

TWO SIDDHASENAS AND THE AUTHORSHIP OF  
THE *NYĀYĀVATĀRA* AND THE *SAMMATI-TARKA-PRAKARAṆA*

1.

One of the conspicuous points that strikes the reader of legendary biographies of Siddhasena Divākara recorded in Jaina *Prabandhas* is that they generally speak of Sanskrit hymns composed by Siddhasena Divākara and of the ill fate Siddhasena Divākara brought upon himself by deciding to render the whole Jaina cannon into Sanskrit, but they never – to my knowledge – happen to mention the title of the *Nyāyāvatāra* (NA.)<sup>1</sup> or of the *Sammati-tarka-prakarāṇa* (STP.)<sup>2</sup> Does this discrepancy in the tradition find any grounding in facts? Would we be right to assume that perhaps NA. was composed by someone other than Siddhasena Divākara?<sup>3</sup> In any case Abhayadevasūri, the commentator on STP., explicitly mentions in the introductory part the title of the work as “Prabandha called *Sammati*” as well as its author Siddhasena Divākara.<sup>4</sup> The true name of STP. is now of secondary importance.

Not to assume at the outset that NA. and STP. were written by the same author, I shall tentatively call the author of the *Nyāyāvatāra* Siddhasena Mahāmāti after the specific identification of Haribhadrāsūri,<sup>5</sup> and provisionally reserve the name of Siddhasena Divākara for the author of the *Sammati-tarka-prakarāṇa*.

2.

Apart from the different languages of NA. (written in Sanskrit) and of STP. (written in Prakrit), the reader cannot fail to notice an overall difference in style. One might be quick to object that, firstly, stylistic differentiation is merely a subjective matter that depends on the reader’s own taste and judgement, and, secondly, even if we are ready to assume that there indeed is such a difference in style, it may only be due to the different “linguistic environment” (Sanskrit in the case of NA., and Prakrit in the case of STP.). By necessity even in the case of a person

bilingual by birth his or her style, say, in English will differ from the style of Hopi or Polish.

### 2.1.

Nevertheless, there are several other minor differences to notice. The first is the general outline and matters discussed in both works. The feature they have in common – perhaps the only one in common – is the epistemological concern. However, NA., in its 32 verses, deals with the question of epistemic validity (*prāmāṇya*) and the definition of the cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*) as well as with its divisions and their definitions. Only two verses (NA.29–30) deal with the issue of multiplexity of reality (*anekānta-vāda*) and with the theory of viewpoints (*naya-vāda*), but there is no mention of the method of the seven-fold predication (*sapta-bhaṅgī*) whatsoever.

The treatment of these issues is in a way non-Jaina, in so far as the choice of terminology and approach place the text within the tradition of such works as, e.g. *Nyāya-praveśa* of Śāṅkarasvāmin or *Nyāya-bindu* of Dharmakīrti (*vide infra*, p. 12 ff.). In fact, as I believe I have recently proved elsewhere,<sup>6</sup> NA. depends heavily on Dharmakīrti and – among his other works – on his NB. in several formulations.

### 2.2.

On the other hand, the scope of the three chapters of STP. is as follows: Chapter 1 contains a detailed exposition of the theory of multiplexity of reality (*anekānta-vāda*), including treatment of *nayas* (*dravyāstika* and *pariyāyāstika*, as well as the set of seven viewpoints: *ṛju-sūtra*, etc., especially STP.1.3–5, 7–18, 23, 31), *nikṣepas* (STP.1.6, 40 ff.), *sapta-bhaṅgī* (STP.1.36–40), and secondary issues such as the idea of *utpāda-sthiti-bhaṅga* in the case of *dravya* (STP.1.12, STP.3.23), ethical issues (*kaṣāyas*, *karman*, *bandha*, *saṃsāra*, *mokṣa*; e.g. STP.1.18–20), the nature of *ātman* / *jīva* (STP.1.51–52) that serves as exemplification of the doctrine of *anekānta-vāda*; Chapter 2 provides the discussion on the cognitive faculties (*upayoga*), including their definition (STP.2.1–2), fivefold division of cognition (*jñāna*, STP.2.2–18) and fourfold division of insight, or conation (*darśana*, esp. STP.2.19–20), the claim that *jñāna* and *darśana* become one in case of an omniscient person (*kevalin*, STP.2 *passim*), which has become the most debated thesis of STP. among future generations of Jaina thinkers, the treatment of “the three jewels” (*tri-ratna*, *samyag-jñāna-darśana-cāritra*, esp. STP.2.32–33), the state of omniscience (*kevala*); Chapter 3 is concerned with ontological issues, the relation of *sāmānya-viśeṣa* (STP.3.1), the relation

of *dravya-paryāya* (STP.3.2 ff., STP.3.30 ff.), *guṇa-paryāya* (STP.3.8–9), two *nayas* (*dravyārthika-paryāyārthika*; STP.3.10–14) and their relation (STP.3.15–18), atoms and matter (STP.3.39–41), miscellaneous ethical and soteriological issues (STP.3.43 ff., 3.62 ff.), sub-categories of *syād-vāda* (STP.3.60).

The above list is not meant to be a detailed catalogue of the contents but should only serve as a provisional list of topics discussed in STP. This list, however, and a more in-depth reading could easily attest to it, should suffice to demonstrate that – despite the overall epistemological interest of the two works – the scopes of NA. and STP. by no means overlap. This is also true not only of the general scope of both treatises but also for particular topics, ideas and notions that occur in both texts.

### 2.3.

Besides, characteristic of NA. is a standardised pattern of definitions and justifications for such definitions (in the form of *hetus*) pervading the whole structure of the text, viz. the term is first mentioned (*uddeśa*) and defined (*lakṣaṇa*), whereas the definition serves as a thesis to be subsequently proved (*pratijñā*); this is followed by the mention of its divisions (*bheda*) and subsequent analysis (*parīkṣā*), which is always followed by the justification and corroboration (*hetu*), e.g.:

- NA.1: *pratijñā = lakṣaṇa (pramāṇam sva-parābhāsi jñānam, bādha-vivarjitam)*  
 [+ division (*pratyakṣam ca parokṣam ca dvidhā*)]  
 + *hetu (meva-viniścayāt)*; or
- NA.4: *pratijñā = lakṣaṇa (aparokṣatayārthasya grāhakaṁ jñānam īdrśam / pratyakṣam)*  
 + division (*itaraj jñeyam parokṣam*)  
 + *hetu (grahaṇēkṣayā)*.

Practically, every second verse reveals such a structure. Thus, the overall approach in NA. is highly structured and analytical; the picture of the logical system it lucidly presents is very clear. Furthermore, Siddhasena Mahāmāti was certainly conscious of what the proper definition should consist in, in so far as he was apparently the first in the history of Jaina epistemological tradition to formulate the descriptive definition of *pramāṇa*.<sup>7</sup>

### 2.4.

On the other hand, we hardly find any true definition in STP., with the exception perhaps of STP.2.1 (a definition of cognitive faculties). But even then the author of STP. does not bother to provide justifications in a systematic form of *hetus*. STP. has the character of a plain exposition

of some aspects of the Jaina doctrine; an occasional refutation of some contrary doctrines happens occasionally. Without a thorough-going, anterior knowledge of Jainism and its *anekānta* doctrine alongside its corollaries such as *sapta-bhaṅgī*, *naya-vāda*, *nikṣepa-vāda*, one could hardly make head or tail of the exposition. Nowhere do we find any *en bloc* enumeration of the five subdivisions of *jñāna* (*mati*, etc.) – and sporadic references to them are fragmentary<sup>8</sup> – or a list of *nayas* (not even all are mentioned by name!); there is no explanation of how *nikṣepas* work, what different kinds of *karman* are (even though the knowledge of the subdivisions is essential to follow the text), etc. The reader is expected to have all this knowledge beforehand in order to understand the argument. One may seem to be justified in having the impression that either NA. and STP. derive from different intellectual backgrounds or that they serve some different purposes, or both.

## 2.5.

As far as vocabulary and particular terms or ideas are concerned, here is a list of selected topics and terms that are crucial in one text but are altogether absent from the other work, not only as being stated *expressis verbis* but even under a different formulation:

(1) Significant terms and ideas in NA. that are neither mentioned nor implied in STP.: the distinction into *svārtha-anumāna* / *parārtha-anumāna* and *svārtha-pratyakṣa* / *parārtha-pratyakṣa* (NA.10, 11, 13), *parārtha-vākyaṃ* (NA.10); non-erroneousness of cognitive criteria (*avibhrāma* / *abhrānti*) NA.5, 6, 7); the idea of self-revealing nature of cognition (*svānya-niścāyi* / *sva-parābhāsi jñānam*; NA.1, 7, 13, 31) and self-cognition (*sva-samvedana*; NA.31); the defining characteristic of the logical reason, e.g. the inseparable connection (*avinā-bhāva*; NA.5, 13), “inexplicability otherwise” (*anyathānupapatti* / *anyathānupapanna*; NA.17, 22, 23) or similar, including the term *anupapatti*;<sup>9</sup> the use of *vyāpti* (NA.18) or *antar-vyāpti* (NA.20); the use of *pakṣa* only in the sense of “thesis” as a logical *terminus technicus* (NA.13, 14, 21);<sup>10</sup> cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*; NA.1, 2, 3, 5, 67, 28, 32) probandum (*sādhya*; NA.5.13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 29, 24, 25) probans (*sādhana*; NA.18, 19, 25, 26); the idea of a valid method of reasoning (*prayoga*; NA.14, 17);<sup>11</sup> the use of the term *anumāna* (NA.5, 11, 13); mental representation (*pratibhāsa*; 7, 12, 27); indirect cognition (*parokṣa*; NA.1.4); fallacy (*ābhāsa*; NA.21, 22, 26); criticism (*dūṣaṇa*; NA.26); testimony based on the doctrine of the seven-fold modal description (*syād-vāda-śruta*; NA.30); the cognoscible (*prameya* / *meya*; NA.1); method / logic and methodologist / logician (*nyāya* and *nyāya-vid*; NA.20, 24, 25); doubt (*sandeha*; NA.22).

(2) Significant terms and ideas in STP. that are not mentioned in NA.: treatment of the viewpoints (*naya* with its two main types: *dravyāstika*, *paryayāstika*, and subdivisions such as *rju-sūtra*, etc.; STP. 1.3–5, 7–18, 31, 3.10, 14, 57);<sup>12</sup> standpoints (*nikṣepa*; STP.1.6, 40 ff.); the theory or origination, continued existence and annihilation that define substance (*utpāda-sthiti-bhaṅga* / *dravya*; STP.1.12, 3.23, 32–35); *kaṣāyas*, *karman* and *bandha* (STP.1.19, 46, 2.2, 3.53); *saṃsāra* and *mokṣa* (STP.1.20, 3.43–45); explicit reference to the Canon and Jaina tradition (STP.1.49) and numerous use

of “*āgama*”; the concept of two cognitive faculties (*upayoga*: *jñāna* and *darśana*; STP.2.1, 20, 29, 3.3, 43); the concept of the five kinds of knowledge (*jñāna*: *matī*, *śruta*, *avadhi*, *manah-paryāya*, *kevala*; STP.2.3, 5, 6, 8, 16, 23, 27); *sapta-bhaṅgī* (STP.1.36–40); the terms *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* (STP.2.1, 3.1, 57); the use of Jaina particle “no-” (“*quasi*”; e.g. in STP.50); the term *samyāñc* (STP.2.33, 3.44); the idea of righteousness and misapprehension (*samyaktva* – *mityhātva*; STP.3.53); the idea of “the three jewels” (*samyag-jñāna-darśana-caritra*; STP.3.44, 67); qualities and modes (*guṇa* – *paryāya*; STP.3.2 ff., 3.24); ethical questions and the (im)possibility of liberation (*bhāvya-bhāvya* beings; STP.3.43 ff.); the notion of mutual non-existence (*anyonyābhāva*; STP.3.31); STP.1.36–40: treatment of *sapta-bhaṅgī*, *rāga-dveṣa-moha* (STP.2.43); six negative and positive false statements (*mithyātva-sthāna*; STP.3.54); treatment of eight sub-categories of *syād-vāda* and ways of predication (*dravya-kṣetra-kāla-bhāva-paryāya-deśa-sambandha*, *ekānta-asadbhūta* and *sadbhūta-anīścita*; STP.3.59–60).

The above juxtaposition of the two lists reveals that the vocabulary of both texts also does not match.

## 2.6.

After even a brief analysis and comparison of both lists, it is clear that NA. shares its vocabulary with the general Indian *pramāṇa* tradition and is very much akin to that of the *pramāṇa* tradition or the Buddhist Sautrāntika-Yogācāra school. We do not find in NA. technical terms derived directly from the Jaina tradition (with the sole exception of “*kevala*” in NA.27), thus the text can be easily understood even by those who are not acquainted with the Jaina doctrine and religion. Besides, the scheme and topics discussed in NA. are not restricted to matters that are of interest merely to the Jainas (e.g. the issue of omniscience and its detailed stages, divisions of karmic bondage, etc., that could hardly evoke any interest in a person not directly involved in Jainism). On the other hand, STP. rests on ideas, locutions and terminology that had to large extent been coined as early as in the Canonical literature and presupposes a closer acquaintance with the Jaina doctrine and peculiarities of expression. The choice of topics demonstrates that, at least to a certain degree, the text is directed specifically to a Jaina reader.

## 2.7.

Does the above situation mean that there are no similarities to be observed between the two works? The followings list summarises the very few similarities I have been able to spot:

(3) (a) the description of the absolute knowledge: *sakalāvaraṇa-muktātma kevalam* (NA.27) and *sayalam aṅāvaraṇam aṅāntam akkhayaṁ kevalam* (STP.2.17);<sup>13</sup> (b) none of the texts uses the terms *vikalpa*, *kalpanā* etc. in their epistemological sense of

“conceptualisation”; thus, the verses of STP.1.33, 34, 35 ff., 41 use the terms *nirvikalpa*, *bālādi-vikalpa*, *avikalpa* and *savikalpa-nirvikalpa* in the sense “(not) distinguished, with(out) division”<sup>14</sup> or in strictly ontological meaning, but with no tinge of epistemological bearing, whereas NA. uses no derivatives of *vi√kṣp*<sup>15</sup> at all; (c) adverbial use of *kevalam* ([shines / arises] “alone, absolutely, [as] absolute”) in NA.27<sup>16</sup> and in STP.2.5.<sup>17</sup>

Such a situation makes any comparative analysis of both works quite difficult indeed, for we cannot simply pinpoint a notion or a technical term and compare how they are used in both texts. And if there were any difference to be observed, we might further ponder whether the difference is crucial enough to infer that both texts were written by two different persons. And if the opposite situation were the case, viz. if we did not observe any difference in usage and meaning, it might serve as quite a strong argument, though never conclusive, for the common authorship of both works. Even the positive corroboration that a particular term or concept is given precisely the same meaning both in STP. and NA. would neither prove that both works were written by one and the same person nor disprove the supposition admitting the common authorship of NA. and STP. The identical usage and understanding of a given term or idea in both STP. and in NA. could only have a supportive-corroborative strength, but it would in no way be decisive, in so far as the similarity might have been merely coincidental. On the other hand, a technical term that is given an entirely different meaning in both works or a notion that rests on entirely different presuppositions could indeed be a serious indication that STP. and NA. were written by two different people.

### 3.

Having considered the differences mentioned above, one might over-hastily come to conclusion that indeed these texts have different authors. However the vice, viz. differences, could theoretically be turned into virtue. One might claim that it was indeed the strategy of Siddhasena to write a manual on logic (NA.) that, on the one hand, systematises Jaina logic and epistemology and, on the other, discloses it in a systematised form to the non-Jaina philosophic audience. That would nicely explain why the author did not employ Jaina doctrinal terminology and took recourse to general standards of discussing philosophy. It would also explain why he decided to use Sanskrit. *Mutatis mutandis*, STP. was composed in Prakrit in order to reach a more general and wider Jaina readership, inclined less epistemologically or philosophically but well

acquainted with specifically Jaina vocabulary and notions. That could explain away the fact that the argumentation of STP. is logically less rigid and less technical. In addition, one might claim that the same Siddhasena deliberately dealt with different topics in both texts in order not to repeat the same ideas.

One might even refer to the famous TS.1.5: “The comprehension of these [categories representing reality] is [accomplished] through cognitive criteria and viewpoints” (*pramāṇa-nayair tad-adhigatiḥ*), and conclude that NA. is devoted to “the comprehension of reality through cognitive criteria” (*pramāṇair tad-adhigatiḥ*), whereas STP. focuses on “the comprehension of reality through viewpoints” (*nayair tad-adhigatiḥ*); hence both works are complementary.

But I believe such an argument would be too artificial with no justification in the textual layer of both treatises. Such an argument would be nothing more than a hermeneutical interpretative attempt to understand the actual role of both works, after one has *already* accepted that they are written by the same person. In my opinion, as I shall try to demonstrate in the subsequent paragraphs, there is hardly anything in both texts that could justify such a claim. There are, however, some strong points to be found in NA. and STP. that prove the contrary thesis.

#### 4.

One of these involves logical issues and the divergent application of logical concepts in STP. and NA. In the third chapter, one of the issues discussed by Siddhasena Divākara is the mutual relationship between substance (*dravya*) and its qualities (*guṇa*), properly defined in the spirit of *anekānta-vāda* as both different from and identical with each other. The author refutes two one-sided (*ekānta*) views, viz., that the substance and its qualities are either entirely different from each other (which is the thesis of the Vaiśeṣika, as it has also been explicated before in STP.3.8) or that they are identical.

Let us first take a look at a couple of verses of STP.3.16–22:<sup>18</sup>

“[3.16:] As a matter of fact, the one-sided doctrine [propounding] the [absolute] difference between the class of substance and the class of quality, has already been rejected; [what] now [follows is only] an example.<sup>19</sup> [3.17:] [This is what the propounder of absolute non-difference between substance and quality says (*dravya-paryāyayor bhedaikānta-vādin*):] ‘The relation[ship] of one man [to another is] like father, son, grandson, heir, brother etc., and he – being the father of one [person] – does not become the father of the remaining ones.<sup>20</sup> [3.18:] Just as this man qualified by the relations [remains] unsurpassed (*sc.* unmodified) in his being a man, in the same way substance possesses qualities such as colour, etc., that come into contact with [respective] senses.’<sup>21</sup> [3.19:] [Rejoinder:] ‘But [even] if a substance

could become sweet of two kinds (flavours) and black of infinite kinds (shades), nevertheless the man does not become small or big because of the relation [e.g. as a son, etc.].<sup>22</sup> [3.20:] [The propounder of absolute identity between substance and quality (*dravya-paryāyayor abhedaiikānta-vādin*):] says: ‘If you accept the existence of the relatum (*sambandhitva*, viz. that *x* is related to *y*) on account of the relation, why [do you not accept as] proved this particular relatum, when this particular relation [is there]?’ [3.21:] [The *Siddhānta-vādin*:] [To accept] this particular relatum on the basis of this particular relation is logically correct. However, transformation (*sc.* sense datum) of a particular colour etc. does not enter a particular [sense organ such as] the eye etc.’ [3.22:] It is said [by an opponent:] ‘How could possibly a complex transformation (*sc.* sense datum) occur in one [substance]?’ [To answer this, the *Siddhānta-vādin*] says by way of application: ‘It is either occasioned by something else, or not’ – such is the one-sided [view]”.

This passage is followed by the exposition of the Jaina view of substance as permanence, origination and annihilation (STP.3.23).<sup>23</sup>

#### 4.1.

I do not wish to discuss ontological issues here, and the reason why I have quoted these verses is to draw attention to the verse STP.3.20, which speaks of accepting a relatum by force of a relation. In fact, the verse goes back to STP.3.8:<sup>24</sup> “Since [sense data such as] colour, taste, smell and touch are characterised by dissimilar (*sc.* individual) grasping, therefore the qualities abide in substance – such is [the standpoint] accepted by some [thinkers].” The idea expressed in the verse boils down to the following: since we perceive various qualities (*guṇa*), incompatible in their nature, we must assume one common substratum for them, and this substratum, or locus, is substance (*dravya*). No doubt, this is a reference to the position to the Vaiśeṣika school, which is also confirmed by the commentary of TBV.<sup>25</sup> The circumstances under which the above is asserted are further characterised in VS.4.1.9-11,<sup>26</sup> where the conditions for perceptibility of visual, gustatory, olfactory and tactile stimuli, which correspond to a number of respective properties located in one and the same substratum, are described.

In the context thus delimited by STP.3.8, STP.3.20 states the condition for accepting such a single substratum common to several qualities: we accept it because it is related to the qualities. The principle lets us infer one thing related to another by a relation (*sambandha*). Thus, the *guṇas* as relata serve as an inferential mark, whereas the *dravya* is the inferred relatum. This is precisely one of possible kinds of inference mentioned in VS.9.18 (and VSU. ad loc.): *asyēdaṁ kāryaṁ kāraṇaṁ sambandhi ekārtha-samavāyi virodhi cēti laṅgikam*. – “The discipline [based on] the inferential sign (*sc.* inference) has the form: ‘[a] this is its effect, [b] this is its cause, [c] this is its connected [attribute],

[d] this is its inherent [property] and [e] this stands in contradiction with [that].” The *sambandhin* (the connected attribute, relatum), also called *saṁyogin*<sup>27</sup> related by a particular relation is adduced as one of reasons in VS.3.1.8: *saṁyogi, samavāyi, ekārtha-samavāyi, virodhi ca. kāryaṁ kāryāntarasya, kāraṇaṁ kāraṇāntarasya. virodhy-abhūtaṁ bhūtasya, bhūtaṁ abhūtasya, abhūta, abhūtasya, bhūtaṁ bhūtasya.* Such a relation is adduced as a proof, e.g. for the existence of the soul (*ātman*) in VS.3.1.13 and for the existence of the mind (*manas*) in VS.3.2.1.

What is conspicuous in Siddhasena Divākara’s reply (STP.3.21) is that he generally accepts this kind of reasoning: “[To accept] this particular relatum on the basis of this particular relation is logically correct” (*jujjaī sambandha-vasā sambandhi-visesaṇam*). There is not the slightest trace of hesitation to accept the principle (*sambandhitva*) of inferring the relatum *x* as connected with its related attribute *y* on account of a relation (*sambandha*) throughout STP., and Siddhasena Divākara seem to apply this principle uncritically.

#### 4.2.

On the other hand, NA. formulates – following Pātrasvāmin, alias Pātrakesarin or Pātrakesarisvāmin, in this regard – an entirely new definition of the logical reason “inexplicability otherwise” (*anyathānupapatti, anyathānupapannatva*) as the basis of all inference, and thereby rejects older forms of inference. NA.22 refers to an earlier source of this idea, which is independently reported and criticised by Śāntarakṣita in TSa.1364 ff. (p. 405 f.)<sup>28</sup> and the crucial verse is TSa.1369.<sup>29</sup> It is Śāntarakṣita TSa.1364, p. 405.1 (*anyathēty-ādinā pātrasvāmi-matam āśaṅkate. . .*), who explicitly mentions Pātrasvāmin<sup>30</sup> as the first who took the notion of the “inexplicability otherwise” (*anyathānupapatti*) to be the proper definition of a logical reason. Whoever has the historical priority, whether it was indeed Pātrasvāmin or someone else who was followed by Siddhasena Mahāmati, is irrelevant for the present issue. In any case, the author of NA. finds the principle of *anyathānupapatti* so important that, in such a short text as NA., he does not fail to mention it explicitly twice,<sup>31</sup> reminding the reader of it (NA.22), and uses it additionally for the third time in NA.23.

It would have been a highly surprising and incongruous attitude on the part of the author to vehemently advocate the novel relation of *anyathānupapatti* in one text, and to completely ignore it in another work, even when the occasion avails. If Siddhasena Divākara had indeed

known of the notion of *anyathānupapatti* as the defining characteristic of the logical reason, his statements in STP.3.21 would have been expressed quite differently.

## 5.

## 5.1.

Furthermore, again in STP.3.22, we find the statement *expressed by way of application*: “It is either occasioned by something else, or not”. The term *uvaṇīya* = *upanīta*, or “expressed by way of application”, is directly related to the technical term *upanaya* (“application”).

The word *uvaṇīya* = *upanīta* occurs once again in STP.3.51<sup>32</sup> by way of introducing an application: “These two, however, [viz. *dravyārthika*- and *pariyāyarthika-nayas*,] when applied in the *anekānta* exposition,<sup>33</sup> become pre-eminent correct conation, because [they are the means of] the elimination of the existential pain; [when] these two [are taken] separately (*sc.* independently of each other) they do not satisfy [the needs].” Furthermore, STP.3.52 explicates this idea by applying it to a particular case, which is the case of the application proper: “Since ‘the pot’ is not separated<sup>34</sup> from earth, therefore their non-difference is logically correct. On the other hand, since ‘the pot’ was not there before, [hence] it is different from earth.” The verse does not state any general rule; on the contrary, it applies a general principle of the *anekānta* description to a particular case. Abhayadevasūri introduces the verse with: *amum eva artham upasamhāra-dvāreṇa upadarśayann āha* (TBV.3.52, p. 710.8).

Both words *upanaya* and *upasamhāra*<sup>35</sup> are technical terms to denote the fourth stage of the classical five-membered proof formula (*pañcāvayava-vākya*). The two verses follow the thesis, expressed in STP.3.46, which states that “the doctrine of viewpoints (*naya-vāda*), [which (or: when it)] is completely pure, becomes a proof of the purport of the Canon only.” STP.3.47 adduces the reason (*hetu*), in other words it states the principle of the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*): “To such an extent [opinions] are a method (*vahā* = *panthan* = *mārga*) of exposition (*vacana*), in the same measure they become doctrines of viewpoints (*naya-vāda*), and vice versa (*caiva . . . caiva*): to such an extent [opinions] are doctrines of viewpoints, in the same measure they become the highest teachings (*samaya* = *siddhānta* = *Āgama*)”.

As the next step, we have the example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) expounded in three subsequent verses. STP.3.48 refers to the doctrine of Sāṃkhya (as *dravyāstika-naya* / *dravyārthika-naya*) and to the doctrine of the

Buddha (as *payāya-vikalpa* = *paryāyāstika-naya* / *paryāyārthika-naya*). STP.3.49 criticises the doctrine of Vaiśeṣika: even though the system combines two viewpoints: *dravyāstika* and *paryāyāstika*, nevertheless, it is the case of falsehood (*mithyāthva*) because the two *nayas* are treated independently: *anyonya-nirapekṣa*. STP.3.50 mentions the followers of Śākya and Ulūka as well as the system of Sāṃkhya again as an example.

What STP.3.53 says – “Time, intrinsic nature, fate, former deed, man are partial causes, [hence] they are [a case of] falsehood (*mithyāthva*); however, in a compound they become truth (*samyaktva*)” – can easily be taken as a reformulation of the initial thesis expressed in STP.3.46. Since this new formulation of the initial thesis links the verses STP.46–52 with a short excursus on causality and liberation, it is not surprising to see that STP.3.53 in its turn emphasises the idea of causes and causality. This is also quite evident if we consider that the section of STP.3.46–53 immediately follows a digression about the doctrine of causality (*hetu-vāda*) and the doctrine of “non-causality” (*ahetu-vāda*) in STP.3.43–45 with regard to soteriological issues, such as the question of beings capable of attaining liberation (*bhāvya*) and beings incapable of it (*abhāvya*) as well as causal predicaments and prerequisites for the attainment of liberation. The idea stated in STP.3.46 and STP.3.53 is explicitly replicated also in the phrase that “Jina’s words are made of an amassment of false views,” found in the final verse of STP.3.69: “prosperity to Jina’s words that are made of an amassment of false views, that are conducive to immortality, that are venerable, and lead to the salvific happiness.”<sup>36</sup> Since STP.3.53 seems to be kind of rephrasing of the thesis of STP.3.46 that immediately follows the application (*upanaya*) in STP.3.51–52, it is clearly the fifth member of the proof formula, viz. the conclusion (*nigamana*).

Accordingly, whereas STP.3.22 is at least an allusion to, if not a direct instantiation of, the five-membered proof formula (*pañcāvayava-vākya*), the verses STP.3.46–53 are an instance of such a proof formula. They therefore demonstrate that Divākara not only approved of the five-membered proof formula (*pañcāvayava-vākya*), but he also employed it himself.

## 5.2.

In contradistinction to this, we can read in NA.20<sup>37</sup> that *drṣṭānta* is not an essential part of the formal reasoning (*sādhanāvayava*), inasmuch as the relation of the internal invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) suffices to prove the thesis. Thereby, the author of NA. not only subscribes to

the ideas expressed in *Vāda-vidhāna* and *Vāda-vidhi*<sup>38</sup> of Vasubandhu to limit the number of necessary “syllogistic” members to three, but he furthermore continues this “economical” trend in Indian logic and ventures to simplify the reasoning procedures in order to make them universally binding, without any need for further empirical justification other than the premises themselves. Besides, he emphasises the sole validity of the principle of *anyathānupapatti* (inexplicability otherwise). It would be incongruous, if Siddhasena Mahāmāti, being such an ardent proponent of the new definition of the valid *hetu* in NA., had subscribed himself to the notion of *sambadhin* as a binding logical principle in a text other than NA.

My interpretation of the genuine standpoint of NA. as regards the validity of the inferences that have recourse to the idea of *sambandhin*, as expressed in VS.9.18, is further strengthened by what Siddharṣiṅgaṇi says in NAV.5.2, while commenting on the Vaiśeṣika definition of inference: [2] *tathānye*: “*’syēdaṁ kāryaṁ kāraṇaṁ saṁyogi samavāyi virodhi cēti laiṅgikam*” *iti*. Referring to the *saṁyogin* part of the Vaiśeṣika definition, Siddharṣiṅgaṇi plainly says: “By the same [argument the thesis that] also a connected [attribute] leads to the comprehension [of the inferendum] is censured because it [is open to] similar criticism.” (NAV.5.3: *etena saṁyogino ’pi gamakatā pratyuktā, samāna-dūṣaṇatvāt.*)

Siddharṣiṅgaṇi’s clarification confirms Siddhasena Mahāmāti’s opinion and stands in contradiction with the inference in STP. based on *sambandhin* / *saṁyogin*. Thus, we encounter in STP. and NA. two conflicting attitudes towards the question of reasoning and the proof formula. It would be highly surprising if one and the same author outspokenly rejected the idea of the five-membered proof formula in one text (NA.) and used the same five-membered proof formula in another text (STP.).

## 6.

### 6.1.

As mentioned already (§ 2.1, p. 2), NA. presupposes the notions, ideas and terminology developed by Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti and the text gives the impression that its author tries to keep pace with the development of Indian logic. There are a large number of other Buddhist notions and quotations, or semi-quotations in NA. (see n. 6), that are consistently and deeply interwoven in the structure of the text, revealing that the author was, on the one hand, aware of possible criticism from the Buddhist side who might disapprove of his own

ideas or, on the other hand, he himself was expressly critical of certain Buddhist concepts.

On the other hand, I do not find even a single notion in STP. that might presuppose its author's acquaintance with Dīnāga's, Śāṅkarasvāmin's or Dharmakīrti's ideas; no criticism is raised against the *viññāna-vāda*, *Yogācāra*, *Yogācāra-Sautrāntika* etc. The main antagonists in STP. are the Vaiśeṣika,<sup>39</sup> whereas the references to other schools are sporadic.<sup>40</sup> Apart from the notions and terms mentioned above in § 2.5 (e.g. *svārtha- / parārtha-anumāna*) or the issue of *sāmānya - viśeṣa* (*vide infra*, § 6.2, p. 13 ff.) that occur in NA. and are absent from STP., there is not the slightest hint in STP. to support the supposition that its author knew of such ideas as: the doctrine of *apoha*; conceptualisation (*kalpanā*); the non-verbal perception (*nīrvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*); non-erroneousness of perception (*avibhrāma / abhrānti*) coupled with erroneousness of inference (*vibhrāma / bhrānti*); the concept of *trairūpya* and general discussion on conditions of validity of inference; the question of causation (also in the epistemological sense), including the arising of cognition as a reflection (*pratibhāsa*) of an object as well as the actual relation between cause and effect (*grāhya-grāhaka-bhāva-sambandha*) in the form of relation of causality (*tad-utpatti*) and relation of essential identity (*tādātmya*). These are only some of the topics one would expect Siddhasena Divākara to deal with in respective sections of STP. devoted to the linguistic approach towards reality (e.g. by applying *syād-vāda* or *naya-vāda*) and the meaning of words, or to the exposition of causality (e.g. in the sections of STP.3.32–35 and STP.3.43–45), for instance, applied to origination of material things (*dravya*) endowed with qualities (*guṇa*) and modes (*paryāya*), or to the working of *karman* (when the author discusses an antiquated doctrine of determinism (*niyati*) in STP.3.53).

Certainly, these notions are likewise absent from NA., and I have named these ideas as an argument *ex silentio*. Their absence from NA. necessitates no further justification: there is no context in the discussion within NA. for them to be mentioned, whereas generally concepts and ideas that are expected to be relevant for the discussion are indeed reported there. This is not the case with STP. This is of course a negative evidence, i.e. it only proves that the author of STP. does not *use* these notions and terms we would expect to find in STP., but it does not disprove the claim that the author was *not aware* of them. The argument rests on the supposition that if the author of STP. had been acquainted with these ideas, he would probably not have missed the opportunity to defend his views against possible criticism

in respective sections of his STP. But, as one could argue, he might simply have considered them irrelevant or thought it unnecessary to refute them for some reason. Whatever the case might have been, it does not seem very plausible that one and the same person could exhibit such divergent attitudes in both works (STP. and NA.) and be so inconsistent (either in terms of conceptual framework or in terms of approach).

## 6.2.

### 6.2.1.

It is in the context of the cognitive faculties (*upayoga*) that Siddhasena Divākara uses the terms *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* in STP.2.1: “Such insight (conation) which grasps the general [becomes] cognition [when] characterised by the specific.<sup>41</sup> This comprehension of an object is [within the scope] of both viewpoints<sup>42</sup> alike.”<sup>43</sup> What concerns me here is the first hemistich that characterises the nature of *darśana* (insight / conation) and *jñāna* (cognition), which grasp the general (*sāmānya*) and the specific (*viśeṣa*) respectively. Here the differentiation into the *sāmānya* and the *viśeṣa* is not along the lines of the typical distinction of the universal (as related to the class notion, *jāti*, language and concepts, *kalpanā*) and the particular (*vyakti*, *svalakṣaṇa*, etc.). Crucial for the distinction is the opposition between “general, indistinct, unclear” (for *sāmānya*) and “distinct, specific, particular” (for *viśeṣa*). What emerges is the picture of the *darśana* grasping the *sāmānya*, and the *jñāna* grasping the *viśeṣa*.

At first glance, one might have an impression that what is at stake is the often-debated division into perception (*pratyakṣa*, which is often – even in Jaina sources – called *darśana*; see below § 6.2.2 for the similar case) and its opposite, non-perceptual cognition, e.g. inference (*anumāna*). What would surprise him or her would be the untypical correlation of perception (*pratyakṣa*) to *sāmānya* and non-perceptual kinds of cognition (such as *anumāna*) to *viśeṣa*. Such a position would immediately be liable to censure not only from the Buddhist side, in so far as it would express precisely the opposite of what e.g. Dharmakīrti claimed, namely that the *viśeṣa* (*svalakṣaṇa*) is the proper object (*viśaya*) for perception (*pratyakṣa*), whereas the *sāmānya* (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) is the proper object (*viśaya*) for inference (*anumāna*).

Naturally, a reader well acquainted with Jaina tradition would immediately recognise that the text deals with the two *upayogas*, not with the division into *pratyakṣa* – *anumāna*, or something similar.

## 6.2.2.

However, the author of STP. was in fact occasionally wary of a possible misunderstanding of his position. An instance is facilitated by the discussion of STP.2.21–24:

[The *prima facie* position to be refuted:] [21] “Insight is nothing but sensation, because it designates ‘[this is] a pot,’ [hence it] becomes [the sensuous]<sup>44</sup> cognition. Just like [sensation], in the same manner, the difference between both the absolute [cognition and insight] is this much only: [22] [the absolute] cognition is preceded by [the absolute] insight, but [the absolute] insight is not conditioned by [the absolute] cognition; hence we rightly conclude that there is difference between both [the absolute] cognition and [the absolute] insight”.<sup>45</sup>

[Rejoinder:] [23–24] “If you maintain that insight is nothing but [ocular]<sup>46</sup> sensation, [or] a qualified cognition, [then], if it were so, it [would] follow that insight is nothing but the sensuous cognition, and such would necessarily be [the case] with the insight derived through the remaining sense organs. But this is not correct”.

[The opponent argues:] “If in [the case of] these [remaining senses] only cognition is understood,<sup>47</sup> in the very same way in [the case of] eyes [only cognition should be understood].<sup>48,49</sup>

From the above passage it follows that the opponent may have considered insight / conation (*darśana*) to be merely perception (*pratyakṣa*), both because of the misleading terminology (see above § 6.2.1 for a similar case) and because of the specific character of insight / conation (*darśana*), viz. its “operating strategy” that merely brings the constataion: “this is such a thing.” Precisely such a constataion is often said to be a characteristic mark of – at least conceptual (*savikalpaka*) – perception.<sup>50</sup> In other words, the opponent may have had the impression that the description of the mechanism of *darśana* matches that of *avagraha*,<sup>51</sup> for “it designates ‘[this is] a pot’” (“*ghaḍo*” *tti nīvvaṇṇanā*),<sup>52</sup> hence he may have been inclined to equate the two. Especially the contents of STP.2.21 and 2.23 are very suggestive in this regard.

Significantly Siddhasena Divākara dismisses any supposition that *darśana* might be equated with *avagraha* and tries to prove that the affinity between Jaina *avagraha* and *darśana* is illusory. He does so, despite the fact that *naturally* anyone sufficiently acquainted with Jaina tradition would immediately recognise that *darśana* and *avagraha* can by no means be identified!

This only demonstrates that Siddhasena Divākara anticipated possible misunderstandings or misinterpretations on the part of his opponent, that he *was* aware of such a possibility.

Accordingly, *if* the author of STP. had been acquainted with Dinnāga’s or Dharmakīrti’s ideas, he would not have failed to expound on the controversial question of the proper relation between *darśana* – *sāmānya*

and *jñāna – viśeṣa* stated in STP.2.1 (vide supra § 6.2.1), for he would have been aware that his statements are not only liable to some misreading but may easily trigger pertinent criticism.<sup>53</sup> This further strengthens the supposition, expressed above in § 6.1, that STP. was written before Dinnāga.

## 7.

Another case of disagreement between NA. and STP. concerns different typologies of cognitive faculties (*upayoga*) and cognitive criteria (*pramāṇa*).<sup>54</sup> In NA. we find two subdivisions of *pramāṇa*: (1) perception (*pratyakṣa*), divided into sensory and supra-sensory (*kevala*), and (2) indirect cognition (*parokṣa*) that comprises inference (*anumāna*) and verbal testimony (*śābda*). With the exception of the *kevala-pratyakṣa* mentioned in NA.27, Siddhasena Mahāmāti's understanding of *pratyakṣa* conforms to the general Indian epistemic tradition that took it to be the cognition directly derived through and with the help of sense organs in the first place. His *pratyakṣa* (perception) departs from the Jaina tradition that regarded *pratyakṣa* to be direct and of exclusively supra-sensory character. There is no reference to the idea of *upayoga* in NA.; instead the main concern of Siddhasena Mahāmāti is the enquiry into the character of *pramāṇa*. His examination culminates in formulating the first descriptive definition of *pramāṇa* in the history of Jaina epistemology and one of the first in India.<sup>55</sup>

In sharp contrast to NA. is the classification outlined in STP. Surprisingly the idea of cognitive validity (*prāmāṇya*) and of cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*) is absent there, and so are such terms as *pramāṇa*, *pramiti*, *māna*, *pramā*, or their equivalents. Instead, what predominates in the epistemological scheme of STP. are the two *upayogas* (investigated esp. STP.2.1–5, 18 ff., 30), divided traditionally into five kinds of *jñāna* and four kinds of *darśana*.

The idea of the fivefold division of *jñāna* into *mati*, *śruta*, *avadhi*, *manah-paryāya*, *kevala* is present e.g. in STP.2.5–6, 2.16, 2.23 and 2.27. There can be no doubt that Divākara recognised the four divisions of *caḥsur-darśana*, *acāḥsur-darśana*, *avadhi-darśana*, *kevala-darśana* (see STP.2.20), with the proviso of STP.2.30–31 (vide infra, p. 16).<sup>56</sup> Surprisingly, the division into *pratyakṣa-parokṣa* is nowhere mentioned explicitly in STP. And – with the exception of STP.2.28–29 – the terms *pratyakṣa*, *samakṣa*, *sakṣāt* etc. as well as their opposites never occur in the text. The same goes for *parokṣa*. Nonetheless we can easily – in the verses that outspokenly speak of *pratyakṣa* – find hints that the author

did conceive of the *upayoga* scheme as bifurcating into the complements of direct and indirect cognition: “[27] In [case of] a conditioned person (i.e. in the state of bondage) the comprehension of objects is occasioned by the sensuous cognition and testimony; there is no insight in any one of them; what from [should there be] insight [in them]? [28] Since objects cognised through testimony are not amenable to grasping [them] directly, therefore the word ‘insight’ does not apply to the cognition through testimony at all. [29] Since entities not [directly] touched [by senses] (*asprṣṭa*) become direct[ly cognisable] for the cognition through telaesthesia, therefore the word ‘insight’ is [correctly] employed with regard to the cognition through telaesthesia.”<sup>57</sup> The next two verses of STP.2.30–31 state that at the level of an omniscient person (*kevalin*) both the cognitive faculties, viz. *kevala-darśana* and *kevala-jñāna* are identical (*aviśeṣa*), since they arise at the same time.

Furthermore, Siddhasena Divākara accepted the sensuous cognition (*mati-jñāna*, *ābhinibodhika-jñāna*) himself,<sup>58</sup> alongside its four traditional stages, viz. sensation (*avagraha*),<sup>59</sup> speculation (*īhā*), perceptual judgement (*apāya*) and retention (*dhāraṇā*), and classified it as the *parokṣa* type cognition (*jñāna*).<sup>60</sup>

Thus, the structure of the cognitive faculties propounded in STP. corresponds basically to what I call Model I:<sup>61</sup> *upayoga*: (I) *jñāna*: (1) *ābhinibodhika-jñāna* with its four stages: (a) *avagraha*, (b) *īhā*, (c) *apāya*, (d) *dhāraṇā*, (2) *śruta-jñāna*, (3) *avadhi-jñāna*, (4) *manaḥ-paryāya-jñāna*, (5) *kevala-jñāna*, (II) *darśana*: (1) *caḥsur-darśana*, (2) *acacṣur-darśana*, (4) *avadhi-darśana*, (5) *kevala-darśana*.

Significantly as it were, not only is this structure incompatible with NA., but also the notion of the sensuous cognition (*mati-jñāna*, *ābhinibodhika-jñāna*) does not fit into the framework of NA.<sup>62</sup>

## 8.

In NA. Siddhasena Mahāmati develops the idea of *svārtha-vākya* and *parārtha-vākya* (NA.10) and *svārtha-pratyakṣa* and *parārtha-pratyakṣa* (NA.11), elaborating upon the well-known division of *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna* developed by Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti.<sup>63</sup> It is precisely in the context of his attempt to prove that the epistemic idea of efficacy for others (*pārārthya*) and efficacy for oneself (*svārthya*) is applicable to both perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*parokṣa*) that one should read his statement of NA.12: “And such an utterance that demonstrates an object recognised through perception is called perception, because it is the external factor for the representation.”<sup>64</sup>

His thesis of *parārtha-pratyakṣa* boils down to saying that things can also be *directly* cognised through verbal means, and verbal utterances can be classified as cases of perception under special conditions, viz. if they contribute to the generating of knowledge in the hearer that corresponds to the speaker's cognitive states derived perceptually.

In contradistinction to the above statement of NA., STP.2.28 explicitly declares that “objects cognised through testimony are not amenable to grasping [them] directly” (*paccakkha-ggahaṇam na inti suya-nāṇa-sammiyā atthā*). In other words, for Siddhasena Divākara verbal communication is incompatible with the notion of direct cognition (*pratyakṣa*), hence must by definition be indirect (*parokṣa*).<sup>65</sup> Here we have a clear case of two contradictory concepts when one and the same sphere of verbal communication is either attributed (NA.) or denied of (STP.) the efficacy of direct cognition. Apparently Siddhasena Divākara could not have been aware of the concept of *parārtha-pratyakṣa*.<sup>66</sup>

## 9.

As I have tried to demonstrate on the preceding pages, there is a number of points that make the common authorship of STP. and NA. highly debatable, namely (1) the general outline, vocabulary and matters discussed (*vide supra* §§ 2.1–2, 2.5–6); (2) presence (in NA.) or absence (in STP.) of the structured pattern of definitions and justifications (*vide supra* §§ 2.3–4); (3) various principles on which inference is based, viz. inference of the relatum (*sambandhin*) by means of a relation (*sambandha*) – i.e. the application of *sambandhin* as *hetu* – accepted in STP. and rejected in NA., and the “inexplicability otherwise” (*anyathānupapatti*) – i.e. the proper *hetu* – as the basis of all inference propounded in NA. (*vide supra* § 4); (4) acceptance (in STP.) or rejection (in NA.) of application (*upanaya*) as a member of the proof formula (*nyāyāvayava, sādhana*), and therefore the rejection or acceptance, respectively, of the classical five-membered proof formula (*pañcāvayava-vākya*) (*vide supra* §§ 5.1–2); (5) presence (in NA.) or absence (in STP.) of notions that presuppose the authors' acquaintance with Dinnāga or Dharmakīrti (*vide supra* §§ (§ 2.1, 6.1), especially the case of the proper relation between *darśana – sāmānya* and *jñāna – viśeṣa* (*vide supra* §§ 6.2.1–6.2.2); (6) different typological schemes of cognitive faculties (*upayoga*) or cognitive criteria (*pramāṇa*), the question of the feasibility of assigning room to the sensuous cognition (*mati-jñāna, ābhinibodhika-jñāna*) in such a classification, as well as different interpretations of the true character of *pratyakṣa* (*vide supra* § 7); (7) the controversy

of the direct, i.e. perceptual character (*pratyakṣa*) of verbal utterances and the question whether things communicated verbally can be grasped directly (*vide supra* § 8).

To this list I could add some more points of divergence, discussed already in BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming), namely: (8) the assignment of either sensory (NA.) or suprasensory (STP.) character to *pratyakṣa*, taken either as perception (NA.) or as blanket term “direct cognition” (STP.);<sup>67</sup> (9) the importance of the essential unity of *jñāna* and *darśana* at the *kevala* stage for the author of STP. and complete indifference to the question in NA. as well as a different treatment of *kevala* in both works;<sup>68</sup> (10) different attitudes to the authority of the Āgamas, either faithfulness to the Āgamic tradition (STP.) or search for novel solutions (NA.).<sup>69</sup>

I believe these points of divergence clearly demonstrate that not only were the *Sammati-tarka-prakarāṇa* and the *Nyāyāvatāra* conceived by two different persons, but also at two different historical periods.

As regards the *Sammati-tarka-prakarāṇa*, it is rather dubious whether the name of its author was indeed Siddhasena Divākara, but since I see no better alternative, I would suggest keeping the name, especially in view of Abhayadevasūri’s identification (*vide supra* n. 4). Since there is no indication that Siddhasena Divākara as the author of the *Sammati-tarka-prakarāṇa* might have been familiar with the terminology of Dinnāga’s school, I would maintain that he must have flourished before ca. 500 C.E.

Since the *Nyāyāvatāra* was definitely composed after 620/660 C.E. (Dharmakīrti) and Pātrasvāmin and before c. 800 C.E. (Haribhadrasūri),<sup>70</sup> its author cannot be the same Siddhasena. To distinguish the two Siddhasenas, I follow the identification by Haribhadrasūri and refer to the author of the *Nyāyāvatāra* as Siddhasena Mahāmāti.<sup>71</sup>

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> The *Prabhāvākacarita* of Prabhācandra – dated from 1277 C.E. (see GRANOFF (1989–1990: I, 329)) – seems to be the only exception, see GRANOFF (1989–1990: II, 292): “The *Prabhāvākacarita* is the only text to name in addition Siddhasena’s manual of logic, his *Nyāyāvatāra* . . .”

<sup>2</sup> See GRANOFF (1989–1990: I, 336): “The work that modern scholars consider to be Siddhasena’s main philosophical work, his *Sammatitarka*, is nowhere mentioned in the biographies in the *prabandhas* and in related sources.”

<sup>3</sup> See UPADHYE (1971: xxiii). “Its [= *Nyāyāvatāra* – P.B.] constitution (whether it had 32 verses), its authorship by Siddhasena (the author of the *Sammatī*) and consequently its date have to remain open questions for a number of reasons.”

<sup>4</sup> TBV.1.1 (introductory part), p. 1.17–18: . . . *Siddhasena-Divākaraḥ tad-upāya-bhūta-Sammaty-ākya-prakarāṇa-karaṇe* . . .

<sup>5</sup> Haribhadrāsūri quotes the verse NA.2 in his *Aṣṭaka* and refers to its author as Mahāmāti, cf. Pt. Dalsukhbhai MALVANIA (1979: 287–288), UPADHYE (1971: xxiv) and DHAKY (1995: 44). The following observation of UPADHYE (1971: xxiv) further strengthens the claim that NA. and STP. had two different authors: “Haribhadra, in his *Aṣṭaka*, quotes the *Nyāyavatāra* 2, by referring to its author as Mahāmāti. Elsewhere, however Haribhadra speaks plainly about the author of the *Sanmati* as Divākara and Śrutakevalin.”

<sup>6</sup> See BALCEROWICZ (1999: “Introduction”, iii-xix) and BALCEROWICZ (2000).

<sup>7</sup> See BALCEROWICZ (2000: 27–28).

<sup>8</sup> E.g. only the *avagraha* stage of *mati-jñāna* is mentioned in STP., while the author is silent on the three remaining subdivisions, viz. *ihā*, *apāya* and *dhāraṇā*. Nevertheless the reader is expected to know them to be able to follow the argumentation.

<sup>9</sup> An exception is the related term *upapanna* occurring in ST.2.33:

*sammanñāne niyameṇa daṁsaṇaṁ daṁsane u bhayaṇijjāṁ /  
sammanñānaṁ ca imaṁ ti atthaṁ hoī uvavaṇṇaṁ //* –

– “Right insight [exists] in right knowledge, and right knowledge should be necessarily admitted [to exist] in right insight – this is explicable (*upapanna*) from the meaning (*arthāt = sāmāthyāt*).”

<sup>10</sup> Truly, the term *pakṣa* occurs in STP., but in the more general sense of “opinion, viewpoint,” e.g. STP.1.23: *anyonya-pakṣa-nirapekṣā nayāh*, and STP.2.39: *aha puṇa puvva-payutto attha egaṁta-pakkha-paṭisehe / taha vi uyāharaṇam iṇaṁ tti heū-paṭijoāṇaṁ vocchaṁ //* – “Even though a fact has been previously adduced to refute a one-sided view, nevertheless, we will formulate a solution (remedy) [in the form] of the reason: ‘this is an example.’” The context for it is STP.2.37–38 and the question: “What is the relation between liberated *jīva* and its *kevala* cognition? They should be different form each other”.

<sup>11</sup> The term *prayoga* occurs in STP.3.32 but not in the logical sense.

<sup>12</sup> NA.29–30 only mentions the term *naya* as an element of the *anekānta* theory.

<sup>13</sup> There is, however, a conspicuous similarity as regards the character of *kevala* (similarities are underlined):

NA.27: *sakalāvaraṇa-muktātma kevalaṁ yat prakāśate /*

*pratyakṣaṁ sakalārthātma-satata -pratibhāsanam //* –

– “That whose essence is freed from all veils, which shines as [something] absolute is perception representing constantly the essences of all objects.”

STP.2.17: *tamhā caivvi-bhāgo jujjāi na u ṇāna-daṁsana-jinānaṁ /*

*sayalam aṇāvaraṇam aṇaṁtam akkhayaṁ kevalaṁ jamhā //* –

– “Therefore it would follow that [cognition would be] four-fold [not five-fold], but there [would be] no [separate] cognition and insight [in case of] Jinas, if the absolute cognition is without veils, eternal, imperishable.” This verse is a rejoinder of Divākara’s opponent who draws the conclusion from Divākara’s thesis about the identity of cognition and insight. But this similarity is apparent and not conclusive, since it may simply be due to a general way of describing the absolute cognition.

<sup>14</sup> E.g. *niṣkrānta-bheda-svarūpa, bhedaṁ na pratipadyante*.

<sup>15</sup> One would expect NA. to use the term (*nir-/sa-*)*vikalpa* or *kalpanā* while discussing the nature of perception, e.g. to take recourse to the idea of non-conceptual perception expressed by Dīnnāga or Dharmakīrti in NB.1.4: *tatra pratyakṣaṁ kalpanāpōdham abhrāntam*. Strangely enough, NA. does nowhere refute the idea of *kalpanāpōdha*.

<sup>16</sup> *sakalāvaraṇa-muktātma kevalaṁ yat prakāśate* – i.e. it is the *only* cognition after all veils have been destroyed.

<sup>17</sup> *kevala-ṇāvaraṇa-kkhaya-jāyaṁ kevalaṁ jahā ṇānaṁ //* – after veils have been

destroyed, other kinds of cognition such as the sensuous cognition, etc., are not possible, i.e. *kevala* is the only cognition.

- <sup>18</sup> STP.3.16: *eyaṃta-pakkha-vāḍo jo uṇa davva-guṇa-jāi-bheyammi /*  
*aha puṇva-paḍikkutṭho uāharaṇamittam eyaṃ tu //*  
 STP.3.17: *piū-putta-nattu-bhavvaya-bhāūṇaṃ eka-purisa-sambamdo /*  
*na yaso ekassa piya tti sesayāṇaṃ piyā hoī //*  
 STP.3.18: *jaha sambandha-visiṭṭho so puriso purisa-bhāva-ṇiraīsaḍo /*  
*taha davvam imdiya-gayaṃ rūvāi-visesaṇaṃ lahaī //*  
 STP.3.19: *hojjāhi du-guṇa-mahuraṃ aṃaṃta-guṇa-kālayaṃ tu jaṃ davvaṃ /*  
*na u daharaḍo mahallo vā hoī sambamdo puriso //*  
 STP.3.20: *bhaṇṇāi sambamdo-vasā jāi sambamdhitaṇaṃ aṇumayaṃ te /*  
*ṇaṇu sambamdo-visese sambamdi-visesaṇaṃ siddhaṃ //*  
 STP.3.21: *jujjaī sambamdo-vasā sambamdi-visesaṇaṃ na uṇa eyaṃ /*  
*ṇayaṇāi-visesa-gaḍo rūvāi-visesa-pariṇāmo //*  
 STP.3.22: *bhaṇṇāi visama-pariṇayaṃ kaha eyaṃ hohū tti uvaṇiyāṃ /*  
*taṃ hoī para-ṇimittāṃ ṇa va tti ettha 'tthi egaṃto //*

<sup>19</sup> The above verse refers to the refutation of the thesis of absolute difference between substance and quality (*dravya-paryāya-bhedaikānta-vāda*) in the preceding section. Cf. Abhayadevasūri's TBV. *ad loc.* p. 636.17–19, *ekānta-vyatiriktābhyupagama-vādo yaḥ punar dravya-guṇa-kriyā-bhedeṣu sa yady api pūrvam eva praktikṣiptaḥ bhedaikānta-grāhaka-pramāṇābhāvād abheda-grāhakasya ca* “*sarvam ekaṃ sad aviśeṣād viśeṣe vā vīyat-kusumavad asattva-prasaṅgāt*” *iti pradarsītatvāt. tathāpi tat-svarūpe dārdhyotpādanārtham udāharana-mātram abhidhiyate.* – “However, even though this [Vaiśeṣika] doctrine accepting absolute difference of (lit. as absolutely different with respect to) the divisions of substance, quality and movement has just in the preceding been rejected – because [firstly] there is no cognitive criterion proving (lit. making one grasp) absolute difference and [secondly] because a counter-proof for (lit. [a cognitive criterion] proving) non-difference of [substance, quality and action] has been demonstrated [in the form]: ‘Everything is the one existent, because there is no distinction [among entities as regards their existence], or if there were [any] distinction, that would lead to the undesired consequence of non-existence of [some entities that should be taken to differ from other entities considered to exist], like a sky-flower’ – nevertheless merely an example is [explicitly] stated in order to provide [additional] substantiation for the gist of this [doctrine of the absolute difference]”.

Thus the dialectical structure of the whole passage is as follows: the *bheda-vāda* of 3.16 as the *pūrvapakṣa* 1 (it is referred to by the *abheda-vādin*), to which is appended its corroborative instantiation in 3.17, is subsequently followed by a rejoinder in 3.19 (inexplicability of the occurrence of two different kinds of situations) and its refutation from the position of the *abheda-vāda* of 3.20. Further, the Jaina position is established in 3.21, only to be followed by the quandary voiced by the opponent in 3.22 ab which is solved in 3.22 cd.

<sup>20</sup> The idea is clear enough: if a man, as the substratum of various interpersonal and family relations, were identical with the relations qualifying him, then a particular relation, say, of his-being-a-father to a particular individual (his son) would have to by necessity bear on all other relations, insofar as they would be likewise identical with the substratum, for the relation of identity (*abheda*) is a transitive relation. Thus, the logical justification for the *bheda-vāda* would, in the eyes of Siddhasena Divākara, be to prevent a range of undesired consequences ensuing from the transitive character of the identity relation that underlies the *abheda-vāda*.

<sup>21</sup> The above verse of 3.18 projects the structural pattern of the complex whole: the man and his relational modes with respect various family relations, onto the substance-qualities structure. The qualities of the substance Siddhasena Divākara

has in mind are colour and other sensations (*viṣaya*) related to the five senses. If a substance as the substratum for its qualities were in the relation of identity to its qualities, then e.g. the relation “substance – visible-form”, which further relates the substance to a particular sense (here: sense of vision), would be passed onto other relational complexes substance – sensation – sense organ; in consequence, the distinction between the character of sensory data would be blurred and disappear, the distinction between them being merely nominal. Cf. Abhayadevasūri’s TBV. *ad loc.* p. 636.23–27, *yathā pradarśita-sambandha-viśiṣṭaḥ pitr-ādi-vyapadeśam āśrityāsau puruṣa-rūpatayā niratiśayo ’pi san tathā dravyam api ghrāṇa-rasana-cakṣus-tvak-śrotra-sambandham avāpya rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśa-śabda-vyapadeśa-mātram labhate dravya-svarūpeṇāviśiṣṭam api nahi śakrēndrādi-śabda-bhedād gīrvāna-nāthasyēva rūpādi-śabda-bhedāt vastu-bhedo yuktas tadā dravyādvaitaikānta-sthiteḥ kathamcid-bhedābheda-vādo dravya-guṇayor mithyā-vāda iti.* – “Just as [a man] qualified by a specified relation, who is determined [in his relational status] by the designation ‘father’, etc., still [remains] unsurpassed (*sc.* unmodified) – viz. existent – in his human form, in the same manner also the substance – having entered a [specific] relation with the [faculties of] smell, taste, vision, touch and hearing – receives the designation alone [that refers to its] colour, taste, smell, touch and sound, even though [the substance remains] the same in its intrinsic nature of [being] a substance. For it is not sound [to assume] that an entity [referred to] is different on account of the difference of [referring] terms [such as] ‘colour, etc.’, analogous to [the non-difference] of [one and the same] male deity despite the difference of [referring] terms [such as] ‘Śakra’, ‘Indra’, etc. Hence, since the doctrine of the absolute unity of substance is proved, the doctrine [propounding] conditional difference – cum – non-difference between substance and its qualities is a false doctrine”.

<sup>22</sup> Abhayadevasūri introduces the refutation with the words *asya nirākaraṇāyāha*, and further explicates (TBV. *ad loc.*, p. 636.29–637.5), *yadi nāma āmrādi-dravyam eva rasana-sambandhād “rasa” iti vyapadeśa-mātram āśādayet dvi-guṇa-madhuram rasataḥ kuto bhavet tathā nayana-sambandhād yadi nāma “kṛṣṇam” iti bhavet ananta-guṇa-kṛṣṇam tat kutaḥ syāt vaiṣamya-bhedāvagater nayanādi-sambandha-mātrād asaṁbhavāt. tathā, putrādi-sambandha-dvāreṇa pitr-ādir eva puruṣo bhavet na tv alpo mahān vēti yuktaḥ. viśeṣa-pratipatter upacaritave mithyātve vā sāmānya-pratipattāv api tathā prasakter iti bhāvah.* – “Suppose that a singular substance such as mango fruit, etc., could acquire the designation alone ‘taste’ due to [its] relation with the [faculty of] smell, how could it become sweet of two kinds (*sc.* possess two sweet flavours, if the determining relation substance-sense is singular) with respect to taste? Similarly, suppose that – due to the relation with [the faculty of] vision – something could be [called] ‘black’, how could it be black of infinite kinds (*sc.* how could it be characterised by innumerable shades of black, if there is only one substance-sense relation)? [This should not occur], because the recognition of difference within the complex [consisting of various flavours / shades] would not be possible due to the mere (*sc.* singular) relation with the [faculty of] vision, etc. Similarly, it is sound [to maintain] that a man who is precisely the father, etc., by way of [his] relation to [his] son, etc., could become neither small nor big, because such should be the [expected] unwelcome consequence if on account of the apprehension of the particular there [could] also [arise] the apprehension of the general, either metaphorically or falsely. Such is the idea”.

What is implied here, I believe, is that in the first case, a singular substance (mango fruit, a black object) is the bearer of a number of indistinct and particular cognate qualities (distinct sweet flavours, a range of particular shades of black), even though there is only one general relation (connection) between the substance and the respective sense organ (faculties of taste, of vision) that is accountable for the respective general blanket-terms such as “sweet” or “black”, whereas in the second case the substance

(the man) retains its (his) singular character, even though one should by analogy expect him to appear diversified, since it (he) enters a number of relations. For the specific meaning of *vaiṣamya* = “particularised complexity / individualised character” see NAV.29.23: *tasmāt tad eva saṁvedanam upasarjanī-kṛta-vaiṣamyaṁ pradhānī-kṛtaikākāraṁ sāmānyam grhṇātīty ucyate...* (“Therefore, it is taught that the very same sensation [in which] the particularised complexity is made subordinate [and in which] one [common] form is made the main [import] grasps the universal...”) and NAT.29 *ad* NAV.29.23: *upasarjanīty-ādi. upasarjanī-kṛtaṁ gauṇī-kṛtaṁ vaiṣamyaṁ viśeṣa-rūpatā yena tat-tathā.*

<sup>23</sup> STP.3.23: *davvassa thaī jammā-vigamā ya guṇa-lakkaṇaṁ ti vattavvaṁ / evaṁ saī kevaliṇo jujjāi taṁ ṇo u daviyassa //*

<sup>24</sup> STP.3.8: *rūva-rasa-gaṁdha-phāsā asamāṇa-ggahaṇa-lakkaṇā jamhā / tamhā davvāṇugayā guṇa tti te keī icchānti //*

<sup>25</sup> TBV. *ad* 3.8, p. 633.1–2, *rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśāḥ asamāna-grahaṇa-lakṣaṇā yasmāt tato dravyāśritā guṇā iti kecana vaiśeṣikādyāḥ.*

<sup>26</sup> VS.4.1.9–11: [9] *aneka-dravyeṇa dravyeṇa samavāyād rūpa-viśeṣāc cōpalabdhiḥ. [10] etena rasa-gandha-sparśeṣu jñānaṁ vyākhyātam. [11] tad-abhāvād avyabhicārah.* The idea is further specified in PBh.[236], p. 44: *rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśeṣv aneka-dravya-samavāyāt svagata-viśeṣāt svāśrāya-sannikarṣān niyatēndriya-nimittam [pratyaṅgam – P.B.] utpadyate.*

<sup>27</sup> VSV.9.18: *sambandhi-śabdena saṁyogino grahaṇaṁ dhūmādeḥ. anyad vyākhyātam saṁyogādi-sūtre.* See the reading of the sūtra in NAV.5: *asyēdam kāryaṁ kāraṇaṁ saṁyogi samavāyī virodhi cēti laṅgikam.*

<sup>28</sup> The relevant section is edited and translated in KUNST (1939: 11–53).

<sup>29</sup> *anyathānupapannatvaṁ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim / nānyathānupapannatvaṁ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim //*

The verse is also found in TSVA. p. 203, TBV. vol. II, p. 569.28–29 and in PMī.2.1.9 § 33: p. 45.17–18. In the reading of Tsa. the *pādas* ab are interchanged with the *pādas* cd! On the authenticity of this verse, see BALCEROWICZ (1999: xxx, n. ix) and BALCEROWICZ (2000: 45, n. 72).

<sup>30</sup> Pātrasvāmin’s treatise in question is his lost *Tri-lakṣaṇa-kadarthana*. See DHAKY (1995: 43).

<sup>31</sup> NA.17ab: *hetos tathōpapattyā vā syāt prayogo ’nyathāpi vā / , NA.22ab: anyathānupapannatvaṁ hetor lakṣaṇam tṛitam //*

<sup>32</sup> I quote the whole passage of STP.3.46–53, which is relevant for further discussion:

STP.3.46: *parisuddho naya-vāyō āgamamettattha-sāhaō hoī / so ceva duṅṅiṅṇo doṅṇi vi pakkhe vidhammeī //*

STP.3.47: *jāvāyā vāyāna-vaḥa tāvāyā ceva hoṁti ṇaya-vāyā / jāvāyā ṇaya-vāyā tāvāyā ceva para-samayā //*

STP.3.48: *jaṁ kāvilāṁ darisaṇaṁ eyaṁ davvatthiyassa vattavvaṁ / suddhoṇa-taṇaṁssa u parisuddho pajjava-viūppo //*

STP.3.49: *dohi vi ṇāēhi ṇāṁ satham ulūēṇa taha vi micchattaṁ / jaṁ savisaā-ppāhanattanena aṇṇoṇa-niravekkhā //*

STP.3.50: *je saṁta-vāya-dose sakkolūyā bhaṇaṁti saṁkhāṇaṁ / saṁkhā ya asavvāē tesim savve vi te saccā //*

STP.3.51: *te u bhayaṇovanīyā sammaddaṁsaṇaṁ aṇuttaraṁ hoṁti / jaṁ bhava-dukkha-vimokkhaṁ do vi na pūreṁti pātikkaṁ //*

STP.3.52: *natthi pudhavi-visitttho ghaḍo tti jaṁ teṇa jujjāi aṇaṇṇo / jaṁ puṇa ghaḍo tti puvvaṁ ṇa āsi pudhavi taō aṇṇo //*

STP.3.53: *kālo sahāva ṇiyāi puvva-kayaṁ purisa kāraṇegaṁtā / micchattaṁ te cevā(va) samāsaō hoṁti sammattaṁ //*

<sup>33</sup> Here: *bhayaṇā = bhajanā = vivakṣā = anekānta.*

- <sup>34</sup> Here: *visiṭṭha* = *visliṣṭa* = *bhinna*. Cf. TBV. *ad loc.*: *nāsti sad-dravya-mṛt-ṛthivūvādibhyo visliṣṭo bhinnāḥ so 'pi vā...* On the meaning of the term *visiṭṭho* cf. also: (1) STP.2.42: *jīvo aṇṇāi-nihaṇo "jīva" tti ya niyamaō na vattavvo / jaṇ purisāiyya-jīvo devāiyya-jīviya-visiṭṭho //* (TBV. *ad loc.* has: *jīvo 'nādi-nidhano jīva eva viśeṣa-vikala iti niyamato na vaktavyam yataḥ puruṣāyuṣka-jīvo devāyuṣka-jīvād viśiṣṭo jīva eva iti...*) and (2) *jaha sambandha-visiṭṭho so puriso purisa-bhāva-nīraīsaō / taha davvam imdiya-gayaṇ rīvāi-visesaṇaṇ lahaī //* (TBV. *ad loc.* has: *yathā pradarsīta-sambandha-viśiṣṭaṇ pitrādi-vyapadeśaṇ āśrityāsau puruṣa-rūpatayā niratiśayo 'pi san tathā dravyam api ghrāṇa-rasana-cakṣus-tvak-śrotra-sambandham avāpya rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśa-śabda-vyapadeśa-mātraṇ labhate...*).
- <sup>35</sup> NBh.1.1.38: *udāharaṇāpekṣas tathēty upasaṁhāro na tathēti vā sādhyasyopanaṇaḥ.*
- <sup>36</sup> STP.3.69: *baddaṇ micchā-dāsaṇa-samūha-māiyyassa amaya-sārassa / jiṇa-vayaṇassa bhagavaō saṁvigga-suhāhigammasa //*
- <sup>37</sup> NA.20: *antar-vyāptyaiva sādhyasya siddher bahir-udāhṛtiḥ / vyarthā syāt tad-asadbhāve 'py evaṇ nyāya-vido viduḥ //*
- <sup>38</sup> Cf. FRAUWALLNER (1933) and FRAUWALLNER (1957).
- <sup>39</sup> See STP.3.8 (the question of the *guṇas* as located in a *dravya*) and the refutation of Vaiśeṣika in STP.3.9 (there are *paryāyas* in addition to *guṇas*), STP.3.14, 3.24, 3.31 (the notion of *anyonyābhāva*, or mutual non-existence), STP.3.39–40 (the Vaiśeṣika notions of *aṇu*, *dvy-aṇuka* and *try-aṇuka*, combination and disintegration of the atom), STP.3.49–50.
- <sup>40</sup> *Sāṁkhya* is referred to in STP.3.48, Buddhists in STP.3.48 and 3.50.
- <sup>41</sup> STPT *ad loc.* correctly explains *visesiyam* as *viśeṣitam iti viśeṣa-grahaṇam*.
- <sup>42</sup> I.e. the substantial, or substance-expressive viewpoint (*dravyārthika-naya*, *dravyāstika-naya*), and attributive, or mode-expressive viewpoint (*paryāyārthika-naya*, *paryāyāstika-naya*). See STP.1.3.
- <sup>43</sup> STP.2.1: *jaṇ sāmaṇṇa-ggahaṇaṇ dāsaṇaṇ eyaṇ visesiyam\* nāṇaṇ / donho vi nāyāna eso paḍekkaṇ attha-pajjāō //*
- \* TBV. *ad loc.* correctly explains *visesiyam* as *viśeṣitam iti viśeṣa-grahaṇam*.
- <sup>44</sup> STPT *ad* 2.21 (p.617.27) correctly supplies: *matī-jñānaṇ*.
- <sup>45</sup> The verse STP.2.22 refers, in my opinion, to the alleged distinction between *kevala-jñāna* and *kevala-darśana* in view of the second hemistich of STP.2.21 that introduces it: "Just like [sensation], in the same manner, the difference between both the absolute [cognition and insight] is this much only...".
- <sup>46</sup> In view of the phrase *sesimdiya* (*śeṣendriya*) in STP.2.24, the sensation here must refer to *cakṣur-avagraha* (\**cakkhuggaha* = *ālocana*).
- <sup>47</sup> The form *gheppai* corresponds to \**ghrp / \*ghrpsyate*, a root paralel to *√grbh* (see: PISHEL (1981: § 212, p. 182, § 534, p. 434 and § 548, p. 441).
- <sup>48</sup> The idea of the opponent is that if one accepts that there should be *only* respective sensory cognition, e.g., olfactory cognition (*ghrāṇa-jñāna*), and the idea of an olfactory insight (*ghrāṇa-darśana*) be rejected, the same rule should be applied to the sense of sight: one should accept only ocular cognition (*cakṣur-jñāna*) and reject the idea of ocular insight (*cakṣur-darśana*). In the preceding section (STP.2.20) Divākara – following tradition – recognises *cakṣur-darśana* as one of four subdivisions of *darśana*.
- <sup>49</sup> STP.2.21–24: *dāsaṇaṇ oggahamettaṇ "ghaḍo" tti niṇvaṇṇaṇā havaī nāṇa / jaha ettha kevalāna vi visesaṇaṇ ettiyaṇ ceva // dāsaṇa-puvvaṇ nāṇaṇ nāṇa-nimittaṇ tu dāsaṇaṇ ṇatthi / teṇa suviṇicchiyāmo dāsaṇa-nāṇāna aṇṇattaṇ //*

*jaī ogghamettaṃ daṃsaṇaṃ ti mañṇasi viśesiāṃ nāṇaṃ /  
maī-nāṇaṃ eva daṃsaṇaṃ evaṃ saī hoī nipphaṇṇaṃ //  
evaṃ sesindīya-daṃsaṇaṃmi niyameṇa hoī na ya juttaṃ /  
aha tattha nāṇamettaṃ gheppāī cakkhummi vi taheva //*

<sup>50</sup> Cf. NBh.1.1.4: *rūpaṃ iti jānīte rasa iti jānīte* [p. 20.8] and *rūpaṃ iti jñānaṃ rasa iti jñānaṃ iti* [p. 21.4–5]; and NBh.2.1.2 [p. 220.1–2]: *cakṣuṣy asati rūpaṃ na grhyate sati ca grhyate, yac ca yasminn asati na bhavati sati (ca) bhavati tasya tad iti vijñāyate...* See also the claim of NBh.2.1.30: *yad idam indriya-sannikarṣād utpadyate jñānaṃ “vrkṣaḥ” iti etat kila pratyakṣaṃ* [p. 119.7], with regard to which the doubt is immediately raised (*tat khalu anumānaṃ – kasmāt?* – p. 119.7–8) and eventually resolved (*tasmād vṛkṣa-buddhir anumānaṃ na bhavati* – p. 120.6). Cf. PBh.2.12.2.a [234] (p. 44): *dravye tāvat tri-vidhe mahaty aneka-dravyavattvodbhūta-rūpa-prakāśa-catuṣṭaya-sannikarṣād dharmādi-sāmagrye ca svarūpa-locana-mātram* (this statement goes back to VS.4.1.6). See also the discussion on the non-conceptual and conceptual kinds of perception in NAV.4.4: *svalakṣaṇa-viśayendriyaja-nirvikalpaka-jñāna-sadbhāve ‘pi na tāvad idam-tayānidam-tayā vārtha-vyavasthitir, yāvad vidhi-pratiśedha-dvāreṇa vikalpa-yugalakam pāścātyaṃ nodayate...* (“even if the non-conceptual cognition, [which is] produced by the senses [and] whose province is an individual thing, is present, so long there [can be] no determinate cognition of an object [in the form:] ‘it is this [object]’ or ‘is it not this [object]’, as long as a pair of conceptualisations is not resolved by means of confirmation and negation...”).

In fact, the constatation of the kind “[this is] a pot” (“*ghaḍo*” *tti nivvaṇṇaṇā*), etc., constitutes a part of the Nyāya definition of perception (NS.1.1.4) and corresponds to what is technically called *vyavasāya*. This defining characteristic of *pratyakṣa* is described in NBh. *ad loc.* [p. 22.4–9]: *dūrāc cakṣuṣā hy ayam arthaṃ paśyan nāvadharaṇyati – dhūma iti vā reṇur iti vā tad etad indriyārtha-sannikarṣotpannam anavadhāraṇa-jñānaṃ pratyakṣaṃ prasajyate ity āha – vyavasāyātmakam iti...* Clearly, this defining characteristic of perception corresponds to the Jaina stage of perceptual judgement (*apāya*, *avāya*), see TBh.1.15 and SSi.1.15: [2] *iḥā: yathā śuklaṃ rūpaṃ kiṃ balākā patākā vēti* (“[Speculation questions:] ‘Is [this], say, white form a crane or a banner?’”); [3] *avāya: utpatana-nipatana-pakṣa-vikṣepādibhir balākā evāyaṃ na patākēti* (“[Perceptual judgement resolves:] ‘due to beating with wings, etc., this [white form] is nothing but a crane, not a banner, due to the upward and downward flight.’”); [4] *dhāraṇā: avetasya kālāntare ‘vismaraṇa-kāraṇaṃ dhāraṇā. yathā sīvāyaṃ balākā pūrvāhṇe yāṃ aham adrakṣam iti* (“Retention is the cause of not forgetting, [even] when some time elapsed, for instance: ‘This is exactly that very crane I saw this morning.’”).

<sup>51</sup> *Avagraha* – as the first stage of the sensuous cognition (*mati-jñāna*) – unequivocally implies that the author of STP. accepted the remaining three stages, viz. *iḥā*, *apāya* and *dhāraṇā*.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. TATIA (1951: 77): Siddhasena then quotes an opinion which recognized *darśana* as ‘*avagraha*, simple and pure’, and *jñāna* as ‘determinate description’ of the form ‘This is a jar...’.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. §§ 2.1–2.2 of BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming).

<sup>54</sup> Here I merely recapitulate the conclusions of BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming), where I dealt with this question at length in §§ 3–5.

<sup>55</sup> See BALCEROWICZ (2000: 27–28).

<sup>56</sup> Typically, *maṇaḥ-paryāya* is explicitly denied its *darśana* counterpart (*nirdiṣṭa = nirdarśana*),

cf. STP.2.19: *jeṇa mano-visaya-gayāṇa daṃsaṇaṃ ṇatthi davva-jāyāṇa /  
to maṇapajjava-nāṇaṃ ṇiyamā nāṇaṃ tu nidditṭhaṃ //*

<sup>57</sup> STP.2.27–29: *maī-suya-nāṇa-ṇimitto chaūmatthe hoī attha-ūvalambho /  
egayarammi vi tesim ṇa dāmsaṇaṃ dāmsaṇaṃ kutto? //  
jaṃ paccakkha-gahaṇaṃ ṇa inti suya-nāṇa-sammiyā athā /  
tamhā dāmsaṇa-saddo ṇa hoī sayale vi suya-nāṇe //  
jaṃ apuṭṭhā bhāvā ohi-ṇṇānāssa hoṃti paccakkhā /  
tamhā ohi-ṇṇāṇo dāmsaṇa-saddo vi uvayutto //*

<sup>58</sup> See STP.2.6, 23, 27, 32.

<sup>59</sup> See STP.2.21 and 2.23–24.

<sup>60</sup> See § 6.2.2 above and n. 47 as well as § 4.3 and § 5 of BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming).

<sup>61</sup> See § 4.1 of BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming). The model is found in the Āgamas, e.g. in *Bhagavaī* 8.2.22–23 (p. 336): *... paṃcavihe nāṇe paṇṇatte, tam jahā – ābhinihoḥiya-nāṇe suya-nāṇe ohi-nāṇe maṇapajjava-nāṇe kevala-nāṇe. ... ābhinihoḥiya-nāṇe catuv-vihe paṇṇatte, tam jahā – uggaho ihā avāō dhāraṇā; Bhagavaī* 2.10.9[2] (p.115): *... jīve naṃ aṇaṃtānaṃ ābhinihoḥiya-nāṇa-pajjavāṇaṃ evaṃ suta-nāṇa-pajjavāṇaṃ ohi-nāṇa-pajjavāṇaṃ maṇapajjava-nāṇa-pajjavāṇaṃ kevala-nāṇa-pajjavāṇaṃ mati-āṇṇāna-pajjavāṇaṃ suta-āṇṇāna-pajjavāṇaṃ vibhaṅga-nāṇa-pajjavāṇaṃ cakkhu-dāmsaṇa-pajjavāṇaṃ acakkhu-dāmsaṇa-pajjavāṇaṃ mohi-dāmsaṇa-pajjavāṇaṃ kevala-dāmsaṇa-pajjavāṇaṃ uvaōgaṃ gacchati, upayoga-lakkaṇe naṃ jīve. . . ;* and in *Nandi* 6[28–29] and 8 (pp. 6, 9): *... nāṇa-dāmsaṇa-guṇāṇaṃ. ... nāṇaṃ paṃcavihaṃ paṇṇattaṃ. tam jahā – ābhinihoḥiya-nāṇaṃ suya-nāṇaṃ ohi-nāṇaṃ maṇapajjava-nāṇaṃ kevala-nāṇaṃ.*

<sup>62</sup> For details see § 4.2 and § 5 of BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming).

<sup>63</sup> See JACOBI (1926: iii, n. 1), VAIDYA (1928: xviii–xx), BALCEROWICZ (1999: ‘Introduction’, vii ff.) and BALCEROWICZ (2000: 20 ff.).

<sup>64</sup> NA 12: *pratyakṣa-pratipannārtha-pratipādi ca yad vacaḥ /  
pratyakṣaṃ pratibhāsasya nimittatvāt tad ucyate //*

<sup>65</sup> Meanings / things that can be verbally conveyed to other people, or ‘communicable entities’ (*prajñāpanīyā bhāvāḥ*), are said in STP.2.16ab to be directly related to the verbal knowledge (*śruta-jñāna*): *paṇṇavaṇijjā bhāvā samatta-suya-nāṇa-dāmsaṇā-visāō / .*

<sup>66</sup> Cf. § 6.2 in BALCEROWICZ (2000).

<sup>67</sup> For details see §§ 3.1–3.2 of BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming).

<sup>68</sup> For details see § 3.3 of BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming).

<sup>69</sup> For details see § 7 of BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming).

<sup>70</sup> On the date of the *Nyāyāvatāra* see BALCEROWICZ (2000: 49).

<sup>71</sup> On the name of the author of NA see: BALCEROWICZ (1999: xxxiv–xxxvi) and n. 5 above.

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