception, and that happened under Praśastapāda’s influence, see FADDEGON (1918: 293), HONDA (1988: 468–469) and ISAACSON (1993: 144–148), cf. WEZLER (1982: 667).

¹⁴⁶ It corresponds to *yuñjāna* (‘connecting’ or ‘disciplining himself, concentrating’) of NBh 1.1.3 (see n. 147).

¹⁴⁷ It is quoted in NBh 1.1.3 (p. 9.8–9) as a proof of the existence of the soul: *pratyakṣam yuñjānasya yoga-samādhijam “ātmany ātma-manasoḥ saṁyoga-viśeṣād ātmā pratyakṣaḥ” iti.*—‘[Another proof of the existence of soul, beside verbal testimony of an authority or inference, is] the perception of a [*yogin*] temporarily engrossed in meditation, which is born in the state of concentration in *yoga* [in accordance with] the following: “Due to particular connection of the self and the mind in the self [there arises] perception of the self”.’ VS(C) 9.13 is also quoted in RVār 5.2, p. 440.9 (as indicated by Muni Jambuvijaya in VS(C), n. 15, p. 234.26–27), and not in RVār 5.22, as ISAACSON (1993: 141) indicates.

Also Kauṇḍinya the Pāsupata accepts this kind of supernatural perception as different from ordinary, sensory variety, see PABh 1.1, p. 7.1–8: *tatra pratyakṣam dvividham indriya-pratyakṣam ātma-pratyakṣam ca. indriya-pratyakṣam indriyārthāḥ śabda-sparśa-rūpa-rasa-gandha-ghaṭādyāḥ, vyākhyāna-tāpa-mūtra-purīṣa-māmsa-lavaṇa-prāṇāyāmaiḥ siddham. ātma-pratyakṣam tad-upahāra-kṛtsna-tapo-duḥkhāntādi-vacanāt siddham. yathā prasthena mito vrihiḥ prasthaḥ. paramārthatas tv indriyārtha-sambandha-vyañjaka-sāmagryam dharmādharma-prakāśa-deśa-kāla-codanādy-anugrhitam sat pramāṇam utpadyate. ātma-pratyakṣam tu cittāntaḥ-karaṇa-sambandha-sāmagryam.* See also PABh 3.19, p. 88.20–21: *kṛtsnasya tapaso lakṣaṇam ātma-pratyakṣam veditavyam* (for the translation see n. 173).

[B: The state of a *yogin* no longer engrossed in meditation (*viyukta*, lit. “disconnected” or “undisciplined, no longer concentrated”):]

[15, interpolation:¹⁴⁹] And [also] due to the contact of the self, sense-organ, mind and object [there arises supernatural perception].¹⁵⁰

(ŚM: And [also] those whose internal organ (mind) is no [longer] concentrated, whose concentration has been interrupted, [acquire perception] of these [other substances].)

[16] And [there is also supernatural perception] of actions and qualities, since they inhere in [the other substances].

[17] And [also there is supernatural perception] of qualities of the self, since they inhere in the self.¹⁵¹

However, as FADDEGON (1918: 293) suspected—on the basis of *tat-°* in *tat-samavāyāt* of VS(C) 9.16 = (VS(Ś) 9.14) referring naturally to VS(C) 9.14 = (VS(Ś) 9.12), not to the preceding *sūtra*—and as ISAACSON (1993: 144 ff., § 4) demonstrated, VS(C) 9.15 (= VS(Ś) 13) is still a later interpolation and its insertion introduced a two-fold division (known to Praśastapāda) of *yogi-pratyakṣa* into *yukta* and *viyukta*, apparently not known to the author of the earlier passage VS(C) 9.13–14

¹⁴⁸ Thus acc. to Candrānanda, VSV(C): ...*vyāpaka-dravyeṣv ātmanāsamīyukteṣv apratiṣiddhātma-samīyogeṣu ca paramānv-ādiśūbhābyām samīyukteṣu...*

¹⁴⁹ See ISAACSON (1993) and HONDA (1988).

¹⁵⁰ Cf. VSV(C) 1.15: *sūkṣma-vyavahīta-viprakṣeṣv artheṣu teṣām catuṣṭaya-sannikarṣād api pratyakṣam jāyate. tathāsmad-ādi-pratyakṣeṣu.*—‘For these [*yogins* no longer engrossed in meditation] there arises perception of objects which are subtle, concealed [from sight] and distant due to the contact of these four [viz. the self, sense-organ, mind and object]^a. And also of things perceptible to people like us.’

^a On *catuṣṭaya* (as well as on *traya* and *dvaya*) see also DPŚ₂ 146 (p. 191–2): ...*yad jñānam taṣyātmēndriya-mano-’rtha-catūṣṭaya-sannikarṣaḥ karaṇam.* Cf. also the sequence of connection in NBhū, p. 170 (apropos of NSā: *vīprayuktāvasthāyām catuṣṭaya-traya-dvaya-sannikarṣād grahaṇam yathā-sambavena yojaniyam*): [*catuṣṭaya*:] *tatra rasana-cakṣus-tvācām ... ātmā manasā samīyujyate, mana indriyeṇa, indriyam arthenēti.* [*traya*:] *śrotreṇārtha-grahaṇe trayāṇām ātma-manaḥ-śrotreṇām sannikarṣaḥ.* [*dvaya*:] *manasārtha-grahaṇe dvayor ātma-manaso sannikarṣa iti.*

¹⁵¹ VS(C) 9.13–17 ≈ VS(Ś) 9.1.11–15 ≈ VS(D) 9.11–13:

- 13: *ātmany ātma-manasoḥ samīyoga-viśeṣād ātma-pratyakṣam.*
 [VS(D) : absent]
 14: *tathā dravyāntareṣu.*
 [VS(Ś) 12: *tathā dravyāntareṣu pratyakṣam.*]
 [VS(D) : absent]
 15: *ātmēndriya-mano-’rtha-sannikarṣāc ca.* [= VS(D)]
 [VS(Ś) 13: *asamāhitāntaḥ-karaṇā upasamīhṛta-samādhayas teṣām ca.*]
 16: *tat-samavāyāt karma-guṇeṣu.* [= VS(D)]
 17: *ātma-samavāyād ātma-guṇeṣu.* [= VS(D)]

and 16–17. Indeed, when we eliminate *sūtra* 15, we obtain a more consistent, uninterrupted reading, without the unnatural jump in the textual structure.

Praśastapāda's full-fledged description of both kinds of supernatural perception of a *yogin*, either directly engrossed in the practice of *yoga* (*yukta*) or not (*viyukta*), that influenced the later insertion of VS(C) 9.15 into the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* section on *yogi-pratyakṣa*, runs as follows:

[240] The grasping of the highest universal (i.e. *mahā-sāmānya*) and of [intermediate universals such as] substantiality, qualitiveness, and mobility etc., inherent in a perceptible substratum, through sense-organs which grasp [their] substratum is the [ordinary] perception of people like us. [241] However, in *yogins* who are temporarily engrossed in meditation (*yukta*) [and] who are superior to us, through the mind influenced by moral excellence (*dharma*) produced by [the practice of] *yoga*, there arises an unerring perception of the intrinsic nature with respect to [such invisible substances as] their own self, the self of others, ether, space, time, air, atoms, mind as well as qualities, actions, universals, individuators which are inherent in these [substances]. [242] On the other hand, in [*yogins* who are] no longer engrossed in meditation (*viyukta*) due to the contact of the four [viz. the self, sense-organ, mind and object and] thanks to the efficacy of the influence of moral law produced by [the practice of] *yoga*, there arises perception with respect to objects which are subtle, concealed (from sight) and distant^{152, 153}.

Just as Praśastapāda's references to god implied the existence of an antecedent Vaiśeṣika tradition, albeit of quite a fresh date, in which that idea had already been established, also in the case of Praśastapāda's mature and particularised description of supernatural perception it seems that the idea of *yogi-pratyakṣa* had already been established in the system for quite some time and it was not Praśastapāda's own innovation.

¹⁵² Cf. n. 150.

¹⁵³ PBh₁ 8.12, p. 187 = PBh₂ 240–242: [240] *bhāva-dravyatva-guṇatva-karmatvādīnām upalabhyādhāra-samaveśānām āśraya-grāhakaṁ indriyair grahaṇam ity etad asmad-ādīnām pratyakṣam*. [241] *asmad-viśiṣṭānām tu yoginām yuktānām yoga-ja-dharmānugṛhītena manasā svātmāntarākāśa-dik-kāla-paramāṇu-vāyu-manaḥsu tat-samaveśa-guṇa-karma-sāmānya-viśeṣeṣu samavāye cāvītatam svarūpa-darśanam utpadyate*. [242] *viyuktānām punaś catuṣṭaya-sannikarṣād yoga-ja-dharmānugraha-sāmarthyāt sūkṣma-vyavahita-viprakṛṣṭeṣu pratyakṣam utpadyate*.

What attests to a mature state of development of the idea of the *yogin*'s supernatural perception is not only the double division mentioned in the above section of PBh, but also the fact that Praśastapāda finds an additional role for *yogi-pratyakṣa* to play in the Vaiśeṣika ontology. For him it serves as an additional tool, or even a direct, perceptual proof of the existence of the individuators (*viśeṣa*), perhaps the most controversial and debatable ontological postulate of the school, and also of the atoms. This is how he attempts to prove the existence of the individuators by taking recourse to supernatural perception:

[370] Similarly to people like us who experience the differentiation in cognition occasioned by equal shapes, qualities, actions, parts or relations, with reference to cows, etc. [as different] from horses, etc.— [e.g. in the form] “[this] cow is white, of swift pace, with a fat neck hump, with a large bell”—in a similar manner *yogins*, who are superior to us, [experience] the differentiation in cognition with reference to permanent [entities like] atoms as well as minds and souls of liberated people that [all] have identical shapes, qualities and actions. Since there is no other factor [that would make such a differentiation between seemingly identical things possible], the factors thanks to which [the *yogins* are able to distinguish] each and every substratum [of qualities and actions in the form]: “this is different, that is different”, and [thanks to which in those *yogins*] a recognition arises: “this is that [atom]” with regard to an atom in distant place and time, are ultimate individuators.¹⁵⁴ [371] Suppose, on the other hand, without [postulating the existence of] ultimate individuators, that the *yogins* possessed such a discrimination through cognition as well as recognition [of individual atoms, which they could acquire] through moral law (*dharma*) produced by [the practice of] *yoga*, what would happen then? It would not be possible [for them to distinguish between atoms etc.] in this

¹⁵⁴ Interestingly, while quoting the passage PBh₁ 11, p. 321–322 = PBh₂ 370 in his *Nyāya-viniścaya-vivaraṇa*, Vādirāja-sūri omits the above phrase *deśa-kāla-viprakarṣe ca paramāṇau sa evāyam iti pratyabhijñānam ca bhavati*, see NViV 1.121, vol. 1, p. 452.1–3: *tato yad uktam <> yoginām nityeṣu tulyākṛti-guṇa-kriyeṣu paramāṇuṣu muktātma-maṇṣu cānya-nimittāsambhava ebhyaḥ nimittebhyaḥ pratyādhāraṁ vilakṣaṇo 'yam <> iti pratyaya-vyāvṛttili <> te 'ntyā viśeṣāḥ*. (The dotted underline shows *varia lectio*, the square brackets <> indicate that some portions preserved in the edited text of PBh are missing in NViV).

That could either mean that Vādirāja-sūri omitted phrase *deśa-kāla-viprakarṣe...* deliberately, for it was not relevant to his critique of the *viśeṣa* category (although his way of quoting other work is generally quite faithful), or the phrase was not present in the manuscripts of PBh Vādirāja-sūri used, which might further imply that the phrase is a latter addition to PBh.

way, [i.e. merely through such a supernatural perception]. Just like a cognition of white in something which is not white or a recognition of something completely invisible does not arise through moral law produced by [the practice of] *yoga*, and if it could [arise] it would be false, in the same manner the *yogins* can possess neither discrimination through cognition nor a recognition through moral law born of [the practice of] *yoga* without [the existence of] ultimate individuators^{155, 156}.

The above account apparently refers primarily to *yogins* who are temporarily engrossed in meditation (*yukta*, *yuñjāna*), because what is at stake is the *yogins*' capability of perceiving atoms, viz. the competence Praśastapāda reserves for them¹⁵⁷. Praśastapāda's strategy is to liken, by analogy¹⁵⁸ (*yathāsmad-ādīnām ... tathāsmad-viśiṣṭānām yoginām*), the operation and scope of supernatural perception, allegedly possessed by *yogins*, to commonplace perception of ordinary humans. At the same time supernatural perception functions as a vital tool for 'the cognoscenti' to access the layers of reality which are beyond the scope or ordinary cognitive apparatus and which is at the same time the ontological fundament of Vaiśeṣika universe and metaphysics. We will subsequently see that it is not the sole role assigned to supernatural perception.

¹⁵⁵ The idea of the individuators that make it possible for the *yogins* to distinguish between various atoms is recapitulated in YBh 3.53 (p. 313.7).

¹⁵⁶ PBh₁ 11, p. 321–322 = PBh₂ 370–371: [370] *yathāsmad-ādīnām gav-ādiṣv aśvadibhyas tulyākṛti-guṇa-kriyāvayava-samyoga-nimittā pratyaya-vyāvṛttir dṛṣṭā gauḥ śuklaḥ sīghra-gatiḥ pīna-kakudmān mahā-ghaṇṭa iti, tathāsmad-viśiṣṭānām yoginām nityeṣu tulyākṛti-guṇa-kriyeṣu paramāṇuṣu muktātma-maṇḥsu cānya-nimittāsambhavād yebhyo nimittebhyaḥ pratyādhāraṁ vilakṣaṇo 'yam vilakṣaṇo 'yam iti pratyaya-vyāvṛttih, deśa-kāla-viprakarṣe ca paramāṇau sa evāyam iti pratyabhijñānaṁ ca bhavati te 'ntyā viśeṣāḥ. [371] yadi punar antya-viśeṣam antareṇa yoginām yoga-jād dharmāt pratyaya-vyāvṛttih pratyabhijñānaṁ ca syāt tataḥ kim syāt? nāvaṁ bhavati. yathā na yoga-jād dharmād aśukle śukla-pratyayaḥ samjāyate atyantādṛṣṭe ca pratyabhijñānaṁ, yadi syān mithyā bhavet, tathēhāpy antya-viśeṣam antareṇa yoginām na yoga-jād dharmāt pratyaya-vyāvṛttih pratyabhijñānaṁ vā bhavitum arhati.*

¹⁵⁷ PBh₁ 8.12, p. 187 = PBh₂ 241, see above p. 311 and n. 153.

¹⁵⁸ Analogy (*upamāna*) is a cognitively valid procedure also for the Vaiśeṣika, albeit it is not classified as a separate cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*) but merely a subvariety of testimony of an authoritative person, see PBh₁, p. 220 = PBh₂ 259: *āptenāprasiddhasya gavayasya gavā gavaya-pratipādanād upamānam āpta-vacanam eva.*—'Analogy based on explanation, by an authoritative person, [what the animal] gayal (Bos Gavaeus) [is like by comparing] the unknown gayal to [well known] cow is nothing but a testimony of an authoritative person.' It is considered different from inference, even such that is based on recognition of the whole from the perception of its parts, see VS(C) 2.1.8: *viśāṇī kakudmān prānte vāladhiḥ sāsnavān iti gotve dṛṣṭam liṅgam.*—'The visible

4.4.2. Supernatural perception of the seers

Supernatural perception acquired through the practice of *yoga* is not the only kind of such an extrasensory faculty admitted by Praśastapāda. The other kind is *ārṣa-pratyakṣa*¹⁵⁹, or perception of the seers (*ṛṣi*) who are endowed with it ‘genetically’,¹⁶⁰ viz. they are apparently born with it by virtue of their past good deeds. However, not only seers have it, as Praśastapāda maintains:

‘The seer’s perception is described as such a cognition which makes things known as they are (*sc.* in correspondence to truth) and which arises, by virtue of the contact of the soul and the mind and due to special moral endowment (*dharma*), in the seers, who are revealers of the Vedic lore, as the insight into past, future and present, and into extrasensory things such as moral law etc., which are expounded in the scriptures and which are not expounded [at all]. This [supernatural perception] is possessed by divine beings and seers in an extensive form, [but] also sometimes by ordinary people, for instance when a girl says: “My heart tells [me] that tomorrow my brother will come”.’¹⁶¹

The new element here is, first, purely extrasensory domain of this supernatural perception and, second, the inclusion of *dharma* in its domain; further it extends to things past and future, rendering predictions, fortune telling, authoritative religious accounts entrusted to scriptural word etc. possible. The seer’s perception, which attracts much less attention in PBh, necessarily requires the contact of the self (*ātman*) and the mind (*manas*), and is considered a tool whereby one can directly, or ‘perceptually’, cognise moral law.

inferential sign [necessary for inference] with respect to “cow” [to be inferred] is that it has horns, it has a hump, it has bristled tail at its end, it has a dewlap.’

¹⁵⁹ The Vaiśeṣika distinguish it from *yogi-pratyakṣa*, even though the critics of the idea (the Mīmāṃsaka and the Cārvāka) take these two varieties, *yogi-pratyakṣa* and *ārṣa-pratyakṣa*, as one and the same phenomenon.

¹⁶⁰ The idea of ‘genetically’ induced supernatural perception is found also in Jainism, see e.g. TS 1.21–22: *divividho ’vadhiḥ. bhava-pratyayo nāraka-devānām.*—‘Clairvoyance is two-fold. [Clairvoyance] occasioned by birth is [possessed] by hell-beings and divine beings.’

¹⁶¹ PBh₁, p. 258 = PBh₂ 288: *āmnāya-vidhātṛṇām ṛṣiṇām atītānāgata-vartamāneṣv atīndriyeṣv artheṣu dharmādiṣu granthōpanibaddheṣv anupanibaddheṣu cātma-manasoḥ saṁyogād dharmaviśeṣāc ca yat pratibham yathārtha-nivedanam jñānam utpadyate tad āṛṣam ity ācakṣate. tat tu prastāreṇa deva-rṣiṇām, kadācid eva laukikānām, yathā kanyakā bravīti śvo me bhrūtāgantēti hṛdayam me kathayātīti.*

The idea of the seer's perception (*ārṣa-pratyakṣa*), occasionally called intuition (*pratibha* or *pratibhā*), is mentioned as a special kind of supernatural perception also in *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* in three recensions: 'The seer's [perception] and the perception of perfected beings [arises] from merits.'¹⁶² This *sūtra* must be again a later interpolation, albeit we find it in all three recensions¹⁶³, because in all of them the *sūtra* is entirely mechanically appended at the very end of the respective chapters, without any direct connection to the preceding portion. The reason for such an insertion was most probably the need to accommodate the two-fold division of supernatural perception (*yogi-pratyakṣa* and *ārṣa-pratyakṣa*) found in the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya*, but not in an earlier version of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, and to verbalise a reaction to the claims of the Mīmāṃsā school denying the existence of such a perception.

On the other hand, we have clear indications that even at the time of Praśastapāda the belief in supernatural perception did not belong to the Vaiśeṣika canon of convictions accepted universally by all proponents of the school. A section of *Daśa-padārtha-śāstra* (DPS₁, p. 108–109 = DPS₂ 145–148) unmistakably shows that Candramati did not admit the existence of any supernatural perception, for he explicitly asserts that such categories as atoms, qualities of atoms etc., which are considered by Praśastapāda to be accessible to *yogi-pratyakṣa*, fall in the category of the imperceptibles. Likewise, in no way does he allude to the existence of or to the mere idea of liberation (*mokṣa*). Hakuju Ui (1917: 11–12) rightly observes that

'The treatise has no mention of Īśvara, as in the case of *V.S. (Vaiśeṣika-sūtra—P.B.)*; there is also no description of the way to emancipation (*mokṣa*); even if the second sort of merit (*dharma*, one of the twenty-four attributes) corresponds to it, it is only a definition of it. As a consequence, the author does not allude to *yoga*, *yogin*, or anything supernatural.'

4.4.3. Supernatural perception and moral law

Both accounts of supernatural perception, i.e. that of a *yogin* and that of a seer, associate it, either directly or indirectly, with moral law (*dharma*) and liberation (*mokṣa*). In the case of *ārṣa-pratyakṣa*, the link is immediate: those who are endowed with this kind of supernatural perception are capable of cognising *dharma* directly. In the

¹⁶² VS(C) 9.28 = VS(Ś) 9.2.18 = VS(D) 9.22: *ārṣam siddha-darśanam ca dharmebhyaḥ*.

¹⁶³ Candrānanda in his exposition (VSV(C), p. 71) recapitulates PB₁ 8.12, p. 258 = PB₂ 288.

case of the *yogin*'s supernatural perception the link is a bit less obvious and not so explicit.

To understand it better, we should first see how Praśastapāda defines moral law (*dharma*):

'[308] Moral law is a quality of the human being. It is the cause of pleasure, good and liberation for the agent;¹⁶⁴ it is extrasensory ... [315] The practice of *yoga* is the moral law (i.e. obligation) [to be followed by] anyone who has [so far] been in any of the [first] three [life stages (*āśrama*)], who has acquired faith, after he has granted (sc. taken the single vow of) permanent amiability (lit. fearlessness) to all creatures [and] has laid down his [mundane] duties, who is not negligent as regards rules (*yama*) and restraints (*niyama*)¹⁶⁵ [and] becomes, due to constant rumination over the six ontological categories, a renouncer [in the last life stage of *saṁnyāsīn*]. [316] Moral law arises through the contact of the soul and mind in dependence on these [above-mentioned] means and through purity of intention with no regard of any visible goal.'¹⁶⁶

This succinct account first states that *dharma*, although a quality of the soul (*puruṣa-guṇa*), is not amenable to sense organs (*atīndriya*) and one therefore requires special faculty to cognise it directly or is forced to rely on another person's account who has seen it directly himself. Since *dharma* is the quality of the soul and under normal circumstances the soul, at least for the Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika, is incapable of self-cognition, or self-illuminating cognition (*sva-saṁvitti*, *sva-saṁvedana*), what is required for the perception of *dharma* is a direct contact of the soul and mind (*ātma-manasoḥ saṁyogād dharmōtpattiḥ*). Further, Praśastapāda declares that there exists the means to cognise the moral law, which is the practice of *yoga* (*yoga-prasādhana*), being at the same time the moral duty of a renouncer. Commenting on

¹⁶⁴ This is a reference to two-fold goal of moral law as expressed in VS(C) 1.1.2: *yato 'bhyudaya-niḥśreyasa-siddhiḥ sa dharmah*.—'That from which [results] the attainment of mundane prosperity and the highest good is moral law.'

¹⁶⁵ These are the well-know first two steps of the eight-fold path of *yoga*, see YS 2.29: *yama-niyamāsana-prāṇāyāma-pratyāhāra-dhāraṇā-dhyāna-samādhayo 'ṣṭāva aṅgāni*. It is certainly not a coincidence to find these two categories of the Yoga school in Praśastapāda's passage, which attests to the influence of *yoga* practice and belief on the latter.

¹⁶⁶ PB₁, p. 272 = PB₂ 308, 315–316: [308] *dharmah puruṣa-guṇah. kartuḥ priya-hita-mokṣa-hetur atīndriyo ...* [315] *trayāṇām anyatamasya śraddhāvataḥ sarva-bhūtebhyo nityam abhayam dattvā saṁnyasya svāni karmāṇi yama-niyameṣv apramattasya ṣaṭ-padārtha-prasamkhyānād yoga-prasāadhanam pravrajitasyēti*. [316] *dṛṣṭam prayojanam anuddiṣyātāni sādhanāni bhāva-prasādam cāpekṣyātma-manasoḥ saṁyogād dharmōtpattiḥ iti*.

the passage, Vyomaśiva makes the idea explicit by adding that the practise of *yoga* is the only means to achieve *dharma*.¹⁶⁷ The adept of *yoga* who is engaged in preliminary stages of the eight-fold path of *yoga* (*yama-niyameṣv apramattasya*) has one aim: liberation, which is achieved by virtue of knowing moral law (*kartuḥ ... mokṣa-hetuḥ*).

An additional support for the thesis that Praśastapāda did view the yogic path as a means to liberation is the expression ‘permanent amiability’, or ‘constant fearlessness’ (*nityam abhayam*), which has its parallel in *Nyāya-bhāṣya* defining the state of liberation (*apavarga*):

‘This is [the state of] amiability (lit. fearlessness), without decay, a state of immortality, the absolute, the attainment of tranquillity.’¹⁶⁸

Moreover, the idea of ‘granting permanent amiability to all living beings’ (*sarva-bhūtebhyo nityam abhayam dattvā*) is not an invention of proponents of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* systems but is an echo of an earlier expression, i.e. *sarva-bhūtābhaya-pradāna*, well anchored in the tradition of the *Yoga-bhāṣya*:

‘Being [continuously] roasted on dreadful coals of transmigration, I take the refuge in moral rules of *yoga* by granting amiability (lit. fearlessness) to all creatures.’¹⁶⁹

Thus, the direct link between a *yogin*, who acquires supersensory faculties through the practice of *yoga*, and *yogi-pratyakṣa*, being precisely such a supersensory faculty, is therefore quite well established. Similarly well authenticated is the relation between the practice of *yoga*, understood as one’s ultimate duty, and liberation (*mokṣa*). Thus, the explicit link between supernatural faculty and the perception of *dharma*, which was straightforwardly expressed in the case of the seer’s perception (*ārṣa-pratyakṣa*), also holds in the case of the first kind of supernatural perception, that of a *yogin*. Consequently, such a supernatural perception of any form (either *yogi*-^o or *ārṣa-pratyakṣa*) is ultimately related to the purpose of achieving the final goal, liberation.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁷ VyV *ad loc.*, vol. II, p. 234.24: *yoga eva tasya dharma-sādhanam*.

¹⁶⁸ NBh 1.1.22, p. 22.3: *tad abhayam ajaram amṛtyu-padaṁ brahma kṣema-prāptir iti*.

¹⁶⁹ YBh 2.33, p. 217.10–11: *ghoreṣu samsārāṅgāreṣu pacyamānena mayā śaraṇam upāgataḥ sarva-bhūtābhaya-pradānena yoga-dharmaḥ*.

¹⁷⁰ The salvific goal does not exhaust all possible motivations why *yoga* was practised: there are other traditions the adepts of which seek supernatural perception and other powers (*siddhi*, *rddhi*) for their own sake, not for the sake of liberation, but such a *siddhi*-tradition is not relevant to the present issue.

The direct link between *yogi-pratyakṣa* of the *yukta-yogins* and *dharma* is embedded in Praśastapāda's statement: "in *yogins* who are temporarily engrossed in meditation (*yukta*) [and] who are superior to us, through the mind influenced by moral excellence (*dharma*) produced by [the practice of] *yoga*"¹⁷¹, which relates moral excellence to the practice of *yoga*, resulting in the superiority of *yogins* and in their inner excellence of supernatural perception that eventually grasps invisible substances such as their own selves, the selves of others, ether, space, time, air, atoms, mind as well as qualities, actions, universals, individuators which are inherent in these substances. A similar dependence between the acquisition of supernatural perception and moral law is expressed by Praśastapāda in another passage¹⁷² which postulates that *yogins* can supernaturally perceive ultimate individuators inherent in atoms, accordingly discriminate between the atoms and recognise them after some time thanks to moral endowment (*dharma*) achieved thanks to their engagement with the practice of *yoga*.

The above passages dealing with supernatural perception as well as the recurrent expression *yoga-ja-dharma*¹⁷³ additionally demonstrate that the practice of *yoga* was conceived of as being instrumental in moral upliftment and inner (spiritual) progress.

4.4.4. Supernatural perception and the gradual development argument

I shall now attempt to demonstrate that the acceptance of supernatural perception eventually entails, in the tradition of Praśastapāda and/or alias Praśastamati, the acceptance the idea of omniscience, or supreme knowledge (*atiśaya-jñāna*, *jñānâtiśaya*), to which the concept is indirectly and logically related. I would even venture to assert that it was a necessary corollary of the omniscience claim.

In his descriptions of *yogi-pratyakṣa*, Praśastapāda indirectly follows at least two lines of reasoning that may count as hidden arguments for omniscience, already referred to above:

¹⁷¹ PBh₁ 8.12, p. 187 = PBh₂ 241, see above p. 311 and n. 153.

¹⁷² PBh₁ 11, p. 322 = PBh₂ 371, see above p. 313, n. 156.

¹⁷³ Altogether five occurrences of *yoga-ja-dharma* in PBh₁ 8.12, p. 187 = PBh₂ 241–242 (n. 153) and PBh₁ 11, p. 322 = PBh₂ 371 (n. 156). A parallel is found in a commentary on the *Pāśupata-sūtra*, in which Kauṇḍinya explains that supernatural perception arises thanks to ascetic practices, see PABh 3.19, p. 88.20–21: *kṛtsnasya tapaso lakṣaṇam ātma-pratyakṣam vedītavyam*.— 'One should know the defining feature of all the austerities is [supernatural] perception of (through?) the self.'

- A1° ‘This [supernatural perception] is possessed by gods and seers in an extensive form, [but] also sometimes by ordinary people, for instance when a girl says: “my heart tells [me] that tomorrow my brother will come”.’¹⁷⁴
- A2° ‘Similarly to people like us who experience the differentiation in cognition occasioned by equal shapes, qualities, actions, parts or relations, with reference to cows, etc. [as different] from horses, etc.—[e.g. in the form] “[this] cow is white, of swift pace, with a fat neck hump, with a large bell”—in a similar manner *yogins*, who are superior to us, [experience] the differentiation in cognition with reference to permanent [entities like] atoms and minds and souls of liberated people that have identical shapes, qualities and actions.’¹⁷⁵

Both these descriptions rely on what I would call ‘gradual development argument’ for omniscience, well attested in Indian philosophical literature.

The underlying structure of such an argument could be phrased as follows:

- T4° ‘Supreme knowledge (omniscience) is possible, because we observe a gradual development of cognitive faculties’,¹⁷⁶

or, alternatively, more universally:

- T5° ‘An invisible perfect condition *x* (e.g. liberation, omniscience, extrasensory perception) is possible, because there is a gradation of the respective faculty”.

A classical and lucid formulation of the argument can be found some time later in Jayanta-bhaṭṭa’s *Nyāya-mañjarī*, who merely recapitulates an older version of it as follows:

‘The proof [of supernatural perception] is the excellence (culmination) of perception. For it is as follows: a person like us whose sight relies [on light] notices a number of things placed in proximity. Cats¹⁷⁷, on the other hand, can recognise even [a thing] that has fallen into a place covered with a layer of mud in the thickest possible darkness. Fur-

¹⁷⁴ PBh₁, p. 258 = PBh₂ 288. *Vide supra*, p. 314, n. 161.

¹⁷⁵ PBh₁ 11, p. 321 = PBh₂ 370. *Vide supra*, p. 313, n. 156.

¹⁷⁶ Cf. BALCEROWICZ (2005: 180–181 and n. 133).

¹⁷⁷ The rare expression *undura-vairin* (‘enemies of mice’) is explained by Jayanta-bhaṭṭa himself later as *vṛṣa-damśa*, see NMa₁, Vol. 1, p. 269.6–10 = NMa₂, Vol. 1, p. 157.17: *sampāti-vṛṣa-damśa-dṛśoḥ*. The term *vṛṣa-damśa* (‘having strong teeth’), i.e. ‘the cat’, is listed, e.g., in the *Amara-kośa* as one of the synonyms of ‘the cat’, see AmK 2.5.6ab, p. 242:

otur biḍālo mārjāro vṛṣa-damśaka ākhu-bhuk /

thermore, one learns from the *Rāmāyaṇa* epic that the king of vultures named Sampāti could even see Sītā (lit. the spouse of Daśaratha's son) in the distance of a hundred miles. This precisely is the excellence (culmination) of perception, just like the culmination of such qualities as white etc., which is based on gradation. Hence it is understood that there is the highest culmination without any higher culmination. And therefore those in whom there is the highest intensity of this [perception] are praised as *yogins*. So the topmost culmination means that [*yogins*'] perception has as its domain [things] that are subtle, concealed [from sight], distant, past, future etc.¹⁷⁸

At first glance, one might say that the above passage only deals with supernatural perception of *yogins* (*yogi-pratyakṣa*), not with omniscience. Jayanta, however, dispels such doubts by himself making a direct link to omniscience, first by quoting Kumārila-bhaṭṭa's criticism of the idea, in which the term *sarva-jñā* expressly occurs,¹⁷⁹ and subsequently by himself referring to the 'all-perceiving *yogins*'.¹⁸⁰ Accordingly, what Jayanta-bhaṭṭa says is the following: some creatures can only see things in proximity when illuminated by light, some can also see objects in the dark, while others can perceive things in distance, and still others can grasp extremely remote objects, etc.; therefore there must be a limit to this gradual increase of perceptive powers which is their complete consummation in the form of omniscience.

The argument rests on an almost universally Indian fear of infinite regress (*anavasthā*), the literally meaning of which is 'lack of foundation', the designation itself quite suggestive of such a fear. Alternatively, what was generally considered a

¹⁷⁸ NMa₁, Vol. 1, p. 268.3–11 = NMa₂, Vol. 1, p. 157.1–7: *darśanātiśaya eva pramāṇam. tathā hy asmad-ādir apekṣitāloko 'valokayati nikaṭa-sthitam artha-vṛndam, undura-vairiṇas tu sāndra-tama-tamaḥ-paṅka-paṭala-vilipta-deśa-patitam api sampaśyanti. sampāti-nāmā ca ḡḍhra-rājo yojana-śata-vyavahitām api daśaratha-nandana-sundarīm dadarśēti rāmāyaṇe śrūyate, so 'yam darśanātiśayaḥ śuklādi-guṇātiśaya iva tāra-tamya-samanvita iti gamayati param api niratiśayam atiśayam. ataś ca yatrāsyā paraḥ prakarṣas te yogino gīyante. darśanasya ca paro 'tiśayaḥ sūkṣma-vyavahita-viprakṣṣa-bhūta-bhaviṣyad-ādi-viśayatvam.*

¹⁷⁹ MŚV 2.112 quoted in NMa₁, Vol. 1, p. 269.13–14 = NMa₂, Vol. 1, p. 158.1–2:

*ekena tu pramāṇena sarva-jñō yena kalpyate /
nūnam sa cakṣuṣā sarvān rasādīn pratipadyate iti //*

¹⁸⁰ NMa₁, Vol. 1, p. 1.271.1–2 = NMa₂, Vol. 1, p. 158.11–12:

*satyam sāhasam etat te mama vā carma-cakṣuṣaḥ /
na tv eṣa durgamaḥ panthā yoginām sarva-darśinām //*

'Surely it would be rash [to claim that] this moral law (*dharma*) [is visible] to physical eyes of you or me. But this is not an impossible path for all-perceiving *yogins*.'

logical fallacy was occasionally¹⁸¹ also called ‘unreachable limit’ (*alabdha-pariniṣṭha*). Any assumption that allows for such an infinite regress must *ex definitione* be wrong. Therefore, while admitting of any gradation of supernatural faculties, one has to admit an upper limit of the gradation, or apex, when the faculties reach their maximum.¹⁸²

Such an argument is not completely new and we find it as early as in Bhartṛhari’s *Vākyapadīya*:

‘It is known that the cognition, encompassing all senses,¹⁸³ of those who are superior to us¹⁸⁴ with respect to [imperceptible universals stems] from repeated practise, just like [the knowledge] of specialists as regards certain [objects such as] gems, silver coins etc.^{185,186}

The same idea of gradual progression, or growth, up to the climax, which underlies the above verse, is explicitly expressed by Bhartṛhari elsewhere:

‘[64/63] Whatever common quality *P* of an object (model, standard) *x* to which another object *y* is compared and of the object *y* that is compared to the object (model, standard) *x* is resorted to, some [other] property *R*, different from *P*, stands out that characterises the objects *x*, *y* etc. to which other objects are compared. [65/64] Whatever quality *P*, which is the cause of culmination (the highest degree) [in an object *x*], is specified as independent (topmost), the fact that this

¹⁸¹ Cf. e.g. NAV 29.23, p. 457.4–5.

¹⁸² Apparently one distinguished infinite regress as logical fallacy from actual infinity such as the infinity of the world, which is limitless or endless (*anādi, ananta*).

¹⁸³ The expression *sarvêndriyam* implies extrasensory cognition which transcends all the conventional limitations of sensory organs that are perceptive only of their particular type of sensory data (*viśaya*), cf. VP 1.155. In other words, the cognition is not sense-dependent and therefore grasps conventionally imperceptible objects.

¹⁸⁴ Cf. VS(C) 2.1.18 [p. 13]: *saṁjñā-karma tv asmad-viśiṣṭānām liṅgam*, and PBh₁ 8.12, p. 187 = PBh₂ 241, see above p. 311 and n. 153.

¹⁸⁵ See VP 1.35:

*pareṣām asamākhyaṃ abhyāsād eva jāyate /
maṇi-rūpyādi-vijñānaṃ tad-vidāṃ nānumānikam //*

‘The knowledge of specialists as regards certain gems, silver coins etc., which is not communicable to others, comes about only through repeated practise, it is not inferential.’

¹⁸⁶ VP 3.1.46:

*jñānaṃ tv asmad-viśiṣṭānām tāsū sarvêndriyam viduḥ /
abhyāsān maṇi-rūpyādi-viśeṣeṣv iva tad-vidāṃ //*

[quality *P*] is of the highest degree can be known only through [still another] quality *R* that subsists in it.’¹⁸⁷

Bhartṛhari’s idea is that any comparison, which in itself entails gradation, of two items *x* and *y* rests on a property *P*, which we can call first-level property, shared by the two items, and the degree of the property *P* in both of the items *x* and *y* is assessed against still another property *R*, let us say a second-level property, being the criterion for the comparison. What may seem a little ambiguous in the above succinct verses is borne out in the commentary of Harivṛṣabha as follows:

‘[63] In the [verse], the following triad is laid down: (1) an object (model) *x* to which another object *y* is compared, (2) an object *y* that is compared to object *x* and (3) a common property of these two. That being the case, a common quality, which is ascertained in an object of comparison [expressed in the sentence:] “The *kṣatriya* studies recitation like a *brāhmaṇa*”, is understood also with respect to the object (model) *x* to which the other object *y* is compared. However, when [in the comparison:] “The recitation study of the *kṣatriya* is similar to the recitation study of a *brāhmaṇa*”, both the students are presented as the relata [of the relation] between an object (model) *x* to which another object *y* is compared and an object *y* that is compared to object *x*, then [first-level] properties such as competence etc. of two such recitation study practices, which are differentiated according to their respective substrata, [i.e. the *kṣatriya* and the *brāhmaṇa*], are ascertained as common properties [of these two substrata]. [That being the case], there are [additional second-level] properties such as absolute perfection etc. [that characterise the first-level properties such as] competence etc., which [in their turn] are relata [of the relation] of both the recitation study practices [accomplished by the *kṣatriya* and by the *brāhmaṇa*]. Hence, there is no limit to differentiation, [because also the second-level properties can be compared by taking recourse to a third-level property]. [64] As long as [anything] is presented [in the form] “this” [or] “that” as the main thing, it is the substance. However, the substance [as such] does not have any higher degree or lower degree. Therefore, an object, with respect to which one intends to express

¹⁸⁷ VP_{1,2} 1.64–65 = VP₃ 1.63–64:

sāmānyam āśritam yad yad upamānōpameyayoḥ /
tasya tasyōpamāneṣu dharmo ’nyo vyatiricyate //
guṇaḥ prakarṣa-hetur yaḥ svātantryeṇōpadiśyate /
tasyāśritād guṇād eva prakṛṣṭatvaṁ pratīyate //

culmination (high degree), is graded by way of factors (sc. attributes) which subsist [in it], which are the causes of differentiation, which are dependent on it, which are associated with it, [and] which are instrumental in [manifesting] the culmination (high degree). ... As long as one expresses culmination (high degree) of something which subsists as the main thing of the expression “this” [or] “that”, so long this [process of] expression [of the gradation] has no end, as having the undesired consequence that one can imagine [still] another factor (sc. attribute) [of higher grade].¹⁸⁸

The undesired consequence (*prasaṅga*), mentioned by Harivṛṣabha, indicates a conviction that a process of gradation must have an end: unlimited gradation is the undesired consequence (*prasaṅga*). What was in VP_{1,2} 1.64–65 primarily a linguistic analysis of suffixes *taraP* and *tamaP* that express comparative and superlative degrees of adjectives or substantives was subsequently, in VP 3.1.46, projected onto metaphysics.

The logical structure of the argument of culmination (‘gradual development argument’), based on a gradation of degree until it reaches a maximum point, has the following structure:

$$(\forall x \exists y (y \rightarrow x)) \rightarrow (\exists y \forall x (y \rightarrow x)),$$

If, for any thing *x* there exists some thing *y* which is higher in degree, then there exists some thing *y* which is highest in degree with respect to all things *x*.

The symbol \rightarrow in the formula denotes any sort of antecedence (logical, causal, physical, spatial etc.).¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁸ VPV 1.63–64 ad VP 1.64/63–65/64: [63] *ihôpamānam upameyam tayoś ca sādharmaṇo dharma iti tritayam etat siddham. tatra “brāhmaṇavad adhīte kṣatriyaḥ” ity upameye śrūyamāṇam sāmānyam upamāne ’pi pratiyate. yadā tu brahmāṇādhyayanena tulyam kṣatriyādhyayanam ity adhyetārau upamānôpameyayoḥ sambandhitvenôpādīyete, tadādhyayanayor āśraya-viśeṣa-bhinnayoḥ sauṣṭhavādayo dharmāḥ sādharmaṇatvena pratiyante. sauṣṭhavādinām apy adhyayana-sambandhinām pariniṣpatty-ādayo dharmā iti nāsti vyatirekasyāvacchedaḥ. [64] yāvad idam tad iti prādhānyenôpādīyate tad dravyam. na ca dravyasya prakarṣāpakarṣau sta ity aśritair bheda-hetubhiḥ para-tantraiḥ saṃsargibhīr nimittaiḥ prakarṣe savyāpāraiḥ pracikīrṣito ’rthaḥ prakṛṣyate. ... yāvad idam tad iti-vyapadeśasya prādhānyenāśritasya prakṛṣṭa-vyapadeśaḥ kriyate, tāvad vicchinno ’yam nimittāntara-parikalpanā-dharma-prasaṅga^a iti.*

^a Recte: *avicchinnô* and *°parikalpanā-prasaṅga*, cf. VPA ad loc., p. 113.28: *tāvad avicchinnô ’yam tatra tatra nimittāntara-parikalpanā-dharma-prasaṅga[h]*.

¹⁸⁹ The structure of this proof resembles the proof of god’s existence which we find in Thomas Aquinas’ *Summa Theologiae* classified as ‘the forth way’, or the argument ‘from the degrees of

A very similar structure relying on which Praśastapāda's acceptance of supernatural perception leads him to the acceptance of god's omniscience is found on a number of occasions in arguments for the existence or perfection of god, which attests to the fact that the logical argumentative structure was quite widespread in India. The first such type is the arguments which correspond to the cosmological argument: from the first cause (*kāraṇa*), known to Uddyotakara¹⁹⁰ and later to Jayanta¹⁹¹, as well as from the first mover, likewise known both Uddyotakara¹⁹² and to Jayanta¹⁹³.

Still before Uddyotakara, we come across an argument from perfection (**guṇa-viśiṣṭa-sāmpad*), which proves most relevant for our discussion. It is an Indian version of the well-known argument that there must be a real standard of perfection to make any hierarchy of beings possible. The argument underlies Vātsyāyana Pakṣila-svāmin's formulation of god's qualities:

'God is something more than soul, being distinguished by his special qualities. When one examines the notion of the soul, it is not possible to conceive of this [god] as anything else [other than as a kind of soul]. Since he is something distinguished by complete absence of evil,

perfection'. The logical flaw of this argument is structurally similar to two other arguments of god's existence ('from the movement' and 'from the efficient cause'), for the first time formulated by Aristotle at the beginning of his *Metaphysics*, at least in one respect. What the argument says is that we can order a set of, say, all possible white things in such a way that there will always be another thing greater in degree (whiter), until we reach the maximum white, or the most perfect white, or we reach the most perfect being in the hierarchy of all entities in the world which is god (which would be Thomas Aquinas's argument). Similarly, we can order all acts of perception so that it will culminate in the most perfect perception (*yogi-pratyakṣa* or *sarva-jñāna*), for which there will be other perfection that is better in degree. The grave logical flaw in the argument is that is not logically permissible to validly interchange the places of the quantifiers in a formula as follows: $\forall x \exists y (T(x, y)) \rightarrow (\exists x \forall y (T(x, y)))$, whereas the following is a tautology: $\exists x \forall y (T(x, y)) \rightarrow \forall y \exists x (T(x, y))$. Besides, there is nothing logically binding that would force us to accept the termination of an infinite succession in a chain of events. In other words, one could admit a gradual quantitative growth of clearness of perception without any qualitative change.

¹⁹⁰ NV₁ 4.1.21, p. 460.16 = NV₂, p. 433.1: *tad-kāritatvāt ... nimitta-kāraṇam īśvaraḥ*.

¹⁹¹ NMa₁, Vol. 1, p. 492.2–3, com., Vol. 1, p. 502.10–13.

¹⁹² NV₁ 4.21, p. 461.10–14 = NV₂, p. 433.13–16: *pradhāna-paramāṇu-karmāṇi prāk pravṛtteḥ buddhimat-kāraṇādhiṣṭhitāni pravartante acetanatvād vāsy-ādivad iti. yathā vāsy-ādi buddhimatā takṣṇā adhiṣṭhitam acetanatvāt pravartate tathā pradhāna-paramāṇu-karmāṇy acetanāni pravartante tasmāt tāny api buddhimat-kāraṇādhiṣṭhitāni iti*.

¹⁹³ NMa₁, Vol. 1, p. 488–490.

wrong cognition and torpidity and by the perfection of righteousness, cognition and concentration, god is something more than soul.¹⁹⁴

The expression *dharmajñāna-samādhi-sāmpad* ('the perfection of righteousness, cognition and concentration') is a clear verbalisation of the conviction, that god stands at the top of the hierarchy of entities with respect to all good qualities. Also humans, or other beings for that matter, are possessed of some degree of righteousness, cognition or concentration. However, what distinguishes god from all other individual souls is that he is the only such a substance in which all virtuous qualities find their perfect completion. He corresponds to what Thomas Aquinas would call *maxime ens*. Interestingly, Vātsyāyana applies the same argument by way of diminution of all negative qualities: it is god in whom all the negative qualities, present in all other individual souls in greater or lesser degree, find their complete annihilation.

This harmonises well with a similar reasoning found in Kauṇḍinya's *Pañcārthabhāṣya* (PABh, c. 500?) comment on the *Pāśupata-sūtra* thesis that 'there is god of all beings'¹⁹⁵:

'In the [*sūtra*] god is [understood] as someone with respect to whom there is nothing supreme.'¹⁹⁶

There is still another relevant argument for the existence of god, the structure of which is in fact a slight modification of the previous argument, embedded in the following rhetorical question posed by Vātsyāyana Pakṣilasvāmin:

'Who could possibly manage to prove, by way of attributes (inferential signs) of the soul such as cognition etc., that god is not recognisable [or] is beyond [all cognitive criteria]: perception, inference and scriptural testimony?'¹⁹⁷

The obvious (albeit not really logically sound) reply to the quandary, which is supposed to rectify the doubt, would be the following argument: 'There is god, because he is inferred through such perceptible attributes as cognition etc.' And this involves a gradation of (the intensity of) the attribute, i.e. of perception. Also such an argument would have to rely on the same idea of gradation: we prove the exis-

¹⁹⁴ NBh 4.1.21, p. 228.6–7: *guṇa-viśiṣṭam ātmāntaram īśvaraḥ. tasya ātma-kalpāt kalpāntarānu-papattiḥ. adharmamīthyā-jñāna-pramāda-hānyā dharmajñāna-samādhi-sāmpadā ca viśiṣṭam ātmāntaram īśvaraḥ.*

¹⁹⁵ PS 5.43, p. 145.1: *īśvaraḥ sarva-bhūtānām.*

¹⁹⁶ PABh 5.43, p. 145.2: *atra niratiśaya aiśvarya īśvaraḥ.*

¹⁹⁷ NBh 4.1.21, p. 228.14: *buddhyādibhiś cātma-liṅgair nirupākhyam īśvaram pratyakṣānumānāgama-viśayātītam kaḥ śakta upapādayitum.*

tence of ordinary souls through the observation of their ordinary attributes, and we know of the existence of god, super-soul, through his extraordinary attributes.

The argumentative structure was well-known among the Jainas, even prior to Praśastapāda, a good example being Kundakunda's *Pavayaṇa-sāra* (ca 4th–5th centuries) and his 'proof' of liberation in which he applies the same gradual development argument, that rests on the idea of gradual purification, or natural development, till one reaches a perfectly pure condition, or perfection (*siddhatva*), tantamount to liberation, characterised by perfect omniscience (*kevala-jñāna*) and perfect 'omni-perception' (*kevala-darśana*):¹⁹⁸

'[45] Perfected souls (saints) [achieve their condition] as a result of merit (or: auspicious *karman*). Their activity is, however, a natural development, which is free from [inauspicious *karman* such as] confusion etc., and therefore it is known as "resulting from the destruction [of *karman*]" (*kṣāyika*)¹⁹⁹. [46] If the soul itself could not become either good or bad by virtue of its own essential nature alone, there would be no mundane world (transmigration) for all the bodies endowed with a soul.'²⁰⁰

Also Samantabhadra (contemporary with Dharmakīrti) avails himself of the same argument in the *Āpta-mīmāṃsā*:

'[4] A complete destruction of defects and karmic veils is possible, because a complete consummation [of the gradual purification process] is [possible], just like a [complete] annihilation of both external and internal blemishes in particular cases with the help of respective

¹⁹⁸ Kundakunda also makes use of what we could call a reverse gradual development argument in his *Samaya-sāra* 222–223, in which the development towards perfection of the soul is compared to a conch which is step by step turning into black until it becomes completely black and dirty.

¹⁹⁹ Cf. TS 10.1: *moha-kṣayāj jñāna-darśanāvaraṇāntarāya-kṣayāc ca kevalam*.—'Absolute knowledge [arises] from the destruction of [the *karman* called] confusion and from the destruction of the *karmans* obstructing and veiling [innate] cognition and perception/conation.'

²⁰⁰ PSā 1.45–46:

*puṇṇa-phalā arahaṃtā tesim kiriyā puṇo hi odaiyā /
mohādihim virahiyā tamhā sā khāiga tti madā //
jadi so suho va asuho ṇa havadi ādā sayam sahāveṇa /
saṃsāro vi ṇa vijjadi savvesim jīva-kāyāṇam //*

Comp. also SSā 204.

causes.²⁰¹ [5] Objects that are subtle, concealed [from sight] and distant remain [always] directly perceptible to someone, because they are inferable, just as fire etc. [is inferable from visible smoke]—such is a proof of the omniscient [Jina].²⁰²

Similar arguments based on the idea of the gradation of attributes can be found also in Buddhist works, e.g. with Dharmakīrti:

‘The *yogin*’s cognition is produced by the ultimate consummation (intensity) of contemplation of existing objects.’²⁰³

Dharmakīrti’s description of supernatural perception achievable to an adept of *yoga* supplies a nucleus of a proof of *yogi-pratyakṣa* which in its crudest form would assume the formulation: ‘Supernatural perception is possible, because it can be achieved by consummation (perfection) of practice (meditation).’ In other words, uninterrupted spiritual practice and meditation have to necessarily lead to their culmination in the form of omniscience. Of course, such an argument in Buddhist (or Jaina) context did not lead one to accept the existence of a divine being endowed with perfect qualities but to accept the possibility of the existence a perfect cognition in a human form (that of Buddha, Bodhisattva or Tīrthāṅkara). Dharmakīrti’s commentator, Dharmottara explains that ‘contemplation (meditation) of an entity is the perpetual (lit. again and again) reflection on it’²⁰⁴, and emphasises the gradual development that finally leads to supernatural perception, by emphatically dividing the process into three stages:²⁰⁵ the consummation (intensity) of contemplation (*bhāvanā-prakarṣa*)²⁰⁶, the apogee of the intensity (*prakarṣa-paryantāvasthā*)²⁰⁷ and, ultimately, the *yogin*’s perception (*yogi-pratyakṣa*) as the final stage^{208, 209}.

²⁰¹ For the analysis of the verse, being a formulation of a proof of liberation, and its soteriological implications see BALCEROWICZ (2005).

²⁰² ĀMī 4–5:

*doṣāvarāṇayor hānir niḥśeṣāsty atiśāyanāt /
kvacid yathā sva-hetubhyo bahir antar mala-kṣayaḥ //
sūksmāntarita-dūrārthāḥ pratyakṣāḥ kasyacid yathā /
anumeyatvato ’gny-ādir iti sarva-jñā-saṁsthitih //*

²⁰³ NB 1.11: *bhūtārtha-bhāvanā-prakarṣa-paryantajam yogi-jñānam cēti*.

²⁰⁴ NBT 1.11, p. 67.5: *bhūtasya bhāvanā punaḥ punaś cetasi viniveśanam*.

²⁰⁵ Cf. NAGASAKI (1988: 349–350).

²⁰⁶ NBT 1.11 (p. 67.5–6): *bhāvanāyāḥ prakarṣo bhāvyamānārthābhāsasya jñānasya sphuṭābhatvārambhaḥ*.—‘The consummation (intensity) of contemplation is the beginning of [the process in which] cognition [the contents of which is] the image of the object being contemplated represents [this object] in a clear way.’

²⁰⁷ NBT 1.11 (p. 67.6–68.2): *prakarṣasya paryanto yadā sphuṭābhatvam iśad asaṁpūrṇam bhavati. yāvad dhi sphuṭābhatvam aparipūrṇam tāvat tasya prakarṣa-gamanam. saṁpūrṇam tu*

It is difficult at this stage to say when, where or with whom the gradual development argument originated. One of the earliest sources is certainly *Yoga-bhāṣya*:

‘Further, his (god’s) supremacy is without any equal excellence [that could compare with it]. To begin with, [his] excellence is not exceeded by any other excellence, [because] that very thing which would be excelling over [it] would necessarily be this very excellence [of god]. Therefore, where the excellence reaches its upper limit that is god. Moreover, there is no excellence that is equal to his. Why? [Because] when out of two [seemingly] equal things one thing is desired at the same time [and] and the thing is selected (lit. established) as follows: “This one must be new; that one must be old”, then it is automatically follows that the other is inferior because it falls short of [satisfying] the desired expectation.²¹⁰ And it is not the case that for two [seemingly] equal things both are achieved as the desired object simultaneously, because of the contradiction in terms. Therefore the one whose supremacy is without any [seemingly equal excellences is god].²¹¹

In view of the usage of the term *atiśaya* or *niratiśaya* in the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya*, the *Pañcārtha-bhāṣya* and the *Yoga-bhāṣya*, it is quite possible that both the for-

yadā tadā nāsti prakarṣa-gatiḥ. tataḥ sampūrṇāvasthāyāḥ prāktany avasthā sphuṭābhatva-prakarṣa-paryanta ucyate.—‘The apogee of the intensity [in such a contemplation] is when the representation of [the object] in a clear way with ultimate intensity is almost complete. For as long as the representation of [the object] in a clear way is not absolutely complete, this is the progress of the consummation (intensity) of such a [contemplation]. But when [it is] complete, then there is no progress [any more]. Therefore, the state prior to the state of complete [representation] is called the apogee of the intensity of the representation of [the object] in a clear way.’

²⁰⁸ NBT 1.11 (p. 68.2–3): *tasmāt paryantād yaj jātām bhāvamānasyārthasya sannihitasyēva sphuṭatarākāra-grāhi jñānam yoginaḥ pratyakṣam.*—‘Such a cognition which is produced by this apogee [of intensity and] which grasps more clear form of the object that is being contemplated as if it were immediately present [in front of the contemplator] is the *yogin*’s perception.’

²⁰⁹ For further description of the three stages see NBT 1.11 (pp. 68.4–69.2). However, Vinīta-deva in his *Ṭīkā* distinguishes four stages, see STCHERBATSKY (1930 II: 31, n. 2) and NAGASAKI (1988: 350–354).

²¹⁰ In my rendering and understanding of the passage I consciously go counter the interpretation of the *Vivaraṇa*.

²¹¹ YBh 2.24, p. 56.2–57.4: *tac ca tasyāiśvaryaṃ sām्यātiśaya-vinirmuktam. na tāvad aiśvaryaṅtareṇa tad atiśayate, yād evātiśāyi syāt tad eva tat syāt. tasmād yatra kāṣṭhā-prāptir aiśvaryaṣya sa iśvara iti. na ca tat-samānam aiśvaryaṃ asti. kasmāt? dvayor tulyayor ekasmin yugapat kāmīte ’rthe navam idam astu purāṇam idam astu ity ekasya siddhau itarasya prakāmya-vighātād ūnatvaṃ prasaktam. dvayor ca tulyayor yugapat kāmītārtha-prāptir nāsti, arthasya viruddhatvāt. tasmād yasya sām्यātiśayair vinirmuktam aiśvaryaṃ sa evēśvaram.*

mulations of the gradual development argument phrased by Kauṇḍinya and Praśastapāda go back to the *Yoga-bhāṣya* or to some common source from which the three traditions stem.

What is beyond doubt in all the passages of the number of authors quoted above is that we come across the very same structure of the argument that grades a particular attribute up to its ultimate perfection. The argument is well known also to the Mīmāṃsā school, which refers to it and criticises it.²¹²

Consequently, in view of the logical structure of the argument, consistently applied in India to prove a ‘perfect apex’, it seems justified to hold that Praśastapāda, and/or Praśastamati for that matter, saw supernatural perception as pointing to the existence of supreme knowledge, or omniscience. My contention gets additional strength in the fact that it was already Vātsyāyana Pakṣilasvāmin who spoke not only of god as such but also of his omniscience, the conviction unambiguously indicated in the statement that ‘god is distinguished by the perfection of cognition (*jñāna-sampad*)’²¹³, thus paving the way for Praśastapāda and his tradition to admit of god also in the system of Vaiśeṣika.

I would further maintain that the acceptance of supernatural perception as such was not merely dictated, at least in part, by religious and extra-philosophical convictions of Praśastapāda and of the generation of Vaiśeṣika thinkers around his time,²¹⁴ but it was also an essential rational corollary of his belief in god’s perfect powers, including his omniscience. In other words, to explain the process of how the idea of god entered the body of convictions of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, *yogi-pratyakṣa* was both a corollary of the belief in god’s omniscience and an intermediary step in an argument for its existence. It was probably a conscious decision of the philosophers to avail themselves of an idea that was well-known to them from the tradition of Yoga.

²¹² See e.g. Sucaritamīśra’s MŚVṬ *ad* MŚV 4.27, p. 215.15 ff., Pārthasārathi Mīśra in NRĀ *ad* MŚV 4.26, p. 102.15-16.

²¹³ See p. 324, n. 194.

²¹⁴ Perhaps the major philosophical function of supernatural perception was to prove the existence of atoms (an idea intimated in the interpolated VS(C) 9.14, see above p. 145, and expressly mentioned in PBh₁ 8.12, p. 187 = PBh₂ 241, see above p. 311 and n. 153) and individuators (mentioned in PBh₁ 8.12, p. 187 = PBh₂ 241, and PBh₁ 11, p. 321–322 = PBh₂ 370–371, see above 312 f.).

5. Conclusion

5.1. God's incompatibility with the system of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika

Having analysed all the four components of the 'knowability thesis package', viz. (1) the equation *astitva = abhidheyatva = jñeyatva*, (2) the belief in god's existence, (3) the belief in god's omniscience and (4) the belief in supernatural perception, we see that all of them played an important role in justifying the three remaining ones, and it must have been a consistent step to accept them all.

The problematic and controversial equation (*vide supra*, p. 281 and § 3.3 ff.), a rational proof for which seemed entirely lacking, needed some additional strong support and eventually found it in the new dogmatics of the Vaiśeṣika school. It was god's unlimited cognition which came to be believed to account for the conviction that everything that exists is expressible and cognisable. In other words, god's omniscience was to guarantee that the Vaiśeṣika system was complete and logically consistent in the light of the knowability thesis: anything that is existent enters god's mind, and therefore can always be cognised at least by one person, i.e. god; likewise, it can also be expressed by him. It was god who indirectly provided people with the *Vedas*, that were supposed to contain the gist of all the knowledge about the world. Seen from this perspective, Praśastapāda's equation 'existence = nameability = cognisability' (*astitva = abhidheyatva = jñeyatva*) turns out to be much less controversial. We should remember that this explanation is only partial: it only explains how the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas as philosophers built the idea into their philosophical system. The other important part of the explanatory scheme is their extra-philosophical conviction, i.e. their religious belief which they entertained on account of reasons that were other than philosophical or rational (see below, p. 341 ff.).

The philosophical meaning of strictly religious belief in supernatural perception (§§ 4.4.1–2) lay in the demonstrative force and structure of the 'gradual development argument' (§ 4.4.4), and supernatural perception was merely an indispensable component of the premisses to prove that omniscience was at all possible.

In addition, the admittance of god into the ontology of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika was no longer a philosophical stance, but a religious belief: all the universe, starting from the indivisible atoms as building blocks of the universe, along with the relations that bind atoms into atomic dyads and triad particles, up to all the ontological categories, is present in god's mind. It is god's mind that stores the design (*vide supra*, p. 297) which precedes the (re)construction of the universe after cyclical periods of dissolution. We know that god is omniscient, because we see the gradation of cognitive faculties in the world, and (faulty) logic, mostly based on the fear of

anavasthā ('infinite regress'), tells us that the gradation must have its apex somewhere. And, indeed, it does find it in god's mind. Since god can know everything, as the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas came to believe, the thesis that everything that exists can be also named and cognised is easily defensible.

The idea of god's existence and omniscience was indispensable in order to accept the equation: existentiality = nameability = cognisability, and *vice versa* the equation was an obvious consequence entailed by the idea of god's omniscience. Even though each of the four components was problematic in itself, they all when taken together, and thus rendering mutual support to each other, made Praśastapāda's decision to introduce all four a consistent move. At the same time the decision demonstrates how philosophical reason eventually capitulated before religious conviction.

What is important, there was nothing in the earlier, pre-Praśastapāda and pre-Vātsyāyana tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that could foreshadow such a development and that would eventually prompt the philosophers to accept the contentious equation as a logical consequence of some ancient teachings. Neither was there anything in the system that would, on purely philosophical or logical grounds, impel the philosophers to accept the doctrine of god's existence and omniscience. What is even more significant, the acceptance of god went against 'the logic' of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, which was strictly realistic.

The theistic shift, correlated with the acceptance of the knowability thesis, eventually proved disastrous to the logical consistency of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system of ethics. In the first place it was the objectivity and impersonality of the workings of *karman* that suffered most.

Prior to that, the workings of karmic retribution were essentially mechanistic, automatic and objective, i.e. not influenced by any extraneous controlling agent. Deeds of transmigrating beings, including humans, were directly translated into their fate in the form of the invisible moral principle (*adr̥ṣṭa*).²¹⁵ It was believed to comprise two aspects: a positive element, merit (*dharma*) and a negative element, demerit (*adharma*). These two were qualities of the soul (*ātman*) and inhered in it,²¹⁶ being connected via the relation called inherence (*samavāya*), the sixth category (*padārtha*) in the system. These joint properties of merit and demerit had both individual and cosmic dimension: they determined the fate of the soul they inhered in (e.g. the future birth and social status);²¹⁷ the fate after death, the movements of

²¹⁵ On *adr̥ṣṭa* see FADDEGON (1918: 341–354). On *adr̥ṣṭa* in early Vaiśeṣika see THAKUR (2003: 14–19), who takes *adr̥ṣṭa* in early Vaiśeṣika to mean merely 'unknown factor'.

²¹⁶ PBh₁ 6, p. 70 = PBh₂ 79: *tasya [= ātmanah] guṇā buddhi-sukha-duḥkhēcchā-dveṣa-prayatna-dharmādharma-samskāra-samkhyā-parimāṇa-prthaktva-saṃyoga-vibhāgāḥ*.

²¹⁷ NV₁ 1.1.1, p. 19.14.

the atomic mind, its egress from the dead body at the moment of death and its ingress into a new body at a new birth etc., digestion, development of the foetus etc.,²¹⁸ emotional states such as passion,²¹⁹ but also—as a cumulated, collective principle of all souls—they determined the course of world, including the movements of atoms, the attraction of iron particles by the magnet,²²⁰ the circulation of liquids and juices in plants and trees,²²¹ the upward motion of the fire, the sideward motion of wind etc.,²²² untypical movements in the world, different from basic categories of movement enumerated in VS(C) 5.2.1,²²³ all movements of water different than its falling down (e.g. rainfall) as a result of weight in the absence of contact, or support (mentioned in VS(C) 5.2.3), e.g. positive and negative results of rainfalls etc., or absence of rain,²²⁴ and other phenomena of the physical world. The invisible moral principle was thus responsible for all phenomena that would not follow ordinary and known physical rules of the world. People could influence the workings of the invisible moral principle (*adr̥ṣṭa*) by various kinds of morally relevant behaviour, including rituals, religious activities etc.:

‘Bath consecration (i.e. bathing in places of pilgrimage), fasting, celibacy, residing in the family of the preceptor, living in a forest [as a renouncer in the third stage of life (*āśrama*)], sacrifice, charity, purification by sprinkling²²⁵, observances regarding cardinal points, constellations, sacrificial formulas and time contribute to the invisible moral principle’²²⁶.

These two properties of all the souls, when combined, could directly affect the material world, without the agency of the souls themselves, because they were in contact with atoms; at the same time the invisible moral principle was believed to

²¹⁸ VS(C) 5.2.19: *apasarpaṇam upasarpaṇam asīta-pīta-samyogaḥ kāryāntara-samyogāś cēty adṛṣṭa-kāritāni*.

²¹⁹ VS(C) 6.2.15.

²²⁰ VS(C) 5.1.15: *maṇi-gamaṇaṁ sūcy-abhisarpaṇam ity adṛṣṭa-kāritāni*.

²²¹ VS(C) 5.2.8: *vṛkṣābhisarpaṇam ity adṛṣṭa-kāritam*.

²²² VS(C) 5.2.14: *agner ūrdhva-jvalanaṁ vāyoś ca tiryak-pavanam aṇu-manasoś cādyaṁ karmēty adṛṣṭa-kāritāni*.

²²³ VS(C) 5.2.2: *tad-viśeṣeṇādṛṣṭa-kāritam*.

²²⁴ VS(C) 5.2.4: *tad-viśeṣeṇādṛṣṭa-kāritam*.

²²⁵ Cf. MDhŚ 5.115c, 118a, 122a.

²²⁶ VS(C) 6.2.2: *abhiṣecanōpavāsa-brahmacarya-guru-kula-vāsa-vāna-prasthya-yajña-dāna-prokṣaṇa-diṅ-nakṣatra-mantra-kāla-nigamāś^a cādṛṣṭāya*.

^a VSV(C) *ad loc.* consistently reads °-*niyama*-°: *diṅ-niyamādayo ’nye viśeṣāḥ. diṅ-niyamaḥ ... nakṣatra-niyamaḥ ... mantra-niyamaḥ ... kāla-niyamaḥ*. Also VSV adopts the reading °- *niyamāś*.

inhere in the souls which were omnipresent, and therefore the results of past deeds stored as subliminal impressions (*saṃskāra*) could in theory be activated, it seems, basically anywhere.²²⁷ The ambiguous term *saṃskāra* ('accumulation') pertained to both material/objective and mental/subjective plains: it comprised physical factors resulting from previous actions and triggering subsequent events, e.g. velocity (VS(C) 5.1.17) of an arrow put in motion, as well as subconscious determinants that were causes activating remembrance (VS(C) 9.22) or as causes, impeding cognitive faculties, of nescience (VS(C) 9.25) etc. Thus, the subliminal impressions mediated in causal relations.

Furthermore, in the causation theory of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the cause—be it efficient cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*) or the 'trigger' of a causal complex (*kāraṇa-sāmagrī*)—was thought to immediately precede the effect.²²⁸ Also karmic retribution was explained as a part of such a rigid causal system, and a delay in either punitive or rewarding sanction, which one would expect to progress immediately after a respective demeritorious or meritorious deed, was mediated by subliminal impressions that temporarily stored the moral potential of the deed in order to activate it in an appropriate future moment. This mechanistic causal system of deeds committed in the past and future retribution for them required no additional agency. It functioned the way atoms could join or molecules could split without anybody's supervision, once a motion was there in the world. And it was there, because souls were believed to be such sources of motion.

The introduction of god brought confusion to the mechanistic principles of the system of karmic retribution and postulated an additional, supervising moral agent, next to moral agents proper, i.e. humans. God came to play a role of the Grand Moral Accountant, or the ultimate supervisor (*adhiṣṭhātṛ*) and supreme co-ordinator of how merit and demerit are distributed over to moral agents. The idea of supervision of moral law was immediately used by Uddyotakara to devise an argument from moral law to prove god's existence:

²²⁷ PBh₁, p. 107, 266 = PBh₂ 127, 300: *ātmāṇu-saṃyogāt*; PBh₁ 5, p. 48.7 ff. = PBh₂ 57: *sarvātma-gata-vṛtti-labdhādr̥ṣṭāpekṣebhyaḥ tat-saṃyogebhyaḥ pavana-paramāṇuṣu karmōtpattau...*

²²⁸ Cf. POTTER (1995: 57): 'One, suggested perhaps by Uddyotakara, has it that the supreme cause is the most effective cause, the event which immediately precedes and brings about the production of the effect.' Early Vaiśeṣika sources do not provide too much information of how causality was conceived. The only passages of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* on causality are the following ones: VS(C) 1.2.1–2: *kāraṇābhāvāt kāryābhāvaḥ. na tu kāryābhāvāt kāraṇābhāvaḥ.*—'From the absence of cause follows the absence of effect. However, it is not the case that from the absence of effect follows the absence of cause'; and VS(C) 4.1.3: *kāraṇa-bhāvād dhi kārya-bhāvaḥ.*—'[The effect of that which is eternal is an inferential sign for its existence,] because from the existence of cause follows the existence of effect.' On causality in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the development of the idea see also Sadananda BHADURI (1975: 271–319) and MATILAL (1975).

‘Merit and demerit, being superintended by a cause endowed with cognitive awareness, cause retribution of a human being, because they are ultimate causes (instruments), like an axe.’²²⁹

In other words, since differentiation into morally good and bad actions is, for whatever reasons, accepted as a matter of fact, and if the freedom of human conduct is to be constrained by some principles entailed by some established convention or moral law (‘if not everything is permitted’), and if moral law is to be carried out *mechanically*, then a source of morality must exist (sc. ‘god exists’). Uddyotakara’s reasoning is a counterpart of Immanuel Kant’s argument from morality. Absolute god’s mind is, therefore, a warrant for moral order and truth in the world. Otherwise, and Uddyotakara would certainly subscribe to Fyodor Dostoevsky’s paradox, ‘if god does not exist, everything is permitted’.

However, there is nothing binding in Uddyotakara’s (or Kant’s) argument that would compel us to draw a conclusion that ‘god exists’ from premisses that there is the *summum bonum* and some rules of conduct, called moral order, exist in a society. Or, which is logically equivalent, from a statement that ‘there is no god’ it does not follow that moral law does not exist and human conduct is not liable to ethical judgement. From the same premiss, which so much troubled Dostoevsky and probably Uddyotakara, that ‘god does not exist’, we can draw a contrary conclusion, just as Jean-Paul Sartre did: ‘we are alone, with no excuses’. If there is no god, we have to accept that there are no divine regulations which could coerce humans to act accordingly, and often uncritically (merely on the basis of divine authority), and no superhuman commandments which humans could adhere to mechanically and unreflectively in the hope of eternal bliss. ‘Man is condemned to be free’ and nobody can tell what is good and what is wrong, what alleviates the pain of nothingness and what can ease the fear of extinction. Man is condemned to be ‘responsible for everything he does’, to find his own way between good and wrong. And that means full responsibility for one’s own deeds which no authority has jurisdiction to absolve one from.

Similarly, the earlier concept of karmic retribution implied full responsibility of human agents for their actions, albeit some clearly defined moral principles existed, determined by moral law (*dharma*). It was the individual, and nobody else, who was wholly accountable for all he had done. The consequences of his actions would inevitably return to him, and to nobody else, and in the degree proportional to the extent of good or wrong earlier committed by him. That was possible precisely be-

²²⁹ NV₁ 4.1.21, p. 463.13–14 = NV₂, p. 435.5–6: *dharmādharmau buddhimat-kāraṇādhiṣṭhitau puruṣasyôpabhogaṃ kurutaḥ karaṇatvād vāsy-ādivad iti*. Cf. n. 136 and VSV(C) 1.1.3: *īśvaraś ca sādhitas tanu-bhuvanādīnām kāryatayā ghaṭādivad buddhimat-kartṛkatvānumānena*.

cause there was no extraneous agency which would remove the burden of responsibility from him or exculpate him, or suspend the workings of moral law by dint of grace, mercy or caprice.

Seen in this light, admission of god by the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas involves a breach in the consistency of the moral law and undermines inevitability of karmic retribution. Uddyotakara's step brings the philosophers closer to strictly religious views and ethical reflection steers them towards devotion to god (*bhakti*), the highest superhuman instance on whose supervision of karmic retribution human fate partly relies. Clearly, such a theistic approach seriously undermined human ethical agency and moral responsibility, rendering the theory of karmic retribution ultimately ineffectual. Alternatively, assuming that the mechanism of karmic retribution retained its force, god's superintendence would become meaningless, because the only role to play for god would merely be that of an uninvolved and completely inactive observer, which would stand in contradiction with the initial premise of his supervision of the process of redistribution of merit and demerit to moral agents.

No wonder such an approach provoked criticism from various opponents who were keen to point out that god is not compatible with *karman*. A Buddhist thinker Vimalamitra (first half of the sixth century?) observed in his *Abhidharma-dīpa* that 'The cause of the world is these [human] deeds, not god etc.'²³⁰. Even earlier, Vasubandhu opined in the often-quoted verse in the same spirit:

'The diversity of the world comes from action (*karman*). This [action] consists in volitional consciousness and all that it brings about'²³¹.

The same criticism was expressed by the Jainas. Abhayadeva-sūri (TBV, p. 105) was not unique among them to point out that Uddyotakara's argument in support of god's supervision contradicts the original view found in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* that

'The upward motion of the fire and the sideward motion of wind etc., the first movement of the atom and of the mind—all this is caused by the invisible principle.'²³²

Among numerous arguments against the existence of god found in his *Mīmāṃsā-śloka-vārttika* (MŚV 5.16.42ab–117), Kumārila-bhaṭṭa directly refers to the problem faced by Uddyotakara and other theistic Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas and points out, in the latter part of the argument below (83cd), that the existence of god as a moral controller renders merit and demerit, to wit moral law, superfluous:

²³⁰ APr [155], p. 118.13: *karmāṇi etāni lokasya kāraṇam nēśvarādayaḥ*.

²³¹ AK 4.1ab: *karma-jam loka-vicitryam cetanā tat-kṛtam ca tat*.

²³² VS(C) 5.2.14, see n. 222.

‘There cannot be any impure (evil) creation [accomplished] by a pure (good) person (sc. god). And since merit and [demerit] were dependent on [god] himself, any distress resulting from them would be inconceivable. On the other hand, if the course [of the world] were determined by these [merit and demerit], then it would imply a different [agency than god’s].’²³³

If the fate of humans, their rebirth, social status and happiness are determined by merit and demerit, that nullifies god, a thesis which is by transposition equivalent to saying that if god exists, he nullifies merit and demerit. Kumārila exposes the same paradox even more explicitly elsewhere:

‘If you accept that it is god’s will [to activate the accumulated *karmans* of living beings at the time of recreation of the world after its dissolution], then precisely this [will] is the [ultimate] cause of the world, [not the *karmans*]. However, if it is god’s will that determines [the world], then to assume [any role for the accumulated] *karman* is pointless.’²³⁴

Therefore, if one is to take human responsibility and ethics seriously, one is compelled to reject the existence of god: the two notions are not compatible.²³⁵

That this critical judgement concerning the relation between the idea of karmic retribution and god’s incompatibility with it was not restricted to philosophers is attested in a popular passage of the *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*:

‘[13] [Every] living being is born by the force of *karman*, and it is by the force of *karman* alone that he expires. Happiness, suffering, fear and tranquillity occur by the force of *karman* alone. [14] Even if there

²³³ MŚV 5.16.82cd–83:

*puruṣasya ca śuddhasya nāśuddhā vikṛtir bhavet //
svādhīnatvāc ca dharmādes tena kleśo na yujyate /
tad-vaśena pravṛttau vā vyatirekaḥ prasajyate //*

²³⁴ MŚV 5.16.72:

*īśvarēcchā yadiṣyeta sāiva syāl loka-kāraṇam /
īśvarēcchā-vaśitve hi niṣphalā karma-kalpanā //*

²³⁵ The question how to exculpate god of all the evil in the world, he himself has created (or has been supervising) occurs as early as during the Kuṣāna reign and is found in the so-called Spitzer Manuscript, tentatively dated ca. 250 (FRANCO (2003: 21)). There (*folio* 284, *fragm.*: Sp. 19) we read: ‘Living beings experience undesirable births. Did they offend God, so that he causes them to suffer?’ (FRANCO (2003: 24)).

is some god who assumes the form of (sc. supervises) the results of the *karmans* of others, he himself engages as an agent, for he has no power over someone who is not an agent. [15] What is the use here of a controller of beings propelled by their own respective *karmans*, who is incapable of modifying what has been determined by people's own nature? [16] For the man, dependent on his own nature, follows his own nature. All this [universe], along with divine beings, demons and humans, is founded on [their] own nature. [17] Living being obtains and casts off bodies of low and high status by force of *karman*. It is nothing but *karman* that is [the living being's] enemy, friend, indifferent bystander, the teacher and god. [18] Therefore a person who is firmly settled in (sc. dependent on) his own nature and performs his own *karman* [alone] should worship *karman*. That alone by the force of which he is instantly propelled is his deity.²³⁶

'Taking moral rights seriously', to invoke Ronald Dworkin's famous work, was not the only concern. The first part of Kumārila's above argument (MŚV 5.16.82cd–83ab) highlights another important problem, that of theodicy²³⁷. At first sight, it would be the idea of karmic retribution, involving merit and demerit, which could help the Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika avoid the paradox of evil. Taking recourse to the idea of purpose (*prayojana*), one could argue that god—omnipotent, good and omniscient—merely creates initial environment into which all living beings are cast. It would precisely be the invisible moral principle (*adṛṣṭa*) of the individuals, or the law of karmic retribution, that exonerate god of all moral responsibility because, after the initial moment of recreation of the world, humans experience (*bhoga*) what

²³⁶ BhāgP 10.24.13–18:

*karmanā jāyate jantuḥ karmaṇāiva pralīyate /
sukhaṁ duḥkhaṁ bhayaṁ kṣemaṁ karmaṇāivābhipadyate // 13 //
astī ced īśvaraḥ kaścīd phala-rūpyaṁ anya-karmaṇām /
kartāraṁ bhajate so 'pi na hy akartuḥ prabhur hi saḥ // 14 //
kim indreṇēha bhūtānām sva-sva-karmānuvartinām /
anīśenānyathā kartuṁ svabhāva-vihitam nṛṇām // 15 //
svabhāva-tantro hi janaḥ svabhāvam anuvartate /
svabhāva-stham idaṁ sarvaṁ sadevāsura-mānuṣam // 16 //
dehān uccāvacān jantuḥ prāpyōtsṛjati karmaṇā /
śatrur mitram udāsīnaḥ karmāiva gurur īśvaraḥ // 17 //
tasmāt sampūjayet karma svabhāva-sthaḥ sva-karma-kṛt /
anjasā yena varteta tad evāsya hi daivatam // 18 //*

²³⁷ On theodicy, or the problem of evil in the world created by omnipotent and omniscient god see the excellent Chapter 9 'The Problem of Evil' in John L. MACKIE (1982), perhaps the best analysis so far of the problem.

they have sown, an argument used much later by Udayana (ĀTV, 410.2–411.5). The major flaw inherent in this argument, and present in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system from the moment it admitted of god as the Grand Moral Accountant, who *s u - p e r v i s e s* merit and demerit, was the contradiction how to explain how morally good, omnipotent and omniscient god, who has a purpose and knows the consequences of his act of creation, creates or supervises a world in which also demerit, or evil, exists and, besides, its workings are beyond his control. This paradox was plainly and succinctly pointed out several decades before Kumārila by the anonymous author of the *Yukti-dīpikā*:

‘Moreover, [the world could not be created by someone endowed with cognitive awareness], **because [the world] is full of utmost suffering**²³⁸. If <this> [world], being a special product, were preceded (sc. caused) by cognitive awareness, then the creator would not have any purpose in furnishing it with utmost suffering. And since the [creator is said to be] omnipotent, he would furnish it with utmost happiness. ... [If you argue that utmost suffering in the world] **is not the fault of god**, [but is there] **because it is occasioned by merit and demerit**, would the following be the opinion [of yours:] “Even though this [world as] a special product is preceded (sc. caused) by god, nevertheless living beings like us, who were brought into existence with utmost happiness at the moment of the initial creation, acquire (lit. come into contact with) lower, intermediate and higher [ranks] of life, caste, character etc. under the influence of merit and demerit. Therefore that is not the fault of god”? **Also this** [argument] **is not correct**. Why? **Because there is no logical reason to** [explain] **the origination of demerit** [in the world in this way]. If god had any authority over merit and demerit, he would create only merit, because [it alone] is the cause of happiness for living beings. [He would] not [create] demerit, because [demerit] has no purpose. Or [perhaps the following is your] opinion: “The origination of merit and demerit is natural, following their own causes, [independently of god]?” [Then you face] a contradiction with what you have said [earlier, namely,] that all manifest (sc. the world) is preceded by god’s cognitive awareness (design). Therefore god cannot be the cause [of the world].²³⁹

²³⁸ The bolded text marks the *vārttikas*, following the convention of Albrecht Wezler and Shujun Motegi, the editors of YDī.

²³⁹ YDī 15d, p. 158.13–15, 19, 23–28: *kiṃ ca duḥkhôttaratvāt. buddhi-pūrvakaś ced <ayam>^a kārya-viśeṣaḥ syāt kartur duḥkhôttara-vidhāne prayojanam nāsti, śaktimāns cāyam iti*

Another blow to an initial consistency of the karmic retribution dealt by the admission of god to the system was connected with the causal theory of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, according to which the effect immediately follows its ultimate cause (*vide supra*, p. 333). There opponents were likewise quick to utilise the incongruity. One of the classical formulations is again found in Kumārila's writings:

'Further, it is not consistent [to assume that] for [beings that] have accumulated *karman* there is a period of existence during which there is no [possibility to] experience the [accumulated *karman*], insofar as the results [of the accumulated *karman*] cannot be [temporarily] withheld by another *karman* on account of some other action [e.g. undertaken by god]. And a state in which all [actions exist] without [producing] a result is not possible. Moreover, such a want of fruition [of living beings' accumulated *karman*] cannot be a result of any *karman* at all. On the one hand, if all *karman* were destroyed [during the dissolution of the world], then no [future] creation [of the world] would be conceivable [because there would be no *karman* to determine the course of the new world]. On the other hand, [if the *karman* were not destroyed completely], what would be the causal factor during the time [of recreation of the world] to activate the [accumulated] *karmans* [of living beings, if all *karmans* were dormant]?'²⁴⁰

sukhōttaram eva vidadhyāt ... dharmādharma-nimittatvād adoṣa iti cet. syān matam. yady apīśvara-pūrvako 'yam kārya-viśeṣas tathāpy ādi-sarge sukhōttarāṇām <asmād->^a-utpannānām prāṇinām dharmādharma-parigrahād dhīna-madhyamōtkṛṣṭa-vayo-jāti-svabhāvādi-yogo bhavati. tataś ca nāparādho 'yam īśvarasyēti. etad apy ayuktam. kasmāt. adharmōtpatti-hetv-abhāvāt. īśvaraś ced dharmādharma-yor utpattāv iṣṭe dharmam eva prāṇinām sukha-hetutvād utpādayet. nādharmaṁ prayojanābhāvāt. atha matam svābhāviki dharmādharma-yoḥ sva-kāraṇād utpattiḥ. yad uktam sarvam īśvara-buddhi-pūrvakam vyaktam iti [tu]^c tasya vyāghātaḥ. tasmād īśvaro na kāraṇam.

^a 'All the Mss read *asya*' (note 2 in YDī, p. 158).

^b 'All the Mss read *asmad-utpannānām*' (note 3 in YDī, p. 158).

^c According to the convention of Albrecht Wezler and Shujun Motegi (YDī, p. XXX), the editors of YDī, the square brackets mark the text to be deleted.

²⁴⁰ MŚV 5.16.69–71:

*na ca karmavatām yuktā sthitis tad-bhoga-varjitā /
karmāntara-niruddham hi phalam na syāt kriyāntarāt //
sarveṣām tu phalāpetam na sthānam upapadyate /
na cāpy anupabhogo 'sau kasyacit karmanāḥ phalam //
aśeṣa-karma-nāśe vā punaḥ sṛṣṭir na yujyate /
karmāṇām vāpy abhivyaughtau kiṁ nimittam tadā bhavet //*

The idea of karmic retribution demanded that there be no intermediate period when accrued *dharma* and *adharma* are suspended by anyone or anything. And that perfectly harmonised with causal contiguity adopted by the two systems. One might at first read Kumāriḷa's argument as formulated against the idea of the cosmic dissolution (*pralaya*). And so it was, in part. The context, however, shows that the reasoning was formulated in a line of arguments to disprove the existence of god. In addition, Kumāriḷa's statement that 'the results [of the accumulated *karman*] cannot be [temporarily] withheld by another *karman* on account of some other action [e.g. taken by god]' (5.16.69cd) demonstrates that what is at stake is god's possible power to suspend the workings of *karman*: no one is omnipotent enough to bring the fruition of the accumulated *karman* to a halt, even for a short while. Any other solution yields inconsistency.

The above arguments formulated by the critics of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika reveal the inherent contradictions involved by the admission of god into the ontology and ethics and indicate that god was indisputably a 'foreign body' in the system.

The critics of the system confirm that the reasons to accept the equation 'existence = nameability = cognisability', along with the existence of god the other two elements of the 'knowability thesis package', could not have been prompted by strictly rational enquiry of the philosophers but must have been motivated by their extra-philosophical and, in essence, non-philosophical religious beliefs. The introduction of the equation alone would have been unwarranted and difficult to defend had it not have come along with god, the guarantor of the completeness of doctrine and attestation to the validity of the equation.

In addition to the above survey of systemic difficulties the creation of god in the world of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika engendered, a handy account of two more serious incompatibilities that the admission of god into the system involved is given by the author of the *Yukti-dīpikā*:²⁴¹ god cannot be included in any of the six categories admitted by the Vaiśeṣika and Kaṇāda did not mention god as a separate category²⁴²; further, god's supervision of the final immobility of atoms during the dissolution of the world and their initial motion after the *pralaya* is problematic.

Why did then the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas adopt the notion of god, if there was neither any rational need for him in the philosophical system (sc. nothing internal or logical necessitated such an improvement of the philosophical doctrine) nor any comfortable room for him in the universe of the categories (sc. such an idea stood in conflict with a range of doctrinal points)?

²⁴¹ Cf. CHEMPARATHY (1965: 130).

²⁴² YDī 15d, p. 160.3 ff.

5.2. The Vaiśeṣikas, the Pāśupatas and god

We know that it was probably around the fifth century when religious ideas of the Pāśupatas and other Śaiva movements started to penetrate into the doctrine of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika.²⁴³

The influence was apparently mutual because we find a number of doctrinal or philosophical points among the tenets held by the Pāśupatas that are of strictly Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika origin, next to Sāṃkhya and Yoga influences.²⁴⁴ A good example is the enumeration of four constituents of the process of cognition, viz. cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*), the cogniser (*pramātṛ*), the cognoscible, or the object of valid cognition (*prameya*) and the resultant cognition (*pramiti*). These well-known four elements are found at the beginning of the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*.²⁴⁵ Exactly the same quadruplet is also found in Kauṇḍinya's *Pañcārtha-bhāṣya*:

‘Thus all three are the cognitive criteria (*pramāṇa*). ... The soul is the cogniser (*pramātṛ*). The five categories, viz. the effect, the cause etc. are the cognoscibles (*prameya*). The resultant cognition is knowledge (*pramiti*).’²⁴⁶

Another instance of such influence concerns the proofs of the existence of the soul. We know that it was already Akṣapāda Gautama who, in order to proof this claim, availed himself of the idea that no substance can exist without its properties, and *vice versa* no property is possible without its substratum, the substance. Thus, by observing mental phenomena, such as desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain,

²⁴³ On the Pāśupatas (and also on the relation between the Pāśupatas and the Vaiśeṣikas) see HARA (1958), SCHULTZ (1958), INGALLS (1962), CHEMPARATHY (1965), HARA (2002), BISSCHOP (2005). There are, of course, numerous elements borrowed from *yoga* practise.

²⁴⁴ Some of them are mentioned by THAKUR (1957: 16): Praśastapāda's ‘classification of inference into Dṛṣṭa and Sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa bears striking resemblance with that in the Pañcārtha-bhāṣya of Kauṇḍinya on the Pāśupatasūtras. Kauṇḍinya's classification of perception into indriya-pratyakṣa and ātmapratyakṣa (P. 7) may equally be compared with the ordinary perception (asmadādīnām pratyakṣam) and the perception of the Yogin (Yogipratyakṣa) of Praśasta°. The Pāśupatas according to Kauṇḍinya accept three means of knowledge, viz. perception, inference and authority and we find a similar classification in the Vyomavatī, though the Vaiśeṣikas generally accept the first two only’ (*vide supra*, n. 147, p. 309). For another similarity between Vaiśeṣika and the Pāśupatas in the realm of the nature of supernatural perception, understood as resulting from ascetic practices see n. 173. See also HARA (1992).

²⁴⁵ NBh 1.1.1: *tatra yasyēpsā-jihāsā-prayuktasya pravṛttiḥ sa pramātā, sa yenārtham pramiṇoti tat pramāṇam, yo 'rthaḥ pramiyate tat prameyam, yad artha-vijñānam sā pramitiḥ.*

²⁴⁶ PABh 1.1, p. 7.19–22: *evam etāni trīṇi pramāṇāni. ... pramātā puruṣaḥ. prameyāḥ kārya-kāraṇādayaḥ pañca padārthāḥ. pramitiḥ samvīt.*

cognition, we conclude that they must have some substratum, which is the soul.²⁴⁷ Akṣapāda described these mental phenomena as inferential signs on the basis of which one infers the existence of the soul.²⁴⁸ The argument was also well known to Praśastapāda.²⁴⁹ Precisely the same reasoning and the same mental phenomena, with slight modification (change in the sequence and ‘consciousness’ for ‘cognition’) is found in Kauṇḍinya’s work:

‘One accepts the soul’s [existence] on the basis of such inferential signs as pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, consciousness.’²⁵⁰

That in this case it was the influence of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition on the Pāśupatas can be proved by the fact that the idea to which Akṣapāda refers to is also found in the *Caraka-saṃhitā*,²⁵¹ historically closely associated with the development of the system of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

Moreover, it is also known that Indian philosophers were quite well aware of the links between the Pāśupatas and the Vaiśeṣikas and the fact that the latter had taken over the belief in god from the former. A clear evidence, and perhaps the earliest evidence, to corroborate this is offered by the author of the *Yukti-dīpikā* in the sixth century:

‘The Pāśupatas and the Vaiśeṣikas hold that “God therefore exists”;²⁵²
‘In such a way this [thesis] of the Vaiśeṣikas [that] “god exists” was taken over from the Pāśupatas.’²⁵³

²⁴⁷ On the structure of the argument see CHAKRABARTI–CHAKRABARTI (1991).

²⁴⁸ NS 1.1.10: *icchā-dveṣa-prayatna-sukha-duḥkha-jñānāny ātmano liṅgam*.

²⁴⁹ See his enumeration of the qualities of the soul: PBh₁ 6, p. 70 = PBh₂ 79 (*vide supra*, n. 216).

²⁵⁰ PABh 5.3, p. 112.1–2: *tasya sukha-duḥkhēcchā-dveṣa-prayatna-caitanyādibhir liṅgair adhigamaḥ kriyata ity arthaḥ*.

²⁵¹ CarS₂ 8.43, p. 260A = CarS₁ 3.8.39: *atha pratyakṣam—pratyakṣam nāma tad yadātmanā pañcēndriyaiś^a ca svayam upalabhyate, tatrātma-pratyakṣāḥ sukha-duḥkhēcchā-dveṣādayaḥ, śabdādayas tv indriya-pratyakṣāḥ*.

^a CarS₁: *cēndriyaiś*.

²⁵² YDī 15d, p. 157.13: *asty evam īśvara iti pāśupata-vaiśeṣikāḥ*.

²⁵³ YDī 15d, p. 160.29–30: *evam kāṇādānām īśvaro ’stīti pāśupatōjñam etat*.

The editors of YDī, Albrecht Wezler and Shujun Motegi, conjecture that this passage may be a later interpolation by hand of a copyist. Even if it were the case, there are numerous similar passages in YDī itself that indicate the Pāśupatas’ theistic influence on the Vaiśeṣikas and, besides, even if the passage does not originate from the sixth century, but a later addition, it still evidences that it was generally a known fact in India that the Vaiśeṣika adopted the idea of god under the influence of the Pāśupatas.

‘Therefore, there is no [room for] god in the system of the author of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*;²⁵⁴

and

‘Thus, this is the [logical] error committed by the Pāśupatas when it comes to the acceptance of god. And this also is the error committed by the Vaiśeṣikas.’²⁵⁵

Certain doctrinal elements of the Pāśupatas would make it extremely easy and self-evident to formulate some arguments for the existence of god, e.g. the cosmological argument (*vide supra*, p. 324). Among the five categories (*padārtha*) that the Pāśupatas distinguished, two of them have a direct bearing on the question of god and rational arguments to prove his existence. These are (1) the category of effect (*kārya*), understood as all the creation, that comprises consciousness, material entities and living beings, and (2) the category of cause (*kāraṇa*), i.e. god (*īśvara*, Śiva), who is the foundation (*pradhāna*) of the creation, from whom all creation takes its origin, ‘who was in the beginning’ (PABh 5.47, pp. 146–148). Kauṇḍinya the Pāśupata devotes considerable space to causal relations: those between the cause and the effect as well as those between god and his creation (PABh 2.1–27, pp. 55–77). Suppose one accepts a strict cause-effect relation between god and the world, the way the Pāśupatas did, and assumes that on the basis of (1) any relation between *a* and *b* (e.g. $a \rightarrow b$), and on the basis of (2) an act of perception of *a*, one can justifiably infer *b*, precisely the way the Vaiśeṣika would infer²⁵⁶ an inferential sign-possessor (*liṅgin*) on the basis of the perceived inferential sign (*liṅga*). Consequently, to come up with an argument for the existence of god based on such an idea of causality is but a natural step.

Another easily discernible influence of the Pāśupatas, relevant for our discussion, is found in the idea of god’s supervision and in Uddyotakara’s moral argument for the existence of god (*vide supra*, p. 334, n. 229) as well as in Praśastapāda’s statement that the divine being Brahman, under the supervision of god (*īśvara*), ‘endows all the created beings with their respective moral duty, knowledge, passionlessness and divine might that conform to their potencies stored as their *karman*’ (*vide supra*, p. 300, n. 130). Precisely such a belief is expressed in Kauṇḍinya’s *Pañcārtha-bhāṣya*:

²⁵⁴ YDī 15d, p. 160.15: *tasmāt sūtra-kāra-mate nāstīśvaraḥ*.

²⁵⁵ YDī 15d, p. 160.2: *evaṃ tāvat pāśupatānām īśvara-parigrahe doṣaḥ. vaiśeṣikāṇām cāyaṃ doṣaḥ*.

²⁵⁶ VS(C) 9.18: *asyēdam kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ sambandhi ekārtha-samavāyi virodhi cēti laiṅgikam*.

‘What is called [god’s] facility to recreate [the word] means the uniting of individual souls²⁵⁷ with the constituents that bear the name of the effects and the instruments²⁵⁸ and with the merit, knowledge, detachment, power, demerit, nescience, absence of detachment, absence of power etc. in agreement with combined net force of the positioning in life, body, sense organs, sensory data [which the soul deserves according to the accumulated *karman*] and according to dimension, division and individual character.’²⁵⁹

We see that god’s authority is to supervise the process of distribution of merit and demerit as well as other positive and negative qualities related to *dharma* at the moment of the creation of the world after its dissolution. This power is called by Kauṇḍinya ‘facility to recreate’, or ‘the production of modification’²⁶⁰ (*vikaraṇatva*).

The author of the *Yukti-dīpikā* quotes, or at least paraphrases, two arguments for god’s existence which were formulated by the Pāśupatas, and accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas:

‘The Pāśupatas and the Vaiśeṣikas hold that “Thus god exists”. Why? [They have two arguments.]
[First argument:] **Because a special product must be preceded** (sc. caused) **by a supreme cognitive awareness.**²⁶¹ In this world, a special product, such as a palace, a vehicle etc., is seen to be preceded (sc. caused) by a supreme cognitive awareness. And indeed this [world],

²⁵⁷ See PABh 2.24, p. 74.2–3, 6–7: *atra kalā nāma kārya-karaṇākhyāḥ kalāḥ. tatra kāryākhyāḥ pṛthivy āpas tejo vāyur ākāśaḥ. ... tathā karaṇākhyāḥ śrotraṁ tvak cakṣuḥ jihvā ghrāṇaṁ pādaḥ pāyuh upasthaḥ hastaḥ vāk manaḥ ahaṁ-kāro buddhir iti.*—‘Here what are called “the constituents” are the constituents that bear the name of the effects and the instruments. Among these, [the constituents] having the name “effect” are [the elements:] earth, water, fire, air, ether. ... Next, what have the name of instruments are: ear, skin, eye, tongue, nose, foot, anus, sex organs, hand, mouth, mind, the centre of personal identity and consciousness.’ Comp. also PABh 1.1, p. 5.5–6: *tatra pāsā nāma kārya-karaṇākhyāḥ kalāḥ.*—‘What are called here individual transmigrating souls are constituents that bear the name of effect and instrument.’

²⁵⁸ The terms *kṣetra* and *kṣetra-jña* are clearly of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga origin, see YS 2.4, YBh 2.17 (p. 175.2), 3.49 (p. 306.1), BhG Chap. 13, MDhP 12.206.8. See also LARSON (1979: 131 f.).

²⁵⁹ PABh 2.24, p. 74.9–11: *vikaraṇatvaṁ nāma sthāna-śarīrēndriya-viśayādi-saṁniveśena vīstara-vibhāga-viśeṣataś ca kārya-karaṇākhyābhiḥ kalābhir dharmā-jñāna-vairāgyāśvāryādhar-mājñānāvairāgyānaśvāryādibhiś ca kṣetra-jña-saṁyojanam.* Cf. CHEMPARATHY’S (1965: 128) translation of the passage.

²⁶⁰ CHEMPARATHY’S (1965: 128).

²⁶¹ See n. 337.

being characterised by a complex structure made from the elements, sense organs, creatures etc., is a special product. Therefore, it must be preceded by a supreme cognitive awareness. That by which this [world] is preceded is god. Therefore, god exists.

What else?

[Second argument:] **Because the conjunction of a conscious [being] and an unconscious [thing] is brought about by a conscious [being].** In this world, the conjunction of a conscious [being] and an unconscious [thing] is seen to be brought about by a conscious [being], for instance [the conjunction] of ox and cart. And indeed this [world] is a conjunction of bodies and souls. Therefore, it must be brought about by a conscious [being]. That by which this [world] is brought about [as a conjunction] is god. Therefore, god exists as the cause.²⁶²

The first of the arguments is a version of cosmological argument, i.e. the argument from the first cause (*kāraṇa*), which was known also to Uddyotakara (*vide supra*, p. 324). Interestingly, the structure of this argument is a combination of a typical cosmological argument and an argument from perfection (*vide supra*, p. 324), based on the idea of a hierarchy of qualities, such as cognitive qualities. The expression ‘supreme cognitive awareness’ (*atiśaya-buddhi*) comes very close to ‘absolute and supreme knowledge’ (*atiśaya-jñāna*) found in *Padārtha-dharma-saṁgraha* (*vide supra*, p. 300, n. 130), or to Praśastamati’s expression ‘excellence of cognition’ (*jñānātiśaya*), quoted in TBV by Abhayadeva-sūri (*vide supra*, p. 305, n. 140), or to the phrase ‘the excellence of perception’ (*darśanātiśaya*, p. 320, n. 178), found later with Jayanta-bhaṭṭa.

It is very likely that precisely such an argument, probably its earlier formulation, was devised within the ranks of the Pāśupatas and later adopted by Uddyotakara and taken for granted by both Praśastamati and Praśastapāda, who not only adopted logical, argumentative structure but also verbal phrasing.

That Kauṇḍinya may indeed have known the argument, although he does not refer to it explicitly, is attested by a passage from his *Pañcārtha-bhāṣya*:

²⁶² YDī 15d, p. 157.13 ff.: *āha—asty evam īśvara iti pāśupata-vaiśeṣikāḥ. kasmāt. kārya-viśeṣasyātiśaya-buddhi-pūrvakatvāt. iha kārya-viśeṣaḥ prāsāda-vimānādir atiśaya-buddhi-pūrvako dṛṣṭaḥ. asti cāyam mahā-bhūtēndriya-bhavana-vinyāsādi-lakṣaṇaḥ kārya-viśeṣaḥ. tasmād anenāpy atiśaya-buddhi-pūrvakeṇa bhavitavyam. yat-pūrvako 'yam sa īśvaraḥ. tasmād astiśvara iti. kiṁ cānyat. cetanācetanayor abhisambandhasya cetana-kṛtatvāt. iha cetanācetanayor abhisambandhaś cetana-kṛto dṛṣṭas tad yathā go-śakaṭayoh. asti cāyam cenācetanayoh śarīra-śarīriṇor abhisambandhaḥ. tasmād anenāpi cetana-kṛtena bhavitavyam. yat-kṛto 'yam sa īśvaraḥ. tasmād astiśaraḥ kāraṇam.*

‘Inference, in its turn, is preceded (sc. caused) by perception, and its causal complex is made from consciousness, internal organ (mind) and [respective logical] relations; it is effected by the remembrance of [such factors as] merit, demerit, explanation, place, time, injunction etc.; [it concerns] origination, subsistence, disappearance, time etc. And by their means one infers of a cause that it is an agent that accomplishes the subsequent creation [of the world].’²⁶³

While describing the nature of inference, he refers to certain categories on the basis of which we can infer that there is a creator of the world. This would support the above evidence of the *Yukti-dīpikā* attesting to the doctrinal influence the Pāsupatas exercised on the system of Vaiśeṣika.

The second of the above arguments is not found in the early writings of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in precisely this form. However, its logical structure in the form the author of the *Yukti-dīpikā* relates it, makes a rather curious and cryptic impression: it states that if we have a material, unconscious thing and a conscious being that come into union, there must be another conscious being to put these two together. One thing is certain, namely that the argument relies on a conviction, widespread not only in India²⁶⁴ but also in ancient Greece,²⁶⁵ that any movement and activity has soul, or a conscious being, as its source. That is why, the Pāsupatas are said to maintain that there must be some conscious agent (‘meta-soul’) to bring these two elements (unconscious thing and conscious being) into union. However, if there is already a conscious being (soul) in conjunction with the unconscious thing, then the second conscious agent (‘meta-soul’), as a source of action or movement that brings these two elements together, turns out to be redundant, insofar as the conscious being (soul) is already capable of coming into union with the material thing without any extraneous agent. Why should then the argument mention the second conscious agent (‘meta-soul’) at all? The argument, aiming at proving god’s existence, would not make any sense because all one would require for a conjunction of, say, a man and a stick, would be the man alone who can take hold of the stick; similarly, oxen

²⁶³ PABh 1.1, p. 7.8–11: *anumānam api pratyakṣa-pūrvakam cittātmāntaḥ-karaṇa-sambandha-sāmagryam ca dharmādharma-prakāśa-deśa-kāla-codanādi-smṛti-hetukam utpatty-anugraha-tiro-bhāva-kālādi. taiś cōttara-sṛṣṭi-kartṛtvam anumīyate kāraṇasya.*

²⁶⁴ See e.g. NV₁ 4.21, p. 461.11–13 (*vide supra*, n. 136).

²⁶⁵ See Plato’s belief that planets must have a soul, or a conviction shared by the Ionians. According to what Aristotle relates, ‘Also Thales, according to what is recorded about him, seems to have held that soul is a mover, since he said that the lodestone has a soul because it moves the iron.’—*De Anima*, 1.2; 405a19: εἰτε δὲ καὶ Θαλῆς ἐξ ὧν ἀπομνημονεύουσι κινητικόν τι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπολαβεῖν, εἴπερ τὴν λιθὸν ἔφη ψυχὴν ἔχειν, ὅτι τὸν σίδηρον κινεῖ.

can easily approach a cart on their own and push it (not draw it, though). In this way, one could easily dispense with any higher agent, and the argument would fail.

My hypothesis is, however, that what we really have here is a version of the argument from the first mover (*vide supra*, p. 303). It states that, indeed, any conjunction (which by definition requires movement), including that of an unconscious thing and a conscious being, is initiated by the conscious being; a series of such events of conjunctions brings us to an initial situation when the souls are, for whatever reason it might be (here it is the *pralaya*), inactive and cannot exercise their capacity to bring about any conjunction. Therefore, there must be a first mover that initiates first motion and capacitates the souls. Accordingly, the argument begins to make a perfect sense when interpreted in the context of the dissolution of the world, when souls' all capacities are dormant. Also the example of the ox and cart would make perfect sense under this view: it is not merely about a n y conjunction of the ox and cart, but the yoking of the ox, which requires some p r i o r d e s i g n of the agent that accomplishes it. Thus, god is the initial agent who brings movement into the world.

Again, also here we may speak of a direct exchange between the Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika and the Pāśupatas. What was already taken for granted by Praśastapāda as requiring no explicit proof finds its formulation in the two anonymous arguments cited by the author of the *Yukti-dīpikā*.

This brief review of mutual influences between the doctrine of the Pāśupatas and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika shows that the admission of god, alongside the package of the corollaries, was no coincidence or inner development in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools but one of such influences from the theistic partner.

A good summary of the above discussion could be the opinion of George CHEMPARATHY (1965: 124–125):

‘... [H]e (i.e. the author of YDī—P.B.) then passes on to refute the Īśvara doctrine of the Vaiśeṣikas, where he shows that the author of the Vaiśeṣikasūtras did not accept the doctrine of Īśvara, but that it was introduced by the Pāśupatas into the system. ... Further it seems reasonable to conclude that these proofs, though they appear in formulations foreign to the Vaiśeṣika terminology, might have been accepted by the early Vaiśeṣikas as proofs for the existence of Īśvara, when as we learn from the Yuktidīpikā, the Īśvara doctrine was accepted into the system from the Pāśupatas...’

Perhaps, the attenuation of the rigidity, or mechanicity, of moral law was not felt as a genuine problem by the Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika because they had already adopted to the idea of the transfer of merit and demerit, which also seems to stand in opposi-

tion to rigour of karmic retribution. Obviously such a concept of the ceding, to or from others, of one's moral responsibilities and retributions for committed deeds was not in accord with the doctrine of *karman* conceived by the early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers. It did harmonise, however, with the new idea that the accrued *karman* could be suspended. It seems also that such a belief in the transfer of merit and demerit paved the way to the latter idea.

It is especially the third chapter of the *Pāśupata-sūtra* which describes how a Pāśupata adept can absorb another person's merit and give away his own demerit and take hold of the merit of others by his provoking, obscene or otherwise unusual behaviour that arouses contempt (*avamāna*) for him in, say, bystanders.²⁶⁶ Again, the idea was that one can manipulate one's own *karman* through various ascetic practices, and merit as well demerit may be, respectively, appropriated from and ceded to others, even without their knowledge or consent. Such unusual practices of the Pāśupatas might have made the philosophers of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika receptive of the laxity of the system of karmic retribution, which had apparently been treated as rigid. They no longer saw it problematic that accumulated *karman* could be transferred by them or its operation simply withheld for some time, during the dissolution of the world, by god.

5.3. Final word

To conclude, the knowability thesis—i.e. the equation: 'existentiality = nameability = cognisability'—was adopted by the Vaiśeṣika at the time of, or slightly prior to Praśastapāda. Its necessary complements were the following three ideas: god's existence, god's omniscience and supernatural perception, and these two entered Vaiśeṣika around the same time, i.e. late fifth century, although the belief in god's existence became a tenet of the Nyāya dogmatics slightly earlier since it was known already to Vātsyāyana Pakṣilasvāmin.

It seems rather certain that the main reason for the Vaiśeṣika to adopt the knowability thesis were not philosophical concerns but their religious belief in god and the knowability thesis was principally an *o f f s h o t* of their theistic belief, not a result of purely rational, philosophical enquiry. The theistic influence came from the side of the Pāśupatas: most probably some thinkers of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika were primarily followers of the Pāśupata doctrine and took the existence of god as something obvious that needed no rational proof (probably being something 'perceived'

²⁶⁶ See Daniel H.H. INGALLS (1962): 'The Pāśupata Sūtra lays stress on the transfer of sin and merit' (p. 293). INGALLS (1962: 285–291) provides a translation of the third chapter of PāśS.

or sensed through ascetic practices). Perhaps the influence was possible thanks to their family or regional background. A conceivable possibility is that, having been brought up, or having grown up, in a religious environment influenced by the worldview of the Pāsupatas they underwent some training in methodology and logic under the supervision of a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika master and eventually joined the ranks of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers. But this is just a hypothesis, albeit a very probable one in Indian social context, for which I have no irrefutable proof at present.

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