On the Date of the *Nyāyâvatāra*

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The *Nyāyâvatāra* (NA.), a work in thirty-two verses—and hence also called *Dvātriṁśikā*—erroneously ascribed by tradition to Siddhasena Divākara, is deemed to open a new era in the history of Jaina epistemology. It is mostly in the realm of Jaina epistemic pursuits that the *Dvātriṁśikā* might claim the status of an innovative or prototypical work. When we, however, consider the development of logic and epistemology in India on a larger scale, the work seems to lose its flavour of originality and novelty.

The problem of the exact dating of the *Nyāyâvatāra*[1] should be solved independently, irrespective of whether Siddhasena Mahāmati, the author of the *Nyāyâvatāra*, can be accurately identified with a Siddhasena (Divākara?), the celebrated author of a series of *Dvātriṁśikā*s, or— inaccurately—with Siddhasena Divākara, the author of the *Saṁmati-tarka-prakaraṇa*.[2] The earliest indication of the

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[1] The most comprehensive bibliographic survey of publications on Siddhasena Divākara is furnished by UPADHYE (1971) in his 'Introduction' (pp. xi-xxvii) and 'Bibliographic Survey' (pp. *3–*72). A few more publications have been published since the review: MOOKERJEE (1971), DHAKY (1981–82), GRANOFF (1989–1990), DHAKY (1990), DHAKY (1995) and WAYMAN (1996).

[2] The question has been discussed at length in BALCEROWICZ (2001) and BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming). A number of features found in the *Nyāyâvatāra* and the *Saṁmati-tarka-prakaraṇa* evince a discrepant attitude towards the Jaina Canon and tradition of both works, different choice of vocabulary, which was not necessitated by the use of different languages (Sanskrit and Prakrit), and the notions and ideas they use are likewise at variance. A detailed comparison of the contents, style and philosophical background of Siddhasena Mahāmati's *Nyāyâvatāra* and Siddhasena Divākara's *Saṁmati-tarka-prakaraṇa* (*vide infra* p. 361 f.), brings me to the conclusion that these two works were written by two different persons. Following the findings, esp. in view of the lack of any hint that the author of STP. knew of Diṅnāga, I would maintain that STP. must have been composed slightly before or circa 500 C.E. Comp. also MUKTHAR (1948): 'The following points are clear: (1) The *Dvā.s* were not composed in the present order; (2) they are not of one and the same Siddhasena; (3) the *Nyāyāvatāra* is one of them; (4)… No indisputable evidence is brought forth for the common authorship of the *Dvā.s*, *Nyāyāvatāra* and *Sanmati*. … There were thus three clear

name of the author of NA. is, it seems, Haribhadrasūri who makes mention of him under the appellation 'Mahāmati' (*vide infra* p. 361). The subsequent source from which we learn that NA. was composed by a Siddhasena is NAVV. of Śāntisūri. The author of NA. is explicitly identified there in at least four places[3]. In the last reference Śāntisūri is even more specific to give the full name of the author as well: Siddhasenārka[4]. All other references we encounter in the Jaina literature of this period are to Siddhasena Divākara as the author of other works, but none to him as the author of NA.[5] Strangely enough, the available colophons of NA. and NAV.

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and distinct Siddhasenas: (1) the author of *Sanmati*; (2) the author of *Nyāyāvatāra*; (3) and another, the author of some *Dvā.s*.' [according to UPADHYE (1971:*28)].

[3] [1] NAVV.36§ 7 (p. 95.8): *śrīsiddhasena-ghaṭita-sphuṭa-gīḥśalākāṁ śuddhām avāpya vimalaṁ vihitaṁ mayâtat //* , [2] NAVV.21.§ 2 (p. 78.9–10): *evaṁ-rūpasya vadhaḥ tyāgaḥ siddhasenārkasyêty arthaḥ.*, [3] NAVV.53.§ 2 (p. 107.18): *siddhasenasya sūtra-kartuḥ…*, [4] NAVV.1.§ 11 (p. 13.14–15): *tat kiṁ svātantryeṇa? na ity āha—siddhasenārka-sūtritam iti. siddhasena eva jagaj-jantu-mano-moha-saṁtatitām asītamaḥ samūhâpoha-kāritvāt arka iva arkaḥ, tena sūtritam.*

[4] Indeed, Śāntisūri speaks of Siddhasenārka, not of Siddhasena Divākara, as UPADHYE (1971: xxiv) would like to have it: '(iii) … The earliest author, as far as I know, who specifies the name of Siddhasena Divākara as the author of the *Nyāyāvatāra* is Śāntisūri of the 11th century A.D. or so.' Nevertheless, I would side with UPADHYE in asserting that 'Arka' is just another name for 'Divākara'. Thus, I see absolutely no justification for the contention of DHAKY (1995: 49, n. 9), who—commenting on the clause: *siddhasena eva jagaj-jantu-mano-moha-saṁtati-tāmasītamaḥ-samūhâpoha-kāritvāt arka iva arkaḥ, tena sūtritam*—maintains that '"Arka" here is not in the sense of "Divākara" but "essence".' Clearly, *arka* here is an epithet of Siddhasena, who is compared to the sun (*arka iva*; *arka=divā-kara*), and by him (*tena*) the idea discussed before is composed in a *sūtra* form (*sūtritam*). If we took *arka* as DHAKY would like it, the whole clause could hardly be construable.

[5] Cf., e.g. [1] UPADHYE (1971: xiii): 'Haribhadra is one of the earlier authors to mention Siddhasena Divākara and his *Sanmati*. First, he calls him Śrutakevalin; and secondly, he tells us that his name was Divākara (p. *1). Then he has a pun on the name that he was like *Divākara*, sun, to the darkness of Duḥṣama-kāla.' [2] UPADHYE (1971: xvii): '…Pūjyapāda …quotes Siddhasena's Stuti III.16 in his *Sarvārthasiddhi* (II.10; VII.13).' [3] H.R. Kāpadīā (AJP., 'Introduction', Vol. II, pp. 98 ff.): 'Haribhadra refers to Siddhasena in his *Sammaipayaraṇa*, in his *Anekāntajayapatākā* as well as in his *Paṁcavatthuya* (vv.1047–8), calling him Suyakevali. Jinadāsagaṇi (c. 676 A.D.) refers to him thrice in his *Niśīhavisehacuṇṇī*.' [4] DAVE (1962): 'So Siddhasena is earlier than Mallavādi and the tradition puts him as a contemporary of Vikramāditya who flourished in 57 B.C.' [according to UPADHYE (1971:*53)] and 'Akalaṅka and Vidyānanda quote the *Sanmati*.' [according to UPADHYE (1971:*59)].

contain no reference to the name of the author of NA. Therefore, for the sake of convenience, I tentatively call the author of the *Nyāyâvatāra* Siddhasena Mahāmati.[6]

On subsequent pages I shall try to establish the chronology of the *Nyāyâvatāra* and its correlation to other, mostly Buddhist, works.

There is a variance of opinions regarding the date of Siddhasena as the author of the *Nyāyâvatāra* and the date of the *Nyāyâvatāra*, and these fall in four groups: (1) Siddhasena was pre-Diṅnāgan[7], (2) Siddhasena flourished soon after Diṅnāga and before Dharmakīrti[8], (3) Siddhasena belongs to a post-Dharmakīrtian tradition[9], whereas (4) some hold that his date is still an open question[10].

The first to notice some chronological dependence of NA was JACOBI (1926: iii), who observed that 'To about the same time [i.e. Śaka-year 598 = 677 C.E.—P.B.] belongs Siddhasenadivākara whom Haribhadra quotes; for he uses, no doubt Dharmakīrti[1], though he does not name him.' There are two points, according to him, that justify such a conclusion: (1) Siddhasena (NA.5) applies the term *abhrānta*—and Dharmakīrti was the first to use it in his definition of *pratyakṣa*, thus improving upon Diṅnāga's definition[11]—to both *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*; (2) Siddhasena (NA.11[12]) 'extends the distinction of *svārtha* and *parārtha*, which properly applies to *anumāna* only, to *pratyakṣa* also, ibidem 12 f. Apparently, he thought to improve on Dharmakīrti by a wholesome generalisation of nice distinctions!' (JACOBI (1926: iii, n. 1)). VAIDYA (1928: xviii-xx) elaborates upon JACOBI's laconic remarks. (3) He further brings up one more important point:

> '…verses 6 and 7 above of Nyāyāvatāra unmistakably presuppose Dharmakīrti and the later phase of the Yogācāra school, as, without them, it is difficult for us to explain why Siddhasena Divākara is required to these views and emphatically declare:

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[6] See BALCEROWICZ (2001) and BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming).

[7] E.g. SUKHLAL (1945/a) and SUKHLAL (1945/b), H.R. Kāpadīā (AJP., 'Introduction', Vol. II, pp. 98 ff.), KRAUSE (1948), DAVE (1962), SUKHLAL–DOSHI (1928), WILLIAMS (1963: 19), MATILAL (1985: 241).

[8] E.g. Malvania (NASV., 'Introduction', pp. 141 f.) and QVARNSTRÖM (1999: 178).

[9] E.g. JACOBI (1926), VAIDYA (1928), MUKTHAR (1948), V.P. Johrapurkar ('Introduction' to VTP., pp. 41 ff.).

[10] UPADHYE (1971: xxv).

[11] PS.1.C,k3c-d: *pratyakṣaṁ kalpanâpoḍhaṁ nāma-jāty-ādy-asaṁyuktam*, and NB.1.4: *tatra pratyakṣaṁ kalpanâpoḍham abhrāntam*, respectively.

[12] Not NA.12, as VAIDYA (1928: xviii, line 16) has it.

सकलप्रतिभासस्य भ्रान्तत्वासिद्धितः स्फुटम् ।
प्रमाणं स्वान्यनिश्रायि द्वयसिद्धौ प्रसिध्यति ॥ ७ ॥ ' (p. xx).

On my part, I would only add that also NA.31 (*pramātā svânya-nirbhāsī*) must have been inspired by similar thoughts as NA.7.

The first argument is sound. Admittedly, the idea of *abhrāntatva* of perception was latent in pre-Dharmakīrti's literature[13], but Dharmakīrti was the first to use the term.[14]

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[13] The term *bhrānta* (*bhrānti*) itself is attested in the pre-Dharmakīrtian literature, for instance in MAVBh.1.4; SacAcBh.(2).2 and in several places of MSA. and Comm. thereon (11.13a, 11.15, 11.17, 11.24–26, Comm. *ad* 10.2 and *ad* 11.27). In all such passages, however, the term *bhrānti* does not occur in the context of *pramāṇa*, still less of valid perception (*pratyakṣa*), in the first place. The term refers either to a general error based on the perceiving of subject–object duality in the world (*dvaya-bhrānti*), and is synonymous to *māyā* (in MSA.), or to the nature of the cognised object (MAVBh.1.4). The latter rests on a rather subtle difference: erroneous is not the cognition as such (the emphasis on the inner, cognitive aspect, viz. erroneous correspondence of an act of cognition), but the way an object is constituted in the cognition (the emphasis on the 'outer', 'objective' side). In none of these texts where we come across the term *bhrānti* is the idea of cognitively valid procedures (*pramāṇa*) discussed; at the most, it points to an antithesis of a general, soteriologically relevant outlook of a person, viz. *citta-bhrānti* / *bhrāntaṁ cittaṁ* / *kṣipta-cittaṁ* (SacAcBh.(2).2). This is confirmed by the application of the past passive participle to people MSA.11.18 (*loko hy abhrāntaḥ*), as loci of *bhrānta-citta*. To sum up, none of the occurrences of the term *(a)bhrānta* in Yogācāra works seems to have been an inspiration for Siddhasena.

[14] An interpretation of non-erroneousness (*abhrāntatva*) is offered by Dharmottara in NBṬ.3.2: *abhrāntam artha-kriyā-kṣame vastu-rūpe 'viparyastam ucyate. artha-kriyā-kṣamaṁ ca vastu-rūpaṁ sanniveśôpādhi-varṇâtmakam. tatra yan na bhrāmyati tad abhrāntam.* Thus, there are two pivotal aspects of *abhrāntatva*, the lack of contrariety (*aviparyastatva*) and its reference to a thing capable of efficient action (*artha-kriyā-kṣama-vastu*). The first element, viz. the lack of contrariety, or correspondence to facts, may be taken to have been preconceived in the idea of *avyabhicāritva* in the non-Buddhist literature as early as NS.1.1.4 (*indriyârtha-sannikarṣôtpannaṁ jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyâtmakaṁ pratyakṣam*) and NBh. *ad loc.* (*yad atasmin tad iti tad vyabhicāri, yat tu tasmin tad iti tad avyabhicāri pratyakṣam iti*). This tendency can be also observed in Jaina sources, e.g. in TBh.1.32 (p. 30.6, p. 31.1–2): *jñāna-viparyayo 'jñānam iti … mithyā-darśana-parigrahād viparīta-grāhakatvam eteṣāṁ* (= *viparyayāṇām*). *tasmād ajñānāni bhavanti.* See also PVin.I(1).4 (p. 40, n. 1).

However, the second element *artha-kriyā-samartha*, the capability to execute efficient action, is Dharmakīrti's innovation, see PV.1.3: *pramāṇam avisaṁvādi jñānam artha-kriyā-sthitiḥ / avisaṁvādanam śābde 'py abhiprāya-nivedanāt //* , as well as PV.2.3:

If we were to take this latency of *abhrāntatva* as a serious counter-argument—which seems totally unconvincing to me—it would imply that Siddhasena chose the term *abhrānta* intuitively and applied it indiscriminately to both *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*, as if he had adumbrated that Dharmakīrti would once qualify perception as a non-erroneous cognition and inference as erroneous. Coincidentally, his way of expression would tally with the actual term used by Dharmakīrti, who would follow him!

Whereas I completely agree with JACOBI–VAIDYA's first argument, their second argument is not entirely convincing to me. Indeed, we cannot understand the idea of *svârtha-vākya* and *parârtha-vākya* (NA.10) as well as *svârtha-pratyakṣa* and *parârtha-pratyakṣa* (NA.11) without Diṅnāga's and Dharmakīrti's well-known division of *svârthânumāna* and *parârthânumāna*. It should suffice to remind the reader of NB.2.1–2: /1/ *anumānaṁ dvividhā.* /2/ *svârthaṁ parârthaṁ ca.* and of NB.3.1–2: /1/ *tri-rūpa-liṅgâkhyānaṁ parârthânumānam.* /2/ *kāraṇe kāryôpacārāt.*

There can be no doubt, in my opinion, that the idea of *vākyasya parârthatvaṁ* necessarily presupposes the idea of *vākyasya svârthatvaṁ*, and that both these concepts—expressed in NA.10 ff.: *parârthaṁ mānam ākhyātaṁ vākyaṁ*—could only have been developed in the context of *svârtha-°* and *parârthânumāna*.

However, the idea of *svârtha-pratyakṣa* and *svârthânumāna* / *parârthânumāna*—central for JACOBI–VAIDYA's reasoning—which is a prerequisite for Siddhasena to establish the thesis of *parârtha-pratyakṣa*, predates Dharmakīrti and is found also in the *saṅgraha-śloka* (*iti śāstrârtha-saṅgrahaḥ*) of *Nyāya-praveśa* of Diṅnāga's disciple, Śaṅkarasvāmin[15].

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artha-kriyā-samarthaṁ yat tad atra paramārtha-sat / anyat saṁvṛti-sat proktaṁ te sva-sāmānya-lakṣaṇe // . Cf. also HATTORI (1968: 14): 'The concept of "*artha-kriyā*" is unfamiliar to Dignāga, but it is an important criterion for the distinguishing of "*sva-lakṣaṇa*" from "*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*" in Dharmakīrti's system of thought.', HATTORI (1968: 79 § 1.14) and FRANCO (1987: 445 n. 203), esp.: 'the concept of *arthakriyā* does not appear anywhere in Dignāga's writings.'

On the other hand, Dharmakīrti's definition does go back to the usage of the term *bhrānta* in the Yogācāra school; his novelty was to mould it to the demands of his *pramāṇa* theory. We should remember about his idea that *anumāna* is *bhrānta* (cf. PVin.II(1).2.6–7, p. 24.6–7: *de ma yin la der ḥdzin phyir || ḥkhrul kyaṅ ḥbrel phyir tshad ma ñid ||* = *atasmiṁs tad-graho bhrāntir api sambandhataḥ pramā //*), which is a proper point of reference here, not the nature of *citta* / *vijñāna*.

[15] *sādhanaṁ dūṣaṇaṁ câva sâbhāsaṁ para-saṁvide / pratyakṣam anumānaṁ ca sâbhāsaṁ tv ātma-saṁvide //* . As for a possible objection that the verse might be later, at least the commentator Haribhadra takes it to be a genuine part of the original work (NP.(1). p. 9.12 ff.): *…ity ādāv eva ślokaḥ,* etc.

Certainly it is not Śaṅkarasvāmin who developed the concept of *svârtha-°* and *parârthânumāna*. It was probably fathomed by Vasubandhu[16], but terminologically conceived and worked out by Diṅnāga[17].

There are, however, two other traits to be noticed in the aphorisms NA.10–11 that point, in my opinion, to Dharmakīrti as their source. The first of them is the idea of metaphorical transference (*upacāra*) used in a very similar context. Siddhasena speaks of the term 'inference for others' (*parârtham mānam*)—which denotes, to be precise, the inferential cognition arisen in another person as a result of an argumentative procedure and/or debate—which is applied through metaphorical transference (*upacāra*) to a 'syllogistic' sentence (*vākyaṁ*), that is, as a matter of fact, merely a cause of such a cognition in another person. We come across the same idea in NB.3.1–2, and even the wording is to a certain extent similar (one should here take into account stylistic differences necessitated by the succint *sūtra* style and versified *kārikā*s). Below, both passages in question are given for the sake of convenience, relevant expressions being underlined:[18]

/NA.10/   *sva-niścayavad anyeṣāṁ niścayôtpādanaṁ budhaiḥ /*
          parârthaṁ mānam ākhyātaṁ vākyaṁ tad-upacārataḥ //

NB.3.1–2: *tri-rūpa-liṅgâkhyānaṁ parârthânumānaṁ. kāraṇe kāryôpacārāt.*

Dharmottara's gloss confirms the interpretation: *kāraṇa* = *vacana* = *vākya*; *kārya* = *[parârtha] anumāna* = *parârtha-māna*.[19] Siddharṣigaṇi, whose comments are in a similar spirit, even quotes a verse, that establishes the relation between speech (*kāraṇa*) and resulting cognition (*kārya*)[20]. Another striking feature is that the

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[16] Cf. FRAUWALLNER (1933: 476–477 [297–298]) and HATTORI (1968: 12, n. 60).

[17] E.g.: PS.2.1ab: *anumānaṁ dvividhā svârthaṁ tri-rūpāl liṅgato parârthânumānaṁ tu sva-dṛṣṭârtha-prakāśanam*; also PS.3.1ab, and PSV.2, K 109a.2–3 = V 27a.5 (*svârthânumāna*): *tshul gsum paḥi rtags las rjes su dpag paḥi don* (V: *rjes su dpag par bya baḥi don*) *mthoṅ ba gaṅ yin pa de ni raṅ gi don gyi rjes su dpag paḥo*. Cf. RANDLE (1926: 28–9), HATTORI (1968: 78, n. I.11) and Steinkellner's note 1, p. 21 in PVin.II(2).

[18] In my analysis throughout I shall use, for the sake of brevity, underlining to mark corresponding phrases in NA. and works of Dharmakīrti or of other authors.

[19] NBṬ.3.2, p. 150.12–151.1: *tasmin kāraṇe vacane kāryasyânumānasyôpacāraḥ samāropaḥ kriyate. tataḥ samāropāt kāraṇaṁ vacanam anumāna-śabdenôcyate. aupacārikaṁ vacanam anumānaṁ, na mukhyam ity-arthaḥ.*

[20]   *vikalpa-yonayaḥ śabdā vikalpāḥ śabda-yonayaḥ /*
       kārya-kāraṇatā teṣāṁ nârthaṁ śabdāḥ spṛśanty api //

The verse is so far untraced, but it refers most probably to another verse by Dharmakīrti, and—at any rate—to an idea expressed in PV.1.286.

reference to the idea of the metaphorical transference (*upacāra*) occurs in both works (NA. and NB.) precisely at the moment of introducing the discussion of *parârtha-anumāna* and that this is the only occurrence of this idea in both works. Neither the term nor the idea as such is encountered at any other point.

Further, VAIDYA's third point is rather weak, as well. He says: 'These verses [NA.6–7—P.B.] contain the favourite view of the Yogācāra School on the subject and the object (grāhya and grāhaka), which both they declare illusory. This view is dependent on the definition of pratyakṣa, and though its origin must be sought in Diṅnāga's works [emphasis—P.B.], the scholars who brought the idea to perfection are Dharmapāla and his pupil Dharmakīrti.' (p. xix). Indeed, we find the idea referred to by VAIDYA in Diṅnāga's works, e.g. in his PS.1.10[21] (cf. n. 67):

Vasudhararakṣita/Seṅ-rgyal 15b.4:	Kanakavarman/Dad-paḥi śes-rab 96a.4–5:
gaṅ tshe snaṅ ba de gṣal bya |	*gaṅ ltar snaṅ ba de gṣal bya* |
tshad ma daṅ deḥi ḥbras bu ni |	*tshad ma daṅ deḥi ḥbras bu ni* |
ḥdsin rnam rig pa de yi phyir |	*ḥdsin rnam rig paḥo de yi phyir* |
de gsum tha dad du ma byas ||	*de gsum tha dad du ma byas* ||

However, we do not find anything in NA.7[22] that would allude to either Diṅnāga's specific theory of triple division of *vijñāna* or to Dharmakīrti's ideas[23]. What we do find instead is the realist's position that, at least: (1) acts of cognition are real, (2) acts of cognition happen to be true and accurate, (3) acts of cognition are self-validatory, (4) acts of cognition are accurate representations of external world, (5) the external world is real.

To have Diṅnāga's or Dharmakīrti's views criticised here we would need an explicit element of *sva-saṁvitti* (*sva-saṁvedana*) or *phala*. There are three possible expressions in NA.7 that might refer to *sva-saṁvitti* (and none to refer to *phala*): (A) *sphuṭaṁ*, (B) *svânya-niścāyi*, (C) *dvaya-siddhau*. (Ad A) The first of the list is highly improbable, for it never—to my knowledge—is used in Buddhist sources to refer to the idea of self-revelatory character of cognition (*sva-saṁvitti*). It is generally used to describe either the veracious, direct, non-inferrential or the

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[21] See HATTORI (1968: 107, n. 1.67):

yad-ābhāsaṁ prameyaṁ tat pramāṇa-phalate punaḥ /
grāhakâkāra-saṁvittī trayaṁ nâtaḥ pṛthak-kṛtam //

[22] *sakala-pratibhāsasya bhrāntatvâsiddhitaḥ sphuṭaṁ /*
pramāṇaṁ svânya-niścāyi dvaya-siddhau prasidhyati //

[23] On the triple and fourfold division of *vijñāna* in the Yogācāra school see HATTORI (1968: 107, n. 1.67).

indubitable, etc., character of acts of cognition. It is explained by Siddharṣigaṇi accordingly by *suniścitatayā*. (Ad B) The second of these expressions (as a similar one in NA.31: *svânya-nirbhāsī*) mentions in fact only two aspects: the cognition (*sva*) and its counterpart—the object (*anya*). If *sva* were to mean *sva-saṁvitti*, the primary act of cognition would not be mentioned; if *anya* were taken to be *sva-saṁvitti*, the *bāhyârtha*, so fundamental for the realist, would not be mentioned. The expression is explained in NAV. as *sva-para-prakāśakaṁ*, which does not bring anything new to our analysis. However, it is coupled in the NAV. with the third expression. (Ad C) The third expression refers to duality, in the first place, and—like in the preceding case—it is highly problematic to take it to allude to Diṅnāga's theory of triple division of *vijñāna*. However, it is Siddharṣigaṇi's gloss on *dvaya-siddhau*: *svarūpârtha-lakṣaṇa-yugma-niṣpattau* that could be implicative of *sva-saṁvitti*: in it, *svarūpa* might refer to the self-revelatory character of cognition. It is especially suggestive in view of his statement in NAV.1 quoted in n. 24. But even then, the third aspect of an act of cognition (apart from the act as such, an object), its self-revelatory character, is not explicitly mentioned here. As a matter of fact, Siddharṣigaṇi, so well conversant with Buddhist ideas, would not have wasted the availing opportunity to indicate the idea of *sva-saṁvitti* and to utilise it[24], if he had noticed any allusion to the Buddhist theories of triple or fourfold division of *vijñāna* in the aphorism of Siddhasena. In other words, there is nothing in Siddharṣigaṇi's gloss that might suggest that Siddharṣigaṇi had seen any point of convergence between the ideas expressed in NA.7 and certain concepts ascribable to Diṅnāga, as VAIDYA would like it. To expell our doubts, he concludes, as a matter of fact, with *anyathā prameyâbhāve pramāṇâbhāvāt*, to show that no third element is implied.

In my opinion, NA.7 can be safely taken to disprove the doctrine of illusory character of worldly appearance propounded by the Buddhist idealist (*Vijñāna-vādin*), whose ideas directly influenced Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti[25]. The aphorism is

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[24] As he does in several places, for instance in NAV.1 (the section beginning with: *ayam atrâbhiprāyaḥ: sva-saṁvedanaṁ prati nikhila-jñānānām eka-rūpatayā sākṣāt-karaṇa-caturatvān nâsty eva bhedaḥ…*) , NAV.29 (the section beginning with: *tathôrarī-kṛta-yogâcāra-matam api balād anekânta-prakāśa-rajjur āveṣṭayaty, ekasyâpi jñānasyâneka-vedya-vedakâkāratayā prathanôpagateḥ…*, and the section beginning with: *atha jñāna-vādy advaita-prakāśam alakṣitam abhyupetya tena bāhuvidhyaṁ dadhāno bodho bādhyamānatvād bhrānta ity abhidadhyāt, tad ayuktam …*), NAV.31, etc.

[25] Cf. HATTORI (1968: 106, n. 1.65).

clearly evocative of such ideas as those expressed, e.g. in MAV.1.1,3[26], Triṁś.1, 29[27] or Viṁś.1ab[28], 16[29]. As Siddharṣigaṇi expresses himself, if there is nothing to be cognised, there can be no cognition. Therefore, to establish the thesis of the existence of the external world is essential for the realist. Similarly, *mutatis mutandis*, it is crucial for the Buddhist idealist to deny the existence of external object. Furthermore, NA.7 fits quite well into the line of critics of the so-called 'Dreaming Argument'[30], that was commonly ascribed to the Buddhist and refuted, for instance, by Kumārila (MŚV.4.(*Nirālambana-vāda*).23, p. 159.7–8), Uddyotakara (NV. on NBh.4.2.33), Śaṅkara (BSŚBh.2.2.5.29, p. 476.2–3) and by Siddharṣigaṇi (NAV.29, the *Śūnya-vāda* section).

Therefore, NA.7 is not a very useful indication to establish the date of the *Nyāyâvatāra*. However, there is a number of other conspicuous traits, that are instrumental in establishing the time of composition of the treatise quite convincingly as posterior to Dharmakīrti. To achieve this, I shall analyse several aphorisms of NA. step by step in order to show Siddhasena's indebtedness to Dharmakīrti (especially to NB.) in respect not only of certain 'loan' ideas but also, partially, of the dialectical structure of the text. Some of the following points are not entirely convincing, when taken singly. Their high number, on the other hand, could not have been a matter of mere coincidence.

[1] The opening line of NA.0 (*pramāṇa-vyutpādanârtham idam ārabhyate*) closely resembles the formulations of HB. p. 1*.5–6: *parokṣârtha-pratipatter anumānâśrayatvāt tat-vyutpādanârthaṁ saṅkṣepata idam ārabhyate*.

[2] Practically, the very first ideas expressed in the opening lines of NA. and NB. are very similar and have similar wording:

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[26] *abhūta-parikalpo 'sti dvayaṁ tatra na vidyate / śūnyatā vidyate tv atra tasyām api sa vidyate // artha-sattvâtma-vijñāpti-pratibhāsaṁ prajāyate / vijñānaṁ nâsti câsyârthas tad-abhāvāt tad apy sat //*

[27] *ātma-dharmôpacāro hi vividho yaḥ pravartate / vijñāna-pariṇāme 'sau pariṇāmaḥ sa trividhā // acitto 'nupalambho 'sau jñānaṁ lokôttaraṁ ca tat / āśrayasya parāvṛttir dvidhā dauṣṭhulya-hānitaḥ //*

[28] *vijñāpti-mātram evâtad asad-arthâvabhāsanāt /*

[29] *pratyakṣa-buddhiḥ svapnâdau yathā sā ca yadā tadā / na so 'rtho dṛśyate tasya pratyakṣatvaṁ kathaṁ matam //* (to be coupled with NA.6–7).

[30] In a typical formulation: 'The sensation in the waking state is erroneous, because it is a cognition, like the sensation in a dream' (*jāgrat-saṁvedanaṁ bhrāntaṁ, pratyayatvāt, svapna-saṁvedanavat*). See TABER (1994).

NA.1: *pramāṇaṁ* […] *pratyakṣaṁ ca parokṣaṁ ca dvidhā*.

NB.1.1.2–3: *dvividham samyag-jñānam. pratyakṣam anumānaṁ ca.*

The differences are that (1) Siddhasena does not have *samyag-jñānam* (this expression is completely absent from NA.), and (2) he has *parokṣa* instead of *anumāna*. The second difference is dictated by the Jaina demand to incorporate *śābda / āgama* (testimony, verbal cognition) in the *pramāṇa*s (as a quasi-separate category, one of the two—alongside *anumāna*—primary sub-divisions of *parokṣa*). However, Siddhasena marks an important, widely known shift in Jaina epistemology, to interpret the directness of *pratyakṣa* in terms of sensory organs (*akṣa = indriya*), not—as it was customary—in terms of the cognitive subject (*akṣa = jīva / ātman*). The commentators are quite explicit about the interpretational shift, which diverts from the *Āgamic* tradition advocated, e.g. by Akalaṅka among many others.[31]

The question is what prompted Siddhasena to introduce this shift? Obviously, these were the demands of the general philosophic discourse in India to be up-to-date with and understood by such schools as Nyāya or Sāṁkhya. But I am deeply convinced that what was responsible for that shift to take the senses as the criterion of directness of *pratyakṣa* was, to a larger degree, Dharmakīrti's inspiration and his works (predominantly the *Nyāya-bindu*) as a groundwork for the *Nyāyâvatāra*. For what other reason would Siddhasena speak of the two-fold division of valid cognition and justify it by referring to Dharmakīrtian ideas? And thereby we come to another element of NA.1 that resembles Dharmakīrti's formulations.

According to Siddhasena, the factor responsible for the division of cognitive acts into *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa* is not the character of the 'cognising organ' (*akṣa*), either the sense organs (*indriya*) or the cognitive subject (*jīva, ātman*) as such. In his opinion, what is crucial in the categorisation of *pramāṇa*s is the character of the object of cognition that determines the way the object of cognition is determined, or cognised. Clearly, in this revolutionary rearrangement he goes against the whole Jaina tradition. The expression he uses: *meya-viniścayāt* (NA.1d), can hardly be explicated without Dharmakīrti's formulations: *tasya viṣayaḥ svalakṣaṇam* (NB.1.1.12), *so 'numānasya viṣayaḥ* (NB.1.1.17) and *mānaṁ dvividhaṁ viṣaya-*

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[31] See, e.g. NAV.1: **pratyakṣaṁ** *cêty-ādi; tatra siddhânta-prasiddha-pāramārthika-pratyakṣâpekṣayâkṣa-śabdo jīva-paryāyatayā prasiddhaḥ. iha tu vyāvahārika-pratyakṣa-prastāvād akṣa-dhvanir indriya-vacano gṛhyate. tataś câkṣaṁ pratigataṁ pratyakṣaṁ. yad indriyam āśrityôjjihīte 'rtha-sākṣāt-kāri jñānaṁ tat pratyakṣam ity arthaḥ. … akṣebhyaḥ parato vartata iti parokṣam. akṣa-vyāpāra-nirapekṣaṁ mano-vyāpāreṇâsākṣād-artha-paricchedakaṁ yaj jñānaṁ tat parokṣam iti bhāvaḥ.*

dvaividhyāt (PV.2.1ab)[32]. Even Siddharṣigaṇi[33] confirms that what is pivotal for the distinction is, in the first place, the character of extrinsic data apprehended by the cognitive subject, that determines the way of apprehension, irrespective of whether the 'cognising organ' are the senses or the soul. It is only in NA.4d that Siddhasena emphasises the way of cognising, or '[the manner of] grasping [an object]', for the first time: *grahaṇêkṣayā*. But even then, the tradition in the person of the commentator Siddharṣigaṇi takes the locution to refer to the existence and the nature of the cognoscible (see his detailed discussion in NAV.4 apropos of *grahaṇêkṣayā*).

   Truly, a formulation similar to NA.1 is found also in PS.(1).1.2ab[34], so Dharmakīrti is not the only potential source. However, if we compare what Diṅnāga has further to say on the two-fold division of *pramāṇa*, we discover that he does not mention the reason for the division explicitly, as Dharmakīrti and Siddhasena do, but he merely points to the parallelism of the two-fold *prameya*[35]. Clearly, one can easily understand the statement *lakṣaṇa-dvayaṁ prameyam* to be a reason adduced by the author for *pratyakṣam anumānaṁ ca pramāṇe* ('there are two cognitive criteria: perception and inference, [because] the cognoscible has two characteristics'), as the commentator himself does[36]. However, neither the word 'because' (*yasmāt / °-tvāt*) nor any direct explanation why *pramāṇa* is twofold is mentioned by Diṅnāga explicitly, as it is by Dharmakīrti in PV.2.1bc (*viṣaya-dvaividhyāt śakty-aśaktitaḥ / artha-kriyāyām …*). Moreover, Diṅnāga's elucidation

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[32] Cf. also PV.2.63 (*anumāna-vicāraḥ*): *na pratyakṣa-parokṣābhyāṁ meyasyânyasya sambhavaḥ / tasmāt prameya-dvitvena pramāṇa-dvitvam iṣyate //*

[33] NAV.1 *ad loc.* (on *meya-viniścayād*): *bahir-arthaṁ punar apekṣya kaścic cakṣurâdi-sāmagrī-bala-labdha-sattākaḥ svâvayava-vyāpinaṁ kālântara-sañcariṣṇuṁ sthagita-kṣaṇa-vivartam alakṣita-paramânu-pārimāṇḍalyaṁ sannihitaṁ viśada-nirbhāsaṁ sāmānyam ākāraṁ sākṣāt-kurvāṇaḥ prakāśaḥ prathate, tatra pratyakṣa-vyavahāraḥ pravartate. yaḥ punar liṅga-śabdâdi-dvāreṇa niyatâniyata-sāmānyâkârâvalokī parisphuṭatā-rahitaḥ khalv ātmano 'rtha-grahaṇa-pariṇāmaḥ samullasati sa parokṣatāṁ svī-karoti.*

[34] *pratyakṣam anumānaṁ ca pramāṇe* (Vasudhararakṣita/Seṅ-rgyal 13b.6: *mṅon sum daṅ ni rjes su dpag tshad ma*; Kanakavarman/Dad-paḥi śes-rab 94a.4: *mṅon sum daṅ ni rjes su dpag tshad ma dag ni*); here, the difference is the absence of the explicit (*sc.* with a numeral, not with the dual form *°-e / dag*) mention of 'twofold' (*dvividham / dvidhā / rnam pa gñis*).

[35] PS.(1).1.2bc: *lakṣaṇa-dvayam / prameyam …* (Vasudhararakṣita/Seṅ-rgyal 13b.6 = Kanakavarman/Dad-paḥi śes-rab 94a.5: *mtshan ñid gñis gsal bya*).

[36] *yasmāt* = Vasudhararakṣita/Seṅ-rgyal: *…phyir ṣe na*; Kanakavarman/Dad-paḥi śes-rab: *… gaṅ gi phyir.*

of the two-fold character of *pramāṇa* (*lakṣaṇa-dvayaṁ prameyam*) differs completely in character from Siddhasena's explanation (*meya-viniścayāt*) and Dharmakīrti's (*viṣaya-dvaividhyāt śakty-aśaktitaḥ artha-kriyāyām …*), insofar as it is 'static' or 'taxonomic', viz. plainly juxtaposes two cases of double division (*pramāṇa—prameya*), whereas Siddhasena and Dharmakīrti offer 'intentional', i.e. actively directed to an object of cognition either by way of determining it (*viniścaya*, cognitive activity) or by any sort of efficient action (*artha-kriyā*).

[3] Apart from the noticeable similarity in wording between NA.1 and NB.1.1.2–3, there is another striking correspondence to be observed in the ideas expressed by Dharmakīrti and Siddhasena. Siddharṣigaṇi introduces NA.1 in the following way: *tatra tāval lakṣaṇa-saṁkhyā-vipratipattī nirācikīrṣur āha*. There is no doubt that Siddharṣigaṇi regarded NA.1 to aim at—beside enumerating subdivisions of *pramāṇa* (*pratyakṣaṁ ca parokṣaṁ ca dvidhā …*)—formulating its definition (*pramāṇaṁ sva-parâbhāsi jñānaṁ bādha-vivarjitam*). And, further, there can hardly be any doubt that a descriptive definition of *pramāṇa* is precisely what Siddhasena in NA.1ab does. In the aphorism, he does not only group all cognitively valid procedures under respective categories of 'direct' and 'indirect', which is a case of a typological definition that demarcates a notion by mentioning specimens to which the definition is applicable (ὁ διὰ τῶν γενῶν ὁρισμὸς), but he also attempts a real definition that describes the character and essential aspects or intrinsic characteristics of a thing (ὁ λέγων ἐξ ὧν ἔστιν ἐνυπαρχόντων [ὁρισμὸς]).[37] Clearly, these two definitions represent two diverse approaches and the latter is intellectually more sublime. Whereas we quite frequently find typological definitions of *pramāṇa* (viz. statements of its divisions) in Jaina literature, we do not, as a matter of fact, come across any attempt at a descriptive definition of *pramāṇa* of the second type in any works, both Jaina and non-Jaina, prior NA. Thus, the formulation of a descriptive definition of cognitive criterion seems definitely to be an advancement. And it would perhaps be surprising to find such an innovation in a work of generally secondary character that repeatedly borrows from other works (it relies, for the most part, on the Buddhist legacy and has very little new ideas, genuinely of its own, to offer), if NA. had no predecessor. However, it is Dharmakīrti who must have inspired Siddhasena's descriptive definition. The opening verse (if we skip the first two introductory verses of obeisant nature) of the *Pramāṇa-siddhi* chapter, i.e. PV.1.3 and PV.1.7cd present such a descriptive definition of *pramāṇa* that specifies its character and individual features. This

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[37] Cf. Aristotelian twofold division in *Met.*998[b] (p. 47.12–14): ἕτερος δ᾽ ἔδται ὁ διὰ τῶν γενῶν ὁρισμὸς καὶ ὁ λέγων ἐξ ὧν ἔστιν ἐνυπαρχόντων.

section of PV. is traditionally[38] assumed to offer the first comprehensive definition of *pramāṇa*. Clearly, for both Manorathanandin and Siddharṣigaṇi the passages of NA.1ab and PV.1.3/7cd respectively are cases of a *pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa*. Occasionally[39], a doubt is raised whether Dharmakīrti's design was indeed a descriptive definition and that actually it was the subsequent Buddhist tradition of commentators where the idea of a comprehensive descriptive definition developed. Irrespective of whether one assumes that the formulation of PV.1.3 was a genuine descriptive definition or that an idea of such a definition first originated with post-Dharmakīrtian commentators, both sides agree that such a descriptive definition did not exist before Dharmakīrti (*ergo* it is altogether absent from Diṅnāga, Śaṅkarasvāmin, etc.). Accordingly, since NA. appears to present such a definition of a descriptive character, it must have been composed after Dharmakīrti and PV.[40]

[4] Late Buddhist sources allegedly refer to NA.2.[41] Surprisingly, NA.2, being a statement of *pūrva-pakṣa*, is the least suitable verse of the whole *Dvātriṁśikā* to serve as an object of anybody's critique. Thus, anyone referring to the verse with the purpose to refute it would have to be highly incompetent and incapable of noticing that the very verse is refuted by Siddhasena himself in NA.3! Therefore it could

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[38] See: FRANCO (1997: 59–61), esp.: 'Therefore, we can safely conclude that the definition of *pramāṇa* in general, unlike the definition of each *pramāṇa* in particular, was not undertaken by any Indian philosopher before Dharmakīrti's time. Consequently, there is no reason why one should expect Dharmakīrti to do so. During the time that separates Dharmakīrti from his commentators, some change in the philosophical requirements must have occurred that produced the expectation of a general definition of *pramāṇas*.' [p. 60]. Cf. also STEINKELLNER–KRASSER (1989: 3–5). Cf., e.g. PVV.1.3 (1: 2.17 ff.; 3: 3.17 ff.): *ayam ācāryo bṛhad-ācāryīya-pramāṇa-samuccaya-śāstre vārttikaṁ cikīrṣuḥ svataḥ-kṛta-bhagavan-namaskāraḥ tac-chāstrârambha-samaye tad-ācārya-kṛta-bhagavan-namaskāra-ślokaṁ vyākhyātu-kāmaḥ prathamaṁ pramāṇa-sāmānya-lakṣaṇam āha …* and PVV.1.7–8 (1: 4.36 ff.; 3: 8.6 ff.): *tad evam avisaṁvādanaṁ pramāṇa-lakṣaṇam uktam. idānīm anyad āha …*

[39] See: FRANCO (1997: 54–62), e.g.: '…Dharmakīrti did not attempt a general definition of the *pramāṇas*, but only wanted to prove that the Buddha is a *pramāṇa* … ' [p. 61].

[40] I am indebted to Claus Oetke for drawing my attention to the above issue of PV.1.3–7 and its relevance to the problem of dating of NA.

[41] QVARNSTRÖM (1999: 178): 'In the eighth-century commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* (II.5), Śākyabuddhi (or Śākyamati) quotes the second verse of *Nyāyāvatāra* and claims that this verse is the object of Dharmakīrti's critique', and refers to p. 163, n. 38 of Chr. LINDTNER's 'Marginalia to Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya.' *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 28 (1984) 149–175.

hardly be an 'object of Dharmakīrti's critique.' Furthermore, any reference to allegedly such a state of affairs would prove the source of such an information to be a highly unreliable one. Consequently, either Śākyabuddhi cannot have referred to NA.2 or his acquaintance with Jaina tradition would be liable to doubt.

As a matter of fact, NA.2 may plausibly be taken as a *prima facie* objection ('no purpose is known for stating the definition of cognitive criterion') against formulating a comprehensive definition of *pramāṇa* of descriptive character, inasmuch as '*cognitive criteria* (mind the plural!—P.B.) are well-known and everyday practice is accomplished by them.' Siddharṣigaṇi takes 'the definition of cognitive criterion' to be '[a statement] consisting in mentioning specific properties of cognitive criterion that are capable of distinguishing [it from that which has] another form,'[42] which is a very accurate explanation of a descriptive definition. Interestingly enough, the reason adduced why such a definition is not necessary in case of *pramāṇa* is *prasiddhāni pramāṇāni*, where the plural is expressly used. This would point to the more archaic kind of definition based on classification, that would define the notion of *pramāṇa* merely by specifying the *pramāṇa* 'inventory'. Thereby NA.2 supports our supposition that what Siddhasena really does is a descriptive definition of *pramāṇa*. Accordingly, NA.2 would rather be a record of the historical change and certain resistance against a new approach towards defining *pramāṇa*. This would also explain the role of the verse, that might seem unnecessary at first glance, in such a succinct work as NA. is.

[5] The *pāda* c (*tad-vyāmoha-nivṛttiḥ*) of NA.3[43]—which is a rejoinder to the doubt raised in NA.2 whether it is 'purposeful to state the definition of cognitive criterion' (viz. whether the treatise, *śāstra* = NA., has a purpose), since 'cognitive criteria are well-known and everyday practice is accomplished by them'—recalls Dharmakīrti's statement found in PV.1.7:

> *prāmāṇyaṁ vyavahāreṇa śāstraṁ moha-nivartanam /*
> *ajñātârtha-prakāśo vā svarūpâdhigateḥ param //*

A statement expressing a similar idea seems to be absent from PS.

[6] Corresponding to the sequence of topics discussed in NB. (truly, it is a typical sequence not restricted to NB.), as a next step, Siddhasena in NA.5 makes his polemical statement and declares also inference to be 'non-erroneous because it is a

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[42] NAV.2   *ad   loc.*:   **pramāṇa-lakṣaṇasyôktau**   *para-rūpa-vyāvartana-kṣamâsādhāraṇa-pramāṇa-dharma-kathana-rūpāyām*.

[43]   *prasiddhānāṁ pramāṇānāṁ lakṣaṇôktau prayojanam /*
         tad-vyāmoha-nivṛttiḥ syād vyāmūḍha-manasām iha //

cognitive criterion, just like perception.' (… *anumānaṁ, tad abhrāntaṁ pramāṇatvāt samakṣavat* …). The use of the term *abhrānta* as well as the polemical character directly points to NB.(1).1.4: *tatra pratyakṣaṁ kalpanâpoḍham abhrāntam*. This issue, that was taken up by JACOBI and VAIDYA, has been already discussed above p. 333 ff. Dharmakīrti expressed such ideas that could have served both as a target and inspiration for Siddhasena also in PV.2.45–46 (*anumāna-vicāraḥ*)[44].

But this is not the only Dharmakīrtian trace to be found in NA.5. Inference is defined by Siddhasena to 'determine the *sādhya* on account of *liṅga*; *liṅga* (the inferential sign) is, in its turn, inseparably connected with the *sādhya*; the determining factor is here the relation of *avinā-bhāva*: NA.5ac: *sādhyâvinā-bhuno liṅgāt sādhya-niścāyakaṁ smṛtam / anumānaṁ*. This definition follows, in most—if not all—details, the ideas expressed by Dharmakīrti in PV.1.287:

> *anumānâśrayo liṅgam avinā-bhāva-lakṣaṇam /*
> *vyāpti-pradarśanād dhetoḥ sādhyenôktañ ca tat sphuṭam //*

This striking correspondence does not only concern central elements in inference and their character as well as their mutual connection, but even the choice of vocabulary. The inseparable connection with the probandum as the defining characteristic of the probans reoccurs in NA.13: *sādhyâvinā-bhuvo hetor*.[45]

[7] NA.8 may have been influenced by Diṅnāga both in terms of vocabulary and notions. Its *pāda* d (*māṇaṁ śābdaṁ prakīrtitam*) reminds of PS.(2).5.1 (esp. *śābda*, *sgra las byuṅ ba*):

> *na pramāṇântaraṁ śābdam anumānāt tathā hi tat /*
> *kṛtakatvâdivat svârtham anyâpohena bhāṣate //* [46]

[8] In NA.13 Siddhasena takes a closer look at *parârthânumāna* and the conditions of its validity: *sādhyâvinā-bhuvo hetor vaco yat pratipādakam / parârtham anumānaṁ tat pakṣâdi-vacanâtmakam //* The phrasing is reminiscent of NB.3.1: *tri-rūpa-liṅgâkhyānaṁ parârthânumānam*. Clearly, the element of *tri-rūpa*—a criterion of validity of *anumāna* for the Dharmakīrtian tradition—is absent in NA., for this idea

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[44] *ayathâbhiniveśena dvitīyā bhrāntir iṣyate / gatiś cet para-rūpeṇa na ca bhrānteḥ pramāṇatā // abhiprāyâvisaṁvādād api bhrānteḥ pramāṇatā / gatir apy anyathā dṛṣṭā, pakṣaś câyaṁ kṛtôttaraḥ //*

[45] Cf. also PV.3.31: *kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvād vā svabhāvād vā niyāmakāt / avinā-bhāva-niyamo 'darśanān na na darśanāt // ,* etc.

[46] *sgra las byuṅ ba rjes dpag las | tshad ma gźan min de ltar de | byas sogs pa bźin du raṅ don la | gźan sel bas ni rjod par byed |* The verse is quoted in TSaP. *ad* TSa.1514 (p. 441.6–7), with a minor alteration (*anumānāt tathā hi saḥ* (*tat*) /).

was not recognised by the Jainas. Instead, syntactically and semantically in the same position, we have the Jaina criterion of validity, viz. *sādhyâvinā-bhuvaḥ*. Thus, NA.13 may be taken as Siddhasena's polemical reply to the Buddhist doctrine of *trairūpya*.

On the other hand, *pādas* c-d of NA.13 (…*anumānaṃ tat pakṣâdi-vacanâtmakam*) bear close resemblance to (1) NP.(2).2 (= NP.(1), p. 1.4–5): *tatra pakṣâdi-vacanāni sādhanam. pakṣa-hetu-dṛṣṭânta-vacanair hi prāśnikānām apratīto 'rthaḥ pratipādyata iti //* as well as to (2) the verse of NM.1: **pakṣâdi-vacanânîti sādhanam; tatra hi svayaṃ / sādhyatvenêpsitaḥ pakṣo viruddhârthânirākṛtaḥ //* . However, this similarity is not decisive at all, inasmuch as all the quotations merely describe the widely known structure of any 'syllogistic' reasoning, that is composed of respective links, viz. members of 'syllogism'.

[9] In the definition of *pakṣa*, NA.14ab: *sādhyâbhyupagamaḥ pakṣaḥ pratyakṣâdy-anirākṛtaḥ /* , we come across other formulations that bear obvious similarity especially to NB.(2).3.37: *svarūpeṇâva svayam iṣṭo 'nirākṛtaḥ pakṣa iti* (but also to NB.(2).3.49–53). Dharmakīrti's *svarūpeṇa* stands for *sādhyatvena*, which is confirmed both by Dharmakīrti himself in the next two *sūtras* (NB.(2).3.39–40: *svarūpeṇêti sādhyatvenêṣṭaḥ. svarūpeṇâvêti sādhyatvenâivêṣṭo na sādhyatvenâpi.*) as well as by Dharmottara (NBṬ.(2).3.37 *ad loc.*: *svarūpeṇâvêti sādhyatvenâiva.*). Dharmottara explains *anirākṛtaḥ* as *pratyakṣâdy-anirākṛtaḥ* (NBṬ.(2).3.37 *ad loc.*: *evaṃ-bhūtaḥ san pratyakṣâdy-anirākṛto yo 'rthaḥ sa pakṣa ity ucyate.*), and—if we suppose that he expressed original ideas of Dharmakīrti (and I believe he did in this regard)—Siddhasena's formulations express almost the same idea as Dharmakīrti did in NB., barring Dharmakīrti's specific delimiting use of *eva* as well as *svayam*.

However, there can hardly be any doubt that the formulations of NA.14ab: *sādhyâbhyupagamaḥ pakṣaḥ pratyakṣâdy-anirākṛtaḥ /* , go back to PV.4.86 (1: p. 378, 3: p. 390):

> *sādhyâbhyupagamaḥ pakṣa-lakṣaṇaṃ teṣv apakṣatā /*
> *nirākṛte*[47] *bādhanataḥ śeṣe 'lakṣaṇa-vṛttitaḥ //*

The idea itself goes back to Diṅnāga and NM. (**svayaṃ sādhyatvenêpsitaḥ pakṣo viruddhârthânirākṛtaḥ*), as it was pointed out by Manorathanandin in PVV., p. 378.26. Another plausible source for NA.14 might be PS.3.2:

> *svarupeṇâva nirdeśyaḥ svayam iṣṭo 'nirākṛtaḥ /*
> *pratyakṣârthânumānâpta-prasiddhena svadharmiṇi //* [48]

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[47] Cf. Manorathanandin's *Vṛtti ad loc.*: *tathā ca teṣu śāstrêṣṭâdiṣu pañcasu vyāvartyeṣu mādhye nirākṛte pratyākṣâdi-bādhite bādhanato 'pakṣatā viruddhârthā.*

Clearly, the word *ādi* of the phrase *pratyakṣâdi* of NA.14b might allude to the categories [*pratyakṣârtha*?], *anumāna*, *āpta*, *prasiddha* enumerated in Diṅnāga's *anirākṛtaḥ pratyakṣârthânumānâpta-prasiddhena*, but it does not necessarily have to, since Siddharṣigaṇi (NAV.14 *ad loc.*: **ādi**-*śabdād anumāna-sva-vacana-lokā gṛhyante*) takes *ādi* to stand for *anumāna-sva-vacana-loka*. Another predecessor of Dharmakīrti in this regard was Śaṅkarasvāmin[49].

Out of all these possible sources, NA.14 has most in common with Dharmakīrti in terms of (1) exact wording (*sādhyâbhyupagamaḥ pakṣa …*), (2) replacement of Diṅnāgan *iṣṭa* with *abhyupagama*, (3) affinity in the explicit correlative *sādhya* (instead of Diṅnāgan *svarupeṇâva nirdeśya*) to *abhyupagama / iṣṭa*.

[10] The description of *hetu* and its role in the inference for others (*parârthânumāna*) in NA.17 is not so conspicuously similar to NB. in phrasing. Nevertheless, semantically both expositions are quite akin to each other. That in NA.17 we still deal with *parârthânumāna* is clear from the context itself, but also Siddharṣigaṇi leaves not doubt (NAV.17 *ad loc.*: **parârthânumānasya** *vacana-rūpatvād …*). Thus, in both cases we have 'the pronouncement of the logical reason' (*hetos … prayogo,* NA.) or 'the announcement of the inferential sign' (*liṅgâkhyānaṁ,* NB.) as the principal element of the inference for others (*parârthânumāna*) and the idea that there is no difference in 'demonstrative force' between the two formulations of the logical reason:

NA.17: *hetos tathôpapattyā vā syāt prayogo 'nyathâpi vā /*
dvi-vidho 'nyatareṇâpi sādhya-siddhir bhaved iti //

NB.3.1,3–7: /1/ *tri-rūpa-liṅgâkhyānaṁ* **parârthânumānam**. /3/ *tad dvi-vidham.* /4/ *prayoga-bhedāt.* /5/ *sādharmya-vaidharmyavac cêti.* /6/ *nânayor arthataḥ kaścid bhedaḥ.* /7/ *anyatra prayoga-bhedāt.*

The idea expressed by Dharmakīrti goes back to his PV.3.16 and PVSV. *ad loc.*[50]

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[48] The above Sanskrit reconstruction of PS.3.2 follows FRAUWALLNER (1957/b: 885) and TILLEMANS (1997: 178, n. 2). Tibetan text reads as follows: *raṅ gi ṅo bo kho na[a] bstan | bdag 'dod raṅ gi chos can la | mṅon sum don daṅ rjes dpag daṅ | yid ches grags pas ma bsal ba'o ||* [[a] TILLEMANS 1997 reads *nar.*] PS.3.2 must have been in its turn the source for NB.(2).3.37.

[49] NP.(2).2.1: *tatra pakṣaḥ prasiddho dharmī prasiddha-viśeṣaṇa-viśiṣṭatayā svayaṁ sādhyatvenêpsitaḥ.* **pratyakṣâdy**-*viruddha iti vākya-śeṣaḥ.*

[50] In PV.3.15 [p. 180] Dharmakīrti first recalls the triple character of *hetu* defined by Diṅnāga in *Nyāya-mukha*: *hetos triṣv api rūpeṣu niścayas tena varṇitaḥ / asiddha-viparītârtha-vyabhicāri-vipakṣataḥ // .* Then (PV.3.16ab) he states the reason for

[11] In NA.20 Siddhasena maintains that *dṛṣṭânta* is not an essential part of 'syllogistic' reasoning, inasmuch as the relation of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) suffices to prove the thesis. This is a continuation of the 'economical' trend in Indian logic—that starts with Vasubandhu and his *Vāda-vidhāna* and *Vāda-vidhi*[51]—to limit the number of necessary 'syllogistic' members, to simplify the reasoning procedures and to make such procedures universally binding, without any need for further empirical justification than the premises themselves:

> NA.20:   *antar-vyāptyâva sādhyasya siddher bahir-udāhṛtiḥ /*
> *vyarthā syāt tad-asadbhāve 'py evaṁ nyāya-vido viduḥ //*

> NB.(2).3.121: *tri-rūpo hetur uktaḥ. tāvatā cârtha-pratītir iti na pṛthag dṛṣṭânto nāma sādhanâvayavaḥ kaścit. tena nâsya lakṣaṇaṁ pṛthag ucyate gatârthatvāt.*

Siddhasena was not so much innovative as it might seem at first glance, inasmuch as it is Dharmakīrti (NB.(2).3.121) who had intuitively foreshadowed such an idea before him, when he had claimed that the example (*dṛṣṭânta*) is not a separate member of the proof (*sādhanâvayava*). It is much more natural and less surprising to find the direct continuation of the 'economical' trend, that had started with Vasubandhu, in the Yogâcāra tradition and Dharmakīrti's works, rather than in the Jaina tradition in the person of Siddhasena, where we do not find such an 'economic' tendency before Siddhasena. In my opinion, Siddhasena verbalised what had already been latent in Dharmakīrti's statement, even though Dharmakīrti himself had not been able to do without the example, which he had considered an integral part of the logical reason (*hetu*), indispensable to authenticate the general principle by taking recourse to its instantiations (relevant portions underlined): NB.(2).3.122: *hetoḥ sapakṣa eva sattvam asapakṣāc ca sarvato vyāvartī rūpam uktam abhedena. punar viśeṣeṇa kārya-svabhāvayor ukta-lakṣaṇayor janma-tan-mātrânubandhau darśanīyāv uktau. tac ca darśayatā—yatra dhūmas tatrâgnir,*

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expressing the concomitance by way of dissimilarity (*vaidharmya-vacana*): *vyabhicāri-vipakṣeṇa vaidharmya-vacanaṁ ca yat /* , only to quote Diṅnāga in PVSV.(1).3.16ab: *yad āha—eṣa tāvan nyāyo yad ubhayaṁ vaktavyaṁ viruddhânaikāntika-pratipakṣeṇa iti.* The rule is further explained by Dharmakīrti in PVSV. as follows: *sādharmya-vacanaṁ viruddha-pratipakṣeṇa, vaidharmya-vācanam anaikāntika-pratipakṣeṇa.* Thereupon, in PV.3.16cd and PVSV. *ad loc.*, he adds that: *yady adṛṣṭi-phalaṁ tac ca yadi tena vipakṣe 'darśanaṁ khyāpyate tad anukte 'pi gamyate // .* Cf. also PVSV.(1).3.24–25 [p. 185]: *tasmāt svabhāva-pratibandhād eva hetuḥ sādhyaṁ gamayati. sa ca tad-bhāva-lakṣaṇas tad-utpatti-lakṣaṇo vā. sa evâvinā-bhāvo dṛṣṭântābhyāṁ pradarśyate.*

[51] Cf. FRAUWALLNER (1933) and FRAUWALLNER (1957/a).

asaty agnau na kvacid dhūmo yathā mahānasêtarayor, yatra kṛtakatvaṁ tatrânityatvam, anityatvâbhāvo kṛtakatvâsambhavo yathā ghaṭâkāśayor—iti darśanīyam. na hy anyathā sapakṣa-vipakṣayoḥ sad-asattve yathôkta-prakāre śakye darśayitum. tat-kāryatā-niyamaḥ kārya-liṅgasya, svabhāva-liṅgasya ca svabhāvena vyāptiḥ. asmiṁś cârthe darśite eva dṛṣṭânto bhavati. etāvan-mātra-rūpatvāt tasyêti. Dharmakīrti expressed a similar idea already in his PV.3.27: *tad-bhāva-hetu-bhāvau hi dṛṣṭânte tad-avedinaḥ / khyāpyete, viduṣāṁ vācyo hetur eva hi kevalaḥ //* . Siddhasena, however, has to his credit that he clearly states the conditions of internal formal validity of the proof and dismisses the need to quote any instantiation: the proof is valid because the premises are valid and the relation between them is universally binding.

[12] Siddhasena states explicitly five conditions that invalidate *pakṣa*—and adds that there are, in fact, several varieties of *pakṣâbhāsa*—in NA.21:

> *pratipādyasya yaḥ siddhaḥ pakṣâbhāso 'kṣa-liṅgataḥ /*
> *loka-sva-vacanābhyāṁ ca bādhito 'nekadhā mataḥ //*

These five *pakṣâbhāsa*s are in concord with the list exemplified by Siddharṣigaṇi in NAV.: (1) *pratipādya-siddha*, (2) *pratyakṣa-bādhita*, (3) *anumāna-bādhita*, (4) *loka-bādhita*, (5) *sva-vacana-bādhita*. Having enumerated five varieties of *pakṣâbhāsa*, it would be redundant and pointless on Siddhasena's part to say by way of recapitulation in a succinct *kārikā* that these varieties are numerous: *anekadhā mataḥ*, unless he had other varieties, not mentioned already by name, in mind. That being the case, he probably referred to other enumerations well-known from other sources.

In fact, Siddhasena's enumeration overlaps with Dharmakīrti's list of fallacies of the thesis, enumerated in NB.(2).49–53[52]. Interestingly, Dharmakīrti subsequently (NB.(2).3.54[53]) adds a few more conditions and the failure to meet them would render the *pakṣa* defective as well. Thus, Siddhasena—by *anekadhā mataḥ*—may

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[52] /49/ (2) *tatra pratyakṣa-nirākṛto yathā: aśrāvaṇaḥ śabda iti.* /50/ (3) *anumāna-nirākṛto yathā: nityaḥ śabda iti.* /51/ (4?) *pratīti-nirākṛto yathā: acandraḥ śaśîti.* /52/ (5) *sva-vacana-nirākṛto yathā: nânumānaṁ pramāṇam.* /53/ *iti catvāraḥ pakṣâbhāsā nirākṛtā bhavanti.*

[53] *evaṁ siddhasya, asiddhasyâpi sādhanatvenâbhimatasya, svayaṁ vādinā tadā sādhayitum aniṣṭasya, ukta-mātrasya nirākṛtasya ca viparyayeṇa sādhyaḥ. tenâiva svarūpeṇâbhimato vādina iṣṭo 'nirākṛtaḥ pakṣa iti pakṣa-lakṣaṇam anavadyaṁ darśitaṁ bhavati.*

have referred to Dharmakīrti's catalogue of defective *pakṣas*. But not necessarily to Dharmakīrti's. He may have as well referred, e.g. to NP.(2).3.1[54].

In any case, NA.21 can in no way attest that Siddhasena was posterior or prior to Dharmakīrti. It merely points to certain similarities between Siddhasena's list and the Buddhist tradition. Probably, it was the tradition of Śaṅkarasvāmin and Dharmakīrti that Siddhasena alluded to by *anekadhā mataḥ*.

[13] In Siddhasena's subsequent aphorism, we find further similarities with NB., though they are less of linguistic nature (similarities in formulations) but rather of methodological character. Analogously to the structure of NB, Siddhasena—after describing fallacious theses—proceeds to discuss fallacious logical reasons (*hetv-ābhāsa*). However, both the authors first look back to their previous definitions of a correct, not defective *hetu*:

> NA.22:   *anyathânupapannatvaṁ* <u>hetor lakṣaṇam īritam</u>[55] /
>   *tad-apratīti-*<u>sandeha</u>*-viparyāsais tad-ābhatā* //

> NB.(2).3.55–56: *tri-rūpa-liṅgâkhyānaṁ   parârthânumānam   ity*
>   <u>uktam</u>[56]. *tatra   trayāṇāṁ   rūpāṇām   ekasyâpi   rūpasyânuktau*
>   *sādhanâbhāsaḥ. uktāv apy asiddhau* <u>sandehe</u> *vā pratipādya-*
>   *pratipādakayoḥ.*

Incidentally, it is the only case in both works that the authors first remind the reader/hearer of the definition of a correct 'syllogistic' member/term, and only then deal with its particular fallacies.

Likewise incidentally, both the authors first state general factors that invalidate a correct *hetu*, either singly or jointly, and subsequently enumerate resulting fallacies one by one. There are two such general invalidating factors for Dharmakīrti, viz. *asiddhi* and *sandeha* (NB.3.56,109): various combinations (with regard to *trairūpya*) are responsible for particular varieties of *hetv-ābhāsa*. For Siddhasena, however, there are three—polemically, as it were—such factors: *tad-apratīti*, *sandeha* and *viparyāsa*; thus Dharmakīrti's *asiddhi* factor would seem to bifurcate

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[54] *sādhayitum iṣṭo 'pi pratyakṣâdi-viruddhaḥ pakṣâbhāsaḥ, tad yathā:* (1) *pratyakṣa-viruddhaḥ,* (2) *anumāna-viruddhaḥ,* (3) *āgama-viruddhaḥ,* (4) *loka-viruddhaḥ,* (5) *sva-vacana-viruddhaḥ,*   (6) *aprasiddha-viśeṣaṇaḥ,*   (7) *aprasiddha-viśeṣyaḥ,* (8) *aprasiddhôbhayaḥ,* (9) *prasiddha-sambandhaś cêti* // *tatra …*

[55] Either in NA.5 (according to Siddharṣi) or in NA.17 (*hetos tathôpapattyā vā syāt prayogo 'nyathâpi vā*, see NAV. *ad loc.*: **anyathâpi vê**ty *anenâvayave samudāyôpacārād anyathânupapattiṁ lakṣayati*).

[56] NB.3.1: *tri-rūpa-liṅgâkhyānaṁ parârthânumānam*; cf. also NB.(2).2.5,11–12.

into Siddhasena's *tad-apratīti* and *viparyāsa*. For instance, for Siddhasena the fallacies of NB.3.58 and 59[57] would be probably a case of *viparyāsa*, whereas the fallacy of NB.3.60[58] should rather be considered a case of *tad-apratīti*. One could analyse all the remaining cases of fallacious *hetu*s (ensuing from the combination of the factors *asiddhi* and *sandeha*) found in NB. and map them onto the triple classification of Siddhasena in the same manner. Practically, it would mean to decide which of the *asiddhi* cases of Dharmakīrti would correspond to *tad-apratīti* cases of Siddhasena, and which to his *viparyāsa* cases. However, we do not have any explicit statement in the far too succinct NA., nor in NAV., that would provide us any algorithm of such a mapping, and the issue is open to our conjectures only.

Interestingly, in NP., for instance, to which NA. might be thought to have occasionally referred to, we do not find any trait of such invalidating factors as *asiddhi* and *sandeha*, or anything similar.

[14] Also NA.23 and the classification of particular varieties of *hetv-ābhāsa*s points to secondary sources of Siddhasena's ideas. There seem to be only two such potential sources, i.e. NB. and NP.:

> NA.23:   *asiddhas tv apratīto yo yo 'nyathâivôpapadyate /*
> *viruddho yo 'nyathâpy atra yukto 'naikāntikaḥ sa tu //*

> NB.(2).3.109: *evam eṣāṁ trayāṇāṁ rūpāṇām ekâkasya dvayor dvayor vā rūpayor asiddhau sandehe vā yathā-yogam asiddha-viruddhânaikāntikās trayo hetv-ābhāsāḥ.*

> NP.(2).3.2. *asiddhânaikāntika-viruddhā hetv-ābhāsāḥ //*

However, NB. is a more probable source, inasmuch as the sequence of fallacies (*asiddha, viruddha, anaikāntika*) listed in NA. is exactly the same as that of NB., not of NP., where the two last varieties are interchanged (*asiddha, anaikāntika, viruddha*). Diṅnāga has the *aniścita* (or *sandigdha*) variety, istead of *anaikāntika*.

What is striking is that Siddhasena has only three varieties of *hetv-ābhāsa*, like Dharmakīrti and Śaṅkarasvāmin, unlike Diṅnāga. Moreover, Dharmakīrti

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[57] NB.(2).3.57–9: /57/ *ekasya rūpasya dharmi-sambandhasyâsiddhau sandehe vâsiddho hetv-ābhāsaḥ.* /58/ *yathā: anityaḥ śabda iti sādhye cākṣuṣatvam ubhayâsiddham* [not proved for both parties]. /59/ *cetanās tarava iti sādhye sarva-tvag-apaharaṇe maraṇaṁ prativādy-asiddham, vijñānêndriyâyur-nirodha-lakṣaṇasya maraṇasyânenâbhyupagamāt, tasya ca taruṣv asambhavāt* [not proved for the opponent].

[58] NB.(2).3.60: *acetanāḥ sukhâdaya iti sādhya utpattimattvam anityatvaṁ vā sāṁkhyasya svayaṁ vādino 'siddham* [not proved for the proponent himself].

outspokenly rejects Diṅnāga's subvariety, i.e. *viruddhâvyabhicārin*[59]: NB.(2).3.110: *viruddhâvyabhicāry api saṁśaya-hetur uktaḥ. sa iha kasmān nôktaḥ.* We do not find any polemical trait in NA., which could even suggest that Siddhasena adopted Dharmakīrti's criticism of *viruddhâvyabhicārin*. Apparently he subscribed to the criticism unhesitatingly.

It is worth noticing that NA. diverges also from the tradition of Kumārila, whose triple classification—into *asiddha*, *sandigdha*, *viruddha* in MŚV.—is more akin to Diṅnāga's: MŚV.5.4.75 p. 264 mentions the classification (*saṁśayâdī-viparyāyāḥ*); subsequently (1) the threefold *asiddha* fallacious reason is mentioned in MŚV.5.4.76–83ab; (2) *sandigdha* and (3) *viruddha* occur in MŚV.5.4.83cd–107 (e.g. in MŚV.5.4.83cd: *sandeha-viparītatva-hetū câtra nirākṛtau*); besides, (2) *sandigdha* is further found in MŚV.5.4.84b–96b, whereas (3) *viruddha* is mentioned in MŚV.5.4.96cd–107ab. Kumārila nowhere in the *Anumāna-pariccheda* section uses the term *anaikāntika* as a *hetv-ābhāsa*, he has *sandigdha* instead, like Diṅnāga, unlike Dharmakīrti, Śaṅkarasvāmin and Siddhasena. However, Pārthasārathi Miśra follows the general post-Dharmakīrtian typology in his classification, while commenting on Kumārila (p. 264.11 *ad* MŚV.5.4.75): *samprati hetv-ābhāsān asiddhânaikāntika-viruddhān prapañcayan* …

[15] NA.24–25 reveal further similarities pointing to NB. as its possible inspiration. One of them is the phraseological affinity as regards the use of *dṛṣṭânta-doṣa*, instead of *dṛṣṭântâbhāsa*, in both works. Both Siddhasena and Dharmakīrti use the expression *pakṣâbhāsa* as well as similarly *tad-ābha* and *hetv-ābhāsa*. However, both of them deviate from the general use of derivatives of *ā√bhās* to technically denote logical fallacies, when they refer to *dṛṣṭânta* by the term *doṣa*, and to *dṛṣṭânta* only:

> NA.24: *sādharmyeṇâtra dṛṣṭânta-doṣā* … ,
> NA.25: *vaidharmyeṇâtra dṛṣṭânta-doṣā* … ,
>
> NB.(2).3.123, 128–129: /123/ *etenâiva dṛṣṭânta-doṣā api nirastā bhavanti.* /128/ *sādharmyeṇa dṛṣṭânta-doṣāḥ.* /129/ *vaidharmyeṇâpi: paramāṇuvat karmavad ākāśavad iti sādhyâdy-vyatirekiṇaḥ.*

Indeed, also Śaṅkarasvāmin has *dṛṣṭânta-doṣa* twice, but in a slightly different context, viz. that of refutation. Generally, when he discusses fallacious examples, he uses the standard term *dṛṣṭântâbhāsa*, e.g. NP.3.3: *dṛṣṭântâbhāso dvividhaḥ:*

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[59] Cf. also RANDLE (1926: 68–69, 79).

sādharmyeṇa vaidharmyeṇa ca // The only two occurences of *dṛṣṭânta-doṣa* are found in NP.(2).6,7[60].

Conspicuously, *dṛṣṭânta-doṣa* occurs as exemplification of *dūṣaṇāni*, in the series of *sādhana-doṣa*, *pakṣa-doṣa*, *hetu-doṣa* and *dṛṣṭânta-doṣa*.[61] Another occurrence of *doṣa* (however, *pratijñā-doṣa*, not *dṛṣṭânta-doṣa*) in NP. is attested in the concluding lines of NP.(2).3.1, that summarise the discussion on *pakṣâbhāsa*[62]. Also here, the term *doṣa* has a more general meaning than the technical term *ābhāsa*, and the peculiarity of the usage of *pratijñā-doṣa* is confirmed by the closing *uktāḥ pakṣâbhāsāḥ*. The usage of *doṣa* in NP. confirms the fact that in works preceding Diṅnāga, Dharmakīrti or Śaṅkarasvāmin—e.g. in NS., VS., NBh., PBh., etc.—*doṣa* is employed to denote general defects and is not used specifically as a *terminus technicus* in the sense of *ābhāsa*.

[16] There is a structural similarity to be observed: both Siddhasena (NA.24) and Dharmakīrti (NB.(2).3.122–3) explicitly define fallacious examples by referring to the definition of a correct *hetu*. Accordingly, NB.3.122 recapitulates the definition of correct *hetu* as well as conditions of its validity. The successive statement of NB.3.123 (*etenâva dṛṣṭânta-doṣā api nirastā bhavanti*; *vide supra* p. 352) shows that fallacious examples are refuted by referring to the correct definition of *hetu*, and all fallacies of the example share the same characteristic. Similarly, Siddhasena relates the deficiency of *dṛṣṭântâbhāsa*s to deficient logical reasons and, with *apalakṣaṇa-hetûtthāḥ*, he expresses the idea known from the work of Dharmakīrti.

[17] Strangely, in NA.24–25 Siddhasena refers to some tradition by *nyāya-vid-īritāḥ* as regards the classification of fallacious examples. However, there seems to have been no earlier (or contemporary) Jaina source he could have referred to. Thus, in default of any extant evidence attesting to a Jaina tradition which offered a typology of

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[60] (6) *sādhana-doṣôdbhāvanāni dūṣaṇāni // sādhana-doṣo nyūnatvam. pakṣa-doṣaḥ pratyakṣâdi-viruddhatvam. hetu-doṣo 'siddhânaikāntika-viruddhatvam. dṛṣṭânta-doṣaḥ sādhana-dharmâdy-asiddhatvam. tasyôdbhāvanaṁ prāśnika-pratyāyanaṁ dūṣaṇam //* (7) *abhūta-sādhana-doṣôdbhāvanāni dūṣaṇâbhāsāni // saṁpūrṇe sādhane nyūnatva-vacanam. aduṣṭa-pakṣe pakṣa-doṣa-vacanam. siddha-hetuke 'siddha-hetukaṁ vacanam. ekânta-hetuke 'nekânta-hetukaṁ vacanam. aviruddha-hetuke viruddha-hetukaṁ vacanam. aduṣṭa-dṛṣṭânte duṣṭa-dṛṣṭânta-doṣa-vacanam. etāni dūṣaṇâbhāsāni. na hy ebhiḥ para-pakṣo dūṣyate, niravadyatvāt tasya // ity uparamyate // .*

[61] NP.6: *sādhana-doṣôdbhāvanāni dūṣaṇāni // sādhana-doṣo nyūnatvam. pakṣa-doṣaḥ pratyakṣâdi-viruddhatvam. hetu-doṣo 'siddhânaikāntika-viruddhatvam. dṛṣṭânta-doṣaḥ sādhana-dharmâdy-asiddhatvam. tasyôdbhāvanaṁ prāśnika-pratyāyanaṁ dūṣaṇam // .*

[62] *eṣāṁ vacanāni dharma-svarūpa-nirākaraṇa-mukhena pratipādanâsaṁbhavataḥ sādhana-vaiphalyataś cêti pratijñā-doṣāḥ // uktāḥ pakṣâbhāsāḥ //*

fallacious examples, one is prone to assume—unless we find any indication to the contrary—that, apparently, he must have referred to a general Indian tradition, where we do find such a typology of *sādharmya-°* and *vaidharmya-dṛṣṭântâbhāsa*s.

Besides, he also seems to have taken it for granted that the reader/hearer could easily determine what is meant by *sādhyâdi-vikalâdayaḥ* in NA.24. This task would naturally be quite easy for anyone who was acquainted with NB.(2).3.124–125. At the same time, however, his elliptical formulation *sādhyâdi-vikalâdayaḥ* was, polemically as it were, unequivocal enough to rule out the three remaining varieties, viz. (A7) *ananvaya*, (A8) *apradarśitânvaya* and (A9) *viparītânvaya*, formulated by Dharmakīrti (NB.(2).3.126–127), which could by no means have been hinted at by the formulations of NA.24.

Similarly, the sixfold classification of dissimilar *dṛṣṭântâbhāsa*s systematised in NA.25 (*sādhya-sādhana-yugmānām anivṛtteś ca saṁśayāt*) closely corresponds to the first six fallacious examples of NB.(2).3.129–132: (V1) *sādhyâvyatirekin*, (V2) *sādhanâvyatirekin*, (V3) *sādhya-sādhanâvyatirekin*, (V4) *sandigdha-sādhya-vyatireka*, (V5) *sandigdha-sādhana-vyatireka*, (V6) *sandigdha-sādhya-sādhana-vyatireka*. Seemingly, NA. and NB. are at variance as regards terminology, for Siddhasena's formulation: *sādhya-sādhana-yugmānām anivṛtteś ca saṁśayāt*, differs from Dharmakīrti's (V1)–(V6). In my opinion, however, *anivṛtteś* and *saṁśayāt* of NA.25 indicate rather plainly *°-vyāvṛtta* and *sandigdha-°* as the last and first elements of the compounds (V1)–(V3) and (V4)–(V6), respectively. Optionally, we could have (V1) **sādhyânivṛtta*, (V2) **sādhanânivṛtta*, (V3) **sādhya-sādhanânivṛtta*, (V4) **saṁśayita-sādhya*, (V5) **saṁśayita-sādhana*, (V6) **saṁśayita-sādhya-sādhana*, which is not different at all from the idea expressed in NB.(2).3.129–132.[63]

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[63] True, theoretically speaking, one could also interpret NA.25 to enforce the acceptance of only (1) *sādhyâvyatirekin*, (2) *sādhanâvyatirekin*, (3) *sādhya-sādhanâvyatirekin*—to use Dharmakīrti's terminology—and only one or more varieties out of (4) *sandigdha-sādhya-vyatireka*, (5) *sandigdha-sādhana-vyatireka*, (6) *sandigdha-sādhya-sādhana-vyatireka*, but not necessarily all of them. While *anivṛtteḥ* is unquestionably construed with *sādhya-sādhana-yugmānām*, the expression *saṁśayāt* might be conjectured to be taken separately, without any dependence on all elements of *sādhya-sādhana-yugmānām*. In this respect, attention should be drawn to an instance of different conceivable ways of construing an aphorism of NA. by commentators which we encounter in the case of NA.8: *dṛṣṭêṣṭâvyāhatād vākyāt paramârthâbhidhāyinaḥ / tattva-grāhitayôtpannaṁ mānaṁ śābdaṁ prakīrtitam //* The aphorism is explained differently by the commentators, viz. (1) NAV. *ad loc.*: **dṛṣṭena pramāṇâvalokitenêṣṭaḥ** pratipādayiṣito *'vyāhato 'nirākṛtaḥ* sāmarthyād artho yasmin vākye tat-tathā; and (2) NAṬ. ad loc.: **dṛṣṭenêty-ādi.** ayaṁ bhinnâdhikaraṇas tri-pado

As for another possible source of insipration, also NP.(2).3.3 distinguished—in accord with the prevalent tradition of those days—two general categories: similar and dissimilar fallacious examples (*dṛṣṭântâbhāso dvividhaḥ: sādharmyeṇa vaidharmyeṇa ca //*). However, a closer look at Śaṅkarasvāmin's varieties reveals essential differences, apart from the terminological ones. Accordingly, I see no way how the formulations of fallacies of examples based on similarity found in *Nyāya-praveśa*[64] could be interpreted to have influenced Siddhasena's *sādhyâdi-vikalâdayaḥ*. As regards *Nyāya-praveśa* on fallacies of examples based on dissimilarity[65], the influence might have been restricted to (V1), (V2) and (V3) only.

[18] Also NA.26, where criticism / refutation (*dūṣaṇa*) and its fallacy (*dūṣaṇâbhāsa*) are discussed, might have partly been inspired by Dharmakīrti's NB.(2).3.137–140. Thus, NA.26a-c: <u>*vādy-ukte sādhane prokta-doṣāṇām udbhāvanam / dūṣaṇaṁ*</u>, reveals a certain similarity—in terms of both formulations and ideas—to the *dūṣaṇa*-section of NB.(2).3.137–8: /137/ *dūṣaṇā nyūnatâdy-uktiḥ.* /138/ *ye pūrvaṁ nyūnatâdayaḥ* <u>*sādhana-doṣā uktās teṣām udbhāvanaṁ dūṣaṇam.*</u> *tena* <u>*parêṣṭârtha-siddhi-pratibandhāt.*</u> Less conspicuous, though, is the remaining portion of the second hemistich of NA.26: <u>*niravadye tu dūṣaṇâbhāṣa-nāmakam //*</u> The corresponding *dūṣaṇâbhāsa*-section of NB.(2).3.139–140 reads: /139/ <u>*dūṣaṇâbhāṣās tu jātayaḥ.*</u> /140/ <u>*abhūta-doṣôdbhāvanāni jāty-uttarāṇîti.*</u> The reoccurring element *dūṣaṇâbhāsa* is not decisive at all, whereas Siddhasena's *niravadye* could be a vague echo of Dharmakīrti's *abhūta-doṣa*.

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bahu-vrīhiḥ yadi vā iṣṭo 'vyāhato 'rtho yatra tad iṣṭâvyāhataṁ vākyam, tadanu dṛṣṭena pramāṇa-nirṇītena iṣṭâvyāhatam iti tat-puruṣaḥ (cf. BALCEROWICZ (1999: 4, n. 8)). Definitely, such an unnatural interpretation—i.e. to take *anivṛtteś* to refer to all elements of the triad *sādhya-sādhana-yugmānām*, while limiting the scope of *saṁśayāt* to selected element(s) of the compound *sādhya-sādhana-yugmānām*—would be a mere guesswork, and one would rather, as a rule, construe *sādhya-sādhana-yugmānām* with both *anivṛtteś* and *saṁśayāt*, and obtain six varieties of dissimilar *dṛṣṭântâbhāsas*. One would not, in any case, obtain any further varieties mentioned by Dharmakīrti in NB.(2).3.133–135: (V7) *avyatireka*, (V8) *apradarśita-vyatireka* and (V9) *viparīta-vyatireka*. Thus, Siddhasena apparently does not accept without reservation the Buddhist typology by rejecting (V7), (V8) and (V9).

[64] NP.(2).3.3.1: *tatra sādharmyeṇa tāvad dṛṣṭântâbhāsaḥ pañca-prakāraḥ, tad yathā:* (1) *sādhana-dharmâsiddhaḥ,* (2) *sādhya-dharmâsiddhaḥ,* (3) *ubhaya-dharmâsiddhaḥ,* (4) *ananvayaḥ,* (5) *viparītânvayaś cêti // tatra …*

[65] NP.(2).3.3.2. *vaidharmyeṇâpi dṛṣṭântâbhāsaḥ pañca-prakāraḥ, tad yathā:* (1) *sādhyâvyāvṛttaḥ,* (2) *sādhanâvyāvṛttaḥ,* (3) *ubhayâvyāvṛttaḥ,* (4) *avyatirekaḥ,* (5) *viparīta-vyatirekaś cêti // tatra …*

As a matter of fact, NA.26c-d (*niravadye tu dūṣaṇâbhāsa-nāmakam*) betrays more affinity to the closing section of NP.(2).7: *abhūta-sādhana-doṣôdbhāvanāni dūṣaṇâbhāsāni // … etāni dūṣaṇâbhāsāni. na hy ebhiḥ para-pakṣo dūṣyate, niravadyatvāt tasya // ity uparamyate //* It is this section, in all probability, that influenced both Dharmakīrti's NB.(2).3.139–140 (*dūṣaṇâbhāsās tu jātayaḥ. abhūta-doṣôdbhāvanāni jāty-uttarāṇîti.*) and the portion of NA.26c-d in question.

[19] The twenty-sixth aphorism (the exposition of *dūṣaṇa*) is the last section of the *Nyāyâvatāra*, where possible influences from Dharmakīrti's side—in terms of Siddhasena's direct use of Dharmakīrti vocabulary or his response to Dharmakīrti's ideas—are easily detectable. Strangely enough, the topic dealt with in NA.26 closely corresponds to the final issue discussed by Dharmakīrti in NB. Thus, the conspicuous absence of further possible Dharmakīrtian traces in NA.—theoretically derivable from other works of Dharmakīrti—points, in my opinion, to the fact that Siddhasena—while composing NA.—closely followed the structure and the contents of NB., up to NA.26.

In the remaining aphorisms (28–32) Siddhasena discusses issues peculiar to Jainism (viz. corollaries of *kevala-jñāna* and *syād-vāda*) and there could hardly have been any Buddhist influence to be noticed in any case: [27] the character of absolute cognition (*kevala-jñāna*); [28] the result of valid cognition in general; the results of absolute cognition (*kevala-jñāna*); the results of valid cognitive procedures other than *kevala-jñāna*; [29] the multiplex character of reality; the domain of cognitive acts; the domain of viewpoints (*naya*); [30] the character of viewpoints (*naya*); the description of the doctrine of seven-fold modal description (*syād-vāda*); [31] the character of the cognitive subject, the soul (*jīva*); [32] the eternal character of Jaina epistemology.

[20] The phrase *pramāṇa-phala* occurring in NA.28 is occasionally taken to be a proof of its dependence on Diṅnāga.[66] It is commonly assumed that the phrase in question goes back to Diṅnāga, e.g. PS.(1).1.8cd–10[67]. In these verses Diṅnāga

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[66] Cf., e.g. QVARNSTRÖM (1999: 178): 'Furthermore, the *Nyāyāvatāra* (28) uses the signature element of Dignāga, namely "pramāṇaphala"[61];' in his note 61, he further draws the reader's attention to the work of G. Dreyfus and Chr. Lindtner: 'The Yogācāra Philosophy of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti'. *Studies in Central & East Asian Religions*. Vol. 2, Ed. by Per K. Sørensen et al. Copenhagen 1989: 27–52.

[67] *savyāpāra-pratītitvāt pramāṇaṁ phalam eva sat // sva-saṁvittiḥ phalaṁ vâtra tad-rūpo hy artha-niścayaḥ / viṣayâkāratâivâsya pramāṇaṁ tena mīyate // yad-ābhāsaṁ prameyaṁ tat pramāṇa-phalate punaḥ / grāhakâkāra-saṁvittī trayaṁ nâtaḥ pṛthak-kṛtam // .* For the Sanskrit text, see HATTORI (1968: 97, n. 1.55—107, n. 1.67). Tibetan text reads as follows:

asserts that the result of *pramāṇa* is *pramāṇa* itself, or introspective cognition which consists in the determining of an object (*sva-saṁvitti, artha-niścaya*). Precisely the same idea (*ātmânubhāva, artha-viniścaya*) is echoed in PV.2.306–307ab, 339[68]. Generally, the idea is discussed at length by Dharmakīrti both in his PVin.I(1).78.12–100.26 and in PV.2.301–366, 388–391. Accordingly, NA.28 might be taken to be a rejoinder of both Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti, and there seems to nothing decisive to be found in NA.28 that would exclude any of the two authors.

On the other hand, any attempt to look for inspiration of NA.28 in works of either Diṅnāga or Dharmakīrti seems to me to be a result of misapprehension of the true import of the aphorism. In it, Siddhasena does not discuss the problem whether *pramāṇa-phala* can or cannot be equated with *pramāṇa* itself, which is the major concern of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti. What is intended in the verse are rather extra-epistemological issues of both soteriological (*kevala*) and mundane (*śeṣa*) character, viz. the result of *pramāṇa* is 'the cessation of nescience' (*ajñāna-vinivartana*), whereas the result of specific kinds of cognition is two-fold. The first category subsumes happiness and indifference (*sukhôpekṣe*) in case of the perfect knowledge (*kevala*), being a prerequisite of liberation (*mokṣa*) and commonly taken by the Jainas to be tantamount to the destruction of nescience. Since it results from the destruction of *karman*[69] it is necessarily associated with innate happiness, etc.[70] that are inhibited by *karman*. The other—pragmatic, as it were—category of results refers to 'the faculty

Vasudhararakṣita/Seṅ-rgyal 15a.5–15b.4:	Kanakavarman/Dad-paḥi śes-rab 95b.5–96a.5:
bya daṅ bcas par rtogs paḥi phyir |	*bya daṅ bcas par rtogs paḥi phyir* |
tshad maḥi ḥbras bu ñid du ḥdod ||	*ḥbras bu ñid du yod tshad ma* ||
raṅ rig la yaṅ ḥdir ḥbras bu |	*yaṅ na raṅ rig ḥdir ḥbras bu* |
de yi ṅo bo las don ṅes |	*de yi ṅo bo las don ṅes* |
yul gyi snaṅ ba ḥdi ñid ḥdi |	*yul gyi snaṅ ba ñid de ḥdiḥi* |
tshad ma de yis ḥjal bar byed ||	*tshad ma de yis ḥjal bar bya* ||
gaṅ tshe snaṅ ba de gsal bya |	*gaṅ ltar snaṅ ba de gsal bya* |
tshad ma daṅ deḥi ḥbras bu ni |	*tshad ma daṅ deḥi ḥbras bu ni* |
ḥdsin rnam rig pa de yi phyir |	*ḥdsin rnam rig paḥo de yi phyir* |
de gsum tha dad du ma byas ||	*de gsum tha dad du ma byas* ||

[68] *tasmāt prameyâdhigateḥ sādhanaṁ meya-rūpatā / sādhane 'nyatra tat-karma-sambandho na prasiddhyati // sā ca tasyâtma-bhūtâiva tena nârthântaraṁ phalam / yadā saviṣayaṁ jñānaṁ jñānâṁśe 'rtha-vyavasthiteḥ / tadā ya ātmânubhāvaḥ sa evârtha-viniścayaḥ //*

[69] Cf. TS.10.1: *moha-kṣayāj jñāna-darśanâvaraṇântarāya-kṣayāc ca kevalam.*

[70] Cf., e.g. TBh.10.7 (p. 231 f.) v.23 ff. (*saṁsāra-viṣayâtītaṁ muktānām avyayaṁ sukham*).

of appropriation and avoidance' (*ādāna-hāna-dhī*) in case all the remaining kinds of (mundane) cognition.[71] Consequently, what really the verse is reminiscent of is rather NBh.1.1.3: *yadā jñānaṁ tadā hānôpādānôpekṣā-buddhayaḥ phalam*, with all the three elements of *hāna*, *upādana* / *ādāna* and *āpekṣā*, as a result (*phala*) of cognition (*jñāna*).

What is important to remember is that there are numerous similarities, more and less conspicuous, and not all of them are decisive when taken alone. Some of these similarities indicated on the preceding pages may equally well point to a tradition or author prior to Dharmakīrti, viz. to Diṅnāga or Śaṅkarasvāmin. Some of such similarities may be due to the general style of writing, of arranging a philosophical treatise, of structuring a philosophical discourse, etc. We should remember that both the *Nyāya-bindu* and the *Nyāyâvatāra* were primarily handbooks of logic and their purpose was predominantly didactic. Nonetheless, the accumulation of evidence only enforces those of them that are quite conclusive and convincing. To sum up, my impression is that in all dubious cases, when both NP. and NB. seem relevant as possible sources of Siddhasena's ideas, Siddhasena probably took recourse to Dharmakīrti rather than to Śaṅkarasvāmin, inasmuch as in all those rare cases when there are clear similarities to be found between NA. and NP., they are also traceable in NB. However, not all cases of similarities between NA. and NB. can be shown with regard to NA. and NP. In other words, the development of certain ideas that had taken place in the period connecting Śaṅkarasvāmin and Dharmakīrti, was reflected in the contents of NA. and some ideas still absent from NP., that were later either introduced or modified by Dharmakīrti, found their way into NA. Similarly, certain influences to be found in NA. point both to Diṅnāga and to Dharmakīrti. However, Siddhasena seems to be acquainted with certain new developments or ideas that first developed with Dharmakīrti (not necessarily only in NB.) and are not found in Diṅnāga's works.

Paradoxically as it were, would it not be thinkable to claim that it was Siddhasena who influenced Dharmakīrti and who was the intermediary stage between Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti? For at least three reasons we should dismiss such a possibility. There is, in the first place, a continuous tradition in epistemic concepts referred to by both Dharmakīrti and Siddhasena that go back to Diṅnāga. Dharmakīrti himself refers to Diṅnāga so explicitly that would seem highly implausible to believe that he had availed himself of the Jaina epistemological tradition with respect to the number of points mentioned above in §§ 1–20, without even a single mention of it: one would expect Dharmakīrti embarking on at least an accidental discussion of a few issues he had supposedly taken over from the Jainas. Secondly, Satkari MOOKERJEE, who believed Siddhasena to flourish in the sixth century and to precede Dharmakīrti,[72] puzzled over what was in his opinion Dharmakīrti's lack of reaction

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[71] Cf. also FRANCO (1997: 65).

[72] See: MOOKERJEE (1935: 398).

as regards Siddhasena's interpretation of the intrinsic invariable concomitance (*antar-vyāpti*) and the superfluous character of the example as an exemplification (*bahir-udāhṛti*) external to the most elementary constituents of the proof formula, as well as the definition of the logical reason as 'inexplicability otherwise'.[73] This becomes no longer a query when we assume that Siddhasena was post-Dharmakīrtian. Moreover, it is for precisely the same reason that also Pātrasvāmin should be taken to flourish after Dharmakīrti. Thirdly, the concepts of *svârtha-vākya* and *parârtha-vākya* (NA.10) as well as *svârtha-pratyakṣa* and *parârtha-pratyakṣa* (NA.11) would have with certainty evoked a refutal from the side of Dharmakīrti, had he known about it. Likewise, Dharmakīrti would have certainly commented upon the idea of non-erroneousness of inference (*anumānaṁ … abhrāntaṁ*) proven by its being a cognitive criterion alone (*pramāṇatvāt*), found in NA.5. The same holds true for the idea of 'inexplicability otherwise' (*anyathânupapannatva*). Thus, any supposition that Siddhasena preceded Dharmakīrti can safely be dismissed.

Accordingly, depending on whether we follow the widely accepted dating of Dharmakīrti, viz. c. 600–660[74] or the results of latest research by KIMURA (1999) who assigns the years 550–620 for Dharmakīrti, we would have for the *terminus post quem* Siddhasena as the author of the *Nyāyâvatāra* circa 620 or 660, respectively.

There is still another factor to be taken account of, viz. the question of the defining characteristic of the logical reason (*hetu*) characterised as 'the fact of being otherwise inexplicable', or 'inexplicability otherwise' (*anyathânupapannatva, anyathânupapatti*) in NA.22: *anyathânupapannatvaṁ hetor lakṣaṇam īritam*. The author clearly refers to an earlier source and the idea did not originate with him in his NA. Independently, we find the idea reported and criticised by Śāntarakṣita in TSa.(1).1364 ff. (p. 405 f.) in the context of the validity of inference (*anumāna*).[75] The most famous and relatively often quoted verse is TSa.1369:

> *anyathânupapannatvaṁ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim /*
> *nânyathânupapannatvaṁ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim //* [76].

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[73] See: MOOKERJEE (1935: 4–5): 'What however strikes us is the intriguing situation created by Siddhasena's reference to *antarvyāpti* and the definition of *hetu* (probans) as *anyathānupapanna* in the verse 20 and 22 respectively. It is nothing short of enigma that this innovation of the Jaina logicians did not evoke a reply from Dharmakīrti.'

[74] See: FRAUWALLNER (1961). Cf. also STEINKELLNER–MUCH (1995: 23).

[75] The relevant section is edited and translated in KUNST (1939: 11–53). See also PATHAK (1930–31) 71–83.

[76] Strangely enough, Śāntarakṣita in TSa. interchanges the *pādas* ab with cd. The verse is also found in (1) TŚVA. p. 203 [the discussion of *anyathânupapatti* and the refutation of *tri-lakṣaṇa* is found there on pp. 198–217], (2) TBV. Vol. II, p. 569.28–29, (3) PMī.2.1.9

Significantly enough, Śāntarakṣita TSa.(1).1364, p. 405.1) mentions Pātrasvāmin as the source of the idea: *anyathêty-ādinā pātrasvāmi-matam āśaṅkate …* , and the treatise in question is the lost *Tri-lakṣaṇa-kadarthana*[77] by Pātrasvāmin, identified occasionally with Pātrakesarin / Pātrakesarisvāmin = Vidyānanda. For obvious reasons this Pātrasvāmin cannot be Vidyānanda (*c.* 850), the author of the *Śloka-vārttika* on Umāsvāti's *Tattvârtha-sūtra*—as SUKHLAL–DOSHI (1928)[78] and CHATTERJEE (1978: 331) would have it—but some else who preceded Śāntarakṣita (*c.* 725–788)[79], the teacher of Kamalaśīla.[80] Since the author of NA. alludes to his predecessors and Śāntarakṣita mentions only Pātrasvāmin, it must have been the latter who was responsible for the idea of *anyathânupapannatva*.[81] Had it been

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§ 33 (p. 45.17–18). Hemacandra's criticism against the Buddhist idea of *trairūpya* in PMī.2.1.9 § 33 (p. 45.1–16) closely follows the exposition of Pātrasvāmin's aphorisms quoted in TSa. attesting to the authenticity of the quotation. Hemacandra, instead of the terms *anyathânupapatti*, uses the expression *avinā-bhāva*, cf. PMī.2.1.9 (p. 43.34–35): *svârthaṁ sva-niścita-sādhyâvinā-bhāvâika-lakṣaṇāt sādhanāt sādhya-jñānam.* The formulation *sādhyâvinā-bhāvâika-lakṣaṇāt* resembles both Pātrasvāmin's *Tri-lakṣaṇa-kadarthana* (*tenâika-lakṣaṇo hetuḥ prādhānyād gamako 'stu naḥ /* = TSa.1379) as well as NA.5ac: *sādhyâvinā-bhuno liṅgāt sādhya-niścāyakaṁ smṛtam / anumānaṁ.*

[77] A reference to the work is found in DHAKY (1995: 43), who refers to Jugal Kishor Mukhtar: 'Saṁmatisūtra aur Siddhasena' (Hindi), *Jaina Sāhitya aur Itihāsa par Viśada Prakāśa*, Calcutta 1956: 538–543 [the work was not available to me].

[78] Cf. UPADHYE (1971: *14–15), PATHAK (1930: *passim*) and PATHAK (1930–31: *passim*), who refers to him as Pātrakesari Vidyānanda or as Pātrakesarisvāmi.

[79] Cf. STEINKELLNER–MUCH (1995: 56).

[80] Cf. BHATTACHARYYA (1926: ixvi-ixvii): 'In that case Pātrasvāmin must be an earlier author than both Śāntarakṣita and Vidyānanda, and he must have first propounded the theory that valid reason is that the existence of which cannot be maintained unless it is invariably concomitant with the major term … *cir.* 700 A.D.'.

[81] Cf. MUKTHAR (1948) [according to UPADHYE (1971:*30)]: '7) The *Nyāyāvatāra* is composed centuries later than the *Sanmati-sūtra*, because it shows the influence of Pātrasvāmi (later than Samantabhadra) as well as Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara'; and V.P. Johrapurkar ('Introduction' to VTP., pp. 41 ff.) quoted in n. 9 above. See also DHAKY (1995: 42–3): '…the first foot of the *kārikā* 22 concerning the *hetu-lakṣaṇa* (character of probans) reflects sense-agreement, even partial verbal concordance with the verses from Pātrasvāmi's (Pātrakesari's) *Trilakṣaṇakadarthana* cited by the Buddhist scholiast Śāntarakṣita in his *Tattvasaṅgraha* (*c.* 2nd quarter of the 8th century A. D.)[32].' SHASTRI (1990: 31) is a bit more reserved and does not take for granted that Pātrasvāmin was anterior to Siddhasena: 'Nyāyāvatāra also defines hetu in the same manner.'

Siddhasena who introduced the idea, Śāntarakṣita would not, in all probability, have missed the opportunity to mention this. Certainly Pātrasvāmin is post-Diṅnāgan, for his *Tri-lakṣaṇa-kadarthana* was conceived to refute the latter, but his dating is quite uncertain. It is surprising, nonetheless, that Śāntarakṣita seems nowhere to allude to the NA. or its author. Consequently, the widespread opinion assuming that NA. is the first Jaina treatise on epistemology per se loses its weight, inasmuch we can safely assume that Siddhasena had his predecessor in the person of Pātrasvāmin.

As regards the *terminus ante quem*, in view of the fact that the verse no. 4 of the *Nyāyâvatāra* is incorporated into ṢDSa. as verse no. 56, it should be assigned to the date of Haribhadrasūri. A supposition that it is ṢDSa.56 that was the source which NA.4 was borrowed from and that NA.4 is merely an interpolation seems inadmissible to me. NA.4 fits ideally the argumentative structure of the text: (1) NA.1 states the definition of *pramāṇa*, as well as the types and a general criterion of such a division, (2) NA.2 is polemical concerning the meaninglessness of formulating a definition for a well-known term/idea of *pramāṇa*, (3) NA.3 is a rejoinder to the objection, (4) NA.4 defines the two main divisions of *pramāṇa* along with a specific reason for such a division,[82] (5) NA.5 opens a section dealing with erroneousness of *pramāṇa*s, etc. The use of vocabulary in NA.4 is not unusual for NA. Coincidentally, two adjacent verses, viz. NA.4 and NA.5, are stylistically and structurally quite akin: *pāda* a–b: ⌐reason⌐ (*aparokṣatayā, sādhyâvinā-bhuno liṅgāt*) + ⌐object + verbal derivative in the meaning of a present participle⌐ (*arthasya grāhakaṁ, sādhya-niścāyakaṁ*) + … + *pāda* c: ⌐subject⌐ (*pratyakṣam, anumānaṁ*) … Admittedly, the similarity is not a crucial argument in favour of the same authorship of the two verses, however, there is nothing that could speak against a common authorship. The argument gains on strength in view of the fact that Haribhadrasūri quotes the verse no. 2 of NA. in his *Aṣṭaka*[83] and refers to its author as Mahāmati[84].

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[82] Both NA.1 and 4 go against the prevalent Jaina tradition to subsume cases of sensory cognition, inference and verbal testimony under *parokṣa*, whereas *pratyakṣa* was taken to denote extra-sensory and extra-mental acts of cognition (viz. *avadhi, manaḥ-paryāya* and *kevala*). For Siddhasena the criterion of directness (*akṣa*) was not the cognising subject, or the soul (*akṣa=jīva=ātman*), but—like in the general *pramāṇa* tradition—the senses (*akṣa=indriya*).

[83] The work is not available to me. I am forced to rely here on Pt. Dalsukhbhai MALVANIA (1979: 287–288). Cf. also UPADHYE (1971: xxiv) and DHAKY (1995: 44).

[84] UPADHYE (1971: xxiv) is right to point out 'that Haribhadra, in his *Aṣṭaka*, quotes the *Nyāyâvatāra* 2, by referring to its author as Mahāmati. Elsewhere, however Haribhadra speaks plainly about the author of the *Sanmati* as Divākara and Śrutakevalin.'

In view of the above, DHAKY's (1995: 44) claim[85]—to handle the discomfort that Haribhadra himself ascribes one of the verses to a Mahāmati—that both NA.2 and 4 were taken from lost *dvātriṁśikā*s of Siddhasena Divākara is highly debatable to me. Not only NA.4 seems to represent an original *kārikā* of NA., but the same holds good in the case of *kārikā* 2. We could not make head or tail of NA.2 (the objection) if we did not have NA.1. Moreover, NA.3 (the rejoinder) would be pointless without NA.2. All the lost *dvātriṁśikā*s of Siddhasena Divākara as a reference source in argumentation resemble rather a kind of *śaśa-viṣāṇa*. Naturally, as long as we do not have all *dvātriṁśikā*s written by Siddhasena Divākara, we cannot, theoretically speaking, preclude the possibility that the verses indeed were taken from some lost *dvātriṁśikā*. But such an argumentation is not very constructive. I see no reason to doubt the authenticity of *kārikā*s 2 and 4 as long as they form a consistent logical part of the *Nyāyâvatāra* as a whole and bear stylistic similarities to adjacent *kārikā*s,[86] especially when the counter-arguments begin with 'perhaps' and are of merely could-or-may-have-been nature.

Further, the identification of Siddharṣigaṇi as the author of both NA. and NAV., postulated by DHAKY, has very weak foundations. In the first place, there is ample evidence that Siddharṣigaṇi (the author of NAV.) is not Siddhasena (the author of

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[85] 'A formidable objection, however, to the above-postulated identification (Siddharṣi was the author of both NA. and NAV.—P.B.) as well as the period determination (ninth/tenth century for NA.—P.B.) can be raised on the grounds of the ascription of a verse, which appears as the *kārikā* 2 of the *Nyāyavatāra*, to Mahāmati (=Siddhasena Divākara) by Yākinisūnu Haribhadra sūri (active c. A. D. 745–785) in his *Aṣṭaka*[38]. And the *kārikā* 4 figures as a part of the *Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya* of the same Haribhadra sūri[39]. Since Haribhadra sūri ascribed the particular verse (*kārikā* 2) to Siddhasena Divākara, it must be so. However, this *kārikā* could be originally from some *dvātriṁśikā*, one of the lost 11 of Siddhasena Divākara, perhaps the *Pramāṇa-dvātriṁśikā*, from which Gandhahasti Siddhasena quotes in his *sa-bhāṣya-Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra-vṛtti*[40]. The *kārikā* 4 in the *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya* may likewise have been taken from one of the unavailable *dvātriṁśikā* of Siddhasena Divākara. Alternatively, if that verse is Haribhadra's own, Siddharṣi must have borrowed it from the *Ṣaḍdarśana*. In any case, Haribhadra and Siddharṣi could have common sources from which they apparently may have drawn.'

[86] I have dealt briefly with the style of NA.4 above. The same is even more true for NA.2 that is closely followed by NA.3 (the most conspicuous similarities underlined):

/2/ *prasiddhāni pramāṇāni vyavahāraś ca tat-kṛtaḥ /*
    pramāṇa-lakṣaṇasyôktau jñāyate na prayojanam //

/3/ *prasiddhānāṁ pramāṇānāṁ lakṣaṇôktau prayojanam /*
    tad-vyāmoha-nivṛttiḥ syād vyāmūḍha-manasām iha //

NA.) and that the two texts were written by different authors, inasmuch as Siddharṣigaṇi refers to the author of NA. explicitly, although not by name, but by the term *ācārya* or *sūtra-kṛt*, to cite a few cases only:[87] [1] Introductory lines of NAV.3: /3/ *adhunâcāryo gṛhītas tāvakīno 'bhiprāyo 'smābhir iti paraṁ pratyāyayaṁs tan-matam anudrāvya tad evânumanyamānas tathâpi lakṣaṇôkteḥ sāphalyam āvedayann āha: …*; [2] the final sentence of NAV.3: *tad evaṁ pramāṇa-lakṣaṇaṁ sāmānyena pratipādya tad-gataṁ kucodyaṁ paryahāry ācāryeṇa*; [3] NAV.13: *yad vâtyantâbhyāsena parikarmita-matitvāt tāvatâiva prastuta-prameyam avabudhyate, tadā hetu-pratipādanam eva kriyate, śeṣâbhidhānasya śrotṛ-saṁskārâkāritayā nairarthakyād ity-ādau hetu-pratipādanaṁ sūtra-kṛtā parârtham anumānam uktam*; [4] NAV.29: *ata evâcāryasya na tal-lakṣaṇādi-svarūpa-kathane 'pi mahânādaraḥ*. Additionally, in some cases (e.g. on NA.8), Siddharṣigaṇi does offer at least two different interpretations of a *kārikā*, or diverges from the contents of NA., e.g. in the case of NA.4d[88].

Thus, we can safely take the date-brackets for the *Nyāyâvatāra* to be firmly fixed after 620 C.E. (Dharmakīrti) and Pātrasvāmin and before *c.* 800 C.E. (Haribhadrasūri).[89] As for the date of Haribhadrasūri, JACOBI (1926: *Introduction*) assigns Haribhadra to *c.* 750, whereas UPADHYE (1971: xxv) to *c.* 750–800 C.E. and DHAKY (1995: 44) to *c.* 745–785. However, the *terminus post quem* for Haribhadra is Arcaṭa, since the latter is quoted in Haribhadrasūri's NPV.9.15–19[90]. Arcaṭa, the teacher of Dharmottara, can be assigned to *c.* 730–790 or 720–780.[91]

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[87] DHAKY (1995: 43) is so far right that indeed Siddharṣi nowhere mentions the author of *Nyāyâvatāra* by name: 'As noted in the beginning, Siddharṣi does not ascribe the *Nyāyāvatāra* to Siddhasena Divākara or to a different Siddhasena or for that matter to any other author.' However, he clearly misses the point when he further claims: 'Nor does he mention it as a composition of a *pūrvācārya*, *vṛddhācārya*, or some *cirantanācārya*. Also, in his verse by verse exposition, he nowhere uses qualificatory phrases such as *śāstrakāra*, *sūtrakāra*, *kārikākāra*, *ācārya*, etc. which may have denoted a second, an earlier revered personage, as the *kārikā*s' author.'

[88] Siddhasena emphasises the way of cognising, or '[the manner of] grasping [an object]', whereas Siddharṣi takes the expression to refer to the existence and the nature of the cognoscible. See p. 341 above.

[89] Thus, I cannot but side with the opinion already expressed in VAIDYA (1928: xx): 'The *terminus a quo* would be the date of Dharmakīrti and the *terminus ad quem* that of Haribhadra.'

[90] Acc. to STEINKELLNER–MUCH (1995: 119) the original title found to the colophon is *Nyāya-praveśa-ṭīkā śiṣya-hitā*.

[91] See: STEINKELLNER–MUCH (1995: 64) and FRAUWALLNER (1961: 148).

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NAVV.   = Śrī Śānti Sūri: *Nyāyâvatāra-vārttika-vṛtti*. See: NASV.

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NP.   = Śaṅkarasvāmin: *Nyāya-praveśa*. (1) [Part One:] *Nyāya-praveśa* of Diṅnāga with Commentaries of Haribhadra Suri & Parsavadeva' ed. by A.B. Dhruva, Oriental Institute, Baroda 1930. (2) See: BALCEROWICZ (1995: 72–77).

NPV.   = Haribhadrasūri: *Nyāya-praveśa-vṛtti*. See: NP.(1).

NS.   = Akṣapāda Gautama: *Nyāya-sūtra*. *Mahāmuni Vātsyāyan's Nyāya-bhāṣya on Gautama-Nyāya-sutras With Prasannapadā Commentary of Pt. Sudarśanācārya Shastrī*. Ed. Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī, *SS* 10, Sudhī Prakāśanam, Vārāṇasī 1986.

NV.   = Uddyotakara: *Nyāya-vārttika. Nyāya-darśana (= Nyāya-sūtra) with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyaṭīkā and Viśvanātha's Vṛtti.* ed. by Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha, *Kalikātā-saṁskṛta-grantha-mālā* 18, Calcutta 1936.

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PMī.   = Hemacandra: *Pramāṇa-mīmāṁsā*. Ed. and trans. by Satkari Mookerjee and Nathmal Tatia, Tārā Publications, Varanasi 1970.

PS.   = Diṅnāga: *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*. (1) Chapter I, see: HATTORI

(1968). (2) *The Tibetan Tripitaka—Peking Edition*, ed. Daisetz T. Suzuki, Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute, Tokyo—Kyoto 1957—*Bstan-ḥgyur, Mdo-ḥgrel, Gtan-Tshogs Rig-pa* I, Vol. 130, No.5700.

PV. = *The Pramāṇa-vārttikam of Ācārya Dharmakīrti with Sub-commentaries: Svôpajña-vṛtti of the Author and Pramāṇa-vārttika-vṛtti of Manorathanandin*. Ed. by Prof. Dr. Ram Chandra Pandeya, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1989.

PVin.I(1) = *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniściayaḥ, 1. Kapitel: pratyakṣaṁ*. Hrsg. und übers. von T. Vetter. *Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Süd- und Ostasiens* Heft 3, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien 1966.

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