

HOW COULD A COW
BE BOTH SYNCHRONICALLY AND DIACHRONICALLY HOMOGENOUS,
OR
ON THE JAINA NOTIONS OF *TIRYAK-SĀMĀNYA* AND *ŪRDHVATĀ-SĀMĀNYA**

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At the outset of the second millennium CE, two new notions find their way into the post-Dharmakīrtian logico-epistemological tradition. These are *ūrdhvatā-sāmānyā* (diachronic homogeneity) and *tiryak-sāmānyā* (synchronic homogeneity), or, to render the terms more literally, ‘the universality of / based on verticality’ and ‘the horizontal universality’.¹ In all probability, their first occurrence is recorded in the *Citrādvaita-prakāśa-vāda* of Ratnakīrti, who is nowadays commonly agreed upon to have flourished between 1000-1050² and who was a disciple of Jñānaśrīmitra. Ratnakīrti avails himself of these two terms in order to contest two arguments, based on direct perceptual experience, that are brought up against two principal points of the Buddhist doctrine, viz. against the concepts of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) and of the ultimate reality of consciousness (*viññāna-vāda* or *viññapti-mātratā*). In this concise work of Ratnakīrti we read: ‘Just the way the apprehension of oneness [of one and the same thing occurs] diachronically – on account of the sensory perception – due to nescience, although the difference of [separate] moments [is in fact] known³, in the same way the apprehension of difference [among similar objects occurs] synchronically merely on account of nescience, although the non-difference [can in fact be] comprehended through self-cognising⁴ perception.’⁵ The first of these, viz. the argument against the concept of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*), takes recourse to the commonly observed temporal continuity and integrity of one and the same object, which seemingly stands in contradiction with the momentary nature of things assumed by the Buddhist. What is of utmost significance, the seeming continuity and integrity of an object is perceived, as he puts it, diachronically (*ūrdhvam*), lit. ‘vertically’. The second argument is based on the perceived multiplexity and divergence of phenomena, that stand in contradiction to the oneness of consciousness in which the phenomena, ultimately unreal, are represented in their seeming diversity as numerous individuals. Their illusory multiplexity is apprehended synchronically (*tiryak*), lit. ‘horizontally’, i.e. simultaneously.

The idea of synchronic and diachronic homogeneity – not only in its standard phrasing, but also in any alternative formulation (*vide infra* pp. 6, 9) – seems to be altogether absent from Buddhist treatises antecedent to *Citrādvaita-prakāśa-vāda*, including the works of Dīnnāga or Dharmakīrti. Moreover, we do not come across any explicit mention of these two terms even in works of Ratnakīrti’s teacher, Jñānaśrīmitra⁶ himself. However, Jñānaśrīmitra does refer to the idea of homogeneity directly in his *Vyāpti-carca*, even though he does not use the qualifiers ‘diachronic’ and ‘synchronic’ to describe the notion of *sāmānya*: ‘This being so, that which is to be grasped (*sc.* directly perceived) is an individual thing [that becomes an object] of perception and that which is to be [indirectly] apprehended is homogeneity (universality). The contrary is [the case with regard to an object] of inference, [viz. it is always the universal apprehended indirectly]. Among these [two varieties], perception establishing [a particular object] is such the province of which is the homogeneity with regard to (*sc.* encompassing) a series [of moments that make up an individual thing], although a [person] aiming at a purposeful activity [catches merely] a momentary glimpse [of that object] only then, [i.e. only in the moment of perceiving this particular object]. However, on the occasion when the invariable concomitance is grasped, [the perception grasping this invariable concomitance] is such the province of which is the homogeneity inasmuch as [the latter’s] province [is constituted by] all individual things belonging to the same class, although [one] sees [only] one individual thing [at the moment of perception].’⁷

The notions of diachronic and synchronic homogeneities reappear in the context of the universal and the particular – that are claimed to constitute objects of cognition – in a work of epigonic character written some decades later, which was a kind of a résumé of the Buddhist post-Dharmakīrtian tradition, namely in the *Bauddha-tarka-bhāṣā* of Mokṣākaragupta⁸: ‘And this homogeneity is two-fold: characterised by synchronicity (lit. characterised by the verticality) and characterised by diachronicity (lit. characterised by the horizontal). Among these [two varieties], the homogeneity characterised by diachronicity is the accumulation of several moments of one individual thing, e.g. a pot etc., [which is] distinguished from [all other things] that belong to the same class, and [this homogeneity is] the object of perception establishing [a particular object]. The synchronic homogeneity, however, is [constituted by] several individual things [of one class] that are distinguished from [all other things] that belong to a different class; [this homogeneity is] the object of perception grasping the invariable concomitance.’⁹ A

detailed textual analysis¹⁰ would show that Mokṣākaragupta in his definitions goes back to the portions of *Vyāpti-carca* quoted above.

Presently, I shall attempt to show that the two said terms – although they fit with the Buddhist theoretical framework very well – were, in fact, introduced to the philosophical discourse by Jaina thinkers.¹¹ Before, however, I broach on this question, I would like to delimit the semantic field of these uniquely – the contention I shall attempt to demonstrate on the following pages – Jaina notions.

Diachronic homogeneity (*ūrdhvatā-sāmānya*) expresses the self-identity of a substance or a particular object in its temporal development, which undergoes several changes in the course of time, irrespective of the class-notion or of its actual form, whereas synchronic homogeneity (*tiryak-°* or *tiraścīna-sāmānya*) subsumes a number of specimens possessed of the same property at the same point of time under the same class. The former concerns the temporal series of modifications of the same substance that preserves its individual character, whereas the latter deals with the numeric arrangement within the same class at a given moment. It should be pointed out, however, that the rendering of the terms *tiryak-sāmānya* and *ūrdhvatā-sāmānya* as ‘horizontal universality’ and ‘vertical universality’¹² respectively fails to express the basic idea and may easily lead to misunderstanding. The notion expressed by *sāmānya* in this case is not the universal juxtaposed with the particular, but the unity of one and the same substance that unfolds itself through a spectrum of its facets. The *locus classicus* for the concept of this two-fold homogeneity – recorded at least a hundred years before the first occurrence of these terms in the Buddhist literature – is Māṇikyā Nandi’s¹³ *Parīkṣāmukha-sūtra*: ‘/3/ Homogeneity is two-fold, due to the division into synchronic (lit. the synchronic) and the diachronic (lit. diachronicity). /4/ The synchronic [homogeneity] is the permutation of the similar [property], like cowness in calves with half-grown horns, in young hornless [cows] etc. /5/ The [homogeneity based on] diachronicity is the substance pervading [all] its prior and subsequent manifestations, like clay in [different stages, say,] a lump of potter’s clay etc.’¹⁴

Anantavīrya¹⁵ in his commentary *Parīkṣāmukha-laghu-vṛtti* glosses: ‘/4/ [Māṇikyā Nandi] states the first division together with an example. The synchronic homogeneity is taught to be only of the nature of variation concerning many similar [specimens], because a single eternal property, like cowness etc., taken [both] consecutively and simultaneously, would contradict purposeful activity and because it is improper to speak of its occurrence in individual things, [each] taken individually. /5/ [Māṇikyā Nandi] describes the second division together with an

illustration, too. [As for «diachronicity» occurring in the *sūtra*,] «homogeneity» is [to be] supplied [from the preceding]. Hence such is the meaning: [it] proves to be the diachronic homogeneity (lit. the homogeneity of diachronicity). What is that substance [mentioned in the *sūtra* by Māṇikyā Nandi]? Exactly that is qualified [as «something pervading all its prior and subsequent manifestations»]. The meaning is that it goes with three times (*sc.* the diachronic homogeneity encompasses past, present and future) [as something that] occurs in previous and subsequent points of time. The meaning is that, similarly, like pervasion – [in case] of one knowledge of a [given] colour, [say, blue] – of [various] shades of blue etc., that constitute the real nature of several [similar blue things] existing simultaneously [in case of synchronic homogeneity] – one [knowledge] pervades the variations of one [substance] taking place in a [temporal] series.¹⁶

The technical term *ūrdhvatā-sāmānya* meaning ‘diachronic homogeneity’ should not be confused with its homophone. Thus, for instance, in *Siddhi-viniścaya-ṭīkā*, in *Siddhi-viniścaya* commentary on Bhaṭṭākalaṅka’s *Siddhi-viniścaya* composed by Anantavīrya himself, the author uses the locution *ūrdhvatā-sāmānya* again – while discussing the four varieties of standpoints (*nikṣepa*, *nyāsa*) and the process of forming representations of perceived so-called ‘genuine’ and ‘not genuine’ substances as well as the question of their credibility – however, in a different meaning: ‘Accordingly, grasping of a given particular is preceded by grasping its common character, just like grasping [by means] of two perceptual judgements [two different] particular [objects, like] pillar and man¹⁷, is preceded by grasping their common character of being upright; and, [correspondingly,] the sensation-cognition¹⁸ grasps [both] the universal and the particular; hence also this [sensation-cognition] is preceded by grasping their common character [of being upright]. Furthermore, neither is the common character non-different from (*sc.* identical with) existence, so that *regressus ad infinitum* would follow, nor is grasping of it grasping of a particular, so that there [would be] the deviation¹⁹ in case of the logical reason.’²⁰ In the above passage, the expression *ūrdhvatā-sāmānya* is clearly not the technical term in question, but it is an ordinary compound which means ‘the common character of being upright [in case of pillar and man]’, viz. it denotes the general idea that both pillar and man are expected to be upright by nature, unless the latter is struggling half-vertically his way back home through gravitational forces after a sparkling banquet evening.

Certainly, it is not Māṇikyā Nandi to whom the priority of introducing the notions of diachronic and synchronic homogeneities can be accredited. The brevity of expression itself may be taken to attest the fact that the idea was already well

developed and fully formed at that time, and thus needed no further elucidation. Not much earlier, Siddharṣigaṇi²¹ makes an incidental use of the two terms in his commentary on the *Nyāyavatāra*²², while discussing the nature of the knowledge of recognition (*pratyabhijñā-jñāna*): '[The process of gaining the knowledge of recognition can be illustrated as follows:] first the perception of an object leaves a subliminal impression in the self; due to the perception of an [object] of this sort this subliminal impression awakes; [when] awakened, this [subliminal impression] generates the recognition – that has the former object as its province – with the description: «This is the same [object] or it belongs to the same class»; because this [recognition] establishes homogeneity subdivided into diachronic and synchronic [and] because this [recognition] does not arise [in case] of [a person in whom] the perception, the domain of which [should be] the former[ly observed] object, has not taken place.'²³ The two aspects of the above-mentioned essential feature of recognition represented by the following description: 'This is the same [object] or it belongs to the same class', accord with the two divisions of homogeneity, viz. the recognition of the type 'this is the same object' corresponds to diachronic homogeneity, whereas the recognition through description 'this object belongs to the same class' expresses the idea of synchronic homogeneity.

The reminiscential factor is maintained by Devabhadrasūri²⁴ in his *Nyāyavatāra-tippaṇa*²⁵ to be a necessary cause of both an accurate identification of a given object and of ascribing it to a given class; in other words, recognition is instrumental in establishing the notion of homogeneity: '[Now we comment upon the expression] commencing with [the word]: «its (= of recognition)». Well, [if one is in quandary as to the reason] why the subliminal impression produces two-fold knowledge of recognition [of the form:] «This is the same [object] or it belongs to the same class», [then] it is said: because this knowledge of recognition determines both these [homogeneities, which have been stated by Māṇikya Nandi]: «The [homogeneity based on] diachronicity is the substance pervading [all] its prior and subsequent manifestations, like clay in [different stages, say,] a lump of potter's clay, an earthenware vessel etc.» [PA.4.5]; «The synchronic [homogeneity] is the permutation of the similar [property], like cowness in calves with half-grown horns, in young hornless [cows] etc.» [PA.4.4]. If, however, the twofold knowledge of recognition did not emerge, the homogeneity, divided into the varieties of diachronic and synchronic, would not be established. If [someone still does not comprehend] why the knowledge of recognition [can] not arise in the very first contact of eyes [with a particular object] because of the absence of the foundation dependent on the following sequence: «initially the perception of an

object [takes place], then [comes the turn of] the subliminal impression, next its awakening [is brought about, only] thereafter [can occur] the knowledge of recognition», [then] it is said: because the knowledge of recognition cannot arise in such a man, in whom the perception the domain of which is the former object has not [yet] appeared; for the knowledge of recognition [takes place] on the awakening of the subliminal impression due to the perception of [an object] of [specifically] this sort; and that [awakening is possible] when the subliminal impression is there; and the subliminal impression [is possible] only when previously the perception of the object [took place].²⁶

We may further trace the idea of the two-fold homogeneity back to Akalaṅka, who lived in the 8th century²⁷. Although he does not use the terms *ūrdhvatā-sāmānya* and *tiryak-sāmānya*, the idea itself is already present in his writings.²⁸ Instead, in his *Laghīyas-traya* as well as in the auto-commentary thereupon, he makes use of a range of synonymous expressions, i.e. *saha-vivartin* or *saha-bhāvin* (‘occurring simultaneously’) and *krama-vivartin* or *krama-bhāvin* (‘occurring consecutively’) with regard to two aspects of one substance:

‘One [knowledge²⁹] reveals itself with divisions – [although] they themselves have no divisions – that consist in appearances of its own object which is either existent or non-existent, that occur simultaneously or consecutively [and] that are visible and invisible.

Just the way one momentary knowledge is accepted [by us] together with diverse representations, either existent or non-existent, that themselves have no [further] divisions, in the very same manner one substance should be considered beginningless and endless with simultaneous and consecutive divisions, visible and invisible, that themselves have no [further] divisions, because in another case, if the mass of infinitesimal atoms and knowledge were as if extraneous [to each other], as if they did not form mutually their essence [viz. as if they were not mutually entirely interdependent, that would] contradict the appearance of [being] one [and] stable (unchanging) [in case of the perceived thing in case] when it is determined that there is no devolution [of it] (*sc.* that the object preserves its identity) throughout.³⁰

The passage cited above leaves no doubt that ‘the simultaneous occurrence’ and ‘the consecutive occurrence’ tally with the *tiryak-sāmānya* and *ūrdhvatā-sāmānya* respectively. In other words, divisions of one substance that occur simultaneously refer to a whole spectrum of individuals, each of them being a particular actualisation of the substance in a given point of time. Thus, all of these

manifestations are maintained to be actual and potentially visible in one, say, present, point of time. Consecutive divisions of a substance, on the other hand, are spread linearly on the time axis and jointly make up an individual object. From the perspective of any arbitrarily chosen moment, the actuality and perceptibility of only one manifestation of the object can be predicated of as real, past and future actualisations of the object being neither actual nor visible, i.e. either already actualised and expired or not yet actualised. In such a way, we are confronted here with a juxtaposition of a class-notion composed of individual manifestations of one substance in the present moment with an idea of momentary singular actualisations of the substance that extend in time.

We encounter the afore-mentioned idea of the simultaneous occurrence and the consecutive occurrence already roughly a century before Akalaṅka. While discussing the nature of substances, modes and qualities in *Tattvārthādhigāma-īkā*, sometimes called *Bhāṣyānusārīṇī*, Siddhasenagaṇi³¹ refers to them directly: ‘Qualities are of various [numerical] power, insofar as they [can] be enumerated by countable, uncountable and infinite numbers. These very alterations that exist consecutively and simultaneously, insofar as they are of every kind, are modes. And [here in TS.5.40] we shall describe these [qualities, such as] forms etc., as well as [modes, such as] clod [of clay], pot, potsherd etc., according to [their particular] characteristics due to [their] diverse specific [numerical] powers as follows: «Qualities have substance as their substratum, [themselves they] are bereft of any qualities»; for, as far as that is concerned, [both] qualities and modes are particular transformations of a substance, but – as we shall make it clear – qualities and modes have no other qualities and modes [of their own] whatsoever. Nevertheless – even though, when resorting to the empirical viewpoint, qualities are modes – there is a practice of referring [to them] by way of difference: [on the one hand], qualities, such as form etc., exist simultaneously, modes, [on the other,] exist non-simultaneously, [viz. consecutively]. In reality, [however, there ensues] identity: modes are qualities.’³² Terminological differences between Siddhasenagaṇi and Akalaṅka are minute and insignificant: *krameṇa bhavant* for *krama-bhāvin* and *saha bhavant* for *saha-bhāvin*. Siddhasenagaṇi, however, glosses the terms further as existing non-simultaneously (*ayugapad-avasthāyin*) and existing simultaneously (*yugapad-avasthāyin*). What is in fact significant, Siddhasenagaṇi equates these divisions with modes (*pariyāya*) in a broader sense, for, according to him, there exists no real difference between modes (*pariyāya*) and qualities (*guṇa*) in a strictly technical meaning. But being more specific, he says, one can indeed draw a distinction between modes and qualities of one and the same

substance. In this sense, a substance, when considered at one particular point of time, viz. synchronically, may be said to permute as a cluster of qualities or individuals, that exist simultaneously. When viewed diachronically, however, the substance evolves through various modes, viz. through temporal stages of one individual, from its origination to its destruction (clod of clay, pot, potsherd etc.).

We have no direct evidence that Samantabhadra³³ was already familiar with the idea of the two-fold homogeneity, apart from a hint contained in Vidyānandācārya's commentary on *Yukty-anuśāsana*. Therein Samantabhadra includes an aphorism that juxtaposes *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*, or the universal and the particular, and treats of two conceivable linguistic means to express them: 'Manifold particulars are grounded in universality (homogeneity)³⁴. Word³⁵ [by its nature] is furnished with an access into (*sc.* pertains to) the particular.³⁶ Another [variety of word (speech element)] conveys (*sc.* points to) a particular, that is of the universal nature,³⁷ because [such a word] functions with regard to that which comprises other particulars.^{38,39} However, commenting upon this particular verse in his *Yukty-anuśāsana-ṭīkā*, especially in the portion that is of much relevance in the context of the two terms examined in this paper, Vidyānandācārya⁴⁰, in all probability a contemporary of Māṇikya Nandī, leaves no doubt that the Jinistic tradition posterior to Samantabhadra understood the latter's remark as referring to the idea of synchronic and diachronic homogeneity: '«Manifold particulars are grounded in universality (homogeneity)» [means that] homogeneity (universality) is two-fold, viz. diachronic homogeneity and synchronic homogeneity. Among these, diachronic homogeneity is substance, which can be comprehended by [means of] an idea of persistence and oneness, concerning modes that take place in a sequence. Synchronic homogeneity consists in permutations of similar [things and] can be comprehended by [means of] an idea of similarity concerning manifold substances and modes. As for that [homogeneity], those whose entirety is grounded in that homogeneity (universality), are those, that are grounded in homogeneity (universality). What are they? They are particulars, or modes. Of what varieties are they? [They are] manifold: some are consecutive, some are simultaneous, [they are] manifestations of [numerically] one substance. Among these, consecutive [manifestations] – that consist in motion, e.g. ascending etc., [or] the essence of which is void of motion – are three-fold: common, [both] partly common and partly uncommon as well as uncommon. Common properties are existence, cognoscibility etc.; [properties that are both] partly common and partly uncommon are substantiality, animateness etc.; uncommon [properties] are modes of an object, that are established in each and every case [and] are differentiated with regard to

every substance. Of such manifold varieties are particulars, which are – insofar as they are based on (*sc.* located in) [numerically] one substance – based [individually] on diachronic homogeneity, because without it they could not be possible [...],⁴¹ Thus, the diachronic homogeneity (*ūrdhvatā-sāmānya*) refers to modes of one and the same thing, that occur in a sequence (*krama-bhāviṣu paryāyeṣu*) and consecutively (*krama-bhuva*), whereas the synchronic homogeneity comprises simultaneous (*saha-bhuva*) permutations of similar things (*sadṛśa-pariṇāma*), viz. of the same class.

We come across the term ‘synchronic homogeneity’ at least once more in a subsequent section of Vidyānanda’s commentary, where it occurs as a link in the chain of argumentation meant to refute the Vaiśeṣika concept of the universal *versus* the particular. Therein the opponent’s objection is being raised against the Jaina position, claiming that ‘Manifold particulars are grounded in universality (homogeneity)’ (YA.40), and consists in an attempt to establish an opposite thesis, viz. ‘Such a universality (homogeneity) is grounded in particulars’.⁴² Vidyānanda oppugns as follows: ‘If [the opponent comes up with the following argument] – “Universality (homogeneity) is grounded in particulars on account of the inherence of universality (homogeneity) in particulars that have different forms, [namely] in substances, qualities and actions” – [we shall retort] that is not [the case], because this [universality (homogeneity) you are talking of] consists in the synchronic homogeneity.’⁴³ Needless to say, Vidyānandācārya uses terminology parallel to that of Siddhasenagaṇi’s and Akalaṅka’s, with minor variations (*krama-bhāvin*, *krama-bhuva*, *saha-bhuva*).

As we have seen above, the terms synchronic homogeneity (*tiryak-sāmānya*) and diachronic homogeneity (*ūrdhvatā-sāmānya*) must have been coined not earlier than in post-Akalaṅkian literature. As late as at the turn of the 9th/10th centuries we can observe certain laxity in use of the two terms. Beside *ūrdhvatā-sāmānya* and *tiryak-sāmānya*, we find such forms as *ūrdhva-sāmānya* and *tiraścīna-sāmānya*⁴⁴. This want of terminological unanimity regarding these two notions may also testify to a quite recent origination of these terms. There is no doubt, however, that the idea itself had been known in the period preceding the activity of Akalaṅka. It is attested by the terminological correspondence of *tiryak-sāmānya* and *ūrdhvatā-sāmānya*, on the one hand, and a sequence of expressions synonymous with them, on the other, i.e. *kramaṇa bhavant* and *saha bhavant*, *krama-bhāvin* and *saha-bhāvin*, *krama-bhuva* and *saha-bhuva*, *krama-vivartin* and *saha-vivartin*, *yugapad-avasthāyin* and *ayugapad-avasthāyin*.

In our quest of further and earlier instances – that could attest to the familiarity of other Indian philosophers with the idea of synchronic and diachronic homogeneity – by using the method of searching for expressions semantically equivalent to *tiryak-sāmānya* and *ūrdhvatā-sāmānya*, like *krama-bhāvin* and *saha-bhāvin* and similar ones – which were replaced by the dyad *tiryak-°* / *ūrdhvatā-sāmānya* in the course of time – we should be wary of taking any single occurrence of such locutions at its face value. Already in the foregoing section apropos of SVṬ.12.4, we have come across an example of a misleading homophonic compound, viz. *ūrdhvatā-sāmānya* pertaining to the notion of erectness in case of material objects, instead to diachronicity. Similarly deceptive may be use of phrases which frequently serve as standard synonyms to synchronic and diachronic homogeneity. Thus, the same Samantabhadra avails himself of such parallel expressions in his work *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* at least once; these are, namely, *yugapat* [*sarva-bhāsana*], glossed by Vidyānanda *akrameṇa* [*paricchedâtma*], and *krama-bhāvin*. Their meaning is, however, in this particular context different and has nothing to do with the idea of homogeneity, but refers to the process of origination of knowledge of objects with the help of respective varieties of cognitive criteria: ‘Cognitive criterion [is tantamount to] the knowledge of truth. It [either] is a simultaneous representation of all [entities (which is the case with the absolute knowledge)] or occurs consecutively (of this kind are remaining varieties of cognitive criteria). This knowledge [of truth] is composed of the method of seven-fold modal description and of [conditionally valid] viewpoints.’⁴⁵

The assumption of Indra Chandra Shastri (1990: 81-82) and Satkari Mookerjee (1978: Chpt. IX) that the idea of synchronic and diachronic homogeneity (‘horizontal and vertical universalities’ in their phraseology) was present already in the *Āgamas* is void of any basis. First, such terms like *tirikkha-°* or *tiriya-sāmaṇṇa* and *uddhattā-sāmaṇṇa*, or similar ones, are entirely unknown to the Jaina canonical literature. Secondly, I have also failed to spot even a single occurrence of the corresponding synonyms of both the terms, enumerated above, in the corpus of the Jaina *Āgamas*. Nonetheless, the two respective entries in JLA. in their Prakrit version⁴⁶ might suggest that the terms were already known to Jaina thinkers, who composed their works in Prakrit. The author of the compendium, Balchandra Siddhantashastri, however, fails to name any Prakrit passage where these terms are mentioned; the only references he is capable of producing are those to exclusively Sanskrit texts of late origin. As a matter of fact, it is highly unlikely that such a sophisticated concept, as the synchronic and diachronic homogeneity certainly is,

could have been developed in early centuries following the origination of Jinism and at the time when the corpus of canonical works was conceived.

The two varieties of homogeneity should by no means be confused with the well-known distinction between the universal (*sāmānya*) and the particular (*viśeṣa*), viz. between a notion of class, that includes all similar entities irrespective of the temporal factor, and a notion of a specimen of the said class. Apart from the fundamentally different concepts of homogeneity and universality, any chronological organisation of a class or of its components is to the universal-particular distinction basically irrelevant. Furthermore, the idea of the dual homogeneity pertains to something entirely different than pure typologies and classifications, common to the Jinistic canonical thought. What Shastri and Mookerjee refer to as exemplifications of homogeneity ('universality' in their terminology) in the Jaina Canon⁴⁷ are either instances of mere classifications or simply statements regarding the ontological status, viz. monistic or pluralistic character, of categories discussed by them. Of exactly such character are numerous passages included, for instance, in the *Ṭhāṇaṅga-sutta*, among others the first⁴⁸ and sixth⁴⁹ chapters, or in the *Bhagavati-sūtra*⁵⁰. Similarly, a mere association of such classifications with the temporal factor or a plain juxtaposition of the notion of permanence of a substance with its transmutations in the time span – as it is the case with two aspects of numerically one existent elementary body (*asti-kāya*) in an aphorism of *Pañcāstikāya-samaya-sāra*⁵¹ of Kundakunda (1st cent. C.E.) – do not indicate that homogeneity is the matter at issue.

In opposition to the categorisation: 'universal *versus* particular', as well as to typological considerations, both varieties of homogeneity make up a linguistic-epistemological device meant to explain away the conspicuous discrepancy, encountered in linguistic practice, in application of one and the same expression, e.g. «cow», to either a group of similar objects or to a series of moments composing a whole, which is referred to as an individual. Thus, diachronic homogeneity is to account for the self-sameness of a given entity on the time axis, which retains its self-identity despite modal fluctuations on the surface. Synchronic homogeneity, on the other hand, deals with typological questions and subsumes a set of individuals exhibiting similar features in a given point of time, under the same class-denotation. In other words, both terms divide numerically one substance into a series of atomic manifestations; accordingly, the substance either unfolds itself via a whole range of individuals specifically in one moment of time or evolves through a succession of its momentary representations limited to one individual in the time span. To cite an example, a class of cows, that includes

calves, heifers, ‘milkable’ cows etc., all of them being considered simultaneously at one point of time, is an instance of synchronic homogeneity. On the other hand, a succession of consecutive stages of development of a bovine specimen, that is born and subsequently grows as a calf, heifer, cow etc., and preserves its identity throughout, offers an illustration of diachronic homogeneity. Thus, I hope to have answered the intriguing question contained in the title of this paper: ‘How could a cow be both synchronically and diachronically homogenous?’

The only existing link connecting the two varieties of homogeneity to the early Jaina canonical thought is the distinctively Jinistic concept of modes (*pariyāya*) or permutations (*pariṇāma*). As we have noticed above, numerous explicit instances of homogeneity are explained by way of simultaneous or consecutive modes or permutations of one and the same substance. Thus, certain metaphysical assumptions of the *Āgamas* regarding the multiplex nature of reality must have constituted a fertile ground for future origination of the idea of homogeneity. Most probably, this idea of the Jainas was developed paradoxically in confrontation with the Buddhist idea of momentariness. It may have been a Jaina answer to solve the aporia presented by the momentary nature of things, which was apt to eventually endanger the substantiality and reality of the phenomenal world. That being the case, the Jaina solution would be an anti-idealistic attempt to account for the undeniable and patent flux of momentary representations of entities, an attempt which took recourse to realistic ontological assumptions inherent to the Jaina tenets and which enabled the Jainas to retain their realistically bound metaphysics. This point, however, requires further detailed examination. The most salient feature of the Jaina idea of homogeneity, viz. the atomisation of numerically one substance denoted by a particular term on the linguistic level into a series of diachronic or synchronic actualisations, to which the term may indiscriminately apply, approximates this idea, as it has already been mentioned in passing, to the concept of momentariness upheld by the Buddhist. It was in all probability the reason which made the Jaina idea appealing to the latter’s mind enough to be subsequently adopted by him and be incorporated into the Buddhist theoretical framework.

Last but not least, what is also remarkable in this context is, semantically speaking, the application of terms *tiryañc / tiraścīna* (‘horizontal’) and *ūrdhva / ūrdhvātā* (‘vertical’) qualifying the word *sāmānya* – which primarily evoke spatial and visual associations – to the concept of time underlying the idea of homogeneity discussed in the foregoing pages. As a consequence, its analysis may incidentally contribute to our understanding of the way time was conceived and *visualised* among Indian philosophers, as well. The associative correlation between the

notions of space and time, as connoted by expressions primarily referring to spacial concepts, that were, in the course of time, extended onto temporal dimensions, can be observed in the use of a pair of principally space-bound locutions, viz. *ūrdhvam* = ‘above, upper, upwards’ and *adhas* = ‘below, beneath, down, downwards’. The dyad is not infrequently used in the sense of ‘hereafter, from now on, later; in the subsequent section, *infra*’ and ‘before, previously; in the preceding section, *supra*’, respectively, to cite two instances from a Jaina work: (1) *iti prapañcaviṣyāma ūrdhvam* (AJP. Vol. 1, p. 48, l. 25) and (2) *ity ukta-prāyaṃ – prāyeṇōktam adhaḥ. vaksyate ca ūrdhvaṃ [...]* (AJP. Vol. 2 p. 96. l. 30 – p. 97 l. 14).⁵² The surmise that it was this secondary, time-oriented use of *ūrdhvam* that played a role in coining the term *ūrdhva(tā)-sāmānya*, does not seem at all improbable.

Whatever the exact genesis of the two terms and their relation to the Jaina canon may be, their history offers us a clinical case, as it were, of a linear development of ideas, that can be followed in the Jaina philosophical works. Furthermore, the proliferation of these two notions in the Buddhist philosophical literature is apparently – as I am inclined to believe in the light of the above evidence – the only documented case of a direct influence of Jaina ideas onto the Buddhist thought in the classical period.

APPENDIX I

On the following pages, I have collected several occurrences of the two terms in question (underlined) in Jinistic works posterior to Mokṣākaragupta, that may prove useful for further study.

(1) *Nyāya-kumuda-candra* of Prabhācandra Sūri⁵³, a commentary on *Laghīyas-traya* of Bhaṭṭākalaṅka: NKC.5.47 p. 647 l.2: *dravyam ūrdhvatā-sāmānyaṃ*.

(2) *Tattva-bodha-vidhāyinī* of Abhayadeva Sūri⁵⁴:

TBV.1.1 [*sarva-jñā-vāda*] p. 58 l. 35: *tiryak-sāmānya-vādino 'pi gopāla-ghaṭikādaḥ dhūma-sāmānyasyāgnim antareṇāpi darśanād vyabhicārāsāṅkayā 'gni-niyata-dhūma-sāmānyāvadhāreṇā tad anumānam*.

TBV.2.1 [*śabdārtha-tat-sambandhayor mīmāṃsā / Prājñākara-matasya nirasanam*] p. 267 21-24: *na ca samānāsamāna-pariṇāmātmaka-vyaktīnām ānantyāt tiryak-sāmānyasya cīkasya sarva-vyakti-vyāpino vyakty-upalakṣaṇa-bhūtasyānabhyupagamāt tad-abhyupagame 'pi tad-yogāt tāsāmānanyāviniṣṭter na saṅketas tāsū sambhavaṭīti vaktavyam, atad-rūpa-parāvṛttāgni-dhūma-vyaktīnām ānantye 'pi yathā pratibandhaḥ parasparaṃ niścīyate*.

(3) *Pramāṇya-naya-tattvālokālaṅkāra* of Vādideva Sūri⁵⁵ and *Ratnākarāvatārikā* of Ratnaprabha Sūri⁵⁶:

PNTAA.3.5: *anubhava-smṛti-hetukaṁ tiryag-ūrdhvatā-sāmānyādi-gocaram saṅkalanātmakam jñānam pratyabhijñānam.*

RA.3.5: *anubhavaś ca pramāṇārpitā pratītiḥ, smṛtiś cānantarōktīva; te hetur yasyēti kāraṇōpadeśaḥ. tiryak-sāmānyam ca gavayādiṣu gotvādi-sva-rūpa-sadṛśa-pariṇāmātmakam. ūrdhvatā-sāmānyam ca parāpara-vivartavyāpi mṛtsnādi-dravyam; etad ubhayam ādir yasya visadṛśa-pariṇāmāder dharma-stomasya sa tiryag-ūrdhvatā-sāmānyādi-gocarō yasyēti viśayākhyānam. saṅkalanam vivakṣita-dharma-yuktatvena vastunaḥ praty-avamarśanam ātmā sva-bhāvo yasyēti sva-rūpa-nirūpaṇam. atrōdāharanti:*

PNTAA.3.6: *yathā taj-jātīya evāyam go-piṇḍaḥ; go-sadṛśo gavayḥ; sa evāyam jinadatta ity-ādi.*

RA.3.5-6: *atra tajjātīya evāyam go-piṇḍa ity-āsmiṁ tiryak-sāmānyōdāharaṇe darśite 'pi go-sadṛśo gavaya iti yat tatrīvōdāharaṇāntaram tan naiyāyikakadāgraha-nigrahārtham. [...] sa evāyam jinadatta iti tūrdhvatā-sāmānyōdāharaṇam. [...].*

RA.5.2: *anugātākārā 'nuvṛtta-svabhāvāḥ gaur gaur ity-ādi-pratītiḥ, viśiṣṭākārā vyāvṛtta-rūpā śabalāḥ śyāmala ity-ādi-pratītiḥ tad-gocaratvāt; iti tiryak-sāmānyaguṇākhyā-viśeṣa-lakṣaṇānekāntatātmaka-vastu-siddhau hetuḥ. pracīnōttarākārayoḥ yathā-saṅkhyena ye parityāgōpādāne, tābhyāṁ yad avasthānam, tat sva-rūpa-pariṇāmeṅārtha-kriyā-sāmarthyā-ghaṭanāt kārya-kāraṇōpapatteḥ ity ūrdhvatā-sāmānyā-paryāyākhyā-viśeṣa-svarūpānekāntatātmaka-vastusiddhau hetuḥ. [...]*

PNTAA.5.3-5: */3/sāmānyam dvi-prakāram tiryag-sāmānyam ūrdhvatā-sāmānyam ca. /4/ prati-vyakti tulya pariṇatis tiryak-sāmānyam, śabala-śābaleyādi-piṇḍeṣu gotvam yathā. /5/ pūrvāpara-pariṇāma-sādāharaṇam dravyam ūrdhvatā-sāmānyam kaṭaka-kaṅkaṅādy anugāmi-kāñcanavat.*

RA.5.3: *tiryag ullekhinānuvṛttākāra-pratyayena grhyamāṇam tiryak-sāmānyam, ūrdhvam ullekhinānugatākāra-pratyayena paricchidyamānam ūd ūrdhvatā-sāmānyam cēti. [...]*

[PNTAA.6.33: *tulye padārthe sa evāyam iti, ekasmiṁś ca tena tulya ity-ādi-jñānam pratyabhijñānābhāsam.*] RA.6.33: *pratyabhijñānam hi tiryag-ūrdhvatā-sāmānyādi-gocaram upavarṇitam, tatra tiryak-sāmānyālingite bhāve sa evāyam iti ūrdhvatā-sāmānyā-svabhāve cīkasmīn dravye tena tulya iti jñānam.*

[PNTAA.7.5: *[nayaḥ] samastas tu dvi-bhedo dravyārthikaḥ parayāyārthikaś ca.]*

RA.7.5: *[...] nanu dravya-paryāya-vyatiriktau sāmānyā-viśeṣau vidyete tatas tad-gocaram aparam api naya-dvayam prāpnoṭīti cet. nītat anupadravam, dravya-paryāyābhyāṁ vyatiriktayoḥ sāmānyā-viśeṣayor aprasiddheḥ. tathā hi: dvi-prakāram sāmānyam uktam [PNTAA.5.3]: 'ūrdhvatā-sāmānyam tiryak-sāmānyam*

ca.' *tatrôrdhvatā-sāmānyam dravyam eva, tiryak-sāmānyam tu prati-vyakti-sadrśa-pariṇāma-lakṣaṇam vyañjana-paryāya eva. sthūlāḥ kālāntara-sthāyinaḥ śabdānām sañkeṭa-viśayā vyañjana-paryāyā iti prāvacanika-prasiddheḥ. viśeṣo 'pi vaisadrśya-vivarta-lakṣaṇaḥ paryāya evāntar-bhavatīti nīṭābhyām adhikānāyāvakāśaḥ.*

(4) *Syād-vāda-ratnākara* of Vādideva Sūri:

SVR.3.5: *tiryak-sāmānyam ca gavādiṣu sadrśa-pariṇāmātmakam.*

SVR.11: *ūrdhvatā-sāmānyam ca pūrvāpara-pariṇāme sadhāraṇa-dravyam.*

(5) *Laghīyas-traya-vṛtti* of Abhayacandra: LTV. p. 67: *sāmānyam sadrśa-pariṇāma-lakṣaṇam tiryak-sāmānyam.*

(6) *Ācāra-sāra* of Vīranandī Saiddhāntika-cakravartin:

ĀS. 4.4: *yat parāpara-paryāya-vyāpi dravyam tad ūrdhvatā, mṛd yathā sthāsa-kośādi-vivarta-parivartinī.*

ĀS. 4.5: *pariṇāmaḥ samas tiryak khaṇḍa-muṇḍādi-goṣu vā gotvam viśeṣaḥ paryāya-vyatireka-dvi-bhedān.*

(7) Bhojakavi (14/15th c.) or Vikrama Saṁ. 1500, cf. Javāharlāl Sāhityāśāstrī (DAT., *Foreword*), DAT.2.4:

*ūrdhvatādi-sāmānyam pūrvāpara-guṇodayam /
piṇḍa-sthādika-saṁsthānānugatā mṛd yathā sthitā //*

APPENDIX II

As for the obscure expression *sthāsa* (which I render by ‘a lump of potter’s clay’), that is nowhere to be found in any of available Sanskrit dictionaries – with the exception of the entry ‘*sthāsakaḥ* [...] 1 Perfuming or smearing the body with fragrant unguents. -2 A bubble of water or any fluid’ in the Apte’s *Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, p.1008 – I would like to draw the readers’ attention to H. R. Kāpadīā’s note on p. 268 Vol. 2 ad p. 19 ll. 16-17 of AJP., to which I have nothing much to add:

‘The words “mṛt-piṇḍa” and “śivaka” occur on p. 123. ll. 6-7, and these two along with “sthāsaka” and “kapāla” on p. 113, ll. 5-6. “Śivaka” occurs also on p. 114, l. 3, too. In Koṭyācārya’s com. (p.181) on *Viśeṣa* (v. 482) [= *Visesāvassaya-bhāsa* – PB] we come across “mṛt-piṇḍa-śivaka-sthāsaka-kośa-kuśūlādi-mṛt-paryāyaḥ”. So it follows that the word “ādi” occurring in *mṛt-piṇḍa-śivakādi* stands for *sthāsaka, kośa, kuśūla* etc. This is borne out by *sthāsa, kośa* and *kuśūla* occurring on p. 104, l. 27 of Mūnicandra’s com.

on AJP. In Siddhasena Gaṇi's com. (p. 308) on TS (V, 31) we have: “*mṛt-piṇḍa-śivaka-sthāsaka-kośa-kuśūla-ghaṭa-kapāla-śakala-śarkarā-pāṁśutruṭi-paramāṇavaḥ*”. In *Durgapadaprakāśa* (p. 23b), a com. by Prabhānanda on *Vītarāgastotra* (VII, 1) we have “*sthāsa-kośa-kuśūlādi*”. In its avacūrṇi (p. 74b) by a pupil of Viśālarāja we have “*sthāsa-kośa-kuśūla-budhnōdara-karṇādi*”. A lump of clay assumes different forms before a pot, a jar, or the like is made out of it. These forms are given names according to the shapes they assume. Thus a ball of clay is called “*mṛt-piṇḍa*”; a lump of clay which has a shape of a *liṅga* of Śiva “*śivaka*”; “*sthāsaka*” is the name given to a lump of clay having the shape of a mirror; “*kośa*” to that resembling a bucket; and “*kuśūla*” to that resembling a granary.’

The two passages referred to by H. R. Kāpadīā read as follows:

(1) AJP.2 Vol. 1 p. 113 l. 5-6: *tathā hi: mṛt-piṇḍa-śivaka-sthāsaka-ghaṭa-kapālādiṣu viśeṣeṇa sarvatrānuvṛtto mṛd-anvayaḥ saṁvedyate.*

(2) AJP.2 Vol. 1 p. 104 l. 27-29: *tat-tat-kṛtau tat-tad-avasthā-bhāva-graha iti. tasya tasya sthāsa-kośa-kuśūlādeḥ kāryasya kṛtau karaṇe tasyās tasyās tat-tat-kārya-karaṇāṅkūlāyā avasthāyāḥ kumbha-kārādeḥ kārya-kartuḥ sambandhinyā bhāva-grahaḥ sattāṅgī-kārah.*

* My thanks are due to Prof. Albrecht Wezler of the University of Hamburg for his valuable suggestions.

¹ In texts that under examination in this paper, we encounter, in fact, two variants of the term which I render as diachronic homogeneity, viz. *ūrdhvatā-sāmānya* (lit. “the homogeneity of / based on diachronicity”; cf. BTBh.1.7.1.2 (n.9), PA.4.3-5 (n.9), PALV.4.3-5 (n.16), SViṬ.12.4 (n.18), NAṬ.1 (n.26), YAṬ.40 (n.43), NKC.5.47 (p.13), PNTAA.3.5 (p.14), RA.3.5 (p. 14), SVR.11 (p.15), ĀS. 4.4 (p.15), DAT.2.4 (p.15)) and *ūrdhva-sāmānya* (“the diachronic homogeneity”; cf. NAV.1 (n.23), NAṬ.1 (n.26)). What seems in several cases conspicuous is the lack of linguistic parallelism one could expect between the two notions, i.e. instead of the pair *ūrdhvatā-sāmānya* and *tiryak-sāmānya*, one would rather anticipate either the pair **«ūrdhva-sāmānya – tiryak-sāmānya»* or **«ūrdhvatā-sāmānya – tiryaktva-sāmānya»*. The question, however, to what degree the variants *ūrdhvatā*-^o and *ūrdhva*-^o as well as the said absence of conformity of expression might correspond to diverse ideas necessitates further study.

² Cf. Kajiyama (1966: 9-10), Mimaki (1992); Vidyābhūṣaṇa (1920: 338) placed him about 940-1000 C.E.

³ Viz. it is known that this seemingly one object consists in reality of separate moments.

⁴ The term *sva-samvedana*, and similar ones (e.g. *sva-samvitti*), meaning self-cognition or self-[cognizing] cognition, connote the self-illuminatory character of knowledge, that renders another second-level knowledge-cognizing knowledge to cognise the first-level object-cognizing knowledge unnecessary. In such a way, one avoids *regressus ad infinitum*, viz. the situation when the second-level knowledge-cognizing knowledge would necessitate the existence of a third-level knowledge that should cognise the second-level knowledge, etc. The idea is defined e.g. in TSa.2012: ‘[Such a knowledge which] neither requires another [cognition] cognizing its own form nor [itself] remains uncognised – such is the meaning of “self-cognition”’ –

*svarūpa-vedanāyānyad vedakam na vyapekṣate /
na cāviditam astīdam ity artho 'yam sva-samvidah //*

⁵ CAPV. p.136 l. 2-3: *yathōrdhvam indriya-pratyakṣataḥ kṣaṇa-bhede pratīte 'py avidyā-vaśād ekatvādhyavasāyaḥ, tathā tiryak sva-samvedana-pratyakṣeṇākārābhede 'dhigate 'py avidyā-vaśād eva bhedāvasāyaḥ.*

⁶ He must of course be placed slightly earlier than Ratnakīrti; thus we may accede to the years 980-1030, the dating proposed by Kajiyama (1966: 8-9) and Mimaki (1992). Anantalal Thakur (JNB. Introduction, p. 3) believes that ‘Jñānaśrīmitra historically becomes a link between the two great logicians Vācaspati and Udayana. Most probably the literary career of Jñānaśrīmitra is the first half of the eleventh century AD’; of this opinion is also A.S. Altekar (RNA., Introduction, p.22).

⁷ VC. p. 166 l. 16-19: *tatra pratyakṣasya svalakṣaṇam grāhyam adhyavaseyam ca* sāmānyam. anumānasya tu viparyayaḥ. tatra sādhana-pratyakṣam tadĪvārthakriyārthinaḥ kṣaṇa-vikṣaṇe 'pi santānāpekṣayā sāmānya-viṣayam. vyāpti-grahaṇa-prakaraṇe punar eka-vyakti-darśane 'pi sarva-sajātīya-vyakti-viṣayatvena sāmānya-viṣayam. [*Cf. NBT.1.12 (p.12 l.16-19): *dvidivho hi viṣayo pramāṇasya: grāhyaś ca yad ākāram utpadyate prāpañīyaś ca yam adhyavasyati. anyo hi grāhyo 'nyaś cādhyavaseyaḥ. pratyakṣasya hi kṣaṇa eko grāhyaḥ. adhyavaseyas tu pratyakṣa-balōtpannena niścayena santāna eva. santāna eva ca pratyakṣasya prāpañīyaḥ, kṣaṇasya prāpayitum aśakyatvāt.*]*

⁸ On account of textual evidence, he can safely be placed between the Buddhists, Jñānaśrīmitra, Ratnakīrti and Ratnākaraśānti, on the one hand, and the Jaina, Malliṣeṇa (*Syād-vāda-mañjarī* written in 1292), on the other. His activity can be further narrowed down to 1050-1202; cf. Kajiyama (1966: 6-11). He was placed in 10th century C.E. by B.N. Singh (1988: 6), about 1100 C.E. by Vidyābhūṣaṇa (1920: 338) and Iyenagar (1952), between 1100-1200 by Krishnamācharya (1942).

⁹ BTBh.1.7.1.2 (Singh: p. 26.10-13 in *pramāṇa-phala-vyavasthā*): *tac ca sāmānyam dvidivham: ūrdhvatā-lakṣaṇam tiryag-lakṣaṇam cēti. tatrĪkasyām eva ghaṭādi-vyaktau*

sajātīya-vyāvṛttāyām aneka-kṣaṇa-samudāyah sāmānyam ūrdhvatā-lakṣaṇam sādhana-pratyakṣasya viśayah. vijātīya-vyāvṛttās tv aneka-vyaktayah tiryak-sāmānyam vyāpti-grāhaka-pratyakṣasya viśayah.

¹⁰ The terminological parallelism is striking in at least a few cases:

VC. p. 166 l. 16-19:

*tatra sādhana-pratyakṣam . . . sāmānya-
viśayah*

kṣaṇa-vikṣaṇe 'pi santānāpekṣayā

sarva-sajātīya-vyakti-viśayatvena

*vyāpti-grāhaka-prakarāṇe . . . sāmānya-
viśayam*

*eka-vyakti-darśane 'pi sarva-sajātīya-
vyakti-viśayatvena*

BTBh.1.7.1.2 (p. 26.10-13):

tatra . . . sādhana-pratyakṣasya viśayah

aneka-kṣaṇa-samudāyah

ghaṭādi-vyaktau sajātīya-vyāvṛttāyām

vyāpti-grāhaka-pratyakṣasya viśayah

vijātīya-vyāvṛttās tv aneka-vyaktayah

¹¹ The likelihood of a direct influence of the Jaina concept of diachronic and synchronic homogeneity onto the Buddhist thought was discussed for the first time in Balcerowicz (1994: 56-59), where a more precise evaluation of the idea was given and the Polish term equivalent to ‘homogeneity’ was initially used.

¹² E.g. Mookerjee (1978: Chpt. IX), Shastri (1990: 81 ff.) as well as N. J. Shah (1967: 144, n. 188); the latter merely speaks of ‘two kinds of universal, one is called Ūrdhvatā-sāmānya and the other Tiryak-sāmānya’, and leaves the qualifiers *ūrdhvatā*-° and *tiryak*-° untranslated.

¹³ He must have been active in the first decades of the 10th century; Shastri (1990: 41) places him about 900 C.E. Assigning him to circa 800 C.E. by Vidyābhūṣaṇa (1920: 188) is certainly too early; he must have flourished after Siddharṣigaṇi, for the latter seems not to have known his *Parīkṣāmukha-sūtra*.

¹⁴ PA.4.3-5: /3/ *sāmānyam dvedhā tiryag-ūrdhvatā-bhedāt.* /4/ *sadrṣa-pariṇāmas tiryak, khaṇḍa-muṇḍādiṣu gotva-vat.* /5/ *parāpara-vivarta-vyāpi-dravyam ūrdhvatā mṛd iva sthāsādiṣu.* As for the term *sthāsa* cf. *Appendix II* p. 15 ff.

¹⁵ We can agree with Mahendrakumār Jain (SV. Introduction, pp. 77-92), who maintains that Anantavīrya ‘must have belonged to a period later than 959 AD and earlier than 1025 AD’ (SV. Introduction, p. 80), ‘Anantavīrya can be assigned to 950-990 AD’ (SV. Introduction, p. 90). Vidyābhūṣaṇa (1920: 198) places him rather late, about 1039 C.E., whereas Shastri (1990: 40) assigns him to 9th century. He was prior to Ratnakīrti.

¹⁶ PALV.4.3-5, p. 46: /4/ *prathama-bhedam sōdāharaṇam āha. nityīka-rūpasya gotvadeḥ krama-yaugapadyābhyām artha-kriyā-virodhāt pratyekam parisamāptyā vyaktiṣu vṛtty-ayogāc cāneka-sadrṣa-pariṇāmātmakam evēti tiryak-sāmānyam uktam.* /5/ *dvitīya-bhedam api sadrṣāntam upadarśayati. sāmānyam iti vartate. tenāyam*

arthaḥ: ūrdhvatā-sāmānyam bhavati. kim tad dravyam? tad eva viśiṣyate. pūrvāpara-kāla-vṛtti tri-kālānuyāyīty arthaḥ. citra-jñānasyīlkasya yugapad-bhāvya-aneka-svabhāva-nīlādy-ākāra-vyāpti-vad ekasya krama-bhāvi-pariṇāma-vyāpitvam ity arthaḥ.

¹⁷ Lit. ‘particulars, [like] pillar and man-hood (*puruṣatva*)’! I have failed, however, to determine what might account for the abstract noun ending °-*tva*, as a rule denoting the universal, used in this context.

¹⁸ Two terms occurring in the passage – viz. *avagraha* (perceptual sensation), being synonymous to *apanoda*, and *avāya* (= *apāya*; perceptual judgement) – refer to the first and third links in the process of four-staged sensuous cognition (*mati-jñāna*) respectively. The four stages are enumerated in TS.1.15 (*avagrahēhāpāya-dhāraṇā*) and exemplified in SSi.1.15: [1] *yathā cakṣuṣā śuklam rūpam iti grahaṇam avagrahaḥ*. [2] *yathā śuklam rūpam kim balākā patākā vēti [ihā]*. [3] *utpatana-nipatana-pakṣa-vikṣepādibhir balākā evāyam na patākēti [avāyaḥ]*. [4] *avetasya kālāntare ’vismaraṇa-kāraṇam dhāraṇā. yathā ślvāyam balākā pūrvāhne yām aham adrākṣam iti*. – ‘[1] Perceptual sensation is grasping with eyes, say, a white form. [2] [Speculation questions:] «Is [this], say, white form a crane or a banner?». [3] [Perceptual judgement resolves:] «due to beating with wings etc., this [white form] is nothing but a crane, and not a banner, due to the upward and downward flight». [4] Retention is the cause of not forgetting, [even] when some time elapsed, for instance: «This is exactly that crane I saw in the morning.»’ Cf. TSBh.1.15. Cf. PMi.1.1.26-29: 26. *akṣārtha-yoge darśanānantaram artha-grahaṇam avagrahaḥ*. 27. *avagrhitā-viśeṣākāṅkṣaṇam ihā*. 28. *ihita-viśeṣa-nirṇayo ’vāyaḥ*. 29. *smṛti-hetur dhāraṇā*. For a detailed analysis of the process cf. Balcerowicz 1990. The term ‘perceptual judgement’ occurs in Bhaṭṭākalaṅka’s verse SV.214:

*tat svārthāvāya evāyam anyāpohaḥ kathaṅcana /
avikalpaka-dṛṣṭeḥ syān na vikalpa-mano yataḥ //*

and is explained as, to wit, ‘nothing but the exclusion of something else’; this process is maintained to take place ‘somehow’, viz. ‘anyhow either by means of direct cognisance by oneself or [anyhow] by means of awakening of past impressions or of conceptualisation’ (SViṭ., p.147.29 – SViṭ., p.148.7): *tad iti nipātaḥ sa ity asya arthe draṣṭavyaḥ. sa eva upagato ’yam nirūpyamāṇaḥ. eva-bhinna-prakramaḥ anyāpoha ity asyāntaram draṣṭavyaḥ, tato ’nyo vijātīyaḥ apohyate sva-viṣayād bhinnō vyavasthāpyate yena vyavasāyena so ’nyāpoha eva svārthāvāyo jainābhimataḥ. yadi vā, yathā-nyāsam eva-kāro ’stu tad-avāya eva anyāpoho nānya ity arthaḥ. kuta etat? ity-atrāha – kathaṅcana ity-ādi. kathaṅcana kenāpi svayam upādānava-prakāreṇa vikalpa-vāsānā-prabhodha-prakāreṇa vā. avikalpaka-dṛṣṭeḥ avikalpa-darśanād syāt bhavet na vikalpa-mano yataḥ. etad uktaṁ bhavati – yadi tad-avāya eva anyāpohaḥ ayam eva vā tad-avāyo na bhavet kintu anya eva darśana-janito mānaso vikalpaḥ,*

tarhi tad-abhāva eva syāt iti. tathā hi – yadi tad-dṛṣṭiḥ kadācid upalambha-gocara-cāriṇī yuktam etat – ‘yato vikalpa-manah’ iti, nānyathā atiprasaṅgāt. na cīvam iti cintitam.

¹⁹ The logical term *vyabhicāra* refers usually to a situation, when the logical reason does not actually occur in the probandum, or more specifically, when even though the logical reason occurs, the probandum is absent. Cf. TK.56: *hetoh sādhyābhāvavad-vṛttitvaṃ vyabhicārah.* – ‘The occurrence of the logical reason in the absence of the probandum is called deviation’.

²⁰ SViṬ.12.4, p. 742.10-12: *tathā yasya viśeṣasya yad grahaṇam tat tat-sāmānya-grahaṇa-pūrvakam yathā sthāṇu-puruṣatva-viśeṣāvāya-dvaya-grahaṇam tad-ūrdhvatā-sāmānya-grahaṇa-pūrvakam, sāmānya-viśeṣa-grahaṇam ca avagraha-jñānam, tataḥ tad api tat-sāmānya-grahaṇa-pūrvakam. na ca sattvato ‘param sāmānyam, yato ‘navasthā syāt. nāpi tad-grahaṇam viśeṣa-grahaṇam, yato hetor vyabhicārah.*

²¹ Shastri (1990: 27) assigns him to 9/10th century. He is also the author of a commentary titled *Heyōpādeyā* on the *Upadeśa-māla* and of *Upamiti-bhava-prapañcā-kathā*. He finished the latter work on 1st May 906 C.E. (Vikrama Saṃvat 962), cf. Vaidya (1928: XXI) and Chatterjee (1978: 287). He is said to be a cousin of Māgha (c. 905 C.E.), acc. to Vidyābhūṣaṇa (1920: 147), and should be placed slightly earlier than Māṇikya Nandī, for he seems not to know the latter.

²² Vidyābhūṣaṇa (1909: XXIX) and (1920: 206) wrongly attributes the authorship of *Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti* to Candraprabha Sūri (1102 C.E.).

²³ NAV.1: *prathamam artha-darśanam ātmani saṃskāram ādhatte, tādrśa-darśanād asau saṃskārah prabudhyate, prabuddhaḥ pūrvārtha-viśayam sa evāyam taj-jātīyo vēty ullekkena pratyabhijñānam utthāpayati, tasyōrdhva-tiraścīna-bheda-sāmānya-vyavasthāpakatvād, asaṃjāta-pūrvārtha-gocara-darśanasya tad-udayābhāvāt.* For the knowledge of recognition *vide infra* Appendix § 3 (PNTAA.3.5).

²⁴ Being a disciple of both Hemaçandra Maladhāri and Śrīçandra, he must have lived about 1150; cf. Vidyābhūṣaṇa (1920: 211) and Vaidya (1928: XI-XXIII).

²⁵ Harakhchand (1917) wrongly attributes the authorship of the *Ṭippana* commentary on *Nyāyāvatāra* to Rājaśekhara Sūri.

²⁶ NAṬ.1: *tasyēty-ādī. nanu kim iti saṃskārah sa evāyam taj-jātīyo vēti dvaidham pratyabhijñā-jñānam janayati? āha: tasya pratyabhijñā-jñānasya ‘parāpara-vivarta-vyāpi-dravyam ūrdhva-sāmānyam mṛd iva sthāsa-kośādiṣu’ [PA.4.5]; ‘sadrśa-pariṇāmaḥ tiraścīna-sāmānyam khaṇḍa-muṇḍādiṣu gotvavad’ [PA.4.4] [iti] tayor dvayor api nirṇāyakatvāt. yadi punar dvaidham pratyabhijñā-jñānam nōjjṛmbhate, tadōrdhva-tiraścīna-bheda-bhinna-sāmānya-vyavasthā na syād iti. atha pūrvam artha-darśanam, tataḥ saṃskārah, tatas tasya prabodhaḥ, tad-anu pratyabhijñā-jñānam iti-paramparāśrayaṇa-nibandhanābhāvāt prathamākṣa-sannipāte eva pratyabhijñā-*

jñānam kiṃ nōtpadyate ity āha: na sañjātam pūrvārtha-gocaram darśanam yasya tasya pumsaḥ pratyabhijñā-jñānodayābhāvāt; pratyabhijñā-jñānam hi tādrśa-darśanataḥ saṃskāra-prabodhe, sa ca sati saṃskāre, saṃskāras ca pūrvam artha-darśane evēti.

²⁷ 8th century acc. to Chatterjee (1978: 328-9); 720-780 C.E. (SV. Introduction, p. 90); about 750 C.E. acc. to Vidyābhūṣaṇa (1920: 184); about 778 acc. to Shastri (1990: 32).

²⁸ The observation of N. J. Shah (1967: 144, n. 188) regarding *ūrdhvatā-sāmānya* and *tiryak-sāmānya* in the context of ‘Akalaṅka’s own position’ pertaining to the problem of universals and the salient similarity among individuals belonging to the same class may wrongly suggest that Akalaṅka was well acquainted with and availed himself of these two terms. Besides, whereas N. J. Shah’s explanation of the first variety, viz. ‘By the first (*sc. ūrdhvatā-sāmānya* – P.B.) they (*sc. the Jainas* – P.B.) mean the permanent substance that abide in the midst of he past, present and future modifications’, is in principle to the point, his understanding of the concept of *tiryak-sāmānya*, as he puts it: ‘By the second they (*sc. the Jainas* – P.B.) mean the similar modifications or characters e.g. dewlap and the like in the cows’ (sic!), needs to be revised.

²⁹ Or, to be more precise: ‘one [representation of the perceived object in knowledge] (*pratibhāsa*)’, for *ekam* is further elucidated by the commentator as *pratibhāsa*; cf. LT. § 36, p. 12.1-2: *evam pratibhāsa-balena sva-para-mata-vidhi-pratiṣedhāv abhidhāya sāmpratam artha-kriyā-kāritva-balena tau pratipādayitukāmaḥ prathamam kṣaṇikānte artha-kriyām nirākurvann āha.*

³⁰ LT.2.34 p. 11 l. 24-25:

*sad-asad-svārtha-nirbhāsaiḥ saha-krama-vivartibhiḥ /
drśyādrśyair vibhāty ekam bhedaiḥ svayam abhedakaiḥ //*

yathĪkam kṣaṇikam jñānam sadbhir asadbhir vā pratibhāsa-bhedaiḥ svayam abhedakair iṣtam, tathĪkam dravyam saha-krama-bhāvibhiḥ svayam abhedakaiḥ bhedaiḥ drśyair adrśyaiś ca anādi-nidhānam avagantavyam. bahir iva jñāna-paramāṇu-sañcaye punaḥ anyonyānātmakatve sarvathāsaṅkrama-vyavasthāyām eka-sthūla-nirbhāsa-virodhāt.

The above passage is a refutation of an hypothetical objection of the Buddhist; cf. LT. § 35 p.11.22-23: *nanu pratikṣaṇa-vilakṣaṇa-jñānādi-lakṣaṇa-vyatiriktasya jīvādi-dravyasyāsambhavāt katham ‘dravyam śaṃset’ [LT.2.33] ity-ādi uktam śobhet? ity-āśaṅkyāha [...] – ‘Having conjectured a possible objection [that may be raised by the Buddhist] – that is: “Since substance, such as the living element etc., is not possible [as something] different from knowledge, which [in its turn] is momentary and diverse, how could it seem plausible what has been stated [in the verse by you], namely «one has to allow [the existence of] substance»” – Akalaṅka says [...].’ The gerund *āśaṅkyā*, preceded by *iti* and followed in most cases by *āha*, which is used by the commentator in several other cases, apparently means throughout the treatise ‘having conjectured a*

possible objection’ or ‘when a possible objection has been conjectured’, and has not been employed in the sense of ‘having raised an objection’, for it is, as a rule, followed by a verse establishing the Jaina position.

³¹ The commentary can be assigned to 7th century, approximately a century before Haribhadra I (8th c.), although there has been much controversy as to which of the numerous Siddhasenas the authorship of the commentary is to be ascribed. The identification – after Winternitz (²1933: 557) – with the famous logician Siddhasena Divākara, the author of *Nyāyāvatāra* seems implausible. Unacceptable is Ohira’s (1982: 38) identification of the commentator with Siddhasenasūri, who is to be placed around 1185. Sukhlal (1974: 52-60) believes the author of the commentary to be Siddhasena Gandhahastin. Acc. to Vidyābhūṣaṇa (1920: 22) Siddhasenagaṇi and Siddhasena Gandhahastin, a disciple of Bhāsvāmin (675-750 r.), are one and the same person. What seems to be beyond any doubt, however, is that this point requires further research.

³² TṬ.5.37 (1 vol., p. 428.1-8; punctuation modified by the P.B.): *saṅkhyeyāsaṅkhyeyānanta-saṅkhyayā saṅkhyāyamānatvāt guṇāḥ śakti-viśeṣāḥ. ta eva kramena saha ca bhavantaḥ sarvato-mukhatvād bhedāḥ paryāyāḥ. tān piṇḍa-ghaṭa-kapālādīn rūpādīmś ca lakṣaṇataḥ asādhāraṇa-śakti-viśeṣād abhidhāsyāmaḥ (TS. 40): ‘dravyāśrayā nirguṇā guṇāḥ’ iti. atra dravyasya hi guṇa-paryāyāḥ pariṇati-viśeṣāḥ sambhavanti, na tu guṇa-paryāyāṇām kecid anye guṇa-paryāyāḥ santīty evaṃ bhāvayīṣyāmaḥ. vyavahāra-naya-samāśrayaṇena tu guṇāḥ paryāyā iti vā bhedena vyavahāraḥ pravacane: yugapad-avasthāyino guṇā rūpādayaḥ, ayugapad-avasthāyinaḥ paryāyāḥ; vastutaḥ paryāyā guṇā ity aikātmyam.*

³³ He may have been a contemporary of Siddhasena Divākara and flourished most probably in 6th or 7th century; 600 C.E. acc. to Vidyābhūṣaṇa (1920: 182); about 450 C.E. acc. to Williams (1963: 19); 500 C.E. acc. to Matilal (1985: 241).

³⁴ Due to the universal-particular opposition, on the one hand, and because of the dubiety whether *sāmānya* was really used in the sense of homogeneity so early, on the other, I prefer to preserve, by way of exception, the meaning ‘universality’ in my rendering.

³⁵ Or, more adequately – in view of the variety of uses of *pada* / *śabda*, as expressed e.g. in YAṬ. p.92. *catur-vidham hi padam nāmākhyāta-nipātōpasarga-bhedāt kecid amānsata. karma-pravacanīyam ca padam iti pañca-vidham anye.* – we should render *pada* as ‘linguistic unit, speech element’.

³⁶ Cf. YAṬ.40, p. 91.22-92.1: *pakṣa-pāto hi svī-kāraḥ parigrahaḥ so ‘syāstīti pakṣa-pāti viśeṣāntare pakṣa-pāti viśeṣāntara-pakṣa-pāti*; YAṬ., p. 91.19-20: *‘padam viśeṣāntara-pakṣa-pāti’ viśeṣam nayata iti viśeṣo dravya-guṇa-karma-bhedāt tri-vidhaḥ*; YAṬ. p. 92.15: *viśeṣam nayata iti dravyam guṇam karma ca nayate prāpayatīty arthaḥ.*

³⁷ The second variety has a particular class as its denotatum and connotes, as a matter of fact, the idea of the triad of the lower intermediate universals (lit. ‘universal particulars’, *sāmānya-viśeṣa*), cf. YAṬ.40, p. 93.3-9: ***anyad padaṁ jāti-viśayam samāna-bhāvaṁ sāmānyam viśeṣam nayate yathā gaur iti-padaṁ gotva-jāti-dvāreṇa dravye pravartamānaṁ jāti-padaṁ svāśraya-bhūta-dravya-viśeṣam api sāmānya-rūpaṁ prāpayati tathā guṇatva-jāti-padaṁ guṇatva-jāti-dvāreṇa guṇe vartamānaṁ guṇam api svāśrayam viśeṣam jāti-rūpatāṁ nayate. tathā karmatva-jāti-padaṁ karmatva-jāti-dvāreṇa karmaṇi pravartamānaṁ karmāpi svādhikaraṇam viśeṣam samāna-bhāvaṁ nayate.***

³⁸ Cf. YAṬ.40, p. 93.9-13: ***‘antar-viśeṣāntara-vṛttitaḥ’*** *iti antar-gataṁ viśeṣāntaram asyēty antar-viśeṣāntaraḥ samāna-bhāvaḥ samāna-parināmas, tatra vṛtteḥ pravartanāt padasyēty-artha-vaśād vibhakti-pariṇāmaḥ. tad etena pradhāna-bhūta-sāmānyam guṇi-bhūtam viśeṣam padaṁ prakāśayatīti nigaditam.*

³⁹ YA.40 (p.94):

*sāmānya-niṣṭhā vividhā viśeṣāḥ padaṁ viśeṣāntara-pakṣa-pāti /
antar-viśeṣāntara-vṛttito ’nyat samāna-bhāvaṁ nayate viśeṣam //*

⁴⁰ 9th century acc. to Shastri (1990: 37); about 800 C.E. acc. to Vidyābhūṣaṇa (1920: 186-7) and Chatterjee (1978: 331); ‘9th-10th centuries’ acc. to Sukhlal (1974: 66).

⁴¹ YAṬ.40, p. 90 l. 5-17: ***‘sāmānya-niṣṭhā vividhā viśeṣāḥ’*** *iti. sāmānyam dvividham ūrdhvatā-sāmānyam tiryak-sāmānyam cēti. tatrōrdhvatā-sāmānyam krama-bhāviṣu paryāyeṣu ekatvānyaya-pratyaya-grāhyam dravyam. tiryak-sāmānyam nānā-dravyeṣu paryāyeṣu ca sādṛśya-pratyaya-grāhyam sadṛśa-pariṇāma-rūpam. tatra sāmānye niṣṭhā parisamāptir eṣāṁ te sāmānya-niṣṭhāḥ. ke te? viśeṣāḥ paryāyāḥ. kim-prakārāḥ? vividhāḥ kecit krama-bhuvāḥ kecit saha-bhuvāḥ eka-dravya-vṛttayaḥ. tatra krama-bhuvāḥ parispanḍa-rūpā utkṣepānādayaḥ, aparispandātmakāḥ sādharmaṇāḥ sādharmaṇāsādharmaṇās ca asādharmaṇās cēti trividhāḥ. sādharmaṇa-dharmāḥ sattva-prameyatvādayaḥ, sādharmaṇāsādharmaṇāḥ dravyatva-jīvatvādayaḥ, asādharmaṇāḥ prati-dravyam prabhidyamānāḥ pratiniyatā artha-paryāyā itī vividha-prakārā viśeṣā eka-dravya-niṣṭhatvād ūrdhvatā-sāmānya-niṣṭhāḥ tad-vyatirekeṇāsambhāvyamānatvāt [...]*

⁴² YAṬ.40, p. 90.7-8: *nanv evaṁ-vidham viśeṣa-niṣṭham sāmānyam kasmān na syād iti cen na [...].*

⁴³ YAṬ.40, pp. 91.3-5: *viśeṣeṣu vyatirikta-rūpeṣu dravya-guṇa-karmasu sāmānyasya samavāyād viśeṣa-niṣṭham sāmānyam iti cen na, tasya tiryak-sāmānya-rūpatvāt.*

⁴⁴ NAV.1 (Harakhchand: 29,13; Vaidya: 19,20-21) and NAṬ.1 (Harakhchand: 29,20-22); Vaidya: 19,31-20,18).

⁴⁵ In my rendering above, I follow an emended reading of ĀMī.101:

*tattva-jñānam pramāṇam. taṁ yugapat sarva-bhāsanam /
krama-bhāvi ca. taj jñānam syād-vāda-naya-saṁskṛtam //*

There are some reasons that make the following printed text (ed. Pannālāl Jain):

*tattva-jñānam pramāṇam te yugapat sarva-bhāsanam /
krama-bhāvi ca yaj jñānam syād-vāda-naya-saṃskṛtam //*

doubtful and allow the conclusion that, apparently, both *te* (dual neuter, dual feminine or plural masculine?) and *yaj* (singular), that in a usual syntactical construction should be expected to be a correlative of *tad*, above can hardly be construed in a natural manner and seem to be a misprint for *taṃ* and *taj* respectively. First, the shift from the singular (*tattva-jñānam pramāṇam*) to the dual (*te*) or plural (which is still less plausible) seems rather unjustified. The dual could theoretically be taken to emphasise two enlisted subdivisions (*yugapat sarva-bhāsanam krama-bhāvi ca*), nonetheless, this bifurcation is of a subsidiary character and does not tally with any standard two-fold division of cognitive criterion, e.g. with a distribution into direct (*pratyakṣa*) and indirect (*parokṣa*). Secondly, one would expect the correlatives *tad . . . yad* to have the same grammatical number, which is here not the case. Thirdly, the *pratīka* of ĀmīV. corroborates my supposition and does read: *krama-bhāvi ca taj jñānam*. Furthermore, the way in which *te . . . yaj* correlates semantically the clauses is also problematic and one would need a lot of good will to render the aphorism approximately as follows: ‘Cognitive criterion [is tantamount to] the knowledge of truth. These [cognitive criteria may either be] a simultaneous representation of all [entities (which is the case with the absolute knowledge)] or such a knowledge that occurs consecutively (of this kind are remaining varieties of cognitive criteria). [Cognitive criterion] is composed of the method of seven-fold modal description and of [conditionally valid] viewpoints.’

⁴⁶ *uddhattā-sāmaṇṇa*: JLA. II:751; *tirikka-sāmaṇṇa*: JLA. IV: 2318/2319.

⁴⁷ Shastri (1990: 82): ‘When all the six categories of Dharma, Adharma, Ākāśa, Pudgala, Jīva and Kāla are considered as dravya or loka it is a case of horizontal universality. [...] many stages of jīva and pudgala [...] are the instances of vertical universality’.

⁴⁸ Especially ṬhSū.1.2,11,12: /2/ *ege āyā*. [...] /11/ *ege jīve pādikkaeṇam sarīraeṇam*; /12/ *egā jīvāṇam aperiāittā viguvvaṇā*.

⁴⁹ Esp. ṬhSū.6.458: *paṃca-vidhā saṃsāra-samāvannagā jīvā pannattā, taṃ-jahā – egimditā jāva paṃceṃditā [...] neraīyā jāva devā, siddhā*.

⁵⁰ VīySū.14.4: /1/ [...] *poggale tītamaṇamtaṃ sāsayaṃ samayaṃ lukkhī, samayaṃ alukkhī, samayaṃ lukkhī vā alukkhī vā, pubbiṃ ca ṇaṃ karaṇeṇaṃ aṇegavaṇṇaṃ aṇegarūvaṃ pariṇāmaṃ pariṇamaṃ, aha se pariṇāme nijjiṇṇe bhavati taṃ pacchā egavaṇṇe egarūve siyā? haṃtā, goyamā! [...]; /2/ [...] *poggale paḍuppannaṃ sāsayaṃ samayaṃ...? evaṃ ceva*. [...] /5/ *jīve tītamaṇamtaṃ sāsayaṃ samayaṃ samayaṃ dukkhī, samayaṃ adukkhī, samayaṃ dukkhī vā adukkhī vā? puvviṃ ca ṇaṃ karaṇeṇaṃ aṇegabhāvaṃ aṇegabhūtaṃ pariṇāmaṃ pariṇamaṃ, aha se veyañjje nijjiṇṇe bhavati tato pacchā egabhāve egabhūte siyā? haṃtā, goyamā! [...], etc.]**

VViySū.25.2.3: *jīva-davvā ṇaṃ bhaṃte! kiṃ saṃkhejjā, asaṃkhejjā, aṇaṃtā? goyamā!*
no saṃkhejjā, no asaṃkhejjā, no aṇaṃtā. se keṇaṭṭheṇaṃ bhaṃte! evaṃ vuccai: jīva-
davvā ṇaṃ no saṃkhejjā, no asaṃkhejjā, no aṇaṃtā? goyamā! asaṃkhejjā neriyā jāva
saṃkhejjāvāukāiyā, aṇaṃtā vaṇaspatikāiyā, asaṃkhijjā beṃdiyā, evaṃ jāva vemāṇiyā,
aṇaṃtā siddhā, seteṇaṭṭheṇaṃ jāva aṇaṃtā.

⁵¹ PASS.6:

te cēve atthikāyā tekkāliya-bhāva-pariṇadā ṇiccā /
gacchaṃti daviya-bhāvaṃ pariyaddāna-lim̐ga-saṃjuttā //

– ‘And indeed these existent elementary bodies (cf. e.g. TSBh.5.1), which permute through [various] states in the three times [and] are permanent, partake of substantiality and are associated with the mark of transformation’.

⁵² Cf. H. R. Kāpadīā’s respective *Notes* to AJP., Vol. II p. 324: ‘P. 48, l. 25 “Ūrdhvaṃ” means “hereafter”, and p. 326: ‘P. 97, l. 14. “Adhaḥ” means below. In a Ms. as we go on reading it, the folio or the leaf that is read, is placed below, and hence it is justifiable to use this word in this sense. In modern terminology it means *supra*. Similarly “ūrdhvaṃ” means above; but here it means *infra*.’

⁵³ 11th century. 950-1020 C.E. acc. to Jha (1991); 1037-1122 Shastri (1990: 43). Acc. to Vidyābhūṣaṇa (1920: 193-194) he ‘was the author of the famous logical treatise called *Prameya-kamala-mārtanḍa*, the earliest commentary on the *Parīkṣā-mukha-sūtra* of Māṇikyā Nandi’ and lived about 825 (p. 193); this date, however, is much too early.

⁵⁴ About 1000 C.E. acc. to Shastri (1990: 42) and Vidyābhūṣaṇa (1920: 196); 1061 acc. to Williams (1963: 9-10).

⁵⁵ He was born 1086 C.E. (Sāṃvat 1143) in Gujarat and died in 1169 C.E. (Sāṃvat 1226), cf. PNTAA. (Preface) and Vidyābhūṣaṇa (1920: 198-200). Acc. to Shastri (1990: 44) he lived 1087-1170.

⁵⁶ Second half of the 12th cent.; cf. Vidyābhūṣaṇa (1920: 211,199): ‘While in Broach at the Aśvāvabodhatīrtha in Sāṃvat 1238 or 1181 AD, he wrote another work called *Upadeśamākāvṛtti* [...]’.

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- ĀMī. = *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra Svāmi, with two commentaries: *Aṣṭa-śatī* of Bhaṭṭākalaṅka and *Devāgama-vṛtti* of Vasunandi, ed. Pannālāl Jain, *SJG* 10(7), Kāśī (Benares) 1914.
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PERIODICALS:

- AS = *Asiatische Studien*
- BBS = *Bauddha Bhāratī Series*
- BI = *Bibliotheca Indica*
- GOS = *Gaekwad's Oriental Series*
- GPMG = *Gujarāta-purātattva-mandira-granthāvalī*
- JĀG = *Jaina-āgama-grantha-mālā*
- JJ = *Jain Journal*
- LOS = *London Oriental Series*
- MCDJG = *Māṇik Chandra Digambara Jaina Grantha-māla*
- MFL = *Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters*, Kyoto University
- PVRS = *P.V. Research Series*
- PRSPS = *Pandit Rampratap Shastri Publications Series*
- RCJŚ = *Raya-candra-jaina-sāstra-mālā*
- SGDOS = *Sri Garib Dass Oriental Series*
- SDLJPFS = *Sheth Devchand Lalbhai Jain Pustakodddhar Fund Series*
- SI = *Studia Indologiczne*, Warsaw University
- SJG = *Sanātana-jaina-grantha-mālā*
- SJS = *Singhī Jaina Series*
- TSWS = *Tibetan Sanskrit Work Series*, Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute
- YJG = *Yaśovijaya Jaina Grantha-mālā*