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THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF THE *NAYA* METHOD OF
THE JAINAS*

The (usually) sevenfold method of conditionally valid predications, known as the doctrine of viewpoints (*naya-vāda*), constitutes an important element of the Jaina theory of multiplexity of reality (*anekānta-vāda*), perhaps the best known and certainly the most interesting and most vehemently criticised Jaina contribution to Indian philosophy. A detailed exposition and comprehensive analysis of the *anekānta-vāda* – that would also comprise the relation of the *naya-vāda* to its two complementary procedures, viz. the method of the four standpoints (*nikṣepa-vāda*, *nyāsa-vāda*) and the method of the seven-fold modal description (*sapta-bhaṅgī*, *syād-vāda*) – is beyond the scope of this paper. Here, I wish to propose a certain interpretative basis for the doctrine of the often misinterpreted *naya-vāda*, as the main objective of the paper. In my analysis, I shall deliberately – in order to avoid addressing an over-generalised notion of ‘the *naya* doctrine of the Jainas’, which would be a *śāśa-viśāna*-like *kalpanā* – refer mostly to the particular understanding of the theory of the *nayas* as it is recorded in Umāsvāti’s¹ *Tattvārthādhigama-bhāṣya*, Siddhasena Divākara’s *Sammati-tarka-prakaraṇa*,² Siddharsigani’s *Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti* and Malliṣeṇa’s *Syād-vāda-mañjarī*, and only occasionally to other Jaina works (e.g. Yaśovijaya’s *Jaina-tarka-bhāṣā*). It is only afterwards that we can see if precisely the same model is shared by other Jaina thinkers.

Ontologically speaking, the theory of multiplexity of reality (*anekānta-vāda*) rests on the conviction that the world forms a complex structure, every part of which enters into specific relations and interdependencies with other parts of the complex whole. The conviction that things relate to each other by an infinite number of relations also has recourse to the specific concept of substance (*dravya*) as being characterised by origination (*utpāda*), continued existence (*sthiti*) and annihilation (*bhaṅga*) and being endowed with qualities (*guṇa*), modes (*paryāya*) and with directly experienced and verbally inexpressible transient occurrences (*vivarta*, *vartanā*). Accordingly, no facet of reality, no entity or event should be analysed without its individual ontological context, as if abstracted from its temporal, spatial, causal and other

relations; at the same time a vast range of properties can be predicated of a given entity with equal right, in so far as each of them seems equally justified due to the infinite manifoldness of inter-dependencies, including various temporal and spatial perspectives. An attempt to express this complex structure of interrelations has – one might have the impression – necessarily led to contradictions. Such contradictions however can easily be resolved, according to the Jainas, when individual points of reference for each and every assertion are taken into consideration and they cease to be unconditional.³

Thus, on the epistemological level, each thesis automatically entails its antithesis: no thing can ever be absolutely predicated of, or even be known, by way of dichotomic categories of big – small, good – bad, existent – nonexistent, true – false, etc. The model cannot be described as dialectical, however, in so far as the synthesis is still contingent upon its corollaries being rooted in the same scheme of interdependencies.⁴ Despite the fact that any assertoric sentence can only be relatively true,⁵ this is by no means tantamount to professing scepticism. The Jainas are quite explicit that truth is warranted not only through cognitive criteria (*pramāṇa*), but also thanks to the feasibility of omniscience (*kevala*), that transcends all seeming contradictions that ensue from relative assertions.⁶

The impossibility of uttering an unconditionally valid statement about reality, which is the direct consequence of the epistemically relative status of every predication, could theoretically lead to at least one more – beside scepticism – approach of an all-inclusive, positive character.⁷ Two contradictory conclusions derived from one and the same thesis do not have to falsify the initial thesis (e.g., ‘things arise from a cause,’ ‘there is motion,’ ‘there is time,’ ‘there is a part and the whole,’ etc.). Such two seemingly contradictory conclusions should only make us aware of the fact that they may – and indeed do – pertain to different contexts.

Similarity to the Nyāya realistic standpoint that there is nothing in our consciousness, even images in the state of dreaming, that is bereft of any objective basis, viz. that is purely a figment of our conceptualisation, as the Vijñāna-vādin would like it, the Jaina hold that some justification and objective basis (a kind of rational *ālambana*) in the world can be found for every statement about the world. Furthermore, one and the same sentence uttered in two different points of time or with two different intentions, i.e., as having two different points of reference, is no longer the same sentence, but acquires a *homonymic* character. That also explains *mutatis mutandis* why one may utter a couple of sentences

with regard to one and the same object or event that only seemingly contradict each other, whereas in fact each of them emphasises another aspect of the same thing and expresses the object from its distinctive perspective. It is only owing to inherent limitations of the language that any proposition about an entity – whose ontological correlations are in fact infinite, hence directly inexpressible – seems to yield falsehood, when taken unconditionally. The *nayas* are precisely such an attempt to determine the truth-value of a proposition by its contextualisation within a given universe of conceivable points of reference. This is accomplished – as I shall try to demonstrate – with the help of *progressive* indexation, and each viewpoint (*naya*) delimits the context by introducing indices of spatial co-ordinates, temporal factors, linguistic convention, etc.

Conditionally valid viewpoints were considered to operate within the purview of, and to corroborate, the theory of multiplexity of reality. From the very beginnings of Jaina epistemology,⁸ they coexisted with cognitive criteria (*pramāṇa*) as an alternative epistemic instrument.⁹ Thus, to grasp reality by means of conditionally valid viewpoints is as justified epistemologically as to cognise through cognitive criteria (*pramāṇa*), though there are undeniably crucial differences between these two modes of cognitive activity. Cognitive criteria, as the criteria of validity and reliability of our cognition, are thought to describe universally possible noetic procedures that would ensure the acquisition of truth, whereas conditionally valid predications seem to be an attempt to contextualise any given utterance. In other words, conditionally valid predications (*naya*) express an implicit conviction that a particular sentence or utterance functions within its given individual context and it is only within the confines delineated by this context that the sentence retains its veracity.

The assumption of the manifold character of reality is thought by the Jainas to imply that every situation can be viewed from infinite angles, and each and every one of such perspectives can be reflected in language. Accordingly, one may predicate of any situation a – theoretically infinite¹⁰ – number of predications, each of them being only conditionally valid, viz. restricted to its particular angle; but traditionally only seven basic conditionally valid viewpoints are distinguished: (1) the comprehensive viewpoint (*naigama*), (2) the collective (*saṅgraha*), (3) the empirical (*vyavahāra*), (4) the direct (*rju-sūtra*), (5) the verbal (*śabda*), (6) the etymological (*samabhirūḍha*) and (7) the factual (*evambhūta*, *ittham-bhāva*). The septuplet is occasionally claimed to exhaust all possibilities of the predicating of an object and to make use of all conceivable optional perspectives an object could be viewed from.¹¹

These are further grouped into two major classes, and two such classifications are most common. The first model subsumes the first three *nayas* under the substantial, or substance-expressive viewpoint (*dravyârthika-naya*, *dravyâstika-naya*), and the remaining four under the attributive, or mode-expressive viewpoint (*paryâyârthika-naya*, *paryâyâstika-naya*).¹² The second model classifies the first four under the heading of the object-bound viewpoint, ‘operating by means of object’ (*artha-dvâreṇa [pravṛtta]*), and the remaining three under the speech-bound viewpoint, ‘operating by means of speech element’ (*śabda-dvâreṇa [pravṛtta]*).¹³ Occasionally the purely sevenfold division is found as well, viz. the cases when the seven viewpoints are no longer organised into larger units.¹⁴


Since the seven viewpoints have been frequently dealt with,¹⁵ a more detailed description here seems unnecessary. For the sake of convenience, I render here two relevant passages of *Tattvârthâdhigama-bhâṣya* that form quite a handy introduction to the problem:

- I: ‘[1] Speech elements that are expressed in inhabited localities (*sc.* colloquially) [have] their meaning; and the comprehension of [such a] meaning of speech elements [is what] the comprehensive viewpoint, which grasps collectively partial [denotations of a speech element, consists in]. [2] The collective viewpoint is the synthesising of one facet out of all [possible facets] of things. [3] The empirical viewpoint has an extended meaning, similar to [the way] common people [understand it], as in the conventional practice. [4] The comprehension by way of the denotative acts concerning the existent and present objects is the direct viewpoint. [5–7] The denoting according to the meaning is the verbal viewpoint. [5] The cognition of an object through a speech element already well-known on [account of] such [categories like] name etc. is the accurate [verbal viewpoint]. [6] The variance (*sc.* denial of any equivalence) among existing meanings is the etymological viewpoint. [7] The factual viewpoint [refers] to the momentary manifestation [of an object] and to the meaning [of the word denoting it].’¹⁶
- II: ‘[1] When one says “pot” what [is meant] is this particular substance (*sc.* thing) produced by the effort [of a pot-maker], with a rounded, elongated neck [and] a rounded edge at the top [as well as] with a spherical container below, [which is] suited for fetching and carrying water etc., [and has been] finished off by secondary operations [like baking]. [Accordingly,] the comprehensive viewpoint [consists in] the comprehension without [making] any distinction between such an individual [thing] furnished with particular features or [things]

belonging to its class.¹⁷ [2] The collective viewpoint [consists in] the comprehension of, [say,] present, past and future pots, distinguished by the name and other [standpoints (*nikṣepa*)], whether with regard to one [individual] or to many [things belonging to its class].¹⁸ [3] The empirical viewpoint [consists in] the comprehension of precisely such [present, past and future things like pots, grasped by the collective viewpoint], comprehensible to common people and experts, [and] accessible to the conventional practice just as they are gross objects.¹⁹ [4] The direct viewpoint [consists in] the comprehension of precisely such [particular things grasped by the empirical viewpoint] which are existent [here] (*sc.* which are being perceived here) and are present (existing now).²⁰ [5] The accurate verbal viewpoint [consists in] the comprehension of precisely those [objects, grasped by means of the direct viewpoint, like] pots, that are present, that comprise one of [such categories like] name etc. [and] that are already well-known.²¹ [6] The etymological viewpoint [consists in] the variance (*sc.* lack of any equivalence) in the understanding of precisely such present [particular things grasped by the accurate verbal viewpoint], like [the case of two expressions:] “contemplation” and “meditation”.²² [7] The factual [viewpoint] means the grasping of the meaning mutually dependent on subtle momentary manifestation [of an object] and the meaning [of the word denoting it, but] only [in the case] of these [present objects grasped by the etymological viewpoint].^{23,24}


What is conspicuous in the above account of the sevenfold description is that each viewpoint is directly related to the one preceding it and represents a further restriction of the point of reference. This fact is clearly pointed out for instance by Umāsvāti, who consistently relates every subsequent viewpoint with the one preceding it (*teṣv eva, teṣv eva satsu, teṣv eva sāmprateṣu, teṣām eva, teṣām eva sāmpratānām*, etc.) and who emphasises the hierarchical, subordinating relation that links and arranges the viewpoints according to the scope of their respective contexts. The gradual decrease of the field of reference is conjoined with the ongoing specification of the context, with progressive enrichment of the linguistic tools, with the growth of the potential of the language and with the precision of expression. It is emphasised that contradictions involved in this theory are only apparent, in so far as each of the utterances has a different point of reference.²⁵ What is significant is that not some abstract, eternal sentences are dealt with in the method of conditionally valid predications, but particular concrete utterances pronounced in a particular situation.

Now, in view of the Jaina theory of multiplexity of reality, the problem arises how far the respective viewpoints (*nayas*) are true, since they refer to one property of a thing that by its nature is endowed with infinite properties. Cognitive criteria convey the truth by nature, in so far as they grasp ‘objects possessed of infinite properties.’²⁶ But in verbal practice, every statement is by necessity restricted to one aspect, in accord with the maxim, frequently repeated in NAV.: ‘all utterances function with a restriction.’²⁷ Is, therefore, partial truth a truth at all? There would not be any doubt in the case of a statement that would in one breath reveal the whole truth about an object, viz. all its facets.²⁸ However, it is a practical impossibility to accomplish this in one sentence or expression; all we have at our disposal are verbal means that allow us to single out only one property at a time.²⁹ Would that mean that in our daily communication we deal with fiction and are doomed to communicate plain falsehoods? It is not merely practical demands of verbal communication that compel us to eventually admit the truth of such partial statements.³⁰ In fact, any such utterance that is destined to be partial could be an instantiation of a conditionally valid predication (*naya*). Accordingly, not every statement of partial reference we utter yields falsehood. The criterion of truth here is the contextual dependence of the utterance. As long a particular statement picks out one aspect without rejecting all its ramifications it remains true.³¹ Therefore, neither is ‘the relation characterised by the association of the denotatum and the denoter’ (*vācya-vācaka-bhāva-lakṣaṇa-sambandha*) a one-to-one relation, nor is determining the truth-value of an utterance a straightforward process of the sort:




To pose an unimaginatively trivial question: Is the Sanskrit sentence *Devadatto 'sti* [‘Devadatta is.’] true or false? Is it an existential proposition? Is the predicate (e.g., ‘tall’, ‘fat’ etc.) perhaps not expressed? Certainly, what we lack is its context. What if ‘for instance, to a person standing at the door, etc., [leading] into a hall filled with many people, with his mind wobbling: “Is there possibly Devadatta here or is [he] not?,” someone says, e.g.: “Devadatta is [here]!”’³² In this particular context, the statement *Devadatta is* ‘merely excludes his possible non-existence [in this place, it does] not [exclude] other people’ (*tad-asambhava-mātram vyavacchinatti, na śeṣa-puruṣāntarāṇi*).

Siddharṣiṅgaṇi explicitly states that to determine the truth-value of an utterance we have to take into account at least the intention of the speaker and the linguistic convention,³³ beside the denoter-denotatum relation.³⁴ Thus, the scheme would be more or less as follows:




Model 2.

To account for other factors that determine the context, the provisional scheme of interpreting an utterance might look as follows, whereby $x_1, x_2 \dots x_n$ stand for additional factors (alluded to e.g. in NAV.29.28 by *prayoktr-abhiprāyādi*, and in SVM.28.56–60, p. 161.13: *vaktur abhiprayānām*):



Model 3.

The method of the seven viewpoints (*naya-vāda*) is meant to provide a consistent framework for interpreting utterances, for the septuplet of the *nayas* is held to comprise all such interpretative factors (see p. 3 and n. 11). This bold claim does not, even though it may seem at first to do so, stand in contradiction with the general opinion that, since the multi-faceted reality has infinite attributes, there are infinite ways (*nayas*) of expressing them. Any partial statement, which is by definition context-dependent, is said to represent ‘an incomplete account’ (*vikalādeśa*) and its point of reference is delimited by a particular *naya*.³⁵ Accordingly, the seven conditionally valid predications subsume all such context-modifiers as ‘intention, linguistic convention, etc.’ under one heading, or category, and serve as indices, or context-indicators (parameters), in what seems to be the model that adequately represents the *naya*-scheme (Model 4).



Model 4.

From the exposition of the conditionally valid predications, it is apparent that an utterance is not simply either true or false, but in order to ascertain its truth-value one has to determine the situation it tends to describe, viz. the context in which it is communicated. In other words one should ascribe the utterance to a specified viewpoint type. The above model comprises all meaningful context-indicators under the index *i*. The interpretation of an utterance is arrived at, or its truth-value obtains – not directly since it is not a binary function (utterance \rightarrow truth-value) – through the intermediary of context-defining parameters. Formally speaking, the adequate context for an utterance is determined by means of indexation, and thereby only the utterance yields either truth or falsehood. By the so conceived context-based interpretation \mathcal{I}

of the utterances $\alpha, \beta, \gamma \dots$ belonging to a class \mathcal{F} of formulas we understand a simple model:

$$\mathcal{I} = \langle D, I, \mathbf{A} \rangle,$$

in which D is the domain of admissible interpretations (i.e., it represents a class of conceivable individuals denotable by the utterances $\alpha, \beta, \gamma \dots$); I is a class of indices i delimiting the context (i.e., I indicates potential circumstances in which the utterances $\alpha, \beta, \gamma \dots$ might be meaningfully communicated); \mathbf{A} comprises i -indexed classes of actual denotata. In other words, \mathbf{A}_i is a particular class indexed with a given $i \in I$, or the i -interpreted class, which groups actual individuals that find themselves in circumstances described by an index i . The truth-value of the i -interpreted utterance α – viz. either $\|\alpha\|_i = 1$ for truth or $\|\alpha\|_i = 0$ for falsity – depends on the *actual* context represented by the circumstances delimited by elements of the class I (indices) in the interpretation \mathcal{I} .

The archetypal index of what we may call *the CATLES model* is circumscribed by the following co-ordinates:

$$(I) \quad i = \langle c, a, t, l, e, s \rangle,$$

where the variable c refers to the class $C \in D$ of possible denotata of the utterances $\alpha, \beta, \gamma \dots$; the variable a designates a particular individual selected from the class C circumscribed with the index c , viz. a is an element of the class C ; the variable t specifies the point of time of the reference (viz. the present moment);³⁶ the variable l stands for the prevalent linguistic convention in accordance with which a given utterance $\alpha, \beta, \gamma \dots$ is used and understood (i.e., l confines the means of denoting a given individual to a set of conventionally chosen expressions); the variable e indicates the etymology or other verbal means accountable for the diversification of the meaning of apparent synonymical expressions $\alpha, \beta, \gamma \dots$ (viz., e describes an equivalence relation between etymology or derivation of a given word and its meaning; thus, for the range of expressions $\alpha, \beta, \gamma \dots$ we have three different co-ordinates $e_\alpha, e_\beta, e_\gamma \dots$); the variable s represents the present status of the individual that is the denotatum of either α, β or $\gamma \dots$, viz., its present state in which it *actually* manifests the quality denoted by either α, β or $\gamma \dots$.

In the case of the first conditionally valid predicative type, viz. the comprehensive viewpoint (*naigama*) – according to the proposed interpretation – the parameters of the index defining the context of

the utterances $\alpha, \beta, \gamma \dots$ remain indeterminate: the interpretation is completely open. Every subsequent viewpoint, however, introduces one new indexical co-ordinate to the index compound and thereby particularises the circumstances the utterance refers to. This situation may be portrayed as follows:

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| 1. the comprehensive (<i>naigama</i>): | $i = \langle \rangle$ |
| 2. the collective (<i>saṅgraha</i>): | $i = \langle c \rangle$ |
| 3. the empirical (<i>vyavahāra</i>): | $i = \langle c, a \rangle$ |
| 4. the direct (<i>ṛju-sūtra</i>): | $i = \langle c, a, t \rangle$ |
| 5. the verbal (<i>śabda</i>): | $i = \langle c, a, t, l \rangle$ |
| 6. the etymological (<i>samabhirūḍha</i>): | $i = \langle c, a, t, l, e \rangle$ |
| 7. the factual (<i>evam-bhūta</i>): | $i = \langle c, a, t, l, e, s \rangle$ |

Model 5.

Now, one may wonder why Siddhasena Divākara does not include the comprehensive viewpoint (*naigama*) in his classification of the *nayas* in STP. at all? I suppose one of the reasons is its non-specific character, or in a way its contextlessness, which finds its materialisation in what has been analysed as the empty contents of the *naigama* index $i = \langle \rangle$ above.

Alternatively, the archetypal index may be described as follows:

$$(I^*) \quad i = \langle c, \{t, x, y, z\}, p, l, e, s \rangle,$$

the only difference being that the individual selected from the class c would be specified – instead of the variable a – by means of the quaternary $\{t, x, y, z\}$ that assigns temporal-spatial co-ordinates to the individual (here the point of reference would be either in the past, present or future), since it is customarily adopted to refer to an individual by the parameters delimiting the individual's position in space and time. Such being the case, the present time variable t of (I) would have to be replaced by the variable p .

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. the comprehensive (<i>naigama</i>): | $i = \langle \rangle$ |
| 2. the collective (<i>saṅgraha</i>): | $i = \langle c \rangle$ |
| 3. the empirical (<i>vyavahāra</i>): | $i = \langle c, \{t, x, y, z\} \rangle$ |

4. the direct (*rju-sūtra*): $i = \langle c, \{t, x, y, z\}, p \rangle$
 5. the verbal (*śabda*): $i = \langle c, \{t, x, y, z\}, p, l \rangle$
 6. the etymological (*samabhirūḍha*): $i = \langle c, \{t, x, y, z\}, p, l, e \rangle$
 7. the factual (*evam-bhūta*): $i = \langle c, \{t, x, y, z\}, p, l, e, s \rangle$

*Model 5**.

Nevertheless, I believe that Interpretation (I) and Model 5 is more accurate than Interpretation (I*) and Model 5*, in so far as at the empirical stage (*vyavahāra*) the time factor may remain unspecified, whereas Model 5* assigns a certain value to t .

In what we have called the CATLES model, the domain D of possible interpretations of the utterances $\alpha, \beta, \gamma \in \mathcal{F}$ is mapped onto the class \mathbf{A} of actual denotata *via* the context delimited by $i \in I$. Thus, the truth-value of the utterances $\alpha, \beta, \gamma \dots$ interpreted in \mathcal{I} at the point of reference i is represented by $\|\alpha\|_i^{\mathcal{I}}, \|\beta\|_i^{\mathcal{I}}, \|\gamma\|_i^{\mathcal{I}} \dots$ respectively.

As expected, these interpretations – being consistent with theory of multiplex character of reality (*anekānta-vāda*) – are non-exclusive and admit of seeming contradictions. To take the Devadatta Example 1 of NAV.29 (see p. 384 and n. 32), we may ask whether the answers Yes ($\alpha = \text{Devadatto 'sti}$) and No ($\neg\alpha = \text{Devadatto nāsti}$) given to the question: ‘Is there possibly Devadatta?’ (*Devadattaḥ samasti?*), really stand in contradiction to each other? For instance, the reply Yes may indicate the situation

$$E1 \quad \|\text{Devadatto 'still}\|_i^{\mathcal{I}} = 1 \text{ (for } i = \textit{naigama}),$$

viz. the affirmative answer to the non-specific question: ‘Is there at all any Devadatta somewhere, either an individual or a group of people?’ At the same time, the reply No may be interpreted as

$$E1' \quad \|\text{Devadatto 'still}\|_i^{\mathcal{I}} = 0 \text{ (} i = \textit{rju-sūtra}),$$

viz. the negative answer to the specific question: ‘Is there this particular Devadatta here and now?’

Accordingly, one may consistently express *Devadatto 'sti* (α) and *Devadatto nāsti* ($\neg\alpha$) without contradiction, in so far as what one actually expresses is $\alpha_i^{\mathcal{I}} \wedge \neg\alpha_i^{\mathcal{I}}$, and not $\alpha \wedge \neg\alpha$. What is meant is this: ‘There are Devadattas alive in the world. But there is none here

and now.' Thus, the claim of multi-faceted reality (*anekānta*) seems to be safeguarded.

Another interesting feature is underscored in the following comparison in Example 2–2':

$$E2 \quad \|Devadatto \text{ 'still}'\|_i^T = 0$$

'Is there any Devadatta, either an individual or a group of people?' – No, for $i = naigama$.

$$E2' \quad \|Devadatto \text{ 'still}'\|_i^T = 1$$

'Is there this particular Devadatta here and now?' – Yes, for $i = \text{?}ju\text{-sūtra}$.

The above combination of E2 and E2' would in my opinion be impossible, for it is counterintuitive to say that 'There have never been, there are no and there will be no Devadattas alive in the world. But there is one here and now.'

The rule would be that a meaningful assertion of a more specific *naya* is warranted by the non-falsity of the more general, viz. less specific viewpoint, or the necessary condition for meaningfulness (not simply for truth or falsity) of the specific *naya* is the truth of the more comprehensive *naya*. In other words, the falsity of the more general *naya* precludes the truth of the more specific one. Perhaps that would be the Jaina solution of the paradox of the seemingly tautological statement that 'a square circle is a circle':

$$E3 \quad \|*cakram \text{ catur-aśraka-cakram}\|_i^T = 0 \text{ [for } i = naigama\text{]}$$

At the non-specific level of the comprehensive viewpoint there exists no circle that is a square circle. Hence it must follow that:

$$E3' \quad \|*cakram \text{ catur-aśraka-cakram}\|_i^T = 0 \text{ [for } i = saṅgraha\text{]}$$

At the Level 2 of the collective viewpoint there is no class of circles that are square circles. Consequently it necessarily follows that:

$$E3'' \quad \|*cakram \text{ catur-aśraka-cakram}\|_i^T = 0 \text{ [for } i = vyavahāra\text{]}$$

At the Level 3 of the empirical viewpoint there is no single circle that is a square circle, etc.

The Devadatta example of NAV.29 mentioned above (p. 8 and n. 32) highlights one more important aspect, namely both the intentional and indexical character of any posed question, not only of any utterance.

Not only statements but also questions must always refer to a *particular* context in order to be meaningful (the maxim ‘all utterances function with a restriction’).

Another problem is how to view the above CATLES model of the *nayas*. I do not think this is a hierarchical, layered structure of different levels of description in the sense of different ‘languages of metaphysics’. What the *naya* model is about is not that we chose a level of description to represent the world in terms of either ordinary physical objects or ideal entities, either names and properties and relations or atomic arrangements, either wholes or configurations of some momentary constituents of reality, etc. In my opinion the *nayas* are indices, or parameters that help us determine the relevant context for utterances, and thus to assign the truth-values to them. Let us have a look at the following passages of the *Jaina-tarka-bhāṣā*: (1) ‘Thus, the applied viewpoints grasp the particular and the non-applied viewpoints grasp the universal. Among them, from the perspective of the applied viewpoint all venerable liberated beings have the same form, however from the perspective of the non-applied viewpoint the beings who have become liberated in one, two or three instants are equal only to those beings who have become liberated in the same instant as theirs.’³⁷ or (2) ‘Among them, the four viewpoints such as the direct viewpoints etc. accept the predominance of the activity characterised by [the right] conduct alone, because it alone is the immediate cause for liberation. However, even though the comprehensive, collective and empirical viewpoints accept that the triad of [the right] conduct, scriptural testimony and predilection for truth [constitute] the cause of liberation. . .’³⁸ As we can see, in all instances the same referring terms are used, only their meanings are specified accordingly to the context. It is not the situation of the shift in terms of various levels of description, e.g. from the level of description in terms of gross objects to the level of description in terms of atoms and quanta; the shift from one *naya* to another is an approximation and specification of the meaning, without any change in terminology. In the process of specification, we do not switch from the language of physical things such as liberated beings (*siddha*), black bees (*śyāma-bhramara*)³⁹ and scriptural testimony to the language of their elements or atomic components such as mental states and noetic occurrences (instead of the *siddhas*), five constitutive colours instead of the black colour of the bee (*bhramarasya pañca-varṇāḥ*) or constitutive underlying scriptural testimony (e.g. respective tenets and moral code prescribed by the scripture). Thus the metaphysical level of description remains the same and we are still in the same world. There are more

examples to be found in JTBh.2 §8, pp. 15–29 of similar sort that instantiate how the viewpoints function.

We may however speak of levels of description in a qualified sense, i.e. as a convenient verbal way of referring to events that is an approximation of relating to referents tokened by a *naya*-index. I shall henceforth refer to the indexicalisation or parameterisation model by the term ‘indexed level of description’ in this qualified sense for the sake of convenience.

To recapitulate, what is taken into account by the comprehensive viewpoint (*naigama-naya*), i.e. in the first indexed level of description, is a complex of meanings and connotations evoked by an utterance, irrespective of either distinctive features of individuals or of constitutive characteristics representative of a given class. In other words, the viewpoint comprises *indiscriminately* both the particular and the universal: it grasps a given phenomenon in a most general way and takes recourse to a possibly extensive, all-inclusive context, which is referred to by a particular utterance. The truth-value of an utterance is not directly dependent on the context of the utterance. Clearly, what is meant here is a colloquial, unreflected usage of an unspecified reference, which is at the same time non-indexical. Apparently it is because of its non-indexicality that the comprehensive viewpoint is conspicuously absent from STP. Later, the viewpoint was taken to demarcate the limits of meaningful discourse: ‘The comprehensive [viewpoint] . . . has as [its] scope existence and non-existence.’⁴⁰

As the second step, the scope of the comprehensive viewpoint (*naigama-naya*) is narrowed down by excluding the particular and laying stress on the universal alone. Thus, the collective viewpoint (*saṅgraha-naya*), i.e. the second indexed level of description, pertains cumulatively to a whole class of individuals, which constitutes the denotation of a given utterance, and thereby it forms a basis for any taxonomical analysis.

In the third indexed level of description, the point of reference is further limited to such individual things, or elements of a class, that are directly amenable to practical activity. Since we can practically deal only with a particular specimen of the whole class of objects in everyday practice (*vyavahāra*), not with the whole class, it is the individual thing that is selected for practical purposes. And we directly refer to it by means of a linguistic unit of general denotation that corresponds to the respective class and the truth-value of which is assigned through the empirical viewpoint (*vyavahāra-naya*), viz. from the nominalist perspective. That is why – especially in early analyses (e.g. TBh.) – the commonplace aspect (*laukika*) and the conventional practice prevalent

among people (*lokôpacāra*) are said to be emphasised in this case. Eventually, the practical aspect means the feasibility, on the part of an object, to become the object of human activity.

Successively the direct viewpoint (*rju-sūtra*) views things according to their transitory properties and modes and provisionally neglects their incontrovertible substantial nature and existence as substrata of those properties and modes. In this way, the fourth indexed level of description narrows the point of reference down to the temporal manifestation of an individual, which is concurrent with the instant characterised by the action or by the event of the individual thing exhibiting the transient aspect that is being expressed by the utterance. As a rule this is the present moment, viz. the moment of articulating the speech units.

The fifth indexed level of description, viz. the verbal viewpoint (*śabda-naya*), or the accurate verbal viewpoint (*sāmprata-śabda-naya*) as Umāsvāti would like it, inserts still another index of purely verbal reference based on linguistic convention. Here the intentional differentiation between meanings of synonymical expressions, based on different derivation, grammatical construction, syntactical relation, etc., is neglected. The recognition of the prevalent linguistic convention is tantamount to the linguistic flexibility derived from freedom to use a variety of expressions to denote one and the same event. Accordingly, saying that 'Falstaff met Mr. Ford' is tantamount to saying that 'Falstaff met Mr. Brook', or 'x follows y' and 'y is preceded by x' refer to the same arrangement of events, or Hesperus, as a 'western' star seen in the evening, and Phosphorus, a 'light-bringing' star seen in the morning, both refer to Venus.⁴¹ To assign the truth-value of an utterance expressing the identity, users of the language agree upon a conventionally determined selection of verbal expressions that denote a particular individual.

What happens in the sixth indexed level of description, in the case of the etymological viewpoint (*samabhirūḍha-naya*), is drawing the distinction among synonymous expressions or (apparent) coreferential utterances, which have up to now been considered equivalent. To cite the well-known example (NAV. 29), although three epithets in an indiscriminating commonplace usage pertain to one and the same god, nonetheless the name 'Indra' refers in fact to a divine sovereign, the appellation 'Śakra' describes a being possessed of might and the epithet 'Purandara' denotes a destroyer of strongholds etc., in the same manner as words like 'Indra', 'pot' or 'man' have different denotata.⁴²

The situation in Level 6 would be opposite to Level 5 of the verbal viewpoint: here synonyms do generate different reflections in mind.⁴³

This approach does not have to indicate that the different referents are necessarily different objects, but the referents can be different complex events, in other words this may still be one and the same thing (considered to be one and the same entity in Level 4 for instance) but involved in different activities or occurring in different contexts. The different mental reflections generated by verbal units would refer to different meaningful events, or different entanglements of one and the same object, but would not predetermine that two different events must necessarily refer to one and the same thing. For instance, Hesperus is indeed something different from Phosphorus, in so far as it is the evening star never seen in the morning nor in the east, whereas the 'light-bringing' Phosphorus is never seen in the evening. Still, Venus is something different from both Hesperus and Phosphorus, in so far as it shares both features of being seen in the morning and in the evening. In this way, we may say that eventually the three names – Hesperus, Phosphorus and Venus – have three different referents. What is understood by 'referent' in the contextualised model is no longer a physical entity as such, as if abstracted from the network of its relata, but always some complex event, made up of some substantial substratum (*dravya*) always co-occurring alongside its qualities (*guṇa*), modes (*paryāya*) and inexpressible transient occurrences (*vivarta*, *vartanā*). Similarly, in this level, there is room for two expressions 'Walter Scott' and 'The author of *Waverley*' to be able to have different referents in the above understanding, even though they would have the same referent in Level 5.

The narrowest, seventh indexed level of description exhausts the framework of possible points of reference, and the context of the factual viewpoint (*evam-bhūta*, *ittham-bhāva*) is the richest. That is why it is no longer irrelevant here which linguistic expressions we choose to refer to one and the same individual: we may apply only such a term with regard to a phenomenon which describes this phenomenon in its present condition most adequately or the etymology or grammatical derivation of which corresponds most closely to the present state of an object it refers to. This is the context to make distinction between the present state and power of a thing exhibited contemporaneously, on the one hand, and the inherent potentiality or extratemporaneous character of the thing, on the other. The viewpoint lays down the rule according to which, out of a series of synonyms, we select such a term in a given context which describes its denotatum in the *present* state in the closest possible way: the evening is the only time to see Hesperus.

That the *naya* method is indeed a hierarchical model in terms of decreasing scope of reference and increasing richness of information, precisely as the *CATLES* model of nested indices, is confirmed by Malliṣeṇa, who extensively quotes NAV.29, in the *Syād-vāda-mañjarī*:

‘Each preceding viewpoint has larger domain, whereas each subsequent [viewpoint] has [its] province [more and more] determined. The comprehensive [viewpoint] is more extensive in [its] province from the collective [viewpoint], which has as [its] province merely the existent, insofar as it has as [its] scope existence and non-existence. The collective [viewpoint] is larger from the empirical [viewpoint], which reveals an existent [particular] individual, insofar as it shows the amassment (sc. set) of all existent [individuals]. The empirical [viewpoint] has broader reference than the direct [viewpoint], which has as [its] province [only] the present [time], insofar as it rests on the province [made up of] the three times. The direct [viewpoint] has wider reference than the verbal [viewpoint], which shows different things by [reference to] the difference in tense (lit. time), etc., insofar as it comprehends what is contrary to that [scope of the verbal viewpoint]. The verbal [viewpoint] has more comprehensive province than the etymological [viewpoint], which takes separate synonymous expressions as [characterised by] difference of reference (denotata / meaning), insofar as it pertains to what is contrary to that [scope of the etymological viewpoint]. The etymological [viewpoint] has wider domain than the factual [viewpoint], which asserts that an object is different as [something possessed of its] specific activity. Likewise the account [based on] viewpoints, [when] it functions with regard to its province, follows the method of the seven-fold predication of affirmation and negation.’⁴⁴

We come across the idea of hierarchically organised model found in the above account frequently in other sources of later origin as well, e.g. in Yaśovijaya’s *Jaina-tarka-bhāṣā*.⁴⁵

The mention of the method of the seven-fold predication (*sapta-bhaṅgī*) in the passage is reminiscent of the *pramāṇa-sapta-bhaṅgī* discussed before in SVM.,⁴⁶ and concerns the relationship of the *naya* and the *pramāṇa*, on the one hand, and the relationship of the *naya* and the doctrine of the [seven-fold] modal description (*syād-vāda*): ‘However, cognitive criterion is characterised by the ascertainment of the correct reference (denotatum / meaning) [and] is of the nature of all viewpoints.’⁴⁷ Thus, the task of describing the proper context and purport of an utterance in a comprehensive manner is no longer with the *naya*, but is ceded to the *pramāṇa*.

Malliṣeṇa refers to the relationship concerning the proper viewpoint (*naya*), the defective viewpoint (*durnaya*) and the cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*) as follows: ‘[To say that] “x is exclusively existent” is the defective viewpoint. [To say that] “x is existent” is the [proper] viewpoint. [To say that] “x is in a certain sense existent” is the cognitive criterion.’⁴⁸ This differentiation is indeed momentous, for it concerns the role of the modal functor *syāt* (*kathaṃcit*) ‘in a certain sense, somehow’ and the correlation of the *naya-vāda* and *syād-vāda*. But this is the issue for another paper.

There is a remark to be made. It is my conviction that the model proffered in this paper accurately describes the structure of the doctrine of viewpoints (*naya-vāda*) as it is represented in *some* Jaina treatises. However, I do not claim that the model is either the ultimate interpretation (though I hope it to be a useful approximation) or the model that is valid for *all* instantiations of the *naya-vāda* we come across in Jaina literature. The *naya* theory came into existence in a gradual historical process, and therefore we may encounter various models with various authors. That is why we should be careful not to impose certain structures that hold valid in some cases onto all interpretations of the *nayas*. However, what is probably common to them all is, I believe, the general idea of a context-dependent analysis of utterances via a range of points of reference by narrowing down the context through successive stages. It was certainly an ingenious contribution to the philosophy of language and epistemology in general, with its interpretative force being directly proportional to the extent it was misunderstood by rival philosophical schools. With their pragmatic approach of context-dependent analyses of actual utterances, the Jainas seem to have anticipated the ideas to be found much later in CRESSWELL (1973), KAPLAN (1978), MONTAGUE (1970), SCOTT (1970) or STALNAKER (1970).

1. NOTES

* The main ideas found in this paper appeared for the first time in a succinct form in Polish in BALCEROWICZ (1994). The present paper was delivered at the *5th Bimal Matilal Conference on Indian Philosophy*, 27th January 2001, King's College, London.

¹ Since there is some controversy about the common authorship of the *sūtra* and the *bhāṣya*, I treat TS. (by Umāsvāmin?) and TBh. (by Umāsvāti?) separately not to predetermine the issue.

² Not to be confused with the author (Siddhasena Mahāmati?) of the *Nyāyavatāra*, who flourished after Dharmakīrti, see: BALCEROWICZ (1999), BALCEROWICZ (2000) and BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming/a).

³ TBh.1.35: *yathā vā pratyakṣānumānōpamānāpta-vacanaiḥ pramāṇair eko 'rthaḥ pramīyate sva-viśaya-niyamān na ca tā vipratipattayo bhavanti tadvan naya-vādā iti.*

⁴ In passing, this is precisely the scope for the method of *sapta-bhaṅgī*.

⁵ Cf. STP.1.21:

*tamhā savve vi ṇayā micchā-diṭṭhī sapakkha-paḍibaddhā/
aṇṇoṇṇa-ṇissīā uṇa havanti sammatta-sabbhāvā//*

⁶ This gave rise to such paradoxical contentions that ultimately truth is made up of all false statements, cf. STP.3.69:

*baddaṃ micchā-daṃsaṇa-samūha-māyassa amaya-sārassa/
jīna-vayaṇassa bhagavaō samvigga-suhāhigamassall*

⁷ To dispense with the soundness of discursive thinking altogether, characteristic for the negative approach of Nāgārjuna, would be the third conceivable approach.

⁸ Probably they were not the innovation of the Jainas, but were rather common

intellectual property shared by various groups of early Indian thinkers, including the Ājīvikas, cf. Sam.(1).147 (p. 86.9–10): *icceyāim satta parikkammāim sasamaīyāim satta ājīviyāim ccha caukkanaīyāim satta terāsiyāim*; and Sam V.(1).147 (fol. 130), p. 87.9–12 = Sam V.(2).147 (fol. 120): *ta eva cājīvikās trairāsīkā bhaṇitāḥ. kasmād? ucyate yasmāt te sarvaṃ try-ātmakam icchanti yathā: jīvo 'jīvo jīvājīvāḥ, loko 'loko lokālokaḥ, sad asat sad-asad ity evam-ādi naya-cintāyām api te tri-vidhaṃ nayaṃ icchanti, tad yathā: dravyārthikaḥ paryāyārthika ubhayārthikaḥ; ato bhaṇitāḥ: 'satta terāsiya' tti sapta parikkammāni trairāsīka-pākhaṇḍikās trividhayā naya-cintāyā cintayantīti arthaḥ. Cf. also BASHAM (1951: 174–181) and JAYATILLEKE (1963: 151–161, §§212–230).*

⁹ See Uttar.28.24:

*davvāṇa savva-bhāvā savva-pamāṇehi jassa uvaladdhā/
savvāhi naya-vihīhiṃ vitthāra-rūi tti nāyavoll,*

Cf. also TS.1.6: *pramāṇa-nayair tad-adhigamaḥ*; and JTBh.2 § 1: *pramāṇa-paricchinnasānanta-dharmātmakasya vastuna eka-deśa-grāhiṇas tad-itaram sāpratīksepīno 'dhyavasāya-viśeṣā nayāḥ.*

¹⁰ Cf. NAV.29.12: *saṃkhyayā punar anantā iti, ananta-dharmatvād vastunas, tad-eka-dharma-paryavasitābhiprāyānām ca nayatvāt, tathāpi cirantanācāryaiḥ sarva-saṅgrāhi-saptābhiprāya-parikalpanā-dvāreṇa sapta nayāḥ pratipādītāḥ*; and SVM.28.56–60 (p. 161.11–15): *nayās cānantāḥ. ananta-dharmatvād vastunas tad-eka-dharma-paryavastitānām vaktur abhiprāyānām ca nayatvāt tathā ca vṛddhāḥ. jāvaīyā vayaṇa-vaḥa tāvaīyā ceva hoṃti naya-vāyā/ [STP.3.47ab] iti.*

¹¹ Cf. NAV.29.13: *tad evaṃ na kaścid vikalpo 'sti vastu-gocarō yo 'tra naya-saptake nāntar-yātīti sarvābhiprāya-saṅgrāhaka ete iti sthitam.*

¹² Cf. e.g., STP.1.3 and STP.1.4–5:

*davvattīhiya-naya-payadī suddhā saṃgaha-parūvaṇāvisaḍ/
paḍirūve puṇa vayaṇa-ttha-nicchaḍ tassa vavahāroll
mūla-nimeṇaṃ pajjāva-nayassa ujjusūya-vayaṇa-vicchedol
tassa tu saddāṭā sāha-pasāhā suhuma-bheyā/*

See also PALV.6.74, p. 54.7–9: *tatra mūla-nayau dvau dravyārthika-paryāyārthika-bhedāt. tatra dravyārthikas tredhā naigama-saṅgraha-vyavahāra-bhedāt. paryāyārthikas caturdhā rju-sūtra-śabda-samabhirūḍhāvam-bhūta-bhedāt. It is entirely absent e.g. from Aṇuōga or Thāṇaṃga, TS. and TBh., NA. or NAV.*

¹³ E.g. NAV.29. The model is followed also in TS. in view of the explicit mention (TS.1.34) of the group *naigama-saṅgraha-vyavahāra-rju-sūtra* to which is appended the uniform *śabda* subcategory, that is subsequently subdivided in the aphorism of TS.1.35. Also TBh. seems to share the model not only because of the absolute absence of *dravyārthika-naya* and *paryāyārthika-naya*, but also because, in the introductory part (TBh.1.35, p. 32.13–17: *nigameṣu ye 'abhihitāḥ śabdās . . . evaṃ-bhūta iti.*), the viewpoints (5)–(7) are singled out by a special preliminary description of their common feature under the head *śabda* (*yathārthābhīdhānam śabdam*), and because, in the four recapitulatory verses on p. 35. 4–36.2 (esp. in verse 4cd, p. 36.2: *vidyād yathārtha-śabdāṃ viśeṣita-padaṃ tu śabda-nayam/*), the stress is laid on the *śabda* category differently.

¹⁴ E.g. Aṇuōga 606 (*satta mūla-nayā paṇṇattā. taṃ jahā – negame saṅgāhe vavahāre ujjusūḍe sadde samabhirūḍhe evāmbhūte*) = Thāṇaṃga 552.

¹⁵ E.g. by MATILAL (1981: 41–46). The passages mentioned in the present paper are discussed at length in BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming/b).

¹⁶ TBh.1.35 (p. 32.13–18): *nigameṣu ye 'abhihitāḥ śabdās teṣāṃ arthaḥ śabdārtha-parijñānaṃ ca deśa-samagra-grāhī naigamaḥ. arthānām sarvāika-deśa-saṅgrahaṇaṃ saṅgrahaḥ. laukika-sama upacāra-prāyo viśīrtārtho vyavahāraḥ. satām sāmpratānām arthānām abhidhāna-parijñānaṃ rju-sūtraḥ. yathārthābhīdhānam śabdām. nāmādiṣu*

prasiddha-pūrvāc chabdād arthe pratyayah sāmprataḥ. satsv artheṣv asaṁkramah samabhirūḍhaḥ. vyañjanārthayor evaṁ-bhūta iti.

¹⁷ Cf. NAV.29.13: *tatrāpi ye paraspara-viśakalītau sāmānya-viśeṣāv icchanti tat-samudāya-rūpo naigamaḥ*; as well as NAV.29.23: *vyavahāro 'pi sarvaḥ pradhānōpasarjana-dvāreṇa kathañcid itarētāvinirluḥita-sāmānya-viśeṣa-sādhyā eva; na hi sāmānyam doha-vāhādi-kriyāyām upayujyate, viśeṣāṅām eva tatrōpayogān, nāpi viśeṣā eva tat-kāriṇaḥ, gotva-sūnyānām teṣām vrkṣādy-aviśiṣṭatayā tat-karaṇa-sāmarthyābhāvāt. . . . tasmāt kathañcid bhedābhedināv evātau, tad-anyatara-samarthakaḥ punar nirāmbanatvād durnayatām svī-karofīti sthitam.*

¹⁸ Cf. NAV.29.13: *punaḥ kevalam sāmānyam vāñchanti tat-samūha-sampādyah saṅgrahaḥ*; and NAV.29.24: *tad-apalāpī kevala-sāmānya-pratiṣṭhāpakah kad-abhiprāyah saṅgraha-dumaya-vyapadeśam svī-kurute, viśeṣāpekṣayāva sāmānya-sthāpakasya saṅgraha-nayatvād iti.*

¹⁹ Cf. TBh.1.35 p. 35.9, verse 3cd: *lokōpacāra-niyatam vyavahāram vistr̥tam vidyāt*!, NAV.29.16: *yad idam kiyat-kāla-bhāvi sthūrātām ābīhṛānam loka-vyavahāra-kāri ghaṭādīkam bhavatas tātvīkam abhipretam tan nākasmīkam . . .*, and PALV.6.74 p. 54l.11: *saṅgraha-grhīta-bhedako vyavahārah.*

²⁰ TBh.1.35 p. 36.1, verse 4ab: *sāmprata-viśaya-grāhakaḥ rju-sūtra-nayam samāsato vidyāt*!, NAV.29.17: *tatra rju praguṇam akuṭīlam atītānagata-vakra-parityāgād vartamāna-kṣaṇa-vivartī-vastuno rūpam sūtrayati niṣṭānkītam darśayātīty rjusūtraḥ, and PALV.6.74 p. 54, 1.11–12: sūddha-paryāya-grāhī pratipakṣa-sāpekṣa rju-sūtraḥ.*

²¹ NAV.29.19: *rūdhito yāvanto dhvanayah kasmīnścid arthe pravartante; yathēndra-śakra-purandarādayah, teṣām sarveṣām apy ekam artham abhipraiti kila pratīti-vaśād.* See also NAV.29.13: *tathā ye rūdhītaḥ śabdānām pravrttīm vāñchanti tan-nivaha-sādhyah śabda iti*, and NAV.29.27: *tataś ca kvacid anapekṣita-vyutpatti-nimittā rūdhītaḥ pravartante . . .*

²² Cf. JTBh.2 §6: *paryāya-bhede bhinnārthān abhimanyate*; as well as PALV.6.74 p. 54, 1.14: *paryāya-bhedāt padārtha-nānārtha-nirūpakam samabhirūḍhaḥ.* See also NAV.29.13: *ye tu vyutpattito dhvanīnām pravrttīm vāñchanti nānyathā tad-vāra-janyah samabhirūḍha iti*, and NAV.29.27: *. . . kvacit sāmānya-vyutpatti-sāpekṣāḥ . . .*

²³ Cf. NAV.29.13: *ye tu vartamāna-kāla-bhāvi-vyutpatti-nimittam adhikṛtya śabdāḥ pravartante nānyathēti manyante tat-saṅgha-ghaṭītaḥ khalv evambhūta iti.* and NAV.29.27: *kvacit . . . tat-kāla-vartī-vyutpatti-nimittāpekṣayēti.*

²⁴ TBh.1.35 (p. 33.9–34.7): *ghaṭa ity ukte yo 'sau ceṣṭābhīnīrvṛtta ūrdhva-kuṇḍalāuṣṭhāyata-vṛtta-grīvo 'dhasāt parimaṇḍalo jalādīnām āharaṇa-dhāraṇa-samartha uttara-guṇa-nīrvartanānīrvṛtto dravya-viśeṣas tasmīn ekasmin viśeṣavati taj-jātīyeṣu vā sarveṣv aviśeṣāt pariñānam naigama-nayah. ekasmin vā bahuṣu vā nāmādi-viśeṣiteṣu sāmpratātītānagateṣu ghaṭeṣu saṁpratayayah saṅgrahaḥ. teṣv eva laukika-parīkṣaka-grāhyeṣūpacāra-gamyēṣu yathā-sthūlārtheṣu saṁpratayayo vyavahārah. teṣv eva satsu sāmprateṣu saṁpratayaya rju-sūtraḥ. teṣv eva satsu sāmprateṣu saṁpratayaya rju-sūtraḥ. teṣv eva sāmprateṣu nāmādīnām anyatama-grāhīṣu prasiddha-pūrvakeṣu ghaṭeṣu saṁpratayayah sāmprataḥ śabdah. teṣām eva sāmpratānām adhyavasāyāsaṁkramo vitarka-dhyānavat samabhirūḍhaḥ. teṣām eva vyañjanārthayor anyonyāpekṣārtha-grāhītvam evambhūta iti.*

²⁵ TS.1.35 p. 38.3–4, verse 5:

*iti naya-vādās citrāḥ kvacid viruddhā ivātha ca viśuddhāḥ!
laukika-viśayātītās tattva-jñānārtham adhigamyāḥ!*

²⁶ See NAV.29.10: *ananta-dharmādhyāsītam vastu svābhipretāka-dharma-viśiṣṭam nayati prāpayati saṁvedanam ārohayātīti nayah, pramāna-pravṛtter uttara-kāla-bhāvi parāmarśa ity arthas; tasya viśayo gocaro mato 'bhipreta eka-deśenānityatvādi-dharma-lakṣaṇena viśiṣṭah para-rūpebhyo vibhinno 'rthah prameya-rūpam, pramānam evaṁ-vidham evārtham grhṇātīti svākutena tena vyavasthāpanād iti. – 'That which*

leads to – [i.e.,] which makes one reach [or] which elevates to consciousness – the real thing, [although it is in reality] possessed of infinite properties, as qualified by [only] one property intended by this [viewpoint] itself, is “the viewpoint”; that means: the reflection which arises in the point of time posterior to the operation of cognitive criterion. Its “province”, [i.e., the viewpoint’s] domain, is “known”, [viz.] is intended, as “an object”, [viz.] a cognoscible form, [that is] “qualified”, [i.e., made] different from other forms, “by [only] one facet” [i.e.,] by a characteristic such as the property of impermanence, etc., because it has been established in accordance with the following intention of ours: “cognitive criterion grasps only an object of exactly such a kind [viz. possessed of infinite properties].”’

²⁷ NAV.29.28: *sarvaṃ vacanaṃ sāvadhāraṇam iti-nyāy[ah].*

²⁸ NAV.29.28: *tataś cānanta-dharmādhyāsita-vastu-sandarśakam eva vacanaṃ yathāvasthūtārtha-pratipādakatvāt satyam.* – ‘And therefore, only the utterance which displays the real thing as possessed of infinite properties – since it demonstrates [its] object (denotatum) corresponding to the state of affairs – is true.’

²⁹ NAV.29.28: *na cāvaṃ vacana-pravṛttir, ghaṭo ’yaṃ śuklo mūrta ity-ādy ekāka-dharma-pratipādana-niṣṭhatayā vyavahāre śabda-prayoga-darśanāt, sarva-dharmāṇāṃ yaugapadyena vaktum aśakyatvāt, tad-abhidhāyakānām apy ānantyāt.* – ‘Yet utterances [are] not used to denote [their objects (denotata)] in such a manner because it is an empirical fact that in the [verbal] communication speech elements are pronounced as related [to their objects (denotata)] by the demonstration of one single property, like “this pot is a white shape,” for it is impossible to state all properties simultaneously, even though [speech elements] denoting these [properties are theoretically] infinite.’

³⁰ NAV.29.28: *na cāikāka-dharma-sandarśakatve ’py amūni vacanāny alikāni vaktum pāryante, samasta-śabda-vyavahārōcheda-prasaṅgāt, tad-alikatve tataḥ pravṛtṭi-asiddher iti.* – ‘And these utterances, although they display [only] one single property, can not be called false because [that would lead to] the undesired consequence of the destruction of the entire verbal communication, inasmuch as if these [utterances] were false, the practice [of the verbal communication] based on them could not be established.’

³¹ NAV.29.28: *na ca tad-vacanānām alikatā, śeṣa-dharmāntara-pratikṣepābhāvāt, tat-pratikṣepa-kāriṇām evālikatvāt.* – ‘And [such] utterances [predicating] of this [single property in question] are not false, inasmuch as other remaining properties are not disproved [by them], because only [such utterances] that lead to disproving [all] the remaining properties are false.’

³² NAV.29.28: *yathāneka-puruṣa-sampūrṇe sadasi dvārādau sthitasya kim atra devadattaḥ samasti nāstīti vā dolāyamāna-buddheḥ kenacid abhidhīyate – yathā devadatto ’stīti.*

³³ NAV.29.28: *... tad-vyavacchedābhiprāyeṇa prastuta-vākya-prayogāt, prayoktr-abhiprāyādī^a-sāpekṣatayāiva dhvaneḥ svārtha-pratipādana-sāmarthyāt.* – ‘...because the sentence under discussion is pronounced with the intention of excluding that (sc. merely his possible non-existence here and now), inasmuch as [any] linguistic unit has the efficacy to demonstrate its own object (denotatum) only depending on the intention, etc.^a, of the person who pronounces [this sentence].’

[^aSee NAT.29 *ad loc.*: *prayoktr-abhiprāyādīti. ādi-śabdāt saṅketādi-grahaḥ.* – ‘... On account of the word ‘etc.’ the linguistic convention, etc., are included.’]

³⁴ NAV.29.28: *na ca vācya-vācaka-bhāva-lakṣaṇa-sambandhānarthakyaṃ, tad-abhāve prayoktr-abhiprāya-mātreṇa rūpasyāiva niyoktum aśakyatvāt.* – ‘But [that (sc. the role of the intention of the speaker, etc.) does] not [imply that] the relation characterised by the association of the denotatum and the denoter is purposeless because, if this [relation between the denotatum and the denoter were] not [there], it would be impossible to make use even of the form [of a particular word or a sentence] merely by the intention of the person who pronounces [the word or the sentence].’

³⁵ NAV.29.28: *ataḥ sampūrṇa-vastu-pratipādanābhāvād vikalādeśo 'bhidhīyate, naya-matena sambhavad-dharmānām darśana-mātram ity arthaḥ.* – ‘Hence, [such a statement] – inasmuch as it does not demonstrate the whole real thing – is called the incomplete account, which means that it merely shows [selected] properties that are possibly there in consonance with the opinion of (sc. according to) a [respective] viewpoint.’

³⁶ The index parameter *t*, which refers to the present moment and means ‘now’, is also a variable (not a constant!), for clearly the actual meaning of the description ‘now’ steadily changes along the time axis.

³⁷ JTBh.2 § 8, p. 23.16–18: *tathā viśeṣa-grāhiṇo 'rpita-nayāḥ, sāmānya-grāhiṇaś cānarpita-nayāḥ. tatrānarpita-naya-mate tulyam eva rūpaṃ sarveṣāṃ siddhānām bhagavatām. arpita-naya-mate tv eka-dvi-try-ādi-samaya-siddhāḥ sva-samāna-samaya-siddhair eva tulyā iti.*

³⁸ JTBh.2 § 8, p. 23.25–26: *tatra rju-sūtrādayaś catvāro nayāś caritra-lakṣaṇāyāḥ kriyāyā eva prādhānyam abhyupagacchanti, tasyā eva mokṣaṃ pratyavyavaharita-kāraṇatvāt. naigama-saṅgraha-vyavahārās tu yady api cāritra-śruta-samyaktvānām trayāṇam api mokṣa-kāraṇatvam icchanti. . .*

³⁹ JTBh.2 §8, p. 23.19.

⁴⁰ SVM.28.205–206 (p. 167.10–11): . . . *naigamo bhāvābhāva-bhūmikatvād bhūma-viśayaḥ.* See below, p. 17 and n. 44.

⁴¹ It is Jonardon Ganeri who drew my attention to the Fregean example.

⁴² See NAV.29.20: *paryāya-śabdā vibhinnārthāḥ, prativibhakta-vyutpatti-nimittakatvād, iha ye ye prativibhakta-vyutpatti-nimittakās te te bhinnārthāḥ, yathēndra-ghaṭa-puruṣa-śabdā vibhinnārthā[h].* The expression *bhinnārtha* in the above passage is a hackneyed description and may indeed also be translated as ‘having different meanings’. The use of *vastu* in the passage below is less unequivocal, TBV.1.3 (*Naya-mīmāṃsā*), p. 313.15–21: *eka-saṃjñā-samabhirohaṇāt samabhirūḍhas tv āha – yathā hi viruddha-liṅgādi-yogād bhidyate vastu tathā saṃjñā-bhedād api. tathā hi – saṃjñā-bhedaḥ prayojana-vaśāt saṅketa-kartṛbhir vidhīyate na vyasanitayā anyathā anavasthā-prasakteḥ tato yāvanto vastunaḥ svābhidhāyakaḥ śabdās tāvanto 'rtha-bhedāḥ pratyartham śabda-niveśāt nāikasyārthasyānekenābhidhānam yuktim iti 'ghaṭaḥ' 'kuṭaḥ' 'kumbhaḥ' iti vacana-bhedād bhinna evārthaḥ, kriyā-śabdāt tvā vā sarva-śabdānām sarve 'py anvarthā eva vācakāḥ tato 'ghaṭate' 'kuṭite' 'kau bhāti' iti ca kriyā-lakṣaṇa-nimitta-bhedāt naimittikenāpy arthena bhinnena bhāvyam iti 'ghaṭaḥ' ity ukte kuṭaḥ 'kuṭaḥ' iti pratipattiḥ tena tad-arthasyānabhihitatvāt?*

⁴³ Cf. NAV.29.19 on the *śabda-naya*: *na cēndra-śakra-purandarādayaḥ paryāya-śabdā vibhinnārtha-vācitatā kadācana pratīyante, tebhyaḥ sarvadāvāikākāra-parāmarśōtpatter . . .*

⁴⁴ SVM.28.204–213 (p. 167.9–18): *pūrvaḥ pūrvo nayaḥ pracura-gocaraḥ paraḥ paras tu parimīta-viśayaḥ. san-mātra-gocarāt saṅgrahān naigamo bhāvābhāva-bhūmikatvād bhūma-viśayaḥ. sad-viśeṣa-prakāśakād vyavahārataḥ saṅgrahaḥ samastat-samūhōpadarśakatvād bahu-viśayaḥ. vartamāna-viśayād rju-sūtrād vyavahāras tri-kāla-viśayāvalambitvād analpārthaḥ. kālādi-bhedena bhinnārthōpadarśinaḥ śabdād rju-sūtras tad-viparīta-vedakatvān mahārthaḥ[.] pratiparyāya-śabdām artha-bhedam abhīpsataḥ samabhirūḍhāc chabdas tad-viparyāyanuyāyitvāt prabhūta-viśayaḥ. pratikriyāṃ vibhinnam artham pratijānānād evaṃ-bhūtāt samabhirūḍhas tad-anyathārtha-sthāpakatvān mahā-gocaraḥ. naya-vākyam api sva-viśaye pravartamānam vidhi-pratiśedhābhyām sapta-bhaṅgīm anuvrajati. iti.*

⁴⁵ JTBh.2 § 9, p. 14.1–1: *kaḥ punar atra bahu-viśayo nayaḥ ko vālpa-viśayaḥ? . . .*

⁴⁶ Cf. also JTBh.1 § 64, p. 20.7–10: *sēyam sapta-bhaṅgī pratibhaṅga(m) sakalādeśa-svabhāvā vikalādeśa-svabhāvā ca. tatra pramāna-pratipannānanta-dharmātmaka-vastunaḥ kālādibhir abheda-vṛtti-prādhānyād abhedōpacārād vā yaugapadyena*

pratipādakam vacaḥ sakalādeśaḥ. naya-viśayī-kṛtasya vastu-dharmasya bheda-vṛtti-prādhānyād bhedōpacārād vā krameṇābhidhāyakam vākyam vikalādeśaḥ. This and similar statements clearly show that the *sapta-bhaṅgī* method is not restricted to the scope of *pramāṇa*, but is applicable to the *naya* method as well.

⁴⁷ SVM.28.216 (p. 167.21): *pramāṇam tu samyag-artha-nirṇaya-lakṣaṇam sarva-nayātmakam.*

⁴⁸ SVM.28.13–14 (p. 159.17–18): *sad evēti durnayaḥ. sad iti nayaḥ. syād sad iti pramāṇam.*

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